ML16262A037

2016-07 Final Operating Test

ML16262A037
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	07/18/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML16262A037 (291)

Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: July 2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all Conduct of Operations modes of plant operation. (4.3)

(RA1) D,R JPM: Calculate BOL Boration for Long Term Use.

(RO1307D) 2.1.43 Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant temperature, secondary Conduct of Operations plant, fuel depletion etc. (4.1)

(RA2) M,R JPM: Determine Reactivity Effects When Starting Positive Displacement Charging Pump. (RO1310E) 2.2.1 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures including operating those controls Equipment Control associated with plant equipment that could (RA3) D,R affect reactivity. (4.5)

JPM: Perform a 1/M Plot and Predict Critical Conditions. (RO1003A) 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal Radiation Control conditions. (3.5)

(RA4) D,R JPM: Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearance. (RWT056B)

Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

Rev. 1

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

RA1 The applicant will calculate BOL Boration for long term use per SOP-104A, Reactor Makeup and Chemical Control System, Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use. Critical steps include determining Reactor Coolant System corrected boron, gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to offset boron, and potentiometer settings for the Chemical and Volume Control System. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.1.23 - IR 4.3)

RA2 The applicant is presented with information pertaining to the boron concentration in the suction piping to the Positive Displacement Charging Pump and the Reactor Coolant System. The applicant will use SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System to determine the reactivity effects of the planned evolution. The critical steps will be to calculate the change in RCS boron concentration and RCS temperature. The JPM is modified from a previous version by changing the RCS boron concentration and the concentration in the PDP suction line. The prior version was a resulting boration. The modified version is a resulting dilution. This is a modified JPM. (K/A 2.1.43 - IR 4.1)

RA3 The applicant will perform a 1/M plot for a Reactor Startup per IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation The critical steps include the critical steps include calculating and plotting 1/M, predicting critical conditions, and identifying action for criticality above the power dependent insertion limit. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.2.1 - IR 4.5)

RA4 The applicant will determine the radiological requirements for implementing a Clearance in a Radiological Controlled Area per STA-656, Radiation Work Control, RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, and RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits. Critical tasks include identifying Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level, and highest dose rate. This is a direct from bank JPM.

(K/A 2.2.37 - IR 3.5)

Rev. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA1 Task # RO1307 K/A # 2.1.23 4.3 / 4.4

Title:

Calculate BOL Boration for Long Term Use Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 startup is in progress following a refueling outage

• Reactor Coolant System boron concentration is 1600 ppm

• Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 7249 ppm

• Boron-10 Weight Fraction is 0.173367 Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• CALCULATE Beginning-Of-Life Boration values per SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use

• RECORD information on Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use page 1 Task Standard: Utilizing SOP-104A, Attachment 2 calculated Reactor Coolant System Corrected Boron, Gallons of Reactor Makeup Water To Offset Boron in Blender Pipe During Normal Volume Control Tank Makeup, Boron Gallons for a Manual Blend, Boric Acid Pot Setting for a Manual Blend, Boric Acid Pot Setting for AUTO Makeup, Gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to Offset Boron in Blender Pipe When Returning Makeup System to Automatic. (SEE KEY)

Ref. Materials: SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, Rev. 15-2.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System

• Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use Page 1 (labeled Procedure 1)

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-104A, Attachment 2 page 1 Examiner Note: Refer to answer key for calculated values Perform Step: 1 RECORD Reference Data as follows:

1.0

• RCS Boron __________

• BAT Boron __________

• B10 WT Fraction __________

Performance ENTERED data on Attachment 2 at Step 1.0 Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

2.A

• RCS Corrected Boron:

Performance CALCULATED 1512 to 1513. [allowable error based on rounding after Standard: first calculation and then performing second calculation]

Comment: SAT UNSAT CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 3 CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

2.B

• Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe during normal VCT makeup:

Performance CALCULATED 132 to 133 gallons. [allowable error based on rounding Standard: carried from Step 2 and those performed in this step]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

2.C

• Boron gallons for a Manual Blend:

Performance CALCULATED 10 to 11 gallons. [allowable error based on rounding]

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

2.D

• Boric Acid Pot Setting for a Manual Blend:

Performance CALCULATED 4.69 +/- 0.1. [allowable error based on rounding and Standard: accuracy of Pot settings]

Comment: SAT UNSAT CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

2.E

• Boric Acid Pot Setting for AUTO Makeup:

Performance CALCULATED 6.62 +/- 0.1. [allowable error based on rounding and Standard: accuracy of Pot settings]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

2.F

• Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe when returning Makeup System to Automatic:

Performance CALCULATED 86 to 87 gallons. [allowable error based on rounding Standard: carried from Step 2 and those performed in this step]

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 startup is in progress following a refueling outage

• Reactor Coolant System boron concentration is 1600 ppm

• Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 7249 ppm

• Boron-10 Weight Fraction is 0.173367 Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• CALCULATE Beginning-Of-Life Boration values per SOP-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use

• RECORD information on Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use page 1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D) Rev. 0

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 ANSWER KEY Rev. 1 CPNPP PROCEDURE NO.

UNIT 1 SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL SOP-104A REACTOR MAKE-UP AND CHEMICAL REVISION NO. 15 PAGE 75 OF 82 l CONTROL SYSTEM CONTINUOUS USE ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 7 BOL BORATION FOR LONG TERM USE This attachment describes the steps to periodically add boron to the RCS at BOL while keeping the system aligned in the BORATE mode. Instructions are provided to address refilling the VCT due to normal losses as well as if an RCS leak were to occur.

NOTE: This attachment assumes prior automatic operation. Therefore, B-10 Corrected RCS Boron Concentration must be < 1600 ppm to use this attachment.

1.0 RECORD Reference Data as follows:

Q ! RCS Boron 1600  ! BAT Boron 7249  ! B10 Wt Fraction 0.173367 2.0 CALCULATE volumes and pot settings as follows:

A. RCS Corrected Boron:

1600 RCS PPM X 0.173367 B-10 Wt Fraction = 1512 to 1513 RCS (c) PPM BORON 0.1834 Corrected B. Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe for Normal VCT Makeup:

7249 132 to 133 BAT PPM X 35 GAL - 35 GAL = 1-FY-111B, RMUW Gallons to 1512.5 RCS(c) BORON BORON Offset Boron in Blender Pipe C. Boron gallons for a Manual Blend:

1512.5 10 to 11 50 Total Gallons X RCS(c) = 1-FY-110B, Boron Gallons for 7249 BAT PPM Manual Blend D. Boric Acid Pot Setting for a Manual Blend:

1512.5 4.69 +/- 0.1 90 Total Flowrate X RCS(c) = 1-FK-110, BA Pot Setting for 4 7249 BAT PPM Manual Blend E. Boric Acid Pot Setting for AUTO Makeup:

1512.5 6.62 +/- 0.1 127 Total Flowrate X RCS(c) = 1-FK-110, BA Pot Setting for 4 7249 BAT PPM Auto Makeup F. Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe when returning Makeup System to Automatic:

7249 86 -87 BAT PPM X 22.8 GAL - 22.8 GAL = 1-FY-111B, RMUW Gallons to 1512.5 RCS(c) BORON BORON Offset Boron in Blender Pipe when returning to Automatic CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 ANSWER KEY Rev. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA2 Task # RO1310 K/A # 2.1.43 4.1 / 4.3

Title:

Determine Reactivity Effects When Starting Positive Displacement Charging Pump Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is 100% power

• The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System

• The last time the Positive Displacement Charging Pump was run the Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration was 25 ppm

• Current Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration is 1222 ppm Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C

• REPORT findings to the Unit Supervisor Task Standard: Utilizing SOP-103A, calculated the change in boron concentration and resultant change in temperature when placing the Positive Displacement Pump in service.

Ref. Materials: SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Rev. 18-15.

Reactivity Briefing Sheet for 1222 ppm Reactor Coolant System conditions.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Step 5.3.1.C. (labeled Procedure 1)

• 90.4 EFPD Reactivity Briefing Sheet. (labeled Handout 1 Rev. 0)

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-103A, Step 5.3.1.

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE the change in RCS Boron concentration which will occur 5.3.1.C.1) + due to the PDP run:

calculation

• B = Change in RCS Boron Concentration due to PDP run Performance CALCULATED B = Change in RCS Boron Concentration:

Standard: B = ( 25 ppm PDP - 1222 ppm RCS) x 0.00128 = -1.53 to -1.54 ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 IF in MODE 1 or 2 THEN PERFOM the following:

5.3.1.C.2).a) + DETERMINE the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity by the calculation performing the following calculation:

B = -1.53 ppm From the Reactivity Briefing Sheet, obtain the following information:

ITC _____ pcm/ºF HFP Differential Boron Worth _____ pcm/ppm Performance DETERMINED the following from the Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

Standard: ITC = - 10.9 pcm/ºF HFP Differential Boron Worth = - 7.0 pcm/ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Calculate:

5.3.1.C.2).a) + ITC / HFP Differential Boron Worth = ppm / ºF calculation Performance CALCULATED change in ppm /ºF:

Standard: - 10.9 pcm/ ºF / - 7.0 pcm/ppm = 1.5 to 1.6 ppm/ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Rounding off of TAVE may occur.

Perform Step: 4 Calculate:

5.3.1.C.2).a) + TAVE = (-1) B ppm / ppm / ºF calculation Performance CALCULATED change in TAVE as follows:

Standard: TAVE = (-1) B ppm / ppm / ºF = (-1)(-1.53 ppm) / 1.56 ppm/ºF = 0.9 to 1.1 ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 IF TAVE calculated above is > 0.5 ºF, THEN NOTIFY the Unit 5.3.1.C.2).b) Supervisor and discuss contingency actions.

Performance DETERMINED TAVE calculated is greater than 0.5 ºF and NOTIFIED Standard: Unit Supervisor.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is 100% power

• The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System

• The last time the Positive Displacement Charging Pump was run the Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration was 25 ppm

• Current Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration is 1222 ppm Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C

• REPORT findings to the Unit Supervisor Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E) REV. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 Answer Key Rev. 1 25 1222

-1.53 to -1.54

-1.53 +/- .01

-10.9 -7.0

-10.9 1.5 to 1.6

-7.0

-1.53 0.9 to 1.1 1.56

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 HANDOUT 1 REV. 0 Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Stable Operation BOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY Valid for approximately 7 days.

Calculations based on core design values, and assume:

Burnup = 4000.0 MWD/MTU Burnup in the BOL range 90.4 EFPD Power = 100 RTP Boron = 1222 ppm NOTE: Re-create the Briefing Sheet B10 Conc = 0.183400 w/o if current values significantly differ Control Bank D = 215 steps from assumed inputs.

Reactivity affects of Control Bank D HFP Diff Worth @ 215.0 steps = -0.9 pcm / step HFP Integral Rod Worth for CBD Step Positions:

Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm 225 0.0 218 -3.1 211 -9.6 200 -27.1 224 0.0 217 -3.8 210 -10.8 195 -37.4 223 -0.8 216 -4.5 209 -12.2 190 -48.9 222 -1.1 215 -5.4 208 -13.6 185 -61.4 221 -1.4 214 -6.3 207 -15.1 180 -74.7 220 -1.9 213 -7.3 206 -16.6 175 -88.6 219 -2.4 212 -8.4 205 -18.2 170 -103.1 Reactivity affects of Boron HFP Diff Boron Worth @ 1222 ppm = -7.0 pcm / ppm 1-FK-110 Pot Setting for Blended Flow @ 1222 ppm = 5.21 (Assuming BAT concentration of 7447.0 ppm)

Reactivity affects of Power Power Coefficient of Reactivity = -11.8 pcm / % RTP Dilution to equal 1% Power Increase = 95.2 gallons RMUW Boration to equal 1% Power Decrease = 18.0 gallons boric acid Reactivity affects of RCS Temperature Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity (ITC) = -10.9 pcm / F Boration to equal 1F Temperature Decrease = 16.6 gallons boric acid Dilution to equal 1F Temperature Increase = 87.8 gallons RMUW Load Reduction equal to 1F Tave Increase = 11.0 MWe

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA3 Task # RO1003 K/A # 2.2.1 4.5 / 4.4

Title:

Perform a 1/M Plot and Predict Critical Conditions Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is performing a Reactor Startup per IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby

• Boron is at the Estimated Critical Boron Concentration of 1220 ppm

• Shutdown Control Rod Banks are fully withdrawn

• Critical Rod Height is predicted to be CBD at 78 steps

• The Full Out Position (FOP) is 225 steps

• Control Rods have been withdrawn four times in increments of 50 steps

• The Unit Supervisor wants to re-perform the Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation and re-plot the points on a 1/M Data Sheet to re-verify Predicted Critical Rod Height Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• PERFORM the Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR) Calculation per for each of the four rod withdrawal readings shown on IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.3.E and 3.3.F

• PLOT the points on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Step 3.3.G

• DETERMINE the ECC (Predicted Critical Rod Height) for each of the four rod withdrawals and record on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.4 and 3.5

• RECORD any required action(s) based on 1/M Data obtained below:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Task Standard: Utilizing IPO-002B, calculated Inverse Count Rate Ratios, performed a 1/M Plot using data provided on Attachment 2, determined estimated critical rod position for each the four rod withdrawals, determined criticality predicted below Rod Insertion Limit and recorded insert all Control Banks to the CBO position.

Ref. Materials: IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Rev. 10-37.

ERX-15-001, COLR for CPNPP Unit 2 Cycle 16, Figure 2, Rod Bank Insertion Limits Versus Thermal Power, Rev. 0.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby (labeled Procedure 1)

• COMPLETE Attachment 2 through four sets of data

• IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby Step 5.2.10 (labeled Procedure 2)

• COLR for CPNPP Unit 2 Cycle 16 Figure 2 Rod Bank Insertion Limits Versus Thermal Power (labeled Handout 1)

Required Materials:

Straight edge or ruler

• Calculator Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from IPO-002B, Attachment 2.

Perform Step: 1 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank A at 50 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank A at 50 steps, Standard: PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet, and RECORDED Data:

• RECORD an average Count Rate of 55.

• CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/55 = 0.91 +/- 0.01.

• RECORD ICRR = 0.91 +/- 0.01.

• PLOT points for CBA @ 0 steps and CBA @ 50 steps.

• DRAW a line from 1.00 to 0.91 that INTERSECTS with CBD at 190 +/- 100 steps.

• LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CBD at 155 and 225 steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank A at 100 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank A at 100 Standard: steps, PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet, and RECORDED Data:

• RECORD an average Count Rate of 65.

• CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/65 = 0.77 +/- 0.01.

• RECORD ICRR = 0.77 +/- 0.01.

• PLOT points for CBA @ 50 steps and CBA @ 100 steps.

• DRAW a line from 0.91 to 0.77 that INTERSECTS with CBD at 10 +/- 50 steps.

• LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CBC at 100 and CBD at 35 steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 3 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank B at 35 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank B at 35 steps, Standard: PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet, and RECORDED Data:

• RECORD an average Count Rate of 88.

• CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/88 = 0.57 +/- 0.01.

• RECORD ICRR = 0.57 +/- 0.01.

• PLOT points for CBA @ 100 steps and CBB @ 35 steps.

• DRAW a line from 0.77 to 0.57 that INTERSECTS with CBC at 55 +/- 30 steps.

• LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CBC at 40 and 90 steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank B at 85 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank B at 85 steps, Standard: PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet, and RECORDED Data:

• RECORD an average Count Rate of 333.

• CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/333 = 0.15 +/- 0.01.

• RECORD ICRR = 0.15 +/- 0.01.

• PLOT points for CBB @ 35 steps and CBB @ 85 steps.

• DRAW a line from 0.57 to 0.15 that INTERSECTS with CBB at 95 +/- 25 steps.

• LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CBB at 80 and 110 steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: The following Performance Standard is from IPO-002B, Step 5.2.10, 4th bullet.

Perform Step: 5 RECORD any required action based on 1/M Data obtained on Attachment 2, Page 3 of 4 and/or the JPM Cue Sheet.

Performance DETERMINED Estimated Critical Condition occurs below the Rod Standard: Insertion Limit (CBC @ 49 steps) within the next reactivity addition and RECORDED the following on the JPM Cue Sheet:

• INSERT all Control Bank Rods to the CBO position (critical).

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is performing a Reactor Startup per IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby

• Boron is at the Estimated Critical Boron Concentration of 1220 ppm

• Shutdown Control Rod Banks are fully withdrawn

• Critical Rod Height is predicted to be CBD at 78 steps

• The Full Out Position (FOP) is 225 steps

• Control Rods have been withdrawn four times in increments of 50 steps

• The Unit Supervisor wants to re-perform the Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation and re-plot the points on a 1/M Data Sheet to re-verify Predicted Critical Rod Height Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• PERFORM the Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR) Calculation per for each of the four rod withdrawal readings shown on IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.3.E and 3.3.F

• PLOT the points on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Step 3.3.G

• DETERMINE the ECC (Predicted Critical Rod Height) for each of the four rod withdrawals and record on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.4 and 3.5

• RECORD any required action(s) based on 1/M Data obtained below:

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1

CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 2 IPO-002B PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 64 OF 83 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION NOTE: This calculation is not required when Core Performance Engineering is performing ICRR calculations per NUC-111.

1.0 PREREQUISITES

! The scalar timer is available for use in the manual mode per SOP-703.

OR

! IF the scalar timer is out-of-service, THEN Nuclear Instrument indication shall be used.

2.0 LIMITATIONS 2.1 Rod withdrawal increments should be performed at approximately 50 steps. The Shift Manager may authorize withdrawal of rods at any other increment less than 50 steps as the Reactor approaches criticality.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS 3.1 The following steps describe the method for determining the baseline reference count values.

NOTE: When count rate is greater than 50 counts/sec, a 10 second counting interval should be used. If count rate is less than or equal to 50 counts/sec, then a 30 second counting interval should be used.

Once initiated, the same counting interval should be used throughout the ICRR.

A. Obtain ten separate reference counts for each Source Range channel and record values on the ICRR worksheet.

B For each Source Range channel, compute the average count from the 10 reference counts on the ICRR worksheet.

3.2 Mark the graph for the rod heights at + / - 500 pcm (if using OPT-308-1) or for the Expected Criticality Range (if using OPT-308-2).

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 Answer Key Rev. 2

CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 2 IPO-002B PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 65 OF 83 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 2 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION 3.3 The following steps describe the method used in determining the Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR).

A. After obtaining the Shift Manager's permission, withdraw the Control Rods a maximum of 50 steps.

The Shift Manager may authorize withdrawals of less than 50 steps.

B. Monitor Source Range indication on recorder 2-NR-0045 to determine when the Source Range channels have stabilized.

C. Obtain three separate integral count measurements for each Source Range channel using the counting interval determined in Step 3.1.

D. Ensure audible Source Range counts is returned to service after completion of counting measurements.

E. Calculate the average of these counts for each Source Range channel on the ICRR worksheet.

F. Perform the following calculation and record the result on the ICRR worksheet.

ICRR = Source Range Channel Reference Counts Source Range Channel Average Counts G. Plot the ICRR values at the appropriate rod position on graph paper similar to the one attached.

3.4 Perform a linear extrapolation of the ICRR plot, using the last two data points, to the point at which the extrapolation intersects the horizontal axis. This point defines the rod position at which criticality is estimated.

3.5 List rod position estimation on the ICRR worksheet.

3.6 Continue to perform Steps 3.3 thru 3.5 until either of the following occurs:

A. The Reactor is critical OR B. The Shift Manager terminates ICRR data collection.

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 Answer Key Rev. 2

CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 2 IPO-002B PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 66 OF 83 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 3 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO Estimated Critical Condition:

Bank CBD at 78 steps Boron Concentration 1220 ppm Completed by Date Time REFERENCE COUNTS N-31 N-32 50 49 49 50 BANK CBA AT 50 STEPS BANK CBA AT 100 STEPS 49 51 N-31 N-32 N-31 N-32 55 55 65 64 51 49 50 56 54 65 67 49 51 51 54 56 65 64 48 52 55 55 65 65 50 50 0.91 AVE 0.91 AVE AVE AVE 0.77 0.77 51 49 ICRR ICRR ICRR ICRR 51 50 ECC ECC ECC ECC 50 50 BANK CBD BANK CBD BANK CBD BANK CBD AVE AVE STEP 190 STEP 190 STEP 10 STEP 10 CBD 155 to 225 CBC 100 to CBD 35 BANK CBB AT 35 STEPS BANK CBB AT 85 STEPS BANK AT STEPS N-31 N-32 N-31 N-32 N-31 N-32 87 89 335 333 88 88 333 329 89 87 331 337 88 88 333 333 AVE AVE AVE AVE AVE AVE 0.57 0.57 0.15 0.15 ICRR ICRR ICRR ICRR ICRR ICRR ECC ECC ECC ECC ECC ECC BANK CBC BANK CBC BANK CBB BANK CBB BANK BANK STEP 55 STEP 55 STEP 95 STEP 95 STEP STEP CBC 40 to 90 CBB 80 to 110 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 Answer Key Rev. 2

CPSES PROCEDURE NO.

INTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL UNIT 2 IPO-002B PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY REVISION NO. 10 PAGE 67 OF 83 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 4 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION 1/MDATASHEET 1.0

.9

.8

.7

.6 ICRR .5

.4

.3

.2

.1 0

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 0 50 100 20 70 GP'A' GP'C' 35 85 05 55 105 155 205 GP'B' GP'D' 0 100 200 300 400 500 565 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 Answer Key Rev. 2

COLR for CPNPP Unit 2 Cycle 16 FIGURE 2 ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER 240 220 (25.3,218) (79.6,218) 200 BANK B ROD BANK POSITION (steps withdrawn) 180 160 (0,164)

(100,146) 140 BANK C 120 100 80 BANK D 60 (0,49) 40 20 (31,0) 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER NOTES: 1. Fully withdrawn shall be the condition where control rods are at a position within the interval of 218 and 231 steps withdrawn, inclusive.

2. Control Bank A shall be fully withdrawn.

11 ERX-15-001, Rev. 0 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 Handout 1 Rev. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA4 Task # RWT056B K/A # 2.3.7 3.5 / 3.6

Title:

Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearance Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service

• Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL

• The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

• DETERMINE the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area

• IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room

• IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Task Standard: Utilizing the General Access Permit, Survey Map, and Valve Locator Guide, determined the Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level and highest area dose rate where tagging is to be performed.

Ref. Materials: RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, Rev. 57-1.

RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits, Rev. 35.

Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810' Room 77A.

Survey Map for U-1 SG 810 Pipe Penetration Area Train B Room 1-077A. 4/4/16 CPNPP General Area Permit 20160011, Routine Maintenance, Rev. 02.

Validation Time: 20 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• Survey Map for U-1 SG 810 Pipe Pen Area Train B Room 1-077A (labeled Handout 1)

• CPNPP General Area Permit 20160011, Tours and inspections for all groups Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP. For entry into elevated dose rates (labeled Handout 2)

• Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810 Room 77A (labeled Handout 3)

MAKE the following references available in the classroom:

• RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting (labeled Procedure 1)

• RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits (labeled Procedure 2)

Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet.

Perform Step: 1 Determine location of 1-7168 and 1-7167 with respect to Survey Map.

Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• LOCATED 1-7168 and 1-7167 using Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810' Room 77N (77A).

• COMPARED the location to the Survey Map.

• DETERMINED 1-7168 and 1-7167 are located inside a Radiation Area and the area is contaminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room.

Performance DETERMINED the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room per Standard: the General Access Permit:

• TLD.

• Alarming Dosimeter.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area.

Performance DETERMINED the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter Standard: the valve area per the General Access Permit:

• Deluxe coveralls

• Booties

• Hood and hard hat cover

• Cotton liners

• Rubber gloves

• Rubber Overshoes Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Identify the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room.

Performance IDENTIFIED the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the Standard: room is < 1000 dpm/100 cm2.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 5 Identify the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room.

Performance IDENTIFIED the highest area dose rate at 8 mR/hr.

Standard:

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

• A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service

• Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL

• The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

• DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area

• IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room

• IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room:

Minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area:

Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room:

Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room:

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room:

TLD, Alarming Dosimeter Minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area:

Single PCs which include:

Deluxe coveralls, Booties, Hood, Hard Hat Cover, Cotton liners, Rubber gloves & Rubber Overshoes Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room:

< 1000 dpm/cm2 Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room:

8 mr/hr CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 Answer Key Rev. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant NPF087, NPF089 GAP GENERAL ACCESS PERMIT GAP GAP

Title:

Tours and Inspections for all groups. GAP #: 20160011 Rev. 02 Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP.

For entry into elevated dose rates.

REACTOR OPERATION + SURVEIL

• 20160011*

Expected Radiological Conditions: Expected general area radiation levels are <1mr\hr to 131 mr\hr not normally to exceed 160mr\hr.

Expected general area contamination levels are <1Kdpm\100cm2 to 20Kdpm\100cm2 not to exceed 200Kdpm\100cm2.

GAP Type: JOB ROUTINE GAP Status: Begin Date: Close On Date:

ACTIVE 2/29/2016 Prepared By: BARTON, JOHN D Job Supervisor: Bob Knapp Estimated Dose: 452.0 mrem Estimated Hours: 1,991.00 Alarm Settings Gamma Dose (mrem) 20.00 Gamma Rate (mrem/hr) 120.00 Neutron Dose (mrem) Neutron Rate (mrem/hr)

Locations Buildings Elevations Rooms Various RCA Locations ALL VARIOUS - VARIOUS RCA LOCATIONS Radiological Conditions Contact Radiation Protection for current radiological conditions prior to performing work on this GAP.

Tasks Task Description Status N/A 4/4/2016 8:00:09AM STA-656-4 R-6 Page 1 of 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPMUse Information RA4 Handout 2 Rev. 0

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant NPF087, NPF089 GAP GENERAL ACCESS PERMIT GAP GAP

Title:

Tours and Inspections for all groups. GAP #: 20160011 Rev. 02 Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP.

For entry into elevated dose rates.

Requirements Requirement Groups Requirement Descriptions CONTAMINATION CONTROL Contaminated components should be wiped down/deconned as necessary to prevent the spread of contamination.

Knee pads should be worn when kneeling in posted high contamination areas.

Radioactive spills and leaks should be addressed and per RP direction.

Frequent change out of outer/ disposable gloves should be performed.

Faceshield is a minimum requirement for system breach.

Use of a barrier material should be used in contamination areas when sitting, kneeling or laying.(ie. orex sheeting,visqueen,etc.)

COVERAGE RP to determine job coverage requirements.

DOSIMETRY TLD Alarming Dosimeter DOSIMETRY A SRPD (PIC) may be used in lieu of an Alarming Dosimeter for rapid response for Fire Brigade personnel.

Vibrating Electronic Dosimeter required in high noise areas.

EXPOSURE CONTROL Donning/Doffing of harnesses should be performed in a low dose area Utilize ALARA principles of time, distance and shielding Read your electronic alarming dosimeter (EPD) or PICs periodically when in Radiation Areas (e.g., once every 30 min) and frequently in High Radiation Areas (e.g., at 1/2 of the expected job entry time or every 15 min, whichever is shorter) and often enough to prevent an EPD Dose Alarm.

Each individual should know and utilize their low dose waiting areas Each individual should know how much dose they are expected to receive this entry into the RCA.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Additional Requirement: Operations personnel are required to wear Ultra PCs when handling hoses in contaminated areas.

Reach-in to a HCA (ex. sink) is allowed with minimum double gloves and labcoat.

Industrial Safety Protective Clothing may be worn in addition to RP Required Clothing.

Lab Coat and Rubber PC Gloves are the minimum required to handle or unpack potentially contaminated equipment or material RP Approval required to modify protective clothing Ultra Orex PCs, double gloves and double shoe covers are the minimum required to enter a posted high contamination area.

Latex Gloves can be SUBSTITUTED for Rubber Gloves with RP Approval.

Single PCs consisting of Deluxe coveralls, booties, hood, hard hat cover, cotton liners, rubber gloves and rubber overshoes are the minimum PC requirement to enter a contaminated area.

RESPIRATORY Respiratory Protection Not Required WORKER INSTRUCTIONS Contact RP PRIOR to removing any material from a posted contamination area.

Contact RP PROR to altering or removing any shielding material.

Contact RP PRIOR to accessing normally inaccessible areas (i.e. overhead areas >7 feet off floor or areas under grating).

Contact RP PRIOR to accessing the RCA for specific work activities.

An ALARA Briefing is required to enter a posted High Radiation Area (HRA).

Contact RP PRIOR to entering a posted High Radiation Area.

4/4/2016 8:00:09AM STA-656-4 R-6 Page 2 of 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPMUse Information RA4 Handout 2 Rev. 0

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant NPF087, NPF089 GAP GENERAL ACCESS PERMIT GAP GAP

Title:

Tours and Inspections for all groups. GAP #: 20160011 Rev. 02 Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP.

For entry into elevated dose rates.

Additional Requirements ADDITIONAL RADIATION WORKER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Operations personnel should notify RP PRIOR to venting or draining radioactive systems.

2. Notify RP PRIOR to transfer or movement of any radioactive material.

3. RP Approval is required prior to entering a HIGH CONTAMINATION AREA.

4, Notify RP prior to any system breach.

RADIATION WORKER STOP WORK LIMITS

1. Posted Locked High Radiation Areas & Very High Radiation Areas

2. Posted Airborne Radioactivity Areas (except Noble Gas areas)

3. Posted Discrete Radioactive Particle Control and associated Buffer Zones

4. Containment Buildings 5.] Posted Alpha Contamination Area.

6.] Failure of protective clothing.

7.] Any EPD dose alarm or unanticipated dose rate alarm.

8.] At the direction of Radiation Protection.

ADDITIONAL RP INSTRUCTIONS RP should discuss the following information with the RadWorker(s) prior to allowing them entry into the RCA:

1. Work location and current radiological conditions.

2. Determine if they are entering a HRA or HCA.

3. RWP data to include dosimeter set points.

4. Contamination levels in the work location.

5. Verify that they have a RCA Entry Card and that it is filled out properly.

RP STOP WORK LIMITS

1. Greater than 3 unplanned personnel contaminations (internal or external) on a single job during a shift.

2. Any level 3 personnel contamination.

3. Unintended exposure to a single worker of > 10mr above an ED set-point.

4. Failure or degradation of radiological engineering controls which impact the radiological safety of the worker.

5. Changes in conditions that elevate the risk level.

6. Airborne Radioactivity > 0.25 DAC. (excluding Noble Gas)

Hold Point- After system breach the Radworker(s) should be directed to a Low Dose Waiting Area while radiological conditions are being evaluated.

Approvals Approver Title Name Date MANAGER KNAPP, ROBERT C 04/04/2016 Attachments N/A 4/4/2016 8:00:09AM STA-656-4 R-6 Page 3 of 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPMUse Information RA4 Handout 2 Rev. 0

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 Handout 3 Rev. 1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 Handout 3 Rev. 1 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: July 2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high Conduct of Operations temperatures, high pressure, caustic, (SA1) N,R chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). (3.6)

JPM: Determine Electrical Safe Work Practices Requirements. (SO1028) 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines or limitations associated with reactivity Conduct of Operations management. (4.6)

(SA2) N,R JPM: Determine Reactivity Management Severity and Notifications. (SO1017B) 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling Equipment Control equipment configuration or status. (4.3)

(SA3) D,R JPM: Determine Fire Compensatory Measures for an Emergent Condition. (SO1048) 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (3.6) 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to Radiation Control D,R internal organizations or external agencies, (SA4) such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (4.1)

JPM: Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearance and Reporting Requirements. (SO1112B) 2.4.41 Knowledge of emergency action level Emergency thresholds and classifications. (4.6)

Procedures/Plan D,R (SA5) JPM: Classify an Emergency Plan Event.

(SO1136I)

Rev. 1

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

SA1 The applicant is presented with a task to determine as the Unit Supervisor, the Personnel Protective Equipment and Safety Boundaries for emergent work of racking the Rx trip breaker from disconnect to remove in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices. The critical steps will be to identify the Hazard/Risk Category, Clothing requirements and Boundaries. In addition, the applicant will be required to determine if their position has approval authority for the task. This is a new JPM. (K/A 2.1.26 - IR 3.6)

SA2 The applicant is presented with a plant transient event and response. As Unit Supervisor, the applicant is required to take necessary actions for a reactivity management event in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program. The critical steps will be to make a determination of the Severity Level and determine the written and verbal notifications. This is a new JPM.

(K/A 2.1.37 - IR 4.6)

SA3 The applicant will evaluate a Fire Protection Impairment per STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments. The critical steps are to determine Fire Watch Implementation and other Compensatory Measures. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.2.14 - IR 4.3)

SA4 The applicant will determine the radiological requirements for implementing a Clearance in a Radiological Controlled Area per STA-656, Radiation Work Control, RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits and STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting. Critical steps include identifying Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level, highest dose rate and determination of proper oral and written notifications due to an overexposure event. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.3.7 - IR 3.6 & K/A 2.4.30 - IR 4.1)

SA5 The applicant will determine the appropriate Emergency Plan Classification in accordance with EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation. The critical step will be the determination of the correct classification. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.4.41 - IR 4.6)

Rev. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA1 Task # SO1028 K/A # 2.1.26 3.6

Title:

Determine Electrical Safe Work Practices Requirements Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• TCX-ESPDTS-01TA, Unit 2 TRAIN A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER RTA is required to be racked from Disconnect to Remove in support of breaker removal.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices:

• Hazard Risk Category: ___________________________________

• Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of FRC: __________________________

• Flash Boundary: ________________________________________

• Prohibited Boundary: _____________________________________

• Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required:

YES NO

• Ear canal hearing protection required:

YES NO

• Insulated tools required:

YES NO Task Standard: Utilizing STA-124, determined the Hazard Risk Category, Minimum ATPV, Flash Boundary, Prohibited Boundary and face protection, ear canal and insulated tool requirements.

Ref. Materials: STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices, Rev. 2-12 Validation Time: 15 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices. (labeled Procedure 1)

Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE Hazard Risk Category.

Performance DETERMINED STA-124 Attachment 8.A, Hazard Risk Category - 2.

Standard: Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4th item, Task column number in parentheses is Hazard Risk Category.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 DETERMINE Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of FRC.

Performance DETERMINED STA-124 Attachment 8A, Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of Standard: FRC - 8 cal/cm2. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4th item, Clothing Minimum Requirements Column.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 DETERMINE Flash Boundary.

Performance DETERMINED STA-124 Attachment 8.A, Flash Boundary - 4 ft.

Standard: Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13, Boundaries Section at top of page.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 DETERMINE Prohibited Boundary.

Performance DETERMINED STA-124 Attachment 8.A, Prohibited Boundary - 1 in.

Standard: Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13, Boundaries Section at top of page.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 DETERMINE Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required.

Performance DETERMINED that an Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash Standard: suit hood required is Required. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4th item, Clothing Minimum Requirements Column. Circled YES.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 DETERMINE Ear canal hearing protection required.

Performance DETERMINED that Ear canal hearing protection is required. Attachment Standard: 8A Page 7 of 13 4th item, Task column Note 11, which is on Page 4 of

13. Circled YES Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 DETERMINE Insulated tools required.

Performance DETERMINED that Insulated tools are not required. Attachment 8A Page 7 Standard: of 13 4th item, Insulated Tools column. Circled NO Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• TCX-ESPDTS-01TA, Unit 2 TRAIN A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER RTA is required to be racked from Disconnect to Remove in support of breaker removal.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices:

1. Hazard Risk Category: ___________________________________

2. Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of FRC: _________________________

3. Flash Boundary: ________________________________________

4. Prohibited Boundary: ____________________________________

5. Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required:

YES NO

6. Ear canal hearing protection required:

YES NO

7. Insulated tools required:

YES NO Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 Answer Key Rev. 0 Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

TCX-ESPDTS-01TA, Unit 2 TRAIN A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER RTA is required to be racked from Disconnect to Remove in support of breaker removal.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices:

2

1. Hazard Risk Category: ___________________________________

8 cal/cm 2

2. Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of FRC: _________________________

4 ft.

3. Flash Boundary: ________________________________________

1 in.

4. Prohibited Boundary: ____________________________________

5. Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required:

YES NO

6. Ear canal hearing protection required:

YES NO

7. Insulated tools required:

YES NO Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 0 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 Answer Key Rev. 0

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA2 Task # SO1017 K/A # 2.1.26 3.6

Title:

Determine Reactivity Management Severity and Notifications Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• A trip of Heater Drain Pump 1-01 occurred

• Control Rods stabilized below the Rod Insertion Limit

• Boration was initiated in accordance with ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction and the 10000.0 MWD/MTU Reactivity Briefing Sheet

• The Reactor Operator made an error when performing the boration and set 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO to 17.5 gallons

• As a result of the error the Control Rods were not restored above the Rod Insertion Limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program:

1. Event Significance Level: ___________________________________

2. Required Notifications: _____________________________________

3. Is a PERC required:

YES NO

4. Is a QERC required:

YES NO Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Task Standard: Utilizing STA-102, determined that a Significance Level 2 event has occurred, that the Shift Operations Manager, Director, Operations and the Reactivity Management Champion are required to be notified, that a PERC is required and that a QERC is not required.

Ref. Materials: STA-102, Reactivity Management Program, Rev. 6-2 ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Rev. 14-19 Validation Time: 15 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• STA-102, Reactivity Management Program. (labeled Procedure 1)

• Reactivity Briefing Sheet for 10000.0 MWD/MTU. (labeled Handout 1)

Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE Event Significance Level.

Performance DETERMINED STA-102 Attachment 8.B, Significance Level - 2.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 DETERMINE Required Notifications.

Performance DETERMINED STA-102 Attachment 8.A, Required Notifications - Shift Standard: Operations Manager, Director, Operations and Reactivity Management Champion Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 DETERMINE PERC Required. PERC is a Plant Event Review Committee.

Performance DETERMINED STA-102 Attachment 8.A, PERC - Required Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 DETERMINE QERC Required. QERC is a Quick Event Review Checklist.

Performance DETERMINED STA-102 Attachment 8.A, QERC - NOT Required Standard:

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• A trip of Heater Drain Pump 1-01 occurred

• Control Rods stabilized below the Rod Insertion Limit

• Boration was initiated in accordance with ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction and the 10000.0 MWD/MTU Reactivity Briefing Sheet

• The Reactor Operator made an error when performing the boration and set 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO to 17.5 gallons

• As a result of the error the Control Rods were not restored above the Rod Insertion Limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program:

1. Event Significance Level: ___________________________________

2. Required Notifications: _____________________________________

3. Is a PERC required:

YES NO

4. Is a QERC required:

YES NO Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Answer Key Rev. 0 Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

A trip of Heater Drain Pump 1-01 occurred Control Rods stabilized below the Rod Insertion Limit Boration was initiated in accordance with ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction and the 10000.0 MWD/MTU Reactivity Briefing Sheet The Reactor Operator made an error when performing the boration and set 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO to 17.5 gallons As a result of the error the Control Rods were not restored above the Rod Insertion Limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program:

2

1. Event Significance Level: ___________________________________

2. Required Notifications: _____________________________________

Shift Operations Manager Director, Operations Reactivity Management Champion

3. Is a PERC required:

YES NO

4. Is a QERC required:

YES NO Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 0 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Answer Key Rev. 0

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Stable Operation MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY Valid for approximately 7 days.

Calculations based on core design values, and assume:

Burnup = 10000.0 MWD/MTU Burnup in the MOL range 225.9 EFPD Power = 100 RTP Boron = 924 ppm NOTE: Re-create the Briefing Sheet B10 Conc = 0.183400 w/o if current values significantly differ Control Bank D = 215 steps from assumed inputs.

Reactivity affects of Control Bank D HFP Diff Worth @ 215.0 steps = -1.4 pcm / step HFP Integral Rod Worth for CBD Step Positions:

Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm Steps pcm 225 0.0 218 -4.9 211 -15.4 200 -42.8 224 0.0 217 -6.1 210 -17.4 195 -58.2 223 -1.2 216 -7.3 209 -19.5 190 -74.6 222 -1.7 215 -8.7 208 -21.8 185 -91.4 221 -2.3 214 -10.2 207 -24.1 180 -108.4 220 -3.1 213 -11.8 206 -26.6 175 -125.3 219 -3.9 212 -13.6 205 -29.1 170 -142.0 Reactivity affects of Boron HFP Diff Boron Worth @ 924 ppm = -7.4 pcm / ppm 1-FK-110 Pot Setting for Blended Flow @ 924 ppm = 3.94 (Assuming BAT concentration of 7447.0 ppm)

Reactivity affects of Power Power Coefficient of Reactivity = -15.1 pcm / % RTP Dilution to equal 1% Power Increase = 152.3 gallons RMUW Boration to equal 1% Power Decrease = 20.7 gallons boric acid Reactivity affects of RCS Temperature Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity (ITC) = -19.3 pcm / F Boration to equal 1F Temperature Decrease = 26.5 gallons boric acid Dilution to equal 1F Temperature Increase = 194.5 gallons RMUW Load Reduction equal to 1F Tave Increase = 15.0 MWe

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Load Reduction Calculation Worksheet Note: Do not perform these calculations following a Runback. For a Runback, borate per the Reactivity Briefing Sheets as soon as possible.

This computer generated form may be substituted for Attachment 1 of NUC-117 Contact Core Performance (817-432-0134) if possible to discuss the plan.

Unit Date / Time:

A.1 Boration Volume gallons Indicate source (listed in order of preference)

BEACON by Core Performance (obtain if time permits)

Reactivity Briefing Sheets from the Boration Matrix CHORE output (under 'Tools' ->'Power Change Rx Calc IPO-003 ATT 3')

IPO-003A Attachment 3 Manual Calculation A.2 Current Turbine Load Setpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWe A.3 Final Turbine Load Setpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWe (200 MWE if plant shutdown planned)

A.4 Total Turbine Ramp Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minutes (Do not include calculation prep and Pre-Job Brief times)

Calculations:

B.1 Load Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWe

= A.2 - A.3 B.2 Load Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWe/min

= B.1 / A.4 B.3 Total Boration Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minutes Ideally, start time should be 5 minutes BEFORE load change is initiated.

If time does not allow, start time should be same as the load change start time.

Ideally, end time should be 15 minutes BEFORE load change is complete.

B.4 Boration Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gpm

= A.1 / B.3 B.5 1-FK-110 Pot Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . turns

= B.4 / 4 (N/A for Batch Boration)

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 900 MWe MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY Basic Control Strategy:

A) A boration of 155 gallons should be initated soon after the runback. This will ensure rods are above RIL within 45 minutes and will likely be needed to restore Target AFD.

B) As rods are withdrawn due to boration, begin dilution when AFD reaches the Target value to maintain Target AFD. Total Dilution Estimate is 1200 gallons.

NOTE: Contact Core Performance Engineering following any Runback for additional support.

Power and CBD Position 120 240 100 200 Power (% RTP) CBD (steps) 80 160 60 120 40 RIL at 74% RTP = 91 80 steps on CBD.

20 Power 40 Control Bank D 0 0

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time Axial Flux Difference and Boron 2 900 0 895

-2 Boron (ppm)

Borate as required to 890 keep CBD above RIL, AFD (%)

-4 and AFD within limits 885

-6 880

-8 AFD 875

-10 Boron

-12 870

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 800 MWe MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY Basic Control Strategy:

A) A boration of 175 gallons should be initated soon after the runback. This will ensure rods are above RIL within 45 minutes and will likely be needed to restore Target AFD.

B) As rods are withdrawn due to boration, begin dilution when AFD reaches the Target value to maintain Target AFD. Total Dilution Estimate is 1500 gallons.

NOTE: Contact Core Performance Engineering following any Runback for additional support.

Power and CBD Position 120 240 100 200 Power (% RTP) CBD (steps) 80 160 60 120 40 80 RIL at 67% RTP = 76 Power 20 steps on CBD. 40 Control Bank D 0 0

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time Axial Flux Difference and Boron 2 900 0 895

-2 Borate as required to Boron (ppm) 890 keep CBD above RIL, AFD (%)

-4 and AFD within limits 885

-6 AFD 880

-8 Boron

-10 875

-12 870

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 700 MWe MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY Basic Control Strategy:

A) A boration of 200 gallons should be initated soon after the runback. This will ensure rods are above RIL within 45 minutes and will likely be needed to restore Target AFD.

B) As rods are withdrawn due to boration, begin dilution when AFD reaches the Target value to maintain Target AFD. Total Dilution Estimate is 2000 gallons.

NOTE: Contact Core Performance Engineering following any Runback for additional support.

Power and CBD Position 120 240 100 200 Power (% RTP) CBD (steps) 80 160 60 120 40 80 RIL at 59% RTP = 59 steps on CBD. Power 20 40 Control Bank D 0 0

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time Axial Flux Difference and Boron 2 905 0 900

-2 895 Boron (ppm)

Borate as required to keep CBD above RIL, AFD (%)

-4 890 and AFD within limits

-6 885

-8 AFD 880

-10 Boron 875

-12 870

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Downpower Boration Matrix MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY The boration/dilution estimates are based on BEACON predictions for maintaining Incore Axial Offset.

With deep rod insertion, it is expected AFD indications (based on Excore Detectors) will be less than the Incore value by ~2-4%. In this case, no immediate action is needed to restore AFD, but contact Core Performance.

Borate at a rate sufficient to allow ~15 minutes of mixing before the final power level is reached.

Contact Core Performance as soon as possible when planning ANY downpower for additional support.

Assumed Initial Conditions Power 100  % RTP CBD Position 215 steps RCS Boron 864 ppm (anticipated boron at middle of validity range) 30 Minute Ramp Down Boration Estimates 900 MWe 800 MWe 700 MWe 50% RTP

(~74% RTP) (~67% RTP) (~59% RTP)

Final CBD Position 172 steps 161 steps 148 steps 123 steps Total Boration 304 gal 384 gal 481 gal 561 gal Dilution in first hour to support maintaining reduced power, while holding Incore AFD on Target:

Followup Dilution (1st hour) 1102 gal 1409 gal 1792 gal 2435 gal Ave Dilution Rate (1st hour) 18.4 gpm 23.5 gpm 29.9 gpm 40.6 gpm Notes: Highlighted values: Max boration rate during downpower may be unable to maintain Target AFD. Restore and hold Target AFD as soon as possible following the Downpower.

2 Hour Ramp Down Boration Estimates 900 MWe 800 MWe 700 MWe 50% RTP

(~74% RTP) (~67% RTP) (~59% RTP)

Final CBD Position 172 steps 158 steps 142 steps 101 steps Total Boration 191 gal 232 gal 286 gal 258 gal Dilution in first hour to support maintaining reduced power, while holding Incore AFD on Target:

Followup Dilution (1st hour) 771 gal 1017 gal 1292 gal 1641 gal Ave Dilution Rate (1st hour) 12.9 gpm 17 gpm 21.5 gpm 27.4 gpm 1 Hour Rapid Shutdown (Ramp to 20% on Target AFD, 30 minute hold, trip) 20% RTP Notes:

Final CBD Position 79.2 steps Total Boration 698 gal After 30 minutes, no dilution (withdrawing rods to control power), holding at 20% RTP CBD Position 107.4 steps Incore AFD 2.8 %

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA3 Task # SO1048 K/A # 2.2.14 3.9 / 4.3

Title:

Determine Fire Compensatory Measures for an Emergent Condition Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• FIR-303-1, Halon Fire Suppression System Inspection Sheet has been completed.

• Based on the FIR-303-1 a Fire Protection Impairment must be initiated using STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

• INITIATE the STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form in accordance with STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments and COMPLETE as follows:

• RECORD the following information in the **IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT** section:

• AFFECTED LOCATION.

• RECORD the following information in the **COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION** section:

• CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH required. CHECK if required.

• ROVING FIRE WATCH route change required. CHECK if required.

Circle YES or NO.

• ROVING FIRE WATCH with OPERABLE detection route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

• NONE REQUIRED. CHECK if none required.

• AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY. CHECK if strategy affected. Circle YES or NO.

• INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. ENTER additional action and specific information if required.

Task Standard: Utilizing STA-738, determined Fire Impairment Compensatory Measures for a disabled Halon System and determined that Fire Brigade Strategy was affected in accordance with the Answer Key.

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Ref. Materials: STA-738, Fire Protection Systems / Equipment Impairments, Rev. 7-1.

STA-738-2, Fire Protection System / Equipment Impairment Form, Rev. 7.

FIR-303-1, Halon Suppression System Inspection Sheet, Rev. 5.

FPI-505, Electrical & Control Building Unit 1 Cable Spread Room Elevation 807-0, Rev. 3-1.

Validation Time: 25 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments. (labeled Procedure 1)

• STA-738-2, Fire Protection System / Equipment Impairment Form. (labeled Form 1)

• FPI-505, Electrical & Control building Unit 1 Cable Spread Room Elevation 807-0.

(labeled Procedure 2)

• Completed FIR-303-1, Halon Fire Suppression System Inspection Sheet. (labeled Handout 1)

Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following information is from STA-728-2.

Perform Step: 1 Enter information for AFFECTED LOCATION.

Performance ENTERED the following; BLDG: Electrical Control, ELEV: 807, Standard: ROOM/OTHER: Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room per FPI-505, Electrical

& Control Building Unit 1 Cable Spread Room Elevation 807-0 Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine if CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH is required.

Performance DETERMINED that a CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH was Required and Standard: checked box per STA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine if ROVING FIRE WATCH route change is required.

Performance DETERMINED that a ROVING FIRE WATCH route change was NOT Standard: Required and circles NO as a continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment within one hour is required per STA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Determine if ROVING FIRE WATCH with operable detection route change is required.

Performance DETERMINED that a ROVING FIRE WATCH with operable detection Standard: route change is NOT Required and circles NO as a continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment within one hour is required per STA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Determine if NONE REQUIRED.

Performance DETERMINED that None Required is not correct and left Blank.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Determine if AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY.

Performance DETERMINED that Fire Brigade Strategy is affected and circled YES Standard: per review of FPI-505 automatic and manual actions for Halon deployment are affected.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Determine if OTHER compensatory measure information is required.

Performance DETERMINED that establishing a continuous fire watch and backup Standard: suppression equipment within one hour is required per STA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• FIR-303-1, Halon Fire Suppression System Inspection Sheet has been completed.

• Based on the FIR-303-1 a Fire Protection Impairment must be initiated using STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

• INITIATE the STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form in accordance with STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments and COMPLETE as follows:

• RECORD the following information in the **IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT** section:

• AFFECTED LOCATION.

• RECORD the following information in the **COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION** section:

• CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH required. CHECK if required.

• ROVING FIRE WATCH route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

• ROVING FIRE WATCH with OPERABLE detection route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

• NONE REQUIRED. CHECK if none required.

• AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY. CHECK if strategy affected. Circle YES or NO.

• INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. ENTER additional action and specific information if required.

Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 Answer Key Rev. 0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT IMPAIRMENT FORM IMPAIRMENT # WORK DOCUMENT NUMBER (S)

CLEARANCE/MTO#

Completed by Fire Protection

• • IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT**

SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ID Number (i.e., affected valves, system no., etc.)

ISOLATION POINT(S):

DETECTION SYSTEM ID Number ( i.e., panel no., zone, detector)

FIRE PUMP: Electric, G Diesel G ID Number FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY G ID Number (i.e. tank, loop piv)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY G Description/ID Number (i.e. walls, floors, ceilings, penetrations seals, fire doors, fire dampers, radiant energy shield, thermolag, etc.)

OTHER SPECIFY:

807 AFFECTED LOCATION: BLDG. Electrical Control ELEV. ROOM/OTHER Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room PERMIT WORK DESCRIPTION: l REQUESTED BY: EXT. RWO: DATE:

Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (normally performed during the impact review process)

• • COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION**

SCHEDULED IMPAIRED DATE: SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE:

X CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH ROUTE NO.:

____ l

____ ROVING FIRE WATCH (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ ROVING FIRE WATCH(with operable detection) (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ NONE REQUIRED X AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY? YES NO

____ l

____ OTHER INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Establish a continuous fire watch with back up fire suppression equipment within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AUTHORIZED BY: DATE:

Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (This section should be completed just prior to impairing any fire protection systems/equipment)

• • IMPAIRMENT/COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATION**

• • • • • COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATED/VERIFIED: YES NO N/A (circle one) *****

BY: DATE: TIME:

Completed by FP/Shift Ops. **RESTORATION**

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT BACK IN-SERVICE YES NO (circle one)

BY: DATE: TIME:

STA-738-2 INFORMATION USE PAGE 1 OF 1 l CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 Answer Key REV. Rev.

7 0 l

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 Form 1 Rev. 0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT IMPAIRMENT FORM IMPAIRMENT # WORK DOCUMENT NUMBER (S)

CLEARANCE/MTO#

Completed by Fire Protection

• • IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT**

SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ID Number (i.e., affected valves, system no., etc.)

ISOLATION POINT(S):

DETECTION SYSTEM ID Number ( i.e., panel no., zone, detector)

FIRE PUMP: Electric, G Diesel G ID Number FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY G ID Number (i.e. tank, loop piv)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY G Description/ID Number (i.e. walls, floors, ceilings, penetrations seals, fire doors, fire dampers, radiant energy shield, thermolag, etc.)

OTHER SPECIFY:

AFFECTED LOCATION: BLDG. ELEV. ROOM/OTHER PERMIT WORK DESCRIPTION: l REQUESTED BY: EXT. RWO: DATE:

Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (normally performed during the impact review process)

• • COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION**

SCHEDULED IMPAIRED DATE: SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE:

____ CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH ROUTE NO.: l

____ ROVING FIRE WATCH (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ ROVING FIRE WATCH(with operable detection) (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ NONE REQUIRED

____ AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY? YES NO l

____ OTHER INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AUTHORIZED BY: DATE:

Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (This section should be completed just prior to impairing any fire protection systems/equipment)

• • IMPAIRMENT/COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATION**

• • • • • COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATED/VERIFIED: YES NO N/A (circle one) *****

BY: DATE: TIME:

Completed by FP/Shift Ops. **RESTORATION**

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT BACK IN-SERVICE YES NO (circle one)

BY: DATE: TIME:

STA-738-2 INFORMATION USE PAGE 1 OF 1 l REV. 7 l

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA4 Task # SO1112 K/A # 2.3.7 3.5 / 3.6

Title:

Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearance And Reporting Requirements Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 1

• A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service

• Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL

• The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

Initiating Cue: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

JPM Cue Sheet 1

• DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

• DETERMINE the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area

• IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room

• IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 2

• The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual performing maintenance received a Shallow Dose Equivalent (SE) of 275 rads to the skin Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

JPM Cue Sheet 2

• Determine Oral and Written Reportability Requirements

• Oral Reporting Requirement ____________________

• Written Reporting Requirement ____________________

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Task Standard: Utilizing the General Access Permit, Survey Map, and Valve Locator Guide, determined the Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level and highest area dose rate where tagging is to be performed.

Utilizing STA-501, determined Oral and Written Reporting Requirements for an overexposure.

Ref. Materials: RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, Rev. 57-1.

RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits, Rev. 35.

Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810' Room 77A.

Survey Map for U-1 SG 810 Pipe Penetration Area Train B Room 1-077A.

4/14/16.

CPNPP General Area Permit 20160011, Routine Maintenance, Rev. 02.

STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting, Rev. 21.

Validation Time: 20 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• Survey Map for U-1 SG 810 Pipe Pen Area Train B Room 1-077A (labeled Handout 1)

• CPNPP General Area Permit 20160011, Tours and inspections for all groups Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP. For entry into elevated dose rates (labeled Handout 2)

• Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810 Room 77A (labeled Handout 3)

• STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting (labeled Procedure 3)

MAKE the following references available in the classroom:

• RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting (labeled Procedure 1)

• RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits (labeled Procedure 2)

Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet 1.

Perform Step: 1 Determine location of 1-7168 and 1-7167 with respect to Survey Map.

Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• LOCATED 1-7168 and 1-7167 using Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810' Room 77N (77A).

• COMPARED the location to the Survey Map.

• DETERMINED 1-7168 and 1-7167 are located inside a Radiation Area and the area is contaminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room.

Performance DETERMINED the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room per Standard: the General Access Permit:

• TLD.

• Alarming Dosimeter.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area.

Performance DETERMINED the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter Standard: the valve area per the General Access Permit:

• Deluxe coveralls

• Booties

• Hood and hard hat cover

• Cotton liners

• Rubber gloves

• Rubber Overshoes Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Identify the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room.

Performance IDENTIFIED the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the Standard: room is < 1000 dpm/100 cm2.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 5 Identify the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room.

Performance IDENTIFIED the highest area dose rate at 8 mR/hr.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet 2.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from STA-501, Attachment 8.D/4.

Perform Step: 6 Determine Oral Reporting Requirements per STA-501. .D/4 Pages 1 of 12 or 7 of 12 Performance DETERMINED Oral Reporting Requirements per STA-501:

Standard: Event involving byproduct, source, or special nuclear material that may have caused or threatens to cause exposure to individual 250 rad (skin or any one extremity).

• DETERMINDED Immediate notification via Emergency Notification System.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Determine Written Reporting Requirements per STA-501. .D/4 Pages 1 of 12 or 7 of 12 Performance DETERMINED Written Reporting Requirements per STA-501:

Standard: Any incident for which notification is required per 10 CFR 20.2202

• DETERMINDED Written Report within 30 days (LER).

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 1 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

• A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service

• Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL

• The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

• DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area

• IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room

• IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room:

Minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area:

Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room:

Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 2 Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 2

• The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual performing maintenance received a Shallow Dose Equivalent (SE) of 275 rads to the skin Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

JPM Cue Sheet 2

• Determine Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.

• Oral Reporting Requirement ____________________

• Written Reporting Requirement ____________________

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 1 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room:

TLD, Alarming Dosimeter Minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area:

Single PCs which include:

Deluxe coveralls, Booties, Hood, Hard Hat Cover, Cotton liners, Rubber gloves & Rubber Overshoes Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm2 for the room:

< 1000 dpm/cm2 Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room:

8 mr/hr CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 Answer Key Rev. 1

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 2 Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual performing maintenance received a Shallow Dose Equivalent (SE) of 275 rads to the skin Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 Determine Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.

Oral Reporting Requirement Immediate per ENS 30 day LER Written Reporting Requirement ____________________

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 Answer Key Rev. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant NPF087, NPF089 GAP GENERAL ACCESS PERMIT GAP GAP

Title:

Tours and Inspections for all groups. GAP #: 20160011 Rev. 02 Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP.

For entry into elevated dose rates.

REACTOR OPERATION + SURVEIL

• 20160011*

Expected Radiological Conditions: Expected general area radiation levels are <1mr\hr to 131 mr\hr not normally to exceed 160mr\hr.

Expected general area contamination levels are <1Kdpm\100cm2 to 20Kdpm\100cm2 not to exceed 200Kdpm\100cm2.

GAP Type: JOB ROUTINE GAP Status: Begin Date: Close On Date:

ACTIVE 2/29/2016 Prepared By: BARTON, JOHN D Job Supervisor: Bob Knapp Estimated Dose: 452.0 mrem Estimated Hours: 1,991.00 Alarm Settings Gamma Dose (mrem) 20.00 Gamma Rate (mrem/hr) 120.00 Neutron Dose (mrem) Neutron Rate (mrem/hr)

Locations Buildings Elevations Rooms Various RCA Locations ALL VARIOUS - VARIOUS RCA LOCATIONS Radiological Conditions Contact Radiation Protection for current radiological conditions prior to performing work on this GAP.

Tasks Task Description Status N/A 4/4/2016 8:00:09AM STA-656-4 R-6 Page 1 of 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPMUse Information SA4 Handout 2 Rev. 0

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant NPF087, NPF089 GAP GENERAL ACCESS PERMIT GAP GAP

Title:

Tours and Inspections for all groups. GAP #: 20160011 Rev. 02 Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP.

For entry into elevated dose rates.

Requirements Requirement Groups Requirement Descriptions CONTAMINATION CONTROL Contaminated components should be wiped down/deconned as necessary to prevent the spread of contamination.

Knee pads should be worn when kneeling in posted high contamination areas.

Radioactive spills and leaks should be addressed and per RP direction.

Frequent change out of outer/ disposable gloves should be performed.

Faceshield is a minimum requirement for system breach.

Use of a barrier material should be used in contamination areas when sitting, kneeling or laying.(ie. orex sheeting,visqueen,etc.)

COVERAGE RP to determine job coverage requirements.

DOSIMETRY TLD Alarming Dosimeter DOSIMETRY A SRPD (PIC) may be used in lieu of an Alarming Dosimeter for rapid response for Fire Brigade personnel.

Vibrating Electronic Dosimeter required in high noise areas.

EXPOSURE CONTROL Donning/Doffing of harnesses should be performed in a low dose area Utilize ALARA principles of time, distance and shielding Read your electronic alarming dosimeter (EPD) or PICs periodically when in Radiation Areas (e.g., once every 30 min) and frequently in High Radiation Areas (e.g., at 1/2 of the expected job entry time or every 15 min, whichever is shorter) and often enough to prevent an EPD Dose Alarm.

Each individual should know and utilize their low dose waiting areas Each individual should know how much dose they are expected to receive this entry into the RCA.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING Additional Requirement: Operations personnel are required to wear Ultra PCs when handling hoses in contaminated areas.

Reach-in to a HCA (ex. sink) is allowed with minimum double gloves and labcoat.

Industrial Safety Protective Clothing may be worn in addition to RP Required Clothing.

Lab Coat and Rubber PC Gloves are the minimum required to handle or unpack potentially contaminated equipment or material RP Approval required to modify protective clothing Ultra Orex PCs, double gloves and double shoe covers are the minimum required to enter a posted high contamination area.

Latex Gloves can be SUBSTITUTED for Rubber Gloves with RP Approval.

Single PCs consisting of Deluxe coveralls, booties, hood, hard hat cover, cotton liners, rubber gloves and rubber overshoes are the minimum PC requirement to enter a contaminated area.

RESPIRATORY Respiratory Protection Not Required WORKER INSTRUCTIONS Contact RP PRIOR to removing any material from a posted contamination area.

Contact RP PROR to altering or removing any shielding material.

Contact RP PRIOR to accessing normally inaccessible areas (i.e. overhead areas >7 feet off floor or areas under grating).

Contact RP PRIOR to accessing the RCA for specific work activities.

An ALARA Briefing is required to enter a posted High Radiation Area (HRA).

Contact RP PRIOR to entering a posted High Radiation Area.

4/4/2016 8:00:09AM STA-656-4 R-6 Page 2 of 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPMUse Information SA4 Handout 2 Rev. 0

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant NPF087, NPF089 GAP GENERAL ACCESS PERMIT GAP GAP

Title:

Tours and Inspections for all groups. GAP #: 20160011 Rev. 02 Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP.

For entry into elevated dose rates.

Additional Requirements ADDITIONAL RADIATION WORKER INSTRUCTIONS

1. Operations personnel should notify RP PRIOR to venting or draining radioactive systems.

2. Notify RP PRIOR to transfer or movement of any radioactive material.

3. RP Approval is required prior to entering a HIGH CONTAMINATION AREA.

4, Notify RP prior to any system breach.

RADIATION WORKER STOP WORK LIMITS

1. Posted Locked High Radiation Areas & Very High Radiation Areas

2. Posted Airborne Radioactivity Areas (except Noble Gas areas)

3. Posted Discrete Radioactive Particle Control and associated Buffer Zones

4. Containment Buildings 5.] Posted Alpha Contamination Area.

6.] Failure of protective clothing.

7.] Any EPD dose alarm or unanticipated dose rate alarm.

8.] At the direction of Radiation Protection.

ADDITIONAL RP INSTRUCTIONS RP should discuss the following information with the RadWorker(s) prior to allowing them entry into the RCA:

1. Work location and current radiological conditions.

2. Determine if they are entering a HRA or HCA.

3. RWP data to include dosimeter set points.

4. Contamination levels in the work location.

5. Verify that they have a RCA Entry Card and that it is filled out properly.

RP STOP WORK LIMITS

1. Greater than 3 unplanned personnel contaminations (internal or external) on a single job during a shift.

2. Any level 3 personnel contamination.

3. Unintended exposure to a single worker of > 10mr above an ED set-point.

4. Failure or degradation of radiological engineering controls which impact the radiological safety of the worker.

5. Changes in conditions that elevate the risk level.

6. Airborne Radioactivity > 0.25 DAC. (excluding Noble Gas)

Hold Point- After system breach the Radworker(s) should be directed to a Low Dose Waiting Area while radiological conditions are being evaluated.

Approvals Approver Title Name Date MANAGER KNAPP, ROBERT C 04/04/2016 Attachments N/A 4/4/2016 8:00:09AM STA-656-4 R-6 Page 3 of 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPMUse Information SA4 Handout 2 Rev. 0

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 Handout 3 Rev. 1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 Handout 3 Rev. 1 Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA5 Task # SO1136 K/A # 2.4.41 2.9 / 4.6

Title:

Classify an Emergency Plan Event Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom: X Actual Performance: X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• EOS-1.1B, Safety Injection Termination is in progress following a Main Steam header break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves

• The Unit Supervisor implemented ABN-740B, Control Room Annunciator System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All Control Room Annunciators 10 minutes ago

• Electrical Maintenance is investigating the tripping of both Annunciator Logic Cabinet breakers

• ABN-906, Plant Process Computer System Malfunction was just entered due to loss of Plant Computer System alarm capability Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

• DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation Task Standard: Utilizing EPP-201, determined the Emergency Action Level Event Classification as SS5.1 using the Emergency Action Level Hot, Common, and Cold Classification Charts within 15 minutes.

Ref. Materials: EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation, Rev. 12.

EPP-201, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document, Rev. 0-1.

CPNPP Emergency Action Level Hot, Common, and Cold Classification Charts, Rev.

12A.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: 15 minutes Completion ________ minutes Time:

Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I) REV.2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

CLASSROOM SETUP Handout:

MAKE the following available in the classroom:

• EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation (labeled Procedure 1)

• EPP-201, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (labeled Procedure 2)

• CPNPP Emergency Action Level Hot, Common, & Cold Classification Charts (labeled Handout 1)

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I) REV.2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from CPNPP Emergency Action Levels Hot.

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE the Event Category.

Performance REFERRED to CPNPP Emergency Action Levels Hot, Common, and Standard: Cold and DETERMINED the following chart is applicable:

• CPNPP EAL HOT Conditions (RCS > 200°F)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 MATCH plant conditions in the EAL Group / Category.

Performance IDENTIFIED EAL Group / Category as System Malfunction (S).

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 MATCH plant conditions in the selected EAL Subcategory.

Performance IDENTIFIED EAL Subcategory as Instrumentation (5).

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I) REV.2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Candidate should refer to \ EPP-201, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases document for clarification regarding the event classification. The following notes are from Page 235 of 323.

Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I) REV.2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Classify the event.

Performance CLASSIFIED the event as an SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SS5.1)

Standard: within 15 minutes.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I) REV.2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

• EOS-1.1B, Safety Injection Termination is in progress following a Main Steam header break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves

• The Unit Supervisor implemented ABN-740B, Control Room Annunciator System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All Control Room Annunciators 10 minutes ago

• Electrical Maintenance is investigating the tripping of both Annunciator Logic Cabinet breakers

• ABN-906, Plant Process Computer System Malfunction was just entered due to loss of Plant Computer System alarm capability INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

• DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation EAL Identifier:________________________

THIS JPM IS TIME CRITICAL Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I) REV.2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions:

EOS-1.1B, Safety Injection Termination is in progress following a Main Steam header break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves The Unit Supervisor implemented ABN-740B, Control Room Annunciator System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All Control Room Annunciators 10 minutes ago Electrical Maintenance is investigating the tripping of both Annunciator Logic Cabinet breakers ABN-906, Plant Process Computer System Malfunction was just entered due to loss of Plant Computer System alarm capability INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation SS5.1 EAL Identifier:________________________

THIS JPM IS TIME CRITICAL CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Answer Key Rev. 1

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Handout 1 Rev. 0 HOT CONDITIONS (RCS > 200°F)

Revision 12A Control Copy #: ________ Effective Date 02/13/2015 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to safeguard AC power capability to safeguard buses reduced to a Loss of all offsite AC power to safeguard buses safeguard buses buses for greater than or equal to 15 min. single power source for greater than or equal to 15 min. for greater than or equal to 15 min.

such that any additional single failure would result in a loss of all AC power to safeguard buses 1

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 SG1.1 (Bases Page 211) SS1.1 (Bases Page 208) SA1.1 (Bases Page 205) SU1.1 (Bases Page 202)

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 6.9 KV Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 6.9 KV safe- AC power capability to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and Loss of all offsite AC power to 6.9 KV safeguard buses Loss of safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 guard buses uEA1 and uEA2 for greater than or equal to uEA2 reduced to a single power source for greater than or uEA1 and uEA2 for greater than or equal to 15 min.

AC AND EITHER: 15 min. (Note 4) equal to 15 min. (Note 4) (Note 4)

Power

• Restoration of at least one safeguard bus within AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of

• CSFST Core Cooling - RED or ORANGE path all AC power to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 (Table S-3)

Loss of all vital DC power for 15 min.

2 1 2 3 4 None SS2.1 (Bases Page 216) None None Loss of DC Less than 105 VDC on all 125 VDC safeguard buses uED1, uED2, uED3 and uED4 for greater than 15 min. (Note 4)

Power Automatic trip and all manual actions fail to shut down Automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and manual Automatic trip fails to shut down the reactor and the Inadvertent criticality the reactor and indication of an extreme challenge to actions taken from the reactor control console are not manual actions taken from the reactor control console are the ability to cool the core exists successful in shutting down the reactor successful in shutting down the reactor 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 4 3 SG3.1 (Bases Page 226)

An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SS3.1 (Bases Page 224)

An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SA3.1 (Bases Page 220)

An automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor SU3.1 (Bases Page 219)

An unplanned sustained positive startup rate observed Criticality AND AND AND on nuclear instrumentation All manual actions do not shut down the reactor as Manual actions taken at the reactor control console (Note 6) Manual actions taken at the reactor control console (Note 6)

& indicated by reactor power greater than or equal to 5% do not shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor successfully shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor RPS AND EITHER: power greater than or equal to 5% power less than 5%

Failure

• CSFST Core Cooling - RED

• CSFST Heat Sink - RED Inability to reach required shutdown within Technical 4 Specification limits 1 2 3 4 S Inability to Reach or Maintain Shutdown Conditions None None None SU4.1 (Bases Page 230)

Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO action statement time System Malfunct.

Inability to monitor a significant transient in progress Unplanned loss of safety system annunciation or Unplanned loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room with either (1) a indication in the Control Room for greater than or equal significant transient in progress, or (2) compensatory to 15 min.

indicators are unavailable 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 None SS5.1 (Bases Page 235)

Loss of approximately 75% (or more) of annunciation or SA5.1 (Bases Page 233)

Unplanned loss of approximately 75% (or more) of SU5.1 (Bases Page 231)

Unplanned loss of approximately 75% (or more) of Instr. indication on CB-01 through CB-09 and CB-11 for greater annunciation or indication on CB-01 through CB-09 and annunciation or indication associated with safety systems on than or equal to 15 min. (Note 4) CB-11 for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 4) CB-01 through CB-09 and CB-11 for greater than or equal to AND AND EITHER: 15 min. (Note 4)

A significant transient is in progress, Table S-1

• A significant transient is in progress, Table S-1 AND

• Compensatory indications are unavailable Compensatory indications are unavailable Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities 1 2 3 4 6 None None None SU6.1 (Bases Page 238)

Loss of all Table S-2 onsite (internal) communication methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations Comm. OR Loss of all Table S-2 offsite (external) communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications Fuel clad degradation 1 2 3 4 SU7.1 (Bases Page 240) 7 None None None Reactor coolant Dose Equivalent I-131 specific activity greater than 60 µCi/gm Fuel Clad OR Degradation Reactor coolant Dose Equivalent XE-133 specific activity greater than 500 µCi/gm SU7.2 (Bases Page 242)

Gross Failed Fuel Monitor, FFLu60 (u-RE-0406), High Alarm (RED)

RCS leakage 8

RCS None None None 1

SU8.1 (Bases Page 244) 2 3 4 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than Leakage 10 gpm (Note 7)

OR Identified leakage greater than 25 gpm 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 F FG1.1 (Bases Page 256)

Loss of any two barriers FS1.1 (Bases Page 254)

Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Table F-1)

FA1.1 (Bases Page 253)

Any loss or any potential loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS FU1.1 (Bases Page 252)

Any loss or any potential loss of Containment (Table F-1)

Fission AND (Table F-1)

Product Loss or potential loss of third barrier (Table F-1)

Barriers Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Fuel Cladding Barrier Reactor Coolant System Barrier Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss A. CSFST 1. CSFST Core Cooling-RED 1. CSFST Core Cooling- 1. CSFST RCS Integrity - RED 1. CSFST Containment - RED entry conditions met entry conditions met ORANGE entry conditions met entry conditions met (Bases Page 298)

None None (Bases Page 260) OR OR CSFST Heat Sink-RED entry CSFST Heat Sink - RED entry conditions met and heat sink conditions met and heat sink required (Bases Page 263) required (Bases Page 280)

2. Core exit TCs greater than 1,200°F B.Core Exit 2. Core exit TCs greater than 2.Core exit TCs greater than AND T/Cs 1,200°F 750°F Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

(Bases Page 266) (Bases Page 267) (Bases Page 301)

None None None 3. All of the following:

• Core exit TCs greater than 750°F

• RVLIS 11 in. above plate light not lit

• Restoration procedures not effective within 15 min.

(Bases Page 303)

C.Radiation 3. Containment radiation 1. Containment radiation greater 4. Containment radiation greater than 4,000 R/hr greater than 400 R/hr than 5 R/hr CTEu16 Containment HRRM CTEu16 Containment CTEu16 Containment (u-RE-6290A), or HRRM (u-RE-6290A), or HRRM (u-RE-6290A), or CTWu17 Containment HRRM CTWu17 Containment CTWu17 Containment (u-RE-6290B)

HRRM (u-RE-6290B) None None None HRRM (u-RE-6290B) (Bases Page 306)

(Bases Page 268) (Bases Page 285) 4.Gross Failed Fuel Monitor, (FFLu60) u-RE-0406, radiation greater than 3.7E04

µCi/cc (Bases Page 270)

D.Inventory 3. RVLIS 11 in. above plate light 2. RCS leak rate greater than 2. RCS leak rate greater than the 1. Containment pressure rise followed by a rapid 5. Containment pressure 50 psig and rising not lit (Bases Page 274) available makeup capacity as capacity of one charging pump in the unexplained drop in Containment pressure (Bases Page 315) indicated by a loss of RCS normal charging mode with letdown (Bases Page 308) subcooling (less than or equal isolated: 6. Containment hydrogen concentration greater

2. Containment pressure or sump level response not than 4% (Bases Page 316) to 25°F [55ºF] )

• Positive Displacement: 98 gpm None consistent with LOCA conditions (Bases Page 309)

(Bases Page 288)

• Centrifugal: 150 gpm 7. Containment pressure greater than 18 psig with (Bases Page 291) 3. Ruptured SG is also faulted outside of Containment neither Containment Spray system train

3. Ruptured SG results in an (Bases Page 311) operating (Bases Page 318)

ECCS (SI) actuation (Bases Page 290) 4. Primary-to-secondary leakrate greater than 10 gpm AND Unisolable steam release from affected SG to the environment (Bases Page 313)

E. Other 5. Coolant activity 5. Failure of all valves in any one line to close greater than 300 µCi/cc I- AND 131 Dose Equivalent None None None Direct downstream pathway to the environment None (Bases Page 275) exists after Containment isolation signal (Bases Page 320)

F. Judgment 6. Any condition in the 4. Any condition in the opinion 4. Any condition in the opinion 3. Any condition in the opinion of the 6. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency 8. Any condition in the opinion of the Emergency opinion of the Emergency of the Emergency of the Emergency Coordinator Emergency Coordinator that Coordinator that indicates loss of the Containment Coordinator that indicates potential loss of the Coordinator that indicates Coordinator that indicates that indicates loss of the RCS indicates potential loss of the RCS barrier (Bases Page 322) Containment barrier (Bases Page 323) loss of the Fuel Clad potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier (Bases Page 295) barrier (Bases Page 296) barrier (Bases Page 277) barrier (Bases Page 278)

Note 4: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the Note 6: For manual trip, the MCB reactor trip switches and deenergizing uB3 and uB4 are applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the Note 5: Applicable on Cold Condition Chart only. Note 7: Use Category F EALs for escalation due to RCS leakage the only methods applicable to EALs SA3.1 and SS3.1 event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time Table S-1 Significant Transients Table S-2 Communications Systems Table S-3 AC Power Sources System Onsite Offsite

• Electrical load rejection greater (internal) (external) Offsite:

than 25% full electrical load

• 138 KV switchyard circuit Gai-Tronics Page/party system (Public Address System) X

• Reactor trip

• 345 KV switchyard circuit Plant Radio System X

• Runback greater than 25% reactor Onsite:

PABX (Private Automatic Branch Exchange System) X X power

• uEG1 Public Telephone System X X

• ECCS injection

• uEG2 Federal Telephone System (FTS) X

• Reactor power oscillations greater EAL Identifier than 10%

XXX.X Category (R, H, E, S, F, C) Sequential number within subcategory/classification Emergency classification (G, S, A, U) Subcategory number (1 if no subcategory)

Prepared for Luminant by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Handout 1 Rev. 0

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Control Copy #: ________

Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant Modes: 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Emergency Action Level Matrix Power Operation Startup Hot Standby Hot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled Revision 12A Effective Date 02/13/2015 GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent Offsite dose resulting from an actual or imminent release Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to release of gaseous radioactivity greater than 1000 of gaseous radioactivity exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or the environment greater than 200 times the ODCM the environment greater than 2 times the ODCM mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual 500 mRem thyroid CDE for the actual or projected for 15 minutes or longer for 60 minutes or longer or projected duration of the release using actual duration of the release meteorology 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF RG1.1 (Bases Page 66) RS1.1 (Bases Page 60) RA1.1 (Bases Page 51) RU1.1 (Bases Page 41)

Valid reading on any radiation monitors greater than Table R-1 Valid reading on any radiation monitors greater than Table R-1 Valid reading on any Gaseous monitors greater than Table Valid reading on any Gaseous monitors greater than Table column GE for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 1) column SAE for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 1)

R-1 column "Alert" for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 2) R-1 column "UE" for greater than or equal to 60 min. (Note 2)

Note 1: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it RA1.2 (Bases Page 55) RU1.2 (Bases Page 45) 1 is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time If dose assessment results are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor values Valid reading on any Liquid monitors greater than Table R-1 Valid reading on any Liquid monitors greater than Table R-1 (see EAL RS1.2). Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment column "Alert" for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 2) column "UE" for greater than or equal to 60 min. (Note 2)

Offsite Rad RG1.2 (Bases Page 69) RS1.2 (Bases Page 63) RA1.3 (Bases Page 58) RU1.3 (Bases Page 49)

Conditions Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases greater than 1,000 mRem TEDE or 5,000 mRem thyroid greater than 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem thyroid CDE at indicate concentrations or release rates greater than 200 times indicate concentrations or release rates greater than 2 times CDE at or beyond the Exclusion Area Boundary or beyond the Exclusion Area Boundary ODCM limits for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 2) ODCM limits for greater than or equal to 60 min. (Note 2)

RG1.3 (Bases Page 71) RS1.3 (Bases Page 64)

Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 1,000 mRem/hr expected to continue for greater greater than 100 mRem/hr expected to continue for greater Note 2: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is than or equal to 60 min. at or beyond the Exclusion Area than or equal to 60 min. at or beyond the Exclusion Area determined that the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, Boundary (Note 1) Boundary (Note 1) assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown.

OR OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5,000 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond greater than 500 mRem for 1 hr of inhalation at or beyond the Exclusion Area Boundary the Exclusion Area Boundary R Table R-1 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has resulted or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel Unplanned rise in plant radiation levels 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Abnorm. Release Point Monitor GE SAE Alert UE RA2.1 (Bases Page 77) RU2.1 (Bases Page 73)

Rad Plant Vent Unplanned water level drop in a reactor refueling pathway as Damage to irradiated fuel OR loss of water level Release PVG384 + PVG385 X-RE-5567 ---------- ---------- 1.3E-1 µCi/cc 1.3E-3 µCi/cc indicated by EITHER of the following:

A+B AND

• less than 857 ft. 3.5 in. in spent fuel pool or fuel transfer

/ Rad 2

A valid High alarm on any of the following:

Gaseous Effluent Plant Vent canal

• RFCu10, LRAM W REFUEL CAV860 (u-RE-6251)

• less than 856 ft. 11 in. in refueling cavity (407 in. above (WRGM) X-RE-5570 1.7E+7 µCi/sec 1.7E+6 µCi/sec 8.0E+5µCi/sec 8.0E+4µCi/sec

• RFCu12, LRAM E REFUEL CAV 860 (u-RE-6253) core plate)

PVF684 + PVF685 A+B

• CAPu98, CNTMT AIR PIG PART (u-RE-5502) AND Onsite Rad

• CAIu99, CNTMT AIR PIG IODINE (u-RE-5566)

Main Steam Valid area radiation monitor reading rise on any of the Conditions MSLu78 u-RE-2325

• CAGu97, CNTMT AIR PIG GAS (u-RE-5503)

& MSLu79 u-RE-2326 27 µCi/cc 2.7 µCi/cc 10 x high alarm 2 x high alarm following:

• FBV088, FB VENT EXH (X-RE-5700)

• RFCu10, LRAM W REFUEL CAV860 (u-RE-6251)

Spent Fuel MSLu80 u-RE-2327 setpoint setpoint

• SFP001, LRAM SFP 2 E WALL (X-RE-6272)

Events MSLu81 u-RE-2328

• RFCu12, LRAM E REFUEL CAV 860 (u-RE-6253)

• SFP002, LRAM SFP 2 N WALL (X-RE-6273)

• SFP001, LRAM SFP 2 E WALL (X-RE-6272)

Liquid Waste

• SFP003, LRAM SFP 1 E WALL (X-RE-6274)

• SFP002, LRAM SFP 2 N WALL (X-RE-6273)

LWE-076 X-RE-5253 -------- -------- 200 X high alarm 2 X high alarm

• SFP004, LRAM SFP 1 S WALL (X-RE-6275)

• SFP003, LRAM SFP 1 E WALL (X-RE-6274) setpoint* setpoint*

Liquid

• SFP004, LRAM SFP 1 S WALL (X-RE-6275)

Service Water RA2.2 (Bases Page 79) RU2.2 (Bases Page 76)

SSWu65 u-RE-4269 -------- -------- 200 X high alarm 2 X high alarm A water level drop in the reactor refueling cavity, spent fuel Unplanned valid area radiation monitor reading rises by a SSWu66 u-RE-4270 setpoint setpoint pool or fuel transfer canal that will result in irradiated fuel factor of 1000 over normal levels*

becoming uncovered

• With effluent discharge not isolated

• Normal levels can be considered as the highest reading in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> excluding the current peak value Rise in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain plant safety functions 3 1 2 RA3.1 (Bases Page 81) 3 4 5 6 DEF None None None CR/CAS Dose rates greater than 15 mRem/hr in areas requiring Rad continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions:

Control Room (X-RE-6281 or X-RE-6282)

OR CAS (by survey)

Natural or destructive phenomena affecting Vital Areas Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the Note 8: Web address for National Earthquake Information Center is: Protected Area http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/dyfi/archives.php 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HA1.1 (Bases Page 154) HU1.1 (Bases Page 143)

Seismic event greater than OBE as indicated by annunciator Seismic event identified by any two of the following:

2A-3.1, OBE EXCEEDED, or yellow OBE light on Seismic

• Annunciator 2A- 2.1, SEISMIC MONITORING Monitoring system panel SYSTEM ACTIVATION, received AND

• Earthquake felt in plant Earthquake confirmed by any of the following:

• National Earthquake Information Center (Note 8)

• Earthquake felt in plant

• National Earthquake Information Center (Note 8)

• Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant HA1.2 (Bases Page 157)

Tornado striking or sustained high winds greater than 80 mph HU1.2 (Bases Page 145) resulting in EITHER: Tornado striking within the Protected Area boundary Table H-1 Structures Containing

• Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures OR Systems Needed for Safe Shutdown

• Control Room indication of degraded performance of Sustained high winds greater than 80 mph systems required to establish or maintain safe

- u-Containment shutdown

- u-Safeguards Building HA1.3 (Bases Page 160) HU1.3 (Bases Page 147) 1 None

- X-Auxiliary Building

- X-Electrical & Control Building Internal flooding in the Safeguards Building or Turbine Building resulting in EITHER:

• An electrical shock hazard that precludes access to Internal flooding that has the potential to affect safety-related equipment required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode in the Safeguards Building or Natural or operate or monitor systems required to establish or

- X-Fuel Building Turbine Building Destructive maintain safe shutdown Phenomena - X-Service Water Intake Structure

• Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown

- u-Diesel Generator Building HA1.4 (Bases Page 162)

- u-Normal switchgear rooms HU1.4 (Bases Page 149)

Turbine failure-generated projectiles resulting in EITHER:

Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to

- u-CST

• Visible damage to or penetration of any Table H-1 turbine or generator seals structures

- u-RWST

• Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown HA1.5 (Bases Page 165) HU1.5 (Bases Page 151)

Safe Shutdown Impoundment level greater than 796.0 ft (lake) Safe Shutdown Impoundment level greater than 794.7 ft (lake)

OR OR Safe Shutdown Impoundment level less than 761.5 ft (inside Safe Shutdown Impoundment level less than 769.5 ft (inside traveling screens) traveling screens)

HA1.6 (Bases Page 167)

Vehicle crash resulting in EITHER:

• Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures

• Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Fire or explosion affecting the operability of plant safety Fire within the Protected Area not extinguished within 15 systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown min. of detection or explosion within the Protected Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 2 Note 9: Explosion is defined as a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage HA2.1 (Bases Page 173) HU2.1 (Bases Page 169) permanent structures, systems, or components. A steam line Fire or explosion resulting in EITHER: Fire not extinguished within 15 min. of Control Room Fire or None break or steam explosion that damages surrounding permanent

• Visible damage to any Table H-1 structures notification or verification of a Control Room fire alarm in Explosion structures or equipment would be classified under this EAL.

• Control Room indication of degraded performance of any Table H-1 area (Note 4) systems required to establish or maintain safe H

HU2.2 (Bases Page 171) shutdown (Note 9) Explosion of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the Protected Area (Note 9)

Access to a Vital Area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation gases deemed detrimental to normal plant operations Hazards of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor 3 Note 3: If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then EAL HA3.1 should not be declared as it 1 2 HA3.1 (Bases Page 178) 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 HU3.1 (Bases Page 175) 2 3 4 5 6 DEF None will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant Hazardous to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that Access to a Vital Area is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in amounts Gas already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of that have or could adversely affect normal plant operations of the event. systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shut down the reactor (Note 3) HU3.2 (Bases Page 177)

Recommendation by local, county or state officials to evacuate or shelter site personnel based on offsite event Hostile action resulting in loss of physical control of the Hostile action within the Protected Area Hostile action within the Owner Controlled Area or Confirmed security condition or threat which indicates a facility airborne attack threat potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HG4.1 (Bases Page 186) HS4.1 (Bases Page 184) HA4.1 (Bases Page 182) HU4.1 (Bases Page 180)

A hostile action has occurred such that plant personnel are A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A hostile action is occurring or has occurred within the A security condition that does not involve a hostile action 4 unable to operate equipment required to maintain any of the following safety functions:

• Reactivity control Protected Area as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor Owner Controlled Area as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor OR as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor OR A credible site-specific security threat notification Security

• RCS inventory A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat OR

• Secondary heat removal within 30 min. of the site A validated notification from NRC providing information of an HG4.2 (Bases Page 187) aircraft threat A hostile action has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling systems AND Imminent fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant Control Room evacuation has been initiated control cannot be established 5 None 1 2 HS5.1 (Bases Page 189) 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 HA5.1 (Bases Page 188) 2 3 4 5 6 DEF Control None Control Room evacuation has been initiated Control Room evacuation has been initiated Room AND Evacuation Control of the plant cannot be established within 15 min.

Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Other conditions existing that in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of General Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of Site Area Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of an Alert Emergency Coordinator warrant declaration of a UE Emergency Emergency 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF 1 2 3 4 5 6 DEF HG6.1 (Bases Page 197) HS6.1 (Bases Page 195) HA6.1 (Bases Page 193) HU6.1 (Bases Page 191)

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the 6 Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a Emergency Coordinator indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to Judgment of containment integrity or hostile action that results in an or hostile action that results in intentional damage or security event that involves probable life threatening risk to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that site personnel or damage to site equipment because of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to are expected unless further degradation of safety systems Guideline exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline occurs CDE) offsite for more than the immediate site area Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE).

which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels (1 Rem TEDE and 5 Rem thyroid CDE) beyond the Exclusion Area Boundary Damage to a loaded cask Confinement Boundary E

ISFSI None None None 1 2 EU1.1 (Bases Page 248) 3 4 5 6 Damage to a loaded cask Confinement Boundary DEF Prepared for Luminant by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Handout 1 Rev. 0

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Handout 1 Rev. 0 Revision 12A COLD CONDITIONS (RCS 200°F)

Effective Date 02/13/2015 Control Copy #: ________

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to safeguard AC power capability to safeguard buses reduced to a buses single power source for greater than or equal to 15 min.

such that any additional single failure would result in a 1

loss of all AC power to safeguard buses 5 6 DEF 5 6 CA1.1 (Bases Page 88) CU1.1 (Bases Page 85)

Loss of None Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to 6.9 KV AC power capability to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and AC None safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 for greater than or equal to uEA2 reduced to a single power source for greater than or Power 15 min. (Note 4) equal to 15 min. (Note 4)

AND Any additional single power source failure will result in loss of all AC power to 6.9 KV safeguard buses uEA1 and uEA2 (Table C-5) 2 Loss of required DC power for 15 min.

5 6 Loss of CU2.1 (Bases Page 91)

None None None Less than 105 VDC on required 125 VDC safeguard buses DC (uED1, uED2, uED3, uED4) for greater than or equal to 15 min.

Power (Note 4)

Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay heat Loss of RCS inventory RCS leakage Containment challenged removal capability 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 CG3.1 (Bases Page 118) CS3.1 (Bases Page 108) CA3.1 (Bases Page 104) CU3.1 (Bases Page 94)

RCS level less than 0 in. above upper core plate (top) for With Containment closure not established, RCS level RCS level less than 33.25 in. above upper core plate (top) RCS leakage results in the inability to maintain or restore greater than or equal to 30 min. (Note 4) less than 27.25 in. above upper core plate (top) OR EITHER of the following for greater than or equal to 15 min.

AND RCS level cannot be monitored for greater than or equal to (Note 4):

Any Containment challenge condition, Table C-4 CS3.2 (Bases Page 111) 15 min. (Note 4) with a loss of RCS inventory as indicated by

• Pressurizer level greater than 17%

With Containment closure established, RCS level less than an unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank level

• Above the low end of the target level control band 0 in. above upper core plate (top) (If pressurizer level was intentionally lowered less CG3.2 (Bases Page 122) than 17%)

RCS level cannot be monitored for greater than or equal to CS3.3 (Bases Page 114)

RCS leakage 30 min. (Note 4) with a loss of RCS inventory indicated by RCS level cannot be monitored for greater than or equal to any of the following: 30 min. (Note 4) with a loss of RCS inventory indicated by

• greater than 20,000 R/hr on any of the following: any of the following: 6

- CTEu16, Containment HRRM

• greater than 20,000 R/hr on any of the following: CU3.2 (Bases Page 96)

(u-RE-6290A) - CTEu16, Containment HRRM

- CTWu17, Containment HRRM Unplanned RCS level drop below EITHER of the following (u-RE-6290A) for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 4):

(u-RE-6290B) - CTWu17, Containment HRRM

• Erratic source range monitor indication

• Reactor Vessel flange (when the level band is (u-RE-6290B) established above the flange)

• Unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank

• Erratic source range monitor indication level

• Target band (when the level band is established

• Unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank below the flange) level AND CU3.3 (Bases Page 100)

Any Containment challenge condition, Table C-4 RCS level cannot be monitored AND Loss of RCS inventory as indicated by an unexplained level rise in any Table C-1 sump / tank level Reactor Vessel Threshold Values C 3 Reactor Vessel Flange EWR 132.50 in.

Plant El.

834 ft. 0.50 in.

EAL(s)

CU3.2 RCS Cold SD/

Level Refueling System Bottom of Hotleg 33.25 in. 825 ft. 9.25 in. CA3.1 Malfunct.

6 in. < Bottom of Hotleg 27.25 in. 825 ft. 3.25 in. CS3.1 Top of Core Plate 0.00 in. 823 ft. 0.00 in. CS3.2 CG3.1 Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown Unplanned loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel in the Reactor Vessel 5 6 5 6 CA4.1 (Bases Page 134) CU4.1 (Bases Page 129) 4 None None An unplanned event results in EITHER:

• RCS temperature greater than 200°F (Note 5) for Unplanned event results in RCS temperature greater than 200°F (Note 5) greater than Table C-3 duration RCS CU4.2 (Bases Page 131)

Temp.

• RCS pressure rise greater than 10 psig due to a loss of RCS cooling (this condition is not applicable in solid Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level indication plant conditions) for greater than or equal to 15 min. (Note 4)

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities 5 6 DEF CU5.1 (Bases Page 138) 5 None None None Loss of all Table C-2 onsite (internal) communication methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations OR Comm. Loss of all Table C-2 offsite (external) communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications Inadvertent criticality 6

Inadvertent None None None CU6.1 (Bases Page 140) 5 6 Criticality An unplanned, sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation Note 4: The Emergency Coordinator should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the Note 5: Begin monitoring hot condition EALs concurrently event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time Table C-1 Sumps / Tanks Table C-2 Communications Systems Table C-3 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds Onsite Offsite

• If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature

• Containment Sump 1 System (internal) (external) is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable

• Containment Sump 2 Gai-Tronics Page/party system (Public Address System) X Containment Duration

• CCW Surge Tank A RCS Status Closure Status Plant Radio System X

• CCW Surge Tank B PABX (Private Automatic Branch Exchange System) X X Intact (but NOT reduced inventory) N/A 60 min.*

• PRT Public Telephone System X X Established 20 min.*

• RCDT Federal Telephone System (FTS) X Not intact OR reduced inventory NOT established 0 min.

Table C-4 Containment Challenge Conditions Table C-5 AC Power Sources

• Containment closure not established Offsite:

• Containment hydrogen concentration

• 138 KV switchyard circuit greater than 4%

• 345 KV switchyard circuit

• Unplanned pressure rise that can breach Onsite:

the Containment barrier

• uEG1

• uEG2 EAL Identifier XXX.X Category (R, H, E, S, F, C) Sequential number within subcategory/classification Emergency classification (G, S, A, U) Subcategory number (1 if no subcategory)

Prepared for Luminant by: Operations Support Services, Inc. - www.ossi-net.com CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 Handout 1 Rev. 0

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: July 2016 Exam Level: RO SRO(I) SRO (U) Operating Test Number: NRC Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function 003 - Dropped Control Rod (RO1024A)

S-1 M,S 1 Respond to Control Rod Misalignment 010 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (RO1205)

S-2 A,D,S 3 PORV Block Valve Operability Test 002 - Reactor Coolant System (RO1412C) L,M,S 4P S-3 Respond to a Shutdown Loss of Coolant 045 - Main Turbine Generator System (RO3113)

S-4 A,L,N,S 4S Perform Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks 026 - Containment Spray System (RO2002C)

S-5 Transfer Containment Spray to Recirculation with A,D,EN,L,S 5 Cavitation 064 - Emergency Diesel Generator System (RO4215B)

S-6 A,D,P,S 6 Restore Safeguards Bus 1EA1 to Offsite Power 015 - Nuclear Instrumentation System (RO1820)

S-7 D,S 7 Respond to a Power Range Channel Malfunction 067 - Plant Fire On-site (RO4405)

S-8 D,S 8 Respond to Fire in the Safeguards Building In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) 004 - Chemical and Volume Control (AO5202A) A,D,E,R 2 P-1 Perform Local Actions to Restart the Positive Displacement Pump 055 - Loss of All AC Power (RO4217H) N,E,L 6 P-2 Perform Attachment 2A DC Load Shedding 068 - Control Room Evacuation (AO5115B) D,E,L,R 8 P-3 Emergency Borate from the Remote Shutdown Panel Page 1 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / > 1(control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3 <3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S-1 Control Rod H-8 which is part of Control Bank D is misaligned from its bank.

Control Rod H-8 is at 204 steps as indicated on DRPI and Control Bank D indicates 216 steps. The applicant is provided ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction and is required to realign Control Rod H-8 using the DRPI Method.

The critical steps include selecting the proper bank, withdrawing the entire bank to a known position, deselecting the non-misaligned rods from moving, aligning Control Rod H-8, resetting the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm, returning the entire bank to its pre-malfunction position and restoring the Control Rod system for continued operation. This is a modified from bank JPM as a recent procedural change added the directions which are to be used for clearing the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm if present and which this JPM now exercises. This JPM is under the Control Rod Drive System - Reactivity Control Safety Function. (K/A 003.AA1.02 - IR 3.6 / 3.4)

S-2 The applicant will be provided with OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test and will be required to perform the Operability Test. This is an Alternate Path JPM because when PORV Block Valve 1/1-8000B is reopened as part of the test, the PORV partially opens requiring the applicant to take action to isolate the open PORV.

The critical steps include closing each PORV Block Valve, performing the stroke test of each PORV and restoring the original configuration. An additional critical step of isolating the stuck open PORV follows the malfunction. PORV Block Valves are provided to isolate a PORV if excessive leakage develops and are discussed in FSAR 15.4.13.2. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Pressurizer Pressure Control System - Reactor Pressure Control Safety Function.

(K/A 010.A4.03 - IR 4.0 / 3.8)

Page 2 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 S-3 The applicant will respond to a lowering Pressurizer level with the Residual Heat Removal System in service per ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, Section 2.0, Shutdown Loss of Coolant. This is a modified JPM under the Residual Heat Removal System - Primary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core Safety Function. The modification consists of a different plant configuration as the Initial Conditions which do not require performance of an Alternate Path.

(K/A 025.AA1.02- IR 3.8 / 3.9)

S-4 The applicant will use OPT-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks to perform the task. This is an Alternate Path JPM as the Turbine speed will increase above the allowable procedural guidance while the HP Stop Valves are opening. This speed increase requires that the turbine be tripped in accordance with OPT-410A. The critical steps will include resetting the turbine trip, latching the turbine, opening the HP Stop Valves and tripping the turbine when speed increases. This is a new JPM under the Main Turbine Generator System - Heat Removal from Reactor Core Secondary Systems Safety Function.

(K/A 045.A4.01 - IR 3.1 / 2.9)

S-5 Following a LBLOCA, the applicant will transfer the Containment Spray System from the Injection mode to Recirculation in accordance with EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. This is an Alternate Path JPM as the applicant will not be able to open the containment sump valves to the Train B Containment Spray Pumps. This will require the applicant to secure Train B. Critical steps will include transferring Train A suction to the containment sump and securing both Train B pumps when suction cannot be realigned. Transferring Containment Spray to Recirculation Mode is considered a Time Significant Action. STI-214.01, Control of Timed Operator Actions, TSA-2.8 requires Containment Spray transferred to Recirculation Mode within 70 seconds of RWST level reaching 6%. This Time Significant Action is performed to avoid the requirement to secure Containment Spray Pumps due to losing suction supply when RWST level reaches 0%. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Containment Spray System - Containment Integrity Safety Function. (K/A 026.A4.01 - IR 4.5 / 4.3)

S-6 The applicant will restore Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 in accordance with SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System, Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply.

The alternate path occurs when a lowering frequency requires separating the Emergency Diesel Generator from the grid. This is a bank JPM, previously used on the 2014 NRC operating test, under the Emergency Diesel Generator System -

Electrical Safety Function. (K/A 064.A4.07 - IR 3.4 / 3.4)

S-7 Following a Power Range Instrument failure. The applicant is required to perform the actions of ABN-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction. Critical steps include several repositions on the NI Detector cabinets to defeat the failed instrument, defeating the N-16 Channel on CB-05 and the TAVE channel on CB-07.

This is a direct from bank JPM under the Nuclear Instrumentation System -

Instrumentation Safety Function. (K/A 015.A2.01 - IR 3.5 / 3.9)

Page 3 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 S-8 A fire has been identified in the Safeguards Building. The applicant is directed to respond to the fire in accordance with ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building. Critical steps include performing an emergency start of Diesel Generator 1-02, performing CVCS realignments and starting CCP 1-02.

Comanche Peak has commitments within ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, to maintain CCP suction due to possible Gas Intrusion as noted in SOER 97-01, Loss of HP Injection & Charging from Gas Intrusion. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Plant Fire On-site - Plant Service Systems Safety Function. (K/A 067.AA2.16 - IR 3.3 / 4.0)

P-1 Following a loss of instrument air, the applicant is required to reset control air to the Positive Displacement Charging Pump in accordance with ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction and restore the PDP to operation in accordance with SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System. This JPM is Alternate Path as the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank level is out of specification during the pump restart and requires filling. Critical steps include resetting the air to the hydraulic speed changer, repositioning the fill valve to the coolant tank and opening the pump discharge valve. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Chemical and Volume Control System - Reactivity Control System Inventory Control Safety Function. (K/A 004.A4.08 - IR 3.8 / 3.4)

P-2 During a complete loss of All AC Power, the applicant is required to perform ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power Attachment 2A which is Initial DC Load Shed.

Critical steps include performing several operations on Distribution Panels to properly align equipment from Unit 2 where possible and shed loads where required. This is a new JPM as DC Load Shedding has been redeveloped following BDBEE considerations. (K/A 055.EA1.04 3.5/3.9)

P-3 During a Control Room evacuation due to a security threat, the applicant is required to take action to place the plant in control of the operators from outside the control room. Actions will be performed using ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability. The critical steps include transferring control of equipment from the Control Room to the Hot Shutdown Panel, starting a Boric Acid Transfer Pump and opening the emergency borate valve. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Control Room Evacuation System - Plant Service Systems Safety Function.

(K/A 068.AA1.11 - IR 3.9 / 4.1)

Page 4 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-1 Task # RO1024 K/A # 003.AA1.02 3.6 / 3.4 SF-1

Title:

Respond to Control Rod Misalignment Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

CUE THE EXAMINEE Provide the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cue to the Examinee. Any special conditions or instructions should be contained on this sheet Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power

• Control Rod H8 is at 204 steps as indicated on DRPI, all other rods in Control Bank D indicate 216 steps

• Demand counters for Control Bank D are indicating 215 steps

• All necessary verifications, repairs, and determinations have been made in accordance with ABN-712

• Technical Specifications have been referenced

• An NEO is standing by at the P/A Converter AUTO/MANUAL Selector Switch

• Control Rod H8 has been misaligned for 15 minutes Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• REALIGN Control Rod H8 with Control Bank D at the normal withdrawal rate per ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section 3.3, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2, STARTING at Step 14

• DESIRED DRPI light for Step 15 is 222 Steps Task Standard: Realigned Control Rod H8 with Control Bank D, positioned Control Bank D to 216 Steps as indicated on DRPI, cleared the Control Rod Urgent Failure Alarm and returned Control Rod Bank Select to Manual.

Ref. Materials: ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction Rev. 10-16.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator:

INITIALIZE to IC-33

• When contacted, EXECUTE remote function RDR03, P/A Converter to MANUAL.

OR INITIALIZE to IC-18 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

• EXECUTE the following malfunctions:

• RD13H8, Control Bank D Rod H8 @ 202 Steps

• PLACE Simulator in RUN

• PLACE 1/1-RBSS, Control Rod Bank Select in MANUAL

• DELETE malfunction RD13H8, Control Bank D Rod H8 @ 202 steps

• PLACE Simulator in FREEZE

• When contacted, EXECUTE remote function RDR03, P/A Converter to MANUAL Handouts:

PROVIDE the Applicant with a copy of:

• ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section 3.3, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2, appropriately marked through Step 13 (Labeled Procedure 1)

Page 2 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ABN-712, Section 3.3.

Perform Step: 1 Transfer 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to affected bank.

3.3.14 Performance ROTATED 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to Bank CBD Standard: position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Record positions for affected Rod:

3.3.15.a & 1 line st

• Affected Rod (DRPI) _____

Performance RECORDED Rod H8 DRPI at 204 Steps.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Record positions for affected Rod:

3.3.15.a & 2nd line

• Bank (DRPI) _____

Performance RECORDED Bank CBD DRPI at 216 Steps.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Record positions for affected Rod:

3.3.15.a & 3rd line

• Group 1 step counter _____

Performance OBSERVED 1-SC-CBD1, CTRL BANK D GROUP 1 and RECORDED Standard: at 215 Steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Record positions for affected Rod:

3.3.15.a & 4th line

• Group 2 step counter _____

Performance OBSERVED 1-SC-CBD2, CTRL BANK D GROUP 2 and RECORDED Standard: at 215 Steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 If restoring a Control Bank rod, Then Locally POSITION and MAINTAIN 3.3.15.b P/A Converter Auto-Manual selector switch (SFGD 832 Rm 1-096) -

MANUAL Performance CONTACTED NEO to place P/A Convertor in MANUAL Standard:

Simulator When contacted, Insert Malfunction RDR03 Operator:

Examiner Cue: Report as NEO that the P/A Converter is in Manual Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: DRPI ROD DEV reflashes on each outward rod movement Perform Step: 7 Move affected group outward to the desired DRPI Light.

3.3.15.c Performance PLACED 1/1-FLRM, CONTROL ROD MOTION CTRL in OUT position Standard: until DRPI lights for Bank D indicated 222 Steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 8 Place all lift coil disconnect switches for affected bank, groups 1 AND 2, 3.3.15.d EXCEPT for affected rod to the UP (disconnected) position.

Performance At rear of Control Board, PLACED Lift Coil Disconnect Switches for Standard: Rods D4, M12, D12, and M4 in ROD DISCONNECTED (up) position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Cue: Inform applicant that other operators will adjust turbine load as required.

Perform Step: 9 Maintain Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following as 3.3.15.e.1) & all bullets necessary:

• Turbine Power/Steam Dumps/Boration/Dilution Performance MONITORED TAVE.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Verify that only affected Rod is moving.

3.3.15.e.2)

Performance VERIFIED that only Rod H8 is moving.

Standard:

Comment: Step SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 Ensure last movement of affected rod is in same direction as last 3.3.15.e.3) movement of affected group.

Performance ENSURED last movement of Control Rod H8 is in same direction as last Standard: movement of Control Bank CBD as entire bank was moved outward.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: DRPI ROD DEV will clear when rod H-8 is withdrawn Perform Step: 12 WITHDRAW the affected rod in controlled increments until aligned with 3.3.15.f its group by DRPI indication.

Performance PLACED 1/1-FLRM, CONTROL ROD MOTION CTRL in OUT position Standard: until DRPI light for Rod H8 indicated 222 Steps.

Examiner Cue: If applicant begins withdrawing in small increments, Inform applicant the US direct withdrawing rods in one or more steps to desired position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 Place all lift coil disconnect switches to the DOWN (connected) position.

3.3.15.g Performance At rear of Control Board, PLACED Lift Coil Disconnect Switches for Standard: Rods D4, M12, D12, and M4 in ROD CONNECTED (down) position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Cue: If applicant questions if cause of alarm has been corrected refer applicant to Initial Conditions.

Perform Step: 14 VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm - CLEAR.

3.3.15.h Performance OBSERVED 1-ALB-6D, Window 1.6, CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT Standard: FAIL is LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm - CLEAR.

3.3.15.h & RNO a Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

• Ensure only lift reg white light on designated circuit card in affected cabinet (See ALB-6D 1.6 logic diagram) - LIT Performance Contacted NEO to determine if the only white light LIT is the LIFT REG Standard: light.

Examiner Cue: Report as NEO that a single white LIFT REG light is LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 6 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 16 VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm - CLEAR.

3.3.15.h & RNO b Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

• DEPRESS 1/1-RCAR, CONTROL ROD CTRL ALARM RESET Performance DEPRESSED 1/1-RCAR, CONTROL ROD CTRL ALARM RESET Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 17 VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm - CLEAR.

3.3.15.h & RNO c Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

• Ensure ALL white lights on designated circuit card in affected cabinet (See ALB-6D 1.6 logic diagram) - DARK Performance Contacted NEO to determine if all white lights are Dark Standard:

Examiner Cue: Report as NEO that All white lights are Dark Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 18 RESTORE affected bank to the DRPI position recorded in step 15a.

3.3.15.i Performance PLACED 1/1-FLRM, CONTROL ROD MOTION CTRL in IN position until Standard: DRPI lights for Bank D indicated 216 Steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 19 RESET affected bank demand step counters to the values recorded in 3.3.15.j Step 15a.

Performance ADJUSTED 1-SC-CBD1 and 1-SC-CBD2 to 215 steps.

Standard:

Examiner Note: If applicant depresses Reset (RS) button, there is no adverse impact other than waiting to reset value to 215 steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 7 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 20 If operated in step 15b, Then PLACE P/A Converter Auto-Manual 3.3.15.k selector switch - AUTO Performance CONTACTED NEO to place P/A Convertor in AUTO Standard:

Simulator When contacted, MODIFY RDR03, to AUTO Operator:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 21 PLACE 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to MANUAL.

3.3.15.l Performance ROTATED 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to MANUAL Standard: position.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 8 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 9 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power

• Control Rod H8 is at 204 steps as indicated on DRPI, all other rods in Control Bank D indicate 216 steps

• Demand counters for Control Bank D are indicating 215 steps

• All necessary verifications, repairs, and determinations have been made in accordance with ABN-712

• Technical Specifications have been referenced

• An NEO is standing by at the P/A Converter AUTO/MANUAL Selector Switch

• Control Rod H8 has been misaligned for 15 minutes Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• REALIGN Control Rod H8 with Control Bank D at the normal withdrawal rate per ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section 3.3, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2, STARTING at Step 14

• DESIRED DRPI light for Step 15 is 222 Steps Page 10 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-1 (RO1024A) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-2 Task # RO1205 K/A # 010.A4.03 4.0 / 3.8 SF-3

Title:

PORV Block Valve Operability Test Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 100% power

• Surveillance on the PORV Block Valves is required

• All Prerequisites have been met Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• PERFORM the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test for both Block Valves

• RECORD data on OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet Task Standard: Performed the PORV Block Valve Operability Test through Step 8.2.3 per OPT-109A and Closed the PORV Block Valve upon failure of PORV 1-PCV-456 prior to a reactor trip.

Ref. Materials: OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test, Rev. 11.

OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet, Rev. 13.

ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE, Rev. 7-2.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-34 OR Load any at power IC AND PERFORM the following:

• VERIFY both PRZR Block Valves are OPEN

• ENSURE ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE is CLEAR

• EXECUTE malfunction RX16B, PRZR PORV 456 fails 30% open when 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV Block Valve is reopened at Step 8.2.3. use the following conditional command to initiate the malfunction:

{DIRCV8000B.Value=2} IMF RX16B f:30 d:13 Handouts:

INITIALLY PROVIDE the applicant with:

• OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test (Labeled Procedure 1)

• OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet (Labeled Form 1)

Provide a copy of ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE when the applicant references the ALM for the above listed annunciator. (Labeled Procedure 2)

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from OPT-109A, Section 8.0.

Perform Step: 1 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.1.1 ENSURE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Performance DETERMINED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.1.2 CLOSE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance

• PLACED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE (critical)

Standard:

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical)

• CIRCLED CLOSED on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step 8.1.2 (NOT critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Stroke test of 1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.1.3 OPEN 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance

• PLACED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in OPEN (critical)

Standard:

• OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical)

• CIRCLED OPEN on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step 8.1.3 (NOT critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.2.1 ENSURE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Performance DETERMINED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 5 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.2.2 CLOSE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance

• PLACED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE (critical)

Standard:

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical)

• CIRCLED CLOSED on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step 8.2.2 (NOT critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Stroke test of 1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

8.2.3 OPEN 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance

• PLACED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in OPEN (critical)

Standard:

• OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical)

• CIRCLED OPEN on Form OPT-109A-1 at Step 8.2.3 (NOT critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT SIMULATOR When 1/1-8000B is reopened, EXECUTE malfunction RX16B at 30%.

OPERATOR Ensure the conditional inserted the malfunction.

NOTE: {DIRCV8000B.Value=2} IMF RX16B f:30 d:13 Perform Step: 7 Acknowledge annunciator 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE.

Performance ACKNOWLEDGED annunciator 5C, Window 1.4 - PORV 455A/456 Standard: NOT CLOSE and RECOGNIZED PORV 456 is OPEN Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Examiner Note: The applicant may recognize the failure and take action prior to referencing the ALM.

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4.

Provide a copy to the examinee when they reach for the control board copy Perform Step: 8 Determine affected PORV.

1 Performance DETERMINED affected PORV is 1/1-PCV-456 Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Monitor pressurizer pressure.

2 & 2.A

• If one channel is indicating > 60 psig difference between the remaining operable channels, go to ABN-705.

Performance DETERMINED all Pressurizer pressure indications are reading Standard: approximately the same value Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV will be stuck in mid-position.

Perform Step: 10 Monitor pressurizer pressure.

2, 2.B, & 2nd bullet

• If reactor is in Mode 1, 2 or 3 with pressurizer pressure < 2335 psig, Then close affected PORV.

• 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV Performance PLACED 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV in CLOSE and OBSERVED red Standard: OPEN and green CLOSE lights both LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 11 With reactor in Mode 4, 5 or 6, Then refer to TDM-301A to determine 3 RCS pressure and temperature limits.

Performance DETERMINED Reactor is in MODE 1 Standard:

Examiner Note: Examinee determines step is N/A.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: As the applicant has already determined the leaking PORV it is not anticipated that this step will be performed but considered N/A by the applicant.

Perform Step: 12 Verify pressurizer or RCS wide range pressure stabilizes.

4, 4.A, & 1st bullet

• IF pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage, THEN close both PORV block valves AND determine affected PORV.

• 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV

• 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV Performance

• PLACED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE Standard:

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: A Low Pressurizer Pressure automatic Reactor Trip is generated at 1880 psig. Procedural guidance contained in ALM-0052A is to manually trip the Reactor if pressure cannot be maintained above 2150 psig.

Perform Step: 13 Verify pressurizer or RCS wide range pressure stabilizes.

4, 4.A, & 2nd bullet

• IF pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage, THEN close both PORV block valves AND determine affected PORV.

• 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV

• 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV Performance

• PLACED 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE prior to a Standard: reactor trip (critical)

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (non-critical)

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 100% power

• Surveillance on the PORV Block Valves is required

• All Prerequisites have been met Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• PERFORM the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test for both Block Valves

• RECORD data on OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 (RO1205) REV. 2

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-2 Form 1 Rev. 0 Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-3 Task # RO1412 K/A # 025.AA1.02 3.8 / 3.9 SF-4-P

Title:

Respond to a Shutdown Loss of Coolant Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 4 with the following conditions:

• RHR Train B is in service

• RHR Train A is in ECCS standby with 1/1-8701A and 1/1-8702A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLVs CLOSED and De-energized

• CCP 1-02, SIP 1-01 and SIP 1-02 breakers have been racked out to comply with LCO 3.4.12

• A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred

• ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant is being implemented

• Positive Displacement Charging Pump has been started

• Pressurizer Level is still lowering Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, starting at Step 2.3.8.b, Check RCS Status, with the Pressurizer Level NOT stable or increasing Task Standard: In accordance with ABN-108, opened 1/1-8835, placed 1/1-APRH2 in pull-out, closed 1/1-8702B and opened a CCP SI ISOL VLV to provide injection to the RCS from a CCP.

Ref. Materials: ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, Rev. 4-5 Validation Time: 10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Page 1 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-40

• ENSURE 480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF Circles ON 1/1-8701A and 1/1-8702A

• ENSURE 480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF Circles OFF 1/1-8701B and 1/1-8702B

• START TREND GTGC MODE 4 for current plant condition or any MODE 4 Initial Condition and then PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE Train B RHR Systems in service

• ENSURE 480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF Circles ON 1/1-8701A and 1/1-8702A

• ENSURE 480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF Circles OFF 1/1-8701B and 1/1-8702B

• START TREND GTGC MODE 4 for current plant condition

• PERFORM the 1st seven steps of ABN-108

• Place PDP in service

• Place CCP 1-02 and SIP Breakers in Rackout

• INSERT malfunction RC17A at 600 gpm to lower RCS level and allow Cold Calibrated PRZR level to lower to 50% then FREEZE the Simulator PERFORM the following after each JPM:

• REMOVE the key from 1/1-8835, SI to CL 1-4 INJ ISOL VLV and RETURN to Key Locker Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant with initials as appropriate through Step 2.3.8.b Page 2 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Simulator When examinee is ready, PLACE Simulator in RUN.

Operator:

Simulator INSERT remote function CVR17 for CCP 1-02 Breaker (Key 1);

Operator: SIR01 for SI Pump 1-01 Breaker (Key 2); or SIR02 for SI Pump 1-02 Breaker (Key 3) as directed by the applicant Perform Step: 1 Dispatch operators to rack in the breaker to affected units non-operating Step 8 RNO 1) CCP OR ONE safety injection pump.

Performance DISPATCHED operator to rack in breaker for one pump Standard:

Examiner Cue: The [Whichever breaker was requested] is racked in.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Examinee will obtain key from Key Locker.

Perform Step: 2 Ensure 1/u-8835, SI TO CL 1-4 INJ ISOL VLV, OPEN.

Step 8 RNO 2)

Performance INSERTED key in switch and TURNED to ON position then PLACED Standard: 1/1-8835, SI TO CL 1-4 INJ ISOL VLV in OPEN (Critical)

OBSERVED red OPEN light illuminated (NOT Critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The next two steps may be performed in any order Perform Step: 3 Stop both RHR pumps AND place HSs in PULL-OUT:

Step 8 RNO 3)

• 1/u-APRH1, RHRP 1 Performance PLACED 1/1-APRH1, RHRP 1, in PULL-OUT and OBSERVED the Standard: green and red pump lights dark Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Stop both RHR pumps AND place HSs in PULL-OUT:

Step 8 RNO 3)

• 1/u-APRH2, RHRP 2 Performance PLACED 1/1-APRH2, RHRP 2, in PULL-OUT and OBSERVED the Standard: green and red pump lights dark Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Close 1/u-8701A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV AND 1/u-8702B, Step 8 RNO 4) RHRP 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV.

Performance OBSERVED 1/1-8701A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV in CLOSE and Standard: DE-ENERGIZED Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Close 1/u-8701A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV AND 1/u-8702B, Step 8 RNO 4) RHRP 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV.

Performance PLACED 1/1-8702B, RHRP 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV in CLOSE and Standard: OBSERVED green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Identify AND Isolate Leak per Attachment 7, while continuing this Step 8 RNO 5) procedure.

Performance IDENTIFY and ISOLATE Leak per Attachment 7, RCS Leak Standard: Identification and Isolation.

Examiner Cue: Another operator will perform Attachment 7, RCS Leak Identification and Isolation.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 GO TO Step 11.

Step 8 RNO 6)

Performance PLACEKEPT to Step 11.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 9 Verify RWST level - GREATER THAN 33%:

Step 11

• u-LI-932, RWST LVL CHAN III

• u-LI-933, RWST LVL CHAN IV Performance DETERMINED RWST level greater than 33% by OBSERVING 1-LI-932, Standard: RWST LVL CHAN III and 1-LI-933, RWST LVL CHAN IV.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Verify ONE CCP - RUNNING.

Step 12.a Performance DETERMINED CCP 1-01 was RUNNING.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 STOP 1/u-APPD, PDP.

Step 12.b Performance PLACED 1/1-APPD, PDP handswitch in STOP and OBSERVED Green Standard: Pump light LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 12 Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

Step 12.c 1st bullet

• 1/u-LCV-112D RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - OPEN Performance VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112D RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN Standard: and OBSERVED red OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

Step 12.c 2nd bullet

• 1/u-LCV-112E RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - OPEN Performance VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112E RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN Standard: and OBSERVED red OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 14 Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

Step 12.c 3rd bullet

• 1/u-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - CLOSED Performance VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE Standard: and OBSERVED green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

Step 12.c 4th bullet

• 1/u-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - CLOSED Performance VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE Standard: and OBSERVED green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 16 Verify the following valves closed:

Step 12.d

• u-ZL-8220, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - CLOSED

• u-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - CLOSED

• 1/u-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV - CLOSED

• 1/u-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV - CLOSED

• 1/u-8202A, VENT VLV - CLOSED

• 1/u-8202B, VENT VLV - CLOSED Performance VERIFIED the following valves closed:

Standard:

• 1-ZL-8220, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - Green light LIT

• 1-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - Green light LIT

• 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV - Green light LIT

• 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV - Green light LIT

• 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV - Green light LIT

• 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV - Green light LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 6 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Performance of either Step 17 or Step 18 is critical to establish an injection path Examiner Note: The next two steps may be performed in any order Perform Step: 17 Align CCP injection:

Step 12.e 1st bullet

• 1/u-8801A, CCP SI ISOL VLV - OPEN Performance PLACED 1/1-8801A, CCP SI ISOL VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red Standard: OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 18 Align CCP injection:

Step 12.e 2nd bullet

• 1/u-8801B, CCP SI ISOL VLV - OPEN Performance PLACED 1/1-8801B, CCP SI ISOL VLV in OPEN and OBSERVED red Standard: OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 19 Verify ECCS flow:

• u-FI-917, CCP SI FLO Performance OBSERVED flow indication on 1-FI-917, CCP SI FLO.

Standard:

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Unit 1 is in MODE 4 with the following conditions:

• RHR Train B is in service

• RHR Train A is in ECCS standby with 1/1-8701A and 1/1-8702A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLVs CLOSED and De-energized

• CCP 1-02, SIP 1-01 and SIP 1-02 breakers have been racked out to comply with LCO 3.4.12

• A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred

• ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant is being implemented

• Positive Displacement Charging Pump has been started

• Pressurizer Level is still lowering Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, starting at Step 2.3.8.b, Check RCS Status, with the Pressurizer Level NOT stable or increasing Page 8 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-3 (RO1412C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-4 Task # RO3113 K/A # 045.A4.01 3.1 / 2.9 SF-4P

Title:

Perform Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 3 Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• Perform OPT-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Task Standard: In accordance with OPT-410A, latched the Turbine, commenced opening the HP and LP stop valves and then tripped the Turbine prior to the HP stop valves obtaining the full open position.

Ref. Materials: OPT-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks. Rev. 9 - 4.

OPT-410A-1, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Data Sheet. Rev. 0 Validation Time: 10 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-37 or Initialize to IC-6 and insert the following:

Insert HP Control Valve leakage

{LOTCZL2414A_2.Value=1} IMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT1 f:600 d:53 r:60

{LOTCZL2414A_2.Value=1} IMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT2 f:600 d:53 r:60

{LOTCZL2414A_2.Value=1} IMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT3 f:600 d:53 r:60

Modify Control Valve Leakage when Turbine tripped

{DITCTCTRP.Value=1} MMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT1 f:194 r:60

{DITCTCTRP.Value=1} MMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT2 f:194 r:60

{DITCTCTRP.Value=1} MMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT3 f:194 r:60 Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• OPT-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks (Labeled Procedure 1)

• OPT-410A-1, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Data Sheet (Labeled Form 1)

Page 2 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from OPT-410A, Section 8.0.

Perform Step: 1 Latch the turbine as follows:

Step 8.1 & 8.1.1 On the TG Control Display, ensure the turbine is tripped, Turbine Trip Bar Red.

Performance DETERMINED that Turbine Trip bar was red.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1 & 8.1.2 Verify the following light indications on CB-04, 1-TSLB-3 are on:

• 1.7 - TURB TRIP FLUID LO 1-63AST 1

• 2.7 - TURB TRIP FLUID LO 1-63AST 2

• 3.7 - TURB TRIP FLUID LO 1-63AST 3 Performance VERIFIED on 1-TSLB-3 that windows 1.7, 2.7 and 3.7 are LIT.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3A On the TG Control Display in the Start-Up Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

A. Click the Turbine Latch Subgroup Controller to bring up the Osd Performance OPENED the Turbine Latch Subgroup Controller Osd.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3B On the TG Control Display in the Start-Up Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

B. IF the Turbine Latch Subgroup Controller is OFF (green/grey),

THEN Click 0/1 then Execute to turn ON (green/red) the Controller.

Performance CLICKED the 0/1 and Execute. Subgroup Controller indicated ON Standard: (green/red).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3C On the TG Control Display in the Start-Up Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

C. On the TG Control Display in the Speed Control Section, verify Speed Target Controller lower or equal to actual speed.

Performance VERIFIED speed target (134 RPM) is lower than actual speed (194 Standard: RPM).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3D On the TG Control Display in the Start-Up Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

D. In the Osd click 1 then Execute to start the Latching of the Turbine.

Performance CLICKED the 1 and Execute. Subgroup controller indicated blinking Standard: red.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 7 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.4 & 1st bullet Verify the following parameters:

• On the TG Display, verify the turbine trip is reset, Turbine Trip Bar white.

Performance VERIFIED Turbine Trip Bar white.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.4 & 2nd bullet Verify the following parameters:

• 1-PI-6559, TURB L/O PRESS - greater than 25 PSIG Performance VERIFIED Turbine Lube Oil Pressure is approximately 42 psig.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.4 & 3rd bullet Verify the following parameters:

• 1-PI-6561, EHC FLUID PRESS - greater than 114 PSIG Performance VERIFIED EHC Fluid Pressure is approximately 170 psig.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Latch the turbine as follows:

8.1, 8.1.4 & 4th bullet Verify the following parameters:

• 1-PI-6566, HP EHC FLUID PRESS - approximately 455 PSIG Performance VERIFIED HP EHC Fluid Pressure is approximately 525 psig.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: If the applicant questions whether the HP EHC Fluid Pressure is close enough to 455 psig to continue; Provide the following cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue with the Turbine Trip Checks.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 11 Verify the following light indications on CB-04, 1-TSLB-3 are on:

8.2

• 1.6 - MSL 1 HP STOP VLV 4 CLOSE UV-2428A

• 2.6 - MSL 2 HP STOP VLV 1 CLOSE UV-2429A

• 3.6 - MSL 3 HP STOP VLV 3 CLOSE UV-2430A

• 4.6 - MSL 4 HP STOP VLV 2 CLOSE UV-2431A Performance VERIFIED on 1-TSLB-3 that windows 1.6, 2.6, 3.6 and 4.6 are LIT.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 12 Verify HP stop valves are closed on CB-10:

8.3

• 1-ZL-2429A, HPT STOP VLV 1

• 1-ZL-2431A, HPT STOP VLV 2

• 1-ZL-2430A, HPT STOP VLV 3

• 1-ZL-2428A, HPT STOP VLV 4 Performance VERIFIED on CB-10 that Green light LIT and Red light DARK for each Standard: valve.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Examiner Note: The turbine speed will continue to increase to greater than 100 RPM above the original turning gear speed requiring a Turbine Trip.

Perform Step: 13 On the TG Control Display in the Start-Up Section, turn ON the Open 8.4 Stop Valves Subloop Controller to open the HP and LP stop valves.

Performance CLICKED the 0/1 and Execute. Subgroup controller turned red.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 6 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 14 The normal turning gear speed for the turbine may increase when the 5.1 & Caution turbine stop valves are open due to some leakage through the control valves. The turbine RPM should not be allowed to increase more than 100 RPM above the original turning gear speed. If the speed continues to increase, the turbine should be tripped and the conditions should be evaluated.

Performance DEPRESSED 1-TTSW Pushbutton on CB-10 prior to ALL HP Stop Standard: Valves obtaining Full Open status on CB-10, Red light LIT and Green light DARK.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 3 Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• Perform OPT-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Page 8 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 (RO3113) REV. 2

CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-4 Form 1 Rev. 0 Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-5 Task # RO2002 K/A # 026.A4.01 4.5 / 4.3 SF-5

Title:

Transfer Containment Spray From Injection to Recirculation Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

Time Critical: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• A Large Break LOCA has occurred and Containment Spray has actuated

• The Emergency Core Cooling System has been aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation per EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

• Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is 7% and lowering Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• When RWST level reaches 6%, Perform EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Attachment 1.H, Containment Spray Switchover Criterion Task Standard: Utilizing EOS-1.3A, transferred Containment Spray Train A from the Injection Mode to the Recirculation Mode from the Containment Sumps. Stopped Train B Containment Spray Pumps when alignment to the Containment Sump could not be performed. Closed RWST to Containment Spray Train A pumps within 70 seconds.

Ref. Materials: EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 9-0.

STI-214.01, Control of Timed Operator Actions, Rev. 0-5.

Validation Time: 3 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Time Critical Time: 70 seconds Completion Time: ________ seconds Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-5 (RO2002C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC #38 or any Post LOCA with RHR Swapover completed IC and PERFORM the following:

• INSERT Malfunction CS05B to fail 1-HS-4783 in CLOSE position.

If IC #38 is not available, RESET to any at power IC and PERFORM the following:

• INSERT malfunction RC08A2 (or equivalent Large Break LOCA).

• PLACE Simulator in RUN.

• REDUCE AFW Flow to all SGs.

• RESET SI, SIS, Containment and Isolation Phases A & B and Containment Spray.

• STOP both Emergency Diesel Generators.

• STOP all Reactor Coolant Pumps.

• When RWST level reaches LO-LO level, TRANSFER ECCS to Cold Leg Recirculation by performing Steps 1-3 of EOS-1.3A.

• INSERT MalfunctionCS05B to fail 1-HS-4783 in CLOSE position.

• FREEZE simulator when RWST level is 7%.

Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.

• Attachment 1.H, Containment Spray Switchover Criterion. (labeled Procedure 1)

Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-5 (RO2002C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from EOS-1.3, Attachment 1.H.

Examiner Note: CUE the Simulator Operator to PLACE the Simulator in RUN.

Perform Step: 1 Check RWST level - LESS THAN 6%.

4.a.

Performance OBSERVED 1-LI-930, RWST LVL CHAN I or 1-LI-931, RWST LVL Standard: CHAN II and VERIFY level is less than 6%.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Once RWST level less than 6%. Time Critical START TIME:

Examiner Note: Steps 2 and 3 may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 2 Realign Containment Spray System as follows:

4.b.1) & 1st bullet

• Open CNTMT SMP TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT ISOL VLVs:

• 1-HS-4782 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1-HS-4782, CNTMT SMP TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT ISOL VLV to OPEN (critical).

• OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Realign Containment Spray System as follows:

4.b.1) & 2nd bullet

• Open CNTMT SMP TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT ISOL VLVs:

• 1-HS-4783 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1-HS-4783, CNTMT SMP TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT ISOL VLV to OPEN.

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT. (Fails to Open)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-5 (RO2002C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: The following step represents the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Perform Step: 4 IF CNTMT SMP TO CSP VLV(s) can NOT be opened, THEN Place 4.b.1) RNO affected CSPs in PULL-OUT.

Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 in PULLOUT (critical).

• OBSERVED red FAN light LIT (NOT critical).

• PLACED 1-HS-4767, CSP 4 in PULLOUT (critical).

• OBSERVED red FAN light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Perform Steps 5 and 6 may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 5 Close RWST TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT VLVs:

4.b.2) & 1st bullet

• 1-HS-4758 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1-HS-4758, RWST TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT VLV to CLOSE (critical).

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Once 1-HV-4758 is Fully Closed. Time Critical STOP TIME:

Perform Step: 6 Close RWST TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT VLVs:

4.b.2) & 2nd bullet

• 1-HS-4759 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1-HS-4759, RWST TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT VLV to CLOSE.

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-5 (RO2002C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 7 Verify containment spray flows.

4.b.3)

Performance OBSERVED Containment Spray flows on:

Standard:

• 1-FI-4772-1, CSP 1 DISCH FLO at ~3600 GPM.

• 1-FI-4772-2, CSP 3 DISCH FLO at ~3600 GPM.

• 1-FI-4773-1, CSP 2 DISCH FLO at 0 GPM.

• 1-FI-4773-2, CSP 4 DISCH FLO at 0 GPM.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 IF containment spray train(s) NOT providing spray flow, THEN perform 4.b.3) RNO 3) A) the following:

Place affected CS HX OUT VLV(s) in PULL-OUT.

Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1-HS-4777, CS HX 2 OUT VLV to PULLOUT

• OBSERVED all lights OFF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 IF containment spray train(s) NOT providing spray flow, THEN perform 4.b.3) RNO 3) B) the following:

Notify Plant Staff of containment spray train(s) condition.

Performance CONSULTED Plant Staff to determine contingency actions.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: Another operator will consult with Plant Staff. The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue with the procedure.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 IF containment spray pumps have been stopped due to RWST 4.b.4) level, THEN perform the following:

Performance DETERMINED Containment Spray Pumps were NOT stopped due to Standard: low RWST Level.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-5 (RO2002C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• A Large Break LOCA has occurred and Containment Spray has actuated

• The Emergency Core Cooling System has been aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation per EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

• Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is 7% and lowering Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• When RWST level reaches 6%, Perform EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Attachment 1.H, Containment Spray Switchover Criterion THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-5 (RO2002C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-6 Task # RO4215 K/A # 064.A4.07 3.4 / 3.4 SF-6

Title:

Restore Safeguards Bus 1EA1 to Offsite Power Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: X Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 1

• Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-01 is supplying the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 due to post-work testing of the EDG

• Power from Transformer XST1 is available to the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1

• Transformer XST2 is NOT available Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• RESTORE Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 per SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System, Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply.

Task Standard: Utilizing SOP-609A, restored Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 and opened the Train A EDG Output Breaker prior to receiving 1-ALB-10B Window 2.8 DG 1 TRBL alarm.

Required Materials: SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System, Rev. 21-12.

Validation Time: 10 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC #39 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

• LOAD the EDG per SOP-609A, Section 5.6, Supplying 6.9 KV SFGD Busses with DG Alone.

• EXECUTE remote function EDR13, 480 VAC MCC Undervoltage Load Shedding Fuses to REMOVE (if Step 5.7.I is reached, the fuses will be reinstalled).

• OPEN both Offsite Power Breakers CS-1EA1-1 and CS-1EA1-2 for Bus 1EA1.

• PLACE CS-1EA1-1, Incoming Breaker 1EA1 in PULLOUT and HANG a Red Tag.

• ENSURE EDG and Safeguards Bus voltages are NOT matched prior to SNAP of IC.

• When the 1EA1-2 Feeder Breaker is CLOSED at Step 5.7.E, EXECUTE malfunction ED09, Grid Frequency Disturbance at 57.9 Hertz and 120 second ramp

{DIED1EA12.iivPanel=3} IMF ED09 f:57.9 r:120.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE:

• After each JPM, VERIFY the Synchroscope Key Switch is moved to a different position.

Handout:

PROVIDE the applicant with a copy of:

• SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System.

• Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply. (labeled Procedure 1)

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-609A, Section 5.7.

Perform Step: 1 TURN the synchroscope for the selected breaker ON.

5.7.A & 2 bullet nd

• SS-1EA1-2 BKR 1EA1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Performance PLACED SS-1EA1-2, BKR 1EA1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE to ON and Standard: OBSERVED the synchroscope move approximately to the 12 o'clock position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Using the DG VOLT CTRL, ADJUST running voltage to match incoming 5.7.B voltage.

Performance ADJUSTED 90-1EG1, DG 1 VOLT CTRL to RAISE or LOWER DG Standard: Output Voltage to MATCH Running Volts (V-RUN) with Incoming Volts (V-IN) and OBSERVED Running Volts MATCHED with Incoming Volts.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Synchroscope speed is not considered critical, however, it must be moving in the SLOW direction.

Perform Step: 3 Using DG SPD CTRL, ADJUST the speed so that the synchroscope is 5.7.C moving 2 to 4 RPM in the SLOW direction.

Performance ADJUSTED 65-1EG1, DG 1 SPD CTRL to RAISE or LOWER Diesel Standard: Generator speed so that synchroscope is moving 2 to 4 RPM in the SLOW direction.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 IF Grid induced load, voltage, OR frequency fluctuations occur while the 5.7.D & 1st bullet DG is synchronized to the bus, THEN OPEN the DG Output Breaker:

• CS-1EG1, DG 1 BKR 1EG1 Performance OBSERVED Note before Step 5.7.D.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 CLOSE the feeder breaker when the synchroscope is slightly before the 5.7.E & 2 bullet nd 12 o'clock position AND moving 2 to 4 RPM in the SLOW direction.

• CS-1EA1-2 INCOMING BKR 1EA1-2 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED CS-1EA1-2, INCOMING BKR 1EA1-2, in CLOSE when synchroscope is at 12 o'clock (critical).

• OBSERVED red CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Simulator VERIFY malfunction ED09, Grid Frequency Fluctuation at 57.9 Hz Operator: over 120 seconds has initiated.

Perform Step: 6 Acknowledge annunciator alarm 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.5 - 6.9 KV BUS 1EA1 / 1EA2 PARALLELED.

Performance ACKNOWLEDGED annunciator alarm 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.5 - 6.9 KV Standard: BUS 1EA1 / 1EA2 PARALLELED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 RAISE DG load to 0.5 MW as necessary, to prevent a reverse power trip 5.7.F using DG SPD CTRL handswitch.

Performance OBSERVED load on W-1EG1, DG 1 MEGAWATTS at approximately 1 Standard: MWe.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 TURN OFF the synchroscope for the selected breaker.

5.7.G Performance PLACED SS-1EA1-2, BKR 1EA1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE in OFF.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: This step may be performed if frequency degradation has not yet been identified.

Perform Step: 9 MAINTAIN 0-500 KVAR out by adjusting the selected DG VOLT CTRL 5.7.H handswitch.

Performance ADJUSTED 90-1EG1, DG 1 VOLT CTRL to RAISE or LOWER DG Standard: Output Voltage to MAINTAIN 0-500 KVAR.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: This is Continuous Action Step 5.7.D to avoid excessive loading.

Perform Step: 10 OBSERVE Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 MWe frequency lowering 5.7.D NOTE uncontrollably and OPEN the output breaker.

Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• OPENED CS-1EG1, DG 1 BKR 1EG1 prior to receiving 1-ALB-10B Window 2.8 DG 1 TRBL alarm (critical).

• OBSERVED green TRIP light LIT (NOT critical).

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 1

• Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-01 is supplying the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 due to post-work testing of the EDG

• Power from Transformer XST1 is available to the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1

• Transformer XST2 is NOT available Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• RESTORE Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 per SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System, Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply.

Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-6 (RO4215C) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-7 Task # RO1820 K/A # 015.A2.01 3.5 / 3.9 SF-7

Title:

Respond to a Power Range Channel Malfunction Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power

• Power Range Instrument N-44 has failed low

• Rod control is in MANUAL Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue performing ABN-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction, START at Step 2.3.3 Task Standard: Defeated failed power range channel N44 utilizing ABN-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction.

Ref. Materials: ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction. Rev. 9-0 Validation Time: 5 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-7 (RO1820) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-35.

OR INITIALIZE to any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

• EXECUTE malfunction NI06E, PR N-44 Channel Failure to 0%

• ENSURE rod control is in MANUAL SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE:

After each JPM, VERIFY the following:

• 1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT (CB-05) is NOT in Loop 4 position

• 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT (CB-07) is NOT in Loop 4 position

• 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 CHAN SELECT N16 Recorder IS in Loop 4 position Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction, appropriately marked through Step 2.3.2. (Labeled as Procedure 1)

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-7 (RO1820) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ABN-703, Step 2.3.3.

Perform Step: 1 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.a At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select ROD STOP BYPASS switch to failed channel.

Performance SELECTED Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS PRN44.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: Another operator will acknowledge alarms.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.b At COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer, select COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to failed channel.

Performance SELECTED Comparator Channel Defeat switch to N44.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.c At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select UPPER SECTION switch to failed channel.

Performance SELECTED Upper Section switch to PRN44.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.d At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select LOWER SECTION switch to failed channel.

Performance SELECTED Lower Section switch to PRN44.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-7 (RO1820) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 5 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.e At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to failed channel.

Performance SELECTED Power Mismatch Bypass switch to BYPASS PRN44.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.f At POWER RANGE A drawer, select RATE MODE switch momentarily to RESET for failed channel.

Performance SELECTED Rate Mode switch momentarily to RESET for N44.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.g & 1st bullet Select the following switches to loop corresponding to failed channel:

• 1/u-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT (CB-05)

Performance PLACED 1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT in Loop 4 position.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Perform the following for failed channel:

2.3.3.g & 2nd bullet Select the following switches to loop corresponding to failed channel:

• u-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT (CB-07)

Performance PLACED 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT in Loop 4 position.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Ensure N16 Recorder selected to - OPERABLE CHANNEL:

2.3.4 & bullet

• 1/u-TS-411E, u-TR-411 CHAN SELECT Performance SELECTED 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 CHAN SELECT N16 Recorder Loop 1, Standard: Loop 2, or Loop 3.

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-7 (RO1820) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is at 100% power

• Power Range Instrument N-44 has failed low

• Rod control is in MANUAL Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue performing ABN-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction, START at Step 2.3.3 Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-7 (RO1820) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-8 Task # RO4405 K/A # 067.AA2.16 3.3 / 4.0 SF-8

Title:

Respond to a Fire in the Safeguards Building Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: Classroom:

Actual Performance: X Simulator: X Alternate Path: Plant:

Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE Provide the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cue to the Examinee. Any special conditions or instructions should be contained on this sheet.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, is in progress

• Other operators are performing ABN-804A, Attachments 5 and 6, which include isolation of Letdown flow Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• RESPOND to a fire in the Safeguards Building per ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, Section 5.0, Fire Affecting Safeguards Building Fire Area 1SD

• START at Step 5.3.6 Task Standard: Utilizing ABN-804A, responded to a fire in the Safeguards Building, started the Train B Emergency Diesel Generator, transferred Charging Pump suction to the RWST and started the Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump.

Ref. Materials: ABN-804A, Respond to a Fire in the Safeguards Building. Rev. 6-2 Validation Time: 10 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR:

INITIALIZE to IC-36 Or Initialize to IC-18 and PERFORM the following:

• ALARM ON for these Safeguards Fire Protection Panel annunciators:

• AFP09_16 for Window 4.2 - 810 SWGR RM TRN A

• AFP09_17 for Window 5.2 - 810 SWGR RM TRN A WTR FLO

• 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV in CLOSE

• 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV in CLOSE

• Place the following malfunctions on a conditional for CS-1DG2E in START with a 3 minute delay

• EBR112, 1ED1-1/9/BKR [BOP ARR 1, 1-CR-03]

• EBR113, 1ED1-1/10/BKR [1-TC-19,22,26]

• EBR115, 1ED1-1/14/BKR [1-TC-07,10]

• EBR116, 1ED1-1/17/BKR [1-TC-13,16]

Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building.

• Section 5.0, Fire Affecting Safeguards Building Fire Area 1SD appropriately marked through Step 5.3.5. (labeled Procedure 1)

Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following is from ABN-804A, and Section 5.0, Step 5.3.6.

Examiner Cue: If an automatic or manual reactor trip occurs during the performance of the procedure inform the examinee that another operator will perform the actions of EOP-0.0A and that they are to continue with ABN-804A.

Perform Step: 1 Perform an emergency start on Trn B Diesel Generator:

5.3.6

• CS-1DG2E, DG 2 EMER STOP/ START - START Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED CS-1DG2E, DG 2 EMER STOP/ START switch in START (Critical).

• OBSERVED V-1EG2, DG 2 VOLTS at ~6900 Volts (NOT critical).

• OBSERVED F-1EG2, DG 2 FREQ at 60 Hertz (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Place 1/1-APRH 1, RHRP 1 - PULL OUT 5.3.7 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1/1-APRH 1, RHRP 1 in PULLOUT (Critical).

• OBSERVED pump lights DARK (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 CLOSE 1/1-8812A, RWST TO RHRP 1 SUCT VLV 5.3.8 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1/1-8812A, RWST TO RHRP 1 SUCT VLV in CLOSE (Critical).

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 4 CLOSE 1/1-8100, RCP SEAL WTR RET ISOL VLV 5.3.9 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1/1-8100, RCP SEAL WTR RET ISOL VLV in CLOSE (Critical).

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

5.3.10.a

• IF charging pump performance indicates possible cavitation, THEN stop charging pump until below valves manually repositioned.

Performance OBSERVED 1-PI-120A, CHRG HDR PRESS and 1-FI-121A, CHRG Standard: FLO and DETERMINED that pump does not indicate cavitation and MARKED step as N/A.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Either 1/1-LCV-112D OR 1/1-LCV-112E can be opened.

Perform Step: 6 Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

5.3.10.b

• Ensure 1/1-LCV-112D OR 1/1-LCV-112E, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - OPEN.

Performance PERFORMED ONE of the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1/1-LCV-112D, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN (Critical).

• OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical).

OR

• PLACED 1/1-LCV-112E, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN (Critical).

• OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Both 1/1-LCV-112B AND 1/1-LCV-112C must be closed.

Perform Step: 7 Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

5.3.10.c

• Ensure 1/1-LCV-112B AND 1/1-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - CLOSED.

Performance PERFORMED BOTH of the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1/1-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE (Critical).

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

AND

• PLACED 1/1-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE (Critical).

• OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

5.3.10.d

• Verify 1-ZL-8220 AND 1-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - CLOSED.

Performance OBSERVED 1-ZL-8220 and 1-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT Standard: VENT VLVs green CLOSE lights LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

5.3.10.e

• Ensure 1/1-8202A AND 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV - CLOSED.

Performance VERIFIED 1/1-8202A and 1/1-8202B, VENT VLVs in CLOSE and Standard: OBSERVED green CLOSE lights LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 10 Ensure 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 - RUNNING.

5.3.11 Performance PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• PLACED 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 in START (Critical).

• OBSERVED red PUMP and FAN lights LIT (NOT critical).

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, is in progress

• Other operators are performing ABN-804A, Attachments 5 and 6, which include isolation of Letdown flow Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• RESPOND to a fire in the Safeguards Building per ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, Section 5.0, Fire Affecting Safeguards Building Fire Area 1SD

• START at Step 5.3.6 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S-8 (RO4405) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-1 (U1) Task # AO5202 K/A # 004.A4.08 3.8 / 3.4 SF-2

Title:

Perform Local Actions to Restart the Positive Displacement Pump Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: X Classroom:

Actual Performance: Simulator:

Alternate Path: X Plant: X RCA: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The crew is performing ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction

• Restart of the Positive Displacement Charging Pump (PDP) is required to establish Charging flow Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• RESET control air to the Unit 1 PDP Fluid Drive per ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction, Step 3.3.4.n

• RESTORE the Unit 1 PDP to operation per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup, Starting at Step 5.3.1.D Task Standard: Reset the PDP hydraulic speed changer, filled the Unit 1 PDP stuffing Box coolant tank and opened the PDP discharge valve.

Ref. Materials: ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction. Rev. 13-0 SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System. Rev. 18-15 Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 PLANT SETUP Handouts:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction, Completed through Step 3.3.4.n (labeled Procedure 1)

• SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Sections 2.5 and 5.3.1; through Step 5.3.1.C (labeled Procedure 2)

Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: Remind examinee to simulate all actions. The following step is from ABN-301, Section 3.0.

Perform Step: 1 Reset air to PDP hydraulic speed changer by pushing the brass button on the 3.3.4 n P/A Converter.

Performance DEPRESSED the control air RESET button located atop the Positive Standard: Displacement Pump Fluid Drive in the PDP Room. (PDP Pump Speed Control Reset)

Examiner Cue: The 1-01 PDP Hydraulic Speed Changer is RESET.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The following steps are from SOP-103A, Section 5.3.1.

Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path when the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is out of specification.

Perform Step: 2 IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN FILL per the following steps:

5.3.1 D Performance OBSERVED Stuffing Box Coolant Tank sight glass level.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The sight glass is EMPTY.

If applicant enquires about the alarm status on the Boron Recycle System Panel, Inform applicant that Window 3.3 - POS DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP COOLANT UNIT 1 LO LEVEL is in Alarm Examiner Cue: DO NOT provide this cue until operator demonstrates that the tank must be filled.

Another operator will monitor sight glass level as the tank is filled.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note:

• The Fill Valve is located in the Charging Pump Remote Operator Room (822) directly north of chemical mixing tank on east wall.

• The operator should turn the valve in the counter clockwise direction, and there will be flow noise, stem nut should be raised from initial position after operator turns counter clockwise.

Perform Step: 3 IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

5.3.1 D 1)

• Slowly crack OPEN 1CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved.

Examiner Cue: The valve is found with stem nut all the way down.

Performance Slowly turned 1CS-0119 in the counterclockwise (OPEN) direction until desired Standard: fill rate was achieved.

Examiner Cue: The valve is turning and flow noise is audible.

After the operator has demonstrated that the valve is open, report The NEO at the PDP stuffing box sight glass reports, The sight glass is at the desired level.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 WHEN the desired tank level has been established, THEN CLOSE 1CS-0119, 5.3.1 D 2) PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV.

Performance Turned valve in the clockwise (CLOSED) direction, when level REPORTED in Standard: the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank, until stem nut is down and valve will not turn.

Examiner Cue: 1CS-0119 stem nut is down and the valve will no longer turn in the clockwise direction, flow noise is no longer heard.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: The remote operator is located in the Charging Pump Remote Operator Room (822). Unit 1 covers are blue and Unit 2 covers are yellow. This valve is normally OPEN; down in the hole where the remote operator is inserted is a valve position indicator that will indicate OPEN.

Examiner Note: The following steps represent the Alternate Path when the discharge valve is closed.

Perform Step: 5 Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

5.3.1 E Examiner Cue: Once the operator has lifted the cover, report that the indicator indicates CLOSE.

Performance In the Charging Pump Remote Operator Room, PERFORMED the following:

Standard:

• REMOVED the blue cover for 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER.

• OBSERVED valve position indicator and DETERMINED valve CLOSE.

• LOCATED a Remote Operator hand tool for 1-8388-RO.

• PLACED hand tool on 1-8388-RO and TURNED in OPEN (counter clockwise) direction.

Examiner Cue: If the operator turns the valve (counter clockwise),

Report the valve has rotated and will no longer move, the indicator indicates OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: These valves are operated from the control room.

Perform Step: 6 OPEN the following valves:

5.3.1 F

• 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB)

• 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Performance CONTACTED the Control Room to ENSURE 1/1-8202A and 1/1-8202B, VENT Standard: VLVs are OPEN.

Terminating Cue: The vent valves are OPEN. This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• The crew is performing ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction

• Restart of the Positive Displacement Charging Pump (PDP) is required to establish Charging flow Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• RESET control air to the Unit 1 PDP Fluid Drive per ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction, Step 3.3.4.n

• RESTORE the Unit 1 PDP to operation per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup, Starting at Step 5.3.1.D Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-1 (AO5202A) (U1) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-2 (U1) Task # RO4217 K/A # 055.EA1.04 3.5 / 3.9 SF-6

Title:

Perform Attachment 2A DC Load Shedding Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: X Classroom:

Actual Performance: Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: X RCA:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue.

When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Loss of All AC Power

• Unit 2 is in MODE 3 with 2EA1 energized and 2EA2 de-energized Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• Perform Unit 1 Initial DC Load Shed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2A, Initial DC Load Shed Task Standard: Completed Section 2 of Attachment 2A, Initial DC Load Shed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power.

Ref. Materials: ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2A, Rev. 9-0 Validation Time: 20 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 PLANT SETUP Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

• ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power.

• Attachment 2A, Initial DC Load Shed. (labeled Procedure 1)

EXAMINER NOTE:

• Simulate/Discuss actions to obtain and use Key #150. (Key is located in the CPC -

Clearance Processing Center)

Page 2 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ECA-0.0A, Attachment 2A Perform Step: 1 Determine appropriate section of Attachment 2A to perform.

Note Performance Determined that Section 2 should be performed.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 IF 2EA1 is energized and 2EA2 is de-energized, THEN perform the 2a following:

ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall Ensure transfer switch on CPX-ECDPED-01S, 125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL XED1-1 AUTO TRANSFER SWITCH XED1-1S in Unit 2 (LOAD CONNECTED TO UNIT 2 LIGHT lit) (Key #150 from Key Locker required).

Examiner Cue: XED1-1S is in the Unit 1 position. LOAD CONNECTED TO UNIT 1 LIGHT is LIT.

Performance PLACED XED1-1S in Unit 2.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: XED1-1S is in the Unit 2 position. LOAD CONNECTED TO UNIT 2 LIGHT is LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Perform Steps 3-25 are bulleted and may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 3 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 1st bullet ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall [125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL XED2-1] CPX-ECDPED-02

• XED2-1/1/BKR, CABLE TERMINATION RACK 1-TC-02 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED XED2-1/1/BKR, Breaker in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 2nd bullet ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall

• XED2-1/3/BKR, CABLE TERMINATION RACK 1-TC-08 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED XED2-1/3/BKR Breaker in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 3rd bullet ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall

• XED2-1/7/BKR, HVAC CONTROL PANEL X-CV-01 TRAIN B SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED XED2-1/7/BKR Breaker in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 4 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 6 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 4th bullet ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall

• XED2-1/8/BKR , CABLE TERMINATION RACK X-TC-04 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED XED2-1/8/BKR Breaker in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 5th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall [125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1ED1-1] CP1-ECDPED-01

• 1ED1-1/6/BKR, TRAIN A SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET 1-SP-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1ED1-1/6/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 6th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall

• 1ED1-1/7/BKR, TRAIN A HVAC CONTROL PANEL X-CV-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1ED1-1/7/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 5 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 9 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 7th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall Northeast Corner [125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1ED2-1] CP1-ECDPED-02

• 1ED2-1/6/BKR, TRAIN B SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET 1-SP-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1ED2-1/6/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 8 bullet th ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall Northeast Corner

• 1ED2-1/7/BKR, TRAIN B HVAC CONTROL PANEL X-CV-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1ED2-1/7/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 9th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall [118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL (CHAN IV) 1PC4] CP1-ECDPPC-04

• 1PC4/6/BKR, SAFEGUARD TEST CABINET (TRAIN B) 1-LTC-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/6/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 6 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 12 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 10th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/7/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01A TRAIN A CHANNEL IV SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/7/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 11th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/8/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01B TRAIN B CHANNEL IV SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/8/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 14 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 12 bullet th ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/10/BKR, NSSS AUXILIARY RELAY RACK 2 1-LAR-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/10/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 13 bullet th ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/11/BKR, 118 VAC INSTRUMENT FUSE PANEL 1PC4-1 (FU2) SUPPLY BREAKER Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Performance PLACED 1PC4/11/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 7 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 16 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 14th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/13/BKR, UPGRADE PROTECTION CABINET (CH IV) 1-50D SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/13/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 17 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 15th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/14/BKR, PROTECTIVE RELAY RACK CHANNEL IV 1-CR-11 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/14/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 18 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 16 bullet th ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC4/18/BKR, ERF TRANSDUCER PANEL 1-LV-17 TRANSDUCER V-XD/1PC4 INPUT SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC4/18/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 19 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 17 bullet th ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall [118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL (CHAN III) 1PC3] CP1-ECDPPC-03

• 1PC3/7/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01A TRAIN A CHANNEL III SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/7/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 8 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 20 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 18th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC3/8/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01B TRAIN B CHANNEL III SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/8/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 21 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 19th bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC3/9/BKR, 118 VAC INSTRUMENT FUSE PANEL 1PC3-1 (FU4) SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/9/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 22 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 20 bullet th ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC3/10/BKR, PROTECTIVE RELAY RACK CHANNEL III 1-CR-11 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/10/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 23 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 21 bullet st ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC3/11/BKR, 118 VAC INSTRUMENT FUSE PANEL 1PC3-1 (FU2) SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/14/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 9 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Perform Step: 24 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 22nd bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC3/14/BKR, UPGRADE PROTECTION CABINET (CH III) 1-50C SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/14/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 25 Place the following breakers OFF:

2b 23rd bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

• 1PC3/18/BKR, ERF TRANSDUCER PANEL 1-LV-16 TRANSDUCER V-XD/1PC3 INPUT SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1PC3/18/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 26 ECB 807, U1 CSR South Wall 2c IF XEC1-1/00/BKR-1, 1EC5 TO 118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTR PANEL XEC1-1 PREFERRED FEEDER BREAKER is ON, THEN perform the following to transfer XEC1-1 supply to Unit 2.

Examiner Cue: XEC1-1/00/BKR-1 is OFF.

Performance Determined XEC1-1/00/BKR-1 is OFF.

Standard:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 10 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Examiner Note: Perform Steps 27 and 28 are bulleted and may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 27 Place the following breakers OFF:

2d 1st bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR on South Side of Column, Near West Wall, South of Stairs [118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1EC6]

CP1-ECDPEC-12

• 1EC6/5/BKR, CNTMT RECIRCULATING SUMP 1-02 LEVEL XMTR 1-LT-4781 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1EC6/5/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 28 Place the following breakers OFF:

2d 2nd bullet ECB 807, U1 CSR West Wall, South of Stairs to Control Room [118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1EC5] CP1-ECDPEC-11

• 1EC5/5/BKR, CNTMT RECIRCULATING SUMP 1-01 LEVEL XMTR 1-LT-4779 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance PLACED 1EC5/5/BKR in OFF.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 29 Notify Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND DC load 2e shed status. Perform Attachment 2.B when informed by Unit Supervisor that Containment Isolation Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation are complete.

Performance Notified Unit Supervisor that Attachment 2.A Section 2 is complete.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: The JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Page 11 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Loss of All AC Power

• Unit 2 is in MODE 3 with 2EA1 energized and 2EA2 de-energized Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

• Perform Unit 1 Initial DC Load Shed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2A, Initial DC Load Shed Page 12 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217H) (U1) Rev. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-3 (U2) Task #RO5115 K/A #068. AA1.11 3.9 / 4.1 SF-8

Title:

Emergency Borate from the Remote Shutdown Panel Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance: X Classroom:

Actual Performance: Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: X Time Critical: RCA: X CUE THE EXAMINEE Provide the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cue to the Examinee. Any special conditions or instructions should be contained on this sheet.

Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions with Unit 2 at 100% power:

• The Control Room was evacuated due to a Security threat

• Actions of ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability are in progress and have progressed to the point where Plant Cooldown is desired

• A Reactor Operator is standing by at the Shutdown Transfer Panel

• All security measures have been satisfied and operation in the area of the Remote Shutdown Panel is allowed Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor DIRECTS you to commence emergency boration to the Unit 2 RCS using Attachment 12 of ABN-905B.

Task Standard: Established emergency boration flow from the Remote Shutdown Panel Ref. Materials: ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability, Rev. 4, PCN-12.

Validation Time: 5 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-3 (RO5115B) (U2) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Handout:

PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability, Attachment 12, Boration. (labeled Procedure 1)

All operations for this JPM will be in Unit 2 Safeguards Building, 832 elevation on the Remote Shutdown Panel, an ABA1 key is required to access the panel.

Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-3 (RO5115B) (U2) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1

- Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Shutdown Transfer Panel (STP) switches will be operated by the Extra Examiner CUE: Reactor Operator.

Perform Steps 1-3 are bulleted and may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 1 Transfer the following from CR to HSP:

Step 1. 1st Bullet

• 43/2 - APBA1L, BA XFER PMP 1 CTRL XFER (STP)

Performance CONTACTED Extra Reactor Operator at STP to have switch transferred.

Standard:

REPORT 43/2 - APBA1L, BA XFER PMP 1 CTRL XFER switch is broke and Examiner Cue:

cannot be transferred at this time.

Comment: SAT UNSAT When pump is transferred green light on 1/2-APBA2L, BA XFER PMP 2 Examiner Note:

(RSP) will be on.

Perform Step: 2 Transfer the following from CR to HSP:

Step 1. 2nd Bullet

• 43/2 - APBA2L, BA XFER PMP 2 CTRL XFER (RSP)

Performance TURNED the switch to HSP Standard:

INDICATE switch is in the HSP position and pump green light is ON Examiner Cue:

Comment: SAT UNSAT When valve is transferred green light on 1/2-8104L, EMER BORATE VLV Examiner Note:

(RSP) will be on.

Perform Step: 3 Transfer the following from CR to HSP:

Step 1. 3rd Bullet

• 43/2 - 8104L, EMER BORATE VLV CTRL XFER (RSP)

Performance TURNED the switch to HSP Standard:

Examiner Cue: INDICATE switch is in the HSP position and valve green light is ON Comment: SAT UNSAT Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-3 (RO5115B) (U2) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Start one Boric Acid Transfer Pump:

Perform Step: 4

• 1/2 - APBA1L, BA XFER PMP 1 (RSP)

Step 2.

• 1/2 - APBA2L, BA XFER PMP 2 (RSP)

Performance TURNED 1/2-APBA2L Handswitch momentarily to START.

Standard:

INDICATE red light ON, green light OFF for pump started Examiner Cue:

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Open 1/2-8104L, EMER BORATE VLV (RSP).

Step 3.

Performance TURNED the switch to OPEN Standard:

Examiner Cue: INDICATE red light ON, green light OFF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Monitor 2-FI-183B, EMER BORATE FLO (RSP).

Step 6.

Performance MONITORED flow on 2-FI-183B.

Standard:

Examiner Cue: INDICATE flow is 95 gpm for one boric acid pump Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Notify the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor that emergency boration is in progress from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Performance NOTIFIED the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor that emergency boration is in progress Standard: from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Examiner Cue: REPORT the Unit Supervisor acknowledges emergency boration in progress from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

STOP TIME:

Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-3 (RO5115B) (U2) REV. 2

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions with Unit 2 at 100% power:

• The Control Room was evacuated due to a Security threat

• Actions of ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability are in progress and have progressed to the point where Plant Cooldown is desired

• A Reactor Operator is standing by at the Shutdown Transfer Panel

• All security measures have been satisfied and operation in the area of the Remote Shutdown Panel is allowed Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor DIRECTS you to commence emergency boration to the Unit 2 RCS using Attachment 12 of ABN-905B.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-3 (RO5115B) (U2) REV. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: July 2016 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 53% power MOL - RCS Boron is 1054 ppm Turnover: 600 MWe due to a B MFP trip. 1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out (DANGER tagged) with breaker de-energized for scheduled maintenance. Restored B MFP following the trip but 1-PV-2286 was damaged and is DANGER tagged out for repairs. Hold power per load dispatch.

Critical Tasks: CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI.

CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event Description No. No.

I (RO, SRO) 1 RX05A PRZR level instrument LT-459 fails low TS (SRO) 2 RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High I (RO, BOP, SRO) 3 RX09A Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low TS (SRO) 4 CH03 C (BOP, SRO) Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 5 FW06A C (BOP, SRO) Main Feed Pump A Recirc valve fails open 6 ED02 TS (SRO) Loss of XST1 Transformer ED01 Loss of offsite power 7 M (RO,BOP,SRO)

EG06A Failure of the DG 1-01 to start (air start failure) 8 Emergency Boration due to loss of DRPI Loss of all AFW 9 FW09A M (RO,BOP,SRO)

TDAFWP Overspeed Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 6 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions 1

(0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC 2 Turnover:

The plant is at 600 MW following a B MFP trip. Reactor power is being held stable per instruction of the Load Dispatcher. MDAFWP 1-02 is Danger tagged for planned maintenance. When the B MFP tripped it caused damage to 1-PV-2286, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve. The MFP has been restored to operation but 1-PV-2286 is Danger tagged to complete repairs.

Event 1 (Key 1)

The first event will be a PRZR level channel (LT-459) failing low. Entry into ABN-706, PRZR Level Instrumentation Malfunction, section 2.0, will be required. Letdown will isolate, charging will be placed in manual to control PRZR level. Actions will include selecting an operable channel, restoring letdown, and then restoring PRZR level to program and placing controls back in automatic. The SRO will determine the loss of this channel is a TS entry for LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; function 9, Condition M.

Event 2 (Key 2)

The next event is Main Feedwater (MFW) Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) will fail high. Entry into ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction Section 5.0, is required. Section 5.0 is designated for Feed Header Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing the MFW Pump Turbine Master Speed Controller in MANUAL. This controller will remain in MANUAL for the duration of the scenario and require monitoring/adjustment. If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the DNB TS 3.4.1 should be entered.

Event 3 (Key 3)

Once the plant is stabilized, the next event is a Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low. Crew actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0 is required. Section 4.0 is designated for Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing Rod Control in Manual and bypassing the failed Turbine 1st Stage Pressure channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; Function 18f, Condition T.

Event 4 (Key 4)

The next event will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable.

Event 5 (Key 5)

The next event is MFP A Recirculation Valve, 1-FCV-2289, opening. ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, section 11.0 will be entered. Since earlier in this scenario the main feedwater header pressure transmitter failed MFP speed control is in manual.

Manual speed control is required to restore S/G levels and stabilize the plant. The RO must ensure rods are in auto for this event. The crew will dispatch an operator to isolate the failed open recirculation valve. Once the failed valve is isolated, the BOP will adjust MFP speed again for the current plant configuration.

Event 6 (Key 6)

The next event is a loss of XST1 which is the alternate offsite power source for Unit 1. The ALM will have the crew enter ABN-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction, as well as a TS entry for 3.8.1, Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating, Condition A.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Event 7 (Key 7)

The major event is a loss of all offsite power causing a reactor trip. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Coincident with the loss of offsite power DG 1-01 will fail to auto start and cannot be manually started due to an air start failure. This will cause a complete loss of all safeguards train A power. The crew will transition to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, to continue with recovery efforts.

Event 8 - CT-1 (Auto)

Due to the Loss of Offsite Power, DRPI is lost and per EOP-0.0A and EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Attachments 1.A, an Emergency Boration will be required. The crew will then perform CT-1; Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response. This will be completed by entering ABN-107, Emergency Boration.

Event 9 (Auto Triggered when 1/1-8104 is placed in open per ABN-107)

After the crew has commenced the emergency boration the TDAFWP will trip on Overspeed. This combined with the loss of all Safeguards Train A power as well as the inoperability of MDAFWP 1-02 will place the crew in a loss of heat sink event. The crew will enter FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and actuate SI. The crew will then perform CT-2, Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated after the crew establishes a bleed and feed path per FRH-0.1A. One CCP and one SI pump running with both PRZR PORVs open.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Risk Significance Determination Risk Significance Event Guidance Failure of risk important systems Loss of Transformer XST1 FSAR 8.2.1.2.1 - Two prior to Reactor Trip independent power sources are available on an immediate basis following a DBA to ensure operation of the vital safety functions. The second offsite power source will no longer be available on loss of XST1.

Risk significant core damage FSAR 15.2.6.3 Loss of Non- EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation sequence emergency AC power to the Cooldown - For Units 1 and 2, station auxiliaries the analysis of the natural circulation capability of the RCS has demonstrated that sufficient heat removal capability exists following reactor coolant pump coastdown to prevent fuel or clad damage.

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink CPNPP Accident Sequence Quantification, R&R-PN-022 -

Loss of secondary heat removal, not related to ventilation failures, accounts for about 9% of CDF.

Risk significant operator actions Initiation of Boration to Add STI 214.01; ABN-107, Negative Reactivity to the Core Emergency Boration; (TSA 2.14) WCAP-1687 1-P, Section 6.3.5; TRM Bases 13.1.31 - Within 15 minutes, when local alignment is required to establish boration flow. Boration is initiated within the prescribed time. When local manual control credited, admin controls are utilized to ensure personnel are aware/designated to perform alignment to establish boration flow.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators Initiate Shutdown Margin After the loss of offsite Started CCP Boration flow will Emergency must be power and the failure 1-02, started be indicated on Boration prior to maintained. of the DG 1-01, DRPI Boric Acid 1-FI-183A, EMER exiting EOS-0.1A, Since there are will be dark and no Transfer Pump BORATE FLO.

Reactor Trip NO DRPI lights lit CCP will be running. 1-02, and Response within the bases states Per attachment 1.A of opened 1/1-a maximum of 15 to borate at least EOS-0.1A, ABN-107 8104, EMER minutes following 3600 gallons of will be performed. BORATE VLV.

the loss of DRPI. 7000 ppm borated water to ensure shutdown margin is maintained. This gallon value corresponds to 2 of the most reactive rods stuck out.

Establish an RCS Actuating SI will AFW flow will not be Actuated SI, Flow indicated on bleed and feed ensure a feed indicated on any AFW ensured at least both a CCP and path prior to path of cool flow meter. Also no one CCP and SI an SI pump.

exiting FRH-0.1A, water to the RCS AFW pumps will be pump is running PRZR PORVs Response to a (core) and isolate running. A RED path with flow open with block Loss of the containment showing on CSFST for indicated valves open.

Secondary Heat to confine any heat sink. The need providing a feed RCS pressure Sink. RCS releases for a heat sink as path for the and temperature from the bleed indicated by RCS RCS. Both lowering.

flow. The bleed temperature and PRZR PORVs flow through both pressure. open providing a PORVs will bleed path for ensure that the RCS.

enough cool water will feed from the ECCS flow path to remove sufficient decay heat.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP FWR021 1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out RACKOUT K0 FWR056 1-PV-2286 Isolated for repairs CLOSED K0 (NOTE)

NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 TDAFWP trips on 1/1-8104 valve opening 9 Condition FW09A TRIP 8104 Open (60 second delay) 1 RX05A PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low 0% K1 Main Feedwater Header Pressure transmitter fails 2 RX18 1500 psig K2 high Main Turbine First Stage pressure PT-505A fails 3 RX09A 0% K3 low 4 CH03 Neutron Detector well fan 9 trip TRIP K4 5 FW06A A MFP recirc valve fails open OPEN K5 (NOTE)

NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

6 ED02 Loss of XST1 Transformer FAIL K6 7 ED01 Loss of offsite power FAIL K7 7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 8 Emergency Borate 9 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink TDAFWP trips on 1/1-8104 valve opening 9 Cond. FW09A TRIP 8104 Open (60 second delay) 9 EDR74 Reset IAC 1-02 Breaker CLOSE K11 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2 and place in RUN.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (1054 ppm).

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- IPO-003A, Power Operations ENSURE TT06 on PWROPS and all points ON-SCALE ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 167 steps.

ENSURE RED tag on MDAFWP 1-02 with handswitch in Pull Out ENSURE RED tag on 1-PV-2286 with RED & GREEN Lights OFF ENSURE GEM Box PLACED 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 9A-3.2 - HDP1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP2 DISCH PRESS HI CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 32 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1).

- PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Indications Available:

PRZR LVL LO (5B-3.6)

PRZR LVL DEV LO (5C-1.2)

RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures RO RECOGNIZE PRZR level channel LT-459 has failed low Direct the performance of ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0

1. Manually CONTROL u-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL OR u-FK-121, CCP RO CHRG FLO CTRL to maintain level at program.

2. TRANSFER 1/u-LS-459D, PRZR LVL CTRL CHAN SELECT to an RO operable alternate controlling channel.

3. ENSURE 1/u-LS-459E, u-LR-459 PRZR LVL SELECT selected to a RO valid channel.

RO 4. VERIFY normal letdown aligned - NO

4. RNO - WHEN pressurizer level is greater than 17%, THEN RO RESTORE letdown per Attachment 6 or Letdown Job Aid.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 32 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: US Directs restoration of Letdown per Job Aid.

1. OPEN OR VERIFY open both letdown isolation valves.

RO

• 1/u-LCV-459, LTDN ISOL VLV

• 1/u-LCV-460, LTDN ISOL VLV

2. ENSURE u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL AND RO 30% demand (50% if two orifice valves will be opened).

3. ENSURE u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL AND RO 50% demand.

4. ADJUST charging to desired flow WHILE maintaining seal injection RO flow between 6 and 13 gpm.

5. OPEN the desired orifice isolation valves.

• 1/u-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (45 GPM)

RO

• 1/u-8149B, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)

• 1/u-8149C, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)

6. ADJUST u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to obtain RO approximately 310 psig on u-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS, THEN PLACE in automatic.

7. ADJUST u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain RO approximately 95EF on u-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, THEN PLACE in automatic.

Simulator Operator: If contacted as the prompt team, acknowledge the request to repair LT-459.

5. If necessary, RECLOSE 1/u-PCPR, PRZR CTRL HTR GROUP C by RO placing the control switch in the "ON" position.

RO 6. If desired, PLACE controller used in Step 1 in AUTO.

7. VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL (see RO Attachment 1)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 32 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 10. REFER to Technical Specifications per Attachment 5.

3.3.1-1 Function 9, Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place in trip RO 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421, as applicable.

When the Charging and Letdown flows are stable, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 11 of 32 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2).

- RX18, Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High.

Indications Available:

Plant Computer Alarm for high Feed Header pressure 1-PI-508, FWP DISCH HDR PRESS indication fails high BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1-PT-508 transmitter failure.

Examiner Note: Feed header pressure failing high will cause Feedwater Pump speed to lower.

The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario.

Examiner Note: If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the RO should recognize entry into TS 3.4.1 for DNB.

DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.

BOP 1. PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.

2. ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to MAINTAIN BOP P between FWP Discharge Pressure and Steam Line Pressure.

• From 20% to 100% power, RAMP P from 80 PSIG to 181 PSIG.

Simulator Operator: If contacted as prompt team acknowledge request to repair PT-508.

US 3. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 32 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Feed header pressure transmitter PT-508 will remain failed for the remainder of the scenario. The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Step 5.3.4 will NOT be performed.

4. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWP MASTER SPD CTRL in - AUTO as follows:

US a. ENSURE differential pressure appropriate for plant conditions.

b. PLACE 1-SK-509A in - AUTO

c. VERIFY correct differential pressure automatically maintained.

When control of Feedwater is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 13 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).

- RX09A, Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) Fails Low.

Indications Available:

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure RO/BOP Instrument failure.

RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low.

DIRECT implementation of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam US Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.

RO 1. PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

BOP 2. VERIFY Steam Dumps - CLOSED WITH NO OPEN DEMAND.

2. RNO - IF Steam Dump operation NOT required, THEN PLACE at least one Steam Dump Interlock Select Switch - OFF.

• 43/1-SDA, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

• 43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 14 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESTORE steam dump availability by placing Steam Dumps in STM BOP PRESS Mode per Attachment 7.

Examiner Note: ABN-709 Attachment 7 steps are after the steps for section 4.0 (next page)

4. TRANSFER 1-PS-505Z, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN SELECT to RO PS-506.

Examiner Note: The crew will conduct a Reactivity Brief and execute a Reactivity Plan to restore TAVE to TREF.

RO 5. ENSURE TAVE within 1ºF of TREF.

RO 6. PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO.

US/RO 7. CHECK Reactor Plant in - MODE 1.

US/BOP 8. CHECK Turbine Power - GREATER THAN 10% POWER.

9. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13, US IN PROPER STATE for existing plant conditions (DARK). - YES CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 15 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C US IN PROPER STATE (DARK) for actual Turbine power. - NO US/BOP 10. RNO - IF AMSAC actuation blocked AND turbine power >40%, THEN ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB-9B 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.

US 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421.

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

• LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

(Function 18.f, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure P-13)

• CONDITION T - One or more required channels inoperable.

• ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour, OR

• ACTION T.2 - Be in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

Examiner Note: The following six steps are from ABN-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and may be performed using the Control Board Job Aid.

BOP 1. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

2. MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current BOP Steam Dump Valve position.

3. VERIFY 1-PCIP, Window 1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 BOP is ON.

BOP 4. PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.

BOP 5. ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. IF desired to control Steam Dumps in AUTO, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. VERIFY 1-PI-507, MS HDR PRESS indicates current MSL BOP pressure.

b. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to control at 1092 psig for "no load" conditions (Pot setting 6.86).

c. PLACE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO.

When TS are completed and Rod Control has been restored to Automatic or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 17 of 32 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4)

- Neutron Detector well fan #9 trips Indications Available:

CB03-2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector well fan #9 tripped BOP Performs actions of ALM-0031A Window 2.1

1. DETERMINE affected fan from the associated handswitch light BOP indication.

• 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR Examiner Note: The steps of SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System, Section 5.2.1, Neutron Detector Well Cooling System Startup are only to place the non-affected fan to start.

BOP 2. START an alternate fan, as required per SOP-801A.

BOP 3. PLACE affected fan handswitch in Pull Out OR Stop, as available.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 18 of 32 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When contacted to investigate the fan trip wait 2 minutes and report back the breaker has tripped on motor overload.

4. DISPATCH an operator to affected fan breaker to determine cause of RO/BOP trip.

5. WHEN conditions permit, THEN PERFORM a Containment entry per US STA-620 to check the fan for signs of damage (smoke, acrid odor, overheating).

6. CORRECT the condition OR INITIATE a CR per STA-421, as US applicable.

When the plant is stable or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 19 of 32 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5).

- A MFP Recirc valve opens Indications Available:

ALL S/G levels lowering FWP A/B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED (7B-4.8)

SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-1.8)

SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-2.8)

SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-3.8)

SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-4.8)

SG 1 LVL DEV (8A-1.12)

SG 2 LVL DEV (8A-2.12)

SG 3 LVL DEV (8A-3.12)

SG 4 LVL DEV (8A-4.12)

BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE A MFP Recirc valve is open AND MFP speed control is in MANUAL. Raises MFP speed to restore S/G levels.

Direct entry into ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain US System Malfunction, Section 11.0.

RO 1. Ensure 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO Examiner Note: 1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be opened. The crew will skip this step.

BOP 2. Ensure u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV - OPEN - NO Examiner Note: Turbine power is already 600 MW so the next step will not be performed BOP 3. Reduce Turbine Power to 700 MW CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 20 of 32 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When contacted to isolate the A MFP recirc valve after 2 minutes DELETE MALFUNCTION FW06A Report back that the valve has been manually isolated by closing FW-0023.

4. Dispatch Operator to isolate affected recirc valve:

RO/BOP

• u-FV-2289, FWP A RECIRC VALVE

• u-FV-2290, FWP B RECIRC VALVE

5. Verify Main Feedwater pump suction pressure - GREATER THAN 200 PSIG BOP

• u-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRESS

• u-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRESS

6. Verify the following:

RO/US a. Rods - ABOVE ROD INSERTION LIMIT

b. Flux - (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS

7. Verify Reactor Power change - LESS THAN 15% RTP WITHIN ONE US HOUR.

Examiner Note: The following step will not be performed as power is unchanged for this event

8. Notify QSE Generation Controller and update GAPS to Create US Current Condition for the down power.

Simulator Operator: When contacted as a member of plant management inform the crew that continued operation of the A MFP with its recirc flowpath isolated at the current power is desired.

9. Plant Management has determined continued operation of the US Feedwater pump is required with recirc flowpath isolated.

US 10. Restore power to level specified by Shift Manager.

11. WHEN steam dumps have closed, THEN reset C-7, if armed.

BOP

• 43/u-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT US 12. Initiate equipment repairs per STA-606.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 21 of 32 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: 1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be open/closed. The crew will not perform this step.

13. Close u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV by performing Section 7.0 of BOP this procedure.

US 14. Return to procedure and step in effect.

When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 22 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 6 (Key 6).

- Loss of XST1 transformer Indications Available:

138 KV XFMR XST1 TRBL (CB14-1.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 LOR TRIP (CB14-3.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 VOLT LO (CB14-3.2)

BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the loss of XST1 transformer and Direct entry into ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM US MALFUNCTION, Section 2.0.

Examiner Note: The alarms that are received will send the crew to the ABN however they may use the ALMs to start the recovery. The ALM will direct the US to the TS.

1. Determine AC Power Status:

US/BOP a. Check the Unit - IN MODES 1, 2, 3 OR 4 - YES

b. Check 6.9 KV Safeguard Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED -

YES

c. Check Unit 6.9 KV Non-Safeguard Buses - ALL REMAINED US/BOP ENERGIZED WITH LOADS CONNECTED TO THE BUS - YES

d. GO TO Step 4

4. Check Switchyard Bus Status - ALL ENERGIZED

• V-E BUS, 345 KV E. BUS VOLT (CB-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV BOP

• V-W BUS, 345 KV W. BUS VOLT (CB-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV

• V/ST1, INCOMING 138 KV XFMR FDR VOLT (CB-12) -

BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV (DE-ENERGIZED)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 23 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. Monitor Blackout Sequencer Status:

a. Affected bus - ENERGIZED - YES BOP b. Verify Blackout Sequencer - OPERATED

• OUTPUT-STEP TIME lights - ALL LIT - NO

• Automatic lockouts AL light - LIT - NO US 5. RNO - GO TO Step 6.

6. Check Transformer XST1 Status:

BOP a. V/ST1, STARTUP XFMR XST1 138 KV FDR VOLT (CB-12) -

BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV - NO US 6. RNO - INITIATE Attachment 2, Restoration of XST1.

Simulator Operator: When contacted as the Shift Manager or Switchyard Coordinator inform the US that the Shift Manager will coordinate the actions of Attachment 2, and that the US should continue with ABN-601, Section 2.0 actions.

1. Determine the origin for the loss of power by performing the following:

US

• Contact the Switchyard Coordinator to provide assistance in determining the transformer status.

Examiner Note: ABN-601 Steps 7, 8 & 9 relate to unaffected transformers and may be N/Ad by the SRO or read and verified.

BOP 10. Verify Diesel Generators - NOT RUNNING BOP 11. Verify 6.9KV Bux XA1 - ENERGIZED Simulator Operator: If contacted as the Shift Manager to have Unit 2 perform SR 3.8.1.1, state that the Extra RO will perform the SR.

US 12. Refer to the appropriate TS:

• MODES 1, 2, 3, OR 4 - Section 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating

• Condition A is applicable

• This is a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> spec to perform SR 3.8.1.1 - Verification of offsite sources 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore power When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7&8 Page 24 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 7 (Key 7).

- Loss of offsite power Indications Available:

Reactor Trip Turbine Trip Multiple Annunciators CREW RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the Reactor Trip and perform Immediate Actions US Direct entry into EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO 1. VERIFY Reactor Trip:

a. Verify the following:

• VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN.

• VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING.

b. VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON. - NO Examiner Note: Emergency Boration is required since all DRPI lights are DARK. This is on Attachment 1.A of both EOP-0.0A and EOS-0.1A. The steps are listed as if this is going to be performed in EOS-0.1A since the transition to this procedure will take place very quickly from EOP-0.0A.

Critical Task Start Time on Loss of DRPI: ___________

BOP 2. VERIFY Turbine Trip:

• VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

Examiner Note: The EDG 1-01 will fail to start and cannot be started due to an air start failure Simulator Operator: If contacted to investigate the failure of the EDG 1-01, wait 2 minutes and report back that the diesel will not start and an air start failure alarm is locked in BOP 3. VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7&8 Page 25 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

a. VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

b. VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. - NO

b. RNO - Restore power to de-energized AC safeguards bus per ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION or ABN-602, RESPONSE TO A 6900/480 VOLT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION when time permits.

RO 4. CHECK SI status:

a. CHECK if SI is actuated.

o VERIFY SI indicated on the First Out Annunciator Panel 1-ALB-6C.

o VERIFY SI Actuated blue status light - ON. - NO RO 4. a. RNO - Check if SI is required:

o Steam Line Pressure less than 610 psig. - NO o Pressurizer Pressure less than 1820 psig. - NO o Containment Pressure greater than 3.0 psig. - NO o IF SI is NOT required, THEN go to EOS-0.1A, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

US Transitions to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response Examiner Note: RO initiates Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI per Attachment 1.A of EOP-0.0A or EOS-0.1A. (Guidance is duplicated in both procedures)

CRITICAL TASK CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS-0.1A, Reactor STATEMENT Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI. Emergency Boration Initiated Time:_______________

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7&8 Page 26 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 1. Ensure a charging pump is running:

• 1/u-APCH1, CCP 1 - NO

• 1/u-APCH2, CCP 2 - YES

• 1/u-APPD, PDP CT-1 RO 2. Start a boric acid transfer pump:

• 1/u-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 - AUTO (AFTER START) - NO

• 1/u-APBA2, BA XFER PMP 2 - AUTO (AFTER START) - YES CT-1 RO 3. Open 1/u-8104, EMER BORATE VLV Examiner Note: When the RO opens the emergency borate valve 1/1-8104 it will auto insert event 9 (60 second delay) for the loss of all AFW. This will give the crew a RED path on Heat Sink.

RO 4. Verify flow on u-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO RO 5. Verify flow on u-FI-121A, CHRG FLOW

6. IF EMER BORATE FLOW OR CHRG FLOW can NOT be verified, RO THEN initiate Emergency Boration Flow per another method of ABN-107.

7. WHEN desired to terminate emergency boration (Reference RO Attachment 7 of ABN-107), THEN GO TO Step 8 of ABN-107.

US Transitions to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Heat Sink on Red Path CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 27 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:

a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG US PRESSURE - YES

b. RCS temperature - GREATER THAN 350°F - YES RO 2. Check CCP Status - BOTH AVAILABLE - NO Examiner Note: There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV RO 2. RNO - Immediately perform the following:

a. STOP ALL RCPs.

b. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves - AVAILABLE

c. Go to Step 13. OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TO STEP 13.

CRITICAL TASK CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH-0.1A, STATEMENT Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CT-2 RO 13. Actuate SI CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 28 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 14. Verify RCS Feed Path:

a. Check CCP SI flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW

b. Check SI pumps - BOTH RUNNING - NO

14. b. RNO - Perform the following:

1) Manually start pump(s) and align valves as necessary.

2) IF either of the following RCS feed paths exists, THEN go to RO Step 15.

• CCPs - BOTH INJECTING - NO

• AT LEAST ONE CCP INJECTING AND ONE SI PUMP RUNNING - YES Examiner Note: Steps 15 - 20 will be performed via Attachment 1D and will not be directed individually by the US.

BOP 15. Check If Diesels Should Be Emergency Started:

a. Check diesel generator(s) - RUNNING - DG 1-02 Only

b. Place D/G EMER STOP/START handswitch(es) in START.

BOP 16. Reset SI.

BOP 17. Reset SI Sequencers.

BOP 18. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B.

BOP 19. Reset Containment Spray Signal.

Simulator Operator: When requested to RESET Instrument Air Compressor 1-02 Breaker, wait 2 minutes and EXECUTE remote function EDR74 to CLOSE (Key 11). Provide Field Support report that IAC 1-02 Breaker is Closed.

BOP 20. Establish Instrument Air And Nitrogen To Containment:

a. Establish instrument air:

1) Verify air compressor running.

• Establish instrument air to containment.

b. Establish nitrogen:

1) Verify ACCUM 14 VENT CTRL, 1-HC-943 - CLOSED

2) Open SI/PORV ACCUM N2 ISOL VLV, 1/1-8880.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 29 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV CT-2 RO 21. Establish RCS Bleed Path:

a. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves - AVAILABLE

b. Verify PRZR PORV block valves - BOTH OPEN

c. Open PRZR PORVs.

RO 22. Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path:

• PRZR PORVs - BOTH OPEN

• PRZR PORV block valves- BOTH OPEN After the bleed and feed is initiated, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2

2016 NRC Scenario 2

Rev. 1

Initialize to IC-16

Setup MDAFWP 1-02 in Pull-Out - Breaker Deenergized IRF FWR021 f

0

1-PV-2286 Isolated for Repairs IOR LOFWHS2286_1 f

0 IOR LOFWHS2286_2 f:0 IRF FWR056 f:0

Event 1 - PRZ LVL [LT-459] Fails Low IMF RX05A f

0 k:1

Event 2 - Main Feedwater Header Pressure [PT-508] Fails High

PT-508 Fails High IMF RX18 f

1500 k:2

Event 3 - Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure [PT-505A] Fails Low

PT-505A Fails Low IMF RX09A f

0 k:3

Event 4 - Neutron Detector Well FN 9 Motor Overload IMF CH03 f

1 k:4

Event 5 - FWP A Recirc Valve Fails Open IMF FW06A f

100 r:10 k:5

Local Isolation of FV-2289 by FW-0023

Delete Malfunction FW06A IOR LOFWZL2289_1 f

0 k:5 d:120 IOR LOFWZL2289_2 f:1 k:5 d:120 IOR LOANAN7B_32 f:1 k:5 d:120

Event 6 - Loss of XST1 IMF ED02 f

1 k:6

Event 7 - Loss of Offsite Power/DG 1-01 Air Start Failure

LOOP IMF ED01 f

1 k:7

Reset IAC 1-02 Breaker IRF EDR74 f

2 k:11

DG 1-01 Air Start Failure IMF EG06A f

1

Event 8 - Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI

Event 9 - TDAFWP Trip if Running (FRH Entry)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2

TDAFWP Trip after emergency borate started

{DICVHS8104.Value=2} IMF FW09A f:1 d:60 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

GUARDED EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT (GEM) SIGN POSTING LOG REASON FOR POSTING MD AFWP 1-02 INOPERABLE Component to be Nomenclature Posting Installed Posting Checked Posting Removed Posted Initial Initial Initial MD AFWP 1 => CB / 830 / X-135 1-HS-2450A JGR RB AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 MOTOR 1APMD1 BREAKER => SG / 810 / 1-083 JGR RB MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER S1-16 PUMP 1-01 ROOM => SG / 790 / 1-072 JGR RB Authorized By Joe UnitSupervisor Date Today Posting Removal Authorized By Date Open Narrative Log Entry Entered Open Narrative Log Entry Closed Comments: This form is not maintained. Verify correct items Guarded per STI-600.01 prior to use.

STI-600.01-1 Page 1 of 1 REFERENCE USE Rev. 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: July 2016 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 53% power MOL - RCS Boron is 1054 ppm Turnover: 600 MWe due to a B MFP trip. 1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out (DANGER tagged) with breaker de-energized for scheduled maintenance. Restored B MFP following the trip but 1-PV-2286 was damaged and is DANGER tagged out for repairs. Hold power per load dispatch.

Critical Tasks: CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI.

CT-1 Manually control the Main Feedwater Master Speed Controller to prevent receiving an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator levels, or a trip of Main Feed Pumps due to low suction pressure, and subsequent manual reactor trip.

CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event Description No. No.

I (RO, SRO) 1 RX05A PRZR level instrument LT-459 fails low TS (SRO) 2 RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High I (RO, BOP, SRO) 3 RX09A Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low TS (SRO) 4 CH03 C (BOP, SRO) Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 5 FW06A C (BOP, SRO) Main Feed Pump A Recirc valve fails open 6 ED02 TS (SRO) Loss of XST1 Transformer ED01 Loss of offsite power 7 M (RO,BOP,SRO)

EG06A Failure of the DG 1-01 to start (air start failure) 8 Emergency Boration due to loss of DRPI Loss of all AFW 9 FW09A M (RO,BOP,SRO)

TDAFWP Overspeed Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 87 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 65 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions 1

(0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC 2 Turnover:

The plant is at 600 MW following a B MFP trip. Reactor power is being held stable per instruction of the Load Dispatcher. MDAFWP 1-02 is Danger tagged for planned maintenance. When the B MFP tripped it caused damage to 1-PV-2286, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve. The MFP has been restored to operation but 1-PV-2286 is Danger tagged to complete repairs.

Event 1 (Key 1)

The first event will be a PRZR level channel (LT-459) failing low. Entry into ABN-706, PRZR Level Instrumentation Malfunction, section 2.0, will be required. Letdown will isolate, charging will be placed in manual to control PRZR level. Actions will include selecting an operable channel, restoring letdown, and then restoring PRZR level to program and placing controls back in automatic. The SRO will determine the loss of this channel is a TS entry for LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; function 9, Condition M.

Event 2 (Key 2)

The next event is Main Feedwater (MFW) Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) will fail high. Entry into ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction Section 5.0, is required. Section 5.0 is designated for Feed Header Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing the MFW Pump Turbine Master Speed Controller in MANUAL. This controller will remain in MANUAL for the duration of the scenario and require monitoring/adjustment. If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the DNB TS 3.4.1 should be entered.

Event 3 (Key 3)

Once the plant is stabilized, the next event is a Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low. Crew actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0 is required. Section 4.0 is designated for Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing Rod Control in Manual and bypassing the failed Turbine 1st Stage Pressure channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; Function 18f, Condition T.

Event 4 (Key 4)

The next event will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable.

Event 5 (Key 5)

The next event is MFP A Recirculation Valve, 1-FCV-2289, opening. ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, section 11.0 will be entered. Since earlier in this scenario the main feedwater header pressure transmitter failed MFP speed control is in manual.

Manual speed control is required to restore S/G levels and stabilize the plant. The RO must ensure rods are in auto for this event. The crew will dispatch an operator to isolate the failed open recirculation valve. Once the failed valve is isolated, the BOP will adjust MFP speed again for the current plant configuration.

Event 6 (Key 6)

The next event is a loss of XST1 which is the alternate offsite power source for Unit 1. The ALM will have the crew enter ABN-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction, as well as a TS entry for 3.8.1, Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources - Operating, Condition A.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Event 7 (Key 7)

The major event is a loss of all offsite power causing a reactor trip. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Coincident with the loss of offsite power DG 1-01 will fail to auto start and cannot be manually started due to an air start failure. This will cause a complete loss of all safeguards train A power. The crew will transition to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, to continue with recovery efforts.

Event 8 - CT-1 (Auto)

Due to the Loss of Offsite Power, DRPI is lost and per EOP-0.0A and EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Attachments 1.A, an Emergency Boration will be required. The crew will then perform CT-1; Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response. This will be completed by entering ABN-107, Emergency Boration.

Event 9 (Auto Triggered when 1/1-8104 is placed in open per ABN-107)

After the crew has commenced the emergency boration the TDAFWP will trip on Overspeed. This combined with the loss of all Safeguards Train A power as well as the inoperability of MDAFWP 1-02 will place the crew in a loss of heat sink event. The crew will enter FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and actuate SI. The crew will then perform CT-2, Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated after the crew establishes a bleed and feed path per FRH-0.1A. One CCP and one SI pump running with both PRZR PORVs open.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Risk Significance Determination Risk Significance Event Guidance Failure of risk important Loss of Transformer XST1 FSAR 8.2.1.2.1 - Two systems prior to Reactor Trip independent power sources are available on an immediate basis following a DBA to ensure operation of the vital safety functions. The second offsite power source will no longer be available on loss of XST1.

Risk significant core damage FSAR 15.2.6.3 Loss of Non- EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation sequence emergency AC power to the Cooldown - For Units 1 and 2, station auxiliaries the analysis of the natural circulation capability of the RCS has demonstrated that sufficient heat removal capability exists following reactor coolant pump coastdown to prevent fuel or clad damage.

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink CPNPP Accident Sequence Quantification, R&R-PN-022 -

Loss of secondary heat removal, not related to ventilation failures, accounts for about 9% of CDF.

Risk significant operator actions Initiation of Boration to Add STI 214.01; ABN-107, Negative Reactivity to the Core Emergency Boration; (TSA 2.14) WCAP-1687 1-P, Section 6.3.5; TRM Bases 13.1.31 - Within 15 minutes, when local alignment is required to establish boration flow. Boration is initiated within the prescribed time. When local manual control credited, admin controls are utilized to ensure personnel are aware/designated to perform alignment to establish boration flow.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators Initiate Shutdown After the loss of Started CCP Boration flow will Emergency Margin must be offsite power and the 1-02, started be indicated on Boration prior to maintained. failure of the DG 1- Boric Acid 1-FI-183A, EMER exiting EOS- Since there are 01, DRPI will be dark Transfer Pump BORATE FLO.

0.1A, Reactor NO DRPI lights and no CCP will be 1-02, and Trip Response lit the bases running. Per opened 1/1-within a states to borate attachment 1.A of 8104, EMER maximum of 15 at least 3600 EOS-0.1A, ABN-107 BORATE VLV.

minutes following gallons of 7000 will be performed.

the loss of DRPI. ppm borated water to ensure shutdown margin is maintained.

This gallon value corresponds to 2 of the most reactive rods stuck out.

Manually control Result of After the Main Feed S/G levels Neither reactor the Main improper Pump A recirc valve maintained on nor Main Feed Feedwater operator action fails open, S/G levels program without Pumps do not Master Speed or inaction, i.e., will begin decreasing. tripping the trip.

Controller to such as an Manual control of the reactor or prevent receiving unintentional feed pump speed will tripping the Main an automatic RPS or ESF maintain S/G levels Feed Pumps on reactor trip due to actuation. on program. low suction low steam Pressure, generator levels, followed by a or a trip of Main manual reactor Feed Pumps due trip (ABN-302, to low suction immediate pressure, and operator action).

subsequent manual reactor trip.

Establish an RCS Actuating SI will AFW flow will not be Actuated SI, Flow indicated on bleed and feed ensure a feed indicated on any AFW ensured at least both a CCP and path prior to path of cool flow meter. Also no one CCP and SI an SI pump.

exiting FRH- water to the RCS AFW pumps will be pump is running PRZR PORVs 0.1A, Response (core) and running. A RED path with flow open with block to a Loss of isolate the showing on CSFST indicated valves open.

Secondary Heat containment to for heat sink. The providing a feed RCS pressure Sink. confine any RCS need for a heat sink path for the and temperature releases from as indicated by RCS RCS. Both lowering.

the bleed flow. PRZR PORVs CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 The bleed flow temperature and open providing a through both pressure. bleed path for PORVs will the RCS.

ensure that enough cool water will feed from the ECCS flow path to remove sufficient decay heat.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER SETUP FWR021 1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out RACKOUT K0 FWR056 1-PV-2286 Isolated for repairs CLOSED K0 (NOTE)

NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 TDAFWP trips on 1/1-8104 valve opening 9 Condition FW09A TRIP 8104 Open (60 second delay) 1 RX05A PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low 0% K1 Main Feedwater Header Pressure transmitter fails 2 RX18 1500 psig K2 high Main Turbine First Stage pressure PT-505A fails 3 RX09A 0% K3 low 4 CH03 Neutron Detector well fan 9 trip TRIP K4 5 FW06A A MFP recirc valve fails open OPEN K5 (NOTE)

NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

6 ED02 Loss of XST1 Transformer FAIL K6 7 ED01 Loss of offsite power FAIL K7 7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 8 Emergency Borate 9 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink TDAFWP trips on 1/1-8104 valve opening 9 Cond. FW09A TRIP 8104 Open (60 second delay) 9 EDR74 Reset IAC 1-02 Breaker CLOSE K11 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2 and place in RUN.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (1054 ppm).

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- IPO-003A, Power Operations ENSURE TT06 on PWROPS and all points ON-SCALE ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 167 steps.

ENSURE RED tag on MDAFWP 1-02 with handswitch in Pull Out ENSURE RED tag on 1-PV-2286 with RED & GREEN Lights OFF ENSURE GEM Box PLACED 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 9A-3.2 - HDP1 DISCH PRESS HI 9A-7.2 - HDP2 DISCH PRESS HI CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 33 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1).

- PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Indications Available:

PRZR LVL LO (5B-3.6)

PRZR LVL DEV LO (5C-1.2)

RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures RO RECOGNIZE PRZR level channel LT-459 has failed low Direct the performance of ABN-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0

1. Manually CONTROL u-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL OR u-FK-121, CCP RO CHRG FLO CTRL to maintain level at program.

2. TRANSFER 1/u-LS-459D, PRZR LVL CTRL CHAN SELECT to an RO operable alternate controlling channel.

3. ENSURE 1/u-LS-459E, u-LR-459 PRZR LVL SELECT selected to a RO valid channel.

RO 4. VERIFY normal letdown aligned - NO

4. RNO - WHEN pressurizer level is greater than 17%, THEN RO RESTORE letdown per Attachment 6 or Letdown Job Aid.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 33 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: US Directs restoration of Letdown per Job Aid.

1. OPEN OR VERIFY open both letdown isolation valves.

RO

• 1/u-LCV-459, LTDN ISOL VLV

• 1/u-LCV-460, LTDN ISOL VLV

2. ENSURE u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL AND RO 30% demand (50% if two orifice valves will be opened).

3. ENSURE u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL AND RO 50% demand.

4. ADJUST charging to desired flow WHILE maintaining seal injection RO flow between 6 and 13 gpm.

5. OPEN the desired orifice isolation valves.

• 1/u-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (45 GPM)

RO

• 1/u-8149B, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)

• 1/u-8149C, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)

6. ADJUST u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to obtain RO approximately 310 psig on u-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS, THEN PLACE in automatic.

7. ADJUST u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain RO approximately 95EF on u-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, THEN PLACE in automatic.

Simulator Operator: If contacted as the prompt team, acknowledge the request to repair LT-459.

5. If necessary, RECLOSE 1/u-PCPR, PRZR CTRL HTR GROUP C by RO placing the control switch in the "ON" position.

RO 6. If desired, PLACE controller used in Step 1 in AUTO.

7. VERIFY instruments on common instrument line - NORMAL (see RO Attachment 1)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 33 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT-459 fails low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 10. REFER to Technical Specifications per Attachment 5.

3.3.1-1 Function 9, Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place in trip RO 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421, as applicable.

When the Charging and Letdown flows are stable, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 33 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2).

- RX18, Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High.

Indications Available:

Plant Computer Alarm for high Feed Header pressure 1-PI-508, FWP DISCH HDR PRESS indication fails high BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1-PT-508 transmitter failure.

Examiner Note: Feed header pressure failing high will cause Feedwater Pump speed to lower.

The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario.

Examiner Note: If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the RO should recognize entry into TS 3.4.1 for DNB.

DIRECT performance of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header US Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.

BOP 1. PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.

2. ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to MAINTAIN BOP P between FWP Discharge Pressure and Steam Line Pressure.

• From 20% to 100% power, RAMP P from 80 PSIG to 181 PSIG.

Simulator Operator: If contacted as prompt team acknowledge request to repair PT-508.

US 3. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 33 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) Fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Feed header pressure transmitter PT-508 will remain failed for the remainder of the scenario. The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Step 5.3.4 will NOT be performed.

4. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWP MASTER SPD CTRL in - AUTO as follows:

US a. ENSURE differential pressure appropriate for plant conditions.

b. PLACE 1-SK-509A in - AUTO

c. VERIFY correct differential pressure automatically maintained.

When control of Feedwater is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 14 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).

- RX09A, Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) Fails Low.

Indications Available:

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure RO/BOP Instrument failure.

RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low.

DIRECT implementation of ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam US Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.

RO 1. PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

BOP 2. VERIFY Steam Dumps - CLOSED WITH NO OPEN DEMAND.

2. RNO - IF Steam Dump operation NOT required, THEN PLACE at least one Steam Dump Interlock Select Switch - OFF.

• 43/1-SDA, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

• 43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 15 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESTORE steam dump availability by placing Steam Dumps in STM BOP PRESS Mode per Attachment 7.

Examiner Note: ABN-709 Attachment 7 steps are after the steps for section 4.0 (next page)

4. TRANSFER 1-PS-505Z, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN SELECT to RO PS-506.

Examiner Note: The crew will conduct a Reactivity Brief and execute a Reactivity Plan to restore TAVE to TREF.

RO 5. ENSURE TAVE within 1ºF of TREF.

RO 6. PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO.

US/RO 7. CHECK Reactor Plant in - MODE 1.

US/BOP 8. CHECK Turbine Power - GREATER THAN 10% POWER.

9. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13, US IN PROPER STATE for existing plant conditions (DARK). - YES CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C US IN PROPER STATE (DARK) for actual Turbine power. - NO US/BOP 10. RNO - IF AMSAC actuation blocked AND turbine power >40%, THEN ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB-9B 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.

US 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421.

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

• LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

(Function 18.f, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure P-13)

• CONDITION T - One or more required channels inoperable.

• ACTION T.1 - Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour, OR

• ACTION T.2 - Be in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

Examiner Note: The following six steps are from ABN-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and may be performed using the Control Board Job Aid.

BOP 1. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

2. MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current BOP Steam Dump Valve position.

3. VERIFY 1-PCIP, Window 1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 BOP is ON.

BOP 4. PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.

BOP 5. ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 17 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure (PT-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. IF desired to control Steam Dumps in AUTO, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. VERIFY 1-PI-507, MS HDR PRESS indicates current MSL BOP pressure.

b. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to control at 1092 psig for "no load" conditions (Pot setting 6.86).

c. PLACE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO.

When TS are completed and Rod Control has been restored to Automatic or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 18 of 33 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4)

- Neutron Detector well fan #9 trips Indications Available:

CB03-2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector well fan #9 tripped BOP Performs actions of ALM-0031A Window 2.1

1. DETERMINE affected fan from the associated handswitch light BOP indication.

• 1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 & DMPR Examiner Note: The steps of SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System, Section 5.2.1, Neutron Detector Well Cooling System Startup are only to place the non-affected fan to start.

BOP 2. START an alternate fan, as required per SOP-801A.

BOP 3. PLACE affected fan handswitch in Pull Out OR Stop, as available.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 19 of 33 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When contacted to investigate the fan trip wait 2 minutes and report back the breaker has tripped on motor overload.

4. DISPATCH an operator to affected fan breaker to determine cause of RO/BOP trip.

5. WHEN conditions permit, THEN PERFORM a Containment entry per US STA-620 to check the fan for signs of damage (smoke, acrid odor, overheating).

6. CORRECT the condition OR INITIATE a CR per STA-421, as US applicable.

When the plant is stable or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 20 of 33 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5).

- A MFP Recirc valve opens Indications Available:

ALL S/G levels lowering FWP A/B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED (7B-4.8)

SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-1.8)

SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-2.8)

SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-3.8)

SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A-4.8)

SG 1 LVL DEV (8A-1.12)

SG 2 LVL DEV (8A-2.12)

SG 3 LVL DEV (8A-3.12)

SG 4 LVL DEV (8A-4.12)

BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE A MFP Recirc valve is open AND MFP speed control is in MANUAL. Raises MFP speed to restore S/G levels.

CRITICAL TASK CT-1 Manually control the Main Feedwater Master Speed Controller to STATEMENT prevent receiving an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator levels, or a trip of Main Feed Pumps due to low suction pressure, and subsequent manual reactor trip.

Direct entry into ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain US System Malfunction, Section 11.0.

RO 1. Ensure 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO Examiner Note: 1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be opened. The crew will skip this step.

BOP 2. Ensure u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV - OPEN - NO Examiner Note: Turbine power is already 600 MW so the next step will not be performed CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 21 of 33 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 3. Reduce Turbine Power to 700 MW Simulator Operator: When contacted to isolate the A MFP recirc valve after 2 minutes DELETE MALFUNCTION FW06A Report back that the valve has been manually isolated by closing FW-0023.

4. Dispatch Operator to isolate affected recirc valve:

RO/BOP

• u-FV-2289, FWP A RECIRC VALVE

• u-FV-2290, FWP B RECIRC VALVE

5. Verify Main Feedwater pump suction pressure - GREATER THAN 200 PSIG BOP

• u-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRESS

• u-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRESS

6. Verify the following:

RO/US a. Rods - ABOVE ROD INSERTION LIMIT

b. Flux - (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS

7. Verify Reactor Power change - LESS THAN 15% RTP WITHIN ONE US HOUR.

Examiner Note: The following step will not be performed as power is unchanged for this event

8. Notify QSE Generation Controller and update GAPS to Create US Current Condition for the down power.

Simulator Operator: When contacted as a member of plant management inform the crew that continued operation of the A MFP with its recirc flowpath isolated at the current power is desired.

9. Plant Management has determined continued operation of the US Feedwater pump is required with recirc flowpath isolated.

US 10. Restore power to level specified by Shift Manager.

11. WHEN steam dumps have closed, THEN reset C-7, if armed.

BOP

• 43/u-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 22 of 33 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US 12. Initiate equipment repairs per STA-606.

Examiner Note: 1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be open/closed. The crew will not perform this step.

13. Close u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV by performing Section 7.0 of BOP this procedure.

US 14. Return to procedure and step in effect.

When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 23 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 6 (Key 6).

- Loss of XST1 transformer Indications Available:

138 KV XFMR XST1 TRBL (CB14-1.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 LOR TRIP (CB14-3.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 VOLT LO (CB14-3.2)

BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the loss of XST1 transformer and Direct entry into ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM US MALFUNCTION, Section 2.0.

Examiner Note: The alarms that are received will send the crew to the ABN however they may use the ALMs to start the recovery. The ALM will direct the US to the TS.

1. Determine AC Power Status:

US/BOP a. Check the Unit - IN MODES 1, 2, 3 OR 4 - YES

b. Check 6.9 KV Safeguard Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED -

YES

c. Check Unit 6.9 KV Non-Safeguard Buses - ALL REMAINED US/BOP ENERGIZED WITH LOADS CONNECTED TO THE BUS - YES

d. GO TO Step 4

4. Check Switchyard Bus Status - ALL ENERGIZED

• V-E BUS, 345 KV E. BUS VOLT (CB-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV BOP

• V-W BUS, 345 KV W. BUS VOLT (CB-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV

• V/ST1, INCOMING 138 KV XFMR FDR VOLT (CB-12) -

BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV (DE-ENERGIZED)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 24 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. Monitor Blackout Sequencer Status:

a. Affected bus - ENERGIZED - YES BOP b. Verify Blackout Sequencer - OPERATED

• OUTPUT-STEP TIME lights - ALL LIT - NO

• Automatic lockouts AL light - LIT - NO US 5. RNO - GO TO Step 6.

6. Check Transformer XST1 Status:

BOP a. V/ST1, STARTUP XFMR XST1 138 KV FDR VOLT (CB-12) -

BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV - NO US 6. RNO - INITIATE Attachment 2, Restoration of XST1.

Simulator Operator: When contacted as the Shift Manager or Switchyard Coordinator inform the US that the Shift Manager will coordinate the actions of Attachment 2, and that the US should continue with ABN-601, Section 2.0 actions.

1. Determine the origin for the loss of power by performing the following:

US

• Contact the Switchyard Coordinator to provide assistance in determining the transformer status.

Examiner Note: ABN-601 Steps 7, 8 & 9 relate to unaffected transformers and may be N/Ad by the SRO or read and verified.

BOP 10. Verify Diesel Generators - NOT RUNNING BOP 11. Verify 6.9KV Bux XA1 - ENERGIZED Simulator Operator: If contacted as the Shift Manager to have Unit 2 perform SR 3.8.1.1, state that the Extra RO will perform the SR.

US 12. Refer to the appropriate TS:

• MODES 1, 2, 3, OR 4 - Section 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating

• Condition A is applicable

• This is a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> spec to perform SR 3.8.1.1 - Verification of offsite sources 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore power When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7&8 Page 25 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 7 (Key 7).

- Loss of offsite power Indications Available:

Reactor Trip Turbine Trip Multiple Annunciators CREW RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the Reactor Trip and perform Immediate Actions US Direct entry into EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO 1. VERIFY Reactor Trip:

a. Verify the following:

• VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN.

• VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING.

b. VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON. - NO Examiner Note: Emergency Boration is required since all DRPI lights are DARK. This is on Attachment 1.A of both EOP-0.0A and EOS-0.1A. The steps are listed as if this is going to be performed in EOS-0.1A since the transition to this procedure will take place very quickly from EOP-0.0A.

Critical Task Start Time on Loss of DRPI: ___________

BOP 2. VERIFY Turbine Trip:

• VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED.

Examiner Note: The EDG 1-01 will fail to start and cannot be started due to an air start failure Simulator Operator: If contacted to investigate the failure of the EDG 1-01, wait 2 minutes and report back that the diesel will not start and an air start failure alarm is locked in BOP 3. VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7&8 Page 26 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

a. VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

b. VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. - NO

b. RNO - Restore power to de-energized AC safeguards bus per ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION or ABN-602, RESPONSE TO A 6900/480 VOLT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION when time permits.

RO 4. CHECK SI status:

a. CHECK if SI is actuated.

o VERIFY SI indicated on the First Out Annunciator Panel 1-ALB-6C.

o VERIFY SI Actuated blue status light - ON. - NO RO 4. a. RNO - Check if SI is required:

o Steam Line Pressure less than 610 psig. - NO o Pressurizer Pressure less than 1820 psig. - NO o Containment Pressure greater than 3.0 psig. - NO o IF SI is NOT required, THEN go to EOS-0.1A, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

US Transitions to EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response Examiner Note: RO initiates Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI per Attachment 1.A of EOP-0.0A or EOS-0.1A. (Guidance is duplicated in both procedures)

CRITICAL TASK CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS-0.1A, Reactor STATEMENT Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI. Emergency Boration Initiated Time:_______________

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 7&8 Page 27 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 1. Ensure a charging pump is running:

• 1/u-APCH1, CCP 1 - NO

• 1/u-APCH2, CCP 2 - YES

• 1/u-APPD, PDP CT-1 RO 2. Start a boric acid transfer pump:

• 1/u-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1 - AUTO (AFTER START) - NO

• 1/u-APBA2, BA XFER PMP 2 - AUTO (AFTER START) - YES CT-1 RO 3. Open 1/u-8104, EMER BORATE VLV Examiner Note: When the RO opens the emergency borate valve 1/1-8104 it will auto insert event 9 (60 second delay) for the loss of all AFW. This will give the crew a RED path on Heat Sink.

RO 4. Verify flow on u-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO RO 5. Verify flow on u-FI-121A, CHRG FLOW

6. IF EMER BORATE FLOW OR CHRG FLOW can NOT be verified, RO THEN initiate Emergency Boration Flow per another method of ABN-107.

7. WHEN desired to terminate emergency boration (Reference RO Attachment 7 of ABN-107), THEN GO TO Step 8 of ABN-107.

US Transitions to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Heat Sink on Red Path CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 28 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:

a. RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG US PRESSURE - YES

b. RCS temperature - GREATER THAN 350°F - YES RO 2. Check CCP Status - BOTH AVAILABLE - NO Examiner Note: There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV RO 2. RNO - Immediately perform the following:

a. STOP ALL RCPs.

b. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves - AVAILABLE

c. Go to Step 13. OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TO STEP 13.

CRITICAL TASK CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH-0.1A, STATEMENT Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CT-2 RO 13. Actuate SI CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 29 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO 14. Verify RCS Feed Path:

a. Check CCP SI flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW

b. Check SI pumps - BOTH RUNNING - NO

14. b. RNO - Perform the following:

1) Manually start pump(s) and align valves as necessary.

2) IF either of the following RCS feed paths exists, THEN go to RO Step 15.

• CCPs - BOTH INJECTING - NO

• AT LEAST ONE CCP INJECTING AND ONE SI PUMP RUNNING - YES Examiner Note: Steps 15 - 20 will be performed via Attachment 1D and will not be directed individually by the US.

BOP 15. Check If Diesels Should Be Emergency Started:

a. Check diesel generator(s) - RUNNING - DG 1-02 Only

b. Place D/G EMER STOP/START handswitch(es) in START.

BOP 16. Reset SI.

BOP 17. Reset SI Sequencers.

BOP 18. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B.

BOP 19. Reset Containment Spray Signal.

Simulator Operator: When requested to RESET Instrument Air Compressor 1-02 Breaker, wait 2 minutes and EXECUTE remote function EDR74 to CLOSE (Key 11). Provide Field Support report that IAC 1-02 Breaker is Closed.

BOP 20. Establish Instrument Air And Nitrogen To Containment:

a. Establish instrument air:

1) Verify air compressor running.

• Establish instrument air to containment.

b. Establish nitrogen:

1) Verify ACCUM 14 VENT CTRL, 1-HC-943 - CLOSED

2) Open SI/PORV ACCUM N2 ISOL VLV, 1/1-8880.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 9 Page 30 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV CT-2 RO 21. Establish RCS Bleed Path:

a. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves - AVAILABLE

b. Verify PRZR PORV block valves - BOTH OPEN

c. Open PRZR PORVs.

RO 22. Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path:

• PRZR PORVs - BOTH OPEN

• PRZR PORV block valves- BOTH OPEN After the bleed and feed is initiated, TERMINATE the scenario.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2

2016 NRC Scenario 2

Rev. 1

Initialize to IC-16

Setup MDAFWP 1-02 in Pull-Out - Breaker Deenergized IRF FWR021 f

0

1-PV-2286 Isolated for Repairs IOR LOFWHS2286_1 f

0 IOR LOFWHS2286_2 f:0 IRF FWR056 f:0

Event 1 - PRZ LVL [LT-459] Fails Low IMF RX05A f

0 k:1

Event 2 - Main Feedwater Header Pressure [PT-508] Fails High

PT-508 Fails High IMF RX18 f

1500 k:2

Event 3 - Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure [PT-505A] Fails Low

PT-505A Fails Low IMF RX09A f

0 k:3

Event 4 - Neutron Detector Well FN 9 Motor Overload IMF CH03 f

1 k:4

Event 5 - FWP A Recirc Valve Fails Open IMF FW06A f

100 r:10 k:5

Local Isolation of FV-2289 by FW-0023

Delete Malfunction FW06A IOR LOFWZL2289_1 f

0 k:5 d:120 IOR LOFWZL2289_2 f:1 k:5 d:120 IOR LOANAN7B_32 f:1 k:5 d:120

Event 6 - Loss of XST1 IMF ED02 f

1 k:6

Event 7 - Loss of Offsite Power/DG 1-01 Air Start Failure

LOOP IMF ED01 f

1 k:7

Reset IAC 1-02 Breaker IRF EDR74 f

2 k:11

DG 1-01 Air Start Failure IMF EG06A f

1

Event 8 - Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI

Event 9 - TDAFWP Trip if Running (FRH Entry)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2

TDAFWP Trip after emergency borate started

{DICVHS8104.Value=2} IMF FW09A f:1 d:60 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

GUARDED EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT (GEM) SIGN POSTING LOG REASON FOR POSTING MD AFWP 1-02 INOPERABLE Component to be Nomenclature Posting Installed Posting Checked Posting Removed Posted Initial Initial Initial MD AFWP 1 => CB / 830 / X-135 1-HS-2450A JGR RB AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 MOTOR 1APMD1 BREAKER => SG / 810 / 1-083 JGR RB MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER S1-16 PUMP 1-01 ROOM => SG / 790 / 1-072 JGR RB Authorized By Joe UnitSupervisor Date Today Posting Removal Authorized By Date Open Narrative Log Entry Entered Open Narrative Log Entry Closed Comments: This form is not maintained. Verify correct items Guarded per STI-600.01 prior to use.

STI-600.01-1 Page 1 of 1 REFERENCE USE Rev. 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: July 2016 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 924 ppm Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions.

Critical Tasks: CT-1 Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CT-2 Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description I (RO, SRO) Cold Leg Loop 4 NR Temperature Transmitter Failure (TE-441B) 1 RP05D TS (SRO) Fails High I (BOP, SRO) Steam Generator (1-01) Steam Line Pressure Instrument (PT-514) 2 RP03A TS (SRO) Fails Low.

3 Override C (RO, SRO) Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK-130) Fails Low C (BOP, SRO) 4 FW22 Station Service Water Pump 1-01 Trip TS (SRO) 5 TC08C C (BOP, SRO) High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed 6 SG02C M (RO, BOP, SRO) Steam Generator 1-03 Tube Rupture 7 RP15E C (BOP, SRO) Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 8 MS08C C (RO, SRO) Steam Generator 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 5 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC 3 Event 1 (Key 1)

The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations.

The first event is a failure high of a Reactor Coolant System Loop 4 Narrow Range Temperature (TE=441B) element. Crew actions are per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0. Section 2.0 is designated for Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction. Actions include placing the Control Rods in MANUAL and defeating the failed channel. Control Rods will be restored in Manual to their pre-failure position and remain in Manual until restored to Operable per ABN-704. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Functions 6 & 7); Condition E, One channel inoperable.

Event 2 (Key 2)

The next event is a failure low of Main Steam Line 1 Pressure Instrument (PT-514). Crew actions are per ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st-Stage Pressure and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 2.0. Section 2.0 is designated for Steam Line Pressure Malfunction. The crew must manually control Steam Generator level, transfer to an Alternate Steam Flow Channel, and restore Steam Generator (SG) Feedwater Flow Control to AUTO. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature System (ESFAS) Instrumentation (Functions 1.e & 4.d); Condition D, One channel inoperable.

Event 3 (Key 3)

The next event is a failure of the Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Controller, TK-130. The controller output will fail to zero demand and cause TCV-4646, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL valve to close. This will result in Letdown Heat Exchanger High temperature alarms and Letdown flow to divert to the VCT on high temperature.

The crew will respond per the ALM, take manual control of TK-130 and raise demand to establish Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperature to approximately 95°F.

Event 4 (Key 4)

The next event is a trip of Station Service Water Pump 1-01. Crew actions are per ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction, Section 2.0. Section 2.0 is designated for Station Service Water Pump Trip. Various equipment controls, as directed by ABN-501, are placed in PULL-OUT to prevent starting with no cooling water available. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.7.8, Station Service Water System; Condition B, One SSWS Train inoperable. The SRO will also refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources -

Operating; Condition B, One DG inoperable as DG 1-01 must be placed in PULL-OUT upon the loss of Train A Station Service Water.

Event 5 (Key 5)

The next event is High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 fails closed. The crew will enter ABN-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section 9.0. Section 9.0 is designated for Inadvertent Closure of an HP or LP Stop or Control Valve.

Actions include placing rod control in Auto to allow the rod control system to respond to the plant transient and reducing turbine load to allow all operable HP Control Valves to come off their full open seat.

Event 6 - (Key 6)

The major event is a Tube Rupture on SG 1-03. The Crew will diagnose the Tube Rupture due to multiple Radiation alarms and lowering Pressurizer Pressure and Level. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transition to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. A maximum rate RCS cooldown to a target CET temperature as determined in EOP-3.0A will be conducted.

Event 7 - CT-1 (Auto)

The Reactor will be manually tripped and Safety Injection manually initiated. The Reactor will fail to trip from both handswitches at CB-07 and CB-10. The crew will then perform CT-1, Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The Reactor must be manually tripped by momentarily de-energizing 480V Normal Switchgear 1B3 and 1B4 to de-energize the Rod Drive MG Sets. The critical task is considered not met if the crew is not successful in tripping the reactor during EOP-0.0A and transitions to FRS-0.1A.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Event 8 (Auto) CT-2 During performance of CT-2, Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. SG 1-03 MSIV will fail to close. The crew will close all remaining MSIVs, disable the Steam Dumps, and close the Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam Supply Valve.

The RCS cooldown will then be conducted via the intact SG ARVs to atmosphere.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated when the target CET Temperature is reached during the RCS cooldown in accordance with EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Risk Significance Determination Risk Significance Event Guidance Failure of risk important system Event 4 - Station Service Water ABN-501; DBD-ME-011 - Initial prior to Reactor Trip Pump Trip operator action to place the affected DG Emergency Stop/Start handswitch in PULL-OUT to remove the DG from service as it will ONLY operate for 1 minute under load, without service water cooling flow, before damage will occur.

Risk significant operator actions Event 7 - Manually tripping the FSAR 15.8 - The worst common Reactor by momentarily de- mode failure which is postulated energizing 1B3 and 1B4 to occur is the failure to trip the reactor after an anticipated transient has occurred.

Event 8 - Closing all intact SG FSAR 15.6.3.2 - The closing of MSIVs upon failure of the all intact SG MSIVs falls in line ruptured SG MSIV to close with the conservative analysis of the postulated SGTR which assumes a loss of offsite power.

Thus, a release of steam from the secondary system occurs due to the loss of steam dump capability and the subsequent venting to the atmosphere through the ARVs.

Risk significant core damage Events 5 - Steam Generator (1)

STI-214.01 TCA-1.9 - Manual sequence Tube Rupture Actions to Mitigate Effects of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture:

1) TDAFWP flow stopped (excessive AFW flow) within 3 minutes of reactor trip. 2) Identify and Isolate ruptured SG within 13 minutes after initiation of SGTR. 3) Initiate maximum rate cooldown within 5 minutes after isolation of ruptured SG. 4)

Initiate RCS depressurization with PORVs within 2 minutes after completion of RCS cooldown. 5) Secure ECCS within 2 minutes after completion of RCS depressurization.

(1) Crew manning for Initial License Examination less than Timed Operator Action validation constraints CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators CT Manually Recognize a failure Procedural direction at The operator will De-energizing the Trip Reactor due to or an incorrect EOP-0.0A Step 1 to attempt to Rod Drive MG sets Failure to automatic determine if a reactor trip manually trip the will result in a loss Automatically Trip actuation of an has occurred. Position Reactor with the of power to the Rod prior to exiting ESF system or indication of the Reactor handswitches on Drive Mechanisms EOP-0.0A, Reactor component. FSAR Trip breakers and both CB-07 and and the Control Trip or Safety 7.1.2.1 Reactor Power, CB-10; however, Rods will insert into Injection Annunciator First out the Reactor will the core. Reactor alarms. fail to trip. The Trip Breakers will operator will then remain closed, momentarily neutron flux will deenergize the lower and rod 480V normal bottom lights will be switchgear 1B3 lit.

and 1B4 to secure power to the Rod Drive MG sets.

CT Identify and Take one or more Procedurally driven from The operator will SG pressure Isolate the actions that would EOP-3.0A, to identify attempt close the increasing, AFW Ruptured Steam prevent a and isolate a ruptured ruptured SG MSIV flow reduced to Generator Prior to challenge to plant SG. Indications include from the control zero and valve Commencing an safety. STI-214.01, MSL Radiation alarms room, however, position indications.

Operator Induced TCA-1.9; FSAR and SG level. the MSIV will fail Cooldown per EOP- 15.6.3.1.1; WCAP- to close and all 3.0A, Steam 16871-P, Section other MSIVs must Generator Tube 6.4; DBD-ME-027 be closed. The Rupture. MSIV will be locally closed in the field. The operator will stop feeding the SG once sufficient level to cover the tubes is available.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC-18 and 2016 NRC Scenario 3.

EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATING VALUE PARAMETER 7 RP15E Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed - All FAIL K0 8 MS08C SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close FAIL K0 1 RP05D Loop 4 Cold Leg Temperature (TE-441B) Failure 630°F K1 2 RP03A MSL 1 Steam Pressure (PT-514) Failure 0 PSIG K2 Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure 3 Override f:10 K3 (TK-130) Fails Low NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for all event overrides.

4 SW01A SSW Pump 1-01 Trip TRIP K4 4 CVR06 CCP 1-02 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Auto AUTO K11 4 CVR05 CCP 1-01 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Off OFF K12 5 TC08C High Pressure Stop Valve #3 Fails Closed CLOSE K5 6 SG02C SG 1-03 Tube Rupture 1 Tube 1 Tube K6 7 RP15E Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed - All FAIL K0 RPR112 7 RPR113 Reactor Trip Breakers Locally Opened OPEN K13 8 MS08C SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close OPEN K0 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-18 and 2016 NRC Scenario 3.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (924 ppm).

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 8 of 38 Event

Description:

NR Cold Leg Loop 4 Temperature Instrument failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1).

- NR Cold Leg Loop 4 TI (TE-441B) fails high.

Indications Available:

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV 6D-2.10 - AVE TAVE HI 6D-3.14 - 1 OF 4 OT N16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 1-TI-441A, CL 4 TEMP (NR) CHAN IV indication failed high 1-TI-442, RC LOOP 4 TAVE CHAN IV indication failed high RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE Control Rods inserting due to TCOLD failed high and Placed RO Control Rods in Manual.

DIRECT performance of ABN-704, Tc / N-16 Instrumentation US Malfunction, Section 2.0.

Examiner Note: The RO may place 1-FK-121, Charging Flow Controller, in MANUAL to maintain PZR level on setpoint.

PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in MANUAL.

RO

[Step 2.3.1]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 38 Event

Description:

NR Cold Leg Loop 4 Temperature Instrument failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO SELECT LOOP 4 on 1-TS-412T, TAVE Channel Defeat. [Step 2.3.2]

VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT actuated and NOT armed.

RO/BOP

[Step 2.3.3]

Examiner Note: The crew will conduct a Reactivity Brief and execute a Reactivity Plan to restore TAVE to TREF.

US/RO RESTORE TAVE to within 1°F of TREF. [Step 2.3.4]

SELECT LOOP 4 on 1/1-JS-411E, N16 Power Channel Defeat.

RO/BOP

[Step 2.3.5]

ENSURE a valid N16 channel supplying recorder on 1/1-TS-411E, 1 TR 411 RO/BOP CHAN SELECT. [Step 2.3.6]

VERIFY PCIP, Window 3.4 - TURB LOAD REJ STM DMP ARMED C-7, not RO/BOP ARMED (DARK). [Step 2.3.7]

US/BOP VERIFY Steam Dumps were NOT blocked. [Step 2.3.8]

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.11]

• LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Functions 6 & 7).

• CONDITION E - One channel inoperable.

• ACTION E.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR

• ACTION E.2 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.12]

US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.13]

When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, proceed to Event 2.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 10 of 38 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 1-01 Steam Line Pressure Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2).

- RP03A, SG 1-01 Steam Pressure Transmitter PT-514 fails low.

Indications Available:

8A-1.7 - MSL 1 OF 3 PRESS LO 8A-1.8 - SG1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-1.16 - SG 1 1 OF 3 PRESS RATE HI Feedwater flow lowering Feedwater pumps lowering in speed BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

DIRECT performance of ABN-709, STM LINE, STM HDR, & TURB 1st US STAGE PRESS. & FEED HDR PRESS. INSTR MALFUNCTION, Section 2.0, Steam Line Pressure Instrument Malfunction.

CHECK ONE Main Steamline Pressure Channel indicating - GREATER BOP THAN 60 psig difference between remaining channels. [Step 2.3.1]

• DETERMINE 1-PI-514A indicating approximately 990 psig LOWER than remaining channels. [Step 2.3.1]

VERIFY Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves - CLOSED:

BOP

[Step 2.3.2]

• 1-ZL-2325, SG 1 ATMOS RLF VLV

• 1-ZL-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV

• 1-ZL-2327, SG 3 ATMOS RLF VLV

• 1-ZL-2328, SG 4 ATMOS RLF VLV AND The following channels are indicating - NORMAL: [Step 2.3.2]

• 1-PI-2325, MSL 1 PRESS

• 1-PI-2326, MSL 2 PRESS

• 1-PI-2327, MSL 3 PRESS

• 1-PI-2328, MSL 4 PRESS CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 11 of 38 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 1-01 Steam Line Pressure Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL AND CONTROL Steam BOP Generator 1-01 level in normal operating range: [Step 2.3.3]

Manually CONTROL 1-SK-509A, FWPT MASTER SPD CTRL as necessary.

BOP

[Step 2.3.4]

BOP SELECT Alternate Steam Flow Channel: [Step 2.3.5]

• Loop, 1-FS-512C, SG 1 STM FLO CHAN SELECT [Step 2.3.5.a]

• Steam pressure/associated steam flow

• 1-FY-512B (PT-514/FT-512)

OR

• 1-FY-513B (PT-515/FT-513)

BOP VERIFY Steam Generator 1-01 is stable at program level. [Step 2.3.6]

PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO AND BOP VERIFY SG 1-01 level - CONTROLLING NORMAL OPERATING RANGE

[Step 2.3.7]

US Evaluate Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.11]

• LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 1.e, Steam Line Pressure - Low.

• LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4d (1) - Steam Line Pressure Low and Negative Rate - High

• CONDITION D - One channel inoperable

• ACTION D.1 - Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR

• ACTION D.2.1 - Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND

• ACTION D.2.2 - Be in MODE 4, within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 12 of 38 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 1-01 Steam Line Pressure Instrument Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421, as applicable. [Step 2.3.12]

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 13 of 38 Event

Description:

Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK-130) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).

- Override, LTDN HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK-130) Fails Low.

Indications Available:

6A-1.3 - LTDN HX OUT TEMP HI 6A-2.3 - LTDN HX NORM OUT FLO DIVERT 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP Rising RO RESPOND to Annunciator Procedure Alarms.

RECOGNIZE 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL has failed to 0% output RO and 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP is rising.

Examiner Note: The operator can take manual control of 1-TK-130 and open TCV-4646 as an automatic control system has malfunctioned, per ODA-102.

RO Performs actions of ALM-0061A, Window 1.3 RO MONITOR 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP. [Step 1]

IF temperature increases to 135°F, ensure 1/1-TCV-129, LTDN DIVERT VLV is diverted to the VCT. [Step 1.A]

RO MONITOR 1-TI-381, BTRS DEMIN IN TEMP. [Step 2]

The BTRS system is NOT in service. [Step 2.A]

RO VERIFY charging flow is 12 gpm greater than letdown flow. [Step 3]

RO VERIFY 1-TI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUT TEMP is 350°F. [Step 4]

1-TI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUT TEMP is NOT > 350°F. [Step 4.A]

BOP VERIFY 1-ZL-4646, LTDN HX CCW RET VLV is OPEN. (1-CB-03) [Step 5]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 14 of 38 Event

Description:

Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK-130) Fails Low Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF 1-ZL-4646 is CLOSED, place 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in RO manual AND adjust letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature to 95°F.

[Step 5.A]

The controller will respond appropriately in MANUAL to control letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature at 95°F. [Step 5.B]

RO ENSURE 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP is maintained < 125°F. [Step 6]

Letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature can be maintained < 125°F with 1-TK-130 in manual. [Step 6.A]

NOTIFY Chemistry and Radiation protection personnel that Letdown has US/RO diverted to the VCT. [Step 7]

US Correct the condition or initiate a work request per STA-606. [Step 8]

When Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature is appropriately controlled, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 15 of 38 Event

Description:

Station Service Water Pump 1-01 Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4).

- SW01A, Station Service Water Pump 1-01 Trip.

Indications Available:

01-1.8 - SSWP 1 / 2 OVRLOAD / TRIP 01-1.11 - CCP 1 L/O CLR SSW RET FLO LO 01-1.12 - SIP 1 L/O CLR SSW RET FLO LO 01-3.8 - CSP 1 & 3 BRG CLR SSW RET FLO LO 3B-4.5 - CCW HX 1 / 2 SPLY FLO LO BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RECOGNIZE 1-HS-4250A, Service Water Pump 1-01 amber MISMATCH BOP and white TRIP lights illuminated.

DIRECT performance of ABN-501, Station Service Water System US Malfunction, Section 2.0 Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.

PLACE CS-1DG1E, Train A Diesel Generator Emergency Start/Stop BOP handswitch in PULLOUT. [Step 2.3.1]

BOP VERIFY Train B SSW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2.3.2]

BOP VERIFY Train B CCW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2.3.3]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 16 of 38 Event

Description:

Station Service Water Pump 1-01 Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When asked about status of SSW Pump breaker/motor, wait 2 minutes and REPORT that the SSW Pump 1-01 50/51 overcurrent relays on Phases B &

C are tripped and the motor is hot.

RO/BOP VERIFY equipment on Train A not required for operation: [Step 2.3.4]

• Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01

• Diesel Generator 1-01

• Component Cooling Water Pump 1-01

• Safety Injection Pump 1-01

• Containment Spray Pumps 1-01 & 1-03

• Determines CCP 1-01 is running and CCP 1-02 must be started.

[Step 2.3.4 RNO]

Simulator Operator: When contacted, EXECUTE remote function CVR06 (Key 11) to START CCP 1-02 Auxiliary Oil Pump and CVR05 (Key 12) to STOP CCP 1-01 Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump.

RO START Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-02.

RO/BOP PLACE equipment on Train A in PULL OUT. [Step 2.3.5]

• Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-01

• Station Service Water Pump 1-01 (may leave as is due to CAUTION)

• Safety Injection Pump 1-01

• Containment Spray Pumps 1-01 & 1-03 BOP VERIFY CCW Pump 1-01 RUNNING. [Step 2.3.6 and 2.3.6.a]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 17 of 38 Event

Description:

Station Service Water Pump 1-01 Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature on Train A remains BOP

< 122ºF. [Step 2.3.6.b]

US Initiate a Work Request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.7]

US Refer to EPP-201. [Step 2.3.8]

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.9]

• LCO 3.7.8.B, Station Service Water System.

• CONDITION B - One SSWS Train inoperable.

• ACTION B.1 - Restore SSWS Train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

• LCO 3.8.1.B, AC Sources - Operating.

• CONDITION B - One DG inoperable.

• ACTION B.1 - Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the required offsite circuits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

• ACTION B.2 - Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable within four hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent within inoperability of redundant required feature(s).

• ACTION B.3 - Determine OPERABLE DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Simulator Operator: If contacted, INFORM the Unit Supervisor that another operator will perform required Tech Spec Surveillance.

US Complete OPT-215 verification within one hour. [Step 2.3.10]

US Submit a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.11]

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 18 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5).

- TC08C, High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed.

Indications Available:

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV 8A-3.6 - SG3 LVL LO 8A-3.8 - SG3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-3.12 - SG3 LVL DEV Main Generator Load Decreasing on Turbine Digital Display Steam Dumps operating to control RCS Temperature Various Heater Drain Alarms BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures BOP RECOGNIZE High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 has Failed Closed Immediately PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in RO AUTO to allow the Rod Control System to Automatically respond to the plant transient.

Examiner Note: If Control Rods are not placed in Auto expeditiously, 1-PV-2286, LP HTR BYPASS VLV may open. If 1-PV-2286 opens, the crew may address the actions of ABN-302, Section 7.0 prior to addressing ABN-401, Section 9.0.

The ABN-302 response is included following the ABN-401 response and begins on page 21.

DIRECT performance of ABN-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section US 9.0 BOP VERIFY operable HP Control Valves are 98% open. [Step 9.3.1]

• PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO.

RO/BOP [Step 9.3.1 RNO a]

• Reduce Turbine power to 50 MW less than current load target at a rate of 100 MW per minute. [Step 9.3.1 RNO b]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 19 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP SET Turbine Load Rate Setpoint Controller to 100 MWe/min.

• OPEN Load Rate Setpoint OSD.

• SELECT blue bar and ENTER 100 MWe/min.

• CLOSE Load Rate Setpoint OSD.

BOP SET Turbine Load Target to 50 MWe less than current load value.

• OPEN Load Target OSD.

• SELECT blue bar and ENTER appropriate MWe.

• DEPRESS Accept then VERIFY value in blue bar is desired Load Target (magnitude and direction).

• DEPRESS Execute then VERIFY Load Target changes to desired load.

• CLOSE Load Target OSD.

BOP VERIFY Steam Generator levels at or trending to program. [Step 9.3.2]

VERIFY PR Delta Flux - (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS: [Step 9.3.3]

• 1-NI-41C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN I RO

• 1-NI-42C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN II

• 1-NI-43C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN III

• 1-NI-44C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN IV VERIFY the Steam Dumps AND Rod Control System - RESPONDING TO RO MAINTAIN Tave to Tref. [Step 9.3.4]

• 1-TI-412A, AVE Tave-Tref DEV VERIFY Pressurizer Level - TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL. [Step 9.3.5]

RO

• 1-LR-459, PRZR LVL/PRZR LVL STPT CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 20 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure - TRENDING TO PROGRAM PRESSURE.

RO [Step 9.3.6]

• 1PR-455, PRESS CHECK Steam Generator Feedwater Level AND Flow Control Valve status:

BOP

[Step 9.3.7]

• Steam Generator Levels - AT 67% [Step 9.3.7.a]

• 1-LI-551/519, SG 1 LVL (NR)

• 1-LI-552/529, SG 2 LVL (NR)

• 1-LI-553/539, SG 3 LVL (NR)

• 1-LI-554/549, SG 4 LVL (NR)

• ALL Steam Generator Feedwater Flow Valves - IN AUTO

[Step 9.3.7.b]

• 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL BOP

• 1-FK-520, SG 2 FW FLO CTRL

• 1-FK-530, SG 3 FW FLO CTRL

• 1-FK-540, SG 4 FW FLO CTRL BOP RESET Steam Dump Valves [Step 9.3.8]

• VERIFY ALL Steam Dumps - CLOSED [Step 9.3.8.a]

• VERIFY 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND - 0% [Step 9.3.8.b]

• PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT to RESET AND then TAVE position [Step 9.3.8.c]

VERIFY Turbine Load - STABLE [Step 9.3.9]

BOP

• GEN MEGAWATTS

• GEN MEGAVARS VERIFY ALL operable HP Turbine Control Valves - INDICATE LESS THAN 100% OPEN: [Step 9.3.10]

TG Control Display OR BOP

• 1-ZI-2429B, HPT CTRL VLV 1 POSN

• 1-ZI-2431B, HPT CTRL VLV 2 POSN

• 1-ZI-2430B, HPT CTRL VLV 3 POSN

• 1-ZI-2428B, HPT CTRL VLV 4 POSN CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 21 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Control Rods may insert below the LO-LO Limit on this transient, if this occurs the Unit Supervisor should refer to TS 3.1.6, Control Bank Insertion Limits.

US REFER to TS/TR listed in Section 10.1 [Step 9.3.11]

RESET Turbine Runback per Section 8.0, if necessary (NOT required)

BOP

[Step 9.3.12]

BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP OBSERVE rising Reactor Power and lowering Main Feedwater temperatures.

DIRECT performance of ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain US System Malfunction, Section 7.0.

Examiner Note: Diamond steps () are Initial Operator Actions.

ENSURE Turbine Power- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 900 MWe.

US

[Step 7.3.1 - YES]

RO

• PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO.

BOP

• MANUALLY RUNBACK Turbine Power to 900 MWe.

• DEPRESS 900 MWe Manual Runback button.

• CLICK on 0/1 button.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 22 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• CLICK on EXECUTE then VERIFY Runback in progress.

Simulator Operator: 3 minutes after being dispatched, REPORT no indication of piping or hanger damage.

Locally INSPECT Heater Drain System for signs of water hammer induced US damage. [Step 7.3.2 - YES]

BOP ENSURE Feedwater Pump suction pressure > 250 PSIG. [Step 7.3.3 - YES]

• 1-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRESS

• 1-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRESS US/BOP RESET Turbine Runback per ABN-401. [Step 7.3.4 - YES]

Examiner Note: The following steps are from ABN-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section 8.0, Turbine Reloading after Runback.

• VERIFY alarm 6D-1.9, ANY TURB RUNBACK EFFECTIVE - DARK.

[Step 8.3.1 - YES]

• In the Load Control Section, ENSURE Load Rate Setpoint Controller is SET to support reload or current plant conditions. [Step 8.3.2 - YES]

• In the Load Control Section, ENSURE Load Target Setpoint Controller is set for actual MWe. [Step 8.3.3 - YES]

• If Manual Runback was used, TURN OFF the appropriate Subloop Controller on the TG Control Display in the MANUAL RUNBACKS Section. [Step 8.3.4 - YES]

• VERIFY Runback is RESET. [Step 8.3.5 - YES]

• VERIFY Runback - GREATER THAN 15% WITHIN ONE HOUR and CONTACT Chemistry. [Step 8.3.6 - YES]

• CONTROL Turbine Load as required per IPO-003A. [Step 8.3.7 - YES]

Examiner Note: Combination of events prior to / during this scenario will result in exceeding the Rod Insertion Limits (RIL). The RO should inform the SRO when ALB-6D, Window 2.7 - ANY CONTROL ROD BANK AT LO-LO LIMIT is LIT. Technical Specifications must be referenced.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 23 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

• LCO 3.1.6.A, Control Bank Insertion Limits.

• CONDITION A - Control bank insertion limits not met.

• ACTION A.1.1 - Verify SDM to be within the limits provided in the COLR within one (1) hour, OR

• ACTION A.1.2 - initiate Boration to restore SDM to within limit within one (1) hour, AND

• ACTION A.2 - Restore control bank(s) to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

BOP When Steam Dumps have closed - RESET C-7. [Step 7.3.5 - YES]

• Momentarily PLACE 43/1-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in RESET.

• VERIFY PCIP, Window 3.4 - TURB LOAD REJ STM DMP ARMED C-7 is DARK.

Examiner Note: Closing 1-PV-2286 is a significant plant reactivity event and requires a detailed reactivity brief. The crew will not be expected to perform additional actions in this section prior to proceeding with the next event.

When the plant has been stabilized, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7 and 8.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 24 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7 and 8 (Key 6).

- SG02C, SG 1-03 Tube Rupture

- RP15E, RX Trip Breakers Jammed Closed - ALL

- MS08C, SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Indications Available:

6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO 5C-1.2 - PRZR LVL DEV LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON PC MSL-180 (1-RE-2327) is RED Main Steam Line Radiation level rising Pressurizer pressure lowering RO/BOP RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.

DETERMINE Reactor Trip/Safety Injection initiation required. Attempt to RO/BOP manually trip the reactor and manually initiate Safety Injection.

US DIRECT performance of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRITICAL TASK CT-1 Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior STATEMENT to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: [Step 1]

• VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers - OPEN. [Step 1.a]

• VERIFY Neutron flux - DECREASING. [Step 1.a]

RO/BOP

• Manually trip reactor from both trip switches [Step 1.a RNO]

• IF reactor will not trip, THEN momentarily de-energize 480 V normal BOP switchgear 1B3 and 1B4. [Step 1.a RNO]

CT-1

• Momentarily places BOTH CS-1B3-1, INCOMING BKR 1B3-1 AND BOP CS-1B4-1, INCOMING BKR 1B4-1 to TRIP and then back to CLOSE.

RO

• VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights - ON. [Step 1.b]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 25 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip: [Step 2]

• VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED. [Step 2]

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses: [Step 3]

• VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

[Step 3.a]

• VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses - ENERGIZED. [Step 3.b]

RO CHECK SI status: [Step 4]

RO

• CHECK if SI is actuated. [Step 4.a]

RO Manually INITIATE Train A and Train B Safety Injection Signal.

• PLACE 1/1-SIA2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB-07 and RO DETERMINE SI has actuated on both Trains. [Step 4.a]

RO

• VERIFY Both Trains SI Actuated: [Step 4.b]

• SI Actuated blue status light - ON NOT FLASHING.

Simulator Operator: If contacted to open the Reactor Trip Breakers, wait 2 minutes and Execute Key 13.

Examiner Note: EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP begin on Page 32 of the scenario guide.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 26 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

US/BOP

[Step 5]

Examiner Note: The crew should stop AFW flow to SG 1-03 promptly after it has been identified as ruptured AND level is greater than 43% per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 1.A, Foldout for EOP-0.0A Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment: [Step *6]

• VERIFY both MDAFW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 6.a]

• PLACE TDAFW Pump in PULLOUT per Foldout Page. [Step 6.b]

• VERIFY AFW total flow - GREATER THAN 460 GPM. [Step 6.c]

• VERIFY AFW valve alignment - PROPER ALIGNMENT. [Step 6.d]

RO VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required: [Step *7]

• VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 1-8, CS ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED.

[Step 7.a]

• VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 4-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT - NOT ILLUMINATED. [Step 7.a]

• VERIFY Containment pressure - LESS THAN 18.0 PSIG. [Step 7.a]

• VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED.

[Step 7.b]

• VERIFY Containment Spray Pumps 2 & 4 - RUNNING. [Step 7.c]

RO CHECK if Main Steam lines should be ISOLATED: [Step *8]

• VERIFY Containment pressure - GREATER THAN 6.0 PSIG. [Step 8.a]

• VERIFY Steam Line pressure - LESS THAN 610 PSIG. [Step 8.a]

• Go to Step 9. [Step 8.a RNO a]

RO CHECK RCS Temperature: [Step *9]

• VERIFY RCS Average Temperature - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 557°F. [Step 9]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 27 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status: [Step 10]

• VERIFY PRZR Safeties - CLOSED. [Step 10.a]

• VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves - CLOSED. [Step 10.b]

• VERIFY PORVs - CLOSED. [Step 10.c]

• VERIFY Power to at least 1 Block Valve - AVAILABLE. [Step 10.d]

• VERIFY Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN. [Step 10.e]

RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step 11]

• VERIFY RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 11.a]

• GO to Step 12. [Step 11.a RNO a]

US/RO CHECK if any SG is Faulted: [Step 12]

• VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. [Step 12.a]

• VERIFY Steam Generator 1-01 pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 12.a]

• Go to Step 13. [Step 12.a RNO a]

US/RO CHECK if SG Tubes Are Not Ruptured: [Step 13]

• Condenser off gas radiation - NORMAL (COG-182, 1RE-2959)

• Main steamline radiation - NORMAL (MSL-178 through 181, 1RE-2325 through 2328)

• SG blowdown sample radiation monitor - NORMAL (SGS-164, 1RE-4200)

• No Steam Generator level increasing in an uncontrolled manner

• Go to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1 based on indications that SG 1-03 is ruptured. [Step 13 RNO]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 28 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior US Transitions to EOS-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture US/RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step *1]

• VERIFY RCS subcooling - LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 1.a]

• GO to Step 2. [Step 1.a RNO].

US/BOP IDENTIFY Steam Generator 1-03 as ruptured. [Step *2]

• OBSERVE high radiation from Steam Generator 1-03 Main Steam Line.

• OBSERVE SG 1-03 level rising out of control.

CT-2 Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to CRITICAL TASK Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, STATEMENT Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

CT-2 RO/BOP ISOLATE flow from Ruptured Steam Generator 1-03: [Step 3]

CT-2

• ADJUST SG 1-03 Atmospheric Controller Setpoint to 1160 PSIG.

[Step 3.a]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 29 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• CHECK SG 1-03 Atmospheric Relief Valve - CLOSED. [Step 3.b]

• CLOSE SG 1-03 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve. [Step 3.c]

• CLOSE SG 1-03 Drip Pot Isolation Valves. [Step 3.c]

CT-2

• RECOGNIZES SG 1-03 MSIV will NOT close and CLOSES all remaining SG MSIVs. [Step 3.c RNO c.1)]

CT-2

• PLACES STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches 43/1-SDA and 43/1-SDB in OFF to close the Steam Dump Valves.

[Step 3.c RNO c.2)]

CT-2

• CLOSES 1-HS-3228, MS TO AUX STM SPLY VLV.

[Step 3.c RNO c.3)]

• DISPATCHES operators to LOCALLY close SG 1-03 MSIV.

[Step 3.c RNO c.4)]

Examiner Note: The intact SG ARVs (SGs 1, 2 and 4) should be set to control at 1092 psig, the steam pressure corresponding to the No load RCS average temperature of 557°F.

Simulator Operator: When contacted to Close MSIV 1-03, wait 2 minutes and then DELETE Malfunction MS08C.

• USE SGs 1, 2 and 4 ARVs during subsequent RCS cooldown.

[Step 3.c RNO c.6)]

• PULL-OUT steam supply valve handswitch from ruptured SG(s) to TDAFWP. (NOT Applicable) [Step 3.d]

• VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from SG 1 CLOSED [Step 3.e]

US/RO CHECK SG 1-03 Level: [Step *4]

• Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) [Step 4.a]

• Stop AFW flow to SG 1-03. [Step 4.b]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 30 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO CHECK SG 1-03 Pressure - GREATER THAN 420 PSIG [Step 5]

Examiner Note: When ruptured Steam Generator pressure is between two values provided on the Table at Step 6.c, the correlating Core Exit Temperature for the lower pressure value is used. SG Pressure ___________.

BOP/RO INITIATE RCS Cooldown: [Step *6]

• CHECK PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 1960 PSIG [Step 6.a]

• BLOCK low steamline pressure SI signal [Step 6.b]

• DETERMINE required core exit temperature from Table 1. [Step 6.c]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 31 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Required CET Temp _____________.

BOP/RO

• RECOGNIZES that condenser is unavailable due to shutting all intact SG MSIVs. [Step 6.d]

• DUMP steam at maximum rate from SGs 1, 2 and 4 using ARVs.

[Step 6.d RNO d]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 32 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• Make plant announcement and notify Plant Staff of steam release.

[Step 6.d RNO d.1)]

• PERFORM the following as necessary to release steam:

[Step 6.d RNO d.2)]

• PLACE SGs 1, 2 and 4 ARVs in manual and fully open valves.

• PLACE all PRZR heater switches to OFF position. [Step 6.e]

• Core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE [Step 6.f]

• STOP RCS cooldown. [Step 6.g]

• MAINTAIN core exit TCs - LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE

[Step 6.h]

When the target CET Temperature is reached during the RCS cooldown in accordance with EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, TERMINATE the Scenario.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # Att. 2 Page 33 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: These steps are performed by the BOP per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment: [Step 1]

• VERIFY SSW Pump 1 RUNNING. [Step 1.a]

• VERIFY EDG 1-02 Cooler SSW return flow. [Step 1.b]

BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pump 1 RUNNING. [Step 2]

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (RED WINDOWS). [Step 3]

BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation - APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (GREEN WINDOWS). [Step 4]

BOP VERIFY CCW Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 5]

BOP VERIFY RHR Pumps - RUNNING. [Step 6]

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment: [Step 7]

• VERIFY CCP 1 RUNNING. [Step 7.a]

• VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve Isolation: [Step 7.b]

• Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves - CLOSED. [Step 7.b.1)]

• Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460 - CLOSED.

[Step 7.b.2)]

BOP VERIFY ECCS flow: [Step 8]

• CCP SI flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.a]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # Att. 2 Page 34 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• RCS pressure - LESS THAN 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.b]

• GO to Step 9. [Step 8.b RNO b]

BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete: [Step 9]

• Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED.

• Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves - CLOSED.

• Feedwater Bypass Control Valves - CLOSED.

• Feedwater Control Valves - CLOSED.

BOP VERIFY Diesel Generator 1 RUNNING. [Step 10]

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights for SI Load Shedding on 1-MLB-9 and 1-MLB LIT. [Step 11]

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment - PROPER MLB LIGHT INDICATION. [Step 12]

BOP VERIFY Components on Table 1 are Properly Aligned. [Step 13]

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # Att. 2 Page 35 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI)

CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK STOPPED/DEENERGIZED DMPR CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & STARTED BSTR FN 42 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # Att. 2 Page 36 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & STARTED BSTR FN 43 CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 3 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 4 & EXH DMPR CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 17 CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY STOPPED/DEENERGIZED FN 18 CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 3 Event # Att. 2 Page 37 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps are now complete.

CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3

2016 NRC Scenario 3

Rev. 1

Event 1 - Loop 4 Tcold Fails High

TE-441B Failure High IMF RP05D f

630 k:1

Event 2 - Main Steam Line 1 Steam Pressure Fails Low

PT-514 Failure Low IMF RP03A f

0 k:2

Event 3 TK-130 Fails to 0% Demand - Manual reopens valve IOR AICVTK130 f

10 k:3

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IMF CV05 f:0

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR LOCVTK130_1 f:1

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR LOCVTK130_2 f:0

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR DICVTK130_2 f:1

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR DICVTK130_4 f:1

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DMF CV05

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR LOCVTK130_1

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR LOCVTK130_2

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR DICVTK130_2

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR DICVTK130_4

{DICVTK130_1.Value=1}IMF CV05 f:0

Event 4 - Station Service Water Pump 1-01 Trip

SSWP 1-01 Trips IMF SW01A f

1 k:4

Event 5 - High Pressure Stop Valve Fails Closed

HP Stop Valve 3 Failure IMF TC08C f

1 k:5

Event 6 - SGTR #3

SGTR 1 Tube IMF SG02C f

1 k:6

Event 7 - ALL Automatic & Manual Rx Trip Failures

Rx Trip Breakers Jammed Close - All IMF RP15E f

1

Event 8 - SG #3 MSIV Fails to Close in Manual

1-HV-2335A Fails to Manually Close IMF MS08C f

1

KEY 11 CCP 1-02 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Auto IRF CVR06 f

1 k:11

KEY 12 CCP 1-01 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Off IRF CVR05 f

0 k:12

KEY 13 Rx Trip Breakers Open IRF RPR112 f

2 k:13 IRF RPR113 f:2 k:13 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: CPNPP 1 and 2 Date of Exam: 07/11/16 Operating Test No.: July NRC A E SCENARIOS P V P E CPNPP #1 CPNPP #2 CPNPP #3 L N T MINIMUM(*)

I T CREW CREW CREW CREW O C

POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T A T A

N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B R T O R T O R T O R T O L T P R I U O C P O C P O C P O C P E

RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 SRO-U1 I/C 1,2,3, 2,4,5, 9 4 4 2 4,5 7 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3,6 - 3 0 2 2 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 SRO-U2 1,3 1,2,3, I/C 4,5,7, 9 4 4 2 8

MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - 1,2,4 3 0 2 2 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 SRO-U3 1,2,3, 1,2,3, I/C 4,5 4,5,7, 12 4 4 2 8

MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3,6 1,2,4 6 0 2 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-5 TRANSIENT AND EVENT CHECKLIST REV. 2.DOCX

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: CPNPP 1 and 2 Date of Exam: 07/11/16 Operating Test No.: July NRC A E SCENARIOS P V P E CPNPP #1 CPNPP #2 CPNPP #3 L N T MINIMUM(*)

I T CREW CREW CREW CREW O C

POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION T A T A

N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B R T O R T O R T O R T O L T P R I U O C P O C P O C P O C P E

RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 RO1 I/C 2,3,4, 1,3,8 7 4 4 2 5

MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - - 0 0 2 2 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 RO2 I/C 2,3,4, 1,3,8 7 4 4 2 5

MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - - 0 0 2 2 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 RO3 I/C 1,3 2,4,5, 6 4 4 2 7

MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - - 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-5 TRANSIENT AND EVENT CHECKLIST REV. 2.DOCX

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: CPNPP Date of Examination: 07/11/16 Operating Test No. July NRC Applicants SRO-U1 SRO-U2 SRO-U3 Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Interpret/Diag- 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 2,4,5, 1,3,7, nose Events - 4,5,6, 6,7 8,9 4,5,6, - 4,5,6, 4,5,6, 7,8,9 7,8 7,8,9 7,8 and Conditions Comply With 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 2,4,5, 1,3,7, and Use - 4,5,6, 6,7 8,9 4,5,6, - 4,5,6, 4,5,6, 7,8,9 7,8 7,8,9 7,8 Procedures (1)

Operate 2,4,5, 1,3,7, Control Boards - -

6,7 8,9 N/A - N/A N/A (2)

Communicate 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 2,4,5, 1,3,7, and - 4,5,6, 6,7 8,9 4,5,6, - 4,5,6, 4,5,6, 7,8,9 7,8 7,8,9 7,8 Interact Demonstrate 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, 1,2,3, Supervisory - 4,5,6, N/A - N/A 4,5,6, - 4,5,6, 4,5,6, 7,8,9 7,8 7,8,9 7,8 Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. - 1,3,6 N/A - N/A 1,2,4 - 1,3,6 1,2,4 Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev.2.docx

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: CPNPP Date of Examination: 07/11/16 Operating Test No. July NRC Applicants RO1 RO2 RO3 Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Interpret/Diag-2,4,5, 1,3,5, 2,4,5, 1,3,5, 1,3,7, 2,4,5, nose Events -

6,7,9 6,7,8 6,7,9 6,7,8 8,9 6,7 and Conditions Comply With 2,3,4, 1,3,4, 2,3,4, 1,3,4, 1,3,7, 2,4,5, and Use - 5,6,7, 5,6,7, - 5,6,7, 5,6,7, -

8,9 6,7 9 8 9 8 Procedures (1)

Operate 1,3,4, 1,3,4, 2,3,4, 2,3,4, 1,3,7, 2,4,5, Control Boards -

5,7,9 5,6,7, -

5,7,9 5,6,7, -

8,9 6,7 8 8 (2)

Communicate 2,3,4, 1,3,4, 2,3,4, 1,3,4, 1,3,7, 2,4,5, and - 5,6,7, 5,6,7, - 5,6,7, 5,6,7, -

8,9 6,7 9 8 9 8 Interact Demonstrate Supervisory - N/A N/A - N/A N/A - N/A N/A Ability (3)

Comply With N/ N/

and Use Tech. - N/A A

- N/A A

- N/A N/A Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

CPNPP 2016 NRC ES-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev.2.docx