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| {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)S 05000529 NOTES:Standardized plant.ACCESSION NBR:9004180104 DOC~DATE: 90/04/02 NOTARIZED: | | {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) |
| NO DOCKET r.FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. | | ACCESSION NBR:9004180104 DOC ~ DATE: 90/04/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET r. |
| Arizona Public Service Co.(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) | | FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk) |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| Special Rept 2-SR-89-010:on 891105 post accident sampling sys declared inoperable. | | Special Rept 2-SR-89-010:on 891105 post accident sampling sys declared inoperable. |
| DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 0 ENCL Q SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), incident Rpt, etc.RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA PETERSON,S. | | DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), |
| INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DET/ESGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: EG&G STUART,V.A LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT NOTES COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD CHAN,T ACRS AEOD/DS P/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8D S SPLB8Dl REG F 02 G FILE 01 L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1.2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D R D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS: | | 0incident ENCL Q SIZE: |
| D D PLEA%HELP US TO REDUCE WASTETH CONTACI'HE, DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISIRIBUTION LISIS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED)TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 39 ENCL 39 Mp I
| | Rpt, etc. S NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D PETERSON,S. 1 1 CHAN,T 1 1. |
| Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O.BOX 52Q34~PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85Q?2-2Q34 JAMES M.LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTIDII
| | INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1. |
| '192-00643-JML/TRB/RKR April 2, 1990 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
| | NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 S SPLB8Dl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG F 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 G FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G STUART,V.A 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 R NOTES 1 1 D |
| | D D |
| | NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| | PLEA% HELP US TO REDUCE WASTETH CONTACI'HE,DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISIRIBUTION LISIS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED) |
| | TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 39 ENCL 39 Mp |
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| ==Dear Sirs:== | | I Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52Q34 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA85Q?2-2Q34 JAMES M. LEVINE '192-00643-JML/TRB/RKR VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTIDII April 2, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 |
| | |
| | ==Dear Sirs:== |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)Unit 2 Docket No.STN 50-529 (License No.NPF-51)Special Report 2-SR-89-010 File 90-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and 6.9.2.This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System inoperable for greater than seven days.This report is submitted to provide updated information from the original report.If you have any questions, please contact T.R.Bradish, (Acting)Compliance Manager at (602)393-2521.Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/tlg Attachment CC: W.F.Conway J.B.Martin D.H.Coe T.L.Chan A.C.Gehr A.H.Gutterman (all with attachment) | | Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) |
| PDR ADOCK 05000529 004180104 900402 ggS | | Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51) |
| | Special Report 2-SR-89-010 File 90-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System inoperable for greater than seven days. This report is submitted to provide updated information from the original report. |
| | If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, (Acting) |
| | Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521. |
| | Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/tlg Attachment CC: |
| | W. F. Conway (all with attachment) |
| | J. B. Martin D. H. Coe T. L. Chan A. C. Gehr A. H. Gutterman 004180104 900402 ggS PDR ADOCK 05000529 |
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| PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Post Accident Sampling System Inoperable for Greater Than 7 Days License No.NPF-51 Supplement 1 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 I.DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED: A.Initial Conditions: | | PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Post Accident Sampling System Inoperable for Greater Than 7 Days License No. NPF-51 Supplement 1 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 I. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED: |
| On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 2 with the reactor coolant system (RCS)(AB)at approximately 2241 psia and 565 degrees Fahrenheit. | | A. Initial Conditions: |
| | On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 2 with the reactor coolant system (RCS)(AB) at approximately 2241 psia and 565 degrees Fahrenheit. |
| Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences): | | Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences): |
| Event Classification: | | Event Classification: Submitted in accordance with ACTION 28 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 At. approximately 1400 MST on November 5, 1989 the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).(IP) was declared inoperable in order to perform scheduled preventive maintenance and surveillance tests. |
| Submitted in accordance with ACTION 28 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 At.approximately 1400 MST on November 5, 1989 the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).(IP) was declared inoperable in order to perform scheduled preventive maintenance and surveillance tests.At this time Unit 2 was in Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN). | | At this time Unit 2 was in Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN). On November 24, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Unit 2 entered Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY). Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 requires PASS to be operable when in Modes 1, 2, or 3. TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 requires PASS to be restored to an operable status within 7 days or initiate the Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP) and prepare and submit a special report. Technical Specifications permitted entry into Mode 3 from Mode 4 with PASS inoperable. |
| On November 24, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Unit 2 entered Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY).Technical Specification (TS)3.3.3.1 requires PASS to be operable when in Modes 1, 2, or 3.TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 requires PASS to be restored to an operable status within 7 days or initiate the Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP)and prepare and submit a special report.Technical Specifications permitted entry into Mode 3 from Mode 4 with PASS inoperable. | | PASP was initiated on November 24, 1989 at approximately 0740 MST. |
| PASP was initiated on November 24, 1989 at approximately 0740 MST.On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, the 7 day limit of TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 was exceeded.After completion of the scheduled preventive maintenance activities it was determined that the PASS booster pump seals were leaking.Troubleshooting determined that the PASS booster pump discharge check valve was allowing leakage that pressurized the pump to a pressure above the 150 psig seal rating.The leaking check valve was replaced and a new PASS booster pump has been installed. | | On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, the 7 day limit of TS 3.3.3. 1 ACTION 28 was exceeded. |
| At approximately 1730 MST on February 7, 1990 while performing post maintenance testing to return PASS to service, the sample bomb could not be depressurized prior to taking a Reactor Coolant System gas sample.An approved work document was initiated to troubleshoot and correct the problem. | | After completion of the scheduled preventive maintenance activities it was determined that the PASS booster pump seals were leaking. Troubleshooting determined that the PASS booster pump discharge check valve was allowing leakage that pressurized the pump to a pressure above the 150 psig seal rating. The leaking check valve was replaced and a new PASS booster pump has been installed. |
| ll H f l Special Report.2-SR-89-010-01 Page 2 Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event: Not applicable | | At approximately 1730 MST on February 7, 1990 while performing post maintenance testing to return PASS to service, the sample bomb could not be depressurized prior to taking a Reactor Coolant System gas sample. An approved work document was initiated to troubleshoot and correct the problem. |
| -no structures, systems, or components were inoperable which contributed to this event.Cause of each component or system failure, if known: The cause of the booster pump seal leakage was excessive pressure because of the discharge check valve leakage.The cause of the check valve leakage is under investigation and will be provided in a supplemental report.Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known: The failure of the booster pump check valve is not known at this time.An investigation is being performed to determine the failure mode.For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected: Not applicable | | |
| -no failures of components with multiple functions were involved.For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the trains were returned to service: Not applicable | | ll H |
| -the component failures did not render a train of a safety system inoperable. | | f l |
| Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error: The leaking check valve was discovered during testing to determine the cause of the booster pump seal leakage.I.Cause of Event: The PASS was made inoperable to perform scheduled maintenance and calibrations on the system.The leaking check valve caused the duration of the system outage to be extended.Safety System Response: Not applicable | | |
| -no safety system'responses were involved. | | Special Report. 2-SR-89-010-01 Page 2 Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event: |
| I I[',I I I Special Report 2-SR-89-010-01 Page 3 K.Failed Component Information: | | Not applicable - no structures, systems, or components were inoperable which contributed to this event. |
| Check Valve 2PSSNV874-VALVE!;stainless steel 6C-1/3NUPRO. | | Cause of each component or system failure, if known: |
| II.ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT: The PASS system is provided to obtain reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples during post accident operation'. | | The cause of the booster pump seal leakage was excessive pressure because of the discharge check valve leakage. The cause of the check valve leakage is under investigation and will be provided in a supplemental report. |
| The inoperability of PASS did not effect the ability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant samples during normal plant operation. | | Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known: |
| The PASP ensures that necessary RCS and containment atmosphere samples can be obtained in the event of an accident when PASS is inoperable. | | The failure of the booster pump check valve is not known at this time. An investigation is being performed to determine the failure mode. |
| Therefore, this event did not effect the health and safety of the public.III.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Immediate The scheduled preventive maintenance was completed. | | For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected: |
| The leaking check valve was replaced.A replacement booster pump has been installed. | | Not applicable - no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. |
| Troubleshooting and action to correct the inability to depressurize the sample bomb is being performed during the current Unit 2 refueling outage.The testing required to return PASS to service will then be performed when Unit 2 is in Mode 3 (Hot Standby)at normal operating temperature and pressure.B.Action to Prevent Recurrence: | | For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the trains were returned to service: |
| | Not applicable - the component failures did not render a train of a safety system inoperable. |
| | Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error: |
| | The leaking check valve was discovered during testing to determine the cause of the booster pump seal leakage. |
| | I. Cause of Event: |
| | The PASS was made inoperable to perform scheduled maintenance and calibrations on the system. The leaking check valve caused the duration of the system outage to be extended. |
| | Safety System Response: |
| | Not applicable - no safety system 'responses were involved. |
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| | Special Report 2-SR-89-010-01 Page 3 K. Failed Component Information: |
| | Check Valve 2PSSNV874 - VALVE!; stainless steel 6C-1/3NUPRO. |
| | II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT: |
| | The PASS system is provided to obtain reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples during post accident operation'. The inoperability of PASS did not effect the ability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant samples during normal plant operation. The PASP ensures that necessary RCS and containment atmosphere samples can be obtained in the event of an accident when PASS is inoperable. Therefore, this event did not effect the health and safety of the public. |
| | III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: |
| | Immediate The scheduled preventive maintenance was completed. The leaking check valve was replaced. A replacement booster pump has been installed. Troubleshooting and action to correct the inability to depressurize the sample bomb is being performed during the current Unit 2 refueling outage. The testing required to return PASS to service will then be performed when Unit 2 is in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at normal operating temperature and pressure. |
| | B. Action to Prevent Recurrence: |
| Investigations to determine the cause of the leaking check valve and inability to depressurize the sample bomb are being performed. | | Investigations to determine the cause of the leaking check valve and inability to depressurize the sample bomb are being performed. |
| These investigations are expected to be completed approximately 45 days after the troubleshooting, corrective action, and testing is completed to return PASS to service.A supplemental report will be provided approximately 30 days after completion of these investigations. | | These investigations are expected to be completed approximately 45 days after the troubleshooting, corrective action, and testing is completed to return PASS to service. A supplemental report will be provided approximately 30 days after completion of these investigations. |
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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999
Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated
ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999
Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys
ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998
Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated
ML17313A1271997-11-26026 November 1997
Special Rept 2-SR-97-002:on 971103,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Coaxial Cable Connector to accelerometer.Loose-part Detection Sys Channel Will Be Reworked
ML17312A6871996-04-0505 April 1996
Rev 1 to Special Rept 2-SR-96-001,on 960404,alert Declared Due to Fire in Voltage Regulator for CR & Remote Shutdown Panel Essential Lighting,Clarifying Status of Power to UPS 2EQDNN02.Further Investigations Into Event Being Performed
ML17312A6611996-04-0404 April 1996
Special Rept 2-SR-96-001:on 960404,fault Occurred in Voltage Regulator for CR & Remote Shutdown Panel Essential Lighting, Resulting in Fire in 100 Ft Elevation of Cb B Battery Equipment Room & Requiring Declaration of Alert,Per EPIP-04
ML17312A5771996-03-0101 March 1996
Special Rept 1-SR-96-01 on:960225,unit 1 Turbine Tripped Followed by Reactor Power Cutback.Caused by Lightning Strike.Unit 1 Will Not Be Connected to Grid Until Repairs Can Be Made to C Neutral Bushing of Transformer
ML17311A8971995-05-25025 May 1995
Special Rept:On 950416,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Coaxial Cable Connector to Transducer.Channel Will Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During First Available Outage of Sufficient Duration
ML17310B3621994-06-0909 June 1994
Special Rept 1-SR-94-001:on 940511,plant Ventilation Sys High Range Effluent Monitors in Units 1 & 2 Inoperable for Periods Greater than 72 H.Caused by High Voltage Failure Alarm.Design Change Package Installed
ML17310B3071994-05-20020 May 1994
Special Rept 2-SR-94-002:on 940518,NOUE Declared Due to Fire Which Burned in Excess of 10 Minutes within Protected Area. Fire Extinguished W/Portable Fire Extinguisher.Investigation Initiated to Determine Cause of Fire & Develop C/As
ML17310A9951994-01-13013 January 1994
Suppl 2 to Special Rept 3-SR-92-006:on 921217,PASS Declared Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days Following Failure to Meet Pressurized Sample Portion of Acceptance Criteria for Monthly Functional Sr.Pass Declared Operable on 921226
ML17310A9941994-01-13013 January 1994
Suppl 2 to Special Rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,PASS Declared Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator & Indication of Water Leakage at PASS RCS Sample Septum.Pass Declared Operable on 930105
ML17310A8951994-01-0303 January 1994
Special rept:1-SR-93-008:on 940103,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Radiation Monitor Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 Hours.Caused by Difficulties in Installing Mod 1-FJ-SQ-060
ML17310A8701993-12-25025 December 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-006:on 931224,30 Day Period for Returning loose-part Detection Sys (Lpds) to Operable Status Exceeded.Inoperable Lpds Channel Scheduled to Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During Next Outage of Sufficient Duration
ML17310A8671993-12-15015 December 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-007:on 931215,30 Day Period for Returning Accelerometer to Operable Condition Exceeded. Accelerometer Will Be Replaced During Next Outage of Sufficient Duration
ML17310A7581993-10-30030 October 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-004:on 931008,high Range RM RU-146 Made Inoperable for Period of Greater than 72 H as Result of Scheduled Electrical Bus Outage.Maint on Associated Bus Completed on 931015 & RU-146 Returned to Service
ML17310A7001993-10-0909 October 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-93-003:on 931002,thirty Day Period for Returning loose-part Detection Sys Channel 8 to Operable Status Exceeded.Subj Channel Scheduled to Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During Next Outage
ML17310A6301993-09-13013 September 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-93-003:on 930806,loose-part Detection Sys (Lpds) Declared Inoperable & Exceeded 30 Day Period for Being Returned to Svc on 930905.LPDS Channel 5 Scheduled to Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During Next Outage
ML17310A5401993-08-11011 August 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-003:on 930806,NOUE Declared When Unit 1 CR Received Verification That Meteorological Instrumentation Unavailable Due to Loss of Power to Meteorological Tower. Caused by Severe Weather.Instrumentation Repaired
ML17310A4961993-08-0202 August 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-93-002:on 930722,Unit 2 in Mode 5,Cold Shutdown During Refueling Outage When ISI of Both SGs Completed.Insp Resulted in Plugging of 74 Tubes in SG 1 & 175 Tubes in SG 2
ML17310A4401993-07-12012 July 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-002:on 930526,period for Returning Min Number of Explosive Gas Monitoring Channels to Operable Condition Exceeded.After All Four Cells Rebuilt,Calibr Completed on 930602 & Subj Analyzer Returned to Svc
ML17306B4231993-04-24024 April 1993
Suppl 1 to Special Repts 2-SR-92-004 & 3-SR-92-006:on 921222 Unit 2 PASS Declared Inoperable Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator.On 921217,Unit 3 PASS Declared Inoperable.Equipment Replaced & Sample Obtained
ML17306B3371993-03-15015 March 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-93-001:on 930314,control Room Personnel Manually Tripped Reactor Due to Rapid Decrease in Pressurizer Heaters.Personnel Commenced Controlled Plant Cooldown.Unit Remains Shut Down for Further Investigation
ML17306B2901993-02-22022 February 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-92-005,suppl 1,provided Per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-03, Notification of Unusual Event Implementing Actions, Occurring on 920822 Re Loss of Power at Meteorological Tower
ML17306B2781993-02-0909 February 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-93-001:on 930204,reactor Trip Occurred & Main Feedwater Pump a Experienced Rapidly Decreasing Pump Speed.Valid Actuation of SI Actuation Sys & Containment Isolation Actuation Sys Also Occurred.Evaluation Underway
ML17306B2721993-01-27027 January 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-004-03:on 920817,PASS Inoperable for More than 7 Days.On 920902,discovered That PASS Unable to Draw Vacuum on Gaseous Sample Bomb.Vent Line Reworked & Procedure Revised
ML17306B2551993-01-24024 January 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,PASS Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than 7 Days Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator & Indication of Water Leakage at PASS Rcs.Pass Returned to Operable Status on 930105
ML17306B2561993-01-24024 January 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-92-007:on 921227,CB Atmosphere RM Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H Due to High Flow Conditions.Temporary Mod Installed on Subj RM to Remove Monitor from Dedicated Rms Grounding Sys
ML17306B2541993-01-22022 January 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-92-006:on 921217,PASS Declared Inoperable Following Failure to Meet Pressurized Sample Portion of Acceptance Criteria for Monthly Functional Sr.Pass Returned to Operable Status Following Satisfactory Repairs & Testing
ML17306B1911992-12-21021 December 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-004-01:on 920201 PASS Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Tubing Being Rerouted.Pass Reworked & Operability Restored on 920905
ML17306B1841992-12-14014 December 1992
Special Rept:On 920810,PASS Declared Inoperable Due to Tubing Being Rerouted.Chemistry Sys Status Procedure 74DP-9ZZ04 Revised to Direct Chemistry Personnel to Ensure That Functional Test Is performed.W/921214 Ltr
ML17306B1291992-11-17017 November 1992
Special Rept 2-SR-92-003:on 921113,reactor Trip Occurred While Motor Generator Set a Out of Svc for Scheduled Maint & Set B Inadvertently Deenergized,Resulting in Loss of Power. State & Local Agencies Notified & Sys Reset
ML17306B0931992-10-30030 October 1992
Suppl 1 to Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:on 920817,seven-day Period for Returning PASS to Service exceeded.30DP-9WP04 Revised to Retest for PASS & Gaseous Radwaste to Be Completed by 921120
ML17306A9951992-09-18018 September 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:seven-day Period for Returning PASS to Svc Exceeded on 920817.On 920902,discovered That PASS Unable to Draw Vacuum on Gaseous Sample Bomb.Possibly Caused by Maint on 920810.PASS Reworked & Operability Restored
ML17306A9651992-09-16016 September 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-003:on 920903,discovered That PASS Unable to Draw Vacuum on Gaseous Sample Bomb & Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Cause Under Investigation. Sys Returned to Operable Status on 920905
ML17306A9401992-08-28028 August 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-005:on 920822,discovered That Info Could Not Be Dispatched from Meterological Tower During Routine Surveillance of Daily Midnight Logs.Tower Declared Operable on 920823 Following Power Restoration
ML17306A8101992-06-27027 June 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-004:on 920620,loose Part Detection Sys Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Caused by Hardware Problems Associated W/Installation of Loose Part Detection Sys Mods.New Computer Processor Board Installed
ML17306A7971992-06-18018 June 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-003:on 920520,RMs RU-145 & 146 Declared Inoperable & Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Errors in Documenting Clearance for Retest of RU-146.Shift Supervisor Disciplined & Technician Verified That Pumps Were Energized
ML17306A7961992-06-18018 June 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-003:on 920514,unit 1 Entered Mode 3 & PASS Declare Inoperable & Failed Surveillance Test.Caused by Leaking Relief Valve & Malfunctioning Pressure Transducer. Relief Valve & Pressure Transducer Replaced
ML17306A7101992-05-0606 May 1992
Special Rept:On 920504,Control Room Received Alarms on All Seven Control Boards.Plan Computer Returned to Svc & Was Declared operable.W/920506 Ltr
ML17306A6811992-04-18018 April 1992
Special Rept SR-92-002:on 920411,insp of SGs Resulted in Plugging of 23 Tubes in SG 1 & 18 Tubes in SG 2.Complete Results of SG Tube ISI Will Be Submitted by 930411
ML17306A4521992-02-0707 February 1992
Special Rept:On 920101,PASS Declared Inoperable When Chemistry Personnel Could Not Obtain a Containment Air Sample.Caused by Malfunctioning Flow Sensor.Pass Expected to Be Returned to an Operable status.W/920207 Ltr
ML17306A3901992-01-0707 January 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-001:on 920102,determined That Leak Existed in Pressurizer Steam Space Instrument Nozzle Mfg from Inconnel 600.Caused by Nonvisible Intergranular Crack.Addl Investigation Underway
ML17306A2981991-12-0505 December 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-91-002:on 911107,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys high-range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Power Supply Deenergized for Scheduled Maint.Monitor Returned to Svc on 911114
ML17306A2791991-11-20020 November 1991
Special Rept 3-SR-91-007:on 911115,mobile Crane Came in Contact W/Energized 13.8 Kv Power Line Resulting in Arcing of Crane Outrigger Pads to Ground & Burning of Asphalt Area in Contact W/Pads.Investigation Re Event Being Performed
ML17306A2221991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 1-SR-91-001-01:on 910111,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H in Order to Perform Scheduled 18-month Surveillance Testing & Maint
ML17306A2211991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-89-007-03:on 891002,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Gaseous Effluent Monitor Declared Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Low Flow Limit Switch Being Out of Adjustment.Microprocessor Operated Manual Mode
ML17306A2201991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-90-005-01:on 900716,plant Vent Sys High Range Effluent Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Requirement to Perform Scheduled 18-month Surveillance Testing.Monitor Returned to Svc on 900729
ML17306A2181991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-90-004-01:on 910613,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys high-range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Need to Perform 18 Month Surveillance Testing.Monitor Returned to Svc
ML17305B7441991-09-18018 September 1991
Special Rept 1-SR-91-002,on 910914:steam Generator Econimizer Valve SGN-FV-1112 Fully Opened Causing Level in Steam Generator 1 to Rapidly Increase.Caused by Malfunction of Lower Gripper High Voltage on Slipped Part Length CEA
1999-06-21
[Table view]
Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999
Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated
ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999
Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys
ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998
Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated
ML17313A1271997-11-26026 November 1997
Special Rept 2-SR-97-002:on 971103,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Coaxial Cable Connector to accelerometer.Loose-part Detection Sys Channel Will Be Reworked
ML17312A6871996-04-0505 April 1996
Rev 1 to Special Rept 2-SR-96-001,on 960404,alert Declared Due to Fire in Voltage Regulator for CR & Remote Shutdown Panel Essential Lighting,Clarifying Status of Power to UPS 2EQDNN02.Further Investigations Into Event Being Performed
ML17312A6611996-04-0404 April 1996
Special Rept 2-SR-96-001:on 960404,fault Occurred in Voltage Regulator for CR & Remote Shutdown Panel Essential Lighting, Resulting in Fire in 100 Ft Elevation of Cb B Battery Equipment Room & Requiring Declaration of Alert,Per EPIP-04
ML17312A5771996-03-0101 March 1996
Special Rept 1-SR-96-01 on:960225,unit 1 Turbine Tripped Followed by Reactor Power Cutback.Caused by Lightning Strike.Unit 1 Will Not Be Connected to Grid Until Repairs Can Be Made to C Neutral Bushing of Transformer
ML17311A8971995-05-25025 May 1995
Special Rept:On 950416,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 1 Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Coaxial Cable Connector to Transducer.Channel Will Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During First Available Outage of Sufficient Duration
ML17310B3621994-06-0909 June 1994
Special Rept 1-SR-94-001:on 940511,plant Ventilation Sys High Range Effluent Monitors in Units 1 & 2 Inoperable for Periods Greater than 72 H.Caused by High Voltage Failure Alarm.Design Change Package Installed
ML17310B3071994-05-20020 May 1994
Special Rept 2-SR-94-002:on 940518,NOUE Declared Due to Fire Which Burned in Excess of 10 Minutes within Protected Area. Fire Extinguished W/Portable Fire Extinguisher.Investigation Initiated to Determine Cause of Fire & Develop C/As
ML17310A9951994-01-13013 January 1994
Suppl 2 to Special Rept 3-SR-92-006:on 921217,PASS Declared Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days Following Failure to Meet Pressurized Sample Portion of Acceptance Criteria for Monthly Functional Sr.Pass Declared Operable on 921226
ML17310A9941994-01-13013 January 1994
Suppl 2 to Special Rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,PASS Declared Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator & Indication of Water Leakage at PASS RCS Sample Septum.Pass Declared Operable on 930105
ML17310A8951994-01-0303 January 1994
Special rept:1-SR-93-008:on 940103,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Radiation Monitor Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 Hours.Caused by Difficulties in Installing Mod 1-FJ-SQ-060
ML17310A8701993-12-25025 December 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-006:on 931224,30 Day Period for Returning loose-part Detection Sys (Lpds) to Operable Status Exceeded.Inoperable Lpds Channel Scheduled to Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During Next Outage of Sufficient Duration
ML17310A8671993-12-15015 December 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-007:on 931215,30 Day Period for Returning Accelerometer to Operable Condition Exceeded. Accelerometer Will Be Replaced During Next Outage of Sufficient Duration
ML17310A7581993-10-30030 October 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-004:on 931008,high Range RM RU-146 Made Inoperable for Period of Greater than 72 H as Result of Scheduled Electrical Bus Outage.Maint on Associated Bus Completed on 931015 & RU-146 Returned to Service
ML17310A7001993-10-0909 October 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-93-003:on 931002,thirty Day Period for Returning loose-part Detection Sys Channel 8 to Operable Status Exceeded.Subj Channel Scheduled to Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During Next Outage
ML17310A6301993-09-13013 September 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-93-003:on 930806,loose-part Detection Sys (Lpds) Declared Inoperable & Exceeded 30 Day Period for Being Returned to Svc on 930905.LPDS Channel 5 Scheduled to Be Reworked & Returned to Svc During Next Outage
ML17310A5401993-08-11011 August 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-003:on 930806,NOUE Declared When Unit 1 CR Received Verification That Meteorological Instrumentation Unavailable Due to Loss of Power to Meteorological Tower. Caused by Severe Weather.Instrumentation Repaired
ML17310A4961993-08-0202 August 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-93-002:on 930722,Unit 2 in Mode 5,Cold Shutdown During Refueling Outage When ISI of Both SGs Completed.Insp Resulted in Plugging of 74 Tubes in SG 1 & 175 Tubes in SG 2
ML17310A4401993-07-12012 July 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-93-002:on 930526,period for Returning Min Number of Explosive Gas Monitoring Channels to Operable Condition Exceeded.After All Four Cells Rebuilt,Calibr Completed on 930602 & Subj Analyzer Returned to Svc
ML17306B4231993-04-24024 April 1993
Suppl 1 to Special Repts 2-SR-92-004 & 3-SR-92-006:on 921222 Unit 2 PASS Declared Inoperable Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator.On 921217,Unit 3 PASS Declared Inoperable.Equipment Replaced & Sample Obtained
ML17306B3371993-03-15015 March 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-93-001:on 930314,control Room Personnel Manually Tripped Reactor Due to Rapid Decrease in Pressurizer Heaters.Personnel Commenced Controlled Plant Cooldown.Unit Remains Shut Down for Further Investigation
ML17306B2901993-02-22022 February 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-92-005,suppl 1,provided Per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-03, Notification of Unusual Event Implementing Actions, Occurring on 920822 Re Loss of Power at Meteorological Tower
ML17306B2781993-02-0909 February 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-93-001:on 930204,reactor Trip Occurred & Main Feedwater Pump a Experienced Rapidly Decreasing Pump Speed.Valid Actuation of SI Actuation Sys & Containment Isolation Actuation Sys Also Occurred.Evaluation Underway
ML17306B2721993-01-27027 January 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-004-03:on 920817,PASS Inoperable for More than 7 Days.On 920902,discovered That PASS Unable to Draw Vacuum on Gaseous Sample Bomb.Vent Line Reworked & Procedure Revised
ML17306B2551993-01-24024 January 1993
Special Rept 2-SR-92-004:on 921222,PASS Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than 7 Days Due to Failure of Containment Air Flow Indicator & Indication of Water Leakage at PASS Rcs.Pass Returned to Operable Status on 930105
ML17306B2561993-01-24024 January 1993
Special Rept 1-SR-92-007:on 921227,CB Atmosphere RM Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H Due to High Flow Conditions.Temporary Mod Installed on Subj RM to Remove Monitor from Dedicated Rms Grounding Sys
ML17306B2541993-01-22022 January 1993
Special Rept 3-SR-92-006:on 921217,PASS Declared Inoperable Following Failure to Meet Pressurized Sample Portion of Acceptance Criteria for Monthly Functional Sr.Pass Returned to Operable Status Following Satisfactory Repairs & Testing
ML17306B1911992-12-21021 December 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-004-01:on 920201 PASS Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Tubing Being Rerouted.Pass Reworked & Operability Restored on 920905
ML17306B1841992-12-14014 December 1992
Special Rept:On 920810,PASS Declared Inoperable Due to Tubing Being Rerouted.Chemistry Sys Status Procedure 74DP-9ZZ04 Revised to Direct Chemistry Personnel to Ensure That Functional Test Is performed.W/921214 Ltr
ML17306B1291992-11-17017 November 1992
Special Rept 2-SR-92-003:on 921113,reactor Trip Occurred While Motor Generator Set a Out of Svc for Scheduled Maint & Set B Inadvertently Deenergized,Resulting in Loss of Power. State & Local Agencies Notified & Sys Reset
ML17306B0931992-10-30030 October 1992
Suppl 1 to Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:on 920817,seven-day Period for Returning PASS to Service exceeded.30DP-9WP04 Revised to Retest for PASS & Gaseous Radwaste to Be Completed by 921120
ML17306A9951992-09-18018 September 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-004:seven-day Period for Returning PASS to Svc Exceeded on 920817.On 920902,discovered That PASS Unable to Draw Vacuum on Gaseous Sample Bomb.Possibly Caused by Maint on 920810.PASS Reworked & Operability Restored
ML17306A9651992-09-16016 September 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-003:on 920903,discovered That PASS Unable to Draw Vacuum on Gaseous Sample Bomb & Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Cause Under Investigation. Sys Returned to Operable Status on 920905
ML17306A9401992-08-28028 August 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-005:on 920822,discovered That Info Could Not Be Dispatched from Meterological Tower During Routine Surveillance of Daily Midnight Logs.Tower Declared Operable on 920823 Following Power Restoration
ML17306A8101992-06-27027 June 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-004:on 920620,loose Part Detection Sys Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Caused by Hardware Problems Associated W/Installation of Loose Part Detection Sys Mods.New Computer Processor Board Installed
ML17306A7971992-06-18018 June 1992
Special Rept 3-SR-92-003:on 920520,RMs RU-145 & 146 Declared Inoperable & Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Errors in Documenting Clearance for Retest of RU-146.Shift Supervisor Disciplined & Technician Verified That Pumps Were Energized
ML17306A7961992-06-18018 June 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-003:on 920514,unit 1 Entered Mode 3 & PASS Declare Inoperable & Failed Surveillance Test.Caused by Leaking Relief Valve & Malfunctioning Pressure Transducer. Relief Valve & Pressure Transducer Replaced
ML17306A7101992-05-0606 May 1992
Special Rept:On 920504,Control Room Received Alarms on All Seven Control Boards.Plan Computer Returned to Svc & Was Declared operable.W/920506 Ltr
ML17306A6811992-04-18018 April 1992
Special Rept SR-92-002:on 920411,insp of SGs Resulted in Plugging of 23 Tubes in SG 1 & 18 Tubes in SG 2.Complete Results of SG Tube ISI Will Be Submitted by 930411
ML17306A4521992-02-0707 February 1992
Special Rept:On 920101,PASS Declared Inoperable When Chemistry Personnel Could Not Obtain a Containment Air Sample.Caused by Malfunctioning Flow Sensor.Pass Expected to Be Returned to an Operable status.W/920207 Ltr
ML17306A3901992-01-0707 January 1992
Special Rept 1-SR-92-001:on 920102,determined That Leak Existed in Pressurizer Steam Space Instrument Nozzle Mfg from Inconnel 600.Caused by Nonvisible Intergranular Crack.Addl Investigation Underway
ML17306A2981991-12-0505 December 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-91-002:on 911107,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys high-range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Power Supply Deenergized for Scheduled Maint.Monitor Returned to Svc on 911114
ML17306A2791991-11-20020 November 1991
Special Rept 3-SR-91-007:on 911115,mobile Crane Came in Contact W/Energized 13.8 Kv Power Line Resulting in Arcing of Crane Outrigger Pads to Ground & Burning of Asphalt Area in Contact W/Pads.Investigation Re Event Being Performed
ML17306A2221991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 1-SR-91-001-01:on 910111,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor Declared Inoperable for Period Greater than 72 H in Order to Perform Scheduled 18-month Surveillance Testing & Maint
ML17306A2211991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-89-007-03:on 891002,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys High Range Gaseous Effluent Monitor Declared Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Low Flow Limit Switch Being Out of Adjustment.Microprocessor Operated Manual Mode
ML17306A2201991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-90-005-01:on 900716,plant Vent Sys High Range Effluent Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Requirement to Perform Scheduled 18-month Surveillance Testing.Monitor Returned to Svc on 900729
ML17306A2181991-10-10010 October 1991
Special Rept 2-SR-90-004-01:on 910613,fuel Bldg Ventilation Sys high-range Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitor Inoperable for More than 72 H.Caused by Need to Perform 18 Month Surveillance Testing.Monitor Returned to Svc
ML17305B7441991-09-18018 September 1991
Special Rept 1-SR-91-002,on 910914:steam Generator Econimizer Valve SGN-FV-1112 Fully Opened Causing Level in Steam Generator 1 to Rapidly Increase.Caused by Malfunction of Lower Gripper High Voltage on Slipped Part Length CEA
1999-06-21
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr
ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3
ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr
ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr
ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure
ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr
ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999
Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated
ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999
Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys
ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr
ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs
ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr
ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked
ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999
LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc
ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr
ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999
Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee.
ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr
ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999
Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results
ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999
1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003
ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr
ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr
ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999
Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies
ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr
ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999
LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised
ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr
ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998
SCE 1998 Annual Rept
ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr
ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998
Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr.
ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr
ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998
LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements
ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr
ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired
ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998
LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters
ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr
ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998
Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3
ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998
Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1
ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998
Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2
ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998
Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency
ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998
Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated
ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr
ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr
ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998
to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998.
ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr
ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998
LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced
ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998
Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3.
ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998
Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3.
ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998
LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria
ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr
ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation
ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998
Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr
ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9004180104 DOC ~ DATE: 90/04/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET r.
FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Special Rept 2-SR-89-010:on 891105 post accident sampling sys declared inoperable.
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER),
0incident ENCL Q SIZE:
Rpt, etc. S NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000529 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 D PETERSON,S. 1 1 CHAN,T 1 1.
INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 1 1.
NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D 1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 S SPLB8Dl 1 1 NRR/DST/SRXB 8E 1 1 REG F 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 G FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G STUART,V.A 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 R NOTES 1 1 D
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEA% HELP US TO REDUCE WASTETH CONTACI'HE,DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISIRIBUTION LISIS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED)
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 39 ENCL 39 Mp
I Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52Q34 ~ PHOENIX, ARIZONA85Q?2-2Q34 JAMES M. LEVINE '192-00643-JML/TRB/RKR VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTIDII April 2, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
Special Report 2-SR-89-010 File 90-020-404 Attached please find Supplement Number 1 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 and 6.9.2. This report discusses the Post Accident Sampling System inoperable for greater than seven days. This report is submitted to provide updated information from the original report.
If you have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, (Acting)
Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/tlg Attachment CC:
W. F. Conway (all with attachment)
J. B. Martin D. H. Coe T. L. Chan A. C. Gehr A. H. Gutterman 004180104 900402 ggS PDR ADOCK 05000529
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Post Accident Sampling System Inoperable for Greater Than 7 Days License No. NPF-51 Supplement 1 to Special Report 2-SR-89-010 I. DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED:
A. Initial Conditions:
On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in Mode 2 with the reactor coolant system (RCS)(AB) at approximately 2241 psia and 565 degrees Fahrenheit.
Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):
Event Classification: Submitted in accordance with ACTION 28 of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 At. approximately 1400 MST on November 5, 1989 the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).(IP) was declared inoperable in order to perform scheduled preventive maintenance and surveillance tests.
At this time Unit 2 was in Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN). On November 24, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, Unit 2 entered Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY). Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.3.1 requires PASS to be operable when in Modes 1, 2, or 3. TS 3.3.3.1 ACTION 28 requires PASS to be restored to an operable status within 7 days or initiate the Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program (PASP) and prepare and submit a special report. Technical Specifications permitted entry into Mode 3 from Mode 4 with PASS inoperable.
PASP was initiated on November 24, 1989 at approximately 0740 MST.
On December 1, 1989 at approximately 0508 MST, the 7 day limit of TS 3.3.3. 1 ACTION 28 was exceeded.
After completion of the scheduled preventive maintenance activities it was determined that the PASS booster pump seals were leaking. Troubleshooting determined that the PASS booster pump discharge check valve was allowing leakage that pressurized the pump to a pressure above the 150 psig seal rating. The leaking check valve was replaced and a new PASS booster pump has been installed.
At approximately 1730 MST on February 7, 1990 while performing post maintenance testing to return PASS to service, the sample bomb could not be depressurized prior to taking a Reactor Coolant System gas sample. An approved work document was initiated to troubleshoot and correct the problem.
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Special Report. 2-SR-89-010-01 Page 2 Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:
Not applicable - no structures, systems, or components were inoperable which contributed to this event.
Cause of each component or system failure, if known:
The cause of the booster pump seal leakage was excessive pressure because of the discharge check valve leakage. The cause of the check valve leakage is under investigation and will be provided in a supplemental report.
Failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known:
The failure of the booster pump check valve is not known at this time. An investigation is being performed to determine the failure mode.
For failures of components with multiple functions, list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected:
Not applicable - no failures of components with multiple functions were involved.
For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the trains were returned to service:
Not applicable - the component failures did not render a train of a safety system inoperable.
Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:
The leaking check valve was discovered during testing to determine the cause of the booster pump seal leakage.
I. Cause of Event:
The PASS was made inoperable to perform scheduled maintenance and calibrations on the system. The leaking check valve caused the duration of the system outage to be extended.
Safety System Response:
Not applicable - no safety system 'responses were involved.
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Special Report 2-SR-89-010-01 Page 3 K. Failed Component Information:
Check Valve 2PSSNV874 - VALVE!; stainless steel 6C-1/3NUPRO.
II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:
The PASS system is provided to obtain reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples during post accident operation'. The inoperability of PASS did not effect the ability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant samples during normal plant operation. The PASP ensures that necessary RCS and containment atmosphere samples can be obtained in the event of an accident when PASS is inoperable. Therefore, this event did not effect the health and safety of the public.
III. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Immediate The scheduled preventive maintenance was completed. The leaking check valve was replaced. A replacement booster pump has been installed. Troubleshooting and action to correct the inability to depressurize the sample bomb is being performed during the current Unit 2 refueling outage. The testing required to return PASS to service will then be performed when Unit 2 is in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at normal operating temperature and pressure.
B. Action to Prevent Recurrence:
Investigations to determine the cause of the leaking check valve and inability to depressurize the sample bomb are being performed.
These investigations are expected to be completed approximately 45 days after the troubleshooting, corrective action, and testing is completed to return PASS to service. A supplemental report will be provided approximately 30 days after completion of these investigations.
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