ML111590912

IR 05000348-11-012, 05000364-11-012, on 11/10/2010 - 05/24/2011, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, NRC Inspection Report and Preliminary White Finding

ML111590912
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	06/08/2011
From:	Croteau R Division Reactor Projects II
To:	Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
EA-11-112 IR-11-012
Download: ML111590912 (13)

See also: IR 05000348/2011012

Text

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

June 8, 2011

EA-11-112

Mr. L. Michael Stinson

Vice President - Farley

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

7388 North State Highway 95

Columbia, AL 36319

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, NRC INSPECTION REPORT

05000348/2011-012 AND 05000364/2011-012 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE

FINDING

Dear Mr. Stinson:

This letter transmits a finding for the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, which has

preliminarily been determined to be White, i.e., a finding with low to moderate increased safety

significance that may require additional NRC inspections. As described in the enclosed

inspection report, the finding involves the failure to maintain the configuration of the 1A RCP oil

lift pump system in accordance with plant design and drawings. This resulted in an electrical

short on November 10, 2010, that caused a fire on the Unit 1 main control room (MCR) 1A

reactor coolant pump (RCP) board handswitch. The finding affected both units due to the

common control room. For Unit 1, the risk was preliminarily determined to be of very low safety

significance (Green), since that unit was shut down at the time. However, the predominant risk

factor for the event was associated with Unit 2 since it was operating at the time. Final

disposition of the issue for Unit 1 will be made in conjunction with the final significance

determination for Unit 2. NRC Inspection Report Number 05000348, 364/2010005 (ADAMS

Accession Number ML110280059), dated January 27, 2011, provides additional details

regarding the staffs review of this matter. Subsequent in-office and on-site inspections were

completed on May 24, 2011, as documented in the enclosed inspection report. This issue was

discussed on June 8, 2011, with Mr. T. Youngblood and other members of your staff.

This finding was assessed based on the best available information, including appropriate

assumptions, using the applicable Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRC took

into consideration the testing that your staff performed to recreate the fire conditions when

performing the risk assessment. The finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to

moderate safety significance (White) for Unit 2. The final resolution of this finding will convey

Enclosure(s) transmitted herewith contains(s) SUNSI. When separated from enclosure(s)

this transmittal document is decontrolled.

LIMITED INTERNAL

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SNC 2

the increment in the importance to safety by assigning the corresponding color, i.e., White, a

finding with low to moderate increased importance to safety that may require additional NRC

inspections. The fire event, caused by the mis-wiring of the 1A RCP oil lift pump pressure

switch, was considered to be potentially challenging (i.e. if not suppressed, the fire could have

eventually led to a MCR evacuation). The basis for assuming the fire could be potentially

challenging was based upon the subjective classification criteria of NUREG-6850, Fire PRA

Methodology for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix C, Section C.2.3.2, Subjective Classification

Criteria. Specifically, this was considered to be a fire requiring active intervention to prevent

spread. The SDP analysis is included as Enclosure 2. Although the Unit 2 finding has potential

safety significance, it does not present an immediate safety concern because you implemented

corrective actions that included, but were not limited to, correcting the mis-wiring on the 1A RCP

oil lift pump pressure switch and replacing the damaged 1A RCP handswitch on the MCR

board.

The finding is also an apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 as discussed in the

enclosed inspection report, and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in

accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which can be found on the NRCs Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. In addition, this finding is

considered to have a cross-cutting aspect related to the Work Practices component of the

Human Performance area in that personnel proceeded with work despite uncertainty and

unexpected circumstances H.4(a).

In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination

Process, we intend to complete our risk evaluations using the best available information and

issue our final determination of safety significance within 90 days of this letter. The SDP

encourages an open dialogue between the staff and the licensee; however, the dialogue should

not impact the timeliness of the staffs final determination. Before we make a final decision on

this matter, we are providing you with an opportunity to (1) attend a Regulatory Conference

where you can present to the NRC your perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC

used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance, or (2) submit your position on the

finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within

30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation

at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and

effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you

decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30

days of your receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a Regulatory Conference or submit a

written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final SDP determination, in that by not

doing either, you fail to meet the appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation

sections of Attachment 2 of IMC 0609.

Please contact Mr. Scott Shaeffer at (404) 997-4521 within 10 business days from the issue

date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10

business days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision.

The final resolution of this matter will be conveyed in separate correspondence.

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SNC 3

Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being

issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number

and characterization of the apparent violation may change as a result of further NRC review.

Additionally, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report,

you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis

for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident

Inspector at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,

Enclosure 1, and your response (if you choose to provide one), will be made available

electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from ADAMS,

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. However,

because of the security-related information contained in Enclosure 2, and in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, a copy of Enclosure 2 will not be available for public inspection. To the extent

possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards

information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Richard P. Croteau, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364

License No.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosure(s): 1. NRC Inspection Report 05000348/2011012, 05000364/2011012

2. SDP Phase 3 Summary (OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SECURITY RELATED

INFORMATION)

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______ML111590912________

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:EICS RII:DRP

SIGNATURE SDR /RA/ Via email Via email Vai email Via email SMS /RA/

NAME SRose ECrowe JSowa WRogers CEvans SShaeffer

DATE 06/08/2011 06/08/2011 06/08/2011 06/08/2011 06/08/2011 06/07/2011

E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

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SNC 4

cc w/encl: J. L. Pemberton

B. D. McKinney, Jr. SVP & General Counsel-Ops & SNC

Regulatory Response Manager Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

Chris Clark

M. J. Ajluni Commissioner

Nuclear Licensing Director Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

John G. Horn

T. D. Honeycutt Site Support Manager

Regulatory Response Supervisor Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

Todd L. Youngblood Ted V. Jackson

Plant Manager Emergency Response and Radiation

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Program Manager

Electronic Mail Distribution Environmental Protection Division

Georgia Department of Natural Resources

L. P. Hill Electronic Mail Distribution

Licensing Supervisor

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Tom W. Pelham

Electronic Mail Distribution Performance Improvement Supervisor

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Jeffrey T. Gasser Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Chief Nuclear Officer Electronic Mail Distribution

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Cynthia A. Sanders

Radioactive Materials Program Manager

R. L. Gladney Environmental Protection Division

Licensing Engineer Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

James C. Hardeman

N. J. Stringfellow Environmental Radiation Program Manager

Licensing Manager Environmental Protection Division

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Electronic Mail Distribution Electronic Mail Distribution

Paula Marino William D. Oldfield

Vice President Principal Licensing Engineer

Engineering Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

(cc w/encl 1 continued next page)

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SNC 5

(cc w/encl 1 continued)

Mr. Mark Culver

Chairman

Houston County Commission

P. O. Box 6406

Dothan, AL 36302

James A. Sommerville

Program Coordination Branch Chief

Environmental Protection Division

Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Electronic Mail Distribution

James L. McNees, CHP

Director

Office of Radiation Control

Alabama Dept. of Public Health

P. O. Box 303017

Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

State Health Officer

Alabama Dept. of Public Health

RSA Tower - Administration

Suite 1552

P.O. Box 30317

Montgomery, AL 36130-3017

L. L. Crumpton

Administrative Assistant, Sr.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

F. Allen Barnes

Director

Environmental Protection Division

Georgia Department of Natural Resources

Electronic Mail Distribution

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SNC 5

Letter to L. Michael Stinson from Richard P. Croteau dated June 8, 2011

SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, NRC INSPECTION REPORT

05000348/2011-012 AND 05000364/2011-012 AND PRELIMINARY WHITE

FINDING

Distribution w/encl:

RidsNrrPMFarley Resource

C. Evans, RII

L. Douglas, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364

License No..: NPF-2, NPF-8

Report No.: 05000348/2011-012 AND 05000364/2011-012

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1

Location: Columbia, AL

Dates: November 10, 2010 - May 24, 2011

Inspectors: W. Rogers, Senior Reactor Analyst (Section 4OA5)

E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector (Section 4OA5)

J. Sowa, Resident Inspector (Section 4OA5)

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

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Enclosure 1

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2011012. 05000364/2011012; 11/10/2010 - 5/24/2011; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear

Plant; Unit 1; Other Activities.

The report transmits the results of the NRCs preliminary assessment of the 1A RCP handswitch

fire. One self-revealing finding and Apparent Violation with potentially low to moderate safety

significance (White) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color

(great than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red); the significance was determined using

Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP); the cross-

cutting aspect was determined using IMC 0310, Components Within The Cross-Cutting Areas;

and that findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity

level after NRC management review.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• TBD. A self-revealing finding and apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4,

Procedures, was identified for failing to maintain the configuration of the 1A RCP oil lift

pump system in accordance with plant design and drawings. The licensee incorrectly re-

landed electrical wiring following maintenance to the 1A RCP oil lift pump pressure

switch. This issue revealed itself upon the discovery of a flame on the 1A RCP

handswitch in the Unit 1 main control room (MCR).

The licensees failure to maintain the configuration of the 1A RCP oil lift pump system in

accordance with plant design and drawings is a performance deficiency. Work was

completed, by skill of the craft, without inclusion into an amendment to the existing

calibration work order, and resulted in the incoming electrical feeds for the 125 vDC and

130 vAC circuits being cross-connected and causing a fire on the MCR board when the

1A RCP handswitch was taken to start. The finding is more than minor because it was

associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events

cornerstone to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge

critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, a fire

occurred in the MCR for Units 1 and 2 as a result of the mis-wiring causing an electrical

short in the 1A RCP handswitch. This finding was assessed using the Phase 1

screening worksheets of Appendix 4 and Appendix F of MC 0609, and warranted a

review by a regional Senior Risk Analyst because a fire in the MCR had actually

occurred. The regional Senior Risk Analysts determined the significance of this finding

is preliminarily White. The finding does not represent an immediate safety concern

because the wiring has been returned to the original plant design. The finding was

assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human

Performance area in that personnel did proceed in the face of uncertainty or unexpected

circumstances. H.4(a)

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Enclosure 1

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3

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA5 Other

Mis-wiring of the 1A RCP oil lift pump pressure switch results in flame on the 1A RCP

handswitch.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted an in-office review and significance evaluation of the events

which led to the 1A RCP handswitch fire.

b. Findings

Introduction A self-revealing finding and apparent violation (AV) of TS 5.4, Procedures,

was identified for failing to maintain the configuration of the 1A RCP oil lift pump system

in accordance with plant design and drawings. The licensee incorrectly re-installed

electrical wiring following maintenance to the 1A RCP oil lift pump pressure switch. This

issue revealed itself upon the discovery of a flame on the 1A RCP handswitch in the Unit

1 MCR board.

Description On November 10, 2010, with Unit 1 shutdown for the refueling outage

(RFO), the licensee attempted to start the 1A RCP. The control room operator noticed

the amber light for the switch position miss-match indication illuminate, heard an audible

noise coming from the 1A RCP handswitch and noticed the presence of smoke coming

from the handswitch. The control room operator and control room supervisor

investigated the smoke by removing the light array from the handswitch and opening the

door to the back of the MCR board panel. Each individual noticed a flame of

approximately one inch in height emanating from the handswitch. The fire was

extinguished by personnel blowing out the flame, after multiple attempts. The estimated

fire duration was approximately one minute.

Leading up to this event, the licensee had recently completed calibration of the 1A RCP

oil lift pump pressure switch during the RFO. During the calibration, workers noticed

damage to wiring on the oil lift pump pressure switch. The workers involved in the

calibration replaced the damage conduit in the containment building and later discussed

the replacement of the conduit with their supervisor. Work was completed by skill of the

craft without inclusion into the calibration or other work order. The conduit replacement

resulted in the removal of the pressure switchs electrical wiring from its 125 vDC and

130 vAC circuits. The licensees event review determined that during the re-installation

of the electrical wiring for the oil pressure switch, the incoming electrical feeds for the

125 vDC and 130 vAC circuits were swapped resulting in the AC and DC circuits being

cross-connected creating the path for an electrical short when the associated control

room 1A RCP handswitch was taken to the start position.

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Enclosure 1

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4

The inspectors reviewed licensee work order (WO) 1063205801 which included station

procedure FNP-0-IMP-425.3, Pressure Actuated Switches (Generic). The inspectors

discovered that FNP-0-IMP-425.3, section 7.4, controls the switch replacement and that

step 7.4.3 requires the technician to make note of lead locations on the pressure switch

terminals then disconnect and remove the field leads. The licensee utilizes skill of the

craft to ensure proper landing of electrical leads at the station. The licensees planners

also include a generic data sheet in work orders that lift and land leads to electrical

components. This generic data sheet was not used since it is not formally required, but

serves as an aid to the technician. The inspectors also reviewed statements from

individuals involved in the lifting and landing of the wires. The individuals indicated that

they wiggled wires on one end of the conduit as their means to locate that wire at the

other end of the conduit. The licensee did not amend the original work order or re-plan

the work activity in order to effect repair to the damaged conduit. The licensee entered

this event into its corrective action program (CAP) as CR 201011613.

Analysis The licensees failure to maintain the configuration of the 1A RCP oil lift pump

system in accordance with plant design and drawings is a performance deficiency. Work

was incorrectly completed by skill of the craft without replanning the calibration work

order. Conduct of the work directly resulted in the incoming electrical feeds for the 125

vDC and 130 vAC circuits being cross-connected. The finding is more than minor

because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the

Initiating Events cornerstone to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant

stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power

operations. An electrical short in the 1A RCP handswitch resulted in a fire occurring in

the MCR for Units 1 and 2. The NRC staff determined the fire to be potentially

challenging (i.e. if not suppressed, the fire could have eventually lead to a MCR

evacuation). The determination that the fire was potentially challenging was based upon

the subjective classification criteria of NUREG-6850, Fire PRA Methodology For Nuclear

Power Plants, Appendix C, Section C.2.3.2, Subjective Classification Criteria.

Specifically, this was considered to be a fire requiring active intervention to prevent

spread. This finding was assessed using the Phase 1 screening worksheets of

Appendix 4 and Appendix F of MC 0609, and warranted a review by a regional Senior

Risk Analyst because a fire in the MCR had actually occurred. The regional Senior Risk

Analysts determined the significance of this finding is preliminarily White. The finding

does not represent an immediate safety concern because the wiring has been returned

to the original plant design. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the Work

Practices component of the Human Performance area in that personnel did proceed in

the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances. H.4(a)

Enforcement TS 5.4.1 a, states in part that written procedures shall be established,

implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide

1.33, Appendix A states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of

safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance

with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the

circumstances. Contrary to the above, on November 10, 2010, the licensee failed to

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Enclosure 1

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5

properly preplan and perform maintenance that affected safety-related equipment.

Specifically, maintenance and repair activities were performed on the 1A RCP oil lift

pump pressure switch wiring in the Unit 1 containment using skill of the craft techniques

and without an approved amendment to WO 1063205801. During maintenance repair

activities for the 125 vDC and 130 vAC circuits on the 1A RCP oil lift pump pressure

switch, the proper wiring configuration was not maintained or accomplished in

accordance with Drawing D-177249, Elementary Diagram Reactor Coolant Pump

Bearing Lift Oil Pumps, Version 2.0. During subsequent activities to return Unit 1 to

power operation on November 10, 2010, licensed operators attempted to start the 1A

RCP. As a result of the mis-wiring, when the 1A RCP control handswitch was taken to

the start position, flame and smoke emanated from the handswitch, from the top and

under the MCR board, thereby presenting a challenge to safety-related equipment

inside and adjacent to the MCR board. The licensee has returned the wiring to its

original plant design and the licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action

program as CR 2010116613. URI 05000348/2010005-03, opened in NRC Inspection

Report Number 05000348/2010005 and 0500364/2010005 is closed. Pending final

significance determination, this finding is identified as AV 05000348,364/2011012-01,

Flame Detected on the 1A RCP Handswitch.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On June 8, 2011, the NRC presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Youngblood who

acknowledged the findings.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

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Enclosure 1

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened

05000348, 364/2011012-01 AV Flame Detected on the 1A RCP Handswitch

(Section 4OA5)

Closed

05000348/2010005-03 URI Flame Detected on the 1A RCP Handswitch

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Attachment