ML20198J406

Ack Receipt of Roe Response to & Copy of Chairman 981014 address,S-98-25.Informs That Root of NRC Problems Lies in Inability to Create multi-dimensional Vision,Mission or Picture of Future NRC in 2003,2008 or Any Time Frame

ML20198J406
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Maine Yankee
Issue date:	11/09/1998
From:	Atkinson J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20198J389	List: ML20198J383 ML20198J406
References
98-84, NUDOCS 9812300174
Download: ML20198J406 (5)

Text

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. P Joseph Atkinson 256 E. Pittston Rd.

• Dresden, Me. 04342-3219 + (207) 737-2021 e-rnail: atkinson@ agate. net Nov. 9,1998 98-84 Shirley Ann Jackson, Chairman '

. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint Nonh Mail Stop 16Cl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 [

Dear Chairman Jackson:

Thank you for the courtesy of Mr. Roe's response to my Oct.15, letter. I further appreciate his providing me with a copy of your Oct.14 address, S-98-25.

It was Commissioner Diaz's S98-16 that got me involved in writing about the changes that i view as being necessary to alter the current nuclear shut down direction in this country. In reviewing your ,

address, I noted the observation and expression of concern that meetings with the managers are "much less interactive. You ask few questions.. "1 Hnd it understandable. In the absence of a response or feedback from the group, I offer a few remarks.

I was introduced to a new tenn in my fairly extensive " nuclear" vocabulary, " Safety Compass" The tenr. is used three times in the address. From the context, the term is used to make reference to an inurument that provides direction. Direction is the center of the problems at the NRC. However, a

" compass" is also an instrument used to draw circles; and metaphorically is an instrument used to circumscribe the bounds of our duties, to define the bounds of responsibility and the essence of our 4

purpose and existence. Whereas a compass that points direction is constrained to a single dimensional plane (from a point to a i ne), the compass that can circumscribe a circle can take us from a line to a superficies; thus giving us a two dimensional plane. The root of NRC problems lies in the inability to create a multi-dimensional vision, mission or picture of a future NRC in 2003,2008 or any time frame from its singular dimensional existence, it is impossible to properly establish direction without a multi-dimensional reference.

j You stated,"The transition from one EDO to another offers us a very real object lesson in change i management. While the NRC will see a new person leading its staff, the business of the agency, its directions, its plans, and its mission remain unchanged. Our goals, our strategies, and our direction i transcend personnel changes..." It is said that, " insanity is to cor.tinue to do the same thing, and expect a different result." It is the vision, mission, plans and direction that must be changed.

You stated, "De6nition of what success is must be well thought out and firmly established.". The withdrawal of the Louisiana Energy Services (LES) application for a combined construction permit and i' operating license for the Claiborne Enrichment Center is a case in point. What is the definition of success? Was the NRC successful in handling LES? Were all stakeholders satisfied? You unquestionably achieved your only stated mission, " adequate protection". Private investors will not tolerate "Unquantifiable Risk". As previously stated in my June 30 letter," Members of the Clamshell

, Alliance were exceedingly creative and successful in manipulating the NRC; reshaping the regulatory e process and delaying the construction of the plant. You concede that,"the mandated hearing process, established to provide checks and balances to power plant licensing was imbalanced and unchecked". ,

You fail to take proper credit for the impact this behavior and the resultant process has on the industry."

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Chairman Jackson 2 Nov. 9,1998 is this a repeat of history?? Change the names, Clamshell Alliance with C/ 'y this time the applicant was a private investor. Withdrawal was the proper and prudent as ..ot only because of the uncertainty of result, but also due to the certainty of great cost and because in (ue face of a dying domestic market it would be more prudent to make the investment in a country where there is greater regulatory certainty, lower cost of electricity and labor and is closer to viable and growing end user markets. The fate of the LES ver,ture is a natural extension of the existing environment and processes.

NRC processes and private investment are incompatible. "The proofis in the pudding."

You stated, " Plans cannot be allowed to change in wholesale fashion based on nothing more than management fiat." I submit that the current changes within the NRC are driven by nothing more than congressional fiat. These changes lack permanency. They are not driven by a change in the enabling legislation; resulting in a clear and expanded statutory statement of purpose nor a mission statement that encompasses more than the vaguely defined, single dimensional space," adequate protection". NRC personnel are having difficulty understanding the " VISION". Why should investors feel confident.

Investors should regard these changes with the same skepticism that Charlie Brown displays when Lucy calls out to him, "Oh, Come on Charlie Brown kick the football, I promise I won't pull it away this time".

You stated, "We are not the Atomic Energy Commission. Neither are we the Department of Energy. It would be improper for us, under the Atomic Energy Act, to promote nuclear technologies. It is imperative that you and the personnel in your organizations internalize the fact that we are still health I i

and safety regulators. That is our statutorily defined role." Iagree thatyour statutory role does not include the promotion ofnuclear technologies. However, it is my conviction that the NRC has a social obligation to minimi:e the cost burden ofits activities on society and thus promote maximi:ation of delivery ofthe benefits ofnuclear generation to society. An obligation that the NRC has not honored, does not acknowledge, does not communicate to its members and does not inculcate to the organi:ation through its mission statement. visions, job desco .ptions, goals orperformance metrics. It is a crucial missingparameter. Cost effective operation is essential to the continuance of the nuclear industry.

Cost effective operation and pursuit of" adequate protection" can not be mutually exclusive.

i i was previously unaware of the Indus Energy Group paper which asserts," regulatory-related shutdowns "have become the single largest contributor to unplanned loss of nuclear generation". It must be stressed to all levels of NRC; a consistent and coherent message that demands attention and alignment; i uncompromising buy-in.. . loss of nuclear ceneration due to reculator action is unaccentable, it is a clear indicator of a failure in the system. You challenged the group to develop Performance Metrics to monitor performance. I recommend that you go back over the past 10 years and tabulate all lost  !

generation due to regulator action; develop a Lessons Learned package and attendant corrective actions to preclude recurrence. Trend performance. The challenge is to find methods of regulation and enforcement that promote the third point of the Principles of Good Regulation, Efficiency (I maintain that good regulation must minimize the cost (resource consumption) to society; not merely staff size.

Lost generation is a social cost). Loss of generation is a last resort; not an acceptable. casual means to bring about compliance or coerce an operator into changes that have no regulatory basis nor to carry out a vendetta against a vilified, errant licensee. It must be treated as a loss of regulatory integrity in parity with a loss ofintegrity in a safeguard system . The NFC should have a goal of zero LORA (Lost Generation due to Regulator Action). LGRA is a critical NRC Performance Parameter.

Plants that are being decommissioned can not loose additional generation. However, Regulator Action, or inaction, can add considerable cost to society. The NRC's direct actions in response to the radiation worker incident at Connecticut Yankee added millions to their cost. The failure of the NRC to take ,

timely action on SECY 93-127 (issued 7/13/93) has added unnecessary cost to Maine Yankee's 4

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i Chairman Jackson 3 Nov. 9,1998 1

decommissioning effort. Some creative effort is required, but a performance metric that measures the cost to the industry caused by Regulatory Action (or inaction) not involving lost generation should be developed; NLGRA (Non-Loss of Generation costs due to Regulator Action). It may not be perfect in the first implementation, but effort should be made to assess the cost impact on society caused by Regulator Action. Performance should be trended and specific action plans developed to reduce the numbers.

Performance Metrics on timeliness are difficult. Dispatch of regulatory affairs are not in the same class as baking cookies. A cookbook can not be written for every situation. However, the protracted process involving LES was obviously untimely. Deadly, untimely. There was a recent gathering to discuss the establishment of Free Release Criteria. It is my understanding that the industry attendees were told that the NRC should have defined " Clearance Levels" in about two years. Please consider that the Constitution was written and the Country was born in less time. It should not require a dramatic LES class event to signal the untimeliness of performance.

You state,(in reference to the Principles of Good Regulation, page 6)"I challenge you to establish metrics which align to these principles, so that we will solve our problems as they arise." Vision, Mission, Goals, Performance Metrics, even job descriptions must be in alignment. Performance Metrics should support goals and the Mission statement. The principles have not been integrated into the mission statement. NRC leadership crertes the conundrum. It has not reconciled the single dimensional statutory authority with the multi-dimensional parameters of the Principles of Good Regulation. The Commissions's own actions must not be in contradiction to these Principles nor with the expectation of performance from the agency. The Commission is the role model.

You stated, "We will not knowingly, and without cause, represent a death knell to the industries we regulate" The NRC is not only holding the end of the rope that rings the bell, . . .

Recommendations for Goine Forward

. As you stated,"begin with a clear articulation of vision and goals" You did not include the Mission statement. It is the responsibility of Executive Management to develop the Mission statement. Apply the management principle that, "it is better to ask forgiveness than for

, permission." (even when it applies to congress). Recraft the Mission statement to include the concepts contained in the Principles of Good Regulation (notwithstanding my presumption that we can agree that Efficiency pertains to social cost, a far greater issue than just staff size); " keeping costs as low as reasonably achievable consistent with safe operation", " working with industry to ensure the delivery ofmaximum value to society while ensuring adequate protection ofpublic health andsafety". Changejob descriptions and other NRC documents th st define NRC responsibility. Send clear, consistent messages to managers, staff, employees, industry, investors and "other stakeholders".

• Develop performance metrics for LGRA and NLGRA. Determine the regulator's cost to society and the various mechanisms that are contributing factors. Develop goals to reduce the cost while

" ensuring adequate protection". Performance metrics must be based upon measurable, quantifiable and objective data. They must have value and purpose in supporting management's efforts to achieve goals. They must be a part of an integrated system of Vision, Mission and Goals.

• This is difficult to suggest (and I generally do not have difficulty with candor), but 1 believe the Chairman needs to make an address to the agency. Use the Millstone event as an example of

Chairman Jackson 4 Nov. 9,1998 unacceptable behavior. This is reminiscent of the scene from "Patton" where George Patton assembles his troops to apologize for slapping the young soldier in the hospital tent. A tough lesson in humility, but I believe it is necessary to bring closure to the contradiction between current " management Dat" and role model behavior; demonstrate a commitn.ent to the ideals and a willingness to be measured by them.

" Alignment" can be visualized as a chain laying on the Door. When the chain is straight and taut, it is effective and ef0cient and capable of carrying load. The NRC is a loose chain with its links disoriented.

S-98-25 is an effort to poke at the links to get them into some sort of common direction. The most effective and ef0cient means to align the chain is to grab the end and pull. It starts with the Mission statement.

The agency and the nation can not sustain more losses like that of Mr. Callan. He experience and skills of the NRC team are valuable assets to the nation. I wish Mr. Travers every success.

Again, thank you for Mr. Roe's response and his sharing S-98-25 with me.

The opportunity for the nuclear industry to survive is in your hands. Here are other factors, but an unfavorable regulatory environment (chilling effect?) where Risk or Cost is deemed unquantinable or unacceptable is absolute, certain death in a deregulated market where private investment must bear the risk and the cost.

I would appreciate the opportunity to be of any assistance of which I am capable. The well being and  ;

successful transition of the NRC is of utmost importance.

Respectfully and with best wishes,  ;

I oe Atkinson l C: S. Collins- NRC J. Roe. NRC 1

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On a personal note:

It took me 20 minutes to review the address and develop 80% of my reactions and comments. It took me 4 days to write this letter. I threw away three pages of text.

I realize that my comments are harsh; my recommendations appear extreme. Perhaps it is battle fatigue.

Survival issues cannot always be approached with pleasantries. I am no longer held in high regard by my former employer or the plant's current contract management. I tried too hard; held on too long; was labeled, a crusader. The politically correct and career enhancing move is to become known as a deccamissioning expen. I fail in political correctness; too much personal integrity and conviction. I hase chosen not to become a " decommissioning expert". Decommissioning a " Big Rock"is an OK career for someone else. Decommissioning a Maine Yankee is offensive. Maine Yankee was a good

plant, good people and had tremendous, undelivered remaining value.

I was a lead project engineer for General Electric. I did EOC/PRT modifications at Monticello and

Millstone I in 1974. I was Dir. of Material Management for Maine Yankee for many years. I worked in Maine Yankee's Grass Roots Campaign, in an effort to build political and community support for the continued operation of the plant. I had worked on a straugic plan to keep Maine Yankee in service until 2032. I was in the Asset Recovery Team and tried to sell the plant in total for relocation or find a buyer for in-situ operation. I escorted numerous representatives from nuclear plants across the nation to look at Maine Yankee's equipment. A universal reaction from them was that it was incredible that a plant in Maine Yankee's state of material plant condition, history of service and low cost operation could be l prematurely closed. A pro forma was offered by a well known , .dustry veteran from Connecticut and his two Washington associates. A budget of $300 million was developed to return Maine Yankee to service. i included, was a budget for a complete digital upgrade of the plant; bringing Maine Yankee to state of the art digital control technology and addressing the cable separation concern in terms of no compromise, absolute compliance. No nuclear owner / operator in the country would take an equity position in the i proposal. No one has tried to return from a 50.82. No one has attempted a total digital upgrade. No one would risk venture capital on NRC approval of a restart within a time frame that private investment could tolerate.

a I have nearly as many concems with owner / operator issues (volumes of text, " equal to or better than" that which I have written on this issue). However, it is also my view that reformatting the NRC is the nexus I issue. It must be done immediately. Adequate protection, in the absolute measure, can not be compromised. Safety is paramount. Safety is a social responsibility and necessary to protect the business investment A safety issue that threatens public health and safety is an intolerable, unacceptable business ruk. Reasonable Assurance of Adequate Protection and good business are not at odds. Good NRC oversicht and enforcement shoidd be in total harmonv with cood business manocement ofa nuclear asset. Nuclear workers have a social obligation to ensure the adequate protection of society. They also has e an obligation to protect the asset from Unancial loss. The latter should more often be the lower threshold for taking corrective action (for me, the TMI lesson). Assessment, oversight and enforcement techniques and licensing processes must be utilized that will ensure the reasonable and adequate protection required while resulting in minimized overall cost to society. Predictable, quanti 6able and acceptable risk levels must be demonstrable.

If you know of a nucl-ar power plant that needs a new owner, please let me know. I have been asked for recommendations for acquisitions and to become involved in the process. Notwithstanding the congressional Sat of the moment..... . the agency must change quickly and dramatically and demonstrate a permanent resolve to stay the course.

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