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{{#Wiki_filter:Apr. 26, 2014 Page 1 of 2 MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2014-19096 USER INFORMATION: | |||
GERLACH*ROSEY M EMPL#:028401 CA#: 0363 Address: NUCSA2 Phone#: 254-3194 TRANSMITTAL INFORMATION: | |||
TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 04/26/2014 LOCATION: USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2) | |||
THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED TO THE HARDCOPY OR ELECTRONIC MANUAL ASSIGNED TO YOU. HARDCOPY USERS MUST ENSURE THE DOCUMENTS PROVIDED MATCH THE INFORMATION ON THIS TRANSMITTAL. WHEN REPLACING THIS MATERIAL IN YOUR HARDCOPY MANUAL, ENSURE THE | |||
* UPDATE DOCUMENT ID IS THE SAME DOCUMENT ID YOU'RE REMOVING FROM YOUR MANUAL. TOOLS FROM THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE TOOL BAG SHOULD BE UTILIZED TO ELIMINATE THE CHANCE OF ERRORS. | |||
ATTENTION: "REPLACE" directions do not affect the Table of Contents, Therefore no TOC will be issued with the updated material. | |||
TSB2 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 03/31/2014 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/25/2014 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 co | |||
Apr. 26, 2014 Page 2 of 2 ID: TEXT 3.6.4.1 ADD: REV: 10 REMOVE: REV:9 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 ID: TEXT 3.6.4.2 ADD: REV: 9 REMOVE: REV:8 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 ID: TEXT LOES REMOVE: REV:119 ADD: REV: 120 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 ID : TEXT TOC SREMOVE : | |||
REV:20 ADD: REV: 21 ANY DISCREPANCIES WITH THE MATERIAL PROVIDED, CONTACT DCS @ X3107 OR X3136 FOR ASSISTANCE. UPDATES FOR HARDCOPY MANUALS WILL BE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN 3 DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES. PLEASE MAKE ALL CHANGES AND ACKNOWLEDGE COMPLETE IN YOUR NIMS INBOX UPON COMPLETION OF UPDATES. FOR ELECTRONIC MANUAL USERS, ELECTRONICALLY REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS | |||
REQUIREMENTS The 24 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to secondary containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances. | REQUIREMENTS The 24 hour Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to secondary containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances. | ||
Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal secondary containment vacuum condition. | Furthermore, the 24 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal secondary containment vacuum condition. | ||
SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches, removable walls and one access door in each access opening required to be closed are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur.Verifying that all such openings are closed also provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur.In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. | SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches, removable walls and one access door in each access opening required to be closed are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. | ||
An access opening typically contains one inner and one outer door.Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in each access opening to secondary containment zones is closed.In some cases (e.g., railroad bay), secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner or multiple outer doors. The intent is to maintain the secondary containment barrier intact, which is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening.When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is closed; all Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed; or, only Zone I removable walls and/or doors are open to the railroad access shaft; or, only Zone III hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft. When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is open; all Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed. The truck bay hatch is closed and the truck bay door (No. 102) is closed unless Zone II is isolated from Zones I and Il1.(continued) | Verifying that all such openings are closed also provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-87 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE | An access opening typically contains one inner and one outer door. | ||
When an access opening between secondary containment zones is being used for exit and entry, then at least one door (where two doors are provided) must remain closed. The access openings between secondary containment zones which are not provided with two doors are administratively controlled to maintain secondary containment integrity during exit and entry. This Surveillance is modified by a Note that allows access openings with a single door (i.e., no airlock) within the secondary containment boundary (i.e., between required secondary containment zones) to be opened for entry and exit. Opening of an access door for entry and exit allows sufficient administrative control by individual personnel making the entries and exits to assure the secondary containment function is not degraded. | Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in each access opening to secondary containment zones is closed. | ||
When one of the zones is not a zone required for secondary containment OPERABILITY, the Note allowance would not apply.The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.(continued) | In some cases (e.g., railroad bay), secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner or multiple outer doors. The intent is to maintain the secondary containment barrier intact, which is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is closed; all Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed; or, only Zone I removable walls and/or doors are open to the railroad access shaft; or, only Zone III hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft. When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is open; all Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed. The truck bay hatch is closed and the truck bay door (No. 102) is closed unless Zone II is isolated from Zones I and Il1. | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-87a Revision 2 PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE | (continued) | ||
SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-87 Revision 2 | ||
To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. | |||
This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to > | PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 (continued) | ||
The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. | REQUIREMENTS When an access opening between secondary containment zones is being used for exit and entry, then at least one door (where two doors are provided) must remain closed. The access openings between secondary containment zones which are not provided with two doors are administratively controlled to maintain secondary containment integrity during exit and entry. This Surveillance is modified by a Note that allows access openings with a single door (i.e., no airlock) within the secondary containment boundary (i.e., between required secondary containment zones) to be opened for entry and exit. Opening of an access door for entry and exit allows sufficient administrative control by individual personnel making the entries and exits to assure the secondary containment function is not degraded. When one of the zones is not a zone required for secondary containment OPERABILITY, the Note allowance would not apply. | ||
As noted, both SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 acceptance limits are dependent upon the secondary containment configuration when testing is being performed. | The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator. | ||
The acceptance criteria for the SRs based on secondary containment configuration is defined as follows: SECONDARY MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN TIME(SEC) | (continued) | ||
MAXIMUM FLOW RATE (CFM)CONTAINMENT (SR 3.6.4.1.4 (SR 3.6.4.1.5 TEST CONFIGURATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-87a Revision 2 | ||
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA)Group 1 Zones I, II and III (Unit 1 _ 300 Seconds _ 5400 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones 1, 11, and Ill) (From Zones 1, 11, and Ill)Secondary Containment). | |||
Zones II and III (Unit 1 _ 300 Seconds < 4000 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and Ill)Zone Ill).Group 2 Zones 1, | PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to >_0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to the maximum time allowed. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.5 demonstrates that one SGT subsystem can maintain | ||
Zones II and III (Unit 1 < 300 Seconds < 3900 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and III)to Secondary Containment). | > 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for at least 1 hour at less than or equal to the maximum flow rate permitted for the secondary containment configuration that is operable. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. As noted, both SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 acceptance limits are dependent upon the secondary containment configuration when testing is being performed. The acceptance criteria for the SRs based on secondary containment configuration is defined as follows: | ||
Only one of the above listed configurations needs to be tested to confirm secondary containment OPERABILITY.(continued) | SECONDARY MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN TIME(SEC) MAXIMUM FLOW RATE (CFM) | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | CONTAINMENT (SR 3.6.4.1.4 (SR 3.6.4.1.5 TEST CONFIGURATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-88 Revision 6 PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) | Group 1 Zones I, II and III (Unit 1 _ 300 Seconds _ 5400 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones 1,11,and Ill) (From Zones 1,11,and Ill) | ||
REQUIREMENTS A Note also modifies the Frequency for each SR. This Note identifies that each configuration is to be tested every 60 months. Testing each configuration every 60 months assures that the most limiting configuration is tested every 60 months. The 60 month Frequency is acceptable because operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance and all active components are tested more frequently. | Secondary Containment). | ||
Therefore, these tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. | Zones II and III (Unit 1 _ 300 Seconds < 4000 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and Ill) | ||
Zone Ill). | |||
Group 2 Zones 1,11and III (Unit 1 < 300 Seconds < 5300 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned (Zones 1,11,and Ill) (From Zones 1,11,and Ill) to Secondary Containment). | |||
Zones II and III (Unit 1 < 300 Seconds < 3900 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and III) to Secondary Containment). | |||
Only one of the above listed configurations needs to be tested to confirm secondary containment OPERABILITY. | |||
(continued) | |||
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-88 Revision 6 | |||
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) | |||
REQUIREMENTS A Note also modifies the Frequency for each SR. This Note identifies that each configuration is to be tested every 60 months. Testing each configuration every 60 months assures that the most limiting configuration is tested every 60 months. The 60 month Frequency is acceptable because operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance and all active components are tested more frequently. Therefore, these tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. | |||
The Unit 1 Railroad Bay can be aligned as a No Zone (isolated from secondary containment) or as part of secondary containment (Zone I or Ill). Drawdown testing of the secondary containment shall be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned in the most limiting configuration. | The Unit 1 Railroad Bay can be aligned as a No Zone (isolated from secondary containment) or as part of secondary containment (Zone I or Ill). Drawdown testing of the secondary containment shall be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned in the most limiting configuration. | ||
More specifically, secondary containment drawdown testing will be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as a No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open or as part of secondary containment. | More specifically, secondary containment drawdown testing will be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as a No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open or as part of secondary containment. The specific alignment will be selected based on the alignment that provides the least amount of inleakage and drawdown time margin (on a percentage basis) to the acceptance criteria. This could result in one alignment (e.g., No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open) being limiting for one criterion (e.g., | ||
The specific alignment will be selected based on the alignment that provides the least amount of inleakage and drawdown time margin (on a percentage basis)to the acceptance criteria. | drawdown time) and the other alignment (e.g., Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment) being limiting for the other criterion (e.g., | ||
This could result in one alignment (e.g., No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open) being limiting for one criterion (e.g., drawdown time) and the other alignment (e.g., Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment) being limiting for the other criterion (e.g., inleakage). | inleakage). It also could result in one alignment being limiting for both criteria. | ||
It also could result in one alignment being limiting for both criteria.Note that aligning the Railroad Bay to either Zone I or III is acceptable since either zone is part of secondary containment when 3 zone testing is performed. | Note that aligning the Railroad Bay to either Zone I or III is acceptable since either zone is part of secondary containment when 3 zone testing is performed. When a Zone II & III test is performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned to Secondary Containment, it must be aligned to Zone III since aligning to Zone I will not allow communication with the isolated zones. The most limiting Unit 1 Railroad Bay alignment shall be established each Surveillance period (60 month). Subsequent drawdown testing during the same Surveillance period only requires testing of the Unit 1 Railroad Bay in the most limiting configuration. For example, Zone 1,11,and III Surveillance testing is performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned both as a No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open and as Zone I1l. If the Surveillance testing determined the most limiting configuration occurs with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as Zone III, then subsequent Zone II and III drawdown testing during the same Surveillance period only needs to be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as Zone Il1. | ||
When a Zone II & III test is performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned to Secondary Containment, it must be aligned to Zone III since aligning to Zone I will not allow communication with the isolated zones. The most limiting Unit 1 Railroad Bay alignment shall be established each Surveillance period (60 month). Subsequent drawdown testing during the same Surveillance period only requires testing of the Unit 1 Railroad Bay in the most limiting configuration. | (continued) | ||
For example, Zone 1, 11, and III Surveillance testing is performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned both as a No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open and as Zone I1l. If the Surveillance testing determined the most limiting configuration occurs with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as Zone III, then subsequent Zone II and III drawdown testing during the same Surveillance period only needs to be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as Zone Il1.(continued) | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-89 Revision 3 | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | |||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-89 Revision 3 PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE | PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued) | ||
Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. | REQUIREMENTS Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. | ||
The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5. | REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.3. | ||
Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. | : 2. FSAR, Section 15.6. | ||
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. | : 3. FSAR, Section 15.7.4. | ||
REFERENCES | : 4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132). | ||
(continued) | |||
SUSQUEHANNA | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-89a Revision 0 | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-89a Revision 0 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)BASES BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. | |||
These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) | ||
Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.APPLICABLE | BASES BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary. | ||
The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary (continued) | The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices. | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-90 Revision 3 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary SAFETY containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ANALYSES before being released to the environment.(continued) | Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges. | ||
APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment SAFETY barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for ANALYSES which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary (continued) | |||
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-90 Revision 3 | |||
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary SAFETY containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ANALYSES before being released to the environment. | |||
(continued) | |||
Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. | Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment. | ||
SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).LCO SCIVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. | SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3). | ||
Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. | LCO SCIVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs. | ||
The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1. | The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1. | ||
The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table B3.6.4.2-2. | The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table B3.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not considered penetration flow paths. | ||
Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not considered penetration flow paths.Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. | Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. When the SDHR and temporary chiller system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the passive devices in TS Bases Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for these systems since the piping forms the barrier. During certain plant evolutions, piping systems may be drained and breached within secondary containment. During the pipe breach, system isolation valves can be used to provide secondary containment isolation. The isolation valve alignment will be controlled when the piping system is breached. | ||
The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. | (continued) | ||
When the SDHR and temporary chiller system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the passive devices in TS Bases Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for these systems since the piping forms the barrier. During certain plant evolutions, piping systems may be drained and breached within secondary containment. | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-91 Revision 3 | ||
During the pipe breach, system isolation valves can be used to provide secondary containment isolation. | |||
The isolation valve alignment will be controlled when the piping system is breached.(continued) | PPL Rev. 9 SClVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued) | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required. | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-91 Revision 3 PPL Rev. 9 SClVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued) | In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. | ||
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. | Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. | ||
Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. | Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. | ||
Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. | ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated. | ||
These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated. | The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. | ||
The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. | The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV. | ||
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barder that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure.Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in (continued) | A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barder that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in (continued) | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-92 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) accordance with Required Action A. 1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-92 Revision 2 | ||
The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A. 1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. | |||
Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) accordance with Required Action A. 1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low. | ||
Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. | For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A. 1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated. | ||
Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.B. I With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must (continued) | Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-93 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.C.1 and C.2 With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. | Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. | ||
The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. | B.I With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours. The method of isolation must (continued) | ||
Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the (continued) | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-93 Revision 1 | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | |||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-94 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low. | ||
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.E.1, E.2, and E.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. | The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions. | ||
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. | C.1 and C.2 With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3. | ||
Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.(continued) | In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated. | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the (continued) | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-95 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued) | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-94 Revision 1 | ||
Required Action E.A has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. | |||
If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. | ||
Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.SURVEILLANCE | Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions. | ||
Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SCIVs in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions. | Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. | ||
Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. | Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. | ||
Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.(continued) | D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. | ||
E.1, E.2, and E.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. | |||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-96 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE | Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. | ||
SR 3.6.4.2.2 SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested every 92 days to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate OPERABILITY. | (continued) | ||
Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-95 Revision 1 | ||
The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. | |||
This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued) | ||
The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. | Required Action E.A has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. | ||
Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. | Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. | ||
REFERENCES | SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. | ||
Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SCIVs I in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. | |||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-97 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers (Page 1 of 1)Reactor Maximum Building Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve Isolation Blne i Time Zone I(Seconds) | Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions. | ||
I HD-17586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-1 7524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-17576A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27576 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 Ill HD-17564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 Ill HD-17514A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 III HD-1 7502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 Ill HD-27564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 III HD-27514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 Ill HD-27502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 N/A HD-17534A Zone 3 Airlock 1-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534B Zone 3 Airlock 1-611 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534D Zone 3 Airlock 1-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534E Zone 3 Airlock 1-805 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534F Zone 3 Airlock 1-617 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534H Zone 3 Airlock 1-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534A Zone 3 Airlock 11-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534D Zone 3 Airlock 11-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534E Zone 3 Airlock 11-805 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534G Zone 3 Airlock C-806 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534H Zone 3 Airlock 11-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-275341 Zone 3 Airlock 11-609 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-98 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 1 of 4)Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. | Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low. | ||
Required Position / Notes X-29-2-44 SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 1 X-29-2-45 SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 1 110176 SDHR Supply Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve I Note 1 110186 SDHR Discharge Drain VIv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110180 SDHR Supply Vent Vlv 29/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110181 SDHR Discharge Fill Vlv 27/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110182 SDH R Discharge Vent VIv 27/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110187 SDHR Supply Fill Vlv 29/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210186 SDHR Supply Drain Vlv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210187 SDHR Supply Vent Vlv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210191 SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv 30/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve I Note 1 210192 SDHR Discharge Drain VIv 30/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210193 SDH R Discharge Vent VIv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 X-29-2-46 Temporary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-2-47 Temporary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-95 Temporary Chiller to Unit I RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanged I Note 2 X-29-5-96 Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-91 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-92 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 187388 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Iso Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187389 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Iso Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187390 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187391 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual iso Valve / Note 2 X-28-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay Yard/670 Capped / Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 4 X-28-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell 28/670 Blind Flanged / Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay 29/670 Capped / Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell 33/670 Blind Flanged / Note 4 X-29-3-54 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanged / Note 6 X-29-3-55 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanged / Note 6 X-29-5-97 Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bay to Unit 2 Elev. 33/749 Capped X-29-5-97________749 X-27-6-42 Diamond Plate Cover over Floor Penetration 271779' Installed X-27-6-92 Instrument Tubing Stubs 27/779' Capped X-29-7-4 1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plug 29/818' Installed X-30-6-72 Instrument Tubing Stubs 30/779' Capped X-30-6-1002 Stairwell | A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open. | ||
#214 Rupture Disc 30/779' Installed Intact X-30-6-1003 Airlock 11-609 Rupture Disc 30/-79' Installed Intact X-25-6-1 008 Airlock 1-606 Rupture Disc 25/779' Installed Intact X-29-4-Dl -B Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1-A Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1 -B Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1 -A Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flange Installed SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99 Revision 7 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 2 of 4)Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. | (continued) | ||
Required Position / Notes HD17534C Airlock 1-707 Blind Flange 28/799' Blind Flange Installed HD27534C Airlock 11-707 Blind Flange 33/799' Blind Flange Installed XD-1 7513 Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-96 Revision 2 | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99a Revision 6 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 3 of 4)Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. | |||
Required Position / Notes | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested every 92 days to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate OPERABILITY. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses. | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99b Revision 4 PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 4 of 4)Note 1: The two blind flanges on the SDHR penetrations (blind flanges for device number X-29-2-44 and X-29-2-45) and all the closed manual valves for the SDHR system (110176,110186,110180,110181,110182,110187, 210186, 210187, 210191, 210192, 210193)can each be considered as a separate secondary containment isolation device for the SDHR penetrations. | SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents. | ||
If one or both of the blind flanges is removed and all the above identified manual valves for the SDHR system are closed, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. With the blind flange removed, the manual valves could be opened intermittently under administrative controls per the Technical Specification Note. When both SDHR blind flanges are installed, opening of the manual valves for the SDHR system will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. When the manual valves for the SDHR system are open in this condition, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. When the SDHR system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system since the piping forms the barrier.Note 2: Due to the multiple alignments of the RBCW temporary chiller, different devices will perform the SCiV function depending on the RBCW configuration. | This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. | ||
There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration. | REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2. | ||
The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-47. | : 2. FSAR, Section 15. | ||
The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is isolation valve 187389. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller supply penetration is closed drain valve 187390 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-92 and/or X-29-5-96. | : 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132). | ||
Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. | SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-97 Revision 1 | ||
Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187390 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-96 and X-29-5-92 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. | |||
The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers (Page 1 of 1) | ||
There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration. | Reactor Maximum Building Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve Isolation Blne i Time Zone I(Seconds) | ||
The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-46. | I HD-17586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-1 7524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-17576A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27576 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 Ill HD-17564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 Ill HD-17514A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 III HD-1 7502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 Ill HD-27564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 III HD-27514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 Ill HD-27502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 N/A HD-17534A Zone 3 Airlock 1-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534B Zone 3 Airlock 1-611 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534D Zone 3 Airlock 1-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534E Zone 3 Airlock 1-805 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534F Zone 3 Airlock 1-617 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534H Zone 3 Airlock 1-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534A Zone 3 Airlock 11-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534D Zone 3 Airlock 11-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534E Zone 3 Airlock 11-805 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534G Zone 3 Airlock C-806 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534H Zone 3 Airlock 11-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-275341 Zone 3 Airlock 11-609 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-98 Revision 2 | ||
The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is isolation valve 187388. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller return penetration is closed drain valve 187391 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-91 and/or X-29-5-95. | |||
Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 1 of 4) | ||
Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187391 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. | Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position / Notes X-29-2-44 SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 1 X-29-2-45 SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 1 110176 SDHR Supply Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve I Note 1 110186 SDHR Discharge Drain VIv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110180 SDHR Supply Vent Vlv 29/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110181 SDHR Discharge Fill Vlv 27/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110182 SDH R Discharge Vent VIv 27/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110187 SDHR Supply Fill Vlv 29/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210186 SDHR Supply Drain Vlv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210187 SDHR Supply Vent Vlv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210191 SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv 30/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve I Note 1 210192 SDHR Discharge Drain VIv 30/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210193 SDH R Discharge Vent VIv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 X-29-2-46 Temporary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-2-47 Temporary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-95 Temporary Chiller to Unit I RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanged I Note 2 X-29-5-96 Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-91 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-92 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 187388 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Iso Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187389 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Iso Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187390 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187391 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual iso Valve / Note 2 X-28-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay Yard/670 Capped / Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 4 X-28-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell 28/670 Blind Flanged / Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay 29/670 Capped / Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell 33/670 Blind Flanged / Note 4 X-29-3-54 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanged / Note 6 X-29-3-55 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanged / Note 6 X-29-5-97 Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bay to Unit 2 Elev. 33/749 Capped X-29-5-97________749 X-27-6-42 Diamond Plate Cover over Floor Penetration 271779' Installed X-27-6-92 Instrument Tubing Stubs 27/779' Capped X-29-7-4 1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plug 29/818' Installed X-30-6-72 Instrument Tubing Stubs 30/779' Capped X-30-6-1002 Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc 30/779' Installed Intact X-30-6-1003 Airlock 11-609 Rupture Disc 30/-79' Installed Intact X-25-6-1 008 Airlock 1-606 Rupture Disc 25/779' Installed Intact X-29-4-Dl -B Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1-A Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1 -B Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1 -A Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flange Installed SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99 Revision 7 | ||
The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment. | |||
When the RBCW temporary chiller piping is connected and full of water, the piping inside secondary containment forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system.Note 3: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.Note 4: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone | PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 2 of 4) | ||
SUSQUEHANNA | Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position / Notes HD17534C Airlock 1-707 Blind Flange 28/799' Blind Flange Installed HD27534C Airlock 11-707 Blind Flange 33/799' Blind Flange Installed XD-1 7513 Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone IIIHVAC 29/799' Position is dependent on Railroad Supply Bay alignment XD-1 7514 Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone IIIHVAC 29/719' Position is dependent on Railroad Exhaust Bay alignment XD-1 2301 PASS Air Flow Damper 11/729' Closed Damper XD-22301 PASS Air Flow Damper 22/729' Closed Damper 161827 HPCI Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 25/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 161828 RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 281645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 161829 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 29/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 161830 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 261820 RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 4 261821 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 34/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 4 261822 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 331645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 4 2LRWI810L Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI810M Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged I Note 7 2LRWI81ON Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI810R Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI810S Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI703A Zone II Floor Drain 34-799 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI615A Zone II Floor Drain 34-779 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100A Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100B Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100C Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100D Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100E Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100F Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100G Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99a Revision 6 | ||
-UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99c Revision 0}} | |||
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 3 of 4) | |||
Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position / Notes 1LRWI81 OU Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI1810V Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI181OW Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged I Note 7 1LRWI81 OX Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OY Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OZ Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OFF Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OGG Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI810HH Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OJJ Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OKK Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRW1615A Zone I, Zone III,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-779 Plugged ! Note 7 1LRWI100A Zone I, Zone II, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged I Note 7 1LRWI100B Zone I, Zone 11,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWII00C Zone I, Zone I1, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI1OOD Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI100E Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI10OF Zone I, Zone III,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI100G Zone I, Zone III,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99b Revision 4 | |||
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 4 of 4) | |||
Note 1: The two blind flanges on the SDHR penetrations (blind flanges for device number X-29-2-44 and X-29-2-45) and all the closed manual valves for the SDHR system (110176,110186,110180,110181,110182,110187, 210186, 210187, 210191, 210192, 210193) can each be considered as a separate secondary containment isolation device for the SDHR penetrations. If one or both of the blind flanges is removed and all the above identified manual valves for the SDHR system are closed, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. With the blind flange removed, the manual valves could be opened intermittently under administrative controls per the Technical Specification Note. When both SDHR blind flanges are installed, opening of the manual valves for the SDHR system will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. When the manual valves for the SDHR system are open in this condition, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. When the SDHR system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system since the piping forms the barrier. | |||
Note 2: Due to the multiple alignments of the RBCW temporary chiller, different devices will perform the SCiV function depending on the RBCW configuration. There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-47. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is isolation valve 187389. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller supply penetration is closed drain valve 187390 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-92 and/or X-29-5-96. Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187390 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-96 and X-29-5-92 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment. | |||
There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-46. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is isolation valve 187388. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller return penetration is closed drain valve 187391 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-91 and/or X-29-5-95. Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187391 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment. | |||
When the RBCW temporary chiller piping is connected and full of water, the piping inside secondary containment forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system. | |||
Note 3: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. | |||
Note 4: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone IIto a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone II is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. | |||
Note 5: These penetrations connect the Railroad Bay to a No-Zone. When the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required. | |||
Note 6: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to the Railroad Bay. The above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are not required if the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone and Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum OR ifthe Railroad Bay is aligned to Zone I. | |||
Note 7: Due to drain header containing multiple floor drains in different ventilation zones, drain plugs were installed in all of the drain header floor drains. To provide the passive Secondary Containment boundary, only drain plugs in one ventilation zone are required to be installed. | |||
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99c Revision 0}} | |||
Latest revision as of 20:35, 5 February 2020
| ML14122A015 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/2014 |
| From: | Susquehanna |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML14122A015 (45) | |
Text
Apr. 26, 2014 Page 1 of 2 MANUAL HARD COPY DISTRIBUTION DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL 2014-19096 USER INFORMATION:
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TO: GERLACH*ROSEY M 04/26/2014 LOCATION: USNRC FROM: NUCLEAR RECORDS DOCUMENT CONTROL CENTER (NUCSA-2)
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TSB2 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 03/31/2014 ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE: 04/25/2014 CATEGORY: DOCUMENTS TYPE: TSB2 co
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SSES MANUJAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date: 04/25/2014 Procedure Name Rev Issue Date Change ID Change Number TEXT LOES 120 04/25/2014
Title:
LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS TEXT TOC 21 04/25/2014
Title:
TABLE OF CONTENTS TEXT 2.1.1 4 05/06/2009
Title:
SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR CORE SLS TEXT 2.1.2 1 10/04/2007
Title:
SAFETY LIMITS (SLS) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) PRESSURE SL TEXT 3.0 3 08/20/2009
Title:
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY TEXT 3. 1.1 1 03/24/2005
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)
TEXT 3.1.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS REACTIVITY ANOMALIES TEXT 3.1.3 2 01/19/2009
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY TEXT 3.1.4 4 01/30/2009
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM TIMES TEXT 3.1.5 1 07/06/2005
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTROL ROD SCRAM ACCUMULATORS TEXT 3.1.6 3 02/24/2014
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ROD PATTERN CONTROL Report Date: 04/25/14 Pagel Page 1 of of 8
.8 Report Date: 04/25/14
SSES MANTA-L Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.1.7 3 10/04/2007
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL (SLC) SYSTEM TEXT 3.1.8 3 05/06/2009
Title:
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME (SDV) VENT AND DRAIN VALVES TEXT 3.2.1 4 05/06/2009
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)
TEXT 3. 2.2 3 05/06/2009
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)
TEXT 3.2.3 2 05/06/2009
Title:
POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE LHGR TEXT 3.3.1.1 5 02/24/2014
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.1.2 2 01/19/2009
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.1 3 02/24/2014
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.2.2 2 02/22/2012
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION FEEDWATER - MAIN TURBINE HIGH WATER LEVEL TRIP INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.1 8 02/28/2013
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.3.2 1 04/18/2005
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM TEXT 3.3.4.1 1 05/06/2009
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION END OF CYCLE RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (EOC-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION Page 2 of 8 Report Date: 04/25/14
SSES MANUJAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.3.4.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (ATWS-RPT) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.1 5 02/24/2014
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.5.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.1 7 03/31/2014
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.6.2 4 09/01/2010
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.7.1 2 10/27/2008
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.1 3 12/17/2007
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION LOSS OF POWER (LOP) INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.3.8.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
INSTRUMENTATION REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ELECTRIC POWER MONITORING TEXT 3.4.1 4 07/20/2010
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RECIRCULATION LOOPS OPERATING TEXT 3.4.2 3 10/23/2013
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) JET PUMPS TEXT 3.4.3 3 01/13/2012
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES (S/RVS)
TEXT 3.4.4 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE Page 3 of 8 Report Date: 04/25/14
.qSE~q MANT.TAI.
Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.4.5 3 03/10/2010
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE (PIV) LEAKAGE TEXT 3.4.6 4 02/19/2014
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION TEXT 3.4.7 2 10/04/2007
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY TEXT 3.4.8 2 03/28/2013
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
- HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.4.9 1 03/28/2013
Title:
- COLD SHUTDOWN (RCS) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM 0
TEXT 3.4.10 3 05/06/2009
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) RCS PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE (P/T) LIMITS TEXT 3.4.11 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) REACTOR STEAM DOME PRESSURE TEXT 3.5.1 3 01/16/2006
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM ECCS - OPERATING TEXT 3.5.2 1 02/24/2014
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM ECCS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.5.3 3 02/24/2014
Title:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC)
SYSTEM RCIC SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.1.1 5 02/24/2014
Title:
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT TEXT 3.6.1.2 1 05/06/2009
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK Report Date: 04/25/14 Page44 Page of of 8 8 Report Date: 04/25/14
SSES MANUAL
.
- Manual Name:
Manual
Title:
TSB2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.1.3 13 02/24/2014
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (PCIVS)
TEXT 3.6.1.4 1 05/06/2009
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TEXT 3.6.1.5 1 10/05/2005
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.1.6 0 11/18/2002
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION CHAMBER-TO-DRYWELL VACUUM BREAKERS TEXT 3.6.2.1 2 12/17/2007
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL AVERAGE TEMPERATURE TEXT 3.6.2.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.6.2.3 1 01/16/2006
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TEXT 3.6.2.4 0 11/18/2002
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY TEXT 3.6.3.1 2 06/13/2006
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS TEXT 3.6.3.2 1 04/18/2005
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRYWELL AIR FLOW SYSTEM TEXT 3.6.3.3 1 02/28/2013
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 10 04/25/2014
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT Report Date: 04/25/14 Pages5 Page of of 88 Report Date: 04/25/14
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.4.2 9 04/25/2014
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (SCIVS)
TEXT 3.6.4.3 4 09/21/2006
Title:
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS STANDBY GAS TREATMENT (SGT) SYSTEM TEXT 3. 7.1 5 04/27/2012
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM AND THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS)
TEXT 3.7.2 2 05/02/2008
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.3 1 01/08/2010
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY (CREOAS) SYSTEM TEXT 3. 7. 4 0 11/18/2002
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM FLOOR COOLING SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.5 1 10/04/2007
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN CONDENSER OFFGAS TEXT 3. 7. 6 3 01/25/2011
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM TEXT 3.7.7 1 10/04/2007
Title:
PLANT SYSTEMS SPENT FUEL STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.7. 8 0 05/06/2009
Title:
MAINE TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATION SYSTEM TEXT 3.8. 1 9 02/24/2014
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.2 0 11/18/2002
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN Report Date: 04/25/14 Pages Page jk of of 8 8 Report Date: 04/25/14
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.8.3 4 10/23/2013
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DIESEL FUEL OIL LUBE OIL AND STARTING AIR TEXT 3.8.4 3 01/19/2009
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.5 1 12/14/2006
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DC SOURCES - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.8.6 1 12/14/2006
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BATTERY CELL PARAMETERS TEXT 3.8.7 4 10/05/2005
Title:
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING TEXT 3.8.8 0 11/18/2002
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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.9.1 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUELING EQUIPMENT INTERLOCKS TEXT 3.9.2 1 09/01/2010
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REFUEL POSITION ONE-ROD-OUT INTERLOCK TEXT 3.9.3 0 11/18/2002
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REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION TEXT 3.9.4 0 11/18/2002
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REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD POSITION INDICATION TEXT 3.9.5 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD OPERABILITY - REFUELING TEXT 3.9.6 1 10/04/2007
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) WATER LEVEL Report Date: 04/25/14 Page2 Page 7 of of 8
.8 Report Date: 04/25/14
SSES MANUAL Manual Name: TSB2 Manual
Title:
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES UNIT 2 MANUAL TEXT 3.9.7 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - HIGH WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.9.8 0 11/18/2002
Title:
REFUELING OPERATIONS RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) - LOW WATER LEVEL TEXT 3.10.1 1 01/23/2008
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SPECIAL OPERATIONS INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION TEXT 3.10.2 0 11/18/2002
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SPECIAL OPERATIONS REACTOR MODE SWITCH INTERLOCK TESTING TEXT 3.10.3 0 11/18/2002
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SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - HOT SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.4 0 11/18/2002
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - COLD SHUTDOWN TEXT 3.10.5 0 11/18/2002
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SINGLE CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) REMOVAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.6 0 11/18/2002
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS MULTIPLE CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL - REFUELING TEXT 3.10.7 1 03/24/2005
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CONTROL ROD TESTING - OPERATING TEXT 3.10.8 2 04/09/2007
Title:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST - REFUELING Report Date: 04/25/14 Page8 Page 8 of of 8 8 Report Date: 04/25/14
TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
B2.0 SA FETY LIM ITS (SLs) ............................................................................ TS/B2.0-1 B2.1.1 Reactor C ore SLs ..................................................................... TS/B2.0-1 B2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL ........................... TS/B2.0-6 B3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY ........ TS/B3.0-1 B3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY .......... TS/B3.0-10 B3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .................................................... B3.1-1 B3.1.1 Shutdow n Margin (SDM ) ................................................................ B3.1-1 B3.1.2 Reactivity A nom alies ...................................................................... B3.1-8 B3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY ...................................................... TS/B3.1-13 B3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times ........................................................ TS/B3.1-22 B3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators ............................................ TS/B3.1-29 B3.1.6 Rod Pattern Control .................................................................. TS/B3.1-34 B3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System ...................................... TS/B3.1-39 B3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves .......... TS/B3.1-47 B3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS ................................................... TS/B3.2-1 B3.2.1 Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) ........ TS/B3.2-1 B3.2.2 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) ..................................... TS/B3.2-5 B3.2.3 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) ....................................... TS/B3.2-10 B3.3 INSTRUM ENTATIO N..................................................................... TS/B 3.3-1 B3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation ................... TS/B3.3-1 B3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation ......................... TS/B3.3-35 B3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation ........................................... TS/B3.3-44 B3.3.2.2 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrum entation ................................................................... TS/B3 .3-55 B3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ..................... TS/B3.3-64 B3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System ....................................................... TS/B3.3-76 B3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)
Instrum entation ................................................................... T S/B 3.3-81 B3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation .............................. TS/B3.3-92 B3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
Instrum entation ................................................................... TS/B3.3-1 01 B3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrum entation ......................................................................... B3.3-135 B3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation .............................. B3.3-147 B3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation ................... TS/B3.3-180 B3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS)
System Instrumentation ...................................................... TS/B3.3-192 (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B TOC - 1 Revision 21
TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
B3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)
B3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation ....................................... TS/B3.3-206 B3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monito ring ................................................................................ B3 .3-2 14 B3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ......................................... TS/B3.4-1 B3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating ................................................. TS/B3.4-1 B3.4.2 Jet P um ps ................................................................................ T S/B3.4-10 B3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) ........................................................... B3.4-15 B3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ..................................................... TS/B3.4-19 B3.4.5 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ........................... TS/B3.4-24 B3.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation .................................. TS/B3.4-30 B3.4.7 RCS Specific Activity ................................................................ TS/B3.4-35 B3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown ........................................................... B3.4-39 B3.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown ................................................... TS/B3.4-44 B3.4.10 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits ........................... TS/B3.4-49 B3.4.11 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure TS/B3.4-58 B3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM ............................ TS/B3.5-1 B3.5.1 ECCS - Operating ................................................................... TS/B3.5-1 B3.5.2 ECCS - Shutdown ................................................................... TS/B3.5-19 B3.5.3 RCIC System ........................................................................... TS/B3.5-25 B3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ........................................................... TS/B3.6-1 B3.6. 1.1 Primary Containment ................................................................ TS/B3.6-1 B3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock ........................................................ B3.6-7 B3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) ......................... TS/B3.6-15 B3.6.1.4 Containment Pressure .............................................................. TS/B3.6-40 B3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ........................................................... TS/B3.6-43 B3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers ................ TS/B3.6-46 B3.6.2.1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature .................................. TS/B3.6-52 B3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level ....................................................... B3.6-58 B3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Co o ling ...................................................................................... B 3 .6-6 1 B3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray ................ B3.6-65 B3.6.3.1 Not Used ................................................................................. TS/B3.6-69 B3.6.3.2 Drywell Air Flow System ................................................................. B3.6-75 B3.6.3.3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration ............................ TS/B3.6-80 B3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment ........................................................... TS/B3.6-83 B3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs) .................... TS/B3.6-90 B3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System .................................... TS/B3.6-100 (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B TOC - 2 Revision 21
TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
B3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ......................................................................... TS/B3.7-1 B3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ...................................... TS/B3.7-1 B3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System ................................ TS/B3.7-7 B3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System ............................................................. TS/B3.7-12 B3.7.4 Control Room Floor Cooling System ........................................ TS/B3.7-19 B3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas ........................................................... TS/B3.7-24 B3.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System ................................................... TS/B3.7-27 B3.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ...................................... TS/B3.7-31 B3.7.8 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System .............................. TS/B3.7-34 B3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM ................................................... TS/B3.8-1 B3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating .......................................................... TS/B3.8-1 B3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ................................................................ B3.8-39 B3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ................................ TSIB3.8-47 B3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating .......................................................... TS/B3.8-56 B3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown .......................................................... TS/B3.8-70 B3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters ........................................................... TS/B3.8-77 B3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating ................................................... B3.8-84 B3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown ................................................... B3.8-94 B3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS .......................................................... TS/B3.9-1 B3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks ................................................ TS/B3.9-1 B3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock ..................................... TS/B3.9-5 B3.9.3 C ontrol Rod Position ...................................................................... B3.9-9 B3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication ...................................................... B3.9-12 B3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY- Refueling ......................................... B3.9-16 B3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level ........................... TS/B3.9-19 B3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level ........................ B3.9-22 B3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level ......................... B3.9-26 B3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS ............................................................... TS/B3.10-1 B3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation ................... TS/B3.10-1 B3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing .......................................... B3.10-6 B3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown ............................. B3.10-11 B3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown ........................... B3.10-16 B3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling ................... B3.10-21 B3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling .................................. B3.10-26 B3.10.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating .................................................... B3.10-30 B3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test- Refueling ............................. B3.10-34 TSB2 TOC.doc 4/17/2014 Revision 21 UNIT 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS // B TS TOC -3 B TOC -3 Revision 21
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision TOC Table of Contents 21 B 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS BASES Page TS / B 2.0-1 1 Pages TS / B 2.0-2 and TS / B 2.0-3 4 Page TS / B 2.0-4 6 Pages TS / B 2.0-5 through TS / B 2.0-8 1 B 3.0 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES Page TS / B 3.0-1 1 Pages TS / B 3.0-2 through TS / B 3.0-4 0 Pages TS / B 3.0-5 through TS / B 3.0-7 1 Page TS / B 3.0-8 3 Pages TS / B 3.0-9 through Page TS / B 3.0-11 2 Page TS / B 3.0-11a 0 Page TS / B 3.0-12 1 Pages TS / B 3.0-13 through TS / B 3.0-15 2 Pages TS / B 3.0-16 and TS / B 3.0-17 0 B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL BASES Pages B 3.1-1 through B 3.1-4 0 Page TS / B 3.1-5 1 Pages TS / B 3.1-6 and TS / B 3.1-7 2 Pages B 3.1-8 through B 3.1-12 0 Page TS / B 3.1-13 0 Page TS / B 3.1-14 1 Page TS / B 3.1-15 0 Page TS / B 3.1-16 1 Pages TS / B 3.1-17 through TS / B 3.1-19 0 Pages TS / B 3.1-20 and TS / B 3.1-21 1 Page TS / B 3.1-22 0 Page TS / B 3.1-23 1 Page TS / B 3.1-24 0 Pages TS / B 3.1-25 through TS / B 3.1-27 1 Page TS / B 3.1-28 2 Page TS / B 3.1-29 1 Pages TS / B 3.1-30 through TS / B 3.1-33 0 Pages TS / B 3.1.34 through TS/ B 3.1-36 1 Page TS / B 3.1-37 2 Page TS /B 3.1-38 3 Pages TS / B 3.1-39 and TS / B 3.1-40 2 Page TS / B 3.1-40a 0 Page TS / B 3.1-41 1 Page TS / B 3.1-42 2 TS/B LOES-1 Revision 120 SUSQUEHANNA -
UNIT 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B] LOES-1 Revision 120
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVESECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.1-43 1 Page TS / B 3.1-44 0 Page TS / B 3.1-45 3 Page TS / B 3.1-46 through TS / B 3.1-49 1 Page TS / B 3.1-50 0 Page TS / B 3.1-51 3 B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES Pages TS / B 3.2-1 and TS / B 3.2-2 2 Page TS / B 3.2-3 4 Page TS / B 3.2-4 1 Page TS / B 3.2-5 3 Page TS / B 3.2-6 4 Page TS / B 3.2-7 3 Pages TS / B 3.2-8 and TS / B 3.2-9 4 Pages TS / B 3.2-10 through TS / B 3.2-12 2 Page TS / B 3.2-13 1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Pages TS / B 3.3-1 through TS /B 3.3-4 1 Page TS / B 3.3-5 2 Page TS / B 3.3-6 1 Page TS / B 3.3-7 3 Page TS / B 3.3-8 4 Pages TS / B 3.3-9 through TS /B 3.3-13 3 Page TS / B 3.3-14 4 Pages TS / B 3.3-15 and TS / B 3.3-16 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-17 through TS / B 3.3-21 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-22 through TS / B 3.3-27 2 Page TS / B 3.3-28 3 Page TS / B 3.3-29 4 Pages TS / B 3.3-30 and TS / B 3.3-31 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-32 and TS / B 3.3-33 4 Page TS / B 3.3-34 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-34a and TS / B 3.3-34b 1 Pages TS / B 3.3.34c and TS / B 3.3-34d 0 Page TS / B 3.3-34e 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-34f through TS / B 3.3-34i 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-35 and TS / B 3.3-36 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-37 and TS / B 3.3-38 1 Revision 120 TS/B LOES-2 UNIT 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA 2 TS / B LOES-2 Revision 120
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Section Title Revision Page TS / B 3.3-39 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-40 through TS / B 3.3-43 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-44 through TS / B 3.3-54 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-54a through TS I B 3.3-54d 0 Page TS / B 3.3.54e 1 Page TS / B 3.3-55 2 Page TS / B 3.3-56 0 Page TS / B 3.3-57 1 Page TS / B 3.3-58 0 Page TS / B 3.3-59 1 Page TS / B 3.3-60 0 Page TS / B 3.3-61 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-62 and TS / B 3.3-63 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-64 and TS / B 3.3-65 2 Page TS / B 3.3-66 4 Page TS / B 3.3-67 3 Page TS / B 3.3-68 4 Page TS / B 3.3.69 5 Page TS / B 3.3-70 4 Page TS / B 3.3-71 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-72 and TS / B 3.3-73 2 Page TS / B 3.3-74 3 Page TS / B 3.3-75 2 Pages TS I B 3.3-75a through TS / B 3.3-75c 6 Pages TS / B 3.3-76 and TS / B 3.3-77 0 Page TS / B 3.3-78 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-79 through TS / B 3.3-81 0 Page TS / B 3.3-82 1 Page TS / B 3.3-83 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-84 and TS / B 3.3-85 1 Page TS / B 3.3-86 0 Page TS / B 3.3-87 1 Page TS / B 3.3-88 0 Page TS / B 3.3-89 1 Pages TS / B 3.3-90 and TS / B 3.3-91 0 Pages TS / B 3.3-92 through TS / B 3.3-103 1 Page TS / B 3.3-104 3 Pages TS / B 3.3-105 and TS / B 3.3-106 1 Page TS / B 3.3-107 2 Page TS / B 3.3-108 1 Page TS / B 3.3-109 2 Pages TS / B 3.3-110 through TS/ B 3.3-112 1 Page TS / B 3.3-113 2 Revision 120 TS/B LOES-3 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA -
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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
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SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision B 3.5 ECCS AND RCIC BASES Pages TS / B 3.5-1 and TS / B 3.5-2 1 Pages TS / B 3.5-3 and TS / B 3.5-4 2 Page TS / B 3.5-5 3 Page TS / B 3.5-6 2 Pages TS / B 3.5-7 through TS / B 3.5-10 1 Pages TS / B 3.5-11 and TS / B 3.5-12 2 Pages TS / B 3.5-13 and TS / B 3.5-14 1 Pages TS / B 3.5-15 and TS / B.3.5-16 2 Page TS / B 3.5-17 3 Pages TS / B 3.5-18 through TS / B 3.5-23 1 Page B 3.5-24 0 Page TS / B 3.5-25 1 Pages TS / B 3.5-26 and TS / B 3.5-27 2 Page TS / B 3.5-28 0 Page TS / B 3.5-29 through TS / B 3.5-31 1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.6-1 2 Page TS / B 3.6-1a 4 Page TS / B 3.6-2 4 Page TS / 8 3.6-3 3 Page TS / B 3.6-4 4 Page TS / B 3.6-5 3 Page TS / B 3.6-6 4 Page TS / 8 3.6-6a 4 Page TS / B 3.6-6b 3 Page TS / B 3.6-6c 0 Page 8 3.6-7 0 Page TS / 3.6-8 1 Pages B 3.6-9 through 8 3.6-14 0 Page TS / 8 3.6-15 4 Page TS / 8 3.6-15a 0 Page TS / B 3.6-15b 3 Pages TS / 8 3.6-16 and TS / 8 3.6-17 3 Page TS / B 3.6-17a 1 Pages TS / 8 3.6-18 and TS / B 3.6-19 1 Page TS / B 3.6-20 2 Page TS / 8 3.6-21 3 Revision 120 TS/BLOES-6 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA -
UNIT 22 TS / B LOES-6 Revision 120
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVESECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.6-21a and TS / B 3.6-21 b 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-22 and TS / B 3.6-23 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-24 and TS / B 3.6-25 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-26 and TS / B 3.6-27 3 Page TS / B 3.6-28 7 Page TS / B 3.6-29 5 Page TS / B 3.6-29a 0 Page TS / B 3.6-30 2 Page TS / B 3.6-31 3 Pages TS / B 3.6-32 and TS / B 3.6-33 2 Page TS / B 3.6-34 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-35 and TS / B 3.6-36 3 Page TS / B 3.6-37 2 Page TS / B 3.6-38 3 Page TS / B 3.6-39 7 Page TS / B 3.6-39a 0 Page TS / B 3.6-40 1 Pages B 3.6-41 and B 3.6-42 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-43 and TS / B 3.6-44 1 Page TS / B 3.6-45 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-46 through TS / B 3.6-50 1 Page TS / B 3.6-51 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-52 through TS / B 3.6-55 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-56 and TS / B 3.6-57 2 Pages B 3.6-58 through B 3.6-62 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-63 and TS / B 3.6-64 1 Pages B 3.6-65 through B 3.6-68 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-69 through TS / B 3.6-71 1 Page TS / B 3.6-72 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-73 and TS / B 3.6-74 1 Pages B 3.6-75 and B 3.6-76 0 Page TS / B 3.6-77 1 Pages B 3.6-78 and B 3.6-79 0 Page TS / B 3.6-80 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-81 and TS / B 3.6-82 0 Page TS / B 3.6-83 4 Page TS / B 3.6-84 2 Page TS / B 3.6-85 4 Pages TS / B 3.6-86 and TS / B 3.6-87 2 Page TS / B 3.6-87a 2 Page TS / B 3.6-88 6 Page TS / B 3.6-89 3 Page TS / B 3.6-89a 0 Revision 120 TS/B LOES-7 UNIT 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA- 2 TS / B LOES-7 Revision 120
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.6-90 and TS / B 3.6-91 3 Page TS / B 3.6-92 2 Pages TS / B 3.6-93 through TS / B 3.6-95 1 Page TS / B 3.6-96 2 Page TS / B 3.6-97 1 Page TS / B 3.6-98 2 Page TS / B 3.6-99 7 Page TS / B 3.6-99a 6 Page TS / B 3.6-99b 4 Page TS / B 3.6-99c 0 Pages TS / B 3.6-100 and TS / B 3.6-101 1 Pages TS / B 3.6-102 and TS / B 3.6-103 2 Page TS / B 3.6-104 3 Page TS / B 3.6-105 2 Page TS / B 3.6-106 3 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.7-1 3 Page TS / B 3.7-2 4 Pages TS / B 3.7-3 through TS / B 3.7-5 3 Page TS / B 3.7-5a 2 Page TS / B 3.7-6 4 Page TS / B 3.7-6a 3 Page TS / B 3.7-6b 2 Page TS / B 3.7-6c 3 Page TS / B 3.7-7 3 Page TS / B 3.7-8 2 Pages B 3.7-9 through B 3.7-11 0 Pages TS / B 3.7-12 and TS / B 3.7-13 2 Pages TS / B 3.7-14 through TS / B 3.7-18 3 Page TS / B 3.7-18a 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-18B through TS / B 3.7-18E 0 Pages TS / B 3.7-19 through TS / B 3.7-24 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-25 and TS / B 3.7-26 0 Page TS / B 3.7-27 4 Pages TS / B 3.7-28 and TS / B 3.7-29 3 Pages TS / B 3.7-30 and TS / B 3.7-31 1 Page TS / B 3.7-32 0 Page TS / B 3.7-33 1 Pages TS / B 3.7-34 through TS / B 3.7-37 0 LOES-8 Revision 120 TS/B SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT UNIT 2 2 TS / B LOES-8 Revision 120
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OFEFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.8-1 1 Pages B 3.8-2 and B 3.8-3 0 Page TS / B 3.8-4 1 Pages TS / B 3.8-4a and TS / B 3.8-4b 0 Pages TS / B 3.8-5 and TS / B 3.8-6 3 Page TS / B 3.8-6a 1 Pages B 3.8-7 and B 3.8-8 0 Page TS / B 3.8-9 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-10 and TS / B 3.8-11 1 Pages B 3.8-12 through B 3.8-18 0 Page TS / B 3.8-19 1 Pages B 3.8-20 through B 3.8-22 0 Page TS / B 3.8-23 1 Page B 3.8-24 0 Pages TS / B 3.8-25 and TS / B 3.8-26 1 Pages B 3.8-27 through B 3.8-30 0 Page TS / B 3.8-31 1 Pages TS / B 3.8-32 through TS / B 3.8-35 0 Page TS / B 3.8-36 1 Page TS / B 3.8-37 0 Page TS / B 3.8-38 1 Pages B 3.8-39 through B 3.8-46 0 Page TS / B 3.8-47 3 Pages TS / B 3.8-48 through TS / B 3.8-50 0 Pages TS / B 3.8-51 and TS / B 3.8-52 3 Page TS / B 3.8-53 1 Page TS / B 3.8-54 0 Page TS / B 3.8-55 1 Pages TS / B 3.8-56 through TS / B 3.8-59 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-60 through TS / B 3.8-64 3 Page TS / B 3.8-65 4 Page TS / B 3.8-66 5 Pages TS / B 3.8-67 and TS / B 3.8-68 4 Page TS / B 3.8-69 5 Pages TS / B 3.8-70 through TS / B 3.8-83 1 Pages TS / B 3.8-83A through TS / B 3.8-83D 0 Pages B 3.8-84 through B 3.8-85 0 Page TS / B 3.8-86 1 Page TS / B 3.8-87 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-88 and TS / B 3.8-89 1 Page TS / B 3.8-90 2 Pages TS / B 3.8-91 through TS / B 3.8-93 1 Pages B 3.8-94 through B 3.8-99 0 Revision 120 TS/BLOES-9 UNIT 2 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA 2 TS / B LOES-9 Revision 120
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVESECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)
Section Title Revision B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES Pages TS / B 3.9-1 and TS / B 3.9-2 1 Page TS / B 3.9-2a 1 Pages TS!/B 3.9-3 through TS / B 3.9-5 1 Pages TS / B 3.9-6 through TS / B 3.9-8 0 Pages B 3.9-9 through B 3.9-18 0 Pages TS / B 3.9-19 through TS / B 3.9-21 1 Pages B 3.9-22 through B 3.9-30 0 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASES Page TS / B 3.10-1 2 Pages TS / B 3.10-2 through TS / B 3.10-5 1 Pages B 3.10-6 through B 3.10-32 0 Page TS / B 3.10-33 2 Page B 3.10-34 0 Page TS / B 3.10-35 1 Pages B 3.10-36 and B 3.10-37 0 Page TS / B 3.10-38 1 Page TS / B 3.10-39 2 TSB2 Text LOES.doc 4/1512014 Revision 120 TS / B LOES-lO SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT SUSQUEHANNA -
UNIT 2 2 TS / B LOES-1 0 Revision 120
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment BASES BACKGROUND The secondary containment structure completely encloses the primary containment structure such that a dual-containment design is utilized to limit the spread of radioactivity to the environment to within limits. The function of the secondary containment is to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products that may leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). In conjunction with operation of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and closure of certain valves whose lines penetrate the secondary containment, the secondary containment is designed to reduce the activity level of the fission products prior to release to the environment and to isolate and contain fission products that are released during certain operations that take place inside primary containment, when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE, or that take place outside primary containment (Ref. 1).
The secondary containment is a structure that completely encloses the primary containment and reactor coolant pressure boundary components.
This structure forms a control volume that serves to hold up and dilute the fission products. It is possible for the pressure in the control volume to rise relative to the environmental pressure (e.g., due to pump and motor heat load additions).
The secondary containment boundary consists of the reactor building structure and associated removable walls and panels, hatches, doors, dampers, sealed penetrations and valves. Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. Breaches of these piping systems within secondary containment will be controlled to maintain secondary containment requirements. The secondary containment is divided into Zone I, Zone II and Zone III, each of which must be OPERABLE depending on plant status and the alignment of the secondary containment boundary. Specifically, the Unit 1 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone I1. Similarly, the Unit 2 secondary containment boundary can be modified to exclude Zone I. Secondary containment may consist of only Zone III when in MODE 4 or 5 during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during handling of irradiated fuel within the Zone III secondary containment boundary.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-83 Revision 4
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES BACKGROUND To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary (continued) containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for the safety related systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System." When one or more zones are excluded from secondary containment, the specific requirements for support systems will also change (e.g., required secondary containment isolation valves).
APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary SAFETY containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)
ANALYSES (Ref. 2) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 3). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).
LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained. The leak tightness of secondary containment must also ensure that the release of radioactive materials to the environment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis. For example, secondary containment bypass leakage must be restricted to the leakage rate required by LCO 3.6.1.3. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of walls, doors, hatches, SCIVs, and available flow paths to the SGT System.
(continued).
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-84 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES (continued)
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.
Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.
ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.
A temporary (one-time) Completion Time is connected to the Completion Time Requirements above (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) with an "OR" connector. The Temporary Completion Time is 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and applies to the replacement of the Reactor Building Recirculating Fan Damper Motors. The Temporary Completion Time of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> may only be used once, and expires on December 31, 2005.
B.1 and B.2 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-85 Revision 4
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)
Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release.
Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.
Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the secondary containment boundary is sufficiently leak tight to preclude exfiltration under expected wind conditions.
Expected wind conditions are defined as sustained wind speeds of less than or equal to 16 mph at the 60m meteorological tower or less than or equal to 11 mph at the 1Om meteorological tower if the 60m tower wind speed is not available. Changes in indicated reactor building differential pressure observed during periods of short-term wind speed gusts above these sustained speeds do not by themselves impact secondary containment integrity. However, if secondary containment integrity is known to be compromised, the LCO must be entered regardless of wind speed.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-86 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency of this SR was developed based on operating experience related to secondary containment vacuum variations during the applicable MODES and the low probability of a DBA occurring between surveillances.
Furthermore, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to an abnormal secondary containment vacuum condition.
SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches, removable walls and one access door in each access opening required to be closed are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur.
Verifying that all such openings are closed also provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur.
In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness.
An access opening typically contains one inner and one outer door.
Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in each access opening to secondary containment zones is closed.
In some cases (e.g., railroad bay), secondary containment access openings are shared such that a secondary containment barrier may have multiple inner or multiple outer doors. The intent is to maintain the secondary containment barrier intact, which is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening.
When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is closed; all Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed; or, only Zone I removable walls and/or doors are open to the railroad access shaft; or, only Zone III hatches and/or dampers are open to the railroad access shaft. When the railroad bay door (No. 101) is open; all Zone I and III hatches, removable walls, dampers, and one door in each access opening connected to the railroad access bay are closed. The truck bay hatch is closed and the truck bay door (No. 102) is closed unless Zone II is isolated from Zones I and Il1.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-87 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.2 and SR 3.6.4.1.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS When an access opening between secondary containment zones is being used for exit and entry, then at least one door (where two doors are provided) must remain closed. The access openings between secondary containment zones which are not provided with two doors are administratively controlled to maintain secondary containment integrity during exit and entry. This Surveillance is modified by a Note that allows access openings with a single door (i.e., no airlock) within the secondary containment boundary (i.e., between required secondary containment zones) to be opened for entry and exit. Opening of an access door for entry and exit allows sufficient administrative control by individual personnel making the entries and exits to assure the secondary containment function is not degraded. When one of the zones is not a zone required for secondary containment OPERABILITY, the Note allowance would not apply.
The 31 day Frequency for these SRs has been shown to be adequate, based on operating experience, and is considered adequate in view of the other indications of door and hatch status that are available to the operator.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-87a Revision 2
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.4 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to >_0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in less than or equal to the maximum time allowed. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.5 demonstrates that one SGT subsystem can maintain
> 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at less than or equal to the maximum flow rate permitted for the secondary containment configuration that is operable. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. As noted, both SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 acceptance limits are dependent upon the secondary containment configuration when testing is being performed. The acceptance criteria for the SRs based on secondary containment configuration is defined as follows:
SECONDARY MAXIMUM DRAWDOWN TIME(SEC) MAXIMUM FLOW RATE (CFM)
CONTAINMENT (SR 3.6.4.1.4 (SR 3.6.4.1.5 TEST CONFIGURATION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA) ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA)
Group 1 Zones I, II and III (Unit 1 _ 300 Seconds _ 5400 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones 1,11,and Ill) (From Zones 1,11,and Ill)
Zones II and III (Unit 1 _ 300 Seconds < 4000 CFM Railroad Bay aligned to (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and Ill)
Zone Ill).
Group 2 Zones 1,11and III (Unit 1 < 300 Seconds < 5300 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned (Zones 1,11,and Ill) (From Zones 1,11,and Ill) to Secondary Containment).
Zones II and III (Unit 1 < 300 Seconds < 3900 CFM Railroad Bay not aligned (Zones II and Ill) (From Zones II and III) to Secondary Containment).
Only one of the above listed configurations needs to be tested to confirm secondary containment OPERABILITY.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-88 Revision 6
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS A Note also modifies the Frequency for each SR. This Note identifies that each configuration is to be tested every 60 months. Testing each configuration every 60 months assures that the most limiting configuration is tested every 60 months. The 60 month Frequency is acceptable because operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance and all active components are tested more frequently. Therefore, these tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity.
The Unit 1 Railroad Bay can be aligned as a No Zone (isolated from secondary containment) or as part of secondary containment (Zone I or Ill). Drawdown testing of the secondary containment shall be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned in the most limiting configuration.
More specifically, secondary containment drawdown testing will be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as a No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open or as part of secondary containment. The specific alignment will be selected based on the alignment that provides the least amount of inleakage and drawdown time margin (on a percentage basis) to the acceptance criteria. This could result in one alignment (e.g., No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open) being limiting for one criterion (e.g.,
drawdown time) and the other alignment (e.g., Railroad Bay aligned to secondary containment) being limiting for the other criterion (e.g.,
inleakage). It also could result in one alignment being limiting for both criteria.
Note that aligning the Railroad Bay to either Zone I or III is acceptable since either zone is part of secondary containment when 3 zone testing is performed. When a Zone II & III test is performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned to Secondary Containment, it must be aligned to Zone III since aligning to Zone I will not allow communication with the isolated zones. The most limiting Unit 1 Railroad Bay alignment shall be established each Surveillance period (60 month). Subsequent drawdown testing during the same Surveillance period only requires testing of the Unit 1 Railroad Bay in the most limiting configuration. For example, Zone 1,11,and III Surveillance testing is performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned both as a No Zone with the Railroad Bay door open and as Zone I1l. If the Surveillance testing determined the most limiting configuration occurs with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as Zone III, then subsequent Zone II and III drawdown testing during the same Surveillance period only needs to be performed with the Unit 1 Railroad Bay aligned as Zone Il1.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-89 Revision 3
PPL Rev. 10 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform SR 3.6.4.1.4 and SR 3.6.4.1.5. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.3.
- 2. FSAR, Section 15.6.
- 3. FSAR, Section 15.7.4.
- 4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-89a Revision 0
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)
BASES BACKGROUND The function of the SCIVs, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, is to limit fission product release during and following postulated Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (Ref. 1). Secondary containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that fission products that leak from primary containment into secondary containment following a DBA, or that are released during certain operations when primary containment is not required to be OPERABLE or take place outside primary containment, are maintained within the secondary containment boundary.
The OPERABILITY requirements for SCIVs help ensure that an adequate secondary containment boundary is maintained during and after an accident by minimizing potential paths to the environment. These isolation devices consist of either passive devices or active (automatic) devices. Manual valves or dampers, de-activated automatic valves or dampers secured in their closed position (including check valves with flow through the valve secured), and blind flanges are considered passive devices.
Automatic SCIVs close on a secondary containment isolation signal to establish a boundary for untreated radioactive material within secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.
Other non-sealed penetrations which cross a secondary containment boundary are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges.
APPLICABLE The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment SAFETY barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for ANALYSES which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events, but the boundary (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-90 Revision 3
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES APPLICABLE established by SCIVs is required to ensure that leakage from the primary SAFETY containment is processed by the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System ANALYSES before being released to the environment.
(continued)
Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.
SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).
LCO SCIVs that form a part of the secondary containment boundary are required to be OPERABLE. Depending on the configuration of the secondary containment only specific SCIVs are required. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.
The automatic isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and the valves actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, are listed in Table B 3.6.4.2-1.
The normally closed isolation valves or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic SCIVs are deactivated and secured in their closed position, or blind flanges are in place. These passive isolation valves or devices are listed in Table B3.6.4.2-2. Penetrations closed with sealants are considered part of the secondary containment boundary and are not considered penetration flow paths.
Certain plant piping systems (e.g., Service Water, RHR Service Water, Emergency Service Water, Feedwater, etc.) penetrate the secondary containment boundary. The intact piping within secondary containment provides a passive barrier which maintains secondary containment requirements. When the SDHR and temporary chiller system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the passive devices in TS Bases Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for these systems since the piping forms the barrier. During certain plant evolutions, piping systems may be drained and breached within secondary containment. During the pipe breach, system isolation valves can be used to provide secondary containment isolation. The isolation valve alignment will be controlled when the piping system is breached.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-91 Revision 3
PPL Rev. 9 SClVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES (continued)
APPLICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, the OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.
In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.
Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.
Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.
The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.
The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.
A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path(s) must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barder that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure.
Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-92 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) accordance with Required Action A. 1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration, and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time is very low.
For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A. 1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident, but no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. The Completion Time of once per 31 days is appropriate because the valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that the affected penetration remains isolated.
Condition A is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two SCIVs. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to devices located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified closed by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
B.I With two SCIVs in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The method of isolation must (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-93 Revision 1
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the probability of a DBA, which requires the SCIVs to close, occurring during this short time, is very low.
The Condition has been modified by a Note stating that Condition B is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two isolation valves. For penetration flow paths with one SCIV, Condition C provides the appropriate Required Actions.
C.1 and C.2 With one or more required penetration flow paths with one required SCIV inoperable, the inoperable valve must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time. The Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is reasonable considering the relative stability of the system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting secondary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3.
In the event the affected penetration flow path is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that secondary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident are isolated.
The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration is isolated is appropriate because the (continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-94 Revision 1
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.
Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one SCIV. For penetration flow paths with two SCIVs, Conditions A and B provide the appropriate Required Actions.
Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted.
Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
D.1 and D.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
E.1, E.2, and E.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended.
Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-95 Revision 1
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2, and E.3 (continued)
Required Action E.A has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.
Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.
Rather, it involves verification (typically visual) that those required SCIVs I in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.
Since these SCIVs are readily accessible to personnel during normal operation and verification of their position is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency was chosen to provide added assurance that the SCIVs are in the correct positions.
Two Notes have been added to this SR. The first Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows them to be verified by use of administrative controls. Allowing verification by administrative controls is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these SCIVs, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is low.
A second Note has been included to clarify that SCIVs that are open under administrative controls are not required to meet the SR during the time the SCIVs are open.
(continued)
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-96 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SCIVs with maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.2.4-1 are tested every 92 days to verify that the isolation time is within limits to demonstrate OPERABILITY. Automatic SCIVs without maximum isolation times specified in Table B 3.6.4.2-1 are tested under the requirements of SR 3.6.4.2.3. The isolation time test ensures that the SCIV will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analyses.
SR 3.6.4.2.3 Verifying that each automatic required SCIV closes on a secondary containment isolation signal is required to prevent leakage of radioactive material from secondary containment following a DBA or other accidents.
This SR ensures that each automatic SCIV will actuate to the isolation position on a secondary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.
REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section 6.2.
- 2. FSAR, Section 15.
- 3. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-97 Revision 1
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-1 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Automatic Isolation Dampers (Page 1 of 1)
Reactor Maximum Building Valve Number Valve Description Type of Valve Isolation Blne i Time Zone I(Seconds)
I HD-17586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-1 7524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 I HD-17576A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27586 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27524 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 II HD-27576 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 10.0 Ill HD-17564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 Ill HD-17514A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 III HD-1 7502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 Ill HD-27564 A&B Supply System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 14.0 III HD-27514 A&B Filtered Exhaust System Dampers Automatic Isolation Damper 6.5 Ill HD-27502 A&B Unfiltered Exhaust System Automatic Isolation Damper 6.0 N/A HD-17534A Zone 3 Airlock 1-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534B Zone 3 Airlock 1-611 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534D Zone 3 Airlock 1-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534E Zone 3 Airlock 1-805 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534F Zone 3 Airlock 1-617 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-17534H Zone 3 Airlock 1-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534A Zone 3 Airlock 11-606 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534D Zone 3 Airlock 11-803 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534E Zone 3 Airlock 11-805 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534G Zone 3 Airlock C-806 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-27534H Zone 3 Airlock 11-618 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A N/A HD-275341 Zone 3 Airlock 11-609 Automatic Isolation Damper N/A SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-98 Revision 2
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 1 of 4)
Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position / Notes X-29-2-44 SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 1 X-29-2-45 SDHR System to Fuel Pool Cooling Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 1 110176 SDHR Supply Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve I Note 1 110186 SDHR Discharge Drain VIv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110180 SDHR Supply Vent Vlv 29/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110181 SDHR Discharge Fill Vlv 27/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110182 SDH R Discharge Vent VIv 27/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 110187 SDHR Supply Fill Vlv 29/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210186 SDHR Supply Drain Vlv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210187 SDHR Supply Vent Vlv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210191 SDHR Discharge Vent Vlv 30/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve I Note 1 210192 SDHR Discharge Drain VIv 30/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 210193 SDH R Discharge Vent VIv 33/749 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 1 X-29-2-46 Temporary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-2-47 Temporary Chiller to RBCW Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-95 Temporary Chiller to Unit I RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanged I Note 2 X-29-5-96 Temporary Chiller to Unit 1 RBCW 29/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-91 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 X-29-5-92 Temporary Chiller to Unit 2 RBCW 33/749 Blind Flanged / Note 2 187388 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Iso Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187389 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Iso Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187390 RBCW Temp Chiller Supply Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 2 187391 RBCW Temp Chiller Discharge Drain Vlv 29/670 Closed Manual iso Valve / Note 2 X-28-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay Yard/670 Capped / Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell Yard/670 Blind Flanged / Note 4 X-28-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 East Stairwell 28/670 Blind Flanged / Note 3 X-29-2-48 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RR Bay 29/670 Capped / Note 5 X-33-2-3000 Utility Penetration to Unit 2 East Stairwell 33/670 Blind Flanged / Note 4 X-29-3-54 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanged / Note 6 X-29-3-55 Utility Penetration to Unit 1 RBCCW Hx Area 27/683 Blind Flanged / Note 6 X-29-5-97 Utility Penetration from Unit 1 RR Bay to Unit 2 Elev. 33/749 Capped X-29-5-97________749 X-27-6-42 Diamond Plate Cover over Floor Penetration 271779' Installed X-27-6-92 Instrument Tubing Stubs 27/779' Capped X-29-7-4 1" Spare Conduit Threaded Plug 29/818' Installed X-30-6-72 Instrument Tubing Stubs 30/779' Capped X-30-6-1002 Stairwell #214 Rupture Disc 30/779' Installed Intact X-30-6-1003 Airlock 11-609 Rupture Disc 30/-79' Installed Intact X-25-6-1 008 Airlock 1-606 Rupture Disc 25/779' Installed Intact X-29-4-Dl -B Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1-A Penetration at Door 4330 29/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1 -B Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flange Installed X-29-4-D1 -A Penetration at Door 404 33/719' Blind Flange Installed SUSQUEHANNA- UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99 Revision 7
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 2 of 4)
Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position / Notes HD17534C Airlock 1-707 Blind Flange 28/799' Blind Flange Installed HD27534C Airlock 11-707 Blind Flange 33/799' Blind Flange Installed XD-1 7513 Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone IIIHVAC 29/799' Position is dependent on Railroad Supply Bay alignment XD-1 7514 Isolation damper for Railroad Bay Zone IIIHVAC 29/719' Position is dependent on Railroad Exhaust Bay alignment XD-1 2301 PASS Air Flow Damper 11/729' Closed Damper XD-22301 PASS Air Flow Damper 22/729' Closed Damper 161827 HPCI Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 25/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 161828 RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 281645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 161829 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 29/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 161830 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 28/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 3 261820 RCIC Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 33/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 4 261821 'A' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 34/645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 4 261822 'B' RHR Blowout Steam Vent Drain Valve 331645' Closed Manual Iso Valve / Note 4 2LRWI810L Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI810M Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged I Note 7 2LRWI81ON Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI810R Zone Ill Floor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI810S Zone IIIFloor Drain 34-818 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI703A Zone II Floor Drain 34-799 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI615A Zone II Floor Drain 34-779 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100A Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100B Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100C Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100D Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100E Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100F Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 2LRWI100G Zone II Floor Drain 34-670 Plugged / Note 7 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99a Revision 6
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 3 of 4)
Device Number Device Description Area/Elev. Required Position / Notes 1LRWI81 OU Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI1810V Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI181OW Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged I Note 7 1LRWI81 OX Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OY Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OZ Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OFF Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OGG Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI810HH Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OJJ Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI81OKK Zone IIIFloor Drain 29-818 Plugged / Note 7 1LRW1615A Zone I, Zone III,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-779 Plugged ! Note 7 1LRWI100A Zone I, Zone II, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged I Note 7 1LRWI100B Zone I, Zone 11,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWII00C Zone I, Zone I1, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI1OOD Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI100E Zone I, Zone Ill, or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI10OF Zone I, Zone III,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 1LRWI100G Zone I, Zone III,or No Zone Floor Drain 29-670 Plugged / Note 7 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99b Revision 4
PPL Rev. 9 SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 Table B 3.6.4.2-2 Secondary Containment Ventilation System Passive Isolation Valves or Devices (Page 4 of 4)
Note 1: The two blind flanges on the SDHR penetrations (blind flanges for device number X-29-2-44 and X-29-2-45) and all the closed manual valves for the SDHR system (110176,110186,110180,110181,110182,110187, 210186, 210187, 210191, 210192, 210193) can each be considered as a separate secondary containment isolation device for the SDHR penetrations. If one or both of the blind flanges is removed and all the above identified manual valves for the SDHR system are closed, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. With the blind flange removed, the manual valves could be opened intermittently under administrative controls per the Technical Specification Note. When both SDHR blind flanges are installed, opening of the manual valves for the SDHR system will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. When the manual valves for the SDHR system are open in this condition, the appropriate LCO should be entered for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. When the SDHR system piping is connected and full of water, the piping forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system since the piping forms the barrier.
Note 2: Due to the multiple alignments of the RBCW temporary chiller, different devices will perform the SCiV function depending on the RBCW configuration. There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-47. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller supply penetration is isolation valve 187389. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller supply penetration is closed drain valve 187390 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-92 and/or X-29-5-96. Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187390 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-96 and X-29-5-92 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment.
There are three devices/equipment that can perform the SCIV function for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration. The first SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is the installed blind flange on penetration X-29-2-46. The second SCIV for the RBCW temporary chiller return penetration is isolation valve 187388. The third SCIV for the temporary RBCW chiller return penetration is closed drain valve 187391 and an installed blind flange on penetrations X-29-5-91 and/or X-29-5-95. Since there are effectively three SCIVs, any two can be used to define the SCIV for the penetration. Removal of one of the two required SCIVs requires entry into the appropriate LCO for one inoperable SCIV in a penetration flow path with two SCIVs. Opening of drain valve 187391 and operation of blank flanges X-29-5-91 and X-29-5-95 will be controlled to prevent cross connecting ventilation zones. These three SCIVs prevent air inleakage into secondary containment. The isolation of the penetration per the Technical Specification requirement is to assure that one of the above SCIVs is closed so that there is no air inleakage into secondary containment.
When the RBCW temporary chiller piping is connected and full of water, the piping inside secondary containment forms the secondary containment boundary and the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required for this system.
Note 3: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.
Note 4: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone IIto a No-Zone. When Secondary Containment Zone II is isolated from the recirculation plenum, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.
Note 5: These penetrations connect the Railroad Bay to a No-Zone. When the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone, the above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are no longer required.
Note 6: These penetrations connect Secondary Containment Zone I to the Railroad Bay. The above listed SCIVs in Table B3.6.4.2-2 are not required if the Railroad Bay is a No-Zone and Zone I is isolated from the recirculation plenum OR ifthe Railroad Bay is aligned to Zone I.
Note 7: Due to drain header containing multiple floor drains in different ventilation zones, drain plugs were installed in all of the drain header floor drains. To provide the passive Secondary Containment boundary, only drain plugs in one ventilation zone are required to be installed.
SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 2 TS / B 3.6-99c Revision 0