ML17250A715

Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment, Revision 3

ML17250A715
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/31/1980
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
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ML17250A714	List: ML17250A713 ML17250A715
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TASK-03-12, TASK-3-12, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8011040240
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EnvironmentalQualificationofElectricalEquipmentR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244February24,1978Rev.1,December1,1978Rev.>2,April25,1980Rev.3,October31,1980-luanCETHEATTACHEDFILESAREOFFICIALRECORDSOFTHEDIVISIONOFDOCUMENTCONTROL.THEYHAVEBEENCHARGEDTOYOUFORALlhhlTEDTIMEPERIODANDMUSTBERETURNEDTOTHERECORDSFACILITYBRANCH016.PLEASEDONOTSEND-DOCUMENTSCHARGEDOUTTHROUGHTHEMAIL.REMOVALOFANY"PAGEIS)FROMDOCUMENTFORREPRODUCTION,MUSTBEREFERREDTOFILEPERSONNEL.Docket@gO~tIO)gSoiIOqca.SVDEADLINERETURNDATEgEGlHATORVOOgKETF{KBo1.>040'/B'P~H>>@RFY"'"~'A,RBCCIIDBFACILITYBRANCHI PrI,,i7g/p11i/ji'N IntroductionTABLEOFCONTENTSPacaeIdentificationofNecessarySafetyRelatedEquipment3A.B.C.EventsAccompanyingaLossofCoolantAccident3EventsAccompanyingaMainSteamLineBreakor11aMainFeedLineBreakHighEnergyLineBreaksOutsideContainment16IdentificationoftheLimitingServiceEnvironmental19ConditionsforEquipmentwhichisRequiredtoFunctiontoMitigatetheConsequencesofEventsIdentifiedAboveA.B.C~D.E.F.G.H.I.InsideContainmentAuxiliaryBuildingIntermediateBuildingCableTunnelControlBuildingDieselGeneratorRoomsTurbineBuildingAuxiliaryBuildingAnnexScreenHouse192225272730303232EquipmentQualificationInformation34 1III LISTOFFIGURESFigure1LossofCoolantAccidentfSequenceofEventsDiagram]Figure2MainSteamorFeedLineBreak(SequenceofEventsDiagram]Figure3-PlantLayoutFigure4PressureEnvelopeforGinna(FSARFigure1ofAppendix6E)Figure5TemperatureEnvelopeforGinna(FSARFigure2ofAppendix6E)Figure6RadiationLevelforGinna(FSARFigure5ofAppendix6E)

LISTOFTABLESTable1LossofCoolantAccident[RequiredEquipmentList]Table2MainSteamorFeedLineBreak[RequiredEquipmentList]Table3EquipmentQualificationTable4EnvironmentalServiceConditions

EnvironmentalQualificationofSafety-RelatedElectricalEquipmentINTRODUCTIONTheelectricalequipmentdescribedinthisreportisthatsafety-relatedequipmentrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofhighormoderateenergylinebreaks(HELB)insideoroutsidecontainment,andtoeffecteventualcoldshutdownofthereactor.Theenvironmentalqualificationrequirementsaredescribedinthe"DORGuidelines",transmittedtoRG6EonFebruary15,1980.AlthoughtheDORGuidelinesaddressallelectricalequipment,theemphasisinthisreportwillbeonthatequipmentexposedtoanadverseHELBenvironment.Thisisdefinedasthatequipmentlocatedinthecontainment,IntermediateBuilding,TurbineBuilding,andAuxiliaryBuildingbasement(radiationonly).ThisrevisedscopeisconsistentwiththeCommissionOrderofSeptember19,1980.Equipmentinother"mild"environmentswillbeaddressedatalatertime.Thissubmittalrevisesandsupersedesourpreviousreportsconcerningenvironmentalqualificationofelectricalequipment,datedFebruary24,1978,December1,1978,andApril25,1980.ItalsoconsolidatesandupdatesallinformationsubmittedonJune10,1980andSeptember24,1980.SectionIVofthisreportpresentsanitem-by-itemresponsetotheDraftInterimTechnicalEvaluationReportFRCProjectC5257,concerningthereviewoftheGinnaelectricalequipment P

environmentalqualification,datedAugust20,1980.Newreferencesareincludedwiththisreport.However,referencespreviouslysubmittedarenotbeingresubmitted.1nSectionIV,itiseithershownthateachitemisadequatelyqualifiedtoperformitsrequiredsafetyfunctioninitspost-accidentoperatingenvironment,oracommitmentforadditionaltestingorreplacementismade.Inallcases,sufficientjustificationforcontinuedoperationisgiven.Table3summarizestheequipmentqualificationintheformatrequestedforSEPbytheNRCinaSeptember6,1978letter.Table4providesthedefinitionofenvironmentalparametersthroughouttheGinnaplant.ThistableiscomparabletoAppendixAofF-C5257,andtabulatestheexplanatorybasisgiveninSectionIIIofthisreport.SupplementNo.3toIEBulletin79-01Bprovidesthetimingforsubmittalofqualificationinformationforequipmentin-stalledtomeettheTMIShortTermLessonsLearned.RGSEintendstofollowtheguidancegiveninthissupplement.Inanumberofcases,itispossiblethatadditionaldocumentationortestingresultsmaybecomeavailableafterNovember1,1980.SincethisadditionalinformationwillbeofuseindocumentingthestatusoftheGinnaenvironmentalqualification,itwillbesubmittedwhenreceived.Everyefforthasbeenmadetoensurethatalldocumentationwasobtainedforusewiththissubmittal.

l II.IDENTIFICATIONOFNECESSARYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTThissectionofthereportidentifiesthenecessarysafetyrelatedequipmentforeachoftheDesignBasisEvents(DBE)ofconcernandabriefdescriptionofwhytheequipmentisneeded.Thisidentificationincludesallelectricalequip-mentrequiredbytheGinnaemergencyproceduresforaccomplish-ingthenecessarysafetyfunctions.Itmustberecognizedthatnotallelectricalequipmentreferencedintheproceduresisrequiredtofunction(asopposedtobeingusefulifavailable),andisthereforenotrequiredtobequalified.Theemergencyoperatingprocedureswerenotdevelopedbyconsideringsafety-relatedcomponentstotheexclusionofallothers.Whilesuchproceduresarewrittenwithpriorityattentiongiventosafety-relatedequipment,othersystemsandcomponentsarejustifiablymentioned.Arealisticevaluationofplantincidentsmightresultinsituationsandhostileenvironmentssignificantlylessseverethanthoseassumedforthepurposesofconductingtheenvironmentalqualificationprogram.Theabsenceoffullqualificationforcertaincomponentswhichfallintothiscategoryisnot,byitself,asufficientmotivetoclassifytheequipmentinoperable.ortoremovethesecomponentsfromtheprocedures.A.EventsAccomaninaLossOfCoolantAccidentAnalysesofthecourseandconsequencesoflossofcoolantaccidentshavebeensubmittedpreviously(LOCA1-4).Adiscussionofequipmentrequiredtofunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofalossofcoolant accidentispresentedintheFSARChapters6,7and14.Post-LOCAoperatoractionsareincludedintheGinnaEmergencyProcedures.TheseproceduresareconsistentwiththegenericWestinghouseguidelines,whichhavebeenapprovedbytheNRC.Additionaldescriptivematerialispresentedinthisreporttoprovidesummaryinformationastothesequenceofeventsandtheequipmentinvolvedateachstage.Figure1illustratesthesequenceofeventsfollowingalossofcoolantaccident.Table1providesaspecificequipmentlistforeachnumberedblockinFigure1.AlsoprovidedinTable1isthesafetyfunctionwhichisrequiredandtheperiodoftimethatoperabilitymustbeensured.ItshouldbenotedthatTable1includesallredundantequipment,nottheminimumsafeguardsequipmentassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Inthe"required"columnitshouldbenotedthatequipmentlistedas"signalinitiation"isrequiredtobeoperableonlyuntilitsrequiredsafetyfunction,theinitiationofasafetysignal,isperformed.ItisimportanttonotethatthearbitraryrequirementoftheDORGuidelinestoqualifyequipmenttofunctionforatleastonehour,evenifitsonlyfunctioniscompletedwithinseconds,isnotwellreasoned.Inmanycases,theenvironmentwouldnotexistunlesstheequipmentsafetyfunctionhadbeencompleted(e.g.,floodingtoasevenfootlevelincontainmentbynecessitymeansthatSIwasinitiated).RGSEdoesnotagreewith thisone-hourrequirement,anditisthereforenotappliedasanenvironmentalqualificationrequirement.Equipmentlistedas"longterm"isrequiredtoprovidelongtermdecayheatremoval,post-accidentmonitoringandsampling,ormaintainingasafeshutdowncondition.Equipmentlistedas"shortterm"isrequiredonlyforashortperiodoftime(hours).Table3providestheenvironmentalqualificationrequire-mentsanddocumentationreferencesfortheGinnaClassIEequipment.1.Thefirsteventinthelossofcoolantaccidentfollowingtheruptureisthedetectionoftherupture.Any2/3lowpressurizerpressureor2/3highcontain-mentpressurewillinitiate"safetyinjection"(SI).la.InstrumentationisavailabletotheoperatortodistinguishbetweenaLOCAandtheotheraccidents,suchasasteamlinebreakorfeedlinebreak.Itisimportanttonotethattheautomaticactionsandimmediateoperatoractions(first10minutes)areidenticalinthemitigationoftheseaccidents.2.Upon"safetyinjection"signalgeneration,safe-guardssequencingisinitiated(seeFSARTable8.2-4).Thedieselgeneratorsstartandenergizethesafeguardsbusesassumingthereisalossofoffsitepower.Withthesafeguardsbusesenergized,eitherbyoff-sitepowerorthediesels,thethreesafetyinjectionpumps,

thetworesidualheatremovalpumps,"twoofthefourservicewaterpumps,thetwomotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps,andthefourcontainment.fancoolers-will"beloadedsequentiallyontothebuses.Thetwocontainmentspraypumpsareautomaticallyloadedontothebuseswhenthe30psigcontainmentpressuresetpoint'sreached.3.Abreakinthereactorcoolantsystempipingactuatesthepassiveaccumulatorinjectionsystemwhenthereactorcoolantsystempressureisreducedto700pslgTheflowpathoftheboratedwaterfromeachaccumulator-isthroughaseriesofcheckvalvesandanormallylockedopen(withACcontrolpowerremoved)motoroperatedvalve.Themotoroperatedvalves,MOV841andNOV865,arenotrequiredtofunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesoftheaccident[Flood-1].4.Themainsteamisolationvalves3516and3517closeuponreceivingahighcontainmentpressuresignalandthemainandbypassfeedwatercontrolvalves4269,4270,4271and4272closeuponreceivingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheSIsignalalsocausesatripofthemainfeedwaterpumps(whichinturncausestheclosingofthefeedwaterdischargevalves).Allofthisequipmentwillfailinitssafetypositiononlossofelectricalpower.

5."ContainmentIsolation"and"ContainmentVentilationIsolation"(referredtocollectivelyassimply,"ContainmentIsolation")isinitiatedbythesafetyinjectionsignal.ContainmentisolationisdiscussedindetailinSection5.2oftheFSAR.Mostofthecontainmentisolationvalvesareairoperatedvalves.Allairoperatedcontainmentisolationvalvesclosewithsafetyinjectionsignalwiththeexceptionofvalves4561and4562whichopenfulltoinsureservicewatersupplytothecontainmentrecirculationfans.Thefailsafepositionofthevalvesisthedesiredsafeguardpositionasdescribedabove.Sixmotoroperatedvalves(313,813,814,ATV-1,ATV-2,ATV-3)receiveacontainmentisolationsignal.Allofthesevalvesarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentandonlyvalves313,813,and814arefedfromthesafeguardsbuses.DuringnormaloperationATV-1,ATV-2,andATV-3areclosedwithblankflangesinstalledontheirrespectivepenetrationsinsidecontainment.Theuseoftheprocesslinesassociatedwiththesevalvesoccursonlyduringthecontainmentbuildingintegratedleakratetests.Valve313,thereactorcoolantpumpssealwaterreturnline,andvalves813and814,reactorcoolantsupportinletandoutletlines,areclosedbythecontainmentisolationsignal.

~6.TheSIsignaltripsthereactorandturbine.OtherreactortripsarediscussedintheFSAR,Section7.7.Thereactorcoolantpumpsaretrippedbymanualoperatoractionwhenlowpressurizerpressure(1715.psig)isreached,andSIflowisinitiated.8.SelectedvalvesthroughouttheplantprovideflowpathsfortherequiredsafeguardsequipmentwiththeadventoftheSIsignal.Duringnormaloperationallrequiredvalvesintheflowpathsforhighheadsafetyinjection'arenormallyopenwiththeexceptionofvalves826Aand826C,thedis-chargevalvesfromtheboricacidstoragetanktothesuctionofthesafetyinjectionpumps.Valves826A;B,CandDreceivethesafetyinjectionsignalandvalves826AandCopenprovidingboratedwatertothereactorcoolantloopcoldlegs.Whenthelevelintheboricacidstoragetankdecreasestothe10%level,suctionforthehighheadsafetyin-jectionpumpsisautomaticallyswitchedfromtheboricacidstoragetankstotherefuelingwaterstoragetankbytheautomaticopeningof,valves825AandBandclosingofvalves826A,B,CandD.Duringnormaloperation,allvalvesintheflowpathsforlowheadsafetyinjectionarenormallyopenexcept forMOV852AandMOV852B,thevalvesinthevesselupperplenuminjectionlines.Thesevalve'sopenuponreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignalandremainopen-thereafter.Thecontainmentspraypumpswillautomaticallystartandthedischargevalves860ABgCandDautomaticallyopen,receivingpowerfromthesafeguardsbuseswhencontainmentpressurereaches30psig.Ifcontainmentpressuredoesnotreach30psig,theoperatormaymanuallystartthespraypumpsafterallothersafeguardsareloadedonthesafeguardsbuses.AutomaticNaOHadditionviaopeningofvalvesHCV836A,Btakesplacetwominutesaftercontainmentspraypumpstartunlessdefeatedmanually.Thecontainmentspraypumpsarenormallyalignedtotherefuelingwaterstoragetankwithallsuctionvalves.open.SIsystemactuationwillautomaticallyalignthetwopostaccidentcharcoalfilterstothecontainmentrecirculationsystembyopeninginletdampers5871and5872,andoutletdampers5873and5874.Loopentrydampers5875and5876willclose.Thesedamperswillfailtotheirsafeguardspositionuponlossofelectricpower.9.Thecontrolroomventilationisautomaticallyplacedinthe100%recirculationmode(withabout25%flowthroughcharcoalfilters),whenSIisinitiated.

10.Afterthesafetyinjectionpumpsareautomaticallyswitchedfromtheboricacidstoragetankstothere-fuelingwaterstoragetanks,theoperatorresetssafetyinjection,startsthecomponentcoolingwaterpumpsandalignsflowtotheRHRheatexchangers,andinitiatesSWflowtothe'CWheatexchangers.Atthe31%RWSTalarm,theoperatorshutsoffoneCSandoneSIpump(ifmorethanonearerunning).Whentherefuelingwaterstoragetanklevelisreducedto10%,theplantoperatorstopstheremainingresidualheatremoval,containmentsprayandhighheadsafetyinjectionpumpsandestablishesflowpathstothereactorvesselforbothhigh(ifrequired)andlowheadsafetyinjectionfromcontainmentsumpB.Thenormal(non-safetygrade)auxiliaryfeedwatersupplysourceisfromthecondensatestoragetanks.Ifthissupplyisexhaustedtheoperatoropensthemotoroperatedvalves4027and4028andmanualoperatedvalves4344and4345toprovideservicewatertothesuctionoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps.IftheAFWsystemisnotfunctioningproperly,theoperatorcanalignfromthecontrolroomtheStandbyAFWsystemtothesteamgenerators(using'ervicewatersuction).11.Intherecirculationphase,theoperatoralignstheRHRpumpstocontainmentsumpBbyopeningvalve850AforpumpAandvalve850BforpumpB,andclosing10

valve704A,704B,856,and896Aor896B.Forlowheadrecirculation,injectionisthroughthevesselnozzles.,Forhighheadrecirculation,theRHRpumpsdischargetothesafetyinjectionpumpsthroughalignmentofvalve857A(forRHRpumpB)and/orvalves857Band857C(forRHRpumpA).ValvesAOV897,898areclosed.Thehighheadsafetyinjectionpumpsthenprovidewatertothecoldleginjectionpoints.ThisalignmentalsoallowsCSpumpoperation,ifdesired.LongtermrecirculationtocompensateforthepossibleeffectsofboronprecipitationhasbeendescribedinRef[Flood-1]andincludestheuseofRHRpumpedflowtothevesselnozzlesandthroughahighheadsafetyinjectionpumpintoeithercoldleg.Post-accidentreactorcoolantandcontainmentatmospheresamplingmodificationsarepresentlybeingundertaken,inaccordancewiththeimplementationschedulefortheTMXLessonsLearnedcommitments.See[RefTMI-3].EventsAccomaninaMainSteamLineBreakoraMainFeedLineBreakTheanalysesofamainsteamlinebreakoramainfeedlinebreakandtheconsequencesthereofhavebeendiscussedinChapters6and'14oftheFSARandinReferences[SLB/FLB2-4].TheHighEnergyLineBreakanalyses[HELB1-7]provideadditionalinformationregardingsteamlinebreaksoutsideofcontainment,as11

wellasfeedwaterlinebreaksinsideandoutsidecontainment.Figure2illustratesthesequenceofeventsrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofamainsteamlinebreak.Thesameinitialsequenceofeventswouldoccurforafeedwaterlinebreak.Sincethesameequipmentisre-quiredtooperateandthesameemergencyprocedureisusedfollowingafeedlinebreakasasteamlinebreak,butasteamlinebreakisamoresevereaccidentin4termsofRCScooldown(returntocriticality)andmassandenergyreleasetocontainment,thesubsequentdiscussionwilladdressthemainsteamlinebreakonly.Table2liststherequiredequipmentforeachnumberedblockinFigure2.1.Alargemainsteamlinebreak(greaterthanapproxi-matelyonesquarefoot)wouldfirstbedetectedbythelowsteamlinepressuresensors.Lowsteamlinepres-suresensedbytwooutofthethreesteamlinepressuretransmittersinitiatessafetyinjectionaccompaniedbyreactorandturbinetrip.la.Diagnosticinstrumentationisavailabletotheoperatortodistinguishamongaccidents,asdescribedintheLOCAdiscussion.2.Twooutofthreelowpressurizerpressuresignalswouldprovideadditionalprotectionforalargersteamlinebreakandalsoprovidestheinitialsafetyinjec-12

tionsignalforsmallerbreaks.Also,high.containmentpressure(6psig)willinitiatesafetyinjection.3.TheGinnadesignincludesnon-returncheckvalvesineachsteamlinejustupstreamofthemainsteamheaderintheintermediatebuilding.Thusforanybreakupstreamofthecheckvalves,whichincludesallbreaksinsidecontainment,thecheckvalveswillprecludeblowdownoftheintactgenerator.Reactortripwillresultinclosingtheturbinestopvalves.Asredundantprotectionintheeventofasteamlinebreakupstreamofthecheckvalves,andforallbreaksdownstreamofthecheckvalves,themainsteamlineisolationvalvesareclosedbyseveralsignals.Thesesignalsinclude2/3highcontainmentpressure(20psig);1/2highsteamflowineithersteamlineplus2/4lowTaveplussafetyinjection;and1/2high-highsteamflowineithersteamlineplussafetyinjection.4.Thesafetyinjecti~onsignalclosesthemainandbypassfeedwatercontrolvalves,tripsthefeedwaterpumpsandclosestheirrespectivedischargevalves.5.Thesafetyinjectionsignalinitiatescontainmentisolationandcontainmentventilationisolationasdescribedinthesequenceofeventsinthelossofcoolantaccident.

6.Thesafeguardssequenceasdescribedinthelossofcoolantaccidentisinitiatedbythesafetyinjectionsignal.(Forsteambreaksoutsidecontainment,thespraypumpsarenotrequired.)7.Thesafetyinjectionsignaltripsthereactorandturbine.OtherreactortripsarediscussedintheFSAR,Section7.8.Thereactorcoolantpumps'aretrippedbymanualoperatoractionwhenlowpressurizerpressure(1715psig)isreached,andSIflowisinitiated.9.Allvalvesassociatedwiththesafetyinjectionsystemsarealignedandautomaticallyfunctionasde-scribedinthelossofcoolantaccidentdiscussion.Ifhighcontainmentpressureof30psigisreached,thecontainmentspraysystemoperatesasdescribedintheLOCAdiscussion.10.Whentheboricacidstoragetanksaredrainedtothe10%levelandsafetyinjectionpumpsuctionhasautomaticallybeenalignedtotherefuelingwaterstoragetank,theoperatorwillresetsafetyinjectionandifreactorcoolantpressureisabovetheshut-offheadoftheRHRpumps,willstoptheRHRpumpsandplacetheminthestandbymode.Ahighsteamlineflowand/orlowsteamlinepressurewillindicatetotheoperatorwhichsteamgeneratorhasthesteamlinebreak.Whenthishasbeendetermined,14 theoperatorwillterminateAFWflowtothefaultedsteamgenerator,andalign/maintainflowtotheintactsteamgenerator.TheinventoryofthereactorcoolantwillbemaintainedbytheremotemanualoperationofthehighheadsafetyinjectionpumpsincombinationwithuseofthechargingpUmps~Atleasttwohoursafterthestartoftheaccident,supplywaterfortheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpscanbemanuallytransferredfromthecondensatestoragetankstotheservicewatersystem,bythemethoddescribedintheLOCAdiscussion[SeeRef.SLB/FLB-6].Iftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemisnotoperatingproperly,theoperatorcaninitiateoperationfromthecontrolroomoftheStandbyAFWsystem(usingservicewatersuction).11.Ifconditionsandequipmentavailabilitypermit,theoperatorcanbeginagradualcooldownanddepressuri-zationtocoldshutdownconditions.However,theprimarysafetyfunctionistomaintaintheRCSinasafeconditionatalltimes,removingdecayheatataratecomparabletothegenerationrate.Maintenanceofthissafeshutdownconditionisaccomplishedbyacombinationofsteamdump(tothecondenseroratmosphere)withprimaryandsecondaryinventorymakeup,accomplishedbyuseofthesafetyinjectionand/orthecharging15

Ipumps,andtheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.ItisexpectedthatRCStemperaturecanbeloweredtonear212'Fbyusingthesteamgenerators.Thesafeshutdownconditionscanbemaintaineduntilafinalcooldownanddepressurizationtoambientconditionscanbeeffected.C.HihEnerLineBreaksOutsideContainmentAnanalysishasbeenprovideddescribingtheeffectsofpipebreaksoutsidecontainment[HELB-1].Thereportproposedaprogramofaugmentedinserviceinspectionofcertainpipingweldsinordertoprecludethenecessitytoaddressfurtherfulldiameterhighenergypipingbreaks.Crediblebreaksofmainsteamlinesoutsidecontainment,thatis,thosenotincludedintheinspec-tionprogram,areboundedbya6inchmainsteamlinebranchconnectionintheIntermediateBuildinganda12inchmainsteamlinebranchconnectionintheTurbineBuilding.Crediblebreaksinthefeedwaterlinesoutsidecontainmentareboundedbyabreakinthe20inchfeedwaterlineintheTurbineBuilding.Theaccidentenvironmentcreatedbythesebreaks,andotherpostulatedbreaksareprovidedinReferences[HELB8-11].TheprogramhasbeenacceptedbytheNRC[Ref.HELB7,8].SeveralmodificationshavebeenperformedattheGinnaNuclearPlantasaresultofhighenergylinebreakanalyses.Reference[HELB-1]discussesthevariousmodifications,butofparticularnoteistheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwatersystemmodification.A-16

remote-manualcontrolledstandbyauxiliaryfeedwatersystem,identicaltotheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemincoolingcapability,hasbeeninstalled.Thepumpsarehousedinaseismicallydesignedstructure(area6Figure3)remotefromtheauxiliaryfeedwaterandanyhighenergylines.Anyportionofthissystemrequiredtooperateinanemergencyisnotsubjectedtoanadverseenvironment.Ref[HELB-8]includestheNRC'sSafetyEvaluationReportconcerningtheRGGEmodificationsresultantfromthereviewofRef.[HELB-1].Itincludesadiscussionoftheacceptabilityoftheinstrumentationrelocationandcablere-routingperformedtoinsurethatsufficientequipmentwillbeprotectedfromtheenvironmentaleffectsofaHELBoutsidecontainment.ThefailureofsteamheatinglinesintheAuxiliaryBuildingwasidentifiedanddiscussedinRef.[HELB-1].Ithasbeendeterminedthatsteamheatinglinesalsotraverseotherareasinthevicinityofsafetyrelatedequipment[Ref.HELB-15].Modificationsareplannedwhichwillisolatethesteamheatinglinetotheaffectedareasintheeventofafailureandthereforeprecludeanadverseenvironment.Thecommitmenttoperformanalyses/modificationsforthosepipebreaksoutsidecontainmentaregiveninReference[HELB-13].Priortoitsinstallation,regularinspectionsarebeingperformedtoreducethelikelihoodofafailurecreatinganadverseenvironment.Theseinspections,performed-17

duringeachplantoperatingshift,woulddetectanyleakage.Plantprocedures(T-35F,"SteamtoAuxiliaryBuilding,ScreenHouse,orDieselGeneratorsandOil-Room")callforisolationoftheaffectedpipingpromptlyupondetectionoftheleakage.18 III.IDENTIFICATIONOFTHELIMITINGSERVICEENVIRONMENTALCONDI-TIONSFOREQUIPMENTWHICHISREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONTOMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCESOFDESIGNBASISEVENTSThisSectionofthereportdefinesthebasesforandreferencestotheenvironmentalconditionsencounteredthroughouttheplant.AtabularsummaryisprovidedinTable4.A.InsideContainmentPostaccidentcontainmentenvironmentalconditionsarediscussedinAppendix6EoftheGinnaFSAR.Theseconditionsresultfromalossofcoolantaccident.ThetemperatureandpressureprofilesaregiveninFigures1and2ofAppendix6Ewithpeakvaluesbeing286'Fand60psigrespectively.TheradiationprofileispresentedinFigures4and5ofAppendix6Eanditisseen,forexample,thatthedosesat30minutesandoneyearfollowingaLOCAare1.7x10and1.6x10rads,68respectively.(ThesefiguresarerepeatedasFigures4,5,and6ofthisreport.)Materialscompatibilitywithpost-accidentchemicalenvironmentisdiscussedindetailinAppendix6E.100$humidityisassumed.Designparameters'forenvironmentalconditionshavebeenconservativelyselectedforGinna.AsseeninFSARFigure14.3.4-2,thecalculatedpeakpressureislessthan53psigwhilethedesignvalueis60psig.Thedurationofthepeak,similarly,boundsthecal-culatedvalues.19 I

Anotherexampleoftheconservatismemployedisseenintheaccidentradiationenvironmentusedfordesignpurposes.AsnotedinWCAP7744,areleaseof100%ofthenoblegases,50%ofthehalogens,and1%,ofallremainingfissionproductsisassumed.Inaddition,nocreditistakenforremovalofradioactivityfromthecontainmentatmospherebysprays,filtersandfissionproductplateout.Finally,thespecificactivityincontainmentwasroughlydoubledbyassumingacontain-mentfreevolumeassociatedwithanicecondensercon-tainment.Thustheradiationenvironmentclearlyover-statesthatwhichwouldbepresenteveninaminimumsafeguardscase.ThisconservationisapparentfromacomparisontotheDORGuidelines,whichsuggestapost-LOCAintegrateddoseof2x10radsgamma.7Submergenceofvalvesinsidecontainment.haspreviouslybeendiscussedinReference[Flood-4]andithasbeenshownthatoperationfollowingsubmergenceisnotrequired.SubmergenceofinstrumentationhasbeendiscussedinRef[Flood-5].Sincetheinstrumentationisnotrequiredtofunctionwhileflooded,noqualificationforsubmergenceisspecified(seee.g.,SectionIV.19ofthisreport).ThepeakpressurefollowingaMSLBisgiveninSection14.2.5oftheFSARas52psig,assumingnocreditforcontainmentpressurereducingequipment.Recentanalyses20 forotherfacilitiesindicatethatthecontainmentvaportemperaturefollowingaMSLBincontaimentmaybrieflyexceedthosederivedforaLOCA.Thesehighertemperaturesshouldnotbelimiting,however,forqualificationofequipmentrequiredfollowingaMSLB,because:1)thefactthatthehightemperaturetransient.isverybriefandthereissuperheatedsteam(withitslowerheattransfercapability)asopposedtosaturatedsteam,2)theequipmentisprotectedfromthedirecteffectsofthesteamlinebreakbyconcretefloorsandshields,and3)thesensitiveportionsoftheelectricalequipmentarenotdirectlyexposedtotheenvironment,butareprotectedbyhousing,cablejackets,andthelike.Forthesereasons,thehumidityandsteamenvironmentfollowingaLOCAremainslimiting.ThisisconsistentwiththeNRC'sposition4.2ofthe"GuidelinesforEvaluatingEnvironmentalQualificationofClassIEElectricalEquipmentinOperatingReactors;"RadiationlevelsincontainmentfollowingaMSLBarenotlimitingsincefuelfailuresarenotprojectedtoresultfromaMSLB.ChemicalenvironmentandsubmergenceareboundedbytheLOCAconditions.21

B.AuxiliarBuildinTheauxiliarybuildinghasaHVACsystemwhichprovidesclean,filteredandtemperedairtotheoperatingflooroftheauxiliarybuilding,andtothesurfaceofthedecontaminationandspentfuelstoragepits.Thesystemexhaustsairfromtheequipmentroomsandopenareasoftheauxiliarybuilding,andfromthedecon-taminationandspentfuelstoragepits,throughaclosedexhaustsystem.Theexhaustsystemincludesa100percentcapacitybankofhighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters,andredundant100percentcapacityfansdischargingtothea'tmosphereviatheplantvent.Thisarrangementinsurestheproperdirectionofairflowforremovalofairborneradioactivityfromtheauxiliarybuilding.Includedintheauxiliarybuildingexhaustsystemisaseparatecharcoalfiltercircuit,whichexhaustsfromroomswherefissionproductactivitymayaccumulate,duringnormalplantoperation,inconcentrationsexceedingtheaveragelevelsexpectedintherestofthebuild-ing.Followingaloss-of-coolantaccident,thiscircuitiscapableofprovidingexhaustventilationfromtheareascontainingpumpsandrelatedpipingandvalvingwhichareusedtorecirculatecontainmentsumpliquid.Afullflowcharcoalfilterbankisprovidedinthecircuit,alongwithtwo50percentcapacityexhaust22 Vg fans.Theairoperatedsuctionanddischargedampersassociatedwitheachfanareinterlockedwiththefansuchthattheyarefullyopenwhenthefanisoperatingandfullyclosedwhenthefanisstopped.Thesedampersfailtotheopenpositiononlossofcontrolsignalorcontrolair.Thefansdischargetothemainauxiliarybuildingexhaustsystem,containingtheHEPAfilterbank.Toassureapathforthecharcoal(andHEPA)filteredexhausttotheplantventif,themainexhaustfansarenotoperating,afailopendamperisinstalledinabypasscircuitaroundthetwomainexhaustfans.Theresidualheatremoval,safetyinjection,containmentsprayandchargingpumpmotorsareprovidedwithaddi-tionalcoolingprovisionstomaintainambienttemperatureswithinacceptablelimitswhen'thepumpsareoperating.ThechargingpumpsandRHRpumpsarelocatedintheirownrooms,eachroombeingprovidedwithtwocoolingunitsconsistingofredundantfans,water-cooledheatexchangers,andductworkforcirculatingthecooledair.Thecapacityofeachunitissufficienttomaintainacceptableroomambienttemperatureswiththeminimumnumberofpumpsrequiredforsystemoperationinservice.Thesafetyinjectionandcontainmentspraypumpsare0providedwithcoolingunitsprovidingcoolairdirectlytothemotor.Thereisaseparatefanforeachofthemotors.23

Intheeventofalossofoffsitepower,theauxiliarybuildingventilationsystemmainsupplyandexhaustfanswouldbeinoperable.However,allotherfansintheauxiliarybuildingventilationsystemaresuppliedbyemergencydieselpowerincludingthecharcoalfiltercircuitandthepumpcoolingcircuitsforsafetyrelatedpumpmotors,asdescribedabove.Sincetheauxiliarybuildingisaverylargevolumebuilding,itisnot'\expectedthattherewouldbeapost-accidenttempera-tureincreaseexceptinsomelocalareasnearhotpipingandlargemotors.Thissituationexistsonlyinthebasementoftheauxiliarybuildingwherethesafety-relatedpumpsandrecirculatedsumpfluidpipingarelocated.AsshowninReference[HELB-14]theventila-tionsystemfortheseareasisexpectedtobeadequatetomaintainthepost-accidenttemperaturewithnormal"ambient"levels.Furtherdetailedevaluationoftheenvironmentintheseareasisbeingaddressedwiththefinalresolutionofthe"mild"environmentqualificationrequirements.TheradiationlevelsintheauxiliarybuildingwillincreaseintheeventofaLOCA.Usingveryconservativepost-accidentfissionproductactivitylevels,thepost-accidentenvironmentintheauxiliarybuildingwascalculatedinAppendixAtoReference[TMI-3].ItisapparentfromTable5-1ofthisreferencethattheonlymajorradiationfieldintermsofequipmentqualification24

willbeinthevicinityoftherecirculatedfluid.TherequiredqualificationdosesareaddressedforalltheaffectedequipmentinTable3.TheRGEEcommitmentsto-ensurethataHELBintheauxiliarybuildingwillnotaffectthecapabilityofeffectingandmaintainingasafeshutdownconditionisprovidedinReference[HELB-13].FloodingisnotaconcernintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Evenintheeventofleakage,two50gpmsumppumpsareprovidedinthelowpointofthe*building.ThisisdescribedinSection9.3oftheFSAR,andhasbeenevaluatedbytheNRCinReference[HELB-15].IntermediateBuildinImplementationofanaugmentedinserviceinspectionprogramforhighenergypipingoutsidecontainmenthasreducedtheprobabilityofpipebreaksinthesesystemstoacceptablylowlevels[Ref.HELB-7,8].AsixinchmainsteamlinebranchconnectionistheintermediatebuildingDBE.Basedonthefailurecapacityofportionsoftheexteriorwalls,thelimitingpressureisestablishedinRef.[HELB-1]asbeingapressureof0.80psig.Assumingsaturationconditions,oneobtainsalimitingI'Itemperatureofapproximately215'F.A100%humiditysteam-airmixtureisassumed.Ifthepipecrackorbranchlinebreakwereinaportionofthesteamor~~feedlinethatcouldbeisolated,theisolationwouldimmediatelyhaltthemassandenergyadditiontotheintermediatebuilding.Apipecrackorbranchline25 whichcouldnotbeisolatedisthelimitingDBEforintermediatebuildingenvironment.Massandenergyreleaseinthiscasewouldbelimitedbythedryoutofthesteamgeneratorswiththedurationoftheenvironmentdependentonthesizeoftheleakorbreak.Basedonflowthroughamainsteamsafetyvalve(a6inchline)of247lbs/secatasteamlinepressureof1100psiaandtheinventoryavailableforreleasefromamainsteambreakof165,500lbs(FSARSection14.2.5),themassandenergyflowwillcontinueforatleast11minutes.Smallerleaksmaycontinuesubstantiallylonger.Ztisexpectedthatwithin30minutestoanhour,actioncouldbetakentoprovideaddedventilationtothebuildingbyopeningdoors.Withinseveralhours,returntonearambientcouldbeaccomplished.Table4providesanestimateofthedurationoftheenvironmentaltransientexpected.Theexactdurationisnotcriticalintermsofaffectedequipmentqualification;therefore,noexplicitcalculationshavebeenperformed.Chemicalsprayisnotadesignconsider-ationinthisbuilding.Theeffectsofsubmergenceneednotbeconsidered,asdescribedinReferences[HELB-1],[HELB-4],and[FLOOD-11'].Thislatterreferencepresentstheresultofananalysisperformedtoensurethatsafety-relatedequipmentwouldnotbefloodedintheeventofanfeedlinebreakintheintermediatebuilding.26 TheradiationenvironmentwasreviewedinresponsetotheTMILessonsLearnedcommitments[seeRef.TMI-3].ItcanbeseenfromTable5-1thattheradiationenviron-mentisnotsignificantintermsofequipmentqualification.CableTunnelSincethecabletunnelisopentotheIntermediateBuilding,thelimitingenvironmentalconditionsforthecabletunnelareidenticaltotheIntermediateBuildingconditions.ControlBuildinThelimitingenvironmentoftheControlBuildingwhichincludesthecontrolroom,relayroom,andbatteryrooms,isnormalambientconditions.ProtectionagainsthighenergylinebreaksandcirculatingwaterlinebreakswhichcouldoccuroutsidetheControlBuildingandaffecttheControlBuildingenvironmentareidentifiedanddiscussedinReferences[HELB-1,HELB-6,HELB-7,HELB-13,HELB-15,FLOOD-1,andFLOOD-5].TheairconditioningsystemforthecontrolroomisdescribedinSection9.9oftheFSAR.ThemainairhandlingunitandcirculationfansforthecontrolroomarepoweredfromasingleClassIEmotorcontrolcenter(MCC-1K),whichreceivespowerfromadiesel-backedemergencybus(diesel1A).Iftherewereafailureofthistrainduringthepostaccidentperiod,itwouldbepossibletocrosstietothe1Bdiesel.Theoperator,afterassuringthatanyfaultsarecleared,wouldclose27

thebustiebetweenbuses14and16'toenergizethein-operable-ControlRoomairhandlingunitfromthe1Bdiesel,whilemakingsurethattheoperationaldiesel-doesnotbecomeoverloaded.Thisemergencybuscross-tiesprocedurehaspreviouslybeenincludedintheGinnaEmergencyProcedures.ThecontrolroomHVACsystemhasbeenoutofserviceseveraltimesinthelast11yearsformaintenance.Asatisfactoryenvironmenthasbeenmaintainedbyopeningthetwocontrolroomdoorsandtworelayroomdoors,connectingthetworoomstogetherandwithoutsideair,toprovidenaturalcirculation.EquipmentfailurehasneverbeenexperiencedduringtheseeventsbecauseofatemperatureincreaseduetolackofHVAC.Itisalsopossible,ofcourse,toprovidefortheuseofportableair-conditioningunitsorfanstomaintainenvironmentalconditionswithinproperspecifications.Furtherevaluationofthelong-termeffectsofthelossofventilationwillbemadeatalatertime,whensafety-relatedequipmentnotexposedtoa"harsh"accidentenvironmentisaddressedintermsofenvironmentalqualification.Therelayroomisnormallycooledbytwonon-safety-relatedairconditioningsystems,whichcanbemanuallyalignedtotheemergencybusesbyclosingtheproperbus-tiebreakers.28

Naturalcirculationwiththecontrolroom,andtheuseofportableair-conditioningunitsandfans,areoptionsavailabletomaintainenvironmentalconditionswithintherequiredspecifications.Furtherevaluationcon-cerninglossofventilationwillbemadeatalatertime,togetherwiththecontrolroomstudy.Tofurtherassurethatalossofventilationtothecontrolandrelayroomsisnotexpectedtobeaconcern,RG&Econductedan8-hourtestonSeptember15,1980.Itwasdemonstratedthat,foralossofallHVAC,no,significanttemperatureincreaseoccurredinthecontrolroomorrelayroom.Onlytheplantcomputer,locatedinitsownroomwithintherelayroom,andnotrequiredforaccidentmitigationorsafeshutdown,appearedtobesusceptibletooverheating.Thebatteryroomshaveasetofinletandexhaustfans,aswellasanair-conditioningsystem.Additionalfansaretobeinstalledinthenearfuture.Thesefanswillbed.c.-powered'directlyfromthebatteries.Whilethismodificationisinprogress,thepresentEmergencyProceduresprovideformanualalignmenttotheemergencybusesbyclosingofbus-tiebreakers.Ifnecessary,portablefanscouldbeusedtoprovidesufficientairhandlingcapacitytomaintainthebatteryroomsatacceptableambientconditions.29 F.DieselGeneratorRoomsG.TheemergencydieselgeneratorroomseachhavetheirownHVACsystem,poweredfromthediesels.Assoonasthedieselsarebroughtuptospeed,stabilized,andtheirrespectivecircuitbreakersclosedtotheiremergencybuses,theHVACsystems(ventilatingfans)areenergized.ProtectionagainstfailureofsteamheatinglinesintheroomsisdescribedinSectionII.Cabove.Failureofasteamheatinglinewouldaffectonlyonediesel.Theotherdiesel,aswellasoffsitepower,wouldstillbeavailable.ThisconfigurationhasbeenreviewedbytheNRCinReference[HELB-15],~andfoundacceptable.ProtectionagainseventsoutsidetheroomsisdescribedinReferences[HELB-1,HELB-6,HELB-7,FLOOD-1,andFLOOD-5].Thelimitingenvironmentinthedieselgeneratorroomsthereforeisnormalambientconditions.TurbineBuildinTheturbinebuildingdoesnotrequireanHVACsystemperse,butratherutilizesroofventfans,wallventvans,windowsandunitheatersforcontroloftheen-virons.Intheeventoflossofpowertofansinthisbuildingtherewouldbenosignificanttemperaturerise,sinceitisalargevolumebuildingwithsufficientopenings(windowsandaccessdoors)toadequatelycir-culateoutsideair.30

Analyseshaveshownthatthelimitingpressurearecausedbyaninstantaneousbreakinthe20inchfeedlineintheturbinebuilding.SeeReference[HELB-1].Peakpressuresare1.14psigonthelowertwolevelsofthebuildingand0.70psigontheoperatingfloor.Failureofportionsoftheexteriorwalllimitthedurationofthepressurepulseto,afewseconds.Pressureandtemperatureislimitedbythefailurecapacityoftheexteriorwalls.Assumingsaturationconditions,oneobtainsalimitingtemperatureofapproximately220'F.A100%humiditysteam-airmixtureisassumed.Isolationofthemainsteamandfeedsystemwillisolatethesourceofenergytotheturbinebuilding.Temperatureandpressurereductionwillbeaccomplishedbyopeningexteriordoorsandwindowsandasaresultofleakagethroughknownopeningstotheoutside.Forconservatism,ithasbeenassumedthatthepeaktemperatureconditionpersistsfor30minuteswithreturntoambientbeingaccomplishedinatotalof3hours.Forconservatism,peakpressuresareassumedtopersistfor1minutewithreturntoambientbeingaccomplishedinatotalof3hours.(ThisistabulatedinTable4).Theexactdurationofhighenvironmental31 conditionsisnotcriticalintermsofaffectedequipmentqualification;therefore,noexplicitcalculationshavebeenperformed.Limitingfloodconditionsaretheresultofacirculatingwatersystempipebreakandisawaterlevelof18inchesinthebasement[FLOOD-5].AuxiliarBuildinAnnexThisstructure,whichhousestheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem,isdescribedinReferences[HELB-1]and[HELB-6].Thelimitingenvironmentinthisstructureisnormalambientconditions.Thecoolingsystemforthisbuildingisredundantandseismicallyqualified.Floodingisnotaconcernsinceallsafety-relatedequipmentassociatedwiththeStandbyAFWSystemiselevatedsothatacompletefailureoftheCondensateTankwouldnotcausesubmergence.ScreenHouseThescreenhouse,liketheturbinebuilding,doesnotrequireanHVACperse,bututilizesroofventfans,wallventfans,windows,andunitheatersforcontroloftheenvirons.Xntheeventofalossofpowertothefans,therewouldbenosignificanttemperaturerise,sinceitisalargevolumebuildingwithsufficientopeningstoadequatelycirculateoutsideair.32

RG&E'scommitmenttoresolvetheHELBenvironmentisprovidedinSectionII.C.ProtectionagainstfloodingisdescribedinReferences[FLOOD-1]and[FLOOD-5].The,limitingenvironmentinthescreenhouseisthusnormalambientconditions.33 IV.EQUIPMENTQUALIFICATIONINFORMATIONTable3summarizesthequalificationinformationofrequiredelectricalequipment.Thissectionprovidesthedetailedbackgroundinformation,withemphasisonaresponsetotheAugust20,1980FRCDraftInterimTechnicalEvaluationReport,ProjectC5257.Forthisreason,theparagraphsareorderedconsistentwithSection3ofthatreport.1.TERParagraph3.2.1-Table3ItemNo.23.MainSteam-linePressureTransmitterintheIntermediateBuilding.TERC5257notedthatthisinstrumentationmeetstheDORGuidelines.Inordertoprovideinstru-mentationwithalloftheproperqualificationdocumentation,thereareplanstoreplacethesetransmittersbyJune1982.Qualificationdocu-mentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.2.TERParagraph3.2.2-Table3ItemNos.31,41.MediumVoltageSwitchgearLocatedOutsideContainment(ModelsDB-50AandDH-350E).TERC5257foundtheseacceptable,sincethebreakersareexposedonlytoarelativelymild(1psig,220'F)environment,mustfunctionwithinashorttime(generallyseconds)andfail-safeonlossofpower.Noadditionalinformationis'onsiderednecessarytoshowproperoperationalcapabilityundertherequiredaccidentconditions.34

I3.TERParagraph3.2.3-Table3ItemNo.21A.ContainmentPressureTransmitterslocatedoutsidecontainment.TERC5257foundthatthesetransmitterssatisfiedtheDORGuidelines.InlightofTMILessonsLearned,fiveoftheseventransmitters,whichcouldseeahighradiationfieldfollowingaLOCA,arebeingreplacedwithnewtransmitters(threewillhavea10-200psigspanandprovidepost-accidentmonitoring).Thesetransmitterswillbequalifiedforthepost-LOCAenvironmentandwillthereforebequalifiedforaHELBoutsidecontainmentenvironment.All5willbereplacedbyJune1982.Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.ThetwotransmittersnotbeingreplacedarenotexposedtoaharshenvironmentastheresultofaLOCA.Forahighenergylinebreakoutsidecontainment,thesetwotransmittersarenotrequiredtofunction.4.TERParagraph3.2.4-Table3ItemNo.25BASTLevelTransmitterintheAuxiliaryBuilding.TERC5257foundthatthesetransmittersmettheintentoftheDORGuidelines.Itisimportanttonotethat,thisinstrumentationperforms'itssafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCAorsteamlinebreakpriortothetimeanyaccidentenvironmentisencounteredintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ForaHELB intheAuxiliaryBuilding,thereisnoneedfortheBASTleveltransmitterstofunction.Noadditionalinformationisrequiredforthisequip-ment.5.TERParagraph3.2.5-Table3ItemNo.18.RWSTLevelTransmitterintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ITERC5257notesthatthisitemsatisfiestheintentoftheDORGuidelines.Forfurtherassurance,thistransmitterwillbereplacedbyJune1982withafully-qualifiedtransmitter.-Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.6.TERParagraph3.2.6-Table3ItemNo.19.RWSTLevelSwitchinAuxiliaryBuilding.TERC5257notesthatthisitemdoesnotrequireenvironmentalqualification,sincethesafetyfunctionisperformedpriortotheonsetofanadverseenvironment.Thisiscorrect;foraddedassuranceofpost-accidentmonitoring,however,thisitemisbeingreplacedbyJune1982.Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.7.TERParagraph3.3.1.1-Table3ItemNo.8A.ValveOperatorsforValvesMOV841,865.TERC5257concludesthat,sincethesevalveactuatorsarelockedinthe"open"positionwithpowerremovedwithnoneedtofunction,lackofvalid36-qualificationdocumentationisamootpoint.Thus,noqualificationinformationisrequiredforthisitem.8.TERParagraph3.3.1.2-Table3ItemNos.SF,SG.ValveOperatorforMOVs851A,B;878B,D.TERC5257concludesthat,sincethesevalveactuators)arelockedinthe"safety"position,withnoneedtofunction,environmentalqualificationisamootpoint.Thus,noqualificationinformationis9.requiredforthisitem./TERParagraph3.3.1.3-Table3ItemNo.SC.ValveOperatorsforMOVs825A,B.AsnotedinTERC5257,thesevalvesperformtheirsafetyfunction(opentoallowRWSTfluidtothesuctionoftheSIpumps)priortothetimeanadverseenvironmentwouldexistintheAuxiliaryBuildingduetosumprecirculation.No"harsh"environmentalqualificationisrequiredfortheseitems.10.TERParagraph3.3.1.4-Table3ItemNo.SD.ValveOperatorsforMOVs4027,4028,4007,4008,4000A,4000B.AsnotedinTERC5257,thesevalveswouldnotbeusedinthe.eventofaHELBintheIntermediateBuilding.RGGEEmergencyProceduresspecificallycallforactuatingtheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwater37 i'

SystemintheeventtheAFWsystemisinoperable.SincenoneoftheStandbyAFWsystemcomponentswillbeeosedxptoaHELB,itisconcludedthatthissystemwillbesufficienttoprovidetheneededsafetyfunction.No"harsh"environmentalqualificationfortheAFWvalvesvesxsneeded.11.TERPararah3gp.3.1.6-Tables3ItemNo11o..AuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpMotors.AsnotedinTERC5257thhesepumpsarenotrequiredtofunctionintheeventofaHELBintheXnter-mediateBuilding.TheSetandbyAFWSystemperformstherequiredsafetyfunctionPdroceurescallforremovingtheAFWumppsfromthesafety-relatedbus,priortoconnectingthestandbysystem.Mechanicalinterlocksensurethatbothsetsofpumpscannotbepoweredfromthd'ieselsconcurrently.No"harsh"environmentalqualificationfortheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsisrequired.12.TERPararah3gp.3.2.1-Table3XtemNo.8E.ValveoperatorsforMOVs.850A,BE856'57AgBJC860AiCiDocumentationReference53bsumittedtotheNRConSeptember241980,providesareferencetoLimitorqueReortBp0003.Thisreferenceprovidesassurancethatthesevalveswillperformtheirsafetfuncti'on.Additionalinformationfrom-38 LimitorqueReportB0058hasbe'enaddedtoReference53,documentingLimitorque'suseofgenericquali-ficationtoqualifymultiplesizeactuatorsbyonetypetest.13.TERParagraph3.3.2.2-Table3ItemNo.8HValveOperatorsforMOVs852A,B.TERCS257notesthatthesevalveactuatorsarenotacceptableforlong-termserviceinanaccidentenvironment,andarenotqualifiedforsubmergedoperation.Qualificationforshort-termpost-LOCAoperationisshowninReference18,however.ThefunctionofthesevalvesistoopenuponreceiptofanSIsignal,andthentoremainopen.Quali-ficationforsubmergedoperationisnotrequired.Submergencecouldoccurunlessthesafetyfunctionofthevalveshasalreadyoccurred.Specifically,tosubmergethesevalveoperators,theentirecontentsoftheprimarysystem,theentirecontentsofbothaccumulators,andaportionofthewaterintherefuelingwaterstoragetankmustbedischargedtothecontainment.Forthistooccur,however,asafetyinjectionsignalmusthaveoccurredandthevalvesmusthaveopened.RGSEhasincorporatedmodificationstothesevalveoperatorstopreventundesiredoperationintheeventofsubmergence.Thedetailsofthese39 modificationswereprovidedinReferences[FLOOD-2,FLOOD-3],transmittedtoFRConMay29,1980.Itisthusconsideredthatthesevalvesarequalifiedtoperformtheirrequiredsafetyfunction.14.TERParagraph3.3.2.3-Table3ItemNo.SI.ValveOperatorsforMOV's9703A,B;9704A,B;9710A,BintheSAFNSystem.AllofthesevalveoperatorsarelocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingAddition,whichisa"mild"environment.Environmentalqualificationisprovidedunderparagraph4.3.3ofthe"DORGuide-lines",AreasNormallMaintainedatRoomConditions.TheAuxiliaryBuildingAdditionismaintainedatroomconditionsbyredundantairconditioningsystemsservedbytheonsiteemergencyelectricalpowersystem.TheroomconditionsspecifiedinReference43are60-120'F.Thevalvespecification(Reference54)statesthat"thevalveactuatorshallbedesignedfora40yearplantlifeunderambientconditionsof40Fto120F..."Sincethereisnochangeintheenvironmentalconditionsbetweennormalandaccidentconditions,"...nospecialconsiderationneedbegiven'totheenviron-mentalqualificationofClassIEequipmentintheseareasprovidedtheagingrequirementsdiscussedinSection7.0aresatisfiedandtheareasaremaintainedatroomconditionsbyredundantair40 conditioningorventilationsystemsservedbytheonsiteemergencyelectricalpowersystem".Reference47describestheprogramdevelopedatR.E.Ginnafordetectingage-relatedfailures.ThisprogramwasdevelopedtoconformtotheprovisionsofSection7.0ofthe"DORGuidelines"forthe"ongoingprograms...toreviewsurveillanceandmaintenance.recordstoassurethatequipmentwhichisexhibitingage-relateddegradationwillbeidentifiedandreplacedasnecessary".15.TERParagraph3.3.2.4-Table3ItemNo.13A.Crouse-HindsElectricalPenetrations.rTERC5257notesthattheBrunswicktestscouldnotbesubstantiated,sincenotestdescriptionwasprovided.Reference45providesthisdescription.Reference58isaletterfromWestinghousestatingthattheBrunswickdataisapplicabletoqualifytheseal,canister,andinternalconnections.Reference54isanevaluationofthecapabilityoftheGinnapenetrationstoperformtheirfunctionunderelevatedandshort-circuitelectricalloadingconditions.Further,anevaluation(Reference59)ofthefunctionsofthevariousmaterialsinthepenetra-tionsdisclosedthattheorganiccompounds,whicharepossiblysubjecttoagingorradiationeffects,41 donotperformanycriticalinsulatingorsealingfunctions.Thesefunctionsareperformedbyceramicandmetalliccomponents..Thisevaluationaugmentsthequalificationtestingperformedonthesepenetrations,confirmingthattheyareNqualifiedtoperformtheirsafetyfunction.16.TERParagraph3.3.2.5-Table3ItemNo.13B.WestinghouseElectricalPenetrations.ItisnotedinTERC5257thatadditionalinformationconcerningthe"similarresin",agingcharacteristicsoftheinsulationonthecableleads,andqualifiedlifeshouldbeprovided.Reference61,ResearchIIReport75-7BS-BIGAL-122,showsthatthelower95%confidencebandonqualifiedlifeat105'Cisgreaterthan40years.Also,theauthorofthisreport,Mr.J.F.Quirk,hasstatedthattheword"similar"hadbeenusedonlyintherespectthattestresultsofthisepoxywereclosetotheresultsofotherepoxiesalsobeingtested.The,epoxyintheGinnapenetrationsisidenticaltothattested.CableleadinsulationagingdataisalsoincludedinReference61.Itcanbeconcludedthatthesepenetrationsaresuitabletoperformtheirrequiredsafetyfunctions.42

17.TERParagraph3.3.2.6-Table3ItemNo.14.WestinghouseTerminalBlocksInsideContainm'ent.TERC5257foundthat,althoughqualificationforpressure,temperature,andhumidityisacceptable,additionalinformationisneededconcerningthermalagingandradiation.Reference60isaProprietaryWestinghouseR&DReport(077-7B7-CBSEL-R3)datedJuly13,1977.Itshowsthatforacriteriaoffailureof50%oftheoriginalflexurestrengthandimpactstrength,the40yearlifeextrapola-tionisapproximately120'C.Thisreport,isnotyetinourpossession,butmaybeauditedattheWestinghousefacility.Additionalinformation-concerningradiationsus-ceptibilityoftheterminalblocksisalsoprovidedinReference60.Itisshownthatthequalificationlevelis2x10rads.Althoughnotmeetingthe7long-termconservativelycalculatedradiationdoseforGinnaof1.6x10rads,theDORGuideline8valuesaremet.Basedontheprotectedlocation'7oftheseterminalblocks,2x10radsisconsideredadequate.Adetailedevaluationofthispost-LOCAradiationdosewillbe'ade.Iftherequireddoseforthelong-termmonitoringfunctionisgreater,replacementoradditionalprotectionwillbeprovided.43 Aspresentlyinstalled,theterminalblocksforpressurizerpressureandlevelinstrumentationwouldbecomesubmergedafteraLOCAenqualifiedlong-termmonitoringinstrumentationforthesefunctionsisinstalledatGinirma,andelevatedabovethesubmergencelevel,theterminalblockswillalsobeelevated.Submergenceanddirectsprayimpingementwillthusbeprecluded.Seeparagraphs19and20foradiscussionofthepressurizerpressureandlevelinstrumentation.18.TERParagraph3.3.2.7-Table3ItemNos.15A,B,CKeriteCableInsideContainment.Reference51isthe"CableIdt'f'niz.cationandQualificationSupplement"Th'isocumentcanbeusedtodeterminetheidentityofcableinusethroughouttheplant.ItisshownthatallpowercableinsidecontainmentisKerite.ThemostrecentandcomprehensivequalificationtestingofKeritecablewaswasperformedinconjunctionwiththetestingofRaychemsleeves(Reference38).Reference55isalettetterfromKeriteverifyingthatthecablesupplied'orthequalificationtestinginReference38isidenticaltothtaorig>nallysuppliedandinstalledintheGinnacotirmacontainment.Thepre-agingdonefortheKeritecableduringtheRaychemsleevetestestablishd933ea.yearlife-44 at140'Fmeansurfacetemperature.TheArrheniusdataisconfidentialtothemanufacturer,butisavailableatRG&EasReference63.RG&EbelievesthatthisrecenttestingdefinitivelydemonstratestheadequacyoftheKeritecableforperformingitsrequiredsafetyfunction.Therearenosafety-relatedcablesinsidecontainmentsubjecttoflooding,whicharerequiredtoperformasafetyfunctionduringsubmergence.Qualificationforsubmergenceisthusnotrequired.19.TERParagraph3.3.2.8-Table3ItemNo.22.PressurizerPressureTransmitters.ThedeficienciesnotedinTERC5257includedlackofradiationandsubmergencequalification.RG&Edoesnotclaimcreditfortheuseofthisinstru-mentationatthetimeitwouldreceiveexcessiveradiationexposure,orbecomesubmerged.GinnaEmergencyProceduresspecifythat,unlesspressurizerpressure,level,andotherparametersappearstableandarereturningtoprescribedlevels,safetyinjectionflowisnottobeterminated.Failuretoterminatesafetyinjectionisnotasafetyconcern.Therefore,lackofqualificationforthisinstrumentationisnotconsideredofimmediatesafetysignificance.45 Itisrecognized,however,thataccurateprimarysysteminformationwouldbeextremelyusefultotheoperatorfordiagnosingthestatusoftheplantduringaccidentconditions.RG6E,therefore,planstoreplacethepresentinstrumentationbyJune1982withfully-qualifiedtransmitters,locatedaboveanypossiblesubmergencelevel.Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.20.TERParagraph3.3.2.9-Table3ItemNo.24.PressurizerLevelInstrumentation.Thesameinformationasdescribedin19aboveforthepressurizerpressureinstrumentationappliestothisinstrumentation.21.TERParagraph3.3.2.10-Table3ItemNo.30.FanCoolerMotorsInsideContainment.TERC5257concludedthatinadditiontotheinformationprovidedinReferences18and20,informationneededforcompletequalificationofthefancoolermotorsisa)documentationregardingqualificationofmotor-leadandlead-to-cablesplices,and(b)determinationofaqualifiedlifeforthemotor.InformationregardingthesplicesisgiveninReference64.46-Aginginformationfortheinsulatingmaterialofthesemotors,aswellasthebearinglubricants,isgiveninReference18,Section4.Agingtodemonstrate40yearcontinuousoperationat120'Cwasperformed.ThisisconsistentwiththedatagiveninReference67,andisconsideredsufficienttoqualifythefancoolermotorsforcontinuedoperation.AprogramatRG6EtomaintainmotorbearingsandlubricantsisgiveninReference65.ThisprogramwillensurethatthelubricantsusedarecompatiblewiththeenvironmentalconditionswhichcouldoccurduringaDBE.AdditionalinformationregardingqualificationtestingofthesametypeofmotorsisgiveninWCAP7829,"FanCoolerMotorUnitTest"(Reference70).22.TERParagraph3.3.2.11-Table3ItemNo.34.RaychemCableSpliceSleeves.TERC5257statesthatRG&Eshouldpresentevidenceofsimilaritybetweenthetestedandinstalledequipment.Thisis'documentedinthedetailedevaluationandobservationofthesplicesleevereplacementprogram,giveninIEInspectionReports78-20and78-21(Reference56).Itisalsostatedthatadeterminationofqualifiedlifeshouldbemadeforthesleeves.Theactual47 testinReference38establisheda12.1yearlifeat60'Cambient.Thispre-agingwasconstrainedbytheconcurrentagingoftheKeritecable,whichwaspre-agedfor93.3yearsat60'Cbythesametest.BasedonproprietaryRaycheminformation(includedinReference63andavailableforauditatRG6E)a40yearlifeat91'Ccanbeexpected..Therefore,thesesleevesareconsideredfullyqualified.23.TERParagraph3.3.2.12-Table3XtemNo.20.SteamFlowTransmittersEnsideContainment.RG&Ehasstatedthatthesetransmittersarenotrequiredtoperformasafetyfunctionatatimetheycouldbeexposedtoahighenergylinebreakenvironment.Thus,thelackofcompletequalificationdocumentationisamootpointforthesetrans-mitters.Forasteamlinebreakinsidecontainment,thesteamlinenon-returncheckvalveswillassurethattheintactsteamgeneratorwillnotblowdown.Steamlineisolationwouldbeprovidedbythehighcontainmentpressuresignal.Foraddedassuranceofsteamlineisolationintheeventofasteambreak'insidecontainment,thesetransmitterswillbereplacedbyJune1982withfully-qualifiedequipment.Qualificationdocumenta-tionwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.48

24.TERParagraph3.3.2.13-Table3ItemNo.21B.Contain-mentPressureTransmittersintheIntermediateBuilding.AsnotedinSectionIV.3ofthisreport,fiveofthesevencontainmentpressuretransmitters,whichcouldbeexposedtohighpost-LOCAradiationlevels,arebeingreplacedwithLOCA-qualifiedunitsbyJune1982,inresponsetoTMILessonsLearned.Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.25.TERParagraph3.3.2.14-Table3,ItemNo.37,HydrogenRecombinerIgniterExciterTERC5257requestedthattheeffectsofcontainmentsprayandthermalagingbeaddressed.Thisinforma-tionhasnotyetbeenreceived.Ifproperdocumen-tationisnotfoundconcerningtheseenvironmentalparameters,RG&Ewillcommittoreplacethenecessaryequipment.ItisimportanttonotethatthepresentlicensingbasisforGinnadoesnotincludethehydrogenrecombinerasameansnecessaryforIpost-LOCAhydrogencontrol(seetheRG&E"TechnicalSupplementAccompanyingApplicationforaFullTermOperatingLicense,"August1972,SectionIII.B.7).26.TERParagraph3.3.2.15-Table3,ItemNo.38,HydrogenRecombinerBlowerMotor.49

TheonlydeficiencynotedinTERC5257isthatnoanalysisexistscomparingtheimpactofdeviationsbetweenthetestspecimenspecificdesignfeatures,materials,andproductionprocedureandthoseoftheinstalledequipment.TheonlyevidenceatthistimeiscontainedinSection5.2ofReference18,WCAP7410-L,Vol.II.Itisstatedthat"the2hpmotorusedinthetestprogramisconstructedinthesamemanneras,istheactual15hpmotorusedintherecombiner."Further,ithasbeenverifiedthattheGinna15hpmotorhasClassHinsulation,thesameasthe2hpmotortested.Basedontheavailableinformation,RG6EbelievesthatthereisreasonableassurancethattheGinnarecombinermotorwillperformitssafetyfunction.Further,asstatedin25above,thehydrogenrecombinerisnotrequiredbythepresentGinnadesignbasis.BasedontheTMILessonsLearned,however,RGEEwillcommittoreplacethemotorifproperenvironmentalqualificationdocumentationisnotestablished.27.TERParagraph3.3.3.1-Table3ItemNo.8B.ValveOperatorsforMOVs826A,B,C,D;896A,B.TheMOVs826A,B,C,DarelocatedatthedischargeoftheBoricAcidStorageTanks,andprovidesuctiontotheSIpumpsintheeventofaSafety50

Injectionsignal.UponlowBASTlevel,thesevalvescloseafterthe825A,Bvalvesopen.Thevalvesarelocatedintheauxiliarybuilding,andwillhavecompletedtheirfunctionpriortothepresenceofanadverseenvironmentcausedbysumprecirculationfluid.MOVs896A,Barenormallylocked-openvalves,locatedatthesuctionoftheSIandCSpumpsfromthe.EST.Thevalvesareclosedpriortothetimesumprecirculationisinitiated.Therefore,thesevalveswillhavecompletedtheirfunctionoriortothetimeanadverseenvironmentwouldoccur.Inthecaseofallsixvalves,environmentalqualificationforanadverseenvironmentisnotrequired.28.TERParagraph3.3.3.2-Table3ItemNos.1A,1B,1C,5.ASCOsolenoidvalves.Thefeedwatercontrolandbypassvalves(items1A,1B)failclosedonlossofair.ThisissupportedbyReference23.InordertofurtherensurethatthesevalveswillperformtheirsafetyfunctionwhenexposedtoaHELBintheTurbineBuilding,thesolenoidswillbereplacedwithvalveshavingproperqualificationdocumentation.ItisexoectedthatthiscanbeaccomplishedbyJune1982.Thefail-safeclosureofthevalvesensuresthatthe51 requiredsafetyfunctioncanbeperformeduntilreplacementcanbeeffected.Item1C,thesolenoidcontrollingLCV112B,willnotexperienceanadverseenvironmentduringanaccident.Further,anaccessiblemanualbypassvalve,valve358,isusedtoprovidealternativesuctionforthechargingpumpsfromtheRWST.Sincethisfunctionwouldnotberequiredformanyhoursfollowinganeventrequiringthemaintenanceofasafeshutdowncondition,theuseofthismanualvalveisconsideredacceptable.Item1CwillthusbedeletedfromTable3.Item5A,theRHRdischargevalves,arenormallyopen.Theyneedonlyremainopenintheeventofanaccident.TheI/Pcontroller(ratherthanasolenoidvalve)controllingtheirpositionisfail-open.Sincenofunctionmustbeperformedbythesevalves,theyhavebeendeletedfromTable3.Item5B,thesolenoidvalvesforAOVs897and898,arerequiredtoclosepriortosumprecirculation.Theywillnotexperienceanadverseenvironmentpriortothetimetheymustperformtheirsafetyfunction.Environmentalqualificationofthesevalveswillbeaddressedinalatersubmittal,concerningelectricalequipmentlocatedina"mild"environment.52 29.TERParagraph3.3.3.3-Table3ItemNo.2.Copes-VulcanSolenoidValves.ThevalveswerepurchasedfromASCO(Series8300).Therefore,allinformationfromReference23appliestothevalves.Further,sincethesevalvesarelocatedina"mild"environment,qualificationofthesevalveswillbediscussedatalatertime.30.TERParagraph3.3.3.4-Table3ItemNos.3A,3B.LawrenceSolenoidValvesinIntermediateBuilding.Basedonthedesignprincipleofthesevalves,theywillperformtheirsafetyfunctionbyfailinginaclosedpositionuponlossofpower.However,ifpowerqualificationdocumentationisnotestablished,.RGaEwillinitiateareplacementforthesesolenoidvalves.Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.Thefail-safemodeofoperationensuresnolossofsafetyfunctionintheinterim.31.TERParagraph3.3.3.5-Table3ItemNo.4.VersaSolenoidValvesinsidecontainment.Thesafetyfunctionofthesolenoidvalvescontrollingthecontainmentairrecirculationdampersisaccomplishedthroughfail-safeoperation.ThisisaccomplishedimmediatelywiththeSIsignalfollowinganaccident,beforeenvironmentalconditionswould53

becomeverysevere.Inordeitohavethissafetyfunctionaccomplishedwithequipmenthavingtheproperqualificationtestinganddocumentation,replacementofthesesolenoidvalveswillbeinitiated.ItisexpectedthatthiscanbeaccomplishedbyJune1982.Qualificationdocu-mentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.32.TERParagraph3.3.3.6-Table3ItemNos.6A,6B.VersaSolenoidValves.Thesafetyfunctionofthesecontainmentpurgeanddepressurizationvalvesimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentistocloseforcontainmentisolation.Thisisaccomplishedbythefail-closedesignofthesevalves.InordertohavethissafetyfunctionIaccomplishedwithequipmenthavingtheproperqualificationtestinganddocumentation,replace-mentofthesesolenoidvalveswillbeinitiated.ItisexpectedthatthiscanbeaccomplishedbyJune1982.Qualificationdocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.33.TERParagraph3.3.3.7-Table3ItemNo.7.ControlRoomDampers.Thisequipmentitemisnotelectrical,andthere-foreisnotaddressedinthisreport.ThesolenoidvalvesoperatingthesedampersareaddressedunderparagraphTER3.3.3.24(Table3,ItemNo.40).54 34.TERParagraph3.3.3.8-Table3ItemNo.9.Standby'FNPumpMotors.Althoughthisitemisnotlocatedinaharshenvironment,andthereforedoesnotneedtobeaddressedatthistime,RGSEconsiderstheenviron-mentalqualificationofthisitemtobecompleteandacceptable.AsstatedinSection4.3.3oftheDORGuidelines,"Nospecialconsiderationneedbe'iventotheenvironmentalqualificationofClassIEequipmentinthese[non-harsh]areasprovidedtheagingrequirementsdiscussedinSection7.0aresatisfiedandtheareasaremaintainedatroomconditionsbyredundantairconditioningorventila-tionsystemsservedbytheonsiteemergencyelectricalpowersystem."Thisisthecasewiththesemotors.Theequipmentspecificationforthesemotors(Reference3)states"Motorsshallberatedforoperationinanambientterneratureof50'C[122'F]".(TnisisconsistentwiththeambientoperatingconditionsfortheAuxiliaryBuildingAdditionof60-120'F(Reference43).Furthermore,theongoing.programdescribedinReference47todetectage-relatedfailuresincludesthesemotors.RG&Ethereforeconsidersthesemotorstohavemetallnecessaryenvironmentalrequirements.P.55 35.TERParagraph3.3.3.9-Table3ItemNos.10A,10B,10C,12A.MotorsfortheContainmentSprayPumps,ComponentCoolingWaterPumps,ResidualHeatRemovalPumps,andSafetyInjectionPumps.ThefirstthreeoftheseGinnamotorshaveClassBinsulationmadeof"ThermalasticEpoxy".TheSIpumpmotorinsulationis"PMR"(PremimumMoistureResistant).ThisisshowninReference67.QualficationofthesesystemsisgiveninWCAP8754,(Reference68),forthe"ThermalastieEpoxy"motors,andtheWestinghouseResearchReport71-1C2-RADMC-R1,"TheEffectofRadiationonInsulatingMaterialsUsedinWestinghouseMediumMotors,"December31,1970(RevisedApril10,1971)(Reference69)forthe"PMR"motors.Thesereportsareproprietary,butareavailableforauditatRGEEandatWestinghouse.Testingdoesindicatethatthesemotorscanwithstandanaccumulateddoseof10radsduringtheiroperating7life,withanoperatinglifeof20years.Sincethesemotorsarenotusedatalltimes(onlytheCCWpumpisusedduringnormaloperation,andeventhenonlyoneofthetwopumpsisnormallyinuse),theoperationalcapabilityisatleast40years.Also,RG&Ehasaprogramofinsulationinspectiononceperyear(M45.1A,InspectionofSafeguardMotor)andreplacement(ifneeded)everyfiveyears.56-rll Sincetheonlyadverseenvironm'entanticipatedforanyofthesemotorsisapost-LOCAradiationdose(conservativelyestimatedinReference[TMI-3]asI62.8x10rads)thesemotorsareconsideredproperlyqualifiedbothfor"life"andradiation.36.TERParagraph3.3.3.10-Table3ItemNo.12B.ServiceWaterPumpMotor.AsstatedinReference[Flood-15],theeffectsofjetimpingementandwatersprayonthesemotorswereevaluatedbytheNRCduringthereviewofSEPTopicIII-5.B,"PipeBreakOutsideContainment".RGEEcommittedtosupplementtheNRCrecommenda-tioninReference[FLOOD-13.].Thus,theServiceWaterPumpMotorshavebeenremovedfromtheHELBenvironmentconsiderations.Furtherreviewforoperationisa"mild"environmentwillbeconductedatalatertime.37.TERParagraph3.3.3.11-Table3ItemNo.16.ColemanCableInsideContainment.Reference51isthe"CableIdentificationandQualificationSupplement".ThisreferenceallowstraceabilityofallcableusedintheGinnaplant,byreferencingbacktotheoriginalpurchaseorderspecifications.Itcanbeseenthat,inadditiontotheKeritesafeguardscable,theonlyothercableinsidecontainmentusedtoperformarequired57 post-accidentsafetyfunctionisthesilicone-rubberinsulatedcable,whichisusedforallrequiredsafety-relatedinstrumentationandcontrolcable.Reference46identifiesthisasColemancable.InadditiontothetestingstatedinReference46,asectionofthiscablewastakenfromtheGinnaplant,andenvironmentallyqualifiedwiththeRaychemsplicesleeves(documentationofthetestingisgiveninFRCFinalReportSupplement,F-C5074(Supplement),April1979,whichisincludedinReference51).ThecableisspecimennumberC5074-7ofTable1ofF-C5074Supplement.ThistestingshowsthattheColemansilicone-rubberinsulatedcablewillperformitsrequiredsafetyfunctionsinsidecontainment.Reference46statesthatthiscableisagedat200'Cfor168hours.AlthoughnospecificArrheniusplotisavailable,theapplicationofthe"10'Crule"showsanoperatinglifeof40yearsat60'C.Thisisconsideredareasonableestimateoftheexoectedlifeofthiscable.38.TERParagraph3.3.3.12-Table3Items17A,17B,17C.Coleman,Rome,andGeneralCablesUsedOutsideContainment.Reference51isthe"CableIdentificationandQualificationSupplement".Fromthisreference,thetypeofcableusedthroughouttheGinnaplant58 canbetracedbyreferencebacktotheoriginalpurchaseorderspecification.Itisshownthatallofthesafety-relatedcableoutsidecontainmentwhichisnotKeritecableisPVC-insulatedcable.ThespecificationsincludedinReference51refertoGAISpecsSP-5324andSP-5315.BothofthesespecificationsinturnspecifytherequirementsofIPCEAS-61-402forPVC-Cable.InformationfromthisstandardisprovidedinReference10.AdditionalinformationforColemanandRomecableisprovidedinReference46.TheIPCEAtestingofthiscable,includinginsula-tionagingat121'C(250'F)for168hours(jacketat212'F),oilimmersion,heatshock,andcoldshock,showstheabilitytooperateunderconditionsmoreseverethanthoseanticipatedoutsidecontainment.Althoughnospecificqualificationtestingwasperformed,thestandardtestingofthesecabletypesgivesreasonableassurancethattheyaresuitableforoutside-containmentuse.39.TERParagraph3.3.3.13-Table3ItemNo.27.RTDsInsideContainment.Reference35isaspecificationsheetanddrawingoftheGinnaRTD(Rosemount176JAmodel).Thereactorcoolantsystemtemperaturedetectors(RTD)arenotrequiredforalossofcoolant-59 accident.Inasteamlinebreakaccident,lowTaveplushighsteamflowplus"asafetyinjectionsignalwillclosethemainsteamlineisolationvalves.Also,high-highsteamflowwillperformthisfunction.AsdescribedinSectionII.Babove,forabreakupstreamofthenon-returncheckvalves,whichincludesallbreaksinsidecontainment,closureofthemainsteamisolationvalvesisnotrequired.Forbreaksdownstxeamofthecheckvalves,closureofthemainsteamisolationvalvesisdesirable,however,inthiscasetheRTDsarenotsubjectedtoanadverseenvironment.Therefore,theRTDsdonotrequireenvironmentalqualificationtopx'ovidetheirrequiredsafetyfunction.However,theRTDswouldbeusefulforpost-accidentmonitoring.SincetheRTDsarenotqualifiedforpost-accidentuse,thepxesentGinnaEmergencyProcedux'esspecifythat,ifa50'Fsubcoolingmargincannotbeestablishedormaintained,safetyinjectionflowshallnotbeterminated.FailureoftheRTDswouldrequirethatSIflowbemaintained.SincetheGinnahighheadsafetyinjectionpumpsdonothaveahighenoughshutoffheadtoopenthepressurizerPORVs,continuedSIpumpoperationisnotasafetyconcern.However,toavoidthepossibilityofoperatorconfusion,RG&Ewillinitiateaprogramtoprovide60

qualifiedRTDsforpost-accidentmonitoring.ThesewillbeprocuredandinstalledbyJune1982,Isubjecttoequipmentavailabilityandprocurement/deliveryschedules.40.TERParagraph3.3.3.14-Table3ItemNo.28.BatteriesintheControlBuilding.AsnotedinTERC5257,theventilationsystemisbeingmodified,suchthatthebatteryroomscanbeconsidereda"mild"environment.ReferencefHELB-13]committedtoaresolutionofthepotentialfloodingproblem.Thebatterieswillthusbefurtherdiscussedatalatertime,togetherwithotherequipmentlocatedina"mild"environment.41.TERParagraph3.3.3.15-Table3ItemNo.26.SteamGeneratorLevelTransmitter.Thesteamgeneratorleveltransmitters,althoughusefulforconfirmingsecondarysystemheatremovalcapability,arenotnecessaryforperformingthisfunction.Foranaccidentinsidecontainment,whichcoulddegradetheperformanceoftheSGleveltransmitters,themainsteampressuretransmitters,locatedoutsidecontainment,provideinformationregardingsteamgeneratorstatus.Auxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentationforeachsteamgenerator,alsolocatedoutsidecontainment,providestheprimaryindicationofthesteamgeneratorheat61 removalcapability.BasedonthelatestinformationprovidedattheWestinghouseEmergencyOperatingInstructionsseminar,theGinnaEmergencyProcedureswillberevisedtoreflectAFWflowindicationsasbeingofprimevalueasthemainindicationofsecondaryheatremovalcapability.Nevertheless,inordertoremovethepossibilityofoperatorconfusionduetomisleadinginstrumentindications,thesteamgeneratorLeveltrans-mitterswillbereplacedbyJune1982.Qualifica-tiondocumentationwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.42.TERParagraph3.3.3.16-Table3ItemNos.29A,29B,29C.DieselGeneratorElectricalEquipment.Thisequipmentislocatedina"mild"environment.Itsqualificationwillreviewedatalaterdate.43.TERParagraph3.3.3.17-Table3ItemNo.35.ValcorSolenoidValvesforthePressurizerPORVs.AdditionalinformationhasbeenaddedtoReference48,consistingofthetestresultsandtestingmethodology.ThiswasprovidedtotheNRCandFRConSeptember24,1980.TheentiretestreportisalsoavailableforauditandreviewatRGSE.ThesevalvesarefullyqualifiedtoIEEE-323-1974toperformtheirpost-accidentsafetyfunction.62

I44.TERParagraph3.3.3.18-Table3itemNo.36.SumpBWideRangeLevelSwitch.Reference52,thespecificationsheetforthisitem,wasprovidedtotheNRCandFRConSeptember24,1980.Thereisevidencethattheselevelswitchescanperformtheirfunctioninacontain-mentpost-accidentenvironment.However,notalloftherequirementsoftheDORGuidelinesaremetforthisinstrumentation.Xtisimportanttonote,however,thattheseinstrumentsarenotusedtoperformanypost-accidentsafety-relatedfunctions,andarenotspecifiedforuseintheGinnaEmergencyProceduresexceptasconfirmatoryinformation.Thesafety-relatedfunctionofdeterminingthetimingofthe"sumpswitchover"procedureisperformedbytheRWSTlevelinstrumentation,locatedoutsidecontainment.TheTMILessonsLearneddeterminedthatawide-rangesumplevelindicationwastobeprovidedforoperatorinformation.Fully-qualifiedequipmentwillbepurchasedtomeetthisrequirement.Thequalificationdocumentationforthisinstrumenta-tionwillbemadeavailablewhenreceived.45.TERParagraph3.3.3.19-Table3XtemNos.42,43.MotorsforCoolingFansforRHR,CS,Sl,andChargingPumpsinAuxiliaryBuilding.63 Reference69providesinformationconcerningthelifeandradiationcharacteristicsofthesemotors.Thesemotorsarecapableofoperationafteraradiationexposureof1x10radsand20years.7Sincethesemotorsarerunonlyintermittently,operationalcapabilityfor40yearsisshown.Sincetheonlyharshenvironmentexperiencedbythesemotorsispost-LOCAradiation(estimatedat2.8x10rads),operationunderrequiredaccident6conditionsisshown.46.TERParagraph3.3.3.20-Table3ItemNos.32,44.IGCCabinetsandRelayRacksinRelayRoom.Thisequipmentislocatedinamildenvironment.Itsqualificationwillbeconsideredatalatertime.47.TERParagraph3.3.3.21-Table3ItemNo.33A.ControlRoomHVACAirHandlingUnits.Thisequipmentislocatedinamildenvironment.Itsqualificationwillbeconsideredatalatertime.48.TERParagraph3.3.3.22-Table3ItemNo.33B.ControlRoomHVACFans.Thisitemisnotanelectricalpieceofequipment.IthasthusbeendeletedfromTable3,andfromconsiderationinthisreport.64 49.TERParagraph3.3.3.23-Table3,ItemNo.39,ChargingPumoMotors.Thisequipmentislocatedinamildenvironment.Itsqualificationwillbeconsideredatalatertime.50.TERParagraph3.3.3.24-Table3ItemNo.40.ControlRoomHVACDamperSolenoids.Thisequipmentislocatedinamildenvironment.Itsqualificationwill.beconsideredatalatertime.65 LOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT1.2/3HIGHCONTAINMENTPRESSUREHIHIj2/3LOWPRESSURIZERPRESSUREFIGURE1SAFETYINJECTIONlaACCIDENTDIAGNOSTICS4.HAINSTEAMLINEISOLATION3.ACCUtlULATORDUtlP2.SAFETYINJECTIONSEQUENCE(AUTO)4.FEEDl<ATERLINEISOLATION5.CONTAINf1ENTISOLATION6.REACTORTRIPVALVES7.REACTORCOOLANTPUf'lpTRIP9:CONTROLROOMVENTILATION10.MANUALACTIONSRECIRC-ULATION TABLE1LOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTBLOCKNO./EQUIPMENTSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIME1.HighContainmentPressureLowPressurizerPressurePT945,946,947PT948)949,950ProvidesignalsforContain-mentSpray,SafetyInjection,ContainmentIsolation,andMainSteamandFeedwaterLineIsolationSignalInitiationPT429)430,433.)449AccidentDiagnosticsProvideReactortripandSafetyInjectionsignalsShorttermSignalInitiationSpliceSleeves,TerminalBlocks,ElectricalPene-trations,ElectricalCableAccidentDiagnosticsControlandPowerSignalTransmissionShorttermLongtermla.SteamLinePressurePT468)469)482PT478,479)483AccidentDiagnosticsShortterm'ontainmentRadiation[BeingprovidedperTMISTLL]AccidentDiagnosticsShorttermContainment'sumplevelIT942,LT943AccidentDiagnosticsShortterm2.SafetyInjectionSequence(Auto)BatterieslA,1BDieselGeneratorandAuxiliariesD.C.PowerPowersupplytosafeguardsbussesduringlossofout-sideACPowerLongTermLongterm480VoltSafeguardsbusses14,16,17,18Provide.thedistributionofpowertosafeguardsequipmentLongtermlA,1B,1CSafetyInjec-tionPumpsHighheadinjectionofbo-ratedwatertoReactorCoolantSystemLongtermlA,1BContainmentSprayPumps(onlyonhi-hiCont.pressure)ContainmentPressure,Tem-perature,andIodinecontrolLongterm TABLE1,fBLCK'NO./EQUIPMENTLOSSOFCOOPTACCIDENTSAFETYFUNCTIONRE(}UIRED.OPERATIONTIME1.<,1BResidualHeatRe-.movalPumps/1A;1B,1C,1DServiceMaterPumpsLowheadinjectionofboratedwatertoReactorVesselCoolingwatertoRHRandCCNHeatExchangersLongtermLongterm1A,1B,1C,"lDContain-mentRecirc.UnitsContainmentPressure,Tem-perature,andIodinecontrolLongtermCoolingUnitsforpumpmotors(SI,RHR,CS,andCharging)HaintainmotorswithinproperambienttemperaturelimitsLongTerm1A,1BHotorDrivenAux.FeedwaterPumpsCoolingwatertoSteamGen-eratorsLongterm480VoltSafeguardsMCC'sProvidethedistributionofpowertosafeguardsequipmentLongterm3~AccumulatorDumpHOV841(N.O.)-'OV865(N.O.)ProvidepathtoReactorVesselfromAccumulatorsforinjectionofboratedwaterNotrequiredtofunction4.MainSteamLineIsolationFeedwaterLineIsolationAOV.3516AOV3517AOV4269AOV4270AOV4271AOV4272Isolate1A,1BSteamGeneratorsIsolateHainFeedwaterSystem5Secondsaftersignal5Secondsaftersignal5.ContainmentIsolationSeeText,SectionII.A.56.ReactorTripReactortripbreakers0ProvidemeanstotripthereactorRequiredforReactorTripReactorprotectionandin-strumentationcabinetsProvidetheinstrumentationandprotectioncircuitsforthecon-trolandtrippingoftheReactorRequiredforReactorTrip7.RCPTripRCPTripBreakersProvidemeanstotripRCP'sShorttermN.O.=NormallyOpen I

CKNO./EQUIPHENTLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIHEalvesHOV825A)BHOV,826A)B)CD(BaaN.O.)AOV836A)BProvidepathtoSIPumpsforbor-atedwatertohighheadsafetyinjectionProvidecontrolledadditionofNaOHtoContainmentSprayforIodinecontrol10/BASTLevelor-1/2hourShorttermHOV852A)BHOV860A)B,C)DBASTLevelIT102)106,171)172HOV878B)D(N.O.)ProvidepathtoReactorVesselofboratedwaterforlowheadsafetyinjectionProvidepathtoContainmentSprayheadersforCSPumpsIndicateBASTLevelforautomatictransferofSIPumpsuctionfromBASTtoRMSTProvidepathtocoldlegsofRCSfromhighheadsafetyinjectionSI'initiationI,ongterm10%BASTIevelor-1/2hournotrequiredtofunctionHOV4007,40081A,1BSteamGeneratorsProvidepathforAux.FeedwatertoShorttermAOV5871,5872,5873AOV5874,5875)58769.ControlRoomVentilationDampersandAiiU10:HanualProvidepathforcleaningofcont.atmospherebyfancoolersProvidecleaningofControlRoomatmospheresignalinitiationShorttermSafetyInjectionResetButton1A,1BComponentCoolingMaterPumps1A,1BContainmentSprayPumps(ifCont.Pressure(30psig)ResetSafetyInjectionsignalafter,automaticS.I.SequencingiscompleteCoolingwaterforsafeguardsequipmentContainmentPressure,TemperatureandIodinecontrollessthan24hoursLongtermLongtermRWSTLevelLT920,LIC921IndicateRMSTLevelforoperatorlessthan24hourstransferfromS.I.phasetoRecirculationphase

'NI TABLE1fBLOCKNO./EQUIPHENTLOSSOFCOOLS'CCIDENTSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIHEHOV4027,4028HOV4000A,4000BHOV4734)4735)4615,4616HOV738A)BStandbyAFWPumpsProvideServiceMatertoHotorDrivenAux.FeedwaterPumpssuctionProvideAFWCross-ConnectDirectSWFlowtoCCWHX'sDirectCCWFlowtoRHRHX'sAFWFlowtoSG'sifnormalAFMSysteminoperablewithin-2hoursShorttermlessthan24hourslessthan24hoursLongtermHOV9629A,BProvideSWtosuctionofstandbyLongtermAFMPumpsHOV9710A,B;9703A,B;9704A)BSteamGeneratorLevelLT460,461,462,463LT470)471,472)473Sampling(beingprovidedperTHI)eHydrogenRecombinersPressurizerPORVs.11.RecirculationHOV850A,Boutsidecont.HOV851A,B(N.O.)insidecont.StandbyAFMDischargeValvestoprovideflowtoSG'sHonitoringSamplecontainmentatmosphereandreactorcoolantHaintainhydrogencontrolRCPressureControlProvidepathtoRHRsuctionfromBsumpforlowheadsafetyinjec-tionLongtermLongtermI,ongtermLongtermLongtermLongtermHOV856(N.O.)HOV896A,B(N.O.)HOV857A,B,CAOV897)898RWSTisolationvalvetoRHRpumpssuction,mustcloseafterRMSTisdrainedRMSTisolationvalve,mustcloseafterRWSTisdrainedProvidepathtosuctionofSIandCSPumpsfromRERpumpsdischargeIsolatehighheadrecirculationflowtoRWSTduringsumprecir-culationrequiredtofunc-tiontoswitchtorecircphaserequiredtofunc-tiontoswitchtorecircphaserequiredtofunc-tiontoswitchtorecircphaseShorttermHOV704A)BrecirculationCloseduringswitchtosumplessthan24hours

MAINSTEAMORFEEDLINEBFIGURE23.2/3HIGHCONTAINMENTPRESSURE1.2/3STEANLINEPRESSURE2.2/3LOMPRESSURIZERPRESSUREHIHI3.2/3STEANLINEFLOIA3.LOWTave2/4SAFETYINJECTIONIACCIDENTOIAGIIOSTICSI3.2/4OVERPOWERhTHI1(I.4.MAINSTEANLINEISOLATION6.SAFETYINJECTIONSEQUENCE(AUTO)FEEDllATERLINEISOLATION5.CONTAINMENTISOLATIONREACTORTRIP9.VALVES8.REACTORCOOLANTPUMPTRIP10.MANUALACTIONS11.CONTINUEDSAFESHUTDOWN TABLE2MAINSTEAMLINEBREAKBLOCKNO./EQUIPMENTSAFETYFUNCTION/BREAKLOCATIONSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIMEINSIDECVOUTSIDECV1.SteamLinePressurePT468,469,482PT478)479)483la.SteamLinePressure(see1above)ProvidesignalforSIonlowsteamlinepressureAccidentDiagnosticssamesamesignalinitiationshorttermContainmentRadiationContainmentSumpLevelHighContainmentPressure(see3below)AccidentDiagnosticsAccidentDiagnosticsAccidentDiagnosticsNANANAshorttermshorttermshortterm2.LowPressurizerPressurePT429,430,431)449ElectricalPenetrations,Cable,Sleeves,andTerminalBlocksProvideReactortripandSafetyInjectionsignalsProvidecontrolandPowerSignalTransmissionsamesamesignalinitiationlongtermHighContainmentPressurePT945)946,947PT948)949~950ProvidesignalsforContainmentSpray,SafetyInjection,ContainmentIsola-tion,andMain-SteamLineIsolationNAsignalinitiationSteamLineFlowFT464,465FT474,475ProvidesignalsforReactortripandMainSteamLineIso-lationsamesignalinitiationReactorCoolantTemperatureLoopAHotIegTE401A,402A)405A,406A,409AProvideIowTave66signalsfor'Reactortrip,SafetyInjec-tionandMainSteamLineIsolationsamesignalinitiation TABLE2MAINSTEAMLINEBREAK-2-BLOCKNO./EQUIPMENTSAFETYFUNCTION/BREAKLOCATIONSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIMEINSIDECVOUTSIDECVLoopAColdLegTE401B>404A,407A>408A,410ALoopBHotLegTE403B>404B,407B,408B,410BLoopBColdI,egTE403B>404B>407B,408B>410BMainSteamIsolationAOV3516AOV3517Isolate1A,BSteamGeneratorssame5secondsaftersignalFeedwaterLineIsolationAOV4269AOV4270AOV4271AOV4272IsolateMainFeed-watersystemsame5secondsaftersignalContainmentIsolationSeeText,SectionII.B.5sameSafetyInjectionSequence(Auto)Batteries1A,1BDieselGeneratorsandauxiliariesD.C.PowerPowersupplytosafe-guardsbussesduringlossof.,outsideACPowersamesameLongtermLongterm480VoltSafeguardsbusses14,16,17,181A,1B,1CSafetyIn-jectionpumpslA,BContainmentSprayPumps(onlyonhi-hicont.Pressure)1A,1B,1C,1DServiceWaterPumpsProvidedistributionofpowertosafe-guardsequipmentHighhead.injectionofboratedwatertoReactorCoolantSystemContainmentPressureandTemperaturecontrolCoolingWatertoCCWHeatExchangersamesameN/AsameLongtermLongtermI,ongtermLongterm HAINSTEAMLINEBREAKBLOCKNO./EQUIPMENTSAFETYFUNCTION/BREAKIOCATIONSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIMEINSIDECVOUTSIDECV1A,1B,1C,1DContainmentRecircUnitsContainmentPressureN/AandTemperaturecon-trolLongterm1A,1BMotorDrivenAux.FeedwaterPumpsCoolingw'atersupplysametoSteamGeneratorsLongtermCoolingUnitsforSI,CS,RHR,andChargingPumpMaintainmotorswithinproperambienttemperaturelimitssameLongterm480VoltSafeguardsHCCs7.ReactorTripProvidethedistribu-sametionofpowertosafeguardsequipmentLongtermReactortripbreakersReactorProtectionandInstrumentationCabinetsProvidemeanstotripthereactorProvidetheinstru-mentationandpro-tioncircuitsforthecontrolandtrippingofthereactorsamesameRequiredfor'eactorTripRequiredforReactorTrip8.ReactorCoolantPumpTripRCPTripBreakersProvidemeanstotripNARCPsShortterm9.ValvesHOV825A>BHOV826A,B)C,D(BaaN.O.)AOV836A,B.ProvidepathtoSIPumpsforborated.watertohighheadsafetyinjectionProvideNaOHtoCSifneededsame10/BASTLevelo~l/2hourShorttermHOV860A,B,C)DHOV878,B,D(N.O.)ProvidepathtoCon-tainment,SprayheadersforCSPumps'rovidepathtocoldlegsof,RCSfromhighheadsafetyinjectionN/AsameLongtermnotrequiredtofunction TABLE2MAINSTEAMLINEBREAKBIOCKNO./EQUIPMENTSAFETYFUNCTION/BREAKLOCATIONSA'FETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIMEINSIDECVOUTSIDECVHOV896)A)B)(NO)MOV4007)4008ProvidepathfromRWSTofboratedwaterforSIandCSpumpssuctionProvidepathforAux.FeedwatertoSteamGeneratorssamesameshort-term(tocloseifneedsumprecirculaton)ShorttermAOV5871)5872)5873AOV5874,5875)5876BASTLevel1LT102)106)171)'72Providepathforcleaningbyfancoolers,coolingofcont.AtmosphereIndicateBASTLevelforautomatictrans-ferofSIPumpsuctionfromBASTtoRWSTN/Asamesignalinitiation10/BASTI,evelor~1/2hourMOV852A,BProvidepathforlowheadSItoReactorVesselsameSignalInitiation10.Manual'GLevelInstrumentationLT470,471,472,473LT460,461,462)463SafetyInjectionResetButtonDetermineaffectedSGsameResetSIsignalaftersameAutomaticSIsequenc-ingiscompleteShorttermlessthan24hours1A,1BComponentCoolingWaterPumpsCoolingWaterforsafeguardsequipmentsameLongterm1A,1BContainmentSprayPump(Ifcont.Pressure<30psig)ContainmentPressureN/AandTemperaturecon-trolLongtermMOV402?,4028ProvideServiceWatertoMotorDrivenAux.FeedwaterPumpsSuctionsamewithin~2hoursChargingpumpsInventorycontroltoRCSsameLongterm TABLE2BLOCKNO./EQUIPHENTHAINSTEAHLINEBREAKSAFETYFUNCTION/BREAKLOCATIONSAFETYFUNCTIONREQUIREDOPERATIONTIHEINSIDECVOUTSIDECVStandbyAFWpumpsHOV9629A,BMOV9710A,B;9703A,B;9704A,BHOV4000A,BProvideflowtoSGsifAFWsystemin-operableProvideSWtosuctionofStandbyAFWPumpsStandbyAFWdischargevalvestoprovideAFWflowtoSGsAFWCross-ConnectValvessamesamesamesameI,ongtermLongtermLongtermShortterm11.ContinuedSafeShutdownSampling(perTHI)PressurizerPORVsSampleContainmentAtmosphereandReactorCoolantRCPressureControlsamesameLongtermLongterm

AccidentReferencesLOCAanalysis[LOCA]FSAR2.3.4,5."ECCSAnalysisfortheR.E.GinnaReactorwithENCWREM-2PWREvaluationModel"datedDecember1977sub-mittedwithApplicationforAmendementtoOperatingLicense,onJanuary6,1978.ECCSAnalysissubmittedbyletterdatedApril7,1977fromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&EtoA.Schwencer,Chief,OperatingReactorsBranchIl,USNRC.ECCSAnalysisfortheR.E.GinnaReactorwithENCWREM-2PWREvaluationModel.ExxonNuclearCo.ReportXN-NF-77-58.GinnaEmergencyProceduresE1.1andE1.2,submittedbyletterdatedFebruary26,1980fromL.D.White,Jr.RG&E,toD.L.Ziemann,USNRC.SteamLineBreakandFeedwaterLineBreak[SLB/FLB]2.3.5.6'.SteamlinebreakanalysessubmittedwithApplicationforAmendmenttoOperatingLicenseonSeptember22,1975.Plant'Transient.AnalysisfortheR.E.GinnaUnit1NuclearPowerPlant,ExxonReportXN-NF-77-40(11/77andupdated12/15/78andMarch,1980.LetterdatedMay24,1977fromK.W.Amish,RG&EtoJ.F.-O'eary,NRC.GinnaEmergencyProceduresE1.1andE1.3,submittedbyletterdatedFebruary26,1980fromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&EtoD.L.Ziemann,USNRC.LetterfromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toD.L.Ziemann,NRC,March28,1980.HighEnergyLineBreak[HELB]"EffectsofPostulated'PipeBreaksOutsidetheCon-tainmentBuilding",GAIReportNo.1815,submittedbyletterdatedNovember1,1973fromK.W.Amish,RG&E,toA,Giambuso,DeputyDirectorforReactorProjects,USNRC.

LetterdatedMay24,1974fromK.W.Amish,RG&E,toJ.F.O'eary,Director,DirectorateofLicensing,USNRC.LetterdatedSeptember4,1974forR.R.Koprowski,RG&EtoEdsonCase,ActingDirector,DirectorateofLicensing,USNRC.LetterdatedNovember1,1974fromK.W.Amish,RG&E,toEdsonCase,ActingDirector,DirectorateofLi-censing,USNRC.LetterdatedMay20,1977fromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toA.Schwencer,ChiefOperatingReactorsBranch51,USNRC.LetterdatedFebruary6,'1978fromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toA.Schwencer,Chief,OperatingReactorsBranchOl,USNRC.AmendmentNo.7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseDPR-18,transmitted,byletterdatedMay14,1975fromRobertA.Purple,Chief,OperatingReactorsBranch-51,USNRC,toL.D.White,Jr,RG&E.AmendmentNo.29toProvisionalOperatingLicenseDPR-18,transmittedbyletterdatedAugust24,1979fromDennisL.Ziemann,Chief,ORB52,toL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E.Letter,L.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toD.L.Ziemann,May17,1979.Letter,L.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toD.L.Ziemann,USNRC,June27,1979.Letter,L.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toD.L.Ziemann,USNRCJuly6,1979.Letter,R.E.Anderson,Gilbert/CommonwealthtoJamesJ.Shea,USNRC,June11,1979.Letter,L.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,SEPTopicIII-5.B,"PipeBreakOutsideContainment,"August7,1980.Letter,J.WenclawiakandT.Snyder,Catalytic,toG.Wrobel,RG&E,"EquipmentEnvironmentalQualification,"October27,1980.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.White,Jr.RG&E,SEPTopicIII-S.B,"PipeBreakOutsideContainment,"June24,1980.

EffectsofFlooding[Flood]LetterdatedMay13,1975fromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toBenardC.Rusche,Director,OfficeofNuclear-ReactorRegulation,USNRC.2.3.,5.6.7.8.9.10.LetterdatedMay20,1975fromL.-D'.White,Jr.,RG&E,toRobertA.Purple,Chief,OperatingReactorsBranch51,DivisionofReactorLicensing.LetterdatedMay30,1975fromL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toRobertA.Purple.tLetterdatedJune16,1975fromL.D.White',Jr.,RG&E,toRobertA.Purple.LetterdatedJuly3,1975fromRobertA.PurpletoL.D.White,Jr.,RG&E.LetterdatedAugust.8,1972fromDonaldJ.Skovholt,AssistantDirectorforOperatingReactors,USAEC,toEdwardJ.Nelson,RG&E.LetterdatedOctober3,1972fromK.W.Amish,RG&E,toDonaldJ.Skovholt,AssistantDirectorforOperatingReactors,USAEC.LetterdatedMay31,1973fromK.W.Amish,RG&E,toDonaldJ.Skovholt,Assistant,DirectorforOperatingReactors,USAEC.ApplicationforAmendmenttoOperatingLicense,sub-mittedMarch10,1975.Amendment,No.14toProvisionalOperatingLicenseDPR-18,transmittedbyletterdatedJune1,1977fromA.Schwencer,Chief,OperatingReactorsBranch51,USNRC.Letter,L.D.White,Jr.RG&E,toDennisL.Ziemann,USNRC,HighEnergyLineBreaksOutsideContainment,June27,1979.TMILessonsLearned[TMI]RG&EletterofOctober17,1979,L.D.White,Jr.,RG&E,toD.L.Ziemann,USNRC,"TMIShortTermLessonsLearnedRequirements."2.3.RG&EletterofNovember19,1979,L.D.White,Jr.toD.L.Ziemann,USNRC,"TMIShortTermLessonsLearned."RG&EletterofDecember28,1979,L.D.White,Jr.toD.,L.Ziemann,USNRC,"TMIShortTermLessonsLearned."

II'\,(l Table3Page1Reactor:GINNASYSTElTICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededENVIRONMENTParameterRequireQuaQua.DocumentMethodReferenceCommentsSolenoidValveASCO/V-4269,V-4270LB8300B61U(FWControlValves)V-4271,V-4272LB8300B64RU(FWBypassValves)2.SolenoidValve'Copes-VulcanAOV836A,B.(NaOHtoCS)3.SolenoidValveLawrence/110114W-Supply125434W-VentV-3516,V-3517(MainSteamIsola-tion)4.SolenoidValveVersa/VSGV-5871,V-5872,~V-5873,V-5874,'V-5875,V-5876(Containment.Recir-culationSystemDampers)Area57SISignalArea52MinutesAreaI3SecondsArea51SecondsTemp('F),Pr(psia)RH(%)ChemRad.Sub.'emp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad:Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.SeeCommentsSeeCommentsSeeCommentsSeeCommentsAmb.Atm.Amb.Amb.Atm.Amb.250Atm.Amb.200Atm.Amb.YesNoExperience23ExperienceExperienceExperience23ExperienceExperienceVendorData25-,.'xperienceExperienceVendorData26ExperienceExperienceDBE-MainSLBinTurbineBldg.Fail-Safe(closed)ThesevalveswerepurchasedfromASCO.8200series.Theyarefailsafe(open).En'closedinNEMA-2drip-proofenclosurewhichissubjectedtosaltwatersprayqualificationtest.Failsafe(closed)Failsafe.Per-formssafetyfunctionwithinsecondsofstartofDBE.Notrequiredtooperatewhenaccidentconditionsarereached.

lr Table3~(]]Page2Reactor:GINNAEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededSYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMENVIRONMENTQua.DocumentParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceComments5.SolenoidValveASCOAOV-897,AOV-898(SIRecirculation)Area42Short-Term(BeforeSumpRecirculation)Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%).Chem.Rad.Sub.SeeAmb.CommentsAtm.Amb.Experience,23ExperienceExperience"Mild"Envt.tobeaddressedlater6.SolenoidValveVersa/Area51VSG-3731Area53(Cont.PurgeValves)VSG-3421(Cont.Depressuriza-tlon)SecondsTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.See200CommentsAtm.Amb.Vendordata26ExperienceExperienceFail-closetoperformcon-tainmentisola-tionfunction7.ControlRoomDampersD-81+D-878a.LimitorqueSMB-2RelianceMotorMOV841,865(AccumulatorDischarge)Area41NotrequiredtooperateTemp(oFPr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.See320Comments105100Yes2x10NoTestTestTestTestTest18,1918,1918,1918,1918,1937NotElectrical.DeletedfromReportValvesarelocked-openwithpowerremoved.Noneedtofunction.tj8b.LimitorqueSMB-OO,PeerlessMOV826A,B,C,D(BASTtoSIPumps)MOV896A,B(RWSTtoSIPumps)Area52Short-Term(BeforeSumprecirculation)Temp('F)Amb.Pr(psia)Atm.RH(%)Amb.Chem.NoRad.NoSub.NoAmb.Atm.Amb.Experience13ExperienceExperienceNotexposedtoDBEenvironment

Table3Page3Reactor:GINNAEquipmentTypeSYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMTameENVIRONMENTQua.DocumentLocationNeededParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceComments8c.IimitorqueSMB-00'RelianceMotorMOV825A,B{RWSTtoSIPumps)Area52Short-Term(BeforeSumpRecirculation)Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.*Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.Experience'3ExperienceExp'erienceNoexposedtoDBEenvironmentSd.8e.LimitorqueSMB-00RelianceMotorMOV4007,4008(AFWDischarge)MOV4027,4028(AFWSuction)4000A,B(AFWCross-Connect)LimitorqueSMB-00RelianceV-850A,B(SumpValves)MOV856(RWSTtoRHR)V-857A,B,C(RHRtoSI)V-860A,B,C,D(CSValves)Area43Area02LongShort-Term.OnlyforDBEsnotinareaN.SeeComment.Temp(4F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr{psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.SeeCommentAmb.Atm.Amb.No3x10NoAmb.Atm.Amb.320105100Yes2x10ExperienceExperienceExperienceTestTestTestTestTest18,19,5318ilgi5318,19,5318,19,5318,19,53NotrequiredtooperateinharshDBEenvt.Alter-nativeSAFWsystemavailable.NotexposedtoDBEenvironmentexceptpost-LOCAsumpwaterrecir-culation8f.LimitorqueSMB-00MOV-851A,BArea51Notrequiredtooperateemp(oF)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.SeeAmb.CommentAtm.Amb.NoNoNoExperience13ExperienceExperienceNotrequiredtofunctionforDBE.Valvesareinlocked-openposi-tionasrequiredforSI.

Table3Page4Reactor:GINNAEquipmentTypeTame,Location-NeededSYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMENVIRONMENTQua.DocumentParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceCommentsg.Limitorque"SMB-00PeerlessMotorMOV878B,D(SItocoldlegs)8h.LimitorqueSMB-1RelianceMotorMOV852A,B(coredeluge)Area51NotrequiredtooperateArea01SISignalTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.28675100Yes1.6x10NoAmb.Atm.Amb.320105100Yes2x10NoExperience-ExperienceExperienceTestTestTestTestTest1318,1918,1918,1918,1918,1937NotrequiredtofunctionforDBE.Valvesarelockedinopenposition,asneededforSI.Valvecompletessafetyfunction(toopen)earlyintoaccident8i.LimitorqueSMB-00RelianceMotorMOV9703A,B;9704A,B;9710A,B(StandbyAFWSystem)9.Motor,PumpGeneralElectric(StandbyAFW)Area46LongTermArea86LongTermTemp(4F)120Pr(psia)Atm.RH(%)Amb.Chem.NoRad.NoSub.NoTemp('F)120Pr(psia)Atm.RH(%)Amb.Chem.NoRad.NoSub.No120Atm.Amb.122Atm.Amb.VendorDataExperienceExperienceVendorDataExperienceExperience43,47,542,3,43,47StandbyAFWSystemlocatedincon-trolledenvt.StandbyAFWpumpslocatedinaux.bldg.annexwhichhascontrolledenvt.1Q.Motor,PumpWestinghouse444TSTBDP445TSTBDP(ContainmentSpray,RHR,ComponentCooling)Area52LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.No3x10No104FAtm.Amb.1x10SpecExperienceExperienceTest15,16,67OnlyDBEenviron-mentispost-accidentradiation69 Table3Page5Reactor:GINNASYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededENVIRONMENTParameterRequireQua.QuaMethodDocumentReferenceCommentsll.Motor,PumpWestinghouse505USABDP(AuxiliaryFeed-water)Area()3LongTemp('F)SeePr(psia)CommentRH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.1040FAtm.Amb.2x10SpecExperienceExperienceTest8,16,6768HaveinstalledtotallyredundantsystemnotexposedtoDBE(standbyAFW)12a.Motor,PumpWestinghouse509USAFDP(SafetyInjection)12b.Motor,Pump509UPHABDP(ServiceWater)AreaC3LongAreaN5LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.No3xloNoAmb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNo104oFAtm.Amb.2x10SeeCommentSpecExperienceExperienceTestExperienceExperienceExperience15,16,676867OnlyDBEenviron-mentispost-accidentradiationThisitemisina"mild"environ-ment.Itwillbeaddressedlater.13a.Penetrations,ElectricalCrouse-HindsArea41LongTemp('F)286FPr(psia)75RH(%)100%Chem.YesRad.1.6xl0Sub.No340oF105100%Yes1.17x10TestTestTestTestTest1,45,54,581,4S,S4,S81,45,54,585845,64Radiationlevelatlocationofpene-trltions<1.6x10rads.Qualifi-ficationtestisgreaterthanDORguidelinesvalueof2x10rads.13b.Penetrations,ElectricalWestinghouseAreaNlLongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.286oF75100%es81.6x10No340oF75100%s82.1x10TestTestTestTest29,30,5929,30,5929,30,5929,30,59

Table3Page6Reactor:GINNAEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededSYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMENVIRONMENTQua.DocumentParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceComments14.TerminalBlockWestinghouse542247Area51LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)chem.Rad.Sub.286oF75100%oes81.6x10No3400F121100%Yes72x10TestTestTestTestTest5050505060Locationofblocks7issuchthat2x10rads,avalueequaltotheDORguidelinesvalue,shouldbeacceptable.Also,terminalblockswillbeelevated.15a.CableKeriteHTAreaIlLongPr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.75100%es81.6xlONoTemp(oF)286F340oF118100%Yes82xlOTestTestTestTestTest11,38,51,55,6315b.CableKeriteHTAllLongPr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.15.8100NoNoNoTemp(oF)220oF340oF118100Yes82x10TestTestTestTestTest11,38,51,55,6316.CableColemanCableAreaNlLongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.28675100Yes1.6xloNo340118100es82xlOTestTestTestTestTest46,5146,5146,5146,5146,51 Table3Page7Reactor:GINNASYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededENVIRONMENTParameterRequireQua.Qua.MethodDocumentReferenceComments17.CableColemanCableRomeCableGeneralCable/18.Transmitter,LevelFoxboro(RWSTLevel)AllLongAreaN2ShortTerm(BeforeSumpRecirculation)Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.22015.8100NoNoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNo250Atm.Amb.Amb.Atm.Amb.TestExperienceExperienceExperienceExperience.Experience5,10,46Inlieuof100/RH,anowlzmmersxontestperformedperIPCEAS-61-402NotexposedtoDBEwhenrequiredtotofunction19.Transmitter,LevelArea42ShortTermBarton289(BeforeSump(RWSTLevel)Recirculation)20.Transmitter,FlowArea51SecondsBarton332(SteamFlow)Temp(oF)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNo28675100Yes1.6x10No200Atm.Amb.SeeCommentsVendorDataExperienceExperienceSeeComments3431NotexposedtoDBEenvt.whenrequiredtofunction.NotexposedtotoDBEwhenrequiredtofunction.21.Transmitter,Pres.Areas2,3Long,Barton332(Cont.Pressure)Temp(oF)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoSeeCommentsSeeComments31NotexposedtoDBEwhenrequiredtofunction.

Table3pPage8Reactor:GINNASYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededENVIRONMENTQua.DocumentParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceComments22.Transmitter,PressureFoxboro611GM-DSI~(PRZRPressure)23.Transmitter,PressureFoxboro611GM-DSI(SteamPressure)24.Transmitter,LevelFoxboro613M-MDLModified(PrzrLevel)Area41ShortArea43ShortArea51Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Sub.28675100Yesl.7xl0NoSeeCommentsSeeComments28675100Yes<3x10SeeCommentsSeeCommentsTestTestTestTestEvaluationSeeCommentsSeeComments18,19,3318,19,3318,19,3318,19,3318,1918,1918,1918,1918,1918,19Adequateforshort-termfunction.Willbereplacedandelevatedtoperformpost-accidentmonitoringfunctionNotexposedtoDBEwhenrequiredtofunctionNotrequiredforashort-termsafetyfunction.Willbereplacedforlong-termmonitoring25.Transmitter,LevelArea52SortFoxboro613DM-MSI(BASTLevel)26.Transmitter,LevelArea51Foxboro613(SGLevel)Temp(4F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoSeeCommentsAmb.Atm.Amb.SeeCommentsExperienceExperienceExperienceSeeCommentsNotexposedtoDBEAlternativeinstrumentationavailabletoper-formsafetyfunction.Willbereplacedforlong-termmonitoring.

II Table3Page9Reactor:GINNAEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededSYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMENVIRONMENTqua.DocumentParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceComments27.TempElementRosemount/176JA(,RTDs)28.BatteryGould/FTA-19Area¹1Area¹8LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.SeeCommentsAmb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNo200Atm.Amb.200R/hr110Atm.Amb.Spec35ExperienceExperienceSpec35VendorData9,32ExperienceExperienceNotrequiredtofunctionforshort-termDBE.Willbereplacedforlong-termmonitoringNotexposedtoDBE29a.DieselGeneratorArea¹4LongALCODiesel251Fb.Westinghouse1900KWGeneratorc.Westinghousefueloiltransferpump-1HP-modelTEFCClassPMFInsulationTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.Experience7ExperienceExperienceNotexposedtoDBE30.Motor,ContainmentArea¹1LongFanCoolersWestinghouse588.5-CSPTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.28675100Yes1.6x10No32095100Yes82xloTestTestTestTestTest18,19,20,64,65,67,7031.CircuitBreakerWestinghouseDB-50A1600AArea¹3SecondsTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.SeeCommentsAmb.Atm.Amb.ExperienceExperienceExperienceEquipmentwillfail-safeonlossofpower Table3Page10Reactor:GINNASYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEquipmentType32.IRCCabinetsFoxboroLocationTameNeededArea08LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.ENVIRONMENTParameterRequireQua.qua.MethodExperienceExperienceExperienceDocumentReferenceCommentsNotexposedtoDBE33.HVACWestinghouse2162{ControlRoomAHU)Area58LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNo122Atm.Amb.Spec4,6ExperienceExperienceNotexposedtoDBE34.SpliceSleevesArea51LongTemp(4F)286340Test36,38,5156,62RaychemWCSF-N35.Solenoids/ValcorV57300(PressurizerPORVs),'36.LevelSwitchesGEMCorp.Model:Special-SimilartoLS-1900(ContainmentSump"B"Level)AreaOlLongArea41Pr(psia)RH{%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.75100Yes1.6x10No28675100Yes1.6x10NoSeeComments118100es82x10346128100Yes82x10SeeCommentsTestTestTestTestTestTestTestTest52Notrequiredtoperformsafetyfunction.How-willbereplacedforTMI-STLL

c,Table3PagellReactor:GINNASYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEguipmentTypeLocationT1meNeededENVIRONMENTParameterRequ1reQua.QuaMethodDocumentReferenceComments37.H2RecombinerArea41IgniterExciterUnitGLAPartNo.43737,Rev.A,Serial001LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.28675100Yes1.6xloNo315105100Yes1.73x10TestTestTestTestTest18,19,4918,19,4918,19,4918,19,4918,19,4938.39.40.41.IH2RecombinerBlowerMotor(2/15Scale)W2HP,ClassHIns.,ModelTBFCSO68C24196PumpMotorU.S.ElectricalMotorsModelVEU,100HPFrame84-445UInsulationClassB(ChargingPump)Solenoids/JohnsonControlsModelD251(ControlRoomAirHandlingUnitDampers)MediumVoltageSwitchgearWestinghouseDH-350E1200ABreakers(RCPTripBreakers)Area51LongAreaN2LongArea58ShortArea07ShortTemp(OFPr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp(OF)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Temp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.28675100Yes1.6xl0NoAmb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.NoNoNo28675100Yes2.0x10NoAmb.Atm.Amb.Amb.Atm.Amb.Amb.Atm.Amb.Te'stTestTestTestTestExperienceExperienceExperienceExperienceExperienceExperienceExperienceExperienceExperience18,19,4918,19,4918,19,4918,19,4918,19,49NotexposedtoDBEenvironmentNotexposedtoDBEenvironmentBreakersneedonlyopenforLOCAinsidecontainmenttostopRCpumps.NotexposedtoDBEwhenneededtofunction.cc

Table3Page12Reactor:GINNASYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAMEquipmentTypeLocationTameNeededENVIRONMENTQua-Document,ParameterRequireQua.MethodReferenceComments42.RHRPumpCoolingSystemFanMotorsWestinghouseModelSBDPClassBInsulation-2HPArea02LongTemp('F)Pr(psia)RH(%)Chem.Rad.Sub.Amb.Atm.3xlONoNoAmb.Atm.Amb.7lx10ExperienceExperienceExperienceTest69OnlyexposedtoDBEradiationenvironment43.ContSpray/SIPumpandChargingPumpCoolingSystemsFanMotorsWestinghouseModelSBDPClassBInsulation-3HP44.MainControlBoardReactorTripRacksRelayLogicandTestRacksMiscellaneousRacksAuxiliaryRelayRacksSafeguardRacksReactorCoolantSystemRacksCVCSRacksFeedwaterControlRacksSISequenceRacksArea52LongAreaN2LongTemp('F)Amb.Pr(psia)Atm.RH(%)Amb.6Chem.3x10Rad.NoSub.NoSeeCommentsAmb.Atm.Amb.>1x10ExperienceExperienceExperienceTest69OnlyexposedtoDBEradiationenvironment"Mild"Environment.beaddressedatalatertime CI Table4EnvironmentalServiceConditionsInsideContainmentNormal0erationTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:60-120F0psig50%(nominal)1Rad/hrgeneral.Canbehigherorlowernearspecificcomponents.Temperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Chem.Spray:Flooding:AuxiliarBuildinNormal0erationFigur'e5(286'Fmax)Figure4(60psigdesign)100%Figure6(1.6x10total)Solutionofboricacid(2000to3000ppmboron)plusNaOHinwater.SolutionpHbetween8and10.7ft(approx)Temperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:50-104F0psig,60%(nominal)10mr/hrgeneral,withareasnearRHRpiping<100mr/hrduringshutdownoperationAccidentConditionsincludinsumrecirculationTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:50-104'F(122'Fnearmotors)0psig60%(nominal)OperatingFloor(271'lev.):NearBus14andNCC1C61L:100radOtherAreas:lessthan50radIntermediateFloor(253'lev.):NearBus16andMCC1D81N:900radOtherAreas:lessthan500radBasementFloor(236'lev.):NearCS,RHR,an(SIPumps:2.8x10padsOtherareas:<10radsN/AN/A

C.IntermediateBuildinNormal0eratzonTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:50-104'F0psig60%(nominal)1mr/hr(highernearreactorcoolantsamplinglines)AccidentConditionBaseduonHELBorMELBTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:215'Ffor30minutes;thenreducingto104within3hrs0.8psigfor30minutes;thenreducingtoO,psigwithin3hrs100%indefinitelyN/AN/A0BaseduonLOCAconditionsTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:D.CableTunnel115'Findefinitely*nearlargemotorsandFWandSLpiping.104'Finopenareas0psig100%NegligibleN/A0E.SameasIntermediateControlBuildinControlRoomNormal0erationBuildingTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:AccidentConditionsTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:50-104'F(usually70-78'F)0psig60%(nominal)Negligible104oF0.psig60%(nominal)NegligibleN/AN/A*Estimated(noexplicitcalculationsperformed)

~1Normal0erationTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:JAccidentConditionsTemperature:Pressure:Humidity.Radiation:Spray:Flooding:50-104F0psig60%(nominal)Negligible104F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleN/AN/ANormal0erationTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:AccidentConditionsTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:SprayFlooding:50-104F0psig60%(nominal)Negligible<104'F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleN/AN/ANecbanicalEimentRoomNormal0eratzonTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Accident,ConditionsTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:50-104F0psig60%(nominal)Negligible<104'F0psig60%(nominal).NegligibleNone3ft.(estimatedforaservicewaterlineleak)

F.DieselGeneratorRoomsNormal0eratxonTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:AccidentConditions60-104F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:G.TurbineBuildinNormal0eration104F0psig90%(estimated)NegligibleN/A0ft**Temperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:AccidentConditions50-104F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:H.AuxiliarBuildinAnnexNormal0eratzon220'F'or30minutes,reduceto100'Fwithin3hrs.1.14psigonmezzanineandbasementlevels,0.7psigonoperatingfloor100%NegligibleN/A18'~inbasement(Circ.WaterBreak)Temperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Accident.'Conditions60-120F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:60-120F.0psig60%(normal)NegligibleN/A2ft.**Servicewaterlinecrackwouldaffectonlyoneroom(seeFEOOD-15)

ScreenhouseNormal0erationTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:AccidentConditions:50-104F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleTemperature:Pressure:Humidity:Radiation:Spray:Flooding:<104F0psig60%(nominal)NegligibleN/A18"(Circ.WaterBreak)

DeedaBasf.sAccidentTemperature-.TimeCurve$000IIII5$0--150~ContainmentTemperatureo~~SumpTemperature~..'loIi.loI~~~~II~I,.~)I~~o~'IIIHeatExchangerOutletI.Temperature~~HIoII,'.-~II~~I~)I~~oII~I*II'I~~~~l.I.~~.'II'~'It.l~.I'~~~~ir~~rI~~*\I~~~~toolI~I~II.'..--i;:>>~I-:~f--1OOI'"'I'-'I"-I-l-j..I~I~.,Illa:..-..j.LI.~~.I~~~~~~~~Ii).,I.o.JufI.j.lP~-l-iI'I--lj,j~---.,I.oI~II-s~..~~~(~~rItg~~lf...Iq,).I.I.-~~oConservativeRepresentationI~~i~oEContainmentPrcssureQI5IO:,.'0~:.~~':-.::.'~:~.':.I10I~~~~I~I10I~:;i.16~6+18-.':'.~II~~<-~',-~t~4-t-I.II)Jay-t~'0310TimAfter9sl.gn2asisAccident('econds)10PoggQgQ

Post-AccidentConMinnentY~terialsDesignConditionsI~....'~~,~!~I~~~.~~.3~,.!~~,~~,~~~,~~~~~~~~~~~~II~'I~'gl'~,;',~'~'~';;,'~,!~,j...,~~~~~~~r.I%PE'P~'I~0~yw,tI~,I~I~~I~~~L~~~~~~I~250.~~I~I~'2OOIgC0!OI~II~~I~a~,'!'~~~~~~~~~gg4~I4~I~lI1.~Ž.-.I~~II+~~",!.'~'''''1M'j~~~~~4~~~4\~'II~IFigurc5 109,54S6799)ContninmentAtmosphereIntcgrntedCnmmnDoseLevel456709125456769)45I)799)254567991676S~~~~it)ltI~I'iti,it!l~<<~'Ial1~IfIi~rti+Zjji~)liCI~i.iIilIIJrLifria<<'Iaairaa'Ia~tit!Ia~,,',iL'.I'II~I~~f~traaigita3~IBf~J2~li~Ia~)ra-'p.glcl10)<<j<<:6IZ}76FIJo2I109676510-~~IIL'j~~wa~~I}~!Irl1;I~'ItlL-"xgWW)4j.'i'l~~a'~II<<~~I~taIIIII~Il'i':.i)i'}a~~IJII+IIi'Jl'I~I.~IR'}J~li:.)p,WI.~JIj3'i~I)II""')IIIII~~:5))}~~I~iaIiii!;IlttIll;~IILt'~ilJli1la!a'I~II'.~IL"~I.;1'Itjil!'iiIaI<<I,.II':II<<II'I'al~I~~I'IIIII'~rItf~I~!atI~~3II!arta)trI~~}~iiIrI:.yldnyII~I'IiIIil}:',I:~I)I;.I;I'9~It,~I~~I,~IIa,!~IlI~II~weekIII~a1+4'.IIl"1M~aI~LaaI:~I~'Pi,itilIi}!I!I:J:":)lI:,:1monthIIa~~I11La~IIat!IIlliiiaI'l)JaMI~jj:II.Z':'t~I~~ilia~III:-'}LIilliI~','gj"It"iF)IxL'I1yent101010t2J.Lf10-'-10TimeAfter.ActivityRelensc(hours)Figur) I,I'>i<I'r)~f GINNASTATION(DOCUMENTATIONREFERENCE)l.2~3~4,5.6.7~8.9~10.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20'1-22'3'4'5.26'7.28'9'0'1'2'3.34'5'6'7'8'9'0'3.dstionsna1974fromL.D.WhiteonReportF-C5074,SpliceSleevesCrouse-HindsPenetrationTestReportGilbertSpec.520-StandbyAFNPumpsGilbertSpec.711-StandbyAFWPumpMotorsGilbertSpec.5201-LargeMotorsDeleted.IncludedinReference51GilbertSpec.5342-HVACThroughoutGinnaGilbertSpec.RO-2239-DieselGeneratorsGilbertSpec.RO-2267-AuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpsGilbertSpec.RO-2400-BatteriesIPCEAStd.S-61-402,Sect.3.8and4.3.1KeriteMemo7/22/68NEMAStd.SG-3,LowVoltageCircuitBreakersNestinghouseSpec.676258-MotorOperatedValvesWestinghouseSpec.676270-ControlValvesWestinghouseSpec.676370-AuxiliaryPumpsWestinghouseSpec.676427-AuxiliaryPumpMotorsNCAP7343June,1969NCAP7410-L,Vol.I&IIWCAP7744,Vol.I8IINCAP9003,January,1969Deleted.IncludedinReference45DeletedReportNS-CE-775,Pail-SafeOperationofASCOSolen.Copes-VulcanSolenoidValvesVendorDataonLaurenceSolenoidVendorDataonVersaSolenoidWCAP7153Deleted.IncludedinReference45GilbertSpec.504-WestinghouseElectricalPenetraTechnical.ProposalforElectricPenetrationforGinContainmentStructurebyNesti'nghouse-September4NCAP7354-LVendorDataonGouldBatteriesWestinghouseSpec.SheetforFoxboroTransmittersVendorDataonBarton209TransmitterRosemontRTDSpec.VendorDataonRaychemSpliceSleevesJune16,1975LettertoR-.A.PurpleContainmentFloodingApril4,1979FRCFinalandCableDeletedDeleted (IJIR) GINNASTATION(DOCUMENTATIONREFERENCE)-CONT'D41'2'3.44~45'6'7.48'9;50'1.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60'1'2'3'4.65'6~67'8.69'0'eletedDeletedDesignCriteria-StandbyAux.FeedwaterSystem-October24,1974LimitSwitchesDesignApprovalTestonMaterialUsedinWestinghousePenetrationsfortheBrunswickStationofCarolinaPowerandLightCompany-Augustll,1972TestDataforColemanandRomeCableAgingFailureDetect.ionProgramValcorSolenoidValve:VendorDataandTestReportExtractsWCAP-9001WestinghouseTerminalBlocksCableIdentificat.ionandQualificationSupplement,IncludingF-C5074(Supplement)ConcerningSilicone-Rubber-InsulatedCableQualificat.ionWide-RangeSumpLevelSwitchSpecificationLimitorqueValveOperatorData,IncludingLimitorqueReportB0003andSection4.1.4ofB0058.Containment,ElectricalPenetrationsKeriteLetter,June26,1980IEInspections78-20and78-21-ReportsConcerningInstallationofSpliceSleevesControlValveSpecificationSP-513-044666-000,September27.,1974,Concerning.StandbyApWValvesWestinghouse10/10/80LetterConcerningCrouse-HindsElectricalPenetrationsEvaluationofOrganicMaterialsonCrouse-HindsElectricalPenetrationsWestinghouseTerminalBlockInformationonAgingandRadiationAgingEvaluationofWestinghouseElectricalPenetrat.ionsRaychemSpliceSleeveAgingInformationKeriteCableAgingInformationContainmentFanCoolerMotorSplicesSafety-Rel'atedMotorBearings.-MaintenanceandLubricationSafety-RelatedMotorCharacteristics(Insulation)WCAP-8754WestinghouseResearchReport71-1C2-RADMC-Rl,December31,1970(RevisedApril10,'1971),Concerning"TheEffect,ofRadiationonInsulatingMaterialsUsedinWestinghouseMediumMotors"WCAP-7829,"FanCoolerMotorUnitTest" IJJJ;P~f}}