ML20197J900

Submits Appeal of DD Re Myap Claim of Backfit Re Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools.Discussion of Licensee Reasons,Provided

ML20197J900
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	12/07/1998
From:	Meisner M Maine Yankee
To:	Travers W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
MJM-98-64, MN-98-73, NUDOCS 9812160025
Download: ML20197J900 (4)

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/ MaineYankee P.O. BOX 408 + WISCASSET. MAINE 04578 + (207) 882-6321 December 7,1993 MN-98-73 MJM-98-64 Mr. William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

References:

(a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)

(b) Letter to USNRC from MYAPCo, Claim of Backfit " Generic Issue 82, Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools", dated February 17,  ;

1998 (MN-98-11)

(c) Letter to MYAPCo from USNRC, Determination Concerning Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Claim of Backfit Regarding Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools, dated April .21,1998.

(d) Letter to USNRC from MYAPCo, Appeal of NRC Determination Conceming Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Claim of Backfit Regarding Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools (Generic Issue 82), dated May 6,1998 (MN-98-38)

(e) Letter to MYAPCo from USNRC, Exemption From Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.54(b) and (c), and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (TAC No. MN0069), dated September 3, j 1998  !

(f) Letter to USNRC from MYAPCo, Emergency Plan Exemption Bases and Associated Information; Claim of Backfit, dated September 22,1998 (MN-98-59)

(g) Letter to MYAPCo, from USNRC, Director's Decision Conceming Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Claim of Backfit Regarding Beyond-Design-Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools, dated November 6,1998

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Subject:

Appeal of Director's Decision Concerning Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Claim of Backfit Regarding Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools

Dear Mr. Travers:

', C h ' ((h In Reference (g), the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation forwarded to us his backfit determination based upon the recommendations of the Backfit Review Panel. This determination stated that the staff did not backfit Maine Yankee in evaluating our request for relief from offsite emergency preparedness requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (q). We wish to appeal this decision to you.

9812160025 901207 PDR ADOCK 05000309 _

W PDR a

n l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MN-98-73 Attn: Mr. William D. Travers Page Two In nearly all respects, the Backfit Review Panel (BRP) confirmed our concerns over the staff l handling of the requested exemptions on emergency planning. Maine Yankee is pleased that the BRP concluded that for Maine Yankee a zirconium cladding fire resulting from a draindown of the spent fuel pool need not have been considered by the NRC in acting on Maine Yankee's  !

exemption request. We are also pleased that the BRP agreed with us, contrary to Reference (c),

that the application of the backfit rule should not depend on whether the change comes from an NRC initiative or a licensee application. It is also interesting to note that the BRP stated that there was not a clear nexus between the need for a comprehensive emergency plan and a zircalloy fire, contrary to the staff's assertion in Reference (c). Additionally, the BRP found that the staff did not pursue a risk-informed reasonable assurance approach, seeking instead to develop an absolute safety finding.'

The Backfit Review Panel's report does not disclose a clear, reasonedjustification for their determination that no backfit was imposed. As best we can tell, the Panel concluded that there is something special about an exemption proceeding - so special that the staffis allowed to (1) ask ,

and have answered any question that they deem relevant and (2) apply new and changing l acceptance criteria unfettered by regulatory control or internal staff guidance.

1 We believe this conclusion to be untenable.

Consider what is likely to happen next year. The staff will go to rulemaking on emergency planning for decommissioning plants to institutionalize their position with regard to zircalloy fire by defining a specific period of fuel decay time required before a licensee may reduce their off- j site emergency planning capability. In the course of the rulemaking process, even if the staff I does not volunteer a backfit analysis, we believe that the Commission will require a backfit analysis for the simple reason that 10CFR50.109 requires it, i.e., ifit weren't a new staff position I there would be no need for rulemaking. The staff already has an extensive technical basis to demonstrate failure to meet the backfit test - that no substantial safety benefit exists, that the probability of a zircalloy fire even early in decommissioning is low (because it depends upon an incredible, catastrophic seismic event as its initiator) and that the costs incurred by Maine Yankee and other facilities are well in excess of the minimal safety benefit achieved.

Yet, the staff has been successful in imposing a requirement on Maine Yankee and other facilities that they cannot achieve through rulemaking. This isn't logical or even a responsible application of the regulations.

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Unfortunately, we are told by the Decommissioning Branch that these and other findings of the BRP are nothing more than recommendations, do not constitute staff policy and will not be considered further. Our understanding is that the Decommissioning Branch feels responsible only to address their lack of timeliness in dealing with our exemptions.

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MN-98-73 l

Attn: Mr. William D. Travers Page Three The back' fitting process that Maine Yankee has initiated is more than just an academic exercise.

The rulemaking on decommissioning (10CFR50.82) was issued with the explicit recognition that licensees would need to request exemption from certain rules like emergency planning and nuclear insurance. It is impossible to decommission a nuclear plant under the current regulatory scheme without requesting exemptions. Neither Maine Yankee nor other licensees can be successful with the regulatory constraints in place unmitigated by the backfit rule.

It is difficult for us and the industry to understand the NRC's aversion to following the backfit process. Almost without fail, rather than simply applying the backfit test, the staff searches for new and creative ways to avoid it. Don't these new staff positions on applicability of the backfit rule to exemptions themselves constitute backfits that should meet the substantial safety benefit test?

Between Maine Yankee and NRC, we've probably wasted thousands of man-hours on this issue, much ofit valuable management time. We could have avoided the wasted effort by simply asking ourselves, in a risk-infonned way, "Is this issue important to safety?" But, that's all the backfit process does.' It is an excellent tool for determining where to place our safety focus.

Rather than avoiding its use, we think the staff should be embracing it, if nothing else, as an efficiency and optimization tool - as a means to allocate resources on important issues and eliminate unnecessary activities.

In conjunction with this appeal, we would like to request a meeting with you so that our positions, and any NRC staff counter positions, can be fully explored prior to any final decisions.

As noted previously, we had great difficulty in determining the BRP's actual basis for concluding that no backfit was imposed. In order that we may be able to effectively prepare for the appeal, we'd request you to carefully review the BRP's report and, if you agree that the basis l is difficult to identify, issue a supplement to the report that clearly explains the logic behind the Panel's conclusion.  !

Finally, we'd like to renew our previous request to revise and reissue the SER the staff prepared j in approving our emergency planning exemptions.2 Regardless of the staff's position on backfit, 3

the BRP's findings on zircalloy fire and lack of risk-informed consideration are entirely inconsistent with the bases for approval of our exemption requests. We believe that NRR management agreed to make the SER bases consistent with the BRP findings, and request that i

the SER be modified appropriately, as well as being updated to correct other mistakes that we've identified to the staff (Reference f).

2 Normally, our outstanding request to the staff should suffice, however we have been informed l by the Decommissioning Branch management that correction of the SER would not occur without direction from their management.

3 For example, in the SER the staff introduced an entirely new scenario - an adiabatic heatup of l the fuel. Unlike the zircalloy fire which is a very low probability event, an adiabatic heatup is an impossible situation, which suggests to the public that such an event can or::ur.

P- i l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MN-98-73  !

Attn: Mr. William D. Travers Page Four ]

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.We look forward to meeting with you and discussing this issue further. If you would like to discuss any of these issues before then, please feel free to contact me at 207-882-5700.

Very truly yours,

. Michael J. Meisner, President Maine Yankee . .

c: Document Control Desk -

Chairman Shirley A. Jackson Commissioner Greta J. Dicus i l

Commissioner Nils J. Diaz Commissioner Edward McGaffigan, Jr.

Commissioner Jeffrey S. Merrifield Mr. Samuel Collins ,

Mr. Hubert Miller l

. Mr. John Zwolinski

.Mr. Michael Webb Mr. MichaelMasnik Mr. Ron Bellamy Mr. Patrick J. Dostie

- Mr. Uldis Vanags i

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