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FOIA Request for Copies of OI Repts 1-96-025 & 1-96-040 Re Maine Yankee
	ML20211J947
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	08/12/1997
From:	Christine K; AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Caputo G; NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
Shared Package
ML20211J931	List: IA-97-317, Second Final Response to FOIA Request for Documents. Documents Listed in App B Being Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemption 7C); ML20211J927; ML20211J947;
References
	FOIA-97-317 NUDOCS 9710090066
	Download: ML20211J947 (1)
	v • d • e

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ifl - FO!A/PAREQUEST Mr. Gto Caputo, Director Om No: '77-3/7 Office ofInvestigations : : Pdd / *.W7 '7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission /,;' 00 Cih Washington, DC 20$55

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O s RE: MAINE 1'ANKEE RELY)RTS Hi-96125 and Hi-96-040

Dear Mr. Caputo:

$ In accordance with the Freedom ofInformation Act, this letter constitutes a formal request for cor lete copies of the Oflice ofInvestigations' reports on Maine Yankee numbered I-9 25 and 1 %040. Please let me know if there will be a charge for photocopying. I would greatly apprecist: hearing from you in the immediate future on this matter, e Sincerely. -

                               .     /luoLL Kris L Christine l

cc: Maine Attomey General Andrew Ketterer U.S. Attorney Jay McCloskey Senator Susan Collins Senator Olympia Snowe t$ ojoog 6 97100g CHRISTl97-317 ppg

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Title:

MAINE YANKEE AT0 HIC POWER STATION: , TNCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE INFORMATION WILLFULLY PROVIDED TO TliE NRC REGARDING T11E ENERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM d Licensee: Case No.: 196040 i Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Report Date: May 30, 1997

329 Bath Road Brunswick, Maine 04011 Control Office: 01:RI Docket No.: 5.0 309 Status: CLOSED i

Reported by: Rev ewed and Approved by: QfukN' b5f a Barry RJ Letts, Director Dennis Boas, Special Agent Office of Investications Office of Investigations Field Office, Reglon IV Field Office, Region 1 Participatina Personnel

Ernest P. Wilson, Senior Special Agent Office of Investigations Field Office, Region I l:am;.c:a:,ym,a;. , t.I ,;

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SYNOPSIS , This investigation was initiated on October 24,1996, by the Nuclear Regulatory Connission (NRC), Office of Investigations (01), Region I (RI), to determine whether incomplete and/or inaccurate information was willfully provided by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo) during an NRC Enforcement Conference on October 14, 1994, regarding the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (NY). Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, 01 did not substantiate that NYAPCo officials willfully provided incomplete or inaccurate information regarding the EFW to the NRC during an October 14, 1994, enforcement conference. i 1 j 9 ) f'N 1. JRE WIT NOT FOR Pt4LIC D

                                                                                  , REG     I-FIELD OFFICE DIRtc ~ OFFICNEJNfESTIGA CaseNo.19604!                            1

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                                                             ,JEy:0NI Case No. 1 96 040                     2

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS . P Page SYNOPSIS .....................' ........... 1 5 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ........................... 7 DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION ......................... Applicable Regulations ........................ 7 Purmse of Investigation ...................... 7 Bac(ground ............................. 7 Interviews of Alleger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Coordination with NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Incom)lete and inaccurate Information was Willfully Allegation: Provided to the 4RC Regarding the Emergency Feedwater System at Maine Yankee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10 Evidence / Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evidence / Testimony .....................12 Agent's Analysis ......................20 Conclusion .........................21 J LIST OF EXHIBITS ............................23 4 9 NOT IC I I ' 0F OFF , OF I I G. RE I Case No. 1 96 040 3

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                                          'I LD ITI                             RE I      I                             [IONI a

Case No. 1 96- 0 1 4

i LIST OF INTERVIEWEES k

EXHIBIT

{ BRAND, Ethan. Su>ervisor. Nuclear Safety Engineering - 17 Group (NSE'3) , MYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FR01111NGHAM, John. Manager, Quality Programs Department 26 & 27 (QPD) MYAFCo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 70 FRIZZLE, Charles, President and Chief Executive Officer, HYAPCo . . . . . 21 ' . FULLER, Edward, President Associated Projects Analysis . . . . . . . . . 28 LEITCH, Graham. Vice President, Operations, NYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . . 23 SMITH, Steven, Manager, Operations Department, NYAPCo . . . . . . . . . . W. . . .m u WHITTIER. George. Vice President. Engineering, NYAPCo . ........22

                                                                                                                         .......25 i                      VEILLEUX, Michael Manager. Maintenance Department. MYAPCo 19 i                      YER0KUN, Jimi. Senior Resident Inspector at HY. MRC . . . . . . . . . . .

i e i T j , 1 4

t SC W 0F NOT PUBL C - IELD FICE RE , CE I GA ONS. RE.31W I 5 Case No. 1 96 040

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I Fi{ Case No. 1 96 040 IRE , OFFI 6 ONS . GI

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i , t . DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION Ano11 cable Reculations , j 10 CFR 50.5: Deliberato misconduct (1994 Edition). l . 10 CFR 50.9: Completeness and accuracy of information (1994 Edition). Puroote of Investiaation This investigation was initiated on October 24, 1996, by the Nuclear i Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (01), Region I (RJ), to ) j ' determine whether incomplete end/or inaccurate information was willfully i provided to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference (EC) on October 14,1994, ! I by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Compar,y (NYAPCo), regarding the Emer l .Feedwater System (EFW) at the Maine Yan, 9 Atomic Power Station (NY) gency l (Exhibit 1). l Backaround ! On August 4,1994, while the NY reactor was in a cold shutdown sodition the l plant operators determined that an EFW isolation valve for the #1 Steam i Generator was leaking. It was determined that under accident conditions which ; I require isolation of EFW, the, isolation valve leakage could exceed Safety - ! Analysis assum3tions and the NRC was informed on September 1,1994 l (Exhibit 7). 1Y initiated an engineering root cause evaluation that was i leted st 8. 1994 (Exhibit 6), and subs ntly initiated a higher 1 se Ev October 6. 1994, S 7C l The NRC identified the EFW isolation valve leakage issue in NRC Inspectioh j 50 309/94 15, dated September 20.1994 (Exhibit 8), and held an enforcement ! conference (EC) on October 14, 1994, and issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) on l October 20, 1994 (Exhibit 9). Additional activities were conducted by the l licensee, to the include reviews by the Nuclear Safety ! , (NSARC) and Plant Operations Review Committee PORC)(Audit (Exhibitand 15). Review Commit i I ISC E j I I , I - 5 Case No. 96 040 7 I i

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                          < Coordination with NRC Staff he dra On November 3, 1996, NRC:0!
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l In a November 7, 1996, telephone conference, Jimi YER0KUN, Senior Residentobs l Inspector at HY, NRC, advised 01:RI and the R ion jc ' e orial variations in the documents n I staff but did not identify any material p conduct an inspection at NY regarding the materials provided to j. l' f FOR LIC DI L WI 1 FIE , OI I TI , .G1 , 9 Case No. 1 96 040 ,

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01:RI and to rovide a written summary analysis relative .to the focus of this 01:RI investi ation. . OnDecember 12,1996, YER0KUN, concluded his review of the EFW documents that had been provided by 01:RI (3 versions of the NY PRCE #190, dated October 6, . 1994, August 1 and 2,1994 [vice 1996]; and 4 versions of the NY EFS Event Investigation Report [EIR),1 dated Se)tember 16, 1994, and 3 dated - September 20,1994), and said he saw t1e results of editing in the documents, but did not see evidence that information was hidden from the NRC. YER0KUN said be did not identify any differences that would have caused the NRC's decision followint the EC to be different. YER0KUN advised that, in general, inadecuacies wcro highlighted in engineering and in the maintenance process. YEROKlN added tnat the ordering of the causes did not change NRC considerations and de emphasizing engineering problems was not, in itself, a

                    ' problem. YER0KUN opined that the key consideration for the NRC, was that the issue did not rise to a safety significant determination, as demonstrated

by the NY safety analysis (Exhibit 19).

On December 1996, the RI staff provided an analysis of the information pc gl and determined tnat, in the materials reviewed MY did not w' t11old information from the NRC (Exhibit 4). On January 31,1997: YER0KUN provided an analysis of additional information provided by 01:RI and determined, again, in the materials reviewed, that HY did not withhold information from the NRC (Exhibit 14). Alleaation: Incomplete and Inaccurate Inform'ation was Willfully Provided to the NRC Regarding the Emergency Feedwater System at Maine Yankee Evidence / Documents RLEcpcedure. No. 20 100,1. Rev. 15 (Exhibit 5) This procedure provides guidance for a Plant Root Cause Evaluation Report, and establishes review responsibility by the NSEG, the Plant Manager, the PORC, each responsible department manager, and the Vice President for Operations. In addition, this procedure required the tracking of the report's ' recommendatic,ns in the Haine Yankee Task Tracking System (MYTTS). Enaineerina Root Cause. dated Auaust 8.1994 (Exhibit 6) This doeurent titled, 'EFW A 338/EFW A 340 Seat Leakage," was the initial review of the August 4,1994. EFW valve leakage event and was conducted by . Lyndon BARR0N, Performance Engineer, Plant Engineering Department, NY. BARR0N concluded that the maintenance procedure did not provide sufficient details regarding seat / disc and actuator orientation. MY letter to the NRC dated Seotember 1.1994 (Exhibit _Z). This letter trasmitted the Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 94 016 to the NRC, d which idnii.ified Jhe August 4,1994. EFW isolation valve leakage event. The LER reported that the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition and plant F FI RE I Case No. 1 96 040 10 { L

i-l operators determined that an EFW isolation valve for #1 Steam Generator was i leaking. Further investigation identified similar leakage in the EFW supplies j tothef2and#3SteamGenerators. It was determined that, under accident

conditions, which require isolation of EFW, the isolation valve leakage could

! exceed Safety Analysis assumptions. b .

               'NRC Letter to MY. dated Seotember 22. 1994 (Exhibit 8)

that This letter reports the NRC inspection findings [IR No. 50309/9415) ion incorporated the August 4,1994, EFW 1eakage event. This NRC inspect i identified the failure of the NY engineering organization to determine leakage

! criteria for the EFW isolation valves, and to translate such into appropriate ! testing requirements, as an apparent violation. , 1 l NRC NOV Letter to MY. dated October 20. 1994 (Exhibit 9) . I This letter transmits the NOV to MY and saarizes the EC results. Also - ! attached were copies of overhead slides that MYAPCo had provided at the ! October 14, 1994. EC. l MY _etter Transmittina a Revised LER to NRC. dated October 28. 1994 j (Ex11 bit 10) This document revised the safety significance of the August 4,1994. EFW event l downward, citing recently completed analyses that showed plant safety was not j significantly compromised by the August 4,1994. EFW event. NRC Letter to MY. dated Deceu.ber 5.1994 (Exhibit 11)- This letter acknowledged the NY reply to the NOV. It confirmed receipt of the ' MY response that explained corrective and preventive actions were initiated regarding post maintenance testing of EFW isolation valves.

            , I MY Nuclear Oversiaht Committee (NOC) Reoorts (Exhibit 13)

The NY NOC' submitted reports for August 13, 1994, January 16, 1995, June 7,

1995, and August 15, 1995, to the Chairman of the Board, NYAPCo. Also l

included with the documents were NOC working notes for the period February 7, 1995 through February 10, 1995. These reports, in part, compiled by

Edward D. FULLER, President, Associated P ojects Analysis, and a member of the

. NOC, identified areas of concern by the Board at MYAPCo. In the reports there i are references to the August 4, 1994 EFW event. These documents were j provided to the staff for review. a

El I D , 1 NI 40 < Case No. 1 9 - 11 j i

}. i 1 l l I NRC Memorandum. dated January 31.1997(Exhibit 14) , i This memorandum is from the staff to 01 and related that a staff review of the additional MY documents (Exhibit 13), provided by 01, duermined that no { additional safc.ty or technical concerns were presented therein. , 4 ! gi&.CMeetinoReoort.datedOctober 21. 1994 (Exhibit 15) i 4 ! I These documents detail a special meeting to review PRCE (190, and identified i that PRCE #190 did not include specific root cause de therefore, required revision. The documents reflect ons and, revisions and 7d the subsequent review and approval of PRCE (190 by t . i Manaaamant Review Board Reoort. dated May 2.1995 (Exhibit 16) < s l This rt titled ' Correct 1ve Actions Associated with Multiple Events

Involvi Incorrect Assembly of Eccentric Butterfly Valves," was completed by j the foll ng individuals: John FROTHINGHAM, Manager, Quality Programs,
Russ PROUTY, Assistant to the Vice President. 0)erations, Mike EVRINGHAM, l

Operations Training Section Head, and STOWERS (30ard Consultant), i The report sunmarized that on March 15, 1995, a larger, but similar valve, was 4 found to have the same problem as identified in the August 4,1994. EFW valve ! laskage event. MY recognized the ' serious nature" of the problem, including r the apparent failure of corrective action, and initiated this Management < Review Board act'.on. The Boarq identified foyr issues deserving management ! attention. This report concluced, in part, that certain management )ractices ! required further review. Items identified were failure to complete RC

commitments in a timely manner, and failure to input PRCE recommendations into i *MYTTS." This report discussed prevent future similar problems, processes that NY should have enacted t i

problem but also to review the issue to look for edditional generic and safety ! implications. The report identified programmatic problems, but did not detect any wrongdoing issues. , Evidence / Testimony i ! IDigrview of BRAND (Exhibit 17) i . l Interviewed on Deccaber 10, 1996,

th PRCEs "'7 Cd

                 -         BRAND sa'J that NSEG p                                     allow for numerous rewrites of the draft PRCE rrports. He recalled that                                      provided a draft PRCE fl90 report to one of tne NY ma                               1] whose              on was reviewed. BRAE said the manager may have ask                               to reposition a portion of the report about his (the id
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i sana r's) se ion to a less noticeable place in the PRCE r t. ! ha i 4 NO PUBl. IISC WI 0F i E' ICE IRE , CE I Case No. 1 96 040 12 ) _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _. _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ __ _. _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

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           . m#190 and he was not aware of any BRAND said he reviewed PRCE i

hide any information from the NRC in PRCE fl90. He opined that all factors were completely and accurately reflected therein, including the resolution of the EFW valve leakage issue. j BRAND said that senior level NY rson tte , l as 7C ; Interview of FRIZZLE (Exhibit 20) Interviewed on February 3. 1997, FRIZZLE, President and Chief Executive Officer, NYAPCo, said he attended the pre EC meetings that were routine p rator meeti s at MY (Exhibit 19, . 149). FRIZZLE ance is call limited to mana . l '7c \ ra n con as a s ! FRZZLEaddedthathedidnotgeecon ! casual factor in the August 4,1994 (Exhibit 19, p. 55). FRIZZLE also did not recall any discussio that there was a problem with l the openness or " level of candor" pre.EC meetings (Exhibit 19, p. 163). 76 FRIZZLE said that he attended the EC, and there was no information withheld f from the NRC: it was an open and productive meeting (Exhibit 19, p. 166). I Interview of FULLER (Exhibit 21) j Interviewed on February 10, 1997. FULLER, President Associated Projects

Analysis, and a member of the NY NOC, recalled the PRCE process at NY and the

! EFW event in August 1994. FULLER said he did not recall discussions about the plant configuration control versus inadequacies in the engineering and maintenance processes. In addition, FULLER did not recall discussions about a related EC, preparations for the EC ' or the withholding of information from the NRC. FULLER sa h parranged about scheduli . FULLER had no recollection of t3 7C. o ice to cuestion him opics pertaining to the or o E i may have been part of a g discussed issues. FLLLQ said tha presence j topics with the NOC, but he ad no specific recollection of or input. , \ NOT LIC L R A .Y ELD E DI , OF CE T ONS. Case No. 1 96 040 13

j . L Interview of WH11 TIER (Exhibit 22) , l Interviewed on February 19, 1997', WHITTIER, Vice president Enginetring, l l HYAFCo, said the p1_ ant root cause process is used for issues thal; cut across j departmental lines, and for issues that are judged to be m6re important. Generally, they start out using one level and change as they gain additional j information, because the assessment of the issue's significance may charge - l (Exhibit 22, p. 144). , WHITTIER said the pre EC meetings are to first understand what the issues are f

. and then to get a cross section of people teqether that are involved with the 1ssuest the August 4,1994. EFW event was innerdepartmental. The people that erations, 2 were Maintenance Department, and Engineering Del >artment. And t Group, Q)he purpose was to involved were NYAPCo Counsel, the Licensing: understand the facts, the causal factors, the root causes of the issues, and i

to outline plans for corrective action. Typically, there is more than one meeting, and, eventually, they have a " dry run' and actually go through a

presentation (Exhibit 22, pp.106 and 107).

! WHITTIER said the decision as to which personnel would attend the EC was conducted on a group or collegial basis, and depending on the issue, by the I appropriate functional manager (Exhibit 22, p.107). WHITTIER recalled thatMattended some of the pre EC meetings, but could f not remember precisely how many there were (Exhibit 22, ). 113). WHITTIER said there were conversations gbout what t at tie EC, but he did not K l remember any issue being brought forward 3 relating to the ' level of ! candor." WHI1 TIER said he did not recall any cation that some issues were out oftheir bounds, or that or"we' raisedid not want to bei),those up to the NRC, to i i raise attention a flag (Exhibit 2 p. 115). 1 WH ER al' y recall way conversatio 7

(WHITTIER) ind' t he did not og conclusions.

i WHITTIER saidi lusions were focused ava ility of design, 2 or safety anal formation. and had not focused on inadequacies involving post maintenance testing. WITTIER said it'was his personal belief, because

r he conducted his own informal investigation, that the engineering problems i were focused on fairly basic >rchless with the post mtr.tenance testing propraal WITTIER felt that W had missed the mark in the needM 4 to aave some si vesents. He did not remember focusi.e'7d' on that area, as seemed to focus her area. WHITTIER recalled telling is comments, because had asked for comments.

WHI1 TIER said he very strongly that the cause process needs to be ! independent, and felt a little awkward in this position, because he did not i want to tell what to write when the are doing an independent root

cause. But, had asked for hi and he had inions. ER 7C

! 1

, p. .

I I j

 !               Case No. 1 96 040                            14

l 4 WHITTIERsaidthefinalPRCE#190 dis yed reorderin , byt he did not recall anything parti anc 134). WITTIER did in order to go along

 .               not recall                                                           Furthef, W11 TIER way conver j                 with WITTI         's c said be did not remember ns                                    .

ever saying that he did not a,1ree with PRCE N---

                 #190 as written (Exhibit              114). WITTIER said he did not, at any time

! to bur the desir, conclusion somewhere in o during this process, tell the body of the report, ra hig i hti 1' up front. WHITTIER said i nts, which he gave, but what he remembered ask he closed with, (Exhibit 22,

p. 119).

WHITTIER said he believed the desi issue was ) resented to the NRC', although maybe not in the s r that would 1 ave liked. WHITTIER caid it 7 C. tha believed the design issue deserved greater emphasis

               'isthanhiswhat memory he (WHI         believed was appropriate (Exhibit 22, p. 118).
                .WHITTIER said he did not pressure                   to issue the PRCE (190 report, and f                 was not aware of anyone doi         that.           IER said he did not recall i                  FROTHINGHAM coming to him wi                   ific discomfort about a lengt concerning the fact thatI k

I conversation FROTHINGHAM had was uncomfortable with his ( 's) input to PRCE #190 and the prepara on meetings for the EC (Exhibit 22, pp. 121 124). l WHITTIER stated that ho did not remember ifMcame in to see him, one on one, to tell him that he was very concerned about the *1evel of candor

7C

, that was going to be displayed at the EC on the EFW issue and in PRCE (190 j (Exhibit 22, p. 140), f Interview of SMITH (Exhibit 23) l Interviewed on February 20 1997, SHITH, Manager, Operations Department, l said be attended all the NY pre EC meetings, but was not sure that 7C ! attended all of them. He did not recall conversations about whether would attend the s a the EC (Exhibitpp. 23,pecific 8 11). EC, but recalled that M manager di SMITH did not recall configuration control being discussed in the pre EC

             '     meetings. He also did not recall any discussions about limits on the level of interaction between NRC and MY. SMITH attended the EC on October 14, 1994, and made a presentation. He said no information was directed to be withheld from the NRC, nor was information withheld from the NRC (Exhibit 23, pp. 12 14).

SMITH recalled no dis s about the ' level of candor" during the EC, and 7 C, he was not aware thatM phad voiced concerns about the information presented at the EC (E d Lt 23, pp. 14 18). ! Interview of VEILLEUX (Exhibit 25) . Interviewed on February, 20, 1997, VE!LLEUX Hanager, Maintenance Department,

                  'HYAPCo, recalled that he initially requested that BARR0N investigate the E

I Case N ,196 040 15

1 4. August 4.1994, EFW valve leakage event to determine the root cause of the 4 problem. YEILLEUX said during .the investigation into the causes of the EFW ?6 leaks, it became obvious that the sco>e neede broade 4 (V requested a more fonnal PR:E, an (Exhibit 25, pp. 12 and 13). , VEILLEUX said the PRCE chartering authority is the individual who defines the '

seppe of ex>ectetion for the roo; cause determination, therefore, he (VEILLEUX) 1elped to define the scope of PRCE #190 (Exhibit 25, p. 20). ,

l VEILLEUX recalled several meetir.gs withm from the time PRCE fl90 was 4 initiated, to the time it was finalized. VE.ILLEUX recalled having three i meetings with M and attended other group meetings. VEILLEUX said they had more than the average number of PRCE meetings, because of the significance 7( and the technical nature of the issue (Exhibit 25, pp. 20 22). ! VEILLEUX said W W did not convey to him a concern that someone else, other i than the charter'ng authority, was directing Show to write PRCE #190 (Exhibit 25, p. 27). VEILLEUX recalled some format type changes as PRCE #190 went through various

editing modes and changes, but did not recall that the order of the root greed with 7C i causes was an issue. VEILLEUX said he was re h l the changes, and said he did not pressure

, (Exhibit 25, pp. 30 34). I VEILLEUX did not recall . aying that Im did not agree with how the yC ! pre EC meeting was going, or at was going to be presented to the NRC l (Exhibit 25, pp. 40 and 51 54). l VEILLEUX said the " dry runs," were a matter of discussing what was the best

                      >resentation, how to put this information forward in the best possible light, low to refine presentation skills, and were not of the nature that we should withhold information. VEILLEUX said he was not aware of any information that
             .       was purposely withheld from the EC (Exhibit 25, p. 41).

i VEILLEUX said the order of how the root causes are presented does not matter, I as long as they are all somewhere in the paper, or somewhere in the ' s presentation to the NRC. VEILLEUX said it did not matter from a technical nature and the order did not matter to him (Exhibit 25, p. 44). .

                    - VEILLEUX said he was not aware that6 complained to any NY officers or                            7 (-
                                                                                                                       /

officials, relative to the ' level of candor" that was displayed at the EC . (Exhibit 25, pp. 51 and 52). , VEILLEUX recalled the EC process, to a certain depree, as being a healthy process and there were a lot of discussions. VEII.LEUX explained that NY identified some good information and good root causes came out of the process, ! although it was a rather lengthy It was his first EC, but he believed that everyone did well, process.and it was their intent to provide accurate t and truthful information for themselves and to the NRC (Exhibit 25, pp. 55 and

56). I 0F EI I Case No. 1 96 040 ' 16.

  ---,-n-y -         -                -                              ,.

t i Interview of FR0llilNGHAM (Exhibits 26 and 27)

Interviewed on March 25,1997 FROTHINGHAM, Manager, Quality Programs Department (QPD), NYAPCo, said the August 1994 EN event occurred during a shutdown, and it aneared that MY was originally unaware of the significance rc of the event. BARth worked on the initial internal investigation for eleven i

.- days, then his visor requested the assistance of a PRCE trained i individual (Exhibit 26, p. 1). 4 ' FROTHINGHAM said the editing of PRCE #190 was sensitive and sought to ensure 4 quality, clarity, readability, and to confirm there was reasonable evidence to identify the causal factors. FRONINGHAM did not recall any particular causal factor at this time and did not recall the term ' configuration control' as j .specifically applicable to this EFW event (Ex ih bit 26, p. 1). I FROTHINGHAM recalled that the work order for the eccentric butterfly valv0 ' was generically written and Quality Assurance had informed NY Maintenance that ! they did not have enough specifics. FROEINGHAM said the eccentric butterfly ' valves were made by contramatics, Inc., and recalled that another set of valves that were similar were also used in the plant. FRON INGHAM said PRCE

#190 was not completed prior to tha EC on October 24, 1994. FROTHINGHAM said that procedural adequacy was questioned in this event and there were i approximately three meetings that he attended prior to the EC. FROTHINGHAM recalled that the biggest concern about attendance at the EC was whether he i

would attend, which became the first EC he attended for NY. FRONINGHAM could

not recall whetherWattended the EC (Expibit 26. p.1).

FROTHINGHAM recalled that the EC was to be a public conference, therefore, how l the information was to be presented was a concern: however, FROTHINGHAM stated

,                           this concern did not compromise MY's integrity. FROTHINGHAM said he did not recall any mention that information obtained by MY was not to be presented to the NRC (Exhibit 26, p. 2). FROMINGHAM said after the EC, he did not recall any discussions about whether the information provided to the NRC was inaccurate (Exhibit 27, p.12).                                                                                     .

4 FROTHINGHAM initiated to expedite processingrecalled aPRCh unique meeting #190 through the In bureaucracy.at attendance were VEILLEUX, STOWERS, BARR0N. James TAYLOR, Senior Nuclear Safety i Engineer. NSEG, NY, and himself. FROTHINGHAM said the uniqueness was that the PRCE #190 report was being presented to the affected managers and they were l' " buying"'into the conclusions prior to the formal presentation to the PORC, i thereby speeding up the formal PORC review process, which was a lengthy process, recuiring many revisions. FROTHINGHAM said, in the past, PRCEs were understaffec, resources were constantly being pulled away, and due dates were continually extended. FROMINGHAM said this meeting was an attempt to move the PRCE (190 report quickly (Exhibit 26, p. 2). FROTHINGiAM did not recall a lot ssion on the substance of the remrt, or any prolonged discussions with during the developent of the PtCE

                             #190, but recalled discussions more
                                                             . 121. FROTHINGHAM to move the report, the'pa said that, as far as he knew, o           Exhibit 27.

of the PRCE #190 report. Although

                                          \f                                                                      3A                     I Ca'se No. 1 96 040                                                   17

may have complained that some individuals mi'ght have been upset with hic recommendations, that would have been fairly routine (Exhibit 27, p.13). FROTHINGHAM said he did not recall any discussion wherein M stated that he did not agree with the PRCE #190, or the way the information was provided I c. to the NRC in the EC, or that he was going to raise his level of concern higher up the organization (Exhibit 27, pp. 20 and 21). - 4 FROTHINGHAM said he was unaware of any directions to o undertake a ,7 C - and find out what concerns were review regardingorthe andevelopment investigation, to try#190 (Exhibit 27, p. 23), of PRCE FROTHINGHAM said, with respect to PRCE #190, there was a request by FRIZZLE that the NSARC review the root cause analysis and draw conclusions about the

                       , adequacy of the root cause. That review (Exhibit 15) was performed, but review b delayed.yFROTHINGHAM the PORC, also                   which    was somewhat explained               resistant that th0 Management          the NSARC's role, waI to Board Review (Exhibit 16) discovered that, through a misunderstanding, the recomendations for PRCE #190 had not yet been put into the NY task process (Exhibit 27, pp. 24 and 25).
       .                 Interview of LEITCH (Exhibit 28)

Interviewed on March 25, 1997, LEITCH, Vice President, Operations, NYAPCo, said from an officer level he had the overall responsibility for at least the maintenance aspects of this issue, ex)laining that post maintenance testing is an Engineering responsibility. LEITCi said M.cause of the serious nature of this problem, they connissioned a PRCE, the second highest level of root cause evaluation that was in place at that time. LEITCH said he approved the charter for the PRCE so as to define exactly the scope of investigation and to insure that it was thorough, and did not just address the specifics of this

                          ) articular issue, but also address the generic implications of the issue.
                          .EITCH said the normal process is to chartering authority (Exhibit 27, pp.                          9 andprovide 10). the final report to the LEITCH recalled a number of actions resulting from the PRCE #190, a number of recommendations, and meetings involving people who had to implement those.

recomendations. The meetings were to insure clarity surrounding the , recommendations: to be sure that the reconnendations made sense; and to insure the recossendations were tracked to completion. He recalled a meeting that ' discussed PRCE #190 when it was in the final draft stage (Exhibit 27, pp.10 and 11). , LEITCH said he knew all three of the individuals who conducted the PRCE #190, but did not remember if they atte. he pre EC meetings. LEITCH rece11ed no 2 discussions about whether or not specifically, would attend the EC (Exhibit 27, pp. 14 and 15). LEITCH said NY had pre EC peetings, which he attended,'and said the attendance selection for the pre EC meetings was not cuite as formal as one may think, in that they decide to have such a meeting anc the people that are involved show up for the meeting. People, generally, understood who was involved: there E I Case No. 1 96 040 18

were some informal discussions, and the people that felt they had a role * ' 1 showed up for the meeting (Exhibit 27, pp.12 and 13), LEITCH said for the EC, even before the ' dry run." they had a planning session: wherein they discussed what points needed to be made, who is the best person to make those particular points, prepare the view graphs, and the text

     '                             to use for the EC. He added that it became clear who the presenters would be, in this case, Engineer 1 , Maintenance, Qaality Assurance, as well as the executive management of           rations Engineering, and FRIZZLE, who chose to come,      As  far as who  makes   the decision who goes, he did not recall the decision making process, but there was some issue having to do with something as mundane as transportation arrangements.                        LE!TCH explained.they had

< difficulty obtaining connercial jet service to King of Prussia Penns'ylvania, so, NYAPCo chartered two small air) lanes. One flew from Portland, Maine, and 6ne flew from Wiscass- Kaine. Tiere was a oractical limitation, as to how many folks could fit che two airplanes (Ex11 bit 27, pp.13 and 14). i LEITCH said that, during the conduct of the " dry runs,* he did not recall discussions about the ' level of candor" ur limits on the free flow of information that would be discussed at the EC. LEITCH said that no information was withheld from the NRC at the EC (Exhibit 27, pp,16 and 17). id he has no recollection of meetings withM, wherer L specifically brought up questions about thelnformation being 7C pr to the NRC, what may be hidden from the NRC, or that the " level of 4 candor" with the NRC was less than desirable (Exhibit 27, pp.17 and 18). LEITCH said, at that time. . worked close to him, physically, and they i would see each other in the a ls and talked frequently about a whole lot of 7C things. However, he did not recall any discussion, at bout a " lack of g on any candor,' nor did he remember any specific meeti subject,forthatmatter. LEITCH said he and 5 and continue to have, a very constructive relationship. To L .,1 seems to be free to talk about any number of issues (Exhibit 27, pp. m 19). LEITCH said, clearly, the valve being installed backwards was a configuration control issue, although he did not recall applying that particular terminology ' to'the situation. LEITCH said he would describe those issues as subsets of,

                              '      what he would call configuration control, a broader terL He said problemsSo, l

j with pott.paintenance testing are illustrative of configuration control. he would say, that there are many things that could lead to configuration control problems, and he would define configuration control as being a broader L. ters than maintenance procedures or post maintenance testing. LEITCH said there were a lot of corrective actions, stemming from this particular issue, i that would have addressed configuration control. He did not recall using that would have addressed ! particular ters, but the actions, certainly,d 20). configuration control (Exhibit 27, pp.19 pa LEITCH said he may have told FULLER that the eccentric butterfly valve was an issue, and one of the things that the N00 ought to take a look at.' But, as far as prescribing who FULLER should talk to, or what documents he should I IRE ,dF I

                                                   ,/                                                                  {GI Case No. 1 96-040                                         19

review, he did not recall having any discussion with him in that regard (Exhibit 27 p. 22), . LEITCH said the document titled, "A Hanagement Review Board Report," is more call an Event Review Board, and is the highest level of event review. commonly P is a l ways comissioned by an officer of the comphny to investigate serious imies, and he commissioned the nne dated, May 2,1995 (Exhibit 27, p. 23),

Aoent's, Analvsis ,

        'ihe August 4,1994 EFW event escalated into a s                                   ! significant issue than 1titially assumed. The 01 investigation's testianial and documentary .

evidence confirm the progression from a relatively low level incident, to the hi9 hest level of attention at NY, with e resultant NRC enforcement conference.

                                                      ; was iniolved with the NY EFW event                                       y investig                The 01 interv ews, with supporting documentation, confirm, in                                   ,

general, account of the event's progression. The PRCE #190 review < process a the NY p,, tectimon reguirdi < nferences were confirmed. However, the only concerns with the PRCE #190 conclusions. g, confi <nvesti as by BRAND and WHITTIER. led that WHIRIER reca*. led tell his op ' ons, blit added that he further M re'ere vera Neither interviewee recalled f information provided to the ing EC. N the interviewees recallel discussions'during pre EC meetings about

iness with the PRCE (190 conclusions, none recalled discussions o possible attender.ce at the EC, none recalled receiving /C dirac ons ut the " level of candor" to be used with the NRC, and none received any directions Y withhold pertinent information from the i;RC.

M identified W bdividuals he soecifically told that he had a concern about the information that was going to be provided to the NRC, would make his concerns know1 to otliers- OI interviewed indivissals end none of thea recalled a conversation wherein problems with the information that MY r advi related /C n is concern. The NRC:RI st;ff was provided extensive documentary information obtained by 01:RI, but did not find anything to indicate that information was withheld . from the NRC. Notwithstanding the denials of othe dised his concerns over th atter with them. 01 considers a credible witness. In addition, volunteered to take a polygrap o verify the veracity of his a ptions. However, testimonial evidence and the doctmentation obta1ned durW the investigation do not apear to support the concern that root cause 76 infoi. nation on tho.EFW event may lave been withheld from the NRC. 01 concludes, from the evidence obtained, that given the avunt of t+.e elapsed, f( RE I I Case No. 1 06 0A0 20

the memory and emphasis of any meetings about e PRCE #190. findings and the

               " level of candor" may have been elevated in                                             conscioasness, but not viewed by others as having the same significance. This might explain, somewhat, the discrepancy between his concera and the available evidence.

Conclusion Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, 01 did not substantiate that NYAPCo officials willfully provided incomplete or inaccurate

              .information regarding the EFW to the NRC during an October 14,1994, enforcement conference.

": 4 , - fiP

                                                                                                 .                                            i s

F0 C DI L 0 FI OfgDIRE , 'I 0F GA DNS S EG : I Case No. 1-96 040 21

l

l

\ THIS PNE LEFT BLANK IKENTIONALLY E F _IC DIy nu Of I [1D

0IC DI , ICE I GA ON , I IION I Cise No. 96 040 22

LIST OF EXHIBITS . Exhibit No. Description 1 Investigation Status Record dated, October 24, 1996, 2 . 3 Emergency Feedwater Valve Leakage Event Investigation Report, PRCE fl90,andDrafts. ,

           '4             NRC Memorandum, YER0KUN to Letts, dated December 16, 1996.

5 HY Procedure, No. 201001, Rev. No.15, issue date April 25, 1994. 6- (Engineering) Root Cause, dated August 8, 1994. 7 HY Letter to the NRC, dated September 1,1994, with LER 94 016 attached. 8 NRC Letter .to NY, dated September '22,1994, with attached Inspection Rcport 50 309/94 15. , 9 NRC NOV Letter to HY, dated October 20, 1994. with attachments. 10 MY Letter transmitting LER 94 016 01 (Rev.1) to NRC, dated October 28, 1994. 11 NRC Letter to HY, dated December 5, 1994, with attachments (MYAPCo's response to NOV). 12 13 HV Nuclear Oversight Committee Reports, dated August 13, 1994, 8 January 16,1995, June 7,1995, and August 15, 1995. 14 ' ' NRC hemorandum, YER0KUN to Lettc, dated Jartiary 31, 1997. 15 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Memorandum, NSARC Heeting Report, dated October 21, 1994, with attachments. 16 HY Management Review 3oard Report, dated May 2, 1995 . 17 Interview Report of Bk C , dated December 10, 1996. 18 ~s i ~. . 19 Interiiew Report of YER0KUN, dated December 12, 1996. E CE D 31 NI

Case No. 1 96 040 23

4 20 Trcnscript of Interview with FRI'ZZLE, dated Eebruary 3, 1997. 21 Interview Report of FULLER, dated February 10, 1997. 22 Transcript of Interview with WHITTIER, dated February 19, 1997. 23 Transcript of Interview with SMIT 5!, dated February 20,1997. - 24 , 25 Transcript of Interview with VEILLEUX, dated February 20,1997. 26 Interview Report of EROTHINGHAM, dated March 25, 199'7. 27 Transcript of Interview with FROTHINGHAM, dated March 25, 1997. 28 Transcript of Interview with LEITCH, dated March 25, 1997. l l l s NOT 10 SC W I FI UI I DI 0FFI 0F GA , G NI Case No. 1 6 04 24 l}}

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