IR 05000293/1987003: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20205E325
| number = ML20210C356
| issue date = 03/19/1987
| issue date = 02/03/1987
| title = Insp Rept 50-293/87-03 on 870101-0220.Violations Noted: Failure to Properly Control High Radiation Area Keys,Failure to Initiate Failure & Malfunction Rept & Failure to Comply W/Fire Protection Sys Tech Specs
| title = Forwards Biweekly Status Rept for 870115-28.NRC Met W/ Util on 870120 at Region I Ofc to Discuss Recent Problems Re Fire Protection.Meeting Minutes Will Be Documented in Insp Rept 50-293/87-03
| author name = Wiggins J
| author name = Wiggins J
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name = Blough A
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| docket = 05000293
| docket = 05000293
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-293-87-03, 50-293-87-3, NUDOCS 8703300592
| document report number = NUDOCS 8702090372
| package number = ML20205E251
| document type = INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL MEMORANDUM, MEMORANDUMS-CORRESPONDENCE
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 4
| page count = 22
}}
}}


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. 1 FEU dJ Docket No. 50-293 MEMORANDUM FOR: Allen R. Blough, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1 FROM: James T. Wiggins, Chief Reactor Projects Section IB SUBJECT: PILGRIM STATUS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 15, -
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JANUARY 28, 1987 Enclosed is the Pilgrim bi-weekly status report from the NRC Resident Office at Pilgrim. Two NRC resident inspectors and a Project Engineer monitored activities at the plant during the report period. The reactor remained shutdown and in the cold condition throughout the period for maintenanc These status reports are intended to provide NRC management and the public with an overview of plant activities and NRC inspection activitie Subsequent inspection reports will address many of these topics in more detai Original Sicaed 37:
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James T. Wiggins, Chief Reactor Projects Section IB
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


==REGION I==
670kuyO372 DR 870203 ADOCK 05000293 PDR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY PILGRIM WEEKLY STATUS REPORT -
Docket N ''
t Report N Licensee: Boston Edison Company 800 Boylston Street
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Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
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Inspection At: Plymouth, Massachusetts i  Inspection Conducted: January 1, 1987 - February 20, 1987 Inspectors: M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector J. Lyash, Resident Inspector
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T. Kim, Resident Inspector L. Doerflien, Project Engineer Approved By: hE AJ M[A  3h ff2
      ~ Date J. {idgins, gf, Reactor Projects Section 18 Inspection Summary:
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of plant operations, radiation protection, physical security, plant events, maintenance, surveillance, outage activities, and reports to the NRC. Licensee preparations for reactor defuel-ing and subsequent fuel movement activities were also reviewe Results: Three violations were identified concerning failure to properly con-trol high radiation area keys, failure to initiate a Failure and Malfunction Report, and failure to comply with fire protection system technical specifica-tion Additional inspector concerns included the following:
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The possible existence of a single failure affecting the standby gas treatment system which had not been identified during recent engineering
. reviews (section 3.a).


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The use of an out of date procedure during conduct of a surveillance test (section 3.c).
11/29/80 TE31i t l
 
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8703300592 870323 3 FDR ADOCK 0500 G
 
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InspectionSummary(Continued) 2
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The absense of technical specifications for the RPS electrical protection assemblies (section 3.c).
 
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The apparent failure of operations and fire protection personnel to recognize the status of fire protection equipment (section 3.d).
 
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Poor contamination control and RWP procedure adherence practices (section 3.e).
 
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Submittal of an inaccurate Licensee Event Report (section 5).
 
The inspectors also noted that the licensee's response to IE Information Notice 86-106, concerning piping erosion-corrosion appears aggressive and thoroug Licensee preparation for and execution of fuel offload activities were well organized and performe ,
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. t cc w/ enc 1:
T. Murley, NRC, RI W. Kane, RI S. Ebneter, NRC, RI T. Martin, RI J. Partlow, NRC, IE S. Collins, RI H. Denton, NRC, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRC, NRR R. Auluck, NRC, NRR J. Lydon, Chief Operating Officer, BECO L. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, BECO A. Pedersen, Station Manager, BECO Paul Levy, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities Chairman, Board of Selectmen J. D. Keyes R. Bowlay Plymouth Civil Defense Director Senator Edward P. Kirby Representative Peter Forman S. M. Pollard M. Conyngham M. R. Jeka K. R. Anderson The Honorable E. J. Markey
; Public Document Room (PDR)
l Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2)
bec w/ encl:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS l
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Pa9e S umma ry o f Fa c i l i ty Ac t i v i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Followup on Previous Inspection Findings ............ 1 Violations, Unresolved Items and Inspector Follow Item Routine Periodic Inspections ........................ 4 System Alignment Inspection Plant Maintenance and Outage Activities Surveillance Testing Fire Protection Radiation Prot'ection Review of Plant Events .............................. 13 Licensee Ma6agement and Organizational Changes Loss of Offsite Power Test Reactor Defueling Preparations and Conduct Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Management Meetings ................................. 18
: Attachment I - Persons Contacted
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DETAILS e
1.0 Summary of Facility Activities The plant was shutdown on April 12, 1986 for unscheduled maintenance. On July 25,1986, Boston Edison announced that. the outage would be extended to include refueling and completion of certain modification A management conference was held at .the licensee's Chiltonville Training Center' on February 2,1987. NRC and licensee senior management discussed the progress of program improvement During the period, Rear Admiral R. G. Bird, U. S. Navy (Retired) was appointed Senior Vice President-Naclear. On February 4, 1987 the licensee announced the replacement of the plant manager, and several other station organization change The licensee commenced reactor defueling on the evening of February 6,  ,
1987. The core was completely off-loaded by February 13, 198 A third full time NRC Resident Inspector was assigned to Pilgrim on January 26, 198 .0 Followup on Previous Inspection Findings Violations (Update) Violation (84-36-03), failure to continuously monitor the SRMs during refueling. The inspector reviewed station procedure 1.3.34 Conduct of Operations, Rev.12, and associated OPER 38, Shift Turnover Checklis The inspector also observed Nuclear Operation Supervisor and Nuclear Plant
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Operator - shift turnovers and determined that adequate transmittal of information regarding plant status and changes in plant conditions were performed. This item remains open pending implementation of licensee commitments, including Operations Section Manager or Chief Operating Engineer presence in the control room during important aspects of the upcoming reactor restar (Closed) Violation (85-19-04), failure to specify surveillance frequencies on Radiation Work Permit (RWPs) for high radiation areas. The inspector reviewed revised station procedure 6.1.022, Revision 20, Issue, Use, and Termination of Radiation Work Permits (RWP's). Surveillance frequencies appear to be adequately addressed. The procedure requires the radiation protection supervisor or designee to specify the surveillance frequency on the RWP. It further states that the frequency shall be in specific terms (i.e., once per shift, constant, every two hours, etc.). The licensee also instructed the health physics supervisors responsible for approving RWP's that surveillance frequencies be specifically stated in the remarks
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section of the RWP. The inspector reviewed selected RWP's during this l inspection period and verified that the frequencies were specified. This
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item is closed.
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Unresolved Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-25-10), review fire barrier discrepancies and compliance with. technt. cal specifications. A number of deficient fire barriers.were identified by the licensee during April,1985. No specific corrective actions were taken in response to these deficiencies until July, 1986. The licensee's failure to effectively utilize the corrective action program in addressing these items was identified as noncompliance 50-293/86-25-0 In addition, the inspector questioned licensee compli-ance with technical specifications during tSis period of tim In re-sponse, the licensee conducted a review of each discrepancy. This review, described in the licensee's written response to inspection report 50-293/
86-25, indicated that fire watch coverage was provided in these areas during the entire time period. This coverage, although not tied to the specific deficiencies, provided compensatory measures equivalent to tech-nical specification requirements. The inspector sampled licensee records supporting this assertio No problems were identifie This item is close (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-29-07), evaluate the reportability of fire barrier deficiencie Failure and Malfunction Report number 86-164 iden-tified nineteen potentially degraded fire barriers. The inspector ques-tioned the reportability of this condition. Engineering evaluations per-formed justify the operability of the existing barriers. This justifica-tion was reviewed and approved by the licensee engineering department under engineering disposition document SUDDS 86-14 Based upon documen'
ted analysis demonstrating that the barriers are capable of performing their design function, this issue does not appear to be reportabl (Closed) Unresolved Item (86-34-04), followup on recent fire barrier inspection The licensee recently identified a large number of fire barrier penetrations which were degraded, with inadequate qualification documentation or for which proper surveillance was not performed. In addition, compensatory measures established by the licensee in response to the number of deficiencies did not appear aggressive. The failure of the licensee to ensure proper implementation of compensatory fire watches is the subject of noncompliance 50-293/86-36-04. The licensee has insti-tuted an extensive program to identify all fire barrier penetrations and i
upgrade appropriate surveillance procedures. Review of progress in this area is tracked by unresolved item 50-293/86-36-0 Based on the above referenced open items, this item is considered administratively close (Update) Unresolved Item (86-36-01), review licensee actions to implement repairs on fire protection equipment and reduce the number of compensatory fire watches. Similar concerns were identified as inspector follow items 50-293/86-38-03 and 86-06-12. Items 86-38-03 and 86-06-12 have been administratively closed based on the existence of item 86-36-0 Future inspection in this area should consider the licensee's commitments and corrective actions contained in written responses to inspection reports 86-38 and 86-0 .- - - . _ _
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Inspector Follow Items (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (83-06-01), review ifcensee actions to assure other fire barrier penetrations are not missed from the progra This item was last updated in inspection report 50-293/86-21. The licen-see identified numerous fire barrier penetrations not included in appli-cable surveillance procedures. It was also noted that resources were not available to properly maintain barrier surveillance procedure The licensee has dramatically increased management oversight and staffing levels in the area of fire protectio An extensive effort to identify and document all penetrations is underwa The progress and completion of this walkdown program is the subject of unresolved item 50-293/
86-36-0 Based on ' the increase in fire protection staffing and the existence of the above referenced item, this item is considered close (Closed) Inspector' Followup Item (84-23-03), general plant working condi-tions to be reviewed during routine safety inspections as followup re-sponse to allegation made to OSHA involving drywell industrial safety hazards. The licensee's records indicate that the item was resolved among the licensee, General Electric Company, and Bechtel Power Company follow-ing a meeting with an OSHA representative on July 27, 1984. The inspector independently conducted tours of the drywell and other plant areas per-iodically to observe plant safety condition The general plant condi-tions appeared satisfactory. The inspectors will continue to review plant safety conditions during routine inspections. This item is close (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (86-06-12), follow licensee efforts to reduce the number of station fire watches. The licensee continues to rely heavily on compensatory fire watche Regional specialist inspection 50-2f 3/86-36 identified similar concerns. Followup on continuing licensee efforts to reduce the number of fire watches will be conducted under unre-solved item 50-293/86-36-01. Based on the above, this item is adminis-tratively close (Update) Inspector Follow Item (86-29-03), review licensee evaluation of SBGT system single failure This item was last updated in inspection report 50-293/86-3 The inspectors questioned licensee engineering personnel regarding a single failure of a backdraft damper which could affect system operabilit This is described in section 3.a of this repor (Update) Inspector Follow Item (86-37-09), review licensee evaluation of the seismic qualification of HGA relays. On January 16, 1987, the licen-see reported via ENS that a potentially significant application of this unqualified relay type had been identified. This is discussed in section 3.c of this repor _ _ - _ _ .
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  (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (86-38-03), fire protection system mainten-
DRP Section Chief R. Auluck, LPM, NRR PA0 (2)
,  ance is not always properly prioritized. Similar observations were made during a specialist inspection and are documented as unresolved item 50-293/86-36-0 Based on the existence of the above item, this item is administratively close .0 Routine Periodic Inspections The inspectors routinely toured the facility to assess general plant' and equipment conditions, housekeeping and adherence to fire protection, security and radiological control measures. Ongoing work activities were monitored to verify that they were being conducted in accordance with approved administrative and technical procedures, and that proper communi-cations with the control room staff had been established. The inspector observed valve, instrument and electrical equipment lineups in the field to ensure that they were consistent with system operability requirements and operating procedure During tours of the control room the inspectors verified proper staffing, access control and operator attentivenes Adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operations were evaluated. The inspectors exam-ined equipment lineup and operability, instrument traces and status of control room annunciators. Various control rooms logs and other available licensee documentation were reviewe In addition to routine equipment operability confirmation, the inspectors performed independent walkdowns. of selected safety systems. Confirmation of the as-built system configuration, identification of any degraded con-ditions and procedure adequacy were evaluate The inspector observed and reviewed outage activities, maintenance and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulations, procedures, codes and standards. Involvement of QA/QC, safety tag use, personnel qualifications, fire protection precautions, retest require-ments, and reportability were assesse ,
The -inspector observed tests to verify performance in accordance with approved procedures and LCO's, collection of valid test results, removal and restoration of equipment, and deficiency review and resolutio Radiological controls were observed on a routine basis during the report-ing period. Standard industry radiological work practices, conformance to radiological control procedures and 10 CFR Part 20 requirements were
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. observe Independent surveys of radiological boundaries and random surveys of radiologically clear points throughout the facility were taken
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Checks were made to determine whether security conditions met regulatory requirements, the physical security plan, and approved procedures. Those
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a. System Alignment Inspection      - Several potential single failures have been identified by the licensee which could affect the operability of the Standby Gas Treatment Sys' tem (SBGT). These single failures have previously been reported to the NRC under Part 21, and are the subject of existing open item 50-293/86-29-03. Each failure identified by the licensee depends on the presence of an air operated fail-open damper which crossties the redundant SBGT system train After completion 'of the licensee's engineering evaluation the
  ' inspectors independently examined the system configuration for the existence of unidentified single failure The SBGT system consists of two treatment trains and two exhaust fans with a common discharge duct. The trains are also connec-ted at the outlet of the treatment trains, just upstream of the exhaust fans, by an air operated fail-open crosstie damper. A backdraft damper is installed on the discharge of each fan to prevent any recirculation flow. During the design basis acci-dent the crosstie damper would fail open and both exhaust fans would auto start. After a preset time delay one fan automati-cally shuts down. If the backdraft damper on the outlet of the idle fan failed to fully close, a recirculation path for the operating fan would be established. This condition could result in a decrease in flow from the reactor building and result in a loss of secondary containment. The licensee stated that a low pressure sensor in the system common discharge duct should activate to restart the idle fan if this failure were to occu Justification that this action would occur under all partial or full failures of the backdraft damper could not be provided by the licensee. The inspector will review the licensee's final analysis under existing open item 50-293/86-29-03. The accepta-bility of the SBGT during fuel offload activities is discussed in section 4.c of this repor The inspector reviewed the measures taken by the licensee to ensure that systems susceptible to freezing were adequately pro-tected. The only safety related systems which are not buried or in a heated area and therefore susceptible to freezing are the main stack sample line and the jockey fire pump low pressure switch sensing line. Both lines are heat traced to prevent freezing and the licensee verified proper operation of the heat tracing circuits during November 198 In addition to these annual circuit checks, the inspector noted other controls are in place, such as weekly surveillance test 8.B.1, Fire Pump Test which periodically verifies the heat tracing circuits are ener-gized. The inspector also noted that the auxiliary boilers, which provide heating to the station's buildings and compart-ments, receive extensive annual preventive maintenance during the summer to ensure proper operation of the station's heating system during cold weathe .
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During a tour of the intake structure, the inspector noted that routine surveillance testing continues to identify diesel fire pump battery cell temperatures which are below specification (77 degrees F i 15 degrees F). This problem was previously identi-fied during inspection 86-0 Discussions with the licensee indicated that the unit heater was verified to be operating properly and that a review of the heater sizing was ongoin The inspector will review the results of this analysis in a future inspectio Plant Maintenance and Outage Activities
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The inspector reviewed the action taken by the licensee in re-sponse to IEN 86-10 Boston Edison has experienced severe erosion-corrosion (E-C) degradation of the extraction steam piping, feedwater heaters and cascading drain piping at Pilgri Starting-in 1980 the licensee implemented an extensive equipment inspection and replacement program in these areas. This program is ongoing. Two studies contracted by BEco in 1981 identified six variables affecting the occurrence of E-C in steam pipin Extensive ultrasonic examination of low pressure steam piping conducted from 1980 to present identified significant degrada-tio Four feedwater heaters and a large amount of piping was replaced with less susceptible chrome-moly or stainless stee In response to the Surry event detailed in IEN 86-106, the licensee expanded the scope of examinations to include the con-densate and feedwater piping. Inspections of fittings located in accessible and high personnel traffic areas has begun with completion expected during the current outage. The criteria established in response to the steam piping E-C problems, fluid chemistry variables such as oxygen concentration, piping stress levels, industry experience, and academic studies will be con-sidered in establishing a prioritized inspection plan for the remaining  pipin Data collection from the inspections currently underway will be used to refine the analysis metho Licensee consideration is being given to extending this effort to other systems including main steam and safety related piping in the drywell . Recommendations on operational and chemistry practices, possible replacement material and design options are under development. The licensee appears to be aggressively pursuing evaluation and resoittion of this industry-wide concer On January 16, 1987 the licensee reported via ENS that certain electrical relays used in the core spray system injection valve logic circuits are not seismically qualified. General Electric type HGA relays may exhibit contact chatter when subjected to seismic accelerations. A review by licensee engineering person-nel identified an application of this relay type which could
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prevent automatic opening of the core spray injection valves during the design basis earthquake. In excess of 200 HGA relays exist at Pilgrim. Licensee review of the application of these relays is ongoing and will be evaluated by the inspectors under existing item 50-293/86-37-0 On January 23, 1987, miscommunication between site Quality Con-trol and Engineering sections regarding operability of a pipe support led to an ENS report. Further evaluation concluded that the pipe support was operabl As documented in inspection report No. 50-293/86-40, the A core spray pump could not achieve rated flow during post maintenance testing. The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's evaluation of the flow problem. During the investigation, the licensee opened and inspected the pump discharge and test line check valves (valves 1400-36A and 1400-35 respectively), removed and inspected the test line restricting orifice, and performed a boroscopic inspection of the core spray test line. The only problem identified was that the disc of valve 1400-35 was found to be excessively loose on the hinged hanger. It was determined that the obstruction caused by the deteriorated check valve resulted in the reduced core spray flo After modifying the internals.of check valve 1400-35, the A core spray pump satis-factorily completed a full flow test on December 17, 198 Surveillance Testing
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M. McBr de ins R. Blough Date 3FEth? ' J. Wigg/3}G Date s Date ?)s)Y)
On February 1, 1987, the inspector witnessed performance of Surveillance test 8.M.2-2.10.8.6, Diesel Generator B Initiation by Loss of Offsite Power Logic. The as-run copy of the test was Revision 5. The procedure revision obtained by the inspector on February 1, 1987 from the licensee's document control center (DCC) was also revision 5. During conduct of the test the inspector noted several apparent technical deficiencies which were referred to the licensee. The licensee later informed the inspector that revision 6 of the procedure had been approved for issuance on January 28, 1987. This revision appears to resolve ,
the technical questions raised by the inspecto However, it appears the test run on February 1 had used an out-of-date pro-cedure. The licensee's Document Control Center issues revised procedures first to the control roon. DCC routinely refrains from general issuance of the new revision until confirmation of
  . receipt is received from the control room. In this case the delay resulted in the use of Revision 5, four days after Revision 6 had been approve The licensee stated that until a long term solution can be achieved, control room confirmation of procedure receipt would be hand carried to DCC. The licensee subsequently reperformed the test using Revision 6. The inspec-tor will review licensee actions taken in this are , . .
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The inspector noted that no technical specifications for the reactor protection system electrical protection assemblies exis By letter dated September 24, 1980 NRC:NRR requested that the lic,ensee provide a schedule for modification of the reactor protection system (RPS) power supply and submission of Technical Specifications addressing the modifications. By let-ter dated November 26, 1980, Boston Edison committed to instal-latf or of GE-designed electrical protection assemblies and sub-mission of the appropriate Technical Specification NRC ap-proval of the design was transmitted by letter dated July 28, 1982. Submission of technical specifications was again reques-ted. The EPAs, which function to provide RPS power supply trips on overvoltage, undervoltage and underfrequency, were subse-quently installe The licensee however, had not submitted Technical Specifications nor revised their commitmen In re-sponse to the inspector's question the licensee submitted to NRC:NRR, by letter dated February 17, 1987, a commitment revis-ion stating that Technical Specifications are not warrante On February 11, 1987, the licensee reported via ENS that two of fo'ur main steam safety relief valves (SRV) had failed lift pressure tests during checks in an offsite test facility. Tech-nical Specifications require lift pressures of plus or minus one percent of nominal setpoint. One SRV was found to lift percent high and the second 2.2 percent lo Pilgrim Station has four two-stage Target Rock SRV's. During the 1984 outage, testing revealed significant failures with one SRV pilot poppet found frozen on its sea In response to these failures the licensee performed extensive metallurgical evaluations and re-placed the pilot poppet seat material. While the lift pressures of two of the four valves recently tested were slightly outside the acceptable range, the results represent significant improve-ment over past performanc Fire Protection
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On January 19, 1987, the licensee reported via ENS that the diesel driven fire water pump had been declared administratively inoperable. A nonconformance report (NCR) written on December 3,1986 identified a small tubing fitting in a pump seal water line which did not meet QA inspection requirements. The Boston Edison Quality Assurance Manual (BEQAM) states that the exist-ence of open NRCs requires that the affected system be declared inoperable. This requirement was not recognized at the i.ime by operations personnel who reviewed the NC The equipment was not declared administratively inoperable until January 19, 1987 when a deficiency report was issued by the QA department high-lighting the situatio The pump was functionally tested and
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was - found- to be capable of_ providing the required flow. The discrepancy was resolved and the pump returned to operable status by January - 23, - 1987. The redundant electric fire pump was also inoperable during this period due to ongoing mainten-anc The inspector questioned the licensee regarding the possible existence of other unaddressed NCR's. The licensee stated that this incident appears to be an isolated occurrenc The inspector had no further questions about this inciden On February 6,1987, the licensee reported via ENS discovery of  -
several potentially degraded fire barriers. The licensee estab-lished fire watches in the area in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. Similar barrier problems have been reported several times during the outage as a result of ongoing walkdowns. Final walkdown results and licensee resolution of findings will be reviewed under existing open item 50-293/
86-36-0 Boston Edison reported _on February 19, 1987 via - ENS that the fixed dry chemical fire suppression system for the A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was found to have been inoperable since December 23, 1986. Technical Specifications require that a con-tinuous fire watch be established if this system is inoperabl A maintenance request written on December 23, 1986 documented that the pressure in one of three chemical storage bottles asso-ciated with the system was found to be slightly below the mini-mum required pressur At the time the MR was written, the impact of the low pressure on system operability was not recog-nized by operations personnel and, consequently, the required compensatory measures were not taken. The dry chemical system and the EDG were subsequently assumed operable during fuel move-ment activities. Upon discovery of the problem on February 19 the licensee established a continuous fire watch in the are While no continuous fire watch was in place from December 23, 1986 to February 19, 1987 a roving fire patrol toured the area on an hourly basis due to unrelated deficiencie Operation personnel initiating the MR did not take appropriate action regarding system operabilit The MR was mistakenly written against the diesel generator system rather than the fire protec-tion system. Because of this misclassification, the Fire Pro-
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tection Group was not aware of the proble This situation
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appears similar to the case discussed above in which operations personnel did not recognize the impact of an NCR on diesel fire
  . pump operability. The sensitivity of the operations staff to fire protection equipment operability and the ability of the Fire Protection Group to monitor equipment status will be evalu-ated during the next inspection period, i
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The licensee's fire water system consists of two redundant fire water storage tanks (FWST) and two redundant fire water pump On October 21, 1986 the diesel driven fire water pump was re-moved from service. This pump was returned to operable status on November 11, 1986. On November 5, 1986 the B FWST was drained for maintenance and remained unavailable until late in November, 198 On November 11, 1986 the electric driven fire water pump sustained serious damage while operating without a suction source. This incident was the subjet of special in-spection 50-293/86-38. The electric pump was not returned to operable status until February 4,1987. This series of mainten-ance activities and equipment failures resulted in a loss of fire water system redundancy from October 21, 1986 until February 4,1987. At all times during this period one of the redundant FWSTs, one of the redundant fire water pumps or a combination of equipr.;ent was inoperabl Technical Specification 3.12.B requires that two operable fire water pumps, two separate fire water supply tanks, and associ-ated flow paths be maintained. With less than the above equip-ment, the licensee must restore the inoperable equipment to operable status within seven days or submit a report to the Commission within thirty days outlining the procedures used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system. Contrary to the above, as of January 23, 1987 fire water supply system re-dundancy had been lost for three month No steps had been taken by the licensee to compensate for this loss of redundancy and no report had been submitted to the Commission describing such plans. The inspector informed the licensee that the above constituted a violation of the Technical Specifications (87-03-01). When informed, the licensee aligned the onsite fire truck with its suction - from the city fire water hydrant and discharge into the fire mai Radiation Protection
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On January 6,1987, the inspector noted that little corrective action had been taken for a lost master high radiation area ke On December 22, 1986, the Watch Engineer notified the Assistant Chief Radiological Engineer that a master "R" key, number OP-5, was missing from the control room. This key is normally used by operations personnel and unlocks all plant areas with dose rates between 1,000 mrems/hr and 10,000 mrems/hr. In addition, the key opens one of two locks on access doors to areas with radia-tion doses greater than 10,000 mrems/h The Watch Engineer found the key ring in the control room at that time, but not the ke . .
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11 The Assistant Chief Radiological Engineer initiated Radiological Occurrence Report (R0R) 86-12-22-0993 which described the inci-dent and immediate corrective actions on December 22, 1986, He contacted the Chief Radiological Engineer (CRE) and the Radio-logical Section Head at that tim The following problems were noted during the inspector's revie The immediate corrective action specified on the ROR was not implemente The cl0R stated that the frequency of surveillance checks of high radiation areas would be increased. This was not done until January 3, 1987, fol-lowing' the licensee review of a disabled high radiation area lock'(ROR 87-01-03-003).
 
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The licensee did not check the control room log to deter-mine who had last returned the missing key to the _ control room. When the log was checked, the licensee determined that the key was unaccounted for between December 19 and December 2 The licensee did not question all the operations staff who had access to the key to determine if they may have inad-vertently retained the ke The licensee took no action to strengthen administrative controls over keys issued from the control room following the discovery of the missing key. At Pilgrim, high radia-tion area access keys are issued at two locations, the main health physics control point and the control roo The station key control procedures, 1.3.10 and 6.1-012, de-scribe the health physics control point key issue method in detai While the procedures mention the control room's issue method, they do not discuss it in detai In response to previous incidents which occurred in the last quarter of 1986 involving high radiation area control, the Operations Section Manager issued detailed instructions on key issuance in a memo on December 15, 198 These instructions were not followed when the key was taken from the control room between December 19 and 22. At the time of the inspector's review, the licensee was not aware that these instructions had been violated and subsequently found that the memo had not gone to all operations personne Subsequently, the memo was incorporated into station procedure ___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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In addition, the licensee indicated that the key was pro-bably . intentionally taken off the key ring. High radiation area key rings have large disks attached to them, to pre-vent an individual from inadvertently leaving the station with a key in their pocket. Removing the key from the key ring eliminates this administrative contro However, no action was taken to address this problem until after the-inspector's revie Initially, neither the Operations nor the Radiological Section Managers assumed the responsibility for determining root cause and implementing corrective action for the lost ke Station procedure 1.3.10 indicated that the Chief Radiological  Engineer in the Radiological Section was responsible for the administrative control of high radia-tion area keys as described in procedure 6.1-012. However, procedure 6.1-012 assigned responsibility for the control of the high radiation area keys in the control room to the Chief Operating Engineer in the Operations Section. Subse-quently, the Radiological Section Manager and the Operations Section Manager jointly reviewed the inciden All locked high radiation areas were subsequently reviewed to determine if radiation levels were below 1,000 mrems/hr and the areas could be unlocked. In addition locked high radiation areas were checked every four hours to ensure that they were properly secured. New high radiation area locks were installed after a high radiation area door was found open on January 24, 1987. The locks were changed because at the time the door was found open no one should have had an authorized key to the are The licensee manned all locked high radiation areas continuously between January 24 and the time the new locks were installe Also, the control room key issuance policy was changed to re-quire operators to obtain high radiation area keys from the health physics control poin The keys in the control room would only be used for emergencies by Operations personne Technical Specification 6.13, "High Radiation Area" requires in part that areas with radiation levels greater then 1,000 mrems/
hr be locked and the keys maintained under the administrative control of the Shift Foreman or unit health physicist. Failure to maintain administrative control over master key (0P-5) to all locked areas in the plant with radiation levels greater ti en
. 1,000 mrems/hr and failure to promptly take corrective action is a violation (87-03-02).
 
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  'On February 18,1987. during a tour-of L the reactor building the -
inspector observed two individuals working in the reactor __ vessel- '
~  instrument cages.- The area was posted:as contaminated and re-quiring an RWP. The applicab1_e ~ RWP required both -cotton and rubber gloves. The individuals'were removing cables in prepara-tion for. instrument replacement and were wearing only cotton
  . gloves. The health physics technician responsible for the. area stated that the individuals 'were - having difficulty performing their task while wearing rubber gloves, and that he had allowed- .
        '
  .the workers _ to remove _them after. having surveyed the area._ :No revision to the RWP. had .been processed. The ongoing' work was -
not being performed in.-accordance with the existing RWP. The'
inspector _ informed licensee radiation protection department management. The situation was of minor safety significance but demonstrates a lack- of attention to detail and a . poor . example
    ~
        ,
being set by health- physics personnel. Poor contamination con-trol practices have been observed in this same area by inspec-
  . tors _ several times- in the past. In-. response the licensee sus-pended the supervising technician for not enforcing the approved -
RWP.. The inspectors,will-continue to closely monitor this are '4.0 ~ Review of Plant Events The inspectors:followed up on events occurring during the period to deter-mine if licensee response was thorough and effective. . Independent reviews -
of the events were- conducted to verify the accuracy and completeness of
 
  = licensee informatio Licensee Management and' Organizational Changes During the period Boston Edison Company. named Rear Admiral
  ' Ralph G. Bird, U. S. Navy (Retired) to head the nuclear organizatio Mr.. Bird, a 28 year veteran of the nuclear navy .and formerly a con-sultant to the; nuclear power industry, will assume the position of +
Senior Vice President-Nuclear. 'In' this capacity he will be respon-sible for all aspects of the licensee's , nuclear operation. Bird will report directly- to Stephen J. Sweeney, Boston Edison's Chairman,.
  -President and Chief Executive Officer. A. Lee Oxsen, Vice President for Nuclear Operations, and Edward Howard, Vice President of.
 
!  Nuclear Engineering and Quality Assurance, will report directly to Mr. Bird. The transition from James Lydon, Chief Operating Officer,
;  to_Mr. Bird was completed on February 20, 198 The~ licensee announced on February 4, that Mr. K. Roberts, the'
'
current Director of Outage Management at Pilgrim, replaced
  ~Mr. A. Pederson as the Plant Manager. Mr. Roberts reports to the Vice President of Nuclear Operations. Mr. Pederson became a staff
:  assistant to the Senior Vice President-Nuclear. The site disciplines
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have been reorganized with training, fire protection, security, and
  . emergency _ planning reporting directly. to the Vice: President of-Nuclear Operations. Plant operations,, maintenance, radiation -protec-tion, itechnical' . and . outage management groups report to the Plant Manager. This realignment was effective' February 4, 198 .' Loss of Offsite Power Test
  - The licensee conducted the once per cycle simulated loss of offsite power : test on February 5,1987. Execution.of the test was witnessed by three NRC resident inspector Independent review of test data to confirm acceptable results _ was also performed by the inspector During initial 1 test performance the licensee identified four. signif-icant deficiencies: 1) the Emergency Diesel Generator Breaker closed onto the A6 bus -later than design ~, 2) the secondary emergency power source closed 'onto the A6 bus earlier than design, 3) the D RHR pump-breaker closed earlier than design and 4) the auto transfer of 480-VAC load center B6: failed to properly function. The first two defic-iencies' resulted in the emergency diesel and secondary emergency power supply breakers racing to _reenergize the bus. The-early start of the D RHR pump resulted in the B and D RHR pumps starting in close succession rather than the desired sequence. - The licensee initiated
    -
Failure and Malfunction Reports (F&MR) for these three problems and notified-_ the NRC via ENS of the failures. .The applicable timing relays were ~ recalibrated, and the test reperformed with acceptable results. Licensee followup of these four test discrepancies will be reviewed during a future inspection (87-03-03).
During the test, it was noted that the power source _ transfer scheme
  'for 480 VAC- vital bus 86 failed to functio Bus B6 supplies AC
  ; power to vital loads such as both RHR system injection valves,1 and containment isolation valves. The -inspector noted that the opera-bility of the B6 bus transfer mechanism is tested only once per oper--
ating cycle.= Although the operability.of the transfer scheme for Bus
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B6 is not included as a test acceptance criterion, it is a failure of p  a safeguards. design feature which could adversely impact plant
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safety, i-  A Failure and Malfunction Report (F&MR) concerning the bus B6 trans-i-  fer failure was not initiated until February 17, 1987 when the in-spector questioned the documentation and followup of the failur Station Procedure No. 1.3.24, Failure and Malfunction Reports,
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;  Revision 14, indicates that the purpose of the F&MR is in part to i: . ensure that an initial internal review and safety assessment is made
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of events of potential safety significance. The reports are submit-
. ted-to the Nuclear Watch Engineer who reviews them to identify events
. that are related to Technical Specification requirements and that may i


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  . ENCLOSURE PILGRIM STATUS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 15, - JANUARY 28, 1987 1.0 Plant Status As of 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 1987, the reactor was in the cold condition with moderator temperature about 85 degrees Fahrenhei .0 Facility Operations Summary The plant has been shut down for maintenance, and to make program improvements si.ce April 12, 1986. The present outage will continue until June 1957 and will include reactor refuelin Preparations for reactor refueling are continuing. The licensee plans to begin defueling the reactor within approximately one week, transferring all fuel from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool. This will allow performance of certain plant modifications which are more easily done without fuel in the reactor. Fuel reload will begin approximately two months late .0 Items of Special Interest Scheduled Management Meetings On January 20, 1987, the licensee met with NRC management in the Region I offices to discuss recent problems in the area of the fire protection program at the station. The minutes of this meeting will be documented in NRC report 50-293/87-0 A meeting between NRC: Region I and Boston Edison senior management will be held at the licensee's Chiltonville training center on February 2, 1987. This is one of a series of ongoing management meetings which provide NRC management the opportunity to closely monitor the progress of licensee improvement program Licensee Employee Drug Related Death On January 21, 1987, a medical examiner announced that a licensee health
>
physics technician died from a cocaine-induced drug overdose. The body had been found at the individual's residence on December 24, 1986, and
! the case had been referred to a medical examiner to determine the cause l of death. Following the December 24, 1986 incident, the licensee in-l creased the frequency of its drug surveillance activities (search dogs j and inspections).


require NRC notificatio Issuance of a F&MR also ensures perform-ance of a root cause analysis. Procedure No.1.3.24 states that an F&MR shall be initiated whenever failures or malfunctions are iden-tified during surveillance testing of safety related components that do or could prevent systems from fulfilling their individual func-tions. The procedure also states that the individual responsible for initiation of the report shall be the person who first identifies an abnormality or a deviation from normal conditio Failure to initi-ate an F&MR following the discovery of the B6 bus transfer failure en February 5,1987 is a violation of Procedure No. 1.3.24 (87-03-04).
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Several-previous items of noncompliance have been issued for licensee failure to properly utilize the corrective action progra c. Reactor Defueling Preparations and Conduct The licensee conducted reactor defueling between February 6 and February 13, 1987. All 680 fuel assemblies were transferred from the reactor vessel to the spent fuel pool. The inspectors reviewed the defueling activities periodicall The review included preparations and prerequisites for core alterations, witnessing of fuel movement from the refueling floor, and control room observation The inspector attended the onsite Operations Review Committee (ORC)
meeting (#0RC 87-20) held on February 6,1987 to observe the conduct of the pre-core-offload checklist revie The committee reviewed surveillance test records, maintenance requests, and Failure and Malfunction Reports to verify operability of vital systems including the emergency diesel generators, the core spray system, the standby gas treatment system, refueling floor ventilation process radiation monitors, refueling platform and reactor manual control syste The inspector reviewed the pre-refueling checklist (OPER 10). This checklist was completed prior to fuel movement and included verifi-cation that the Onsite Review Committee had granted permission to move fuel. A review of control room logs indicated that the periodic testing of the refueling equipment (OPER 13, OPER 14) had been per-formed. Procedure No. 4.3, Fuel Handling, was reviewed to ensure it adequately addressed Technical Specification (TS) requirements for fuel handling. The inspector also observed on-the-job training of two licensed operators on the new refuel bridge. The training was performed in accordance with a prepared training check list and appeared adequat Fuel movement activities were observed from the refueling floor and from the control room. A Senior Reactor Operator
. supervised the refueling bridge activities and was assisted by a licensed Reactor Operator and a reactor engineer. The activities were well controlled and the communication between the refueling bridge and the control room were adequat . .
p ~e
 
The inspector reviewed the status of the standby gas treatment (SBGT) -
system in preparation for refueling operation The licensee sub-mitted Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 86-21, one LER supplement and two 10 CFR Part 21 reports which described various potential compon-ent failures within the SBGT system that could result in offsite radiation doses exceeding 10 CFR 100.11 limits during a design basis loss of coolant or fuel handling accident. The licensee determined that each of the postulated SBGT. system failures could result in reducing the efficiency of the SBGT system charcoal filter These filters are installed to reduce the potential release of radioactive iodine to the environment during the design basis accidents noted abov To allow refueling during the current outage without. modifying the SBGT system, the !!censee performed safety evaluation No. 2027 which addressed the operability of the system under current plant condi-tions. The inspector discussed this safety evaluation with engineer-ing, operations and technical support personnel and compared it to the requirements of the Technical Specifications and the commitments made in the Final Safety Analysis Repor The safety evaluation indicated that, for a fuel handling accident after October 4, 1986-(175 days after the April 1986 shutdown), and assuming a zero percent charcoal filter efficiency, the offsite doses would be five orders of magnitude less severe than for the design basis even This was because the radionuclides produced during power operation which would be absorbed by the charcoal have been allowed to decay. The safety evaluation was reviewed and approved by the Operations Review Commit-tee during meeting no. 86-14 The inspector also noted that to further mitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident, the licensee initiated Temporary Modif-ication No. 87-02 to maintain the deluge system isolated from the SBGT system and to cause the crosstie damper to permanently remain open. In addition, the licensee modified the SBGT operating proced-ure to require that a motor operated discharge damper be closed in the event that one of the SBGT fans is stopped. This addresses the backdraft damper failure issue described earlier in this inspection report. The inspector had no further questions regarding SBGT system operability for refueling. The licensee is evaluating modifications to the system which must be installed prior to startup from the cur-rent outage. These modifications will be reviewed by the NRC during a future inspection and are the covered under existing open item 50-293/86-29-0 ~,
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5.0 -Review of LER's
  ' ' LER's 1 submitted ;to NRC:RI were reviewed to verify that .the details were-
  : clearly reported, -including ' accuracy of the description of cause and ade-
  .
quacy. of corrective actio The -inspector. determined -whether further
  ;information 'was . required from the' licensee, whetherigereric> implications-were ; indicated, and whether - the event. warranted 'onsite' followup. The following LER's were reviewed:-
LER N Event Date' Report Date Subject 86-26-00 11/04/86 12/04/86 Failure to perform--Sur-veillance Tests of Stand-by. Gas Treatment (System and Liquid -Radioactive Effluent Flow - Monito . 12/22/86 01/21/87 Failure to : Recognize -
,    Effects of Electrical Isolation Resulting' in an Unplanned 'ESF Actua-tio ' 12/23/86 01/22/87 Loss of Offsite: Power While Removing Salt from Switchyard Insulator LER 86-26-00 describes the licensee'.s failure to perform adequate surveil-
      ~
lance testing of the standby gas treatment system- (SBGT) -and the radio-active-liquid effluent flow rate device. The LER states that .a technical review of station surveillance requirements and procedures had:been con-
  ' ducted but that- Amendment 89 was not included in this review because of '
its late issuanc Inadequate administrative controls resulted in the failure to properly' implement .the new requirements incorporated by .this amendment. .The inspector pointed out that the SBGT system-test require-ments were .not altered by Amendme'nt 89 and had existed' during the refer-enced technical review. The root cause of this deficiency:does not appear to be'related to technical specification amendment issuance. The LER also stated that there was no evidence of the failure of the radioactive ~efflu-ent flow monitor to perform its design function. In fact, this device is not and has not been functional due to a design deficiency. The Opera-
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tions Department maintains a procedure to calculate discharge flow rate
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  - based on tank levels. The licensee stated at the ' exit meeting that an j . updated LER would be issued.
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i
  . 4 These activities found no indications of drug substances or use onsit The licensee revised its fitness for duty policy on January 1,1987 to require all licensee and contractor personnel to be tested for drug us once a yea This policy had been under development for some time prior to implementatio The NRC was informed of the death on December 29, 1986 and learned on January 21, 1987 that it was drug relate .0 Emergency Notification System (ENS) Reports During this period, the licensee made three reports to NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. These reports described the following incident On January 16, 1987 the licensee reported that a type of electrical relay used in safety system control circuits is not seismically qualified. During a seismic event these relays may not operate properly, delaying core spray injectio The licensee will replace the relays prior to startup and is continuing the review to identify any others presen On January 19, 1987 the licensee reported that the diesel driven fire water pump had been declared inoperable. A small tubing fitting in a pump seal water line which did not meet applicable inspection requirements was identified. This resulted in the equipment being administratively declared inoperable, although it was functionally tested and was capable of providing the required flow. The discrepancy was resolved and the pump returned to operable status by January 23, 198 On January 23, 1987, miscommunication between site Quality Control and Engineering sections regarding an operability of a pipe support led to an ENS report. Further evaluation concluded that the pipe support hangar is operabl .0 NRC Staff Status During the Period Twc NRC Resident Inspectors monitored plant activities between January
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, 15, and January 28, 1987. The inspection staff at Pilgrim during the
 
'
  '
report period consisted of the following:
n
Martin McBride, Ph.D. --- Senior Resident Inspector Jeffrey Lyash --- Resident Inspector Tae Kim --- Resident Inspector A third full time resident inspector has been assigned to Pilgrim. M Tae Kim reported to the onsite resident inspector office on January 23, 1987. A regional Project Engineer assisted the resident inspectors durinq tha week of January 23, 198 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY PILGRIM WEEKLY STATUS REPORT -
  ._ . . ,  .-
11/29/80
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[. The . inspector. noted .that the root cause for the spurious ESF actuation . in  -
LER 86-28 was _ attributed to operator error. L However, a lack of preplann-
  .ing prior 'to the isolation' of electrical . bus - B-18.was also a major con-
  . tributor _to the event. :At the exit meeting,_ the licensee agreed and stated. that .the ' outage- manual had been changed to - require. more planning ~
prior ' to major electrical isolations. This event ~ was _ reviewed in NRC
  -
inspection 50-293/86-40. Thc sequence of events in the LER is not fully consistent with' that . in inspection report' 86-40. The inspector-checked
  .the LER sequence against plant logs and drawings and concluded that the LER was-correct. The licensee plans to update the LER to more accurately reflect the root cause and corrective ' action' for the isolation proble The inspector noted that corrective actions were not completely.. described
  ~
in LER.86-29. Specifically, the licensee required that the control room-be notifi_ed prior to each switchyard washing sequence. This assured that the operations staff was ; aware of the washing and could prepare for a potential loss of -offsite powe Also, the licensee is -considering an insulator design: change to lessen the need to wash the switchyard. This incident was also. reviewed -in NRC report 50-293/86-40.~:The licensee also plans to update this LER to more completely describe the corrective ac-tions take .0 Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of_the inspection period, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and preliminary findings of the resident inspectors. No written material was given to the-licensee that was.not pre'vious'y available to the publi On January 20,1987, _the licensee met with NRC management in the Region I offices to discuss recent problems .in'the area of.the station fire protec-t tion program. Minutes of this meeting are documented in report 50-293/
  - 87-0 A meeting between NRC Region I and Boston _ Edison senior management was held at the licensee's Chiltonville training center on February 2,198 This -is one of a series of ongoing management meetings which provide NRC management the opportunity to closely monitor the progress of licensee
  ' improvement program Minutes ' of this meeting are documented in report 50-293/87-0 .
______________..___-_________.____.____m_ - _ _
 
r=
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  . - e, s Attachment I to Inspection Report 50-293/87-03
~ Persons Contacted
* R. Bird, Senior Vice President, Nuclear L. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear 0perations K. Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager A. Pederson, Staff Assistant - Senior VPN D. Swanson, Nuclear Engineering Department Manager R. Fairbank, NED, Licensing and Analysis Section Head N. Brosee, Maintenance Section Head T. Sowdon, Radiological Section Head J. Seery, Technical Section Head P. Mastrangelo, Chief Operating Engineer R. Sherry, Chief Maintenance Engineer N. Gannon, Chief Radiological Engineer F. Wozniak, Fire Protection Group Leader C. Higgins, Security Group Leader
* Senior licensee representative present at the exit meetin .
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:06, 4 December 2021

Forwards Biweekly Status Rept for 870115-28.NRC Met W/ Util on 870120 at Region I Ofc to Discuss Recent Problems Re Fire Protection.Meeting Minutes Will Be Documented in Insp Rept 50-293/87-03
ML20210C356
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 02/03/1987
From: Wiggins J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Blough A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8702090372
Download: ML20210C356 (4)
v • d • e


Text

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. 1 FEU dJ Docket No. 50-293 MEMORANDUM FOR: Allen R. Blough, Acting Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1 FROM: James T. Wiggins, Chief Reactor Projects Section IB SUBJECT: PILGRIM STATUS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 15, -

JANUARY 28, 1987 Enclosed is the Pilgrim bi-weekly status report from the NRC Resident Office at Pilgrim. Two NRC resident inspectors and a Project Engineer monitored activities at the plant during the report period. The reactor remained shutdown and in the cold condition throughout the period for maintenanc These status reports are intended to provide NRC management and the public with an overview of plant activities and NRC inspection activitie Subsequent inspection reports will address many of these topics in more detai Original Sicaed 37:

James T. Wiggins, Chief Reactor Projects Section IB

670kuyO372 DR 870203 ADOCK 05000293 PDR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY PILGRIM WEEKLY STATUS REPORT -

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11/29/80 TE31i t l

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. t cc w/ enc 1:

T. Murley, NRC, RI W. Kane, RI S. Ebneter, NRC, RI T. Martin, RI J. Partlow, NRC, IE S. Collins, RI H. Denton, NRC, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRC, NRR R. Auluck, NRC, NRR J. Lydon, Chief Operating Officer, BECO L. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, BECO A. Pedersen, Station Manager, BECO Paul Levy, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities Chairman, Board of Selectmen J. D. Keyes R. Bowlay Plymouth Civil Defense Director Senator Edward P. Kirby Representative Peter Forman S. M. Pollard M. Conyngham M. R. Jeka K. R. Anderson The Honorable E. J. Markey

Public Document Room (PDR)

l Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2)

bec w/ encl:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)

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DRP Section Chief R. Auluck, LPM, NRR PA0 (2)

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M. McBr de ins R. Blough Date 3FEth? ' J. Wigg/3}G Date s Date ?)s)Y)

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. ENCLOSURE PILGRIM STATUS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 15, - JANUARY 28, 1987 1.0 Plant Status As of 8:00 a.m. on January 28, 1987, the reactor was in the cold condition with moderator temperature about 85 degrees Fahrenhei .0 Facility Operations Summary The plant has been shut down for maintenance, and to make program improvements si.ce April 12, 1986. The present outage will continue until June 1957 and will include reactor refuelin Preparations for reactor refueling are continuing. The licensee plans to begin defueling the reactor within approximately one week, transferring all fuel from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool. This will allow performance of certain plant modifications which are more easily done without fuel in the reactor. Fuel reload will begin approximately two months late .0 Items of Special Interest Scheduled Management Meetings On January 20, 1987, the licensee met with NRC management in the Region I offices to discuss recent problems in the area of the fire protection program at the station. The minutes of this meeting will be documented in NRC report 50-293/87-0 A meeting between NRC: Region I and Boston Edison senior management will be held at the licensee's Chiltonville training center on February 2, 1987. This is one of a series of ongoing management meetings which provide NRC management the opportunity to closely monitor the progress of licensee improvement program Licensee Employee Drug Related Death On January 21, 1987, a medical examiner announced that a licensee health

>

physics technician died from a cocaine-induced drug overdose. The body had been found at the individual's residence on December 24, 1986, and

! the case had been referred to a medical examiner to determine the cause l of death. Following the December 24, 1986 incident, the licensee in-l creased the frequency of its drug surveillance activities (search dogs j and inspections).

i

!

,

!

. 4 These activities found no indications of drug substances or use onsit The licensee revised its fitness for duty policy on January 1,1987 to require all licensee and contractor personnel to be tested for drug us once a yea This policy had been under development for some time prior to implementatio The NRC was informed of the death on December 29, 1986 and learned on January 21, 1987 that it was drug relate .0 Emergency Notification System (ENS) Reports During this period, the licensee made three reports to NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. These reports described the following incident On January 16, 1987 the licensee reported that a type of electrical relay used in safety system control circuits is not seismically qualified. During a seismic event these relays may not operate properly, delaying core spray injectio The licensee will replace the relays prior to startup and is continuing the review to identify any others presen On January 19, 1987 the licensee reported that the diesel driven fire water pump had been declared inoperable. A small tubing fitting in a pump seal water line which did not meet applicable inspection requirements was identified. This resulted in the equipment being administratively declared inoperable, although it was functionally tested and was capable of providing the required flow. The discrepancy was resolved and the pump returned to operable status by January 23, 198 On January 23, 1987, miscommunication between site Quality Control and Engineering sections regarding an operability of a pipe support led to an ENS report. Further evaluation concluded that the pipe support hangar is operabl .0 NRC Staff Status During the Period Twc NRC Resident Inspectors monitored plant activities between January

, 15, and January 28, 1987. The inspection staff at Pilgrim during the

'

report period consisted of the following:

Martin McBride, Ph.D. --- Senior Resident Inspector Jeffrey Lyash --- Resident Inspector Tae Kim --- Resident Inspector A third full time resident inspector has been assigned to Pilgrim. M Tae Kim reported to the onsite resident inspector office on January 23, 1987. A regional Project Engineer assisted the resident inspectors durinq tha week of January 23, 198 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY PILGRIM WEEKLY STATUS REPORT -

11/29/80

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