ML17263A833: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 328: | Line 328: | ||
==Reference:== | ==Reference:== | ||
FC7.1HCS6.1PC8.1BasisReference(s):None9-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ATTACHMENTAFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERLOSS4POTENTIALLOSSINDICATORS FissionProductBarrierLoss/PotentialLossMatrix(Rosethresholdsforwhichlossorpotentialisdeterminedtobeimminent,classifyasthoughthethreshold(s)hasbeenexceeded)PotentialLoss,ORANGEpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoreExitThermocoupleReadings>/00'FRVLIS543%w/noRCPsrunningEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGCoolantactivity>300IiCi/ccof1-131CoreExitThermocoupleReadings>1200'FContainmentradmonitorreading>100R/hrLetdownMonitor(R-9)reading>10R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentPotentialLossREDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITYREDpathonF-0.3,HEATSINKPrimaiysystemleakage>46gpmEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentRCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakageUnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"Containmentradiationmonitorreading>10R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentA-2 FissionProductBarrierLoss/PotentialLossMatrix+hosethresholdsforwhichlossorpotentialisdeterminedtobeimminent,classifyasthoughthethreshold(s)hasbeenexceeded)PotentialLoseREDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENTRapiduncontrolleddecreaseinContainmentPressurefollowinginitialincreaseEither:Coreexitthermocouples>1200'FORCoreexitthermocouples>700'FwithRVLIS<43%(noRCPs)ANDRestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15minutesLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditions,i.e.unexpectedchangesoccurintheseparametersthatarenotexplainableduetooperatoractionsorautomaticsystemactions.SafetyinjectionsignalduetoLOCAwith<theminimumcontainmentcoolingsafeguardsequipmentoperating:CNMTpressure<28psig:2CNMTRecircFansCNMTpressure228psig:2CNMTSprayPumpsOR2CNMTRecircFansand1CNMTSprayPumpEither.CIorCVIisolationrequiredandCIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsContainmentpressure60psigandincreasingReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakagegreaterthantechspecallowableof0.1CPMpersteamgeneratorh4%hydrogenconcentrationincontainmentBothdoorsopenoncontainmentairlockORInabilitytoclosecontainmentpressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentORClorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredwhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentContainmentradiationmonitorreading>1000R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentA-3 ATTACHIVlENTBWORDLIST/DEFINITIONS OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ActuateToputintooperation;tomovetoaction;commonlyusedtorefertoautomated,multi-facetedoperations."ActuateECCS".AdversaryAsappliedtosecurityEALs,anindividualwhoseintentistocommitsabotage,disruptStationoperationsorotherwisecommitacrimeonstationproperty.Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotentialsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.AnyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractionsoftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels.AvailableThestateorconditionofbeingreadyandabletobeused(placedintooperation)toaccomplishthestated(orimplied)actionorfunction.Asappliedtoasystem,thisrequirestheoperabilityofnecessarysupportsystems(electricalpowersupplies,coolingwater,lubrication,etc.).Can/Cannotbedetermined(</>)Thecurrentvalueorstatusofanidentifiedparameterrelativetothatspecifiedcan/cannotbeascertainedusingallavailableindications(directandindirect,singlyorincombination).Can/Cannotbemaintainedabove/below(c/>)Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecifiedlimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformanceinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Neitherimpliesthattheparametermustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached.B-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Can/Cannotberestoredabove/below(c/>)Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobereturnedtoabove/belowspeci6edlimitsafterhavingpassedthoselimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemsperformancesinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Doesnotimplyanyspecifictimeintervalbutdoesnotpermitprolongedoperationbeyondalimitwithouttakingthespecifiedaction.Asappliedtolossofelectricalpowersources(ex.:Powercannotberestoredtoanyvitalbusin<4hrs)thespecifiedpowersourcecannotbereturnedtoservicewithinthespecifiedtime.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturerestorationcapabilities.Impliesthatthedeclarationshouldbemadeassoonasthedeterminationismadethatthepowersourcecannotberestoredwithinthespecifiedtime.CloseTopositionavalveordampersoastopreventflowoftheprocessfluid.Tomakeanelectricalconnectiontosupplypower.Con6rm/Con6rmationTovalidate,throughvisualobservationorphysicalinspection,thatanassumedconditionisasexpectedorrequired,withouttakingactiontoalterthe"asfound"configuration.ControlTakeaction,asnecessary,tomaintainthevalueofaspecifiedparameterwithinapplicablelimits;tofixoradjustthetime,amount,orrateof;toregulateorrestrict.DecreaseTobecomeprogressivelylessinsize,amount,number,orintensity.DischargeRemovalofafluid/gas&omavolumeorsystem. | FC7.1HCS6.1PC8.1BasisReference(s):None9-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ATTACHMENTAFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERLOSS4POTENTIALLOSSINDICATORS FissionProductBarrierLoss/PotentialLossMatrix(Rosethresholdsforwhichlossorpotentialisdeterminedtobeimminent,classifyasthoughthethreshold(s)hasbeenexceeded)PotentialLoss,ORANGEpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoreExitThermocoupleReadings>/00'FRVLIS543%w/noRCPsrunningEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGCoolantactivity>300IiCi/ccof1-131CoreExitThermocoupleReadings>1200'FContainmentradmonitorreading>100R/hrLetdownMonitor(R-9)reading>10R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentPotentialLossREDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITYREDpathonF-0.3,HEATSINKPrimaiysystemleakage>46gpmEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentRCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakageUnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"Containmentradiationmonitorreading>10R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentA-2 FissionProductBarrierLoss/PotentialLossMatrix+hosethresholdsforwhichlossorpotentialisdeterminedtobeimminent,classifyasthoughthethreshold(s)hasbeenexceeded)PotentialLoseREDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENTRapiduncontrolleddecreaseinContainmentPressurefollowinginitialincreaseEither:Coreexitthermocouples>1200'FORCoreexitthermocouples>700'FwithRVLIS<43%(noRCPs)ANDRestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15minutesLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditions,i.e.unexpectedchangesoccurintheseparametersthatarenotexplainableduetooperatoractionsorautomaticsystemactions.SafetyinjectionsignalduetoLOCAwith<theminimumcontainmentcoolingsafeguardsequipmentoperating:CNMTpressure<28psig:2CNMTRecircFansCNMTpressure228psig:2CNMTSprayPumpsOR2CNMTRecircFansand1CNMTSprayPumpEither.CIorCVIisolationrequiredandCIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsContainmentpressure60psigandincreasingReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakagegreaterthantechspecallowableof0.1CPMpersteamgeneratorh4%hydrogenconcentrationincontainmentBothdoorsopenoncontainmentairlockORInabilitytoclosecontainmentpressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentORClorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredwhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentContainmentradiationmonitorreading>1000R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentA-3 ATTACHIVlENTBWORDLIST/DEFINITIONS OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ActuateToputintooperation;tomovetoaction;commonlyusedtorefertoautomated,multi-facetedoperations."ActuateECCS".AdversaryAsappliedtosecurityEALs,anindividualwhoseintentistocommitsabotage,disruptStationoperationsorotherwisecommitacrimeonstationproperty.Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotentialsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.AnyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractionsoftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels.AvailableThestateorconditionofbeingreadyandabletobeused(placedintooperation)toaccomplishthestated(orimplied)actionorfunction.Asappliedtoasystem,thisrequirestheoperabilityofnecessarysupportsystems(electricalpowersupplies,coolingwater,lubrication,etc.).Can/Cannotbedetermined(</>)Thecurrentvalueorstatusofanidentifiedparameterrelativetothatspecifiedcan/cannotbeascertainedusingallavailableindications(directandindirect,singlyorincombination).Can/Cannotbemaintainedabove/below(c/>)Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecifiedlimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformanceinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Neitherimpliesthattheparametermustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached.B-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Can/Cannotberestoredabove/below(c/>)Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobereturnedtoabove/belowspeci6edlimitsafterhavingpassedthoselimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemsperformancesinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Doesnotimplyanyspecifictimeintervalbutdoesnotpermitprolongedoperationbeyondalimitwithouttakingthespecifiedaction.Asappliedtolossofelectricalpowersources(ex.:Powercannotberestoredtoanyvitalbusin<4hrs)thespecifiedpowersourcecannotbereturnedtoservicewithinthespecifiedtime.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturerestorationcapabilities.Impliesthatthedeclarationshouldbemadeassoonasthedeterminationismadethatthepowersourcecannotberestoredwithinthespecifiedtime.CloseTopositionavalveordampersoastopreventflowoftheprocessfluid.Tomakeanelectricalconnectiontosupplypower.Con6rm/Con6rmationTovalidate,throughvisualobservationorphysicalinspection,thatanassumedconditionisasexpectedorrequired,withouttakingactiontoalterthe"asfound"configuration.ControlTakeaction,asnecessary,tomaintainthevalueofaspecifiedparameterwithinapplicablelimits;tofixoradjustthetime,amount,orrateof;toregulateorrestrict.DecreaseTobecomeprogressivelylessinsize,amount,number,orintensity.DischargeRemovalofafluid/gas&omavolumeorsystem. | ||
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1EnterTogointo.EstablishToperformactionsnecessarytomeetastatedcondition."EstablishcommunicationwiththeControlRoom."EvacuateToremovethecontentsof;toremovepersonnelfromanarea.ExceedsTogoorbebeyondastatedorimpliedlimit,measure,ordegree.ExistTohavebeingwithrespecttounderstoodlimitationsorconditions.FailureAstateofinabilitytoperformanormalfunction.GeneralEmergencyEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationormeltingwithpotentialforlossofcontainmentintegrity.ReleasescanbereasonablyexpectedtoexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsoFsiteformorethantheimmediatesitearea.Logictermwhichindicatesthattakingtheactionprescribediscontingentuponthecurrentexistenceofthestatedcondition(s).Iftheidenti6edconditionsdonotexist,theprescribedactionisnottobetakenandexecutionofoperatora'ctionsmustproceedpromptlyinaccordancewithsubsequentinstructions.B-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1'ncreaseTobecomeprogressivelygreaterinsize,amount,numberorintensity.IndicateTopointoutorpointto;todisplaythevalueofaprocessvariable;tobeasignorsymbol.InitiateTheactofplacingequipmentorasystemintoservice,eithermanuallyorautomatically.Activationofafunctionorprotectivefeature(i.e.initiateamanualtrip).IajectionTheactofforcingafluidintoavolumeorvessel.InoperableNotabletoperformit'sintendedfunctionIntrusionTheactofenteringwithoutauthorizationFailureofoperabilityorlackofaccessto.MaintainTakeaction,asnecessary,tokeepthevalueofthespecifiedparameterwithintheapplicablelimits.MonitorObserveandevaluateatafrequencysufBcienttoremainapprisedofthevalue,trend,andrateofchangeofthespecifiedparameter.B-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1NotifyTogivenoticeoforreporttheoccurrenceof;tomakeknownto;toinformspecifiedpersonnel;toadvise;tocommunicate;tocontact;torelay.OpenTopositionavalveordampersoastoallowflowoftheprocessfluid.Tobreakanelectricalconnectionwhichremovesapowersupplyfromanelectricaldevice.Tomakeavailableforentryorpassagebyturningback,removing,orclearingaway.OperableAbletoperformit'sintendedfunctionPerformTocarryoutanaction;toaccomplish;toaFect;toreachanobjective.PrimarySystemThepipes,valves,andotherequipmentwhichconnectdirectlytothereactorvesselorreactorcoolantsystemsuchthatareductioninreactorcoolantsystempressurewilleffectadecreaseinthesteamorwaterbeingdischargedthroughanunisolatedbreakinthesystem.RemoveTochangethelocationorpositionof.ReportTodescribeasbeinginaspecificstate.RequireTodemandasnecessaryoressential.8-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Taketheappropriateactionrequirestoreturnthevalueofanidentifiedparametertowithinapplicablelimits.RiseDescribesanincreaseinaparameterastheresultofanoperatororautomaticaction.SampleToperformananalysisonaspecifiedmediatodetermineitsproperties.ShutdownToperformoperationsnecessarytocauseequipmenttoceaseorsuspendoperation;tostop."Shutdownunnecessaryequipment."SiteAreaEmergencyEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsexceptnearthesiteboundary.SustainedProlonged.NotintermittentoroftransitorynatureTFlpTode-energizeapumporfanmotor;topositionabreakersoastointerruptorpreventtheflowofcurrentintheassociatedcircuit;tomanuallyactivateasemi-automaticfeature.ITotakeactiontocauseshutdownofthereactorbyrapidlyinsertingacontrolrodorcontrolrods(PWR).8-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1UncontrolledAnevolutionlackingcontrolbutisnottheresultofoperatoraction.UnplannedNotasanexpectedresultofdeliberateaction.UntilIndicatesthattheassociatedprescribedactionistoproceedonlysolongastheidentifiedconditiondoesnotexist.UnusualEventEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichindicateapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Noreleasesofradioactivematerialrequiringoffsiteresponseormonitoringareexpectedunlessfurtherdegradationofsafetysystemsoccurs.ValidSupportedorcorroboratedonasoundbasis.VentToopenaneffluent(exhaust)flowpathfromanenclosedvolume;toreducepressureinanenclosedvolume.VerifyToconGrmaconditionandtakeactiontoestablishthatconditionifrequired."Verifyreactortrip,verifySIpumpsrunning."B-8 f4)pi(i'IIl~'I<<->~a)A | OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1EnterTogointo.EstablishToperformactionsnecessarytomeetastatedcondition."EstablishcommunicationwiththeControlRoom."EvacuateToremovethecontentsof;toremovepersonnelfromanarea.ExceedsTogoorbebeyondastatedorimpliedlimit,measure,ordegree.ExistTohavebeingwithrespecttounderstoodlimitationsorconditions.FailureAstateofinabilitytoperformanormalfunction.GeneralEmergencyEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationormeltingwithpotentialforlossofcontainmentintegrity.ReleasescanbereasonablyexpectedtoexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsoFsiteformorethantheimmediatesitearea.Logictermwhichindicatesthattakingtheactionprescribediscontingentuponthecurrentexistenceofthestatedcondition(s).Iftheidenti6edconditionsdonotexist,theprescribedactionisnottobetakenandexecutionofoperatora'ctionsmustproceedpromptlyinaccordancewithsubsequentinstructions.B-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1'ncreaseTobecomeprogressivelygreaterinsize,amount,numberorintensity.IndicateTopointoutorpointto;todisplaythevalueofaprocessvariable;tobeasignorsymbol.InitiateTheactofplacingequipmentorasystemintoservice,eithermanuallyorautomatically.Activationofafunctionorprotectivefeature(i.e.initiateamanualtrip).IajectionTheactofforcingafluidintoavolumeorvessel.InoperableNotabletoperformit'sintendedfunctionIntrusionTheactofenteringwithoutauthorizationFailureofoperabilityorlackofaccessto.MaintainTakeaction,asnecessary,tokeepthevalueofthespecifiedparameterwithintheapplicablelimits.MonitorObserveandevaluateatafrequencysufBcienttoremainapprisedofthevalue,trend,andrateofchangeofthespecifiedparameter.B-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1NotifyTogivenoticeoforreporttheoccurrenceof;tomakeknownto;toinformspecifiedpersonnel;toadvise;tocommunicate;tocontact;torelay.OpenTopositionavalveordampersoastoallowflowoftheprocessfluid.Tobreakanelectricalconnectionwhichremovesapowersupplyfromanelectricaldevice.Tomakeavailableforentryorpassagebyturningback,removing,orclearingaway.OperableAbletoperformit'sintendedfunctionPerformTocarryoutanaction;toaccomplish;toaFect;toreachanobjective.PrimarySystemThepipes,valves,andotherequipmentwhichconnectdirectlytothereactorvesselorreactorcoolantsystemsuchthatareductioninreactorcoolantsystempressurewilleffectadecreaseinthesteamorwaterbeingdischargedthroughanunisolatedbreakinthesystem.RemoveTochangethelocationorpositionof.ReportTodescribeasbeinginaspecificstate.RequireTodemandasnecessaryoressential.8-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Taketheappropriateactionrequirestoreturnthevalueofanidentifiedparametertowithinapplicablelimits.RiseDescribesanincreaseinaparameterastheresultofanoperatororautomaticaction.SampleToperformananalysisonaspecifiedmediatodetermineitsproperties.ShutdownToperformoperationsnecessarytocauseequipmenttoceaseorsuspendoperation;tostop."Shutdownunnecessaryequipment."SiteAreaEmergencyEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsexceptnearthesiteboundary.SustainedProlonged.NotintermittentoroftransitorynatureTFlpTode-energizeapumporfanmotor;topositionabreakersoastointerruptorpreventtheflowofcurrentintheassociatedcircuit;tomanuallyactivateasemi-automaticfeature.ITotakeactiontocauseshutdownofthereactorbyrapidlyinsertingacontrolrodorcontrolrods(PWR).8-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1UncontrolledAnevolutionlackingcontrolbutisnottheresultofoperatoraction.UnplannedNotasanexpectedresultofdeliberateaction.UntilIndicatesthattheassociatedprescribedactionistoproceedonlysolongastheidentifiedconditiondoesnotexist.UnusualEventEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichindicateapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Noreleasesofradioactivematerialrequiringoffsiteresponseormonitoringareexpectedunlessfurtherdegradationofsafetysystemsoccurs.ValidSupportedorcorroboratedonasoundbasis.VentToopenaneffluent(exhaust)flowpathfromanenclosedvolume;toreducepressureinanenclosedvolume.VerifyToconGrmaconditionandtakeactiontoestablishthatconditionifrequired."Verifyreactortrip,verifySIpumpsrunning."B-8 f4)pi(i'IIl~'I<<->~a)A}} | ||
}} | |||
Revision as of 13:29, 18 May 2018
| ML17263A833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 10/11/1994 |
| From: | ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17263A834 | List: |
| References | |
| OSSI-92-402A-4, OSSI-92-402A-4-REG-1, NUDOCS 9411090266 | |
| Download: ML17263A833 (209) | |
Text
AttachmBllDNawÃI0'oOMCl0'o'4Ul4QwO~DOOUMV-R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsAnnotatedClassificationCriteriaBasedonResponsetoNRCRAlsCategory1.0CSFSTStatusCategory2.0-ReactorFuelCategory3.0Category4.0Category5.0Category6.0Category7.0Category8.0Category9.0ReactorCoolantSystemContainmentRadioactivityReleaseElectricalFailuresEquipmentFailuresHazardsOther R.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsProposedRevision19BasedonResponsetoNRCRAIsCategory1.0Category2.00Category3.0Category4.0Category5.0Category6.0Category7.0Category8.0Category9.0CSFSTStatusReactorFuelReactorCoolantSystemContainmentRadioactivityReleaseElecrticalFailuresEquipmentFailures-HazardsOther10/11/94 1.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality1.1.1Alert[SA2]ORANGEorREDpathF-0.1SUBCRITICALITYANDEmergencyborationisrequiredPowerOperations,HotShutdownCatego.0CSFSTStatus1.0CSFSTStatus12CoreCooling1.2.1SiteAreaEmergency[fpl/fl,rl][SS4]ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGPowerOperations,HotShutdown1.2.2GeneralEmergency[fl,rl,cpl]1.1.2SiteAreaEmergency[SS2]REDpathinF-0.1SUBCRITICALITYANDeither:EmergencyborationisinoperableORPowerrangenot<6%within15min.ofinitiationofemergencyborationPowerOperations,HotShutdownREDpathinF~-0.2,CORECOOLINGANDFunctionalrestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15min.PowerOperations,HotShutdown1.1.3GeneralEmergency[SG2]REDpathinF-0.1,SUBCRITICALITYANDActualorimminententryintoeither:REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGORREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKPowerOperations,HotShutdown1-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 1.0CSFSTStatus13HeatSink1.3.1SiteAreaEmergency[fpl,rpl][SS4]REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKPowerOperations,HotShutdownCatego.0CSFSTStatus1.0CSFSTStatus1.4Integrity1.4.1Alert[rpl]REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITYPowerOperations,HotShutdown1-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0CSFSTStatus1.0CSFSTStatus1.5Containment1.5.1GeneralEmergency[6,rl,cpl]REDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENTresultingfromlossofreactorcoolantPowerOperations,HotShutdown1-4fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0ReactorFuel2.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.1UnusualEvent[SU4]Coolantsampleactivity:>100%%uoof84/EbarpCi/cctotalspecificactivityOR>0.2pCi/ccI-131equivalentandtheconditionsofTechnicalSpecifications3.1.4.3.bareexceededAll2.1.2Alert[0]Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccI-131equivalentPoweroperation,hotshutdown2.1.3SiteAreaEmergency[fi.rpl/rl]Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccI-131equivalentandanyofthefollowing:~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakage~ContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>10R/hrPoweroperation,hotshutdown2.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors2.2.1UnusualEvent[SU4]LetdownLineMonitorR-9>2R/hrAll2.2.2AlertLetdownLineMonitorR-9>10R/hrPoweroperation,hotshutdown2.2.3SiteAreaEmergency[fl,rpl]LetdownLineMonitorR-9>10R/hrandanyofthefollowing:~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakage~Containment*radiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>10R/hrPoweroperation,hotshutdown2-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0ReactorFuel2.0ReactorFuel2.3ContainmentRadiation2.3.1AlertContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>10R/hrPoweroperation,hotshutdown2.3.2SiteAreaEmergency[fl,rl]ContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100R/hrPoweroperation,hotshutdown2.8.3GeneralEmergency[fl,rl,cpl]ContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>1000R/hr2.0ReactorFuel2.4RefuelingAccidentsorOtherRadiationMonitors2.4.1UnusualEvent[AU2]Spentfuelpool(reactorcavityduringrefueling)waterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmsetpointAll2.4.2Alert[AA2]Con6rmedsustainedalarmonanyofthefollowingradiationmonitorsresultingfromanuncontrolledfuelhandlingprocess:~R-2ContainmentAreaMonitor~R-5SpentFuelPit~R-12ContainmentNobleGasPoweroperation,hotshutdown2.4.8Alert[AA2]ReportofvisualobservationofirradiatedfueluncoveredAll2-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot,lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category.0-ReactorCoolantSystem3.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1RCSLeakage3.1.1UnusualEvent[SU5]3.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.2PrimarytoSecondaryLeakage3.2.1UnusualEvent[cl]Unidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakage>10gpmORIdentifiedleakage>25gpmPoweroperation,hotshutdown3.1.2Alert[rpl]Primarysystemleakage>46gpmPoweroperation,hotshutdownReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakage>0.1gpmpersteamgeneratorPoweroperation,hotshutdown13.2.2SiteAreaEmergency[rpl,cl]Unisolablereleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakage>46gpmPoweroperation,hotshutdown3.1.3SiteAreaEmergency[fpl,rl][SS5]3.2.3SiteAreaEmergency[fl,cl]RVLIScannotbemaintained>43%withnoRCPsrunningORWiththereactorvesselheadremoved,itisreportedthatwaterlevelinthereactorvesselisdroppinginan.uncontrolledmannerandcoreuncoveryislikely.Releaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakage>0.1gpmpersteamgeneratorANDEither:Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131ORLetdownLineMonitorR-9>108/hrAllPoweroperation,hotshutdown3-1fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.3RCSSubcooling3.3.1Alert[rl]RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakagePoweroperation,hotshutdown3-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category4.0Containment4.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.1UnusualEvent[cl]4.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.3SiteAreaEmergency[rl,cl]BothdoorsopenoncontainmentairlockORInabilitytoclosecontainmentpressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentORCIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredwhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentEither:CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowingconfirmedLOCAORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsPoweroperation,hotshutdownPoweroperation,hotshutdown4.1.2SiteAreaEmergency[rl,cl]RapiduncontrolleddecreaseincontainmentpressurefollowinginitialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditionsPoweroperation,hotshutdown4.1.4GeneralEmergency[fl,rl,cpl]SafetyinjectionsignalduetoLOCAwithlessthanminimumoperablecontainmentheatremovalequipment,Table4.3ANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladloss,Table4.1Poweroperation,hotshutdown4-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 0Category4.0Containment4.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.5GeneralEmergency[fpVfl,rl,cl]4.0Containment4.2SGTubeRupturew/SecondaryRelease4.2.1SiteAreaEmergency[rl,cl]Either:RapiduncontrolleddecreaseincontainmentpressurefollowinginitialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditionsANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladdamage,Table4.2Poweroperation,hot'hutdown4.1.6GeneralEmergency[fpVfl,rl,cl]Either:CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowingconfirmedLOCAORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladdamage,Table4.2UnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"Poweroperation,hotshutdown4.2.2GeneralEmergency[fpVfl,rl,cl]UnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"ANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladdamage,Table4.2Poweroperation,hotshutdownPoweroperation,hotshutdown4-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 4.0Containment4.3CombustibleGasConcentrations4.3.1GeneralEmergencyIfl,rl,cpl]24%hydrogenconcentrationincontainmentPoweroperation,hotshutdownCatego.0ContainmentTable4.1FuelCladLossIndicators1.Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-1312.ContainmentradmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100R/hr3.LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hr4.REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGTable4.2FuelCladDamaeIndicators~ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLING~REDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINK~Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131~ContainmentradmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100H/hr~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hr<28psigN/A>28psigTable4.3MinimumOperableContainmentHeatRemovalEuimentCNMTPressureRecircFansOperableSprayPumpsReuired4-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category6.0RadioactivityRelease6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.1EQluentMonitors6.1.1UnusualEvent[AU1]6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.1EQluentMonitors6.1.4GeneralEmergency[AG1]AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"NUE"for>60min.unlesssampleanalysiscanconfirmreleaserates<2xtechnicalspecificationswithinthistimeperiod.AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"GE"for>15min.unlessdoseassessmentcanconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"GE"withinthistimeperiod.AllAll6.1.2Alert[AA1]AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.unlessdoseassessmentcanconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"Alert"withinthistimeperiod.All6.1.3SiteAreaEmergency[AS1]AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for>15min.unlessdoseassessmentcanconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"SAE"withinthistimeperiod.All5-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Categoryo.0RadioactivityRelease6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation6.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates5.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates6.2.1UnusualEvent[AU1]6.2.4SiteAreaEmergency[AS1]Confirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>60min.AllDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveysresultingfromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"SAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.All6.2.2Alert[AA1]Confirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>200xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>15min.6.2.5GeneralEmergency[AG1]Doseprojectionsorfieldsurveysresultingfromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.All5.2.8Alert[AA1]Doseprojectionsorfieldsurveysresultingfromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.All.Table5.3.PlantAreas~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~TurbineBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~ScreenHouse~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding5-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Categoo.0RadioactivityRelease5.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.3AreaRadiationLevels5.3.1'UnusualEvent[AU2]AnysustaineddirectARMreadings>100xalarmoroAscalehiresultingfromanuncontrolledprocess5.3.2Alert[AA3]Sustainedarearadiationlevels>15mR/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStationandSecondaryAlarmStation5.3.3Alert[AA3]Sustainedabnormalarearadiationlevels>8R/hrwithinanyareas,Table5.3ANDAccessisrequiredtoestablishormaintaincoldshutdown.All5-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Categoryo.0RadioactivityReleaseMonitorTable5.1EfHuentMonitorClassificationThresholdsAlertGER-llR-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533pCi/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr.23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsAlertGETEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hr100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr5-4fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0ElectricalFailures6.0ElectricalFailures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.1UnusualEvent[SUl]Lossofabilitytosupplypowertothesafeguardbusesfromoffsitecircuits751and767for>15min.All6.0ElectricalFailures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.4SiteAreaEmergency[SS1]LossofallsafeguardsbusACpowerfor>15min.Poweroperation,hotshutdown6.1.2Alert[SA1]6.1.6GeneralEmergency[SGl]6.1.3Alert[SA5]LossofallsafeguardsbusACpowerfor>15min.ColdShutdown,Refueling,DefueledLossofallsafeguardsbusACpowerANDeither:Powerrestorationtoanysafeguardsbusisnotlikelyin<4hrsORActualorimminententryintoORANGEorREDpathonF-0.2,"CORECOOLING"AvailablesafeguardtrainACpowerreducedtoonlyoneofthefollowingfor>15min.:~EDG1A(14/18)~EDG1B(16/17)~StationAuxiliaryTransformer12A~StationAuxiliaryTransformer12BPoweroperation,hotshutdownPoweroperation,hotshutdown6-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category6.0ElectricalFailures6.0ElectricalFailures6.2LossofDCPowerSources6.2.1UnusualEvent[SU7]<105vdcbusvoltageindicationson125vdcbatteries1Aand1Bfor>15min.ColdShutdown,Refueling6.2.2SiteAreaEmergency[SS3]>105vdcbusvoltageindicationson125vdcbatteries1Aand1Bfor>15min.Poweroperation,hotshutdown6-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category.0EquipmentFailures7.0EquipmentFailuresV.1TechnicalSpecification%Requirements7.1.1UnusualEvent[SU2]PlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithinTechnicalSpecificationsLCOAction-StatementTime.Poweroperation,hotshutdownV.OEquipmentFailuresV.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.1UnusualEvent[HU1]Reportofmainturbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbinesealsorgeneratorseals.PowerOperationsV.2.2Alert[HA1]TurbinefailuregeneratedmissilesresultinanyvisiblestructuraldamagetoplantvitalequipmentPowerOperations,HotShutdown7.2.8Alert[HA5]EntryintoAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessability"All7.2.4Alert[SA3]Reactorcoolanttemperaturecannotbemaintained<200'FColdShutdown,Refueling7-1fyl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0EquipmentFailuresV.OEquipmentFailures7.0EquipmentFailuresV.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.3LossofIndications/Alarms/CommunicationCapabilityV.2.5SiteAreaEmergency[HS2]V.3.1UnusualEvent[SU3]ControlRoomevacuationANDCorecoolingcannotbeestablishedperAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessibility"in<20min.AllUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicationsonanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationPoweroperation,hotshutdown7.3.2UnusualEvent[SU6]Lossofallcommunicationscapabilityaffectingtheabilitytoeither:PerformroutineoperationsORNotifyoffsiteagenciesorpersonnel7-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0.EquipmentFailuresV.OEquipmentFailuresV.3LossofIndications/Alarms/CommunicationCapabilityTable7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsV.3.3Alert[SA4]BCDEFGUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicationsonanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationANDeither:AplanttransientinprogressORPPCSandSASareunavailablePoweroperation,hotshutdownV.3.4SiteAreaEmergency[SS6]Lossofannunciatorsor'indicationsonanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3ANDCompletelossofabilitytomonitorallcriticalsafetyfunctionstatusANDAplanttransientinprogressPoweroperation,hotshutdown7-3fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Catego.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.1SecurityThreats8.1.1UnusualEvent[HU4]8.0Hazards8.1SecurityThreats8.1.4GeneralEmergency[HG1]BombdeviceorotherindicationofattemptedsabotagediscoveredwithinplantProtectedArea.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Securityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomORLossofremoteshutdowncapabilityAll8.1.2Alert[HA4]IntrusionintoplantProtectedAreabyanadversary.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresentsanactualsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.All8.1.3SiteAreaEmergency[HS1]Intrusionintoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresentsactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.All8-1fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossryl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Hazards8.0Hazards8.2FireorExplosion8.2.1UnusualEventDiU2]8.0Hazards8.3Man-MadeEvents8.3.1UnusualEventDiU1]Confirmedfireinanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3notextinguishedin515min.ofControlRoomnotification:AllVehiclecrashintoorprojectilewhichimpactsplantstructuresorsystemswithinProtectedAreaboundaryAll8.2.2Alert[HA2]8.3.2UnusualEvent[HU1]Fireorexplosioninanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3whichresultsinEITHER:~visibledamagetoplantequipmentorstructuresneededforsafeplantoperationOR~whichaffectssafetysystemoperabilityasindicatedbydegradedsystemperformanceReportbyplantpersonnelofanexplosionwithinProtectedAreaboundaryresultinginvisibledamagetopermanentstructuresorequipmentAll8.3.3UnusualEvent[HU3]ReportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtectedAreaboundaryinamountsthatcouldaffectthehealthofplantpersonnelorsafeplantoperationORReportbylocal,countyorstateofficialsforpotentialevacuationofsitepersonnelbasedonoffsiteeventAll8-2fpl-fuelcladpot.lossfl-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss Category8.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.3Man-MadeEvents8.3.4Alert[HA1]8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.1UnusualEvent[HU1]'ehiclecrashorprojectileimpactwhichprecludespersonnelaccesstoordamagesequipmentinplantvitalareas,Table8.3AllEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyoperatorANDIConfirmationofearthquakeofanintensity>0.01gperSC-5"EarthquakeEmergencyPlan".All8.3.5Alert[HA3]Reportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinaplantarea,Table8.3,inconcentrationsthatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnelorprecludeaccesstoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation8.4.2UnusualEvent[HU1]ReportbyplantpersonneloftornadowithinplantProtectedAreaboundaryAll8.4.3UnusualEvent[HUl]DeerCreekfloodingoverentranceroadbridge(handrail)ORLakelevel>252ftORScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<15ft(low-lowlevelalarm)All8-3~fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.4Alert[HA1]Category.0Hazards8.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.7Alert[HA1]EarthquakefeltinplantbyanyplantoperationspersonnelANDConfirmationofearthquakeofanintensity)0.08gperSC-5"EarthquakeEmergencyPlan"AllFloodwateraccumulatingonscreenhouseoperatingfloorORLakelevel>253ftI'RScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<13ftAll8.4.5Alert[HA1]Sustainedwinds>75mphORTornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.3All8.4.6Alert[HAl]Table8.2PlantAreas~TurbineBuilding~TSC~ServiceBuilding~ContaminatedStorageBuildingAnynaturaleventwhichresultsinareportofvisiblestructuraldamageorassessmentbyControlRoompersonnelofactualdamagetoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation,Table8.3AllTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuildingAuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouse8-4fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossryl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 9.0Other9.1.1UnusualEventCategory9.0Other9.0Other9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Anyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.AIl9.1.2UnusualEvent9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofcontainment,Attach.A.Poweroperation,hotshutdownAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadorhasledtoa,lossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier,Attach.A.Poweroperation,hotshutdown9-1fpl-fuelcladpot.lossQ-fuelcladlossrpl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss 9.0Other9.1.5SiteAreaEmergencyCategory9.0Other9.0Other9.1.VGeneralEmergencyAsdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposureswhichexceedEPAPAGs,Attach.A.AllAsdeterminedbytheShikSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotentialforalargereleaseofradioactivematerialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.All9.1.6SiteAreaEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:LossorpotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrier,Attach.A.ORLossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunctionwithalossofcontainment,Attach.A.9.1.8GeneralEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiA.SupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotentiallossofthethird,Attach.A.Poweroperation,hotshutdownPoweroperation,hotshutdown9-2fpl-fuelcladpot.loss6-fuelcladlossryl-RCSpot.lossrl-RCSlosscpl-contain.pot.losscl-contain.loss OSSI-92-402A-4-REGfgi.J2'gfI'inndEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1}AttachmentCNewYorkEALUpgradeProjectR.E.GinnaEmergencyActionLevelsTechnicalBasesRevision1BasedonProposedResponsestoNRCRAIs10/11/94 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument.Rev1PURPOSEThepurposeofthisdocumentistoprovideanexplanationandrationaleforeachoftheemergencyactionlevels(EALs)includedintheEALUpgradeProgramforR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStation(REGNPS).ItisalsointendedtofacilitatethereviewprocessoftheREGNPSEALsandprovidehistoricaldocumentationforfuturereference.Thisdocumentisalsointendedtobeutilizedby,thoseindividualsresponsibleforimplementationofEPIP-1-0"GinnaStationEventEvaluationandClassification"asatechnicalreferenceandaidinEALinterpretation.DISCUSSIONEALsaretheplant-specificindications,conditionsorinstrumentreadingswhichareutilizedtoclassifyemergencyconditionsdefinedintheREGNPSEmergencyPlan.SubsequenttotheacceptancebytheNRCofNUMARC/NESP-007"MethodologyforDevelopmentofEmergencyActionLevels"asanacceptablealternativetotheNUREG0654EALguidance,thefournuclearutilitiesintheStateofNewYorkdecidedtoperformajointimplementationofthenewmethodology.Thisupgradeprojectinvolvedthefollowingplants:~NineMilePointUnit1(NMPC)~NineMilePointUnit2(NMPC)JamesA.FitzPatrickNuclearPowerPlant(NYPA)~IndianPointStation2(ConEd)~IndianPoint3NuclearPo'werStation(NYPA)~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerStation(RG&E)WhiletheupgradedEALsaresitespecific,anobjectiveoftheupgradeprojectwastoensureconformityandconsistencybetweenthesitestotheextentpossible.TherevisedEALswerederivedfromtheInitiatingConditionsandexampleEALsgivenintheREGNPSPlant-SpecificEALGuideline(PEG).ThePEGistheREGNPSinterpretationoftheNUMARCmethodologyfordevelopingEALs.ThePEGidentifiesdeletionsfromtheNUMARCmethodologybystrikingoutwordsandphrasesthatarenotapplicabletoREGNPS;additionsareidentifiedbyunderliningnewwordsandphrases.ThesourceofdocumentsforPEGchangesfromNUNCmethodologyarelistedinthereferencessectionofthePEG.ManyoftheEALsderivedfromtheNV)~Cmethodologyarefissionproductbarrierbased.Thatis,theconditionswhichdefinetheEALsare OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Revlbaseduponlossorpotentiallossofoneormoreofthethreefissionproductbarriers.Theprimaryfissionproductbarriersare:A.rF11inThefuelcladdingiscomprisedofthezirconiumtubeswhichhousetheceramicuraniumoxidepelletsalongwiththeendplugswhichareweldedintoeachendofthefuelrods.B.rInmTheRCSiscomprisedofthereactorvesselshell,vesselhead,vesselnozzlesandpenetrationsandallprimarysystemsdirectlyconnectedt'othereactorvesseluptothefirstcontainmentisolationvalve.C~i~Yhiip'fhpcontainmentstructureandallisolationvalvesrequiredtomaintaincontainmentintegrityunderaccidentconditions.Thefollowingcriteriaservesasthebasesforeventclassificationrelatedtofissionproductbarrierloss:n1EvnAnylossorpotentiallossofcontainmenthhzf'nylossoranypotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSrnAnylossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSorAnypotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSwithalossofanyadditionalbarrierLossofanytwobarrierswithlossorpotentiallossofathirdThoseEALs-which'referenceoneormoreofthefissionproductbarrierICdesignators(FC,RCSandPC)inthePEGReferencesectionofthetechnicalbasesarederivedfromtheFissionProductBarrierAnalysis.Theanalysisentailedanevaluationofeverycombinationoftheplantspecificbarrierloss/potentiallossindicatorsappliedtotheabovecriteria.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEAI.TechnicalBasesDocument,RevIWherepossible,theEALshavebeenmadeconsistentwith'ndutilizetheconditionsdefinedintheREGNPSCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTrees(CSFSTs).WhilethesymptomsthatdriveoperatoractionsspecifiedintheCSFSTsarenotindicativeofgllpossibleconditionswhichwarrantemergencyclassification,theydodefinethesymptoms,independentofinitiatingevents,forwhichreactorplantsafetyand/orfissionproductbarrierintegrityarethreatened.WherethesesymptomsareclearlyrepresentativeofoneofthePEGInitiatingConditions,theyhavebeenutilizedasanEAL.Thisallowsforrapidclassificationofemergencysituationsbasedonplantconditionswithouttheneedforadditionalevaluationoreventdiagnosis.AlthoughsomeoftheEALspresentedherearebasedonconditionsdefinedintheCSFSTs,classificationofemergenciesusingtheseEALsisnotdependentuponEmergencyOperatingProcedures(EOPs)entryorexecution.TheEALscanbeutilizedindependentlyorinconjunctionwiththeEOPs.Totheextentpossible,theEALsaresymptombased.Thatis,theactionlevelisdefinedbyvaluesofkeyplantoperatingparameterswhichidentifyemergencyorpotentialemergencyconditions.Thisapproachisappropriatebecauseitallowsthefullscopeofvariationsinthetypesofeventstobeclassifiedasemergencies.But,apurelysymptombasedapproachisnotsufBcienttoaddressalleventsforwhichemergencyclassificationisappropriate.ParticulareventstowhichnopredeterminedsymptomscanbeascribedhavealsobeenutilizedasEALssincetheymaybeindicativeofpotentiallymoreseriousconditionsnotyetfullyrealized.TheEALsaregroupedintoninecategoriestosimplifytheirpresentationandtopromotearapidunderstandingbytheirusers.Thesecategoriesare:1.2.3.45.6.7.8.9.CSFSTStatusReactorFuelReactorCoolantSystemContainmentRadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiationElectricalFailuresEquipmentFailuresHazardsOtherCategories1through5areprimarilysymptombased.Thesymptomsareindicativeofactualorpotentialdegradationofeitherfissionproductbarriersorpersonnelsafety.Categories6,7and8areeventbased.ElectricalFailuresarethoseeventsassociatedwithlossesofeitherACorvitalDCelectricalpower.EquipmentFailuresareabnormalandemergencyeventsassociatedwithvitalplantsystemfailures,whileHazardsarethosenon-plantsystemrelatedeventswhichhaveaffectedormayaffectplantsafety.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument.RevICategory9providestheEmergencyCoordinator(ShiRSupervisor)thelatitudetoclassifyanddeclareemergenciesbasedonplantsymptomsoreventswhichinhisjudgmentwarrantclassification.ThisjudgmentincludesevaluationoflossorpotentiallossofoneormorefissionproductbarrierswarrantingemergencyclassificationconsistentwiththeNUMlARCbarrierlosscriteria.ThefissionproductbarrierlossandpotentiallossindicatorsareprovidedinAttachmentA.Categoriesarefurtherdividedintooneormoresubcategoriesdependingonthetypesandnumberofplantconditionsthatdictateemergencyclassifications.Forexample,theElectricalFailurescategoryhastwosubcategorieswhosevaluescanbeindicativeoflossesofelectricalpowersources:lossofACpowersourcesandlossofDCpowersources.AnEALmayormaynotexistforeachsubcategoryatallfourclassificationlevels.Similarly,morethanoneEALmayexistforasubcategoryinagivenemergencyclassificationwhenappropriate(i.e.noEALattheGeneralEmergencylevelbutthreeEALsattheUnusualEventlevel).ForeachEAL,the,followinginformationisprovided:Classification:UnusualEvent,Alert,SiteAreaEmergency,orGeneralEmergencyNUMARCInitiatingCondition&omwhichtheEALwasderived,ifapplicable.~Fissionproductbarrierloss/potentiallossconditionwhichtheEALrepresents,ifapplicable.~OperatingModeApplicability:Oneormoreofthefollowingplantoperatingconditionsarelisted:PowerOperation,HotShutdown,ColdShutdown,RefuelandDefueledEAL:DescriptionoftheconditionorsetofconditionswhichcomprisetheEAL~Basis:DescriptionoftherationalefortheEAL~PEG
Reference:
PEGIC(s)andexampleEAL(s)fromwhichtheEALisderived~BasisReference(s):SourcedocumentationfromwhichtheEALisderived OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1TheidentifiedoperatingmodesaredefinedasfollowsReactorshutdownmarginislessthanTechnicalSpecificationminimumrequiredwithcoolanttemperature(Tavg)atorabovenormaloperatingtemperature.ReactorshutdownmargingreaterthanorequaltoTechnicalSpecificationminimumrequiredwithcoolanttemperature(Tavg)lessthannormaloperatingtemperature.~IhReactorshutdownmargingreaterthanorequaltoTechnicalSpecificationminimumrequiredwithcoolanttemperature(Tavg)lessthanorequalto200'F.E~f~gReactorshutdownmargingreaterthanorequaltoTechnicalSpecificationminimumrequiredforrefuelingoperationsandcoolanttemperature(Tavg)lessthanorequalto140'F.Lh~luiReactorvesselcontainsnoirradiatedfuel.TheseoperatingmodescorrelatetotheNUMARC-007andPEGidentifiedoperatingmodesasfollows:hni1BPowerOperationsStartup/HotstandbyHotShutdownColdShutdownRefuelDefueledAllPowerOperationsPowerOperationHotShutdownColdShutdownRefuelDefueledAll OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PlantEmergencyOperatingProcedures(EOPs)aredesignedtomaintainand/orrestoreasetofcriticalsafetyfunctionswhichareprioritizedforrestorationeffortsduringaccidentconditions.Bymonitoringthecriticalsafetyfunctionsstatus,theimpactofmultipleeventscanbeinherentlyaddressed.ThecriticalsafetyfunctionsaremonitoredthroughtheuseofCriticalSafetyFunctionStatusTrees(CSFSTs).WhencertainplantparametersexceedthresholdvaluesspecifiedbytheCSFST,theplantoperatorisdirectedtooneormorefunctionalrestorationand/orEOPsinanattempttorestorethoseparameterstowithinacceptablelimits.ThefollowingCSFSTsareutilizedtobeindicativeoffailuresorpotentialfailuresofoneormorefissionproductbarriers:'0gRdpttltl'SFSTldltlfreactivitycontrolwhichmayposeathreattofuelcladandRCS'ntegrity.CgRdptlI'SFSTldllfcoresubcoolingandthusposeadirectthreattotheintegrityofthereactorfuelcladandRCS.~H~ink'heRedpathofthisCSFSTisindicativeofalossofabilitytoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandthusposesadirectthreattofuelcladandRCSintegrity.TheRedpathofthisCSFSTisindicativeofadirectthreattoRCSbarrierintegrity.RdptftgCSFSTlldltltlffcladandRCSbarrieranddirectthreattothecontainmentbarrierintegrity.1-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality1.1.1AlertORANGEorREDpathF-0.1SUBCRITICALITYANDEmergencyborationisrequiredNUIVIARCIC:FailureofReactorProtectionsysteminstrumentationtocompleteorinitiateanautomaticreactortriponceaReactorProtectionsystemsetpointhasbeenexceededandimmediatemanualtripswerenotsuccessfulwhileinpoweroperationsorhotstandbyFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTSubcriticality-ORANGEpathisenteredbasedonfailureoftheintermediaterangestartupratemonitorstoindicatenegativeorzerofollowingreactortrip.ThisEALaddressesanymanualtriporautomatictripsignalfollowedbyamanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentrequiringemergencyboration.Amanualtripisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperator(s)atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcausescontrolrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringsthereactorsubcritical(e.g.,reactortripbutton).Thisconditionindicatesfailureoftheautomaticandmanualprotectionsystemstotripthereactortotheextentwhichprecludesthereactorbeingmadesub-critical.Althoughafrontlineautomaticprotectionsystemdidnotfunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient,itisthecontinuedcriticalityunder"conditionsrequiringareactortripwhichposesthepotentialthreattofuelcladintegrityandthuswarrantingdeclarationofanAlert.PEG
Reference:
SA2.11-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.CSFSTF-0.1,Subcriticality2."MethodologyforDevelopmentofEmergencyActionLevelsNUMARC/NESP-007Revision2-QuestionsandAnswers,June19931-3 OSSA-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality1.1.2SiteAreaEmergencyREDpathinF-0.1SUBCRITICALITYANDeither:EmergencyborationisinoperableORPowerrangenot<5%within15min.ofinitiationofemergencyborationNUINARCIC:FailureofReactorProtectionsysteminstrumentationtocompleteorinitiateanautomaticreactortriponceaReactorProtectionsystemsetpointhasbeenexceededandmanualscramtripwasnotsuccessfulandthereiscontinuedpowergeneration.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTSubcriticality-REDpathisenteredbasedonfailureofpowerrangeindicationtodecreasebelow5%followingareactortrip.ThisportionoftheEALaddressesanymanualtriporautomatictripsignalfollowedbyamanualtripwhichfailstoshutdownthereactortoanextentthatthereactorisproducingmoreheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.Amanualtripisanysetofactionsbythereactoroperator(s)atthereactorcontrolconsolewhichcauses"controlrodstoberapidlyinsertedintothecoreandbringspowerbelowthatpercentpowerassociatedwiththeabilityofthesafetysystemstoremoveheatandcontinuetodecrease."Thisconditionindicatesfailureofboththeautomaticandmanualprotectionsystemstotripthereactorinconjunctionwithafailureofalternateborationsystemstoreducereactorpowerbelowdecayheatlevels.Thecombinationoffailureofbothfrontlineandbackupprotectionsystemstofunctioninresponsetoaplanttransient,alongwiththecontinuedproductionofheatposesadirectthreattofuelcladandRCSintegrityandthuswarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.1-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev115minutesisspecifiedtoallowtimeforemergencyborationtobeeffectiveandprovidesadiscriminatorbetweenSA2.1andSS2.1.Theclassificationshouldbemadeassoonasitisapparentthatemergencyborationisnotorwillnotbeeffectiveinreducingreactorpowerbelow5%.PEG
Reference:
SS2.1SS4.1BasisReference(s):l.2.3.4CSFSTF-0.1,SubcriticalityFR-S.1,ResponsetoReactorRestart/ATWSFR-S.2,ResponsetoLossofCoreShutdown"MethodologyforDevelopmentofEmergencyActionLevelsNUMARC/NESP-007Revision2-QuestionsandAnswers,June19931-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.1Subcriticality1.1.3GeneralEmergencyREDpathinF-0.1,SUBCRITICALITYANDActualorimminententryintoeitherREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGORREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKMBRLRCIC:FailureoftheReactorProtectionSystemtocompleteanautomatictripandmanualtripwasnotsuccessfulandthereisindicationofanextremechallengetotheabilitytocoolthecore.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTSubcriticality-REDpathisenteredbasedon>5%reactorpowerfollowingareactortrip.CSFSTHeatSink-REDpathisenteredbasedonboth:~bothS/G'snarrowrangelevel<5%AND~TotalfeedwaterflowtoS/Gs<200gpmCSFSTCoreCooling-REDpathisenteredbasedoneither:~Coreexitthermocouples>1200'FOR~Coreexitthermocouples>700'FAND~RVLISlevel<43%w/noRCPs(TAF).1-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Thecombinationoftheseconditions(reactorpower>5%andHeatSink-REDorCoreCoolingREDpath)indicatestheultimateheatsinkfunctionisunderextremechallenge.Additionally,theeffortstobringthereactorsubcriticalhavebeenunsuccessfuland,asaresult,thereactorisproducingmoreheatloadforwhichthesafetysystemsweredesigned.Thissituationcouldbetheprecursorforacoremeltsequence.Amajorconsiderationistheinabilitytoinitiallyremoveheatduringtheearlystagesofthissequence.Ifemergencyfeedwaterflowisinsufficienttoremovetheamountofheatrequiredbydesignfromatleastonesteamgenerator,anextremechallengeshouldbeconsideredtoexist.ThisequatestoaHEATSinkREDcondition.IfCETsindicate>1200'Forare>700'FwithRVLIS<topofactivefuelaconditionindicativeofseverechallengetoheatremovalalsoexists.Intheeventthischallengeexistsatatimewhenthereactorhasnotbeenbroughtbelowthepowerassociatedwithsafetysystemdesignpower(5%)acoremeltsequenceisconsideredtoexist.Inthissituation,coredegradationcanoccurrapidly.Forthisreason,theGeneralEmergencydeclarationisintendedtobeanticipatoryofthefissionproductbarriermatrixdeclarationtopermitmaximumoffsiteinterventiontime.PEG
Reference:
SG2.1BasisReference(s):l.2.3.3.4CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSinkCSFSTF-0.1,SubcriticalityCSFSTF-0.2,CoreCoolingFR-S.1,ResponsetoReactorRestart/ATWSFR-S.2,ResponsetoLossofCoreShutdown1-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.2CoreCooling1.2.1SiteAreaEmergencyORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLING1%JMARCIC:Completelossoffunctionneededtoachieveormaintainhotshutdownwithreactorcoolant)200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladpotentialloss,RCSlossModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTCoreCooling-ORANGEpathisenteredbasedoneither:~Coreexitthermocouples)700'FOR~RVLISlevel(43%w/noRCPs(TAF)Eitherconditionindicatessubcoolinghasbeenlostandthatsomecladdamagemayoccur.ItmustalsobeassumedthatthelossofRCSinventoryisaresultofalossofRCSbarrier.ThereforeaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarrantedbaseduponthepotentiallossoffuelcladwithlossofRCSbarriers.PEG
Reference:
FC1.2FC3-.2FC4.1SS4.1BasisReference(s):1.CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling1-8 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.2CoreCooling1.2.2GeneralEmergencyREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGANDFunctionalrestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15min.NUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladlos,Sloss,ContainmentpotentiallossModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTCoreCooling-REDpathisenteredbasedoneither:~Coreexitthermocouples>1200'FOR~Coreexitthermocouples>700'FAND~RVLISlevel<43%(TAF)EitherconditionindicatessignificantcoreexitsuperheatingandcoreuncoveryandisconsideredalossoftheFuelCladBarrier.ItmustalsobeassumedthatthelossofRCSinventoryisaresultofalossofRCSbarrier.Theseconditions,ifnotmitigated,willlikelyleadtocoremeltwhichwillinturnresultinapotentiallossofcontainment.Therefore,declarationofaGeneralEmergencyiswarranted.Severeaccidentanalyses(e.g.,NUREG-1150)haveconcludedthatfunctionrestorationprocedurescanarrestcoredegradationwithinthereactorvesselinasignificantfractionofthecoredamagescenarios,andthatthelikelihoodofcontainmentfailureisverysmallintheseevents.Giventhis,itisappropriatetoprovideareasonableperiodtoallowfunctionrestoration'rocedurestoarrestthecoremeltsequence.Whetherornotprocedureswillbeeffectiveshouldbeapparentwithin15minutes.TheEmergency1-9 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Coordinatorshouldmakethedeclarationassoonasitisdeterminedthattheprocedureshavenotbeen,orwillnotbeeffective.ForthepurposeofthisEALtheterm'effective'ithregardstofunctionalrestorationproceduresmeansthattheCSFSTCoreCooling-REDpathentrycriterionnolongerexists.PEG
Reference:
FC1.1PC6.1PC6.2BasisReference(s):1.CSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling1-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.3HeatSink1.3.1SiteAreaEmergencyREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKNUINARCIC:Completelossoffunctionneededtoachieveormaintainhotshutdownwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladpotentialloss,RCSpotentiallossModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTHeatSink-REDpathisenteredbasedonboth:~bothS/0'snarrowrangelevel<5%AND~TotalfeedwaterflowtoS/Gs<200gpmThecombinationofthesetwoconditionsindicatestheultimateheatsinkfunctionisunderextremechallenge.ThisEALaddresseslossoffunctionsrequiredforhotshutdownwiththereactoratpressureandtemperature.Undertheseconditions,thereisanactualmajorfailureofasystemintendedforprotectionofthepublicwithpotentialformultiplefissionproductbarrierloss.Therefore,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarranted.PEG
Reference:
FC1.3RCS1.2SS4.1BasisReference(s):1.'SFSTF-0.3,HeatSink1-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.4Integrity1.4.1AlertREDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITYNU1VCARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSpotentiallossModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTIntegrity-REDpathisenteredbasedonboth:~exceedingRCScooldownrateof100'F/hrAND~allRCScoldlegtemperaturestotheleRoftheRCSPressure/RCSColdLegTemperatureCurveThecombinationofthese'woconditionsindicatestheRCSbarrierisundersignificantchallengeandshouldbeconsideredapotentiallossofRCSbarrier.AnylossorpotentiallossofRCSbarrierwarrantsdeclarationofanAlert.PEG
Reference:
RCS1.1BasisReference(s):*1.CSFSTF-0.4,Integrity1-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev11.0CSFSTStatus1.5Contaixunent1.5.1GeneralEmergencyREDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENTNUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,ContainmentpotentiallossModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:CSFSTContainment-REDpathisenteredbasedonexceedingcontainmentdesignpressureof60psig.Thispressureiswellinexcessofthatexpectedfromthedesignbasislossofcoolantaccident.ThisisindicativeofalossofbothRCSandfuelcladboundariesinthatitisnotpossibletoreachthisconditionwithoutseverecoredegradation(metal-waterreaction)orfailuretoscramincombinationwithRCSbreach.Sincecontainmentpressuresatorapproachingdesignlevelsisalsoapotentiallossofcontainment,'thiscombinationofconditionsrequiresthedeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.PEG
Reference:
PC1.1BasisReference(s):1.CSFSTF-0.5,Containment1-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Thereactorfuelcladdingservesastheprimaryfissionproductbarrier.Overtheusefullifeofafuelbundle,theintegrityofthisbarriershouldremainintactaslongasfuelcladdingintegritylimitsarenotexceeded.Should'fueldamageoccur(breachofthefuelcladdingintegrity)radioactivefissionproductsarereleasedtothereactorcoolant.Themagnitudeofsuchareleaseisdependentupontheextentofthedamageaswellasthemechanismbywhichthedamageoccurred.Oncereleasedintothereactorcoolant,thehighly,radioactivefissionproductscanposesignificantradiologicalhazardsinplantfromreactorcoolantprocessstreams.Ifotherfissionproductbarriersweretofail,theseradioactivefissionproductscanposesignificantoffsiteradiologicalconsequences.Thefollowingparameters/indicatorsareindicativeofpossiblefuelfailures:A'gai,t1fiproductactivityisverylow.Smallconcentrationsoffissionproductsin'hecoolantareprimarilyfromthefissionoftrampuraniuminthefuelcladdingorminorperforationsinthecladdingitself.Anysignificantincreasefromthesebase-linelevelsisindicativeoffuelfailures.~FilFl0'Aswithcoolantactivity,anyfuelfailureswillreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolant.ThesefissionproductswillbecirculatedwiththereactorcoolantandbedetectedbythefailedfuelradiationdetectorintheRCSletdownline.inAlthoughnotadirectindicationormeasurementoffueldamage,exceedingpredeterminedlimitsoncontainmenthighrangeradiationmonitorsunderLOCAconditionsisindicativepossiblefuelfailures.~flinA'riinMnir'othareaandprocessradiationmonitoringsystemsdesignedtodetectfissionproductsduringrefuelingconditionsaswellasvisualobservationcanbeutilizedtoindicatelossorpotentiallossofspentfuelcladdingintegrity.2-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.1UnusualEventCoolantsampleactivity:)100%of84/Ebarp,Ci/cctotalspecificactivityOR>0.2p,Ci/gmI-131equivalentandtheconditionsofTechnicalSpecifications3.1.4.3.bareexceededNUINARCIC:FuelcladdegradationFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.ThisEALaddressesreactorcoolantsamplesexceedingcoolanttechnicalspecifications.PEG
Reference:
SU4.2BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecificationssection3.1.42-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.2AlertCoolantactivity>300p.Ci/ccI-131equivalentIMUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:FuelcladlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:Elevatedreactorcoolantactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisamountofcoolantactivitycorrespondstoabout2%to5%fuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.Therefore,declarationofanAlertiswarranted.PEG
Reference:
FC2.1BasisReference(s):None2-3
,OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.1CoolantActivity2.1.3SiteAreaEmergencyCoolantactivity>300pCi/ccI-131equivalentandanyofthefollowing:~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakageMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSpotentialloss/lossNodeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressescombinationsoffuelcladlosswithRCSlossandpotentiallossindicators.300pCi/ccI-131equivalentcoolantactivitycorrespondstoabout2%to5%fuelcladdamage.Whenreactorcoolantactivityreachesthislevel,significantcladheatinghasoccurredandthusthefuelcladbarrierisconsideredlost.ThisconditionincombinationwithanyofthefollowingRCSloss/potentiallossindicatorswarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency:REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY:REDpathindicatesanextremechallengetothesafetyfunctionderivedfromappropriateinstrumentreadings,andindicatesapotentiallossofRCSbarrier.RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING:Thisindicatoraddresses'conditionswhereleakagefromtheRCSisgreaterthanavailableinventorycontrolcapacitysuchthatalossofsubcoolinghasoccurred.ThelossofsubcoolingasdeterminedfromE-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionisthe.fundamentalindicationthattheinventorycontrolsystemsareinadequateinmaintainingRCSpressureandinventoryagainstthemasslossthroughaleak.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Primarysystemleakage>46gpm:ThispotentiallossofRCSisbasedontheinabilitytomaintainnormalliquidinventorywithintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsideredastwopositivedisplacementchargingpumpsdischargingtothechargingheader.PEG
Reference:
FC2.1+RCS1.1,RCS2.1andRCS2.2BasisReference(s):1.2.3.45.EPIP-2-16"CoreDamageEstimation"CSFSTF-0.4IntegrityE-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionTechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.5.2FSARTable9.3.62-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors2.2.1UnusualEventLetdownLineMonitorR-9>2R/hrNUMARCIC:FuelcladdegradationFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:Elevatedletdownlineactivityrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantandapotentialprecursorofmoreseriousproblems.Thisradiationlevel(2H/hr)correspondsto1%fuelfailure(basesfortheTechnicalSpecificationscoolantactivitylimits).Therefore,declarationofanUnusualEventiswarranted.PEG
Reference:
SU4.1BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecificationssection3.1.42.P-9"RadiationMonitoringSystem"3.EPIP2-16section6.2.l.b2-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors2.2.2AlertLetdownLineMonitorR-9>10R/hrMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:FuelcladlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:Thisconditionindicatesthelossofthefuelcladbarrier.FailedFuelMonitorreadingsof2R/hrcorrespondsto1%fuelfailures.FailedFuelMonitorreadingsof10R/hrcorrespondsto5%fuelfailuresandisconsideredanactuallossoffuelclad.Note:MonitorR-9automaticallyshiftsscalefrommR/hrtoR/hrwhenindicatedvaluesexceed1000mR/hr.PEG
Reference:
FC6.1BasisReference(s):l.EPIP-2-16"CoreDamageEstimation"2.P-9"RadiationMonitoringSystem"3.EPIP2-16section6.2.1.b2-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.2FailedFuelDetectors2.2.3SiteAreaEmergencyLetdownLineMonitorR-9>108/hrandanyofthefollowing:~REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY~Primarysystemleakage>46gpm~RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakageNUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSpotentiallossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressescombinationsoffuelclad.losswithRCSlossandpotentiallossindicators.FailedFuelMonitorreadingsof10R/hrcorrespondsto5%fuelfailures.Thisconditionindicatesthelossofthefuelcladbarrier.Note:MonitorR-9automaticallyshiRsscalefrommR/hrtoR/hrwhenindicatedvaluesexceed1000mR/hr.ThisconditionincombinationwithanyofthefollowingRCSloss/potentiallossindicatorswarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency:REDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITY:REDpathindicatesanextremechallengetothesafetyfunctionderivedfromappropriateinstrumentreadings,andindicatesapotentiallossofRCSbarrier.RCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLING:ThisindicatoraddressesconditionswhereleakagefromtheRCSisgreaterthanavailableinventorycontrolcapacitysuchthatalossofsubcoolinghasoccurred.ThelossofsubcoolingasdeterminedfromE-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionisthefundamentalindicationthattheinventorycontrolsystemsareinadequateinmaintainingRCSpressureandinventoryagainstthemasslossthroughaleak.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Primarysystemleakage>46gpm:ThispotentiallossofRCSisbasedontheinabilitytomaintainnormalliquidinventorywithintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsideredastwopositivedisplacementchargingpumpsdischargingtothechargingheader.PEG
Reference:
FC6.1+RCS1.1,RCS2.1andRCS2.2BasisReference(s):1.2.3.45.6.7.EPIP-2-16"CoreDamageEstimation"CSFSTF-0.4IntegrityE-O,ReactorTriporSafetyInjectionF-0.5,ContainmentFR-Z.1,ResponsetoHighContainmentRadiationLevelTechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.5.2FSARTable9.3.62-9 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3ContainmentRadiation2.3.1AlertContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading)10R/hrMB4ARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:Thel0R/hrreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolanttothecontainment.Thereadingwasderivedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithnormaloperatingconcentrations(i.e.,withinT/S)intothecontainmentatmosphere.ThisEALisindicativeofaRCSleakonly.IftheradiationmonitorreadingincreasedtothatspecifiedbyReactorFuelEAL2.3.2,significantfueldamagewouldalsobeindicated.PEG
Reference:
RCS4.1BasisReference(s):1.F-0.5,Containment2.FR-Z.1,ResponsetoHighContainmentRadiationLevel3.EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation2-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3ContainmentRadiation2.3.2SiteAreaEmergencyContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100R/hrNUMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:The100R/hrreadingisavaluewhichindicatesthereleaseofreactorcoolant,withelevatedactivityindicativeoffueldamage,intothecontainment.Thereadingisderivedassumingtheinstantaneousreleaseanddispersalofthereactorcoolantnoblegasandiodineinventoryassociatedwithaconcentrationof300p.Ci/gmdoseequivalentI-131intothecontainmentatmosphere.Reactorcoolantconcentrationsofthismagnitudeareseveraltimeslargerthanthemaximumconcentrations(includingiodinespiking)allowedwithintechnicalspecificationsandarethereforeindicativeoffueldamage(approximately2-5%cladfailuredependingoncoreinventoryandRCSvolume).ThisvalueishigherthanthatspecifiedinEAL2.3.1whichwouldbeindicativeofonlytheRCSbarrier.Thus,thisEALindicatesalossofboththefuelcladbarrierandalossofRCSbarrierwarrantingdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
FC5.1BasisReference(s):1.P-9,RadiationMonitoringSystem,Section2.2.2.6,pg.P-9:22.EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimation2-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3ContainmentRadiation2.3.3GeneralEmergencyContainmentradiationmonitorR-29/R-30reading>1000R/hrNUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,ContainmentpotentiallossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:The1000H/hrreadingisavaluewhichindicatessignificantfueldamage(>20%cladfailure)wellinexcessoftheEALsassociatedwithbothlossoffuelcladandlossofRCSbarriers.Amajorreleaseofradioactivityrequiringoffsiteprotectiveactionsfromcoredamageisnotpossibleunlessamajorfailureoffuelcladdingallowsradioactivematerialtobereleasedfromthecoreintothereactorcoolant.Regardlessofwhethercontainmentischallenged,thisamountofactivityincontainment,ifreleased,couldhavesuchsevereconsequencesthatitisprudenttotreatthisasapotentiallossofcontainment,suchthataGeneralEmergencydeclarationiswarranted.NUREG-1228"SourceEstimationsDuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents,"indicatesthatsuchconditionsdonotexistwhentheamountofcladdamageislessthan20%.PEG
Reference:
PC5.12-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.EPIP1-0,GinnaStationEventEvaluationandClassificationEPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimationNUREG-1228"SourceEstimationsDuringIncidentResponsetoSevereNuclearPowerPlantAccidents"TechnologyforEnergyReportNo.R-81-0122-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3RefuelingAccidentsorOtherRadiationMonitors2.4.1UnusualEventSpentfuelpool(reactorcavityduringrefueling)waterlevelcannotberestoredandmaintainedabovethespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmsetpointNl3EIARCIC:Unexpectedincreaseinplantradiationorairborneconcentration.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:InlightofReactorCavitySealfailure,incidentsattwodifferentPWRsandlossofwaterintheSpentFuelPit/FuelTransferCanalataBWRalloccurringsince1984,explicitcoverageofthesetypesofeventsviaEALs¹1and¹2isappropriategiventheirpotentialforincreaseddosestoplantstaKClassificationasanUnusualEventiswarrantedasaprecursortoamoreseriousevent.Thespentfuelpoollowwaterlevelalarmsetpointof20in.belowtopofpoolisactuatedbyLC-661.Thedefinitionof"...cannotberestoredandmaintainedabove..."allowstheoperatortovisuallyobservethelowwaterlevelcondition,ifpossible,andtoattemptwaterlevelrestorationinstructionsaslongaswaterlevelremainsabovethetopofirradiatedfuel.WaterlevelrestorationinstructionsforlossofrefuelingcavitywaterlevelduringrefuelingareperformedinaccordancewiththeRF-65seriesofprocedures.Whenthefueltransfercanalisdirectlyconnectedtothespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity,therecouldexistthepossibilityofuncoveringirradiatedfuelinthefueltransfercanal.Therefore,thisEALisapplicableforconditionsi'whichirradiatedfuelisbeingtransferredtoandfromtheRPVandspentfuelpool.2-14T OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
AU2.1BasisReference(s):1.ER-SFP.1"LossofSpentFuelPitCooling"2.AR-K-293.RF-65series2-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel2.3RefuelingAccidentsorOtherRadiationMonitors2.4.2AlertConfirmedsustainedalarmonanyofthefollowingradiationmonitorsresultingfromanuncontrolledfuelhandlingprocess:~R-2ContainmentAreaMonitor~R-5SpentFuelPit~R-12ContainmentNobleGasNUMARCIC:Majordamagetoirradiatedfuelorlossofwaterlevelthathasorwillresultintheuncoveringofirradiatedfueloutsidethereactorvessel.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:AllBasis:NUREG-0818,"EmergencyActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors,"formsthebasisforthisEAL.ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareawhereirradiatedfuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,reactorvessel,orspentfuelpool.NUREG/CR-4982,"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupport,ofGenericSafetyIssue82,"July1987,indicatesthatevenifcorrectiveactionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalitiesarepredicted,andthatriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition,NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowinginitsdiscussion:"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolvingdecayedspentfuel,protectiveactionswouldbeneededforpersonnelonsite,whileoffsitedoses(assuminganexclusionarearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmentalProtecti'onAgency'sProtectiveActionGuides.Accordingly,itisimportanttobeabletoproperlysurveyandmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwith'decayedspentfuel."2-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1WAn"uncontrolledfuelhandlingprocess"isdefinedasanyeventoractivityrelatedtothemovementofirradiatedfuelwhichresultsinunexpectedoruncontrolledconditions.Thisterminologyhasbeenspecificallyaddedtoexcludeanticipatedincreasesinarearadiationlevelsasaresultofactionsperformedinaccordancewithapprovedproceduresduringrefuelingoperations.Thus,anAlertClassificationforthiseventisappropriate.Escalation,ifappropriate,wouldoccurviaEmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentinEALCategory9.0.ThebasisfortheContainmentAreaMonitorsetpoint(50mR/hr)andSpentFuelPitmonitorsetpoint(25mH/hr)areaspentfuelhandlingaccidentandis,therefore,appropriateforthisEAL.PEG
Reference:
AA2.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.P-9RadiationMonitoringSystemNUREG-0818,"EmergencyActionLevelsforLightWaterReactors,"NUREG/CR-4982,"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82"2-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev12.0ReactorFuel'.3RefuelingAccidentsorOtherRadiationMonitors2.4.3AlertReportofvisualobservationofirradiatedfueluncoveredMBCARCIC:Majordamagetoirradiatedfuelorlossofwaterlevelthathasorwillresultintheuncoveringofirradiatedfueloutsidethereactorvessel.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALisdefinedbythespecificareaswhereirradiatedfuelislocatedsuchasreactorcavity,orspentfuelpool.Thereisnoindicationthatwaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolorrefuelingcavityhasdroppedtothelevelofthefuelotherthanbyvisualobservation.Sincethereisnolevelindicatingsysteminthefueltransfercanal,visualobservationoflossofwaterlevelwouldalsoberequired.SuQicienttimeexiststotakecorrectiveactionsfortheseconditionsandthereislittlepotentialforsubstantialfueldamage.NUREG/CR-4982"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82"indicatesthatevenifcorrectiveactionsarenottaken,nopromptfatalitiesarepredictedandtheriskofinjuryislow.Inaddition,NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"presentsthefollowingititsdiscussion:"Intheeventofaseriousaccidentinvolvingdecayedspentfuel,protectiveactionswouldben'cededforpersonnelonsite,whileoQ'sitedoses(assuminganexclusionarearadiusofonemilefromtheplantsite)wouldbewellbelowtheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency'sProtectiveActionGuides.Accordingly,itisimportanttobeabletoproperlysurvey2-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1andmonitorforKr-85intheeventofanaccidentwithdecayedspentfuel.Thus,anAlertClassificationforthiseventisappropriate.Escalation,ifappropriate,wouldoccurviaradioactivityreleasecategory5.0orEmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentinEALCategory9.0.ThisEALappliestospentfuelrequiringwatercoverageandisnotintendedtoaddressspentfuelwhichislicensedfordrystorage.PEG
Reference:
AA2.2BasisReference(s):1.2.P-9RadiationMonitoringSystemNUREG/CR-4982"SevereAccidentinSpentFuelPoolsinSupportofGenericSafetyIssue82".NRCInformationNoticeNo.90-08,"KR-85HazardsfromDecayedFuel"2-19 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Thereactorvesselprovidesavolumeforthecoolantwhichcoversthereactorcore.Thereactorvesselandassociatedpressurepiping(reactorcoolantsystem)togetherprovideabarriertolimitthereleaseofradioactivematerialshouldthereactorfuelcladdingintegrityfail.TherearethreeRCSparameterswhichareindicativeofconditionswhichmayposeathreattoRCSorfuelcladdingintegrity:SCfLtlRR*(>>Tll1ST'fitl)RCSltgindicationsareutilizedtoindicatepotentialpipecrackswhichmaypropagatetoanextentthreateningfuelclad,RCSandcontainmentintegrity.RCSleakageofadegreerequiringECCStomaintainRCSinventoryposesadirectthreattofuelcladintegrity.Reactorvesselwaterlevelisalsodirectlyrelatedtothestatusofadequatecorecooling,andthereforefuelcladdingintegrity.nAsubsetofRCSleakage,excessiveprimarytosecondaryleakageinconjunctionwithunisolablesecondaryreleasestoenvironmentmayresultinlossesofcontainmentintegrityaswellasthreatenfuelcladintegrityformoresevereSGtuberuptures.AlfRCSAllglfdtlldlthattheinventorycontrolsystemsareinadequateinmaintainingRCSpressureandinventoryagainstmasslossthroughaleak.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1.1UnusualEvent3.1RCSLeakageUnidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakage>10gpmORIdentifiedleakage>25gpmNUMARCIC:RCSleakagewhengreaterthan200'FFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditionsofthisEALmaybeaprecursorofmoreseriousconditionsand,asaresult,isconsideredtobeapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.The10gpmvalueforthe.unidentifiedleakageandpressureboundaryleakagewasselectedbecauseitisobservablewithnormalControlRoomindications.Smallervaluesmustbedeterminedthroughtime-consumingsurveillancetests(e.g.,massbalances).The25gpmvalueforidentifiedleakageissetatahighervaluebecauseofthesignificanceofidentifiedleakageincomparisontounidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakage.Onlyoperatingmodesinwhichthereisfuelinthereactorcoolantsystemandthesystemispressurizedarespecified.PEG
Reference:
SU5.1BasisReference(s):None
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1RCSLeakage3.1.2AlertPrimarysystemleakage>46gpmMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSpotentiallossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisbasedontheinabilitytomaintainnormalliquidinventorywithintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsideredastwopositivedisplacementchargingpumpsdischargingtothechargingheader.PEG
Reference:
RCS2.2BasisReference(s):1.FSARTable9.3.63-3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.1.3SiteAreaEmergency3.1RCSLeakageRVLIScannotbemaintained>43%withnoRCPsrunningORWiththereactorvesselheadremoved,itisreportedthatwaterlevelinthereactorvesselisdroppinginanuncontrolledmannerandcoreuncoveryislikelyNUINARCIC:Lossofreactorvesselwaterlevelhasorwilluncoverfuelinthereactorvessel.FPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladpotentialloss,RCSlossModeApplicability:Basis:ThereactorvesselwaterlevelusedinthisEAListhetopofactivefuel(TAF).ThisvaluecorrespondstothelevelwhichisusedinCSFSTstoindicatechallengetocorecoolingandlossofthefuelcladbarrier.Thisistheminimumwaterleveltoassurecorecoolingwithoutfurtherdegradationoftheclad.SeverecoredamagecanoccurandreactorcoolantsystempressureboundaryintegritymaynotbeassuredifreactorvesselwaterlevelisnotmaintainedabovethatcorrespondingtoRVLISat43%.RVLISdynamicrangeindicationsarenotutilizedinthisEALsincetheRCPswouldnotberunningunderconditionswherevessellevelisapproachingTAF.Thus,declarationofaSiteAreaEmergencyiswarrantedundertheconditionsspecifiedbythisEAL.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencywouldbeviaradioactivityreleasecategory5.0.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
SS5.1FC4.1BasisReference(s):1.FR-C.1"ResponsetoInadequateCoreCooling" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0ReactorCoolantSystem8.2PrimarytoSecondaryLeakage8.2.1UnusualEventReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakage>0.1gpmpersteamgeneratorNUlVIARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesSGtubeleaksindicativeofalossofcontainment.Secondarysidereleasestoatmosphereincludethosefromfeedlineorsteamlinebreaksaswellasstuckopensafetyoratmosphericreliefvalvesthatcannotbeisolatedonceisolationhasbeendirected.bytheEOPs.AsteamgeneratorwhichisrequiredtobeusedforplantcooldownwouldalsobecoveredunderthisEAL.Forsmallleaks,notexceedingthenormalchargingcapacitythresholdinRCSleakageEAL3.1.2,thisEALresultsinanUnusualEvent.Forlargerleaks,RCSleakageEAL3.2.2wouldresultinaSiteAreaEmergency.ForSGtuberuptureswhichmayinvolvemultiplesteamgeneratorsorunisolablesecondarylinebreaks,SGtuberuptureEAL4.2.1wouldalsoresultinaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
PC4.1BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.5.2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.2PrimarytoSecondaryLeakage3.2.2SiteAreaEmergencyUnisolablereleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakage)46gpmMMARCICN/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSpotentialloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesSGtubeleaksindicativeofalossofbothRCSandcontainmentbarriers.UnisolablesecondarysidereleasestoatmosphereincludethosefromfeedlineorsteamlinebreaksaswellasstuckopensafetyoratmosphericreliefvalvesthatcannotbeisolatedonceisolationhasbeendirectedbytheEOPs.AsteamgeneratorwhichisrequiredtobeusedforplantcooldownwouldalsobecoveredunderthisEAL.Primarytosecondaryleakage)46gpmisbasedontheinabilitytomaintainnormalliquidinventorywithintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bynormaloperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwhichisconsideredastwopositivedisplacementchargingpumpsdischargingtothechargingheader.Forprimarytosecondaryleakage)46gpmintheabsenceofanysecondarytoatmosphererelease,anAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL3.1.2,ThisEALrepresentsthelossofbothRCSandcontainmentbarriersandthereforewarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
PC4.1+RCS2.2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.5.22.E-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"3.FSARTable9.3.6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.2PrimarytoSecondaryLeakage3.2.3SiteAreaEmergencyReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakage>0.1gpmpersteamgeneratorANDCoolantactivity)300pCi/ccofI-131MMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesSGtubeleaksindicativeofalossofcontainmentinconjunctionwithalossoffuelcladding.UnisolablesecondarysidereleasestoatmosphereincludethosefromfeedlineorsteamlinebreaksaswellasstuckopensafetyoratmosphericreliefvalvesthatcannotbeisolatedonceisolationhasbeendirectedbytheEOPs.AsteamgeneratorwhichisrequiredtobeusedforplantcooldownwouldalsobecoveredunderthisEAL.Acoolantactivity)300pCi/ccofI-131indicatesalossoffuelcladding.RefertoEALN2.1.2basisThisconditionrepresentsalossofbothprimarycontainmentwiththelossoffuelcladdingandthuswarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
PC4.1+FC2.1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.43-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev13.0ReactorCoolantSystem3.3RCSSubcooling3.3.1AlertRCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakageNUINARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesconditionswhereleakagefromtheRCSisgreaterthanavailableinventorycontrolcapacitysuchthatalossofsubcoolinghasoccurred.ThelossofsubcoolingisthefundamentalindicationthattheinventorycontrolsystemsareinadequateinmaintainingRCSpressureandinventoryagainstthemasslossthroughtheleak.LossoftheRCSbarrierwarrantsdeclarationofanAlert.PEG
Reference:
RCS2.1BasisReference(s):1.E-O,ReactorTripOrSafetyInjection3-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Thecontainmentstructureisanatmosphericvaporcontainmentsystem.ItformsaGssionproductbarrierdesignedtocontaintheradioactivefissionproductsgeneratedfromanypostulatedaccidentsoastoprecludeexceedingoffsiteexposurelimits.Thecontainmentstructureisalowleakagesystemhousingthereactorvessel,thereactorcoolantpiping,steamgeneratorsandotherbranchconnectionsofthereactorprimarysystem.Thecontainmentisequippedwithisolationvalvesforsystemswhichpenetratethecontainmentboundary.Thesevalvesautomaticallyactuatetoisolatesystemsunderemergencyconditions.TherearethreecontainmentparameterswhichareindicativeofconditionswhichmayposeathreattocontainmentintegrityorindicatedegradationofRCSorreactorfuelcladintegrity.~inIAbnormallyhighcontainmentpressureorfailureofcontainmentcoolingsystemsfollowingaLOCAareindicativeofpotentiallossesofthecontainmentbarrierintegrity.TheexistenceofanunisolableCIorCVIlinebreakoutsidecontainmentconstitutesalossofcontainmentintegrityaswellasalossofRCSboundary.InconsistentcontainmentresponsetoaknownLOCAisalsoindicativeofcontainmentlossinconjunctionwithRCSbarrierbreach.Shouldalossoffuelcladdingintegrityoccurundereitheroftheseconditions,thepotentialforreleaseoflargeamountsofradioactivematerialstotheenvironmentexists.mrwihn1SGtuberupturesinconjunctionwithasecondarysystemlinebreakresultinginreleasetotheenvironmentconstituteslossesofbothRCSandcontainmentintegrity.PrimarytosecondaryleakageinexcessofTechnicalSpecificationsinconjunctionwithfuelcladdamageandsecondarysystemleakagetotheenvironmentconstituteslossesoffuelclad,RCSandcontainmentintegrity.Thisconditionprovidesthepotentialforreleaseoflargeamountsofradioactivematerialstotheenvironment.~mi1nr'Theexistenceofcombustible'gasconcentrationsincontainmentposeaseverethreattocontainmentintegrityandareindicativeofseverelydegradedreactorcoreandRCSconditions.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.1UnusualEventBothdoorsopenoncontainmentairlock.ORInabilitytoclosecontainmentpressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentNUMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesanindicationthatunambiguouslyindicateslossofthecontainmentbarrierunderconditionswhencontainmentintegrityisrequired.Itisimportanttonotehowever,thatlossofcontainmentduetobothairlockdoorsbeingopeniseventdependent.Uponrecognition,shiftpersonnelwouldrapidlyrespondinanattempttoreestablishcontainmentintegrity.Ifthedoorscannotbereclosed,anylossoftheRCSbarrierthatoccurswiththedoorsopenwouldappearasaninconsistentLOCAresponse.Therefore,thiseventisnotusedasadefinitiveindicatoroflossoftheprimarycontainmentbarrierforpurposesofdefininghigherclassificationEALs.RatheritislefttotheEmergencyCoordinator'sjudgmentwhethersuchalosshasoccurred.'EG
Reference:
PC7.1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus/4.1.2SiteAreaEmergency4RapiduncontrolleddecreaseincontainmentpressurefollowinginitialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditionsMBMRCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:Rapidunexplainedlossofpressure(i.e.,notattributabletocontainmentsprayorFanCoolingUnitsorcondensationeffects)followinganinitialpressureincreaseindicatesalossofbothRCSandcontainmentintegrity.Containmentpressureandsumplevelsshouldincreaseasaresultofth'massandenergyreleaseintocontainmentfromaLOCA.Thus,sumplevelorpressurenotincreasingindicatescontainmentbypass(V-sequence)andalossofcontainmentintegrity.ThisEALindicateslossofbothRCSandcontainmentandthereforewarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
PC2.1PC2.2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.Alarmresponseprocedure,AR-C-18,Revision62.Alarmresponseprocedure,AR-C-19,Revision43.R.E.GinnaUpdatedFSAR,Figure6.2-3through6.2-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.3SiteAreaEmergencyEither:CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowingconfirmedLOCAORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressincompletecontainmentisolationthatallowsdirectreleasetotheenvironment.ItrepresentsalossofboththeRCSandcontainmentbarrierandthereforewarrantsdeclarationofaSiteAreaEmergency.FailureofCIorCVIvalvestoisolateisintendedtoaddressincompletecontainmentisolationthatallowsdirectreleasetotheenvironment.ItrepresentsalossofboththeRCSandcontainmentbarrier.ConfirmationofaIOCAshouldbebasedondiagnosticactivitiesconsistentwithE-0"ReactorTriporSafetyInjection.""Inabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainment"isintendedtoaddressotherprimarysystems,eitherdirectorindirect,whichtheinabilitytoisolateindicatelossofbothRCSandcontainment.PEG
Reference:
PC3.1
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.FR-2.1"ResponsetoHighContainmentPressure" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment'4.lContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.4GeneralEmergencySafetyinjectionsignalduetoLOCAwithlessthanminimumoperablecontainmentheatremovalequipment,Table4.3ANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladloss,Table4.1Table4.3Minimum0erableContainmentHeatRemovalEuimentCNMTPressureRecircFans0erableSraPumsReuired<28psigN/A>28psigTable4.1FuelCladLossIndicators1.Coolantactivity>300p.Ci/ccofI-1312.ContainmentradmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100H/hr3.LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10H/hr4.REDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,ContainmentpotentiallossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrepresentsapotentiallossofcontainmentinconjunctionwithlossesofbothRCSandfuelclad.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ApotentiallossofcontainmentisconsideredtoexistinthatthecontainmentheatremovaVdepressurizationsystems(e.g.,containmentsprays,Recirc.Fans,butnotincludingcontainmentventingstrategies)areeitherlostorperforminginadegradedmanner,asindicatedbyplantparameterssuchascontainmentpressure,pressurizerlevelandsteamlinepressureinexcessofthesetpointsatwhichtheequipmentwassupposedtohaveactuated.RCSisalsoassumedtobelostinthisconditionduetoexceedingsafetyinjectioninitiationsetpoints:containmentpressure()4psig)orlowpressurizer(<1723psig).Table4.1presentsfuelcladlossindicatorswhichrepresent2-5%cladfailures.RefertoEAL0's2.1.2,2.2.2,and2.3.2forbasesoftheseindicators.PEG
Reference:
PC2.5+FC2.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):l.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.TechnicalSpecifications,Table3.5-4,pg.3.5-17R.E.GinnaUFSAR,Section6.2.2.1.2.4,pg.6.2-28TechnicalSpecifications,Article5.2.1,pg.5.2-1FR-Z.1,ResponsetoHighContainmentPressure,Revision3R.E.GinnaUFSAR,Section6.2.2.1,pg.6.2-24bR.E.GinnaUFSAR,Section6.2.2.2,pg.6.2-32andFigure6.2-11EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimationP-9,RadiationMonitoringSystem,Revision67,Section2.2.2.6,pg.P-9:2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.5GeneralEmergencyEither:RapiduncontrolleddecreaseincontainmentpressurefollowinginitialincreaseORLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditionsANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladdamage,Table4.2Table4.2FuelCladDamageIndicatorsORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131ContainmentradmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100EhrLetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hrMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladpotentialloss/loss,RCSloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALindicateslossofbothRCSandcontainmentwithlossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladdingandthereforewarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.,4-10
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Rapidunexplainedlossofpressure(i.e.,notattributabletocontainmentsprayorFanCoolingUnitsorcondensationeffects)followinganinitialpressureincreaseindicatesalossofbothRCSandcontainmentintegrity.ContainmentpressureandsumplevelsshouldincreaseasaresultofthemassandenergyreleaseintocontainmentfromaLOCA.Thus,sumplevelorpressurenotincreasingindicatescontainmentbypass(V-sequence)andalossofcontainmentintegrity.Table4.2presentsfuelcladlossandpotentiallossindicators:~ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling:RefertoEAL¹1.1.1basis~REDpathinF-0.3,HeatSink:RefertoEAL¹1.2.1basisCoolantactivity>300p,Ci/ccofI-131:RefertoEAL¹2.1.2basis~Containmentradmonitorreading>100R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.3.2basis~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10H/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.2.2basisPEG
Reference:
PC2.1/PC2.2+FC1.2,FC1.3,FC2.1,FC3.2,FC4.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):l.2.3.45.6.7.8.9.10.Alarmresponseprocedure,AR-C-18,Revision6Alarmresponseprocedure,AR-C-19,Revision4R.E.GinnaUpdatedFSAR,Figure6.2-3through6.2-5EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimationCSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling,Revision3CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSink,Revision3FR-C.1,ResponsetoInadequateCoreCooling,Revision7FR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,step9.aFR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,Note,pg.3P-9"RadiationMonitoringSystem"4-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.1ContainmentIntegrityStatus4.1.6GeneralEmergencyEither:"CIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredfollowingconfirmedLOCAORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladdamage,Table4.2Table4.2FuelCladDamaeIndicatorsORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoolantactivity>300p,Ci/ccofI-131ContainmentradmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100R/hrLetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hrMMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss/potentialloss,RCSloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALindicateslossofbothRCSandcontainmentwithlossorpotentiallossofthefuelcladdingandthereforewarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.FailureofCIorCVIvalvestoisolateisintendedtoaddressincompletecontainmentisolationthatallowsdirectreleasetotheenvironment.ItrepresentsalossofboththeRCSandcontainmentbarrier.4-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEAITechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1"Inabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainment"isintendedtoaddressotherprimarysystems,eitherdirectorindirect,whichtheinabilitytoisolateindicatelossofbothRCSandcontainmentTable4.2presentsfuelcladlossandpotentiallossindicators:~ORANGEpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling:RefertoEAL¹1.1.1basis~REDpathinF-0.3,HeatSink:RefertoEAL¹1.2.1basis~Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131:RefertoEAL¹2.1.2basisContainmentradmonitorreading>100R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.3.2basis~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10H/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.2.2basisPEG
Reference:
PC3.1+FC1.2,FC1.3,FC2.1,FC3.2,FC4.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.45.6.7.8.9.10.FR-2.1"ResponsetoHighContainmentPressure"CSFSTF-0.2,"CoreCooling"FR-C.l,"ResponsetoInadequateCoreCooling"EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimationCSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling,Revision3CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSink,Revision3FR-C.1,ResponsetoInadequateCoreCooling,Revision7FR;C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,step9.aFR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,Note,pg.3P-9"Radiatio'nMonitoringSystem"4-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Contaixunent4.2SGTubeRupturew/SecondaryRelease4.2.1SiteAreaEmergencyUnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"NMGQtCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:RCSloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressthefullspectrumofSteamGenerator(SG)tuberuptureeventsinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentduetoasignificantsecondarylinebreak.ThisEALaddressesrupturedSG(s)withanunisolablesecondarylinebreakcorrespondingtothelossof2of3fissionproductbarriers(RCSbarrierandcontainmentbarrier).Thisallowsthedirectreleaseofradioactivefissionandactivationproductstotheenvironment.Resultantoffsitedoseratesareafunctionofmanyvariables.Examplesinclude:coolantactivity,actualleakrate,SGcarryover,iodinepartitioning,andmeteorology.Theindicationsutilizedshouldbeconsistentwiththediagnosticactivitiesoftheemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs),ifavailable.Thisshouldincludeindicationofreductioninprimarycoolantinventory,increasedsecondaryradiationlevels,andanuncontrolledorcompletedepressurizationoftherupturedSG.Secondaryradiationincreasesshouldbeobservedviaradiationmonitoringofcondenserairejectordischarge,SGblowdown,mainsteam,and/orSGsamplingsystem.Determinationofthe"uncontrolled"depressurizationoftherupturedSGshouldbebasedonindicationthatthepressuredecreaseintherupturedsteamgeneratorisnotafunctionofoperatoraction.ThisshouldpreventdeclarationbasedonadepressurizationthatresultsfromanEOPinducedcooldownoftheRCSthatdoesnotinvolvetheprolongedreleaseofcontaminatedsecondarycoolantfromtheaffectedSG4-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1totheenvironment.ThisEALencompassessteambreaks,feedbreaks,andstuckopensafetyorreliefvalves.PEG
Reference:
RCS3.1BasisReference(s):1.E-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"4-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.2SGTubeRupturew/SecondaryRelease4.2.2GeneralEmergencyUnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"ANDAnyindicatorsoffuelcladdamage,Table4.2Table4.2FuelCladDamaeIndicatorsORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoolantactivity>300p.Ci/ccofI-131ContainmentradmonitorR-29/R-30reading>100R/hrLetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hrNUMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss/potentialloss,RCSloss,ContainmentlossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressthefullspectrumofSteamGenerator(SG)tuberuptureeventsinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentduetoasignificantsecondarylinebreakwithactualorpotentiallossofthefuelcladintegrity.ThisEALaddressesrupturedSG(s)withanunisolablesecondarylinebreakcorrespondingtothelossof2of3fissionproductbarriers(RCSbarrierandcontainmentbarrier)withtheactualorpotentiallossofthethird(fuelcladding).Thisallowsthedirectreleaseofradioactivefissionandactivationproductstotheenvironment.Resultantoffsitedoseratesareafunctionofmanyvariables.Examplesinclude:coolantactivity,actualleakrate,SGcarryover,iodinepartitioning,andmeteorology.4-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Theindicationsutilizedshouldbeconsistentwiththediagnosticactivitiesoftheemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs),ifavailable.Thisshouldinclude.indicationofreductioninprimarycoolantinventory,increasedsecondaryradiationlevels,andanuncontrolledorcompletedepressurizationoftherupturedSG.Secondaryradiationincreasesshouldbeobservedviaradiationmonitoringofcondenserairejectordischarge,SGblowdown,mainsteam,.and/orSGsamplingsystem.Determinationofthe"uncontrolled"depressurizationoftherupturedSGshouldbebasedonindicationthatthepressuredecreaseintherupturedsteamgeneratorisnotafunctionofoperatoraction.ThisshouldpreventdeclarationbasedonadepressurizationthatresultsfromanEOPinducedcooldownoftheRCSthatdoesnotinvolvetheprolongedreleaseofcontaminatedsecondarycoolantfromtheafFectedSGtotheenvironment.ThisEALencompassessteambreaks,feedbreaks,andstuckopensafetyorreliefvalves.Table4.2presentsfuelcladlossandp'otentiallossindicators:~ORANGEorREDpathinF-0.2,CoreCooling:RefertoEAL¹1.1.1basis~REDpathinF-0.3,HeatSink:RefertoEAL¹1.2.1basis~Coolantactivity>300pCi/ccofI-131:RefertoEAL¹2.1.2basis~Containmentradmonitorreading>100R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.3.2basis~LetdownMonitorR-9reading>10R/hr:RefertoEAL¹2.2.2basisThisconditionrepresentsalossofbothRCSandprimarycontainmentwiththelossorpotentiallossoffuelcladdingandthuswarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.PEG
Reference:
RCS3.1+FC1.2,FC1.3,FC2.1,FC3.1,FC3.2,FC4.1,FC5.1andFC6.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.45.6.'7.8.TechnicalSpecificationsSection3.1.5.2EPIP2-16,CoreDamageEstimationCSFSTF-0.2,CoreCooling,Revision3CSFSTF-0.3,HeatSink,Revision3FR-C.1,ResponsetoInadequateCoreCooling,Revision7FR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,step9.aFR-C.2,ResponsetoDegradedCoreCooling,Revision6,Note,pg.3P-9"RadiationMonitoringSystem"4-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev14.0Containment4.3CombustibleGasConcentrations4.3.1GeneralEmergency>4%hydrogenconcentrationincontainmentMJMARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Fuelcladloss,RCSloss,ContainmentpotentiallossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:Existenceofanexplosivemixture(4%hydrogen)meansahydrogenandoxygenconcentrationofatleastthelowerdeflagrationlimitcurveexists.Whenhydrogenandoxygenconcentrationsreachorexceedthedeflagrationlimits,imminentlossofthecontainmentbarrierexists.Togeneratesuchlevelsofcombustiblegas,lossofthefuelcladandRCSbarriersmusthaveoccurred.ThisEALrepresentslossofbothfuelcladand,RCSwiththepotentiallossofcontainmentandthereforewarrantsdeclarationofaGeneralEmergency.PEG
Reference:
PC2.4BasisReference(s):1.FR-Z.1"ResponsetoHighContainmentPressure"4-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0ManyEALsare'asedonactualorpotentialdegradationoffissionproductbarriersbecauseoftheincreasedpotentialforoÃsiteradioactivityrelease.Degradationoffissionproductbarriersthough,isnotalwaysapparentvianon-radiologicalsymptoms.Therefore,directindicationofincreasedradiologicaleffluentsorarearadiationlevelsareappropriatesymptomsforemergencyclassification.Atlowerlevels,abnormalradioactivityreleasesmaybeindicativeofafailureofcontainmentsystemsorprecursorstomoresignificantreleases.Athigherreleaserates,offsiteradiologicalconditionsmayresultwhichrequireoffsiteprotectiveactions.Increasedarearadiationlevelsinplantmayalsobeindicativeofthefailureofcontainmentsystemsorprecludeaccesstoplantvitalequipmentnecessarytoensureplantsafety.Therearetwobasicindicationsofradioactivityreleaseratesandoneforarearadiationlevelswhichwarrantemergencyclassifications.DiiiiiifBliii'i'gsystemsprovidesarapidassessmentmechanismtodeterminereleasesinexcessofclassifiablelimits.P.Projectedoffsitedoses(basedoneffluentmonitorreadings)oractualoffsitefieldmeasurementsindicatingdosesordoseratesaboveclassifiablelimits.:Sustainedgeneralarearadiationlevelsinexcessofthoseindicatinglossofcontrolofradioactivematerialsorthoselevelswhichmayprecludeaccesstovitalplantareasalsowarrantemergencyclassification.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.1EffluentMonitors5.1.1UnusualEventAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"NUE"for)60min.unlesssampleanalysiscanconfirmreleaserates<2xtechnicalspecificationswithinthistimeperiod.Table5.1EffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdsMonitorNUEAlertR-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00p,Ci/cc0.533p,Ci/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33p,Ci/cc115.00p,Ci/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr23.8mR/hrNU1KARCIC:AnyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentthatexceedstwotimestheradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsfor60minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0Basis:The"valueshown"foreachmonitoristwotimesthecalculatedTechnicalSpecificationreleaseratesasspecifiedinP-9section2.4.Unplannedreleasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrateddose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergencyclass)isnottheprimaryconcernhere;itisthedegradationinplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore,itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiatingcondition.Further,theEmergencyCoordinatorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutes.MonitorindicationsarecalculatedonthebasisofthemethodologyofthesiteOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM).Annualaveragemeteorologyisused.Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.PEG
Reference:
AU1.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.4.5.6.EPIP2-3EmergencyReleaseRateDeterminationP-9RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessmentTechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3"CalculationsforNU)~CEALs"byP.S.PolfleitFileEAL.XLSRD-15.0ODCM5.3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.1EffluentMonitors5.1.2Alert.AvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"Alert"for>15min.unlessdoseassessmentcanconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"Alert"withinthistimeperiod.MonitorTable5.1EfQuentMonitorClassificationThresholdsNUEQE,R-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533pCi/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mEVhr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProjection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr 0
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0NUINARCIC:Anyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentthatexceeds200timesradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsfor15minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThiseventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyescalatingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100.Proratingthe500mR/yrcriterionforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognitionoftheincreasedseverity.MonitorindicationsarecalculatedonthebasisofthemethodologyoftheEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment.Annualaveragemeteorologyisused.Aspreviouslystated;the10mR/hrvalueisbasedonaprorationof200timesthe500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupationalMPClimits,roundeddownto10mR/hr.Thevaluesforthegaseouseffluentradiationmonitorsarebaseduponnotexceeding10mR/hratthesiteboundaryasaresultoftherelease.TheconversionfactorsarebaseduponthemixtureofnoblegaspresentinreactorcoolantduringtheV25/82tuberupture-normaloperations.Sincethereisnohighrangemonitorassociatedwithliquide6luentmonitorR-18andthe200xTechnicalSpecificationvalueisbeyondit'supperscale,anindicationof"offscalehi"isconservativelyused.Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeenconfirmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0PEG
Reference:
AA1.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.45.EPIP2-3EmergencyReleaseRateDeterminationP-9RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessmentTechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3"CalculationsforNUMARCEALs"byP.S.PolfleitFileEAL.XLS OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.1EffluentMonitors5.1.3SiteAreaEmergencyAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"SAE"for)15min.unlessdoseassessmentcanconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"SAE"withinthistimeperiod.MonitorTable5.1EfHuentMonitorClassificationThresholdsAlertR-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4Safety1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533pCi/cc11.50p,Ci/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mR/hr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mEUhr23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProjection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsAlertTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0MBCARCIC:Boundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivityexceeds100mRemTEDEor500mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationoftherelease.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThevaluesshownweredeterminedutilizingEPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment"basedupona100mRwholebodyexposure.Thecalculationsmadetheassumptionofneutralstabilityandan8mphwindspeed.Theseconditionsrepresentannualaveragemeteorology.Themostrestrictivex/Qvaluesatthe0-0.5miledistancewereused.EPIP2-18specifiesthatwholebodydoseislimitingwithrespecttoemergencyclassificationandprotectiveactionrecommendationsbasedupontheassumptionofanoblegastoiodineratioof1E-4.The100mRintegrateddoseisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulationexposure.Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirablegradient(oneorderofmagnitude)betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergencyclasses.ItisdeemedthatexposureslessthanthislimitarenotconsistentwiththeSiteAreaEmergencyclassdescription.The500mRintegratedchildthyroiddosewasestablishedinconsiderationofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelinesforwholebodythyroid.Integrateddosesaregenerallynotmonitoredinreal-time.Inestablishingtheemergencyactionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed,basedonasiteboundarydoseof100mR/hourwholebodyor500mR/hourchildthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).AlthoughEPIP2-18providesforR-3V32releasedeterminations,thevariabilityofresultsbaseduponthenumberofARV'sand/orSV'sprecludestheuseofanysinglemonitordefaultvalueforthesemonitors.Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeencon6rmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0PEG
Reference:
AS1.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.45.P-9RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessmentFSARTable2.3"CalculationsforMJMARCEALs"byP.S.PolfleitFileEAL.XLSRD-15.0ODCMTables3,5and7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.1.4GeneralEmergency5.1EQ1uentMonitorsAvalidreadingonanymonitorsTable5.1column"GE"for>15min.unlessdoseassessmentcanconfirmreleasesarebelowTable5.2column"GE"withinthistimeperiod.Table5.1EfQuentMonitorClassificationThresholdsMonitorR-11R-12R-13R-14R-15R-18R-12A(7/9)R-14A(7/9)R-15A(7/9)R-31/321ARV1Safety2Safety3Safety4SafetyNUE1.62E6cpm7.80E6cpm2.20E4cpm6.40E5cpm4.00E5cpm3.60E5cpmN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AAlertN/A1.07E7cpmN/A1.61E6cpm2.31E7cpmoffscalehiN/AN/AN/A1.900mR/hr0.951mR/hr0.476mR/hr0.317mR/hr0.238mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A6.00pCi/cc0.533p,Ci/cc11.50pCi/cc19.0mR/hr9.51mR/hr4.76mR/hr3.17mR/hr2.38mR/hrN/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A60.00pCi/cc5.33pCi/cc115.00pCi/cc190mEUhr95.1mRhr47.6mR/hr31.7mR/hr23.8mR/hrTable5.2DoseProjection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mR/hr5000mR/hr5-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0NUIVCARCIC:Boundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivityexceeds1000mRemTEDEor5000mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationofthereleaseusingactualmeteorology.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThevaluesshownweredeterminedutilizingEPIP2-18"ControlRoomDoseAssessment"basedupona1000mRwholebodyexposure.Thecalculationsmadetheassumptionofneutralstabilityandan8mphwindspeed.Theseconditionsrepresentannualaveragemeteorology.EPIP2-18specifiesthatwholebodydoseislimitingwithrespecttoemergencyclassificationandprotectiveactionrecommendationsbasedupontheassumptionofanoblegastoiodineratiooflE-4.The1000mRwholebodyandthe5000mRchildthyroidintegrateddosearebasedontheEPAprotectiveactionguidancewhichindicatesthatpublicprotectiveactionsareindicatedifthedoseexceeds1remwholebodyor5remchildthyroid.ThisisconsistentwiththeemergencyclassdescriptionforaGeneralEmergency.ThislevelconstitutestheupperlevelofthedesirablegradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.Integrateddosesaregenerallynotmonitoredinreal-time.Inestablishingtheemergencyactionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed,basedonasiteboundarydoseof1000mR/hourwholebodyor5000mR/hourchildthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting(dependsonsourcetermassumptions).AlthoughEPIP2-18providesforR-3V32releasedeterminations,thevariabilityofresultsbaseduponthenumberofARV'sand/orSV'sprecludestheuseofanysinglemonitordefaultvalueforthesemonitors.Validmeansthataradiationmonitorreadinghasbeen,con6rmedbytheoperatorstobecorrect.5-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0PEG
Reference:
AG1.1*BasisReference(s):l.2.3.4P-9'RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessmentFSARTable2.3"CalculationsforMV~CEALs"byP.S.PolQeitFileEAL.XLS5-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates5.2.1UnusualEventConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates>2xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>60min.NUINARCIC:AnyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentthatexceedstwotimestheradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsfor60minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:Unplannedreleasesinexcessoftwotimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor60minutesorlongerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.Thefinalintegrateddose(whichisverylowintheUnusualEventemergencyclass)isnottheprimaryconcernhere;itisthedegradationinplantcontrolimpliedbythefactthatthereleasewasnotisolatedwithin60minutes.Therefore,itisnotintendedthatthereleasebeaveragedover60minutes.Forexample,areleaseof4timesT/Sfor30minutesdoesnotexceedthisinitiatingcondition.Further,theEmergencyCoordinatorshouldnotwaituntil60minuteshaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthatthereleasedurationhasorwilllikelyexceed60minutesPEG
Reference:
AU1.25-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0BasisReference(s):,1.TechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.35-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates5.2.2AlertConfirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleaserates)200xtechnicalspecificationslimitsfor>15min.NUINARCIC:Anyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentthatexceeds200timesradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsfor15minutesorlonger.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:Confirmedsampleanalysesinexcessoftwohundredtimesthesitetechnicalspecificationsthatcontinuefor15minutesorlongerrepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.ThiseventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyincreasingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnicalSpecifications).Proratingthe500mR/yrbasisofthe10CFR20non-occupationalMPClimitsforbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Therequiredreleasedurationwasreducedto15minutesinrecognitionoftheincreasedseverity.PEG
Reference:
AA1.25-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.35-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates5.2.3AlertDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveysresultingfromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"Alert"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.Table5.2DoseProjection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsAlertTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mB/hrN/A100mR500mR100mR/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mH/hr5000mR/hrNUMARCIC:Anyunplannedreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentthatexceeds200timesradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsfor15minutesorlongerFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis.Offsiteintegrateddosesinexcessof10mRTEDEordoseratesinexcessof10mR/hrTEDErepresentanuncontrolledsituationandhence,apotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafety.ThiseventescalatesfromtheUnusualEventbyincreasingthemagnitudeofthereleasebyafactorof100overtheUnusualEventlevel(i.e.,200timesTechnicalSpecifications).Proratingthe5-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20forbothtime(8766hr/yr)andthe200multiplier,theassociatedsiteboundarydoseratewouldbe10mR/hr.Aspreviouslystated,the10mR/hrvalueisbasedonaprorationof200timesthe500mR/yrbasisof10CFR20,roundeddownto10mR/hr.PEG
Reference:
AA1.2BasisReference(s):2.3.4TechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Article's3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3EPIP2-3EmergencyReleaseRateDeterminationP-9RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment5-18
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates5.2.4SiteAreaEmergencyDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveysresultingfromactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"SAE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.Table5.2DoseProjection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mR/hrN/A100mR500mR100mH/hr500mH/hr1000mR5000mR1000mH/hr5000mH/hrNUINARCIC:Boundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivityexceeds100mRemTEDEor500mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationoftherelease.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:'Basis:The100mRintegratedTEDEdoseinthisEALisbasedontheproposed10CFR20annualaveragepopulationexposure.Thisvaluealsoprovidesadesirablegradient(oneorderofmagnitude)betweentheAlert,SiteAreaEmergency,andGeneralEmergencyclasses.ItisdeemedthatexposureslessthanthislimitarenotconsistentwiththeSiteAreaEmergencyclass5-19 OSSI-92-402A-4-BEGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0description.The500mRintegratedCDEthyroiddosewasestablishedinconsiderationofthe1:5ratiooftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelinesforwholebodythyroid.Inestablishingthedoserateemergencyactionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore,thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof100mR/hrTEDEor500mRlhrCDEthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting.PEG
Reference:
AS1.3AS1.4BasisReference(s):2.3.TechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3EPIP2-3EmergencyReleaseRateDeterminationP-9RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessmentt5-20 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.2DoseProjections/EnvironmentalMeasurements/ReleaseRates5.2.5GeneralEmergencyDoseprojectionsorfieldsurveysresultingRomactualorimminentreleasewhichindicatedoses/doserates>Table5.2column"GE"atthesiteboundaryorbeyond.Table5.2DoseProection/Env.MeasurementClassificationThresholdsAlertTEDECDEThyroidTEDErateCDEThyroidrate10mRN/A10mH/hrN/A100mR500mR100mH/hr500mR/hr1000mR5000mR1000mH/hr5000mH/hrNUIHARCICBoundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivityexceeds1000mRemTEDEor5000mRCDEThyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationofthereleaseusingactualmeteorology.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:TheGeneralEmergencyvaluesofTable5.2arebasedontheboundarydoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivitythatexceeds1000mRTEDEor5000mRCDEthyroidfortheactualorprojecteddurationoftherelease.The1000mRTEDEandthe5000mRCDEthyroidintegrateddosearebasedontheEPAprotectiveactionguidancewhich5-21 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0indicatesthatpublicprotectiveactionsareindicatedifthedoseexceeds1remTEDEor5remCDEthyroid.ThisisconsistentwiththeemergencyclassdescriptionforaGeneralEmergency.ThislevelconstitutestheupperlevelofthedesirablegradientfortheSiteAreaEmergency.Actualmeteorologyisspecificallyidentifiedsinceitgivesthemostaccuratedoseassessment.Actualmeteorology(includingforecasts)shouldbeusedwheneverpossible.Inestablishingthedoserateemergencyactionlevels,adurationofonehourisassumed.Therefore,thedoserateEALsarebasedonasiteboundarydoserateof1000mR/hrTEDEor5000mR/hrCDEthyroid,whicheverismorelimiting.PEG
Reference:
AG1.3AG1.4~BasisReference(s):2.3.4TechnicalSpecifications,AmendmentNo.24,Articles3.9.1.1thru3.9.2.3EPIP2-3EmergencyReleaseRateDeterminationP-9RadiationMonitoringSystemEPIP2-18ControlRoomDoseAssessment5-22 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.3AreaRadiationLevels5.3.1UnusualEventAnysustaineddirectARMreadings>100xalarmoroffscalehiresultingfromanuncontrolledprocessMMARCIC:Unexpectedincreaseinplantradiationorairborneconcentration.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:Validelevatedarearadiationlevelsusuallyhavelongleadtimesrelativetothepotentialforradiologicalreleasebeyondthesiteboundary,thusimpacttopublichealthandsafetyisverylow.ItshouldbenotedthattheCASandSASdonothaveinstalledradiationmonitors.Therefore,evaluationofthisEALwouldrequiresurveyoftheseareas.ThisEALaddressesunplannedincreasesinradiationlevelsinsidetheplant.Theseradiationlevelsrepresentadegradationinthecontrolofradioactivematerialandapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Arearadiationlevelsabove100timesthealarmsetpointhavebeenselectedbecausetheyarereadilyidentifiableonARMinstrumentation.SinceARMsetpointsarenominallysetonedecadeovernormallevels,100timesthealarmsetpointprovidesanappropriatethresholdforemergencyclassification.ForthoseARMswhoseupperrangelimitarelessthan100timesthealarmsetpoint,avalueofoffscalehighisused.ThisEALescalatestoanAlert,iftheincreasesimpairthelevelofsafeplantoperation.
00 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0PEG
Reference:
AU2.4.BasisReference(s):None5-24 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.3AreaRadiationLevels5.3.2AlertSustainedarearadiationlevels)15ma/hrineither:ControlRoomORCentralAlarmStationandSecondaryAlarmStationIVUMARCIC:Releaseofradioactivematerialorincreasesinradiationlevelswithinthefacilitythatimpedesoperationofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperationsortoestablishormaintaincoldshutdown.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddressesincreasedradiationlevelsthatimpedenecessaryaccesstooperatingstationsrequiringcontinuousoccupancytomaintainsafeplantoperationorperformasafeplantshutdown.AreasrequiringcontinuousoccupancyincludetheControlRoom,thecentralalarmstation(CAS)andthesecondarysecurityalarmstation(SAS).ThesecurityalarmstationsareincludedinthisEALbecauseoftheirimportancetopermittingaccesstoareasrequiredtoassuresafeplantoperations.Thevalueof15mR/hrisderivedfromtheGDC19valueof5remin30dayswithadjustmentforexpectedoccupancytimes.AlthoughSectionIII.D.3ofNUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTMIActionPlanRequirements",providesthatthe15mR/hrvaluecanbeaveragedoverthe30days,thevalueisusedherewithoutaveraging.A30daydurationimpliesaneventpotentiallymoresignificantthananAlert.5-25 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0Itistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.ThecauseormagnitudeoftheincreaseinradiationlevelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergencyCoordinatormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreasedradiationlevelsanddetermineifanyotherEALsmaybeinvolved.Forexample,adoserateof15mR/hrintheControlRoommaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicativeofhighdoseratesinthecontainmentduetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergencyoraGeneralEmergencymaybeindicatedbyotherEALcategories.ThisEALisnotintendedtoapplytoanticipatedtemporaryradiationincreasesduetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainermovement,depletedresintransfers,etc.).PEG
Reference:
AA3.1BasisReference(s):1.GDC192.NUREG-0737,"Clari6cationofTMIActionPlanRequirements",SectionIII.D.33.P-9RadiationMonitoringSystemRev.675-26 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev05.0RadioactivityRelease/AreaRadiation5.3AreaRadiationLevels5.3.3AlertSustainedabnormalarearadiationlevels>8R/hrwithinanyareas,Table5.3ANDAccessisrequiredtoestablishormaintaincoldshutdown.Table5.3PlantAreas~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~TurbineBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~ScreenHouse~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuildingNUMARCIC:Releaseofradioactivematerialorincreasesinradiationlevelswithinthefacilitythatimpedesoperationofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperationsortoestablishormaintaincoldshutdown.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddressesincreasedradiationlevelsinareasrequiringinfrequentaccessinordertomaintainsafeplantoperationorperformasafeplantshutdown.Arearadiationlevelsatorabove8H/hrareindicativeofradiationfieldswhichmaylimitpersonnelaccessoradverselyaffectequipmentwhoseoperationmaybeneededtoassureadequatecorecoolingorshutdownthereactor.ThebasisofthevalueisdescribedinNMPCmemoFileCode5-27 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev0NMP31027"ExposureGuidelinesForUnusual/AccidentConditions".TheareasselectedareconsistentwiththoselistedinotherEALsandrepresentthosestructureswhichhousesystemsandequipmentnecessaryforthesafeoperationandshutdownoftheplant.Itistheimpairedabilitytooperatetheplantthatresultsintheactualorpotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.ThecauseormagnitudeoftheincreaseinradiationlevelsisnotaconcernofthisEAL.TheEmergencyCoordinatormustconsiderthesourceorcauseoftheincreasedradiationlevelsanddetermineifanyotherEALmaybeinvolved.Forexample,adoserateof8R/hrmaybeaprobleminitself.However,theincreasemayalsobeindicativeofhighdoseratesinthecontainmentduetoaLOCA.Inthislattercase,aSiteAreaEmergencyoraGeneralEmergencymaybeindicatedbyotherEALcategories.ThisEALisnotmeanttoapplytoincreasesinthecontainmentradiationmonitorsastheseareeventswhichareaddressedinotherEALs.Norisitintendedtoapplytoanticipatedtemporaryradiationincreasesduetoplannedevents(e.g.,radwastecontainermovement,depleteresintransfers,etc.).PEG
Reference:
AA3.2BasisReference(s):1.NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporationmemoFileCodeNMP31027"ExposureGuidelinesForUnusuaVAccidentConditions",Revision1,3/18/935-28 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Lossofvitalplantelectricalpowercancompromiseplantsafetysystemoperabilityincludingdecayheatremovalandemergencycorecoolingsystemswhichmaybenecessarytoensurefissionproductbarrierintegrity.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowingtwolossofelectricalpowertypes:APr'hiscategoryincludeslossesofonsiteand/oro6'siteACpowersourcesincludingstationblackoutevents.fDPr'hiscategoryinvolvestotallossesofvitalplant125vdcpowersources.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.1.1UnusualEvent6.1LossofACPowerSourcesLossofabilitytosupplypowertothesafeguardbusesfromoffsitecircuits751and767for>15min.NUINARCIC:Lossofalloffsitepowertoessentialbussesforgreaterthan15minutes.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ProlongedlossofalloFsiteACpowerreducesrequiredredundancyandpotentiallydegradesthelevelofsafetyoftheplantbyrenderingtheplantmorevulnerabletoacompletelossofACpower(stationblackout).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.PEG
Reference:
SU1.1BasisReference(s):1.RGE-6"4160VElectricalDistributionSystem"2.RGE-7"480VDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.2AlertLossof'allsafeguardsbusACpowerfor>15min.NUlKARCIC:LossofalloffsitepowerandlossofallonsiteACpowertoessentialbussesduringcoldshutdown,refuelingordefueledmode.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:ColdShutdown,Refueling,DefueledBasis:LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpower.ThisEALisindicatedby:lossofallo6'siteANDonsiteACpowertosafeguardsbuses14/18AND16/17forgreaterthan15minutes.Whenincoldshutdown,refueling,ordefueledmodetheeventcanbeclassifiedasanAlert,becauseofthesigni6cantlyreduceddecayheat,lowertemperatureandpressure,increasingthetimetorestoreoneoftheemergencybusses,relativetothatspeci6edfortheSiteAreaEmergencyEAL.EscalatingtotheSiteAreaEmergency,ifappropriate,isbyAbnormalRadLevels/RadiologicalEfHuent,orEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentICs.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.PEG
Reference:
SA1.1BasisReference(s):1.RGE-6"4160VElectricalDistributionSystem" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.1.3Alert6.1LossofACPowerSourcesAvailablesafeguardtrainACpowerreducedtoonlyoneofthefollowingfor>15min.:~EDG1A(14/18)~EDG1B(16/17)~StationAuxiliaryTransformer12A~StationAuxiliaryTransformer12B1%JMARCIC:ACpowercapabilitytoessentialbussesreducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthan15minutessuchthatanyadditionalsinglefailurewouldresultinstationblackoutwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:TheconditionindicatedbythisEAListhedegradationoftheoffsitepowerwithaconcurrentfailureofoneemergencygeneratortosupplypowertoitsemergencybusses.AnotherrelatedconditioncouldbethelossofalloFsitepowerandlossofonsiteemergencydieselswithonlyonetrainofemergencybussesbeingfedfromtheunitmaingenerator,orthelossofonsiteemergencydieselswithonlyonetrainofemergencybussesbeingfedfromoffsitepower.ThesubsequentlossofthissinglepowersourcewouldescalatetheeventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.RGE-6"4160VElectricalDistribution"2.RGE-7"480vDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.1LossofACPowerSources6.1.4SiteAreaEmergencyLossofallsafeguardsbusACpowerfor>15min.NUINARCIC:LossofalloffsitepowerandlossofallonsiteACpowertoessentialbusseswithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpower.ThisEALisindicatedby:lossofalloffsiteANDonsiteACpowertosafeguardsbuses14/18AND16/17forgreaterthan15minutes.ProlongedlossofallACpowerwillcausecoreuncoveryandlossofcontainmentintegrity,thusthiseventcanescalatetoaGeneralEmergency.Thetimedurationshouldbeselectedtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses,butshouldnotexceed15minutes.PEG
Reference:
SS1.1BasisReference(s):1.RGE-6"4160VElectricalDistribution"2.RGE-7"480vDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.1.5GeneralEmergency6.1LossofACPowerSourcesLossofallsafeguardsbusACpowerANDeither:Powerrestorationtoanysafeguardsbusisnotlikelyin54hrsORActualorimminententryintoORANGEorREDpathonF-0.2,"CORECOOLING"NUMARCIC:ProlongedlossofalloffsitepowerandprolongedlossofallonsiteACpowerwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallACpowercompromisesallplantsafetysystemsrequiringelectricpower.ProlongedlossofallACpowerwillleadtolossoffuelclad,RCS,andcontainment.AlthoughthisEALmaybeviewedasredundanttotheRPVWaterLevelEALs,itsinclusionisnecessarytobetterassuretimelyrecognitionandemergencyresponse.ThisEALisspecifiedtoassurethatintheunlikelyeventofprolongedstationblackout,timelyrecognitionoftheseriousnessoftheeventoccursandthatdeclarationofaGeneralEmergencyoccursasearlyasisappropriate,basedonareasonableassessmentoftheeventtrajectory.Thelikelihoodofrestoringatleastoneemergencybusshouldbebasedonarealisticappraisalofthesituationsinceadelayinanupgradedecisionbasedononlyachanceofmitigatingtheeventcouldresultinalossofvaluabletimeinpreparingandimplementingpublicprotectiveactions.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Inaddition,undertheseconditions,fissionproductbarriermonitoringcapabilitymaybedegraded.AlthoughitmaybedifBculttopredictwhenpowercanberestored,theEmergencyCoordinatorshoulddeclareaGeneralEmergencybasedontwomajorconsiderations:1.ArethereanypresentindicationsthatcorecoolingisalreadydegradedtothepointthatLossorPotentialLossoffissionproductbarriersisimminent?2.Iftherearenopresentindicationsofsuchcorecoolingdegradation,howlikelyisitthatpowercanberestoredintimetoassurethatalossoftwobarrierswithapotentiallossofthethirdbarriercanbeprevented?Thus,indicationofcontinuingcorecoolingdegradationmustbebasedonfissionproductbarriermonitoringwithparticularemphasisonEmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentasitrelatestoimminentlossorpotentiallossoffissionproductbarriersanddegradedabilitytomonitorfissionproductbarriers.ThetimetorestoreACpowerisbasedonsiteblackoutcopinganalysisperformedinconformancewith10CFR50.63andRegulatoryGuide1.155,"StationBlackout",withappropriateallowanceforoffsiteemergencyresponse.PEG
Reference:
SG1.1BasisReference(s):1.2.3.4F-0.2,"CORECOOLING,"NRClettertoDr.MecredydatedV30/92"REGinnaNuclearPowerPlantStationBlackoutAnalysis(TACM68548)RGE-6"4160vElectricalDistributionSystem"RGE-7"480vDistribution" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.2.1UnusualEvent6.2LossofDCPowerSources<105vdcbusvoltageindicationson125vdcbatteries1Aand1Bfor>15min.MMARCIC:UnplannedlossofrequiredDCpowerduringcoldshutdownorrefuelingmodeforgreaterthan15minutes.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:ColdShutdown,RefuelingBasis:ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognizealossofDCpowercompromisingtheabilitytomonitorandcontroltheremovalofdecayheatduringcoldshutdownorrefuelingoperations.ThisEALisintendedtobeanticipatoryinasmuchastheoperatingcrewmaynothavenecessaryindicationandcontrolofequipmentneededtorespondtotheloss.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessaryfortheoperationofsafetyrelatedequipment.Thisvoltagevalueincorporatesamarginofatleast15minutesofoperationbeforetheonsetofinabilitytooperateloads.PEG
Reference:
SU7.1BasisReference(s):1.RGE-9"InstrumentBusandDCPowerSystem" OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev16.0ElectricalFailures6.2.2SiteAreaEmergency6.2LossofDCPowerSources>105vdcbusvoltageindicationson125vdcbatteries1Aand1B.for>15min.NUINARCIC:LossofallvitalDCpowerwithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:LossofallDCpowercompromisesabilitytomonitorandcontrolplantsafetyfunctions.ProlongedlossofallDCpowerwillcausecoreuncoveringandlossofcontainmentintegritywhenthereissignificantdecayheatandsensibleheatinthereactorsystem.EscalationtoaGeneralEmergencywouldoccurbyotherEALcategories.Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Thebusvoltageisbasedontheminimumbusvoltagenecessaryfortheoperationofsafetyrelatedequipment.Thisvoltagevalueincorporatesamarginofatleast15minutesofoperationbeforetheonsetofinabilitytooperateloads.PEG
Reference:
SS3.1BasisReference(s):1.RGE-9"InstrumentBusandDCPowerSystem"6-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Numerousplantsystemrelatedequipmentfailureeventswhichwarrantemergencyclassification,basedupontheirpotentialtoposeactualorpotentialthreatstoplantsafety,havebeenidentifiedinthiscategory.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowingeventtypes:T'OnlyoneEALfallsunderthiseventtyperelatedtothefailureoftheplanttobebroughttotherequiredplantoperatingconditionrequiredbytechnicalspecifications.milrrnr1mvinThiscategoryincludeseventswhichareindicativeoflossesofoperabilityofsafetysystemssuchasECCS,isolationfunctions,ControlRoomhabitabilityorcoldandhotshutdowncapabilities.fn'nA1nliCertaineventswhichdegradetheplantoperatorsabilitytoeffectivelyassessplantconditionsorcommunicatewithessentialpersonnelwithinorexternaltotheplantwarrantemergencyclassification.Underthiseventtypearelossesofannunciatorsand/orcommunicationequipment.7-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.1TechnicalSpeci6cationRequirements7.1.1Unusual'EventPlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithinTechnicalSpecificationsLCOActionStatementTime.1%UAIARCIC:InabilitytoreachrequiredshutdownwithinTechnicalSpecificationLimits.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:LimitingConditionsofOperation(LCOs)requiretheplanttobebroughttoarequiredshutdownmodewhentheTechnicalSpecificationrequiredconfigurationcannotberestored.Dependingonthecircumstances,thismayormaynotbeanemergencyorprecursortoamoreseverecondition.Inanycase,theinitiationofplantshutdownrequiredbythesiteTechnicalSpecificationrequiresaonehourreportunder10CFR50.72(b)non-emergencyevents.TheplantiswithinitssafetyenvelopewhenbeingshutdownwithintheallowableactionstatementtimeintheTechnicalSpecifications.AnimmediateNotificationofanUnusualEventisrequiredwhentheplantisnotbroughttotherequiredoperatingmodewithintheallowableactionstatementtimeintheTechnicalSpecifications.DeclarationofanUnusualEventisbasedonthetimeatwhichtheLCO-specifiedactionstatementtimeperiodelapsesunderthesiteTechnicalSpecificationsandisnotrelatedtohowlongaconditionmayhaveexisted.OtherrequiredTechnicalSpecificationshutdownsthatinvolveprecursorstomoreseriouseventsareaddressedbyotherEALs.7-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
SU2.1BasisReference(s):1.TechnicalSpecificationsSection3.07-3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.1UnusualEventReportofmainturbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbinesealsorgeneratorseals.NUMARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:PowerOperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALisintendedtoaddressmainturbinerotatingcomponentfailuresofsuf6cientmagnitudetocauseobservabledamagetotheturbinecasingortothesealsoftheturbinegenerator.Ofmajorconcernisthepotentialforleakageofcombustiblefluids(lubricatingoils)andgases(hydrogencooling)totheplantenvirons.ActualfiresandflammablegasbuildupareappropriatelyclassifiedthroughotherEALs.ThisEALisconsistentwiththedefinitionofanUnusualEventwhilemaintainingtheanticipatorynaturedesiredandrecognizingtherisktonon-safetyrelatedequipment.PEG
Reference:
HU1.6BasisReference(s):None7-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.2AlertTurbinefailuregeneratedmissilesresultinanyvisiblestructuraldamagetoplantvitalequipmentNUINARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:PowerOperations,HotShutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesthethreattosafetyrelatedequipmentimposedbymissilesgeneratedbymainturbinerotatingcomponentfailures.Theinvolvedequipmentincludessafety-relatedequipment,theircontrols,andtheirpowersupplies.ThisEALisconsistentwiththedefinitionofanALERTinthat,ifmissileshavedamagedorpenetratedareascontainingsafety-relatedequipment,thepotentialexistsforsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.PEG
Reference:
HA1.6BasisReference(s):None7-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.3AlertEntryintoAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessability"MMARCIC:Controlroomevacuationhasbeeninitiated.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:AllBasis:WiththeControlRoomevacuated,additionalsupport,monitoringanddirectionthroughtheTechnicalSupportCenterand/orotheremergencyoperationscenterisnecessary.InabilitytoestablishplantcontrolfromoutsidetheControlRoomwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
HA5.1BasisReference(s):1.AP-CR.1ControlRoomInaccessibility7-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures17.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.4AlertReactorcoolanttemperaturecannotbemaintained<200'FNUINARCIC:Inabilitytomaintainplantincoldshutdown.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:ColdShutdown,RefuelingBasis:hThisEALaddressescompletelossoffunctionsrequiredforcorecoolingduringrefuelingandcoldshutdownmodes.EscalationtoSiteAreaEmergencyorGeneralEmergencywouldbethroughotherEALs.AreactorcoolanttemperatureincreasethatapproachesorexceedsthecoldshutdowntechnicalspecificationlimitwarrantsdeclarationofanAlertirrespectiveoftheavailabilityoftechnicalspecificationrequiredfunctionstomaintaincoldshutdown.TheconcernofthisEAListhelossofabilitytomaintaintheplantincoldshutdownwhichisdefinedbyreactorcoolanttemperatureandnottheoperabilityofequipmentwhichsupportsremovalofheatfromthereactor.PEG
Reference:
SA3.17-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.AP-RHR.1"LossofRHR"2.TechnicalSpecificationsSection1.23,AP-RHR-2"LossofRHRWhileOperatingatReducedRCSInventoryConditions"7-8 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1'7.0EquipmentFailures7.2SystemFailuresorControlRoomEvacuation7.2.5SiteAreaEmergencyControlRoomevacuationANDCorecoolingcannotbeestablishedperAP-CR.1"ControlRoomInaccessibility"in~20min.MJMARCIC:Controlroomevacuationhasbeeninitiatedandcontrolofcorecoolingcannotbeestablished.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALindicatesthatexpeditioustransferofsafetysystemshasnotoccurredbutfissionproductbarrierdamagemaynotyetbeindicated.Thetimeintervalfortransferisbasedonanalysisorassessmentsastohowquicklycontrolmustbereestablishedwithoutcoreuncoveringand/orcoredamage.Thedesigncriteriafortheremoteshutdownequipmentspecifiesthatcontrolofsafetysystemsmustbeabletobeachievedwithoutresultingincoreuncoveryorcoredamage.REGNPSAppendixRsubmittalindicates20minutesisthemaximumtimeforwhichcontrolofplantsafetysystemsshouldoccurunderworstcaseconditions.Therefore,20minutesiswithinthedesigncriteriaoftheremoteshutdownequipment.Incoldshutdownandrefuelingmodes,operatorconcernisdirectedtowardmaintainingcorecoolingsuchasisdiscussedinGenericLetter88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval."Inpoweroperation,andhotshutdownmodes,operatorconcernisprimarilydirectedtowardmaintainingcriticalsafetyfunctionsandtherebyassuringfissionproductbarrie'rintegrity.7-9 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
HS2.1BasisReference(s):1.AP-CR.1ControlRoomInaccessibility2.AppendixRSection6.4.5page6-353.GenericLetter88-17,"LossofDecayHeatRemoval."7-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.3LossofIndications/Alarms/CommunicationCapability7.3.1UnusualEventUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicationsonanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationTable7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsAAABCDEF0NUINARCIC:Unplannedlossofmostorallsafetysystemannunciationorindicationinthecontrolroomforgreaterthan15minuteswithreactorcoolanttemperature>2OO'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizesthedifhcultyassociatedwithmonitoringchangingplantconditionswithouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciationorindicationequipment.Recognitionoftheavailabilityofcomputerbasedindicationequipmentisconsidered(PPCSandSAS)."Unplanned"lossofannunciatorsorindicatorsexcludesscheduledmaintenanceandtestingactivities.ItisnotintendedthatplantpersonnelperformadetailedcountoftheinstrumentationlostbuttheuseofjudgmentbytheShiftSupervisorasthethresholdfordeterminingtheseverityoftheplantconditions.Thisjudgment7-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1issupportedbythespecificopinionoftheShikSupervisorthatadditionaloperatingpersonnelwillberequiredtoprovideincreasedmonitoringofsystemoperationto,safelyoperatetheplant.Itisfurtherrecognizedthatmostplantdesignsprovideredundantsafetysystemindicationpoweredfromseparateuninterruptablepowersupplies.Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciatorsismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications,theconcernisincludedinthisEALduetodifficultyassociatedwithassessmentofplantconditions.Thelossofspecific,orseveral,safetysystemindicatorsshouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponentoperabilitystatus.ThiswillbeaddressedbytheirspecificTechnicalSpecification.TheinitiationofaTechnicalSpecificationimposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrumentlosswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.IftheshutdownisnotincompliancewiththeTechnicalSpecificationaction,theUnusualEventisbasedonEAL7.1.1,InabilitytoReachRequiredShutdownWithinTechnicalSpecificationLimits.AnnunciatorsorindicatorsforthisEALmustincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingprocedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.).Fifteenminuteswasselectedasathresholdtoexcludetransientormomentarypowerlosses.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperationduringcoldshutdown,refueling,anddefueledmodes,thisEALisnotapplicableduringthesemodesofoperation.ThisUnusualEventwillbeescalatedtoanAlertifatransientisinprogressduringthelossofannunciationorindication.PEG
Reference:
SU3.1BasisReference(s):None7-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.3LossofIndications/Alarms/CommunicationCapability7.3.2UnusualEventLossofallcommunicationscapabilityaffectingtheabilitytoeither:PerformroutineoperationsORNotifyoffsiteagenciesorpersonnelNUMARCIC:Unplannedlossofallonsiteoroffsitecommunicationscapabilities.FPBloss/potentialloss:~N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListorecognizealossofcommunicationscapabilitythateitherdefeatstheplantoperationsstaffabilitytoperformroutinetasksnecessaryforplantope'rationsortheabilitytocommunicateproblemswithoffsiteauthorities.Thelossofoffsitecommunicationsabilityisexpectedtobesignificantlymorecomprehensivethantheconditionaddressedby10CFR50.72.Theonsitecommunicationslossmustencompassthelossofallmeansofroutinecommunications(i.e.,phones,soundpoweredphonesystems,pagepartysystem,and'radios/walkietalkies).Theoffsitecommunicationslossmustencompassthelossofallmeansofcommunicationswithoffsiteauthorities.ThisshouldincludeENS,Belllines,FAXtransmissions,anddedicatedphonesystems.ThisEALisintendedtobeusedonlywhenextraordinarymeansarebeingutilizedtomakecommunicationspossible(relayingofinformationfromradiotransmissions,individualsbeingsenttooffsitelocations,etc.).7-13 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1.PEG
Reference:
SU6.1BasisReference(s):1.A-56,"CommunicationSystemsatGinnaStation"7-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.3LossofIndications/Alarms/CommunicationCapability7.3.3AlertUnplannedlossofannunciatorsorindicationsonanyControlRoomPanels,.Table7.3for>15min.ANDIncreasedsurveillanceisrequiredforsafeplantoperationANDeither:AplanttransientinprogressORPPCSandSASareunavailableTable7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsAABCDEFGNUMARCIC:Unplannedlossofmostorallsafetysystemannunciationorindicationincontrolroomwitheither(1)asignificanttransientinprogress,or(2)compensatorynon-alarmingindicatorsareunavailablewithreactorcoolant>200'F.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizesthedifBcultyassociatedwithmonitoringchangingplant'onditionswithouttheuseofamajorportionoftheannunciationorindicationequipmentduringatransient.Recognitionoftheavailabilityofcomputerbasedindicationequipmentisconsidered(PPCS,SAS,etc.)."Unplanned"lossofannunciatorsorindicatorsdoesnotincludescheduledmaintenanceandtestingactivities.7-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ItisnotintendedthatplantpersonnelperformadetailedcountoftheinstrumentationlostbuttheuseofjudgmentbytheShiftSupervisorasthethresholdfordeterminingtheseverityoftheplantconditions.ThisjudgmentissupportedbythespecificopinionoftheShiftSupervisorthatadditionaloperatingpersonnelwillberequiredtoprovideincreasedmonitoringofsystemoperationtosafelyoperatetheplant.Itisfurtherrecognizedthatmostplantdesignsprovideredundantsafetysystemindicationpoweredfromseparateuninterruptablepowersupplies.Whilefailureofalargeportionofannunciatorsismorelikelythanafailureofalargeportionofindications,theconcernisUicludedinthisEALduetodifFicultyassociatedwithassessmentofplantconditions.Thelossofspecific,orseveral,safetysystemindicatorsshouldremainafunctionofthatspecificsystemorcomponentoperabilitystatus,ThiswillbeaddressedbythespecificTechnicalSpecification.TheinitiationofaTechnicalSpecificationimposedplantshutdownrelatedtotheinstrumentlosswillbereportedvia10CFR50.72.AnnunciatorsorindicatorsforthisEALincludesthoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingProcedures,intheEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,area,process,and/oreffluentradmonitors,etc.)."Significanttransient"includesresponsetoautomaticormanuallyinitiatedfunctionssuchastrips,runbacksinvolvinggreaterthan25%thermalpowerchange,ECCSinjections,orthermalpoweroscillationsof10%orgreater.Ifbothamajorportionoftheannunciationsystemandallcomputermonitoringareunavailabletotheextentthattheadditionaloperatingpersonnelarerequiredtomonitorindications,theAlertisrequired.Duetothelimitednumberofsafetysystemsinoperationduringcoldshutdown,refuelinganddefueledmodes,noEALisindicatedduringthesemodesofoperation.ThisAlertwillbeescalatedtoaSiteAreaEmergencyiftheoperatingcrewcannotmonitorthetransientinprogress,PEG
Reference:
SA4.1BasisReference(s):None7-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev17.0EquipmentFailures7.3LossofIndications/Alarms/CommunicationCapability7.3.4SiteAreaEmergencyLossofannunciatorsorindicationsonanyControlRoomPanels,Table7.3ANDCompletelossofabilitytomonitorallcriticalsafetyfunctionstatusANDAplanttransientinprogressTable7.3VitalControlRoomPanelsAAABCDE'GNUIKARCIC:Inabilitytomonitorasignificanttransientinprogresswithreactorcoolant>200DFFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALrecognizestheinabilityoftheControlRoomstafftomonitortheplantresponsetoatransient.ASiteAreaEmergencyisconsideredtoexistiftheControlRoomstaffcannotmonitorsafetyfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.AnnunciatorsforthisEALshouldbelimitedtoincludethoseidentifiedintheAbnormalOperatingProcedures,intheCSFST'sandEmergencyOperatingProcedures,andinotherEALs(e.g.,rad"monitors,etc.)."Significanttransient"includesresponsetoautomaticormanuallyinitiatedfunctionssuchasscrams,runbacksinvolvinggreaterthan25lothermal7-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1powerchange,ECCSinjections,orthermalpoweroscillationsof10%orgreater.Indicationsneededtomonitorcriticalsafetyfunctionsnecessaryfor'rotectionofthepublicmustincludeControlRoomindications,computergeneratedindicationsanddedicatedannunciationcapability.Thespecificindicationsshouldbethoseusedtodeterminesuchfunctionsastheabilitytoshutdownthereactor,maintainthecorecooledandinaeoolablegeometry,toremoveheatfromthecore,tomaintainthereactorcoolantsystemintact,andtomaintaincontainmentintact."Planned"actionsareexcludedfromtheEALsincethelossofinstrumentationofthismagnitudeisofsuchsignificanceduringatransientthatthecauseofthelossisnotanamelioratingfactor.PEG
Reference:
SS6.1BasisReference(s):None7-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Hazardsarethosenon-plantsystemrelatedeventswhichcandirectlyorindirectlyimpactplantoperationorreactorplantandpersonnelsafety.Theeventsofthiscategoryhavebeengroupedintothefollowingtypes:PMtgpldt*dtptpintotheProtectedAreaaswellasbombthreatsandsabotageattempts.Alsoaddressedareactualsecuritycompromisesthreateninglossofphysicalcontroloftheplant.Plplglltt*dtpldreactorsafety.AppropriateforclassificationarefireswithinthesiteProtectedAreaorwhichmayaffectoperabilityofvitalequipment.EM-dttg-tMloccurringeventswhichcancausedamagetoplantfacilitiessuchasaircraftcrashes,missileimpacts,toxicorflammablegasleaksorexplosionsfromwhateversource.Ett',tqddwhichhavepotentialtocausedamagetoplantstructuresorequipmentsignificantenoughtothreatenpersonnelorplantsafety.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.1.1UnusualEvent8.1SecurityThreatsBombdeviceorotherindicationofattemptedsabotagediscoveredwithinplantProtectedArea.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresentsapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.MMARCIC:Confirmedsecurityeventwhichindicatesapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALisbasedontheREGNPSSecurityContingencyPlan.Securityeventswhichdonotrepresentatleastapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplant,arereportedunder10CFR73.71orinsomecasesunder10CFR50.72,TheplantProtectedAreaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesecurityplan.BombdevicesdiscoveredwithintheplantvitalareawouldresultinEALescalation.PEG
Reference:
HU4.1HU4.2BasisReference(s):1.REGNPSSecurityContingencyPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.1.2Alert8.1SecurityThreatsIntrusionintoplantProtectedAreabyanadversary.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresentsanactualsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.MMARCIC:Securityeventinaplantprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisclassofsecurityeventsrepresentsanescalatedthreattoplantsafetyabovethatcontainedintheUnusualEvent,ForthepurposesofthisEAL,theintrusionbyunauth'orizedpersonnelinsidetheProtectedAreaboundarycanbeconsideredasignificantsecuritythreat.IntrusionintoavitalareabyunauthorizedpersonnelwillescalatethiseventtoaSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
HA4.1HA4.2BasisReference(s):1.REGNPSSecurityContingencyPlan8.3 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.1.3SiteAreaEmergency8.1SecurityThreats.Intrusionintoaplantsecurityvitalareabyanadversary.ORAnysecurityeventwhichrepresentsactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.MMARCIC:Securityeventinaplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisclassofsecurityeventsrepresentsanescalatedthreattoplantsafetyabovethatcontainedintheAlertinthatunauthorizedpersonnelhaveprogressedfromtheProtectedAreatothevitalarea.PEG
Reference:
HS1.1HS1.2BasisReference(s):1.REGNPSSecurityContingencyPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.1.4GeneralEmergency8.1SecurityThreatsSecurityeventwhichresultsin:LossofplantcontrolfromtheControlRoomORLossofremoteshutdowncapabilityNUMARCICSecurityeventresultinginlossofabilitytoreachandmaintaincoldshutdown.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALencompassesconditionsunderwhichunauthorizedpersonnelhavetakenphysicalcontrolofvitalareasrequiredtoreachandmaintainsafeshutdown.PEG
Reference:
HG1.1HG1.2BasisReference(s):1.REGNPSSecurityContingencyPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1~8.0Hazards8.2.1UnusualEvent8.2FireorExplosionConfirmedfireinanyplantarea,Table8.2or8.3notextinguishedin<15min.ofControlRoomnotification:Table8.2PlantAreas~TurbineBuilding~TSCServiceBuilding~ContaminatedStorageBuildingTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouseNUIYIARCICFirewithinprotectedareaboundarynotextinguishedwithin15minutesofdetection.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Basis:ThepurposeofthisEAListoaddressthemagnitudeandextentoffiresthatmaybepotentiallysignificantprecursorstodamagetosafetysystems.Thisexcludessuchitemsasfireswithinadministrationbuildings,waste-basketfires,andothersmallfiresofnosafetyconsequence.PEG
Reference:
HU2.1BasisReference(s):1.SitePlotPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.2.2Alert8.2FireorExplosionFireorexplosioninanyplantarea,Table8.2orTable8.3whichresultsinEITHER:~visibledamagetoplantequipmentorstructuresneededforsafeplantoperationOR~whichaffectssafetysystemoperabilityasindicatedbydegradedsystemperformanceTable8.2PlantAreas~TurbineBuilding~TSC~ServiceBuilding~ContaminatedStorageBuildingTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouseNUIKARCIC:Fireorexplosionaffectingtheoperabilityofplantsafetysystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdown.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:All OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Basis:Thelistedareascontainfunctionsandsystemsrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplant.TheREGNPSsafeshutdownanalysiswasconsultedforequipmentandplantareasrequiredfortheapplicablemode.Withregardtoexplosions,onlythoseexplosionsofsuQicientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentrequiredforsafeoperation,orwhichresultsindegradedperformanceofsafetysystemswithintheidentifiedplantareasshouldbeconsidered.Asusedhere,anexplosionisarapid,violent,unconfinedcombustion,oracatastrophicfailureofpressurizedequipment,thatpotentiallyimpartssignificantenergytonearbystructuresandmaterials.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThewordingofthisEALdoesnotimplythatanassessmentofsafetysystemperformanceisintendedtobeperformed,ratherthatasaresultoftheevent,safetysystemparametersymptomsaredegradedasaresultoftheevent.ThedeclarationofanAlertandtheactivationoftheTSCwillprovidetheEmergencyCoordinatorwiththeresourcesneededtoperformdamageassessments.TheEmergencyCoordinatoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosions.PEG
Reference:
HA2.1BasisReference(s):1.SitePlotPlan OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.3.1UnusualEvent8.3Man-MadeEventsVehiclecrashintoorprojectilewhichimpactsplantstructuresorsystemswithinProtectedAreaboundaryNUIKARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/A~ModeApplicability:Basis:TheProtectedAreaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.ThisEALaddressessuchitemsasplane,helicopter,train,barge,carortruckcrash,orimpactofotherprojectilesthatmaypotentiallydamageplantstructurescontainingfunctionsandsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifthecrashisconfirmedtoaffectaplantvitalarea,theeventmaybeescalatedtoAlert.PEG
Reference:
HU1.4BasisReference(s):1.SitePlotPlan8-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.3.2UnusualEvent8.3Man-MadeEventsReportbyplantpersonnelofanexplosionwithinProtectedAreaboundaryresultinginvisibledamagetopermanentstructuresorequipmentNUINARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:TheProtectedAreaboundaryiswithinthesecurityisolationzoneandisdefinedinthesitesecurityplan.ForthisEAL,onlythoseexplosionsofsufBcientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentwithintheProtectedAreashouldbeconsidered.Asusedhere,anexplosionisarapid,violent,unconfinedcombustion,oracatastrophicfailureofpressurizedequipment,thatpotentiallyimpartssignificantenergytonearbystructuresandmaterials.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.Theoccurrenceoftheexplosionwithreportsofevidenceofdamage(e.g.,deformation,scorching)issufficientfordeclaration.TheEmergencyCoordinatoralsoneedstoconsideranysecurityaspectsoftheexplosion.PEG
Reference:
HU1.5BasisReference(s):1.SitePlotPlan8-11 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.3.3UnusualEvent8.3Man-MadeEventsReportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegasesthatcouldenterorhaveenteredwithintheProtectedAreaboundaryinamountsthatcouldafFectthe~healthofplantpersonnelorsafeplantoperationORReportbylocal,countyorstateofficialsforpotentialevacuationofsitepersonnelbasedonoffsiteeventNUMARCIC:Releaseoftoxicorflammablegasesdeemeddetrimentaltosafeoperationoftheplant.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALisbasedonreleasesinconcentrationswithinthesiteboundarythat=willafFectthehealthofplantpersonnelorafFectingthesafeoperationoftheplantwiththeplantbeingwithintheevacuationareaofanofFsiteevent(i.e.,tankertruckaccidentreleasingtoxicgases,etc.).TheevacuationareaisasdeterminedfromtheDOTEvacuationTablesforSelectedHazardousMaterials,intheDOTEmergencyResponseGuideforHazardousMaterials.Shouldanexplosionoccurwithinaspecifiedplantarea,anAlertwouldbedeclaredbasedonEAL8.2.2.,PEG
Reference:
HU3.1HU3.28-12 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocumentRev1BasisReference(s):None8-13
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.3.4Alert8.3Man-MadeEventsVehiclecrashorprojectileimpactwhichprecludespersonnelaccesstoordamagesequipmentinplantvitalareas,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouseNUINARCIC:NaturalanddestructivephenomenaafFectingtheplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALaddressessuchitemsasplane,helicopter,train,barge,carortruckcrash,orimpactofprojectilesintoaplantvitalarea.8-14 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
HA1.5BasisReference(s):None8-15 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.3.5Alert8.3Man-MadeEventsReportordetectionoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinaplantarea,Table8.3,inconcentrationsthatwillbelifethreateningtoplantpersonnelorprecludeaccesstoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperationTable8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouseMMARCIC:Releaseoftoxicorflammablegaseswithinafacilitystructurewhichjeopardizesoperationofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperationsortoestablishormaintaincoldshutdown.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALisbasedongasesthathaveenteredaplantstructureprecludingaccesstoequipmentnecessaryforthesafeoperationoftheplant.ThisEALappliestobuildingsandareascontiguoustoplantvitalareasorothersignificantbuildingsorareas.TheintentofthisEALisnottoincludebuildings(i.e.,warehouses)orotherareasthatarenotcontiguousorimmediatelyadjacenttoplantvitalareas.Itisappropriatethatincreasedmonitoringbedonetoascertainwhetherconsequentialdamagehasoccurred.8-16 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTech'nicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
HA3.1HA3.2BasisReference(s):None8-17 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4.1UnusualEvent8.4NaturalEventsEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyoperatorANDConfirmationofearthquakeofanintensity)0.01gperSC-5"EarthquakeEmergencyPlan".MMARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:REGNPSseismicinstrumentationactuatesat0.01g.Damagetosomeportionsofthesitemayoccurbutitshouldnotaffectabilityofsafetyfunctionstooperate.Methodsofdetectioncanbebasedoninstrumentationvalidatedbyareliablesource,operatorassessment,orindicationreceivedfromoutsideagencies.Asde6nedintheEPRI-sponsored"GuidelinesforNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",datedOctober1989,a"feltearthquake"is:"AnearthquakeofsuQicientintensitysuchthat:(a)theinventorygroundmotionisfeltatthenuclearplantsiteandrecognizedasanearthquakebasedonaconsensusofControlRoomoperatorsondutyatthetime,and(b)forplantswithoperableseismicinstrumentation,theseismicswitchesoftheplantareactivated.Formostplantswithseismicinstrumentation,theseismicswitchesaresetatanaccelerationofabout0.01g."PEG
Reference:
HU1.18-18 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.SC-5EarthquakeEmergencyPlan2.EPRIdocument,"GuidelinesforNuclearPlantResponsetoanEarthquake",datedOctober19898-19 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4NaturalEvents8.4.2UnusualEventReportbyplantpersonneloftornadowithinplantProtectedAreaboundaryM;5hVKCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALisbasedontheassumptionthatatornadostriking(touchingdown)withintheProtectedAreaboundarymayhavepotentiallydamagedplantstructurescontainingfunctionsorsystemsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.Ifsuchdamageiscon6rmedvisuallyorbyotherin-plantindications,theeventmaybeescalatedtoAlert.PEG
Reference:
HU1.2BasisReference(s):None8-20 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4.3UnusualEvent8.4NaturalEventsDeerCreekfloodingoverentranceroadbridge(handrail)ORLakelevel>252ftORScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<15ft(low-lowlevelalarm)MMARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheprotectedarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:Thiscovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditionsthatcouldbeprecursorsofmoreseriousevents.Deercreekfloodingoverentranceroadbridgemayprecludeemergencyresponsepersonnelaccessandegress.Lakewaterlevel>252ft.correspondstoplantdesignlevels.ScreenHouseSuctionBaylevel<15R.correspondstothelow-lowlevelalarmpointandwhichrequiresloadreductionbelow50%.PEG
Reference:
HU1.7BasisReference(s):1.2.3.SC-4HighWater(Flood)EmergencyPlanSC-4.1LowScreenhouseWaterLevelInterofficeMemo"ScreenhousePumpBayWaterLevel"datedV24/94toTerryWhitefromWilliamRapinandJeffreyWayland8-21 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4.4Alert8.4NaturalEventsEarthquakefeltinplantbyanyplantoperationspersonnelAND~Confirmationofearthquakeofanintensity)0.08gperSC-5"EarthquakeEmergencyPlan"NUIYGMCIC:NaturalanddestructivephenomenaafFectingtheplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARdesignbasisoperatingearthquakeof0.08g.Seismiceventsofthismagnitudecancausedamagetoplantsafetyfunctions.PEG
Reference:
HAl.lBasisReference(s):1.SC-5"EarthquakeEmergencyPlan"8-22
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4.5Alert8.4NaturalEv'entsSustainedwinds>75mphOR,Tornadostrikesaplantvitalarea,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouseMMARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALisbasedontheFSARassumed"severeenvironmentalloading"conditionof75mph.Windloadsofthismagnitudecancausedamagetosafetyfunctions.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1PEG
Reference:
HA1.2BasisReference(s):1.RGEFSARSection3.3.2.1.48-24 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4.6Alert8.4NaturalEventsAnynaturaleventwhichresultsinareportofvisiblestructuraldamageorassessmentbyControlRoompersonnelofactualdamagetoequipmentneededforsafeplantoperation,Table8.3Table8.3PlantVitalAreas~ControlBuilding~ReactorContainmentBuilding~AuxiliaryBuilding~IntermediateBuilding~EmergencyDieselBuilding~StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterBuilding~ScreenHouseMMARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtoforcesbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.ThisEALspecifiesareasinwhichstructurescontainingsystemsandfunctionsrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantarelocated.8-25 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1'PEG
Reference:
HA1.3BasisReference(s):None8-26 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Hazards8.4.VAlert8.4NaturalEventsFloodwateraccumulatingonscreenhouseoperatingfloorOR'akelevel>253ftORScreenHouseSuctionBaywaterlevel<13ftNUMARCIC:Naturalanddestructivephenomenaaffectingtheplantvitalarea.FPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddresseseventsthatmayhaveresultedinaplantvitalareabeingsubjectedtolevelsbeyonddesignlimits,andthusdamagemaybeassumedtohaveoccurredtoplantsafetysystems.Theinitialreportshouldnotbeinterpretedasmandatingalengthydamageassessmentpriortoclassification.NoattemptismadeinthisEALtoassesstheactualmagnitudeofthedamage.This.EALcovershighandlowlakewaterlevelconditionsthatexceedlevelswhichthreatenvitalequipment.Floodwateraccumulatingonthescreenhouseoperatingfloororlakelevels>253ft.correspondstolevelsthreateningvitalequipment.ScreenHouseSuctionBaylevel<13ft.correspondstothelevelbelowwhichthemotordrivenfirewaterpumpsuctionbowlsareuncovered.PEG
Reference:
HA1.78-27 OSSI-92-402A-4-REG'innaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1BasisReference(s):1.SC-4HighWater(Flood)EmergencyPlan2.SC-4.1LowScreenhouseWaterLevel3.Interof6ceMemo"ScreenhousePumpBayWaterLevel"dated1/24/94toTerryWhitefromWilliamRapinandJeffreyWayland8-28 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1TheEALsdefinedincategories1.0through8.0specifythepredeterminedsymptomsoreventswhichareindicativeofemergencyorpotentialemergencyconditions,andwhichwarrantclassification.WhiletheseEALshavebeendevelopedtoaddressthefullspectrumofpossibleemergencyconditionswhichmaywarrantclassificationandsubsequentimplementationoftheEmergencyPlan,aprovisionforclassificationofemergenciesbasedonoperator/managementexperienceandjudgmentisstillnecessary.TheEALsofthiscategoryprovidetheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinatorthelatitudetoclassifyemergencyconditionsconsistentwiththeestablishedclassificationcriteria,basedupontheirjudgment.9-1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0Other9.1.1UnusualEventAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NUINARCIC:EmergencyDirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyCoordinatortofallundertheUnusualEventemergencyclass.Fromabroadperspective,oneareathatmaywarrantEmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentisrelatedtolikelyoractualbreakdownofsitespecificeventmitigatingactions.Examplestoconsiderincludeinadequateemergencyresponseprocedures,transientresponseeitherunexpectedornotunderstood,failureorunavailabilityofemergencysystemsduringanaccidentinexcessofthatassumedinaccidentanalysis,orinsufhcientavailabilityofequipmentand/orsupportpersonnel.PEG
Reference:
HU1.3HU5.1 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1'BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0Other9.1.2UnusualEventAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadtoorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofcontainment,.AttachmentA.NUbXARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:Containmentloss/potentiallossModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergencyCoordinatorindeterminingwhetherthecontainmentbarrierislostorpotentiallylost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitor,thebarriershouldalsobeincorporatedinthisEALasafactorinEmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentthatthebarriermaybeconsideredlostorpotentiallylost.PEG
Reference:
PCS.XBasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0Other9.1.3AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShikSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldcauseorhascausedactualsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.NMGLRCIC:EmergencyDirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:BasisThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyCoordinatortofallundertheAlertemergencyclass.PEG
Reference:
HA6.1BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0Other9.1.4AlertAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShikSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrier,AttachmentA.NM4A'RCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:LossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesanyotherfactorsthataretobeusedbytheEmergencyCoordinatorindeterminingwhetherthefuelcladorRCSbarriersarelostorpotentiallylost.Inaddition,theinabilitytomonitorthebarriersshouldalsobeconsideredinthisEALasafactorinEmergencyCoordinatorjudgmentthatthebarriersmaybeconsideredlostorpotentiallylost.PEG
Reference:
FC7.1RCS6.1BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0OCher9.1.5SiteAreaEmergencyAsdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorlikelyfailuresofplantsystemsneededtoprotectthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposureswhichexceedEPAPAGs.NUMARCIC:EmergencyDirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyCoordinatortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionforSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
HS3.1BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev18.0Other9.1.6SiteAreaEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShikSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadorhasledtoeither:LossorpotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrier,AttachmentAORLossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunctionwithalossofcontainment,AttachmentANUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:LossorpotentiallossofbothfuelcladandRCSbarrierORLossorpotentiallossofeitherfuelcladorRCSbarrierinconjunctionwithalossofcontainmentModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsaffectingfissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressedexplicitlyelsewhere.DeclarationofanemergencyiswarrantedbecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyCoordinatortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionforSiteAreaEmergency.PEG
Reference:
FC7.1RCS6.1PC8.1BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0>>Other9.1.7GeneralEmergencyAsdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,eventsareinprogresswhichindicateactualorimminentcoredamageandthepotential.foralargereleaseofradioactivematerialinexcessofEPAPAGsoutsidethesiteboundary.NUINARCIC:EmergencyDirectorJudgmentFPBloss/potentialloss:N/AModeApplicability:Basis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsnotaddressedexplicitlyelsewherebutthatwarrantdeclarationofanemergencybecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyCoordinatortofallundertheGeneralEmergencyclass.ReleasescanreasonablybeexpectedtoexceedEPAPAGplumeexposurelevelsoutsidethesiteboundary..PEG
Reference:
HG2.1BasisReference(s):None OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev19.0Other9.1.8GeneralEmergencyAnyevent,asdeterminedbytheShiftSupervisororEmergencyCoordinator,thatcouldleadorhasledtoalossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotentiallossofthethird,AttachmentA.NUIKARCIC:N/AFPBloss/potentialloss:LossofanytwofissionproductbarriersandlossorpotentiallossofthethirdModeApplicability:Poweroperation,hotshutdownBasis:ThisEALaddressesunanticipatedconditionsaffectingfissionproductbarrierswhicharenotaddressedexplicitlyelsewhere.DeclarationofanemergencyiswarrantedbecauseconditionsexistwhicharebelievedbytheEmergencyCoordinatortofallundertheemergencyclassdescriptionfortheGeneralEmergencyclass.PEG
Reference:
FC7.1HCS6.1PC8.1BasisReference(s):None9-10 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ATTACHMENTAFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERLOSS4POTENTIALLOSSINDICATORS FissionProductBarrierLoss/PotentialLossMatrix(Rosethresholdsforwhichlossorpotentialisdeterminedtobeimminent,classifyasthoughthethreshold(s)hasbeenexceeded)PotentialLoss,ORANGEpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGREDpathinF-0.3,HEATSINKCoreExitThermocoupleReadings>/00'FRVLIS543%w/noRCPsrunningEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentREDpathinF-0.2,CORECOOLINGCoolantactivity>300IiCi/ccof1-131CoreExitThermocoupleReadings>1200'FContainmentradmonitorreading>100R/hrLetdownMonitor(R-9)reading>10R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentPotentialLossREDpathonF-0.4,INTEGRITYREDpathonF-0.3,HEATSINKPrimaiysystemleakage>46gpmEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentRCSsubcooling<EOPFig.MINSUBCOOLINGduetoRCSleakageUnisolablesecondarysidelinebreakwithSGtuberuptureasidentifiedinE-3"SteamGeneratorTubeRupture"Containmentradiationmonitorreading>10R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentA-2 FissionProductBarrierLoss/PotentialLossMatrix+hosethresholdsforwhichlossorpotentialisdeterminedtobeimminent,classifyasthoughthethreshold(s)hasbeenexceeded)PotentialLoseREDpathF-0.5,CONTAINMENTRapiduncontrolleddecreaseinContainmentPressurefollowinginitialincreaseEither:Coreexitthermocouples>1200'FORCoreexitthermocouples>700'FwithRVLIS<43%(noRCPs)ANDRestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15minutesLossofprimarycoolantinsidecontainmentwithcontainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditions,i.e.unexpectedchangesoccurintheseparametersthatarenotexplainableduetooperatoractionsorautomaticsystemactions.SafetyinjectionsignalduetoLOCAwith<theminimumcontainmentcoolingsafeguardsequipmentoperating:CNMTpressure<28psig:2CNMTRecircFansCNMTpressure228psig:2CNMTSprayPumpsOR2CNMTRecircFansand1CNMTSprayPumpEither.CIorCVIisolationrequiredandCIorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredORInabilitytoisolateanyprimarysystemdischargingoutsidecontainmentANDRadiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentexistsContainmentpressure60psigandincreasingReleaseofsecondarysidetoatmospherewithprimarytosecondaryleakagegreaterthantechspecallowableof0.1CPMpersteamgeneratorh4%hydrogenconcentrationincontainmentBothdoorsopenoncontainmentairlockORInabilitytoclosecontainmentpressurerelieforpurgevalveswhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentORClorCVIvalve(s)notclosedwhenrequiredwhichresultsinaradiologicalreleasepathwaytotheenvironmentContainmentradiationmonitorreading>1000R/hrEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentEmergencyCoordinatorJudgmentA-3 ATTACHIVlENTBWORDLIST/DEFINITIONS OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1ActuateToputintooperation;tomovetoaction;commonlyusedtorefertoautomated,multi-facetedoperations."ActuateECCS".AdversaryAsappliedtosecurityEALs,anindividualwhoseintentistocommitsabotage,disruptStationoperationsorotherwisecommitacrimeonstationproperty.Eventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotentialsubstantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.AnyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractionsoftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels.AvailableThestateorconditionofbeingreadyandabletobeused(placedintooperation)toaccomplishthestated(orimplied)actionorfunction.Asappliedtoasystem,thisrequirestheoperabilityofnecessarysupportsystems(electricalpowersupplies,coolingwater,lubrication,etc.).Can/Cannotbedetermined(</>)Thecurrentvalueorstatusofanidentifiedparameterrelativetothatspecifiedcan/cannotbeascertainedusingallavailableindications(directandindirect,singlyorincombination).Can/Cannotbemaintainedabove/below(c/>)Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobekeptabove/belowspecifiedlimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemperformanceinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Neitherimpliesthattheparametermustactuallyexceedthelimitbeforetheactionistakennorthattheactionmustbetakenbeforethelimitisreached.B-2 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Can/Cannotberestoredabove/below(c/>)Thevalueoftheidentifiedparameter(s)is/isnotabletobereturnedtoabove/belowspeci6edlimitsafterhavingpassedthoselimits.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturesystemsperformancesinrelationtothecurrentvalueandtrendoftheparameter(s).Doesnotimplyanyspecifictimeintervalbutdoesnotpermitprolongedoperationbeyondalimitwithouttakingthespecifiedaction.Asappliedtolossofelectricalpowersources(ex.:Powercannotberestoredtoanyvitalbusin<4hrs)thespecifiedpowersourcecannotbereturnedtoservicewithinthespecifiedtime.Thisdeterminationincludesmakinganevaluationthatconsidersbothcurrentandfuturerestorationcapabilities.Impliesthatthedeclarationshouldbemadeassoonasthedeterminationismadethatthepowersourcecannotberestoredwithinthespecifiedtime.CloseTopositionavalveordampersoastopreventflowoftheprocessfluid.Tomakeanelectricalconnectiontosupplypower.Con6rm/Con6rmationTovalidate,throughvisualobservationorphysicalinspection,thatanassumedconditionisasexpectedorrequired,withouttakingactiontoalterthe"asfound"configuration.ControlTakeaction,asnecessary,tomaintainthevalueofaspecifiedparameterwithinapplicablelimits;tofixoradjustthetime,amount,orrateof;toregulateorrestrict.DecreaseTobecomeprogressivelylessinsize,amount,number,orintensity.DischargeRemovalofafluid/gas&omavolumeorsystem.
OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1EnterTogointo.EstablishToperformactionsnecessarytomeetastatedcondition."EstablishcommunicationwiththeControlRoom."EvacuateToremovethecontentsof;toremovepersonnelfromanarea.ExceedsTogoorbebeyondastatedorimpliedlimit,measure,ordegree.ExistTohavebeingwithrespecttounderstoodlimitationsorconditions.FailureAstateofinabilitytoperformanormalfunction.GeneralEmergencyEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationormeltingwithpotentialforlossofcontainmentintegrity.ReleasescanbereasonablyexpectedtoexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsoFsiteformorethantheimmediatesitearea.Logictermwhichindicatesthattakingtheactionprescribediscontingentuponthecurrentexistenceofthestatedcondition(s).Iftheidenti6edconditionsdonotexist,theprescribedactionisnottobetakenandexecutionofoperatora'ctionsmustproceedpromptlyinaccordancewithsubsequentinstructions.B-4 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1'ncreaseTobecomeprogressivelygreaterinsize,amount,numberorintensity.IndicateTopointoutorpointto;todisplaythevalueofaprocessvariable;tobeasignorsymbol.InitiateTheactofplacingequipmentorasystemintoservice,eithermanuallyorautomatically.Activationofafunctionorprotectivefeature(i.e.initiateamanualtrip).IajectionTheactofforcingafluidintoavolumeorvessel.InoperableNotabletoperformit'sintendedfunctionIntrusionTheactofenteringwithoutauthorizationFailureofoperabilityorlackofaccessto.MaintainTakeaction,asnecessary,tokeepthevalueofthespecifiedparameterwithintheapplicablelimits.MonitorObserveandevaluateatafrequencysufBcienttoremainapprisedofthevalue,trend,andrateofchangeofthespecifiedparameter.B-5 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1NotifyTogivenoticeoforreporttheoccurrenceof;tomakeknownto;toinformspecifiedpersonnel;toadvise;tocommunicate;tocontact;torelay.OpenTopositionavalveordampersoastoallowflowoftheprocessfluid.Tobreakanelectricalconnectionwhichremovesapowersupplyfromanelectricaldevice.Tomakeavailableforentryorpassagebyturningback,removing,orclearingaway.OperableAbletoperformit'sintendedfunctionPerformTocarryoutanaction;toaccomplish;toaFect;toreachanobjective.PrimarySystemThepipes,valves,andotherequipmentwhichconnectdirectlytothereactorvesselorreactorcoolantsystemsuchthatareductioninreactorcoolantsystempressurewilleffectadecreaseinthesteamorwaterbeingdischargedthroughanunisolatedbreakinthesystem.RemoveTochangethelocationorpositionof.ReportTodescribeasbeinginaspecificstate.RequireTodemandasnecessaryoressential.8-6 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1Taketheappropriateactionrequirestoreturnthevalueofanidentifiedparametertowithinapplicablelimits.RiseDescribesanincreaseinaparameterastheresultofanoperatororautomaticaction.SampleToperformananalysisonaspecifiedmediatodetermineitsproperties.ShutdownToperformoperationsnecessarytocauseequipmenttoceaseorsuspendoperation;tostop."Shutdownunnecessaryequipment."SiteAreaEmergencyEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorlikelymajorfailuresofplantfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevelsexceptnearthesiteboundary.SustainedProlonged.NotintermittentoroftransitorynatureTFlpTode-energizeapumporfanmotor;topositionabreakersoastointerruptorpreventtheflowofcurrentintheassociatedcircuit;tomanuallyactivateasemi-automaticfeature.ITotakeactiontocauseshutdownofthereactorbyrapidlyinsertingacontrolrodorcontrolrods(PWR).8-7 OSSI-92-402A-4-REGGinnaEALTechnicalBasesDocument,Rev1UncontrolledAnevolutionlackingcontrolbutisnottheresultofoperatoraction.UnplannedNotasanexpectedresultofdeliberateaction.UntilIndicatesthattheassociatedprescribedactionistoproceedonlysolongastheidentifiedconditiondoesnotexist.UnusualEventEventsareinprocessorhaveoccurredwhichindicateapotentialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplant.Noreleasesofradioactivematerialrequiringoffsiteresponseormonitoringareexpectedunlessfurtherdegradationofsafetysystemsoccurs.ValidSupportedorcorroboratedonasoundbasis.VentToopenaneffluent(exhaust)flowpathfromanenclosedvolume;toreducepressureinanenclosedvolume.VerifyToconGrmaconditionandtakeactiontoestablishthatconditionifrequired."Verifyreactortrip,verifySIpumpsrunning."B-8 f4)pi(i'IIl~'I<<->~a)A