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| | issue date = 02/16/1979 | | | issue date = 02/16/1979 |
| | title = Forwards Review of Safety Actuation Circuits W/Manual Override.Reset Operation Does Not Prevent Equipment from Operating,Which Is Necessary to Mitigate a Postulated Accident | | | title = Forwards Review of Safety Actuation Circuits W/Manual Override.Reset Operation Does Not Prevent Equipment from Operating,Which Is Necessary to Mitigate a Postulated Accident |
| | author name = WHITE L D | | | author name = White L |
| | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. | | | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| | addressee name = ZIEMANN D L | | | addressee name = Ziemann D |
| | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR) | | | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR) |
| | docket = 05000244 | | | docket = 05000244 |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:NOTES.tBEGULAT(g INFORMATION DISTBIBUTIONyYSTEM (RIDE>ACCESSION NBR-7902210226 DOC.DATEi 79/02/16NOTARIZED~ | | {{#Wiki_filter:BEGULAT(g INFORMATION DISTBIBUTIONyYSTEM (RIDE> |
| NODOCKET0FACILt50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclear.PowerPlant,UnitI,Roches05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION WHITE,L.D.
| | ACCESSION NBR-7902210226 DOC.DATEi 79/02/16 NOTARIZED~ NO DOCKET 0 FACILt50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear .Power Plant, Unit I,Roches 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WHITE,L.D. Rochester Gas 8, Electric Corp. |
| Rochester Gas8,ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ZIEMANN,.D.L. | | RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ZIEMANN,.D.L. , |
| ,Operating Rector+Branch2SUBJECTSForwardsreviewofsafetyactuation..circuits w/manualoverride.
| | Operating Rector+ Branch 2 SUBJECTS Forwards review of safety actuation..circuits w/manual override. Concludes reset operation does not prevent equipment from .operating .whi'ch is necessary to nitigate a postulated accident. |
| Concludes resetoperation doesnotpreventequipment from.operating | | ~ SIZE<~ |
| .whi'chisnecessary tonitigateapostulated accident. | | e DISTBIBUTI(>N CODEF AOOI S COPIES RECEIVED(LTR M ENCL TITLE( GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOB AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LIC ~ |
| eDISTBIBUTI(>N CODEFAOOISCOPIESRECEIVED(LTR MENCL~SIZE<~TITLE(GENERALDISTRIBUTION FOBAFTERISSUANCEOFOPERATING LIC~((-~ll~~a<o45RFCIPIENTIDCODE/NAME ACTION-05BCA@6+~INTERNAL-t 03.EGFILE1.215KORE,PERF BR.I7ENGRBR019PLANT.SYSBR21EFLTTRT.SYSEXTERNAL.i 03LPDR23ACRSCOPIESLTTRENCL77.II22.I.I,I~1II.I,II1616RECAPIENTID'ODE/NAME 02NRCPDRI'((ITA/ED()16AD5YS/PROJ18REACSFTYBR20EEB22BRINKMAN04NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL.III.III.II.II.II.II~((UfgQt6Ad~sgagric~TOTALNUMBER.OFCOPIESREQUIRED'TTR 38ENCL38 IE1IIr,rr
| | NOTES.t ( (-~ll ~~a <o 45 RFC I P I ENT COPIES RECAP I ENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID'ODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION - 05 BC A@6+ ~ 7 7 I NTERNAL-t 03. EG FILE .I I 02 NRC PDR .I I 1.2 2 2 I'((I TA/ED() I .I 15 KORE,PERF BR .I .I 16 A D 5 YS/P RO J I I |
| ~Pr~*February16,1979DirectorofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention: | | .I7 ENGR BR ,I 18 REAC SFTY BR .I I 0 19 PLANT .S YS BR 21 EFLT TRT .SYS |
| Mr.DennisL.Ziemann,ChiefOperating ReactorBranchNo.2U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555 | | ~ 1 I 20 EEB .I I I .I 22 BRINKMAN .I I EXTERNAL.i 03 LPDR ,I I 04 NS IC .I I 23 ACRS 16 16 |
| | ~((U fgQ t 6 Ad~s g agric~ |
| | TOTAL NUMBER. OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 38 ENCL 38 |
| | |
| | I E |
| | 1 I |
| | Ir, rr |
| | |
| | ~ P r |
| | ~ |
| | * February 16, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 |
|
| |
|
| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| ReviewofSafetyActuation CircuitswithOverrides R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244
| | Review of Safety Actuation Circuits with Overrides R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 |
| | |
| | ==Dear Mr. Ziemann:== |
| | |
| | 4 Your letter dated November 29, 1978 requested restrictions be placed on containment purging during normal operation and that a review of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate manual override features be made. The Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RGB) letter dated January 2, 1979 transmitted the RG6E commitments on purging during normal operation and stated that the required review of override features would be completed by mid February 1979. The purpose of this letter is to transmit the results of that review. Details of the review are presented in Appendix A. |
| | The review of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature indicates that actuating a particular override (reset) does not cause the bypass of other safety actuation signals. The reset switches described in Appendix A are push button switches located on the control board with no physical restraints. |
| | In all cases where the safety actuation signal is generated automatically and the reset switch is actuated, the safety actu-ation signal will be inhibited until all logic paths for auto-matically generating the safety actuation signal have opened. |
| | Once all logic paths open, the particular safety actuation signal reset relays de-energize and re-establish the ability to auto-matically generate the safety actuation signal. Since the reset remains actuated only if the input signals causing the automatic safety actuation signal persist and these input signals are annunciated, no separate annunciation for the reset actuation is necessary. The operator has sufficient information to deduce a certain system is in the reset mode. p0 |
| | ~ |
| | v80zzaoww4 e,'g~(g', |
| | |
| | ROCHFST=R GwS AiVO L= CTR)C CORP. ryEET,VO February 16, 1979 Tc Mr. D.L. Ziemann, Chief does actuation of a particular reset switch 1 |
| | Zn no case prevent the operator from manually operating the equipment from the control board. Therefore, operation of a reset does not prevent equipment from operating which is necessary to mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident. |
| | Very truly yours, |
| | ~~+ |
| | L. D. White, Jr. |
| | LDW:np Attachment |
| | |
| | Appendix A Review of Safety Actuation Signal Circuits Incorporating manual Overrides The following summaxizes the results of a review of safety actu-ation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature. |
| | The purpose of the review is to ensure that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not also cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signals: |
| | SAFETY INJECTION CIRCUIT: |
| | This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting safety injection one- minute or longer after initiation. Actuation of the reset. swatch in itself does not change the state of any equipment, but permits the operator to place the equipment affected by safety injection to the position desired. |
| | If safety in]ection is caused by automatic actuation, and the reset switch is actuated, automatic safety ingection will be inhibited until all logic paths for automatic safety injection have opened. Once all logic paths open, the safety injection reset relays de-energize and re-establishes automatic safety injection capabilities. |
| | Manual safety injection initiation is available at all times. |
| | There is no annunciation of the safety xngection circuit being in the reset mode. |
| | The purpose of the reset switch on the safety injection system is to allow equipment to be realigned for the recirculation phase of a postulated LOCA. |
| | : 2. CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION CIRCUIT: |
| | This circuit has a reset switch which gives the opexator the means of resetting containment ventilation isolation. |
| | Once the reset switch has been actuated, most 'of tne equipment. will automatically return to the state selected prior to the isolation signal. |
| | If containment ventilation isolation was caused automatically, either by safety injection or high radiation alarm on containment gas and/or particulate monitors, and this condition continues to exist: after the xeset switch has been actuated, then containment ventilation isolation cannot be achieved automatically or by the manual isolation switches until th'is logic clears. Once the automatic logic clears, the containment ventilation isolation reset relays de-energize and re-establishes automatic or manual isolation capabilities. |
| | |
| | Manual operation of the valves from the control board is available at all times. |
| | There is no annunciation of the automatic containment ventilation isolation system being in the reset mode. |
| | IJ The purpose of the reset switch on the containment venti-lation isolation system is to allow purging of containment in order to limit potential hydrogen concentration buildup following a postulated LOCA when high containment activity and safety injection signals could be present. |
| | : 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CIRCUIT: |
| | This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting containment .isolation. Once the reset switch has been actuated, some equipment will return |
| | ,automatically to the position selected prior to the iso-lation signal. |
| | If containment isolation was caused automatically by an automatic safety injection signal, and containment iso-lation reset switch is actuated without resetting safety injection, containment isolation cannot be obtained injec-by the manual containment isolation switches until safety tion is reset. |
| | Actuation of the reset permits the operator to place the valves affected by the containment isolation signal in the position~desired. This capability is necessary so that the operator has flexibility in dealing with post accident conditions within containment. |
| | There is no annunciat'ion of the automatic containment isolation being in the reset mode. |
| | : 4. CONTAINMENT SPRAY CIRCUIT: |
| | This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting containment spray. Once the reset switch has been actuated the spray additive tank discharge valves will return automatically to the position called for by the controller prior to the containment spray signal. The containment spray pumps and their discharge valves would require operator action to change state. |
| | If containment spray was caused automatically by the high containment pressure logic, and this logic continues to exist after reset, containment spray cannot be initiated by the manual spray switches. Once the high pressure logic has cleared, the containment spray reset relays de-energize and re-establishes automatic or manual contain-ment spray capabilities. |
|
| |
|
| ==DearMr.Ziemann:==
| | Actuation of the reset permits the operator to place the valves and pumps affected by the containment spray signal in the state desired. This capability is necessary so that the operator has flexibility in dealing with post accident conditions within containment. |
| 4YourletterdatedNovember29,1978requested restrictions beplacedoncontainment purgingduringnormaloperation andthatareviewofallsafetyactuation signalcircuitswhichincorporate manualoverridefeaturesbemade.TheRochester GasandElectricCorporation (RGB)letterdatedJanuary2,1979transmitted theRG6Ecommitments onpurgingduringnormaloperation andstatedthattherequiredreviewofoverridefeatureswouldbecompleted bymidFebruary1979.Thepurposeofthisletteristotransmittheresultsofthatreview.Detailsofthereviewarepresented inAppendixA.Thereviewofallsafetyactuation signalcircuitswhichincorporate amanualoverridefeatureindicates thatactuating aparticular override(reset)doesnotcausethebypassofothersafetyactuation signals.Theresetswitchesdescribed inAppendixAarepushbuttonswitcheslocatedonthecontrolboardwithnophysicalrestraints.
| | There is no annunciation of the automatic containment spray system being in the reset mode. |
| Inallcaseswherethesafetyactuation signalisgenerated automatically andtheresetswitchisactuated, thesafetyactu-ationsignalwillbeinhibited untilalllogicpathsforauto-matically generating thesafetyactuation signalhaveopened.Oncealllogicpathsopen,theparticular safetyactuation signalresetrelaysde-energize andre-establish theabilitytoauto-matically generatethesafetyactuation signal.Sincetheresetremainsactuatedonlyiftheinputsignalscausingtheautomatic safetyactuation signalpersistandtheseinputsignalsareannunciated, noseparateannunciation fortheresetactuation isnecessary.
| | : 5. FEEDNATER ISOLATION RESET: |
| Theoperatorhassufficient information todeducea~certainsystemisintheresetmode.p0v80zzaoww4 e,'g~(g',
| | This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting the isolation signal to the feed-water bypass valves only. The main feedwater valves will remain closed until the isolation logic clears, and then they automatically assume the position requested by their control circuit. |
| ROCHFST=R GwSAiVOL=CTR)CCORP.February16,1979TcMr.D.L.Ziemann,ChiefryEET,VO1Znnocasedoesactuation ofaparticular resetswitchpreventtheoperatorfrommanuallyoperating theequipment fromthecontrolboard.Therefore, operation ofaresetdoesnotpreventequipment fromoperating whichisnecessary tomitigatetheconsequences ofapostulated accident.
| | If feedwater level logic, isolation is caused by high steam generator and this condition still exists after the reset switch is actuated,-a safety injection sign'al would not cause an isolation to that particular feedwater bypass valve. It should be noted that a safety injection signal also causes the main feedwater pumps to be tripped, therefore, closing the feedwater bypass valves on a safety injection signal is redundant. |
| Verytrulyyours,~~+L.D.White,Jr.LDW:npAttachment AppendixAReviewofSafetyActuation SignalCircuitsIncorporating manualOverrides Thefollowing summaxizes theresultsofareviewofsafetyactu-ationsignalcircuitswhichincorporate amanualoverridefeature.Thepurposeofthereviewistoensurethatoverriding ofonesafetyactuation signaldoesnotalsocausethebypassofanyothersafetyactuation signals:SAFETYINJECTION CIRCUIT:Thiscircuithasaresetswitchwhichgivestheoperatorthemeansofresetting safetyinjection one-minuteorlongerafterinitiation.
| | There is no annunciation of the automatic feedwater iso-lation system being in the reset mode. |
| Actuation ofthereset.swatchinitselfdoesnotchangethestateofanyequipment, butpermitstheoperatortoplacetheequipment affectedbysafetyinjection tothepositiondesired.Ifsafetyin]ection iscausedbyautomatic actuation, andtheresetswitchisactuated, automatic safetyingection willbeinhibited untilalllogicpathsforautomatic safetyinjection haveopened.Oncealllogicpathsopen,thesafetyinjection resetrelaysde-energize andre-establishes automatic safetyinjection capabilities.
| | 6 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM DEFEAT ~ BYPASS g AND BLOCK SWITCHES: |
| Manualsafetyinjection initiation isavailable atalltimes.Thereisnoannunciation ofthesafetyxngection circuitbeingintheresetmode.Thepurposeoftheresetswitchonthesafetyinjection systemistoallowequipment toberealigned fortherecirculation phaseofapostulated LOCA.2.CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION CIRCUIT:Thiscircuithasaresetswitchwhichgivestheopexatorthemeansofresetting containment ventilation isolation.
| | ~ |
| Oncetheresetswitchhasbeenactuated, most'oftneequipment.
| | This system has several switches which are used for the following purposes: |
| willautomatically returntothestateselectedpriortotheisolation signal.Ifcontainment ventilation isolation wascausedautomatically, eitherbysafetyinjection orhighradiation alarmoncontainment gasand/orparticulate
| | (a) Defeat Switches - Defeats a permissive which rein-states a trip logic. |
| : monitors, andthiscondition continues toexist:afterthexesetswitchhasbeenactuated, thencontainment ventilation isolation cannotbeachievedautomatically orbythemanualisolation switchesuntilth'islogicclears.Oncetheautomatic logicclears,thecontainment ventilation isolation resetrelaysde-energize andre-establishes automatic ormanualisolation capabilities. | | (b) Bypass Switches Bypasses a trip or runback function for calibration or maintenance purposes. Protection is still provided by redundant channel or channels. |
| Manualoperation ofthevalvesfromthecontrolboardisavailable atalltimes.Thereisnoannunciation oftheautomatic containment ventilation isolation systembeingintheresetmode.IJThepurposeoftheresetswitchonthecontainment venti-lationisolation systemistoallowpurgingofcontainment inordertolimitpotential hydrogenconcentration buildupfollowing apostulated LOCAwhenhighcontainment activityandsafetyinjection signalscouldbepresent.3.CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CIRCUIT:Thiscircuithasaresetswitchwhichgivestheoperatorthemeansofresetting containment
| | (c) Block Switches Blocks trips generated by source, |
| .isolation.
| | .intermediate, and power range channels. These switches are actuated as permissive setpoints are reached to permit taking reactor critical and up in power. These blocks automatically reset as power is decreased below its particular setpoint. |
| Oncetheresetswitchhasbeenactuated, someequipment willreturn,automatically tothepositionselectedpriortotheiso-lationsignal.Ifcontainment isolation wascausedautomatically byanautomatic safetyinjection signal,andcontainment iso-lationresetswitchisactuatedwithoutresetting safetyinjection, containment isolation cannotbeobtainedbythemanualcontainment isolation switchesuntilsafetyinjec-tionisreset.Actuation oftheresetpermitstheoperatortoplacethevalvesaffectedbythecontainment isolation signalintheposition~desired.
| | All the above switches if actuated, are indicated by one or more of the following: status light, alarm on the computer, or actuate an annunciator. |
| Thiscapability isnecessary sothattheoperatorhasflexibility indealingwithpostaccidentconditions withincontainment.
| | : 7. INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL DEFEAT SWITCHES: |
| Thereisnoannunciat'ion oftheautomatic containment isolation beingintheresetmode.4.CONTAINMENT SPRAYCIRCUIT:Thiscircuithasaresetswitchwhichgivestheoperatorthemeansofresetting containment spray.Oncetheresetswitchhasbeenactuatedthesprayadditivetankdischarge valveswillreturnautomatically tothepositioncalledforbythecontroller priortothecontainment spraysignal.Thecontainment spraypumpsandtheirdischarge valveswouldrequireoperatoractiontochangestate.Ifcontainment spraywascausedautomatically bythehighcontainment pressurelogic,andthislogiccontinues toexistafterreset,containment spraycannotbeinitiated bythemanualsprayswitches.
| | The following switches and their circuits were reviewed to insure that they are only performing their intended function, and no other safety functions are being bypassed. The |
| Oncethehighpressurelogichascleared,thecontainment sprayresetrelaysde-energize andre-establishes automatic ormanualcontain-mentspraycapabilities.
| | -purpose for these switches is to be able to switch control from one sensor loop to another for testing, calibration and maintenance purposes. In all cases, reactor trip and safety injection signals are generated prior to defeat switches, and are not affected by switch position. |
| Actuation oftheresetpermitstheoperatortoplacethevalvesandpumpsaffectedbythecontainment spraysignalinthestatedesired.Thiscapability isnecessary sothattheoperatorhasflexibility indealingwithpostaccidentconditions withincontainment.
| | (a) P/429A Pressurizer Pressure Selector Switcn Used to select two of the four pressurizer pressure channels for controlling pressurizer heaters, sprays, and power relief valve PCV-430. |
| Thereisnoannunciation oftheautomatic containment spraysystembeingintheresetmode.5.FEEDNATER ISOLATION RESET:Thiscircuithasaresetswitchwhichgivestheoperatorthemeansofresetting theisolation signaltothefeed-waterbypassvalvesonly.Themainfeedwater valveswillremaincloseduntiltheisolation logicclears,andthentheyautomatically assumethepositionrequested bytheircontrolcircuit.Iffeedwater isolation iscausedbyhighsteamgenerator levellogic,andthiscondition stillexistsaftertheresetswitchisactuated,-a safetyinjection sign'alwouldnotcauseanisolation tothatparticular feedwater bypassvalve.Itshouldbenotedthatasafetyinjection signalalsocausesthemainfeedwater pumpstobetripped,therefore, closingthefeedwater bypassvalvesonasafetyinjection signalisredundant.
| | (b) L/428A Pressurizer Level Selector Switch - Vsed to sele'ct two of the three pressurizer level channels for controlling charging pump speed, letdown iso-lation, and pressurizer heaters. |
| Thereisnoannunciation oftheautomatic feedwater iso-lationsystembeingintheresetmode.6NUCLEARINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMDEFEAT~BYPASSgANDBLOCKSWITCHES:
| | (c) T/405E and T/405F Delta T Defeat Switches Vsed to defeat a channel from the over temperature and over power turbine runback circuit, and to remove a channel Delta T signal from the input of the summer for generating the average Delta T signal or the Rod Insertion Limit Circuit. |
| ~Thissystemhasseveralswitcheswhichareusedforthefollowing purposes: | | (d) T/401A and T/401B Tavg Defeat Switches Used to defeat a Tavg channel from the input to the average Tavg summer which is used for full length rod control, condenser steam dump, and pressurizer level setpoint.}} |
| (a)DefeatSwitches-Defeatsapermissive whichrein-statesatriplogic.(b)BypassSwitches-Bypassesatriporrunbackfunctionforcalibration ormaintenance purposes. | |
| Protection isstillprovidedbyredundant channelorchannels. | |
| (c)BlockSwitches-Blockstripsgenerated bysource,.intermediate, andpowerrangechannels. | |
| Theseswitchesareactuatedaspermissive setpoints arereachedtopermittakingreactorcriticalandupinpower.Theseblocksautomatically resetaspowerisdecreased belowitsparticular setpoint.
| |
| Alltheaboveswitchesifactuated, areindicated byoneormoreofthefollowing:
| |
| statuslight,alarmonthecomputer, oractuateanannunciator.
| |
| 7.INSTRUMENT ANDCONTROLDEFEATSWITCHES: | |
| Thefollowing switchesandtheircircuitswerereviewedtoinsurethattheyareonlyperforming theirintendedfunction, andnoothersafetyfunctions arebeingbypassed.
| |
| The-purposefortheseswitchesistobeabletoswitchcontrolfromonesensorlooptoanotherfortesting,calibration andmaintenance purposes.
| |
| Inallcases,reactortripandsafetyinjection signalsaregenerated priortodefeatswitches, andarenotaffectedbyswitchposition.
| |
| (a)P/429APressurizer PressureSelectorSwitcn-Usedtoselecttwoofthefourpressurizer pressurechannelsforcontrolling pressurizer heaters,sprays,andpowerreliefvalvePCV-430.(b)L/428APressurizer LevelSelectorSwitch-Vsedtosele'cttwoofthethreepressurizer levelchannelsforcontrolling chargingpumpspeed,letdowniso-lation,andpressurizer heaters.(c)T/405EandT/405FDeltaTDefeatSwitches-Vsedtodefeatachannelfromtheovertemperature andoverpowerturbinerunbackcircuit,andtoremoveachannelDeltaTsignalfromtheinputofthesummerforgenerating theaverageDeltaTsignalortheRodInsertion LimitCircuit.(d)T/401AandT/401BTavgDefeatSwitches-UsedtodefeataTavgchannelfromtheinputtotheaverageTavgsummerwhichisusedforfulllengthrodcontrol,condenser steamdump,andpressurizer levelsetpoint.}} | |
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Forwards LER 99-007-00 Re Personnel Error Which Caused Two Channels to Be in Tripped Condition,Resulting in Rt.Util Is Planning to Submit Suppl to LER by 990730
ML20206U0921999-05-13013 May 1999
Forwards Four Copies of Rev R to Gnpp Security Plan,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Clarifies Armed Response Team Assignments & Does Not Degrade Physical Security Effectiveness.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21
ML17265A6461999-05-12012 May 1999
Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept & 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, for Re Ginna NPP
ML17265A6411999-05-12012 May 1999
Forwards LER 99-004-00 IAW 10CFR50.73 & 10CFR21.Further Assessment Will Be Provided in Suppl to LER by 990630
ML20206E7221999-04-29029 April 1999
Forwards Four Copies of Rev Q to Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Degrade Physical Security Effectiveness.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21
ML20206H6911999-04-22022 April 1999
Forwards Info Requested During Informal Telcon on 980408 Concerning Upcoming Osre at Ginna Station.Info Requested Listed.Without Encls
ML17265A6271999-04-19019 April 1999
Forwards Rev 0 & Rev 1 to Colr,Cycle 28 for Re Ginna NPP, Per TS 5.6.5
ML17309A6501999-04-14014 April 1999
Forwards Revised Ginna Station EOPs & Procedures Index
ML17265A6121999-03-29029 March 1999
Forwards Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Re Ginna Npp,For Which Rg&E Is Sole Owner,Per 10CFR50.75. Data Presented Herein,Current as of 981231
ML17265A6041999-03-24024 March 1999
Forwards LER 99-001-00,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) & 10CFR21.Addl Analyses Are Being Performed to Support Future Cycle Operation & Supplemental LER Is Scheduled to Be Submitted by 990618
ML17265A5671999-03-0101 March 1999
Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-18,to Revise TSs Battery Cell Parameters Limit for Specific Gravity (SR 3.8.6.3 & SR 3.8.6.6).Supporting Tss,Encl
ML17265A5641999-03-0101 March 1999
Forwards Response to NRC 990217 RAI Concerning Changes to QA Program for Re Ginna Station Operation.Rg&E Is Modifying Changes Requested in 981221 Submittal.Modified QA Program,Encl
ML17265A5551999-02-25025 February 1999
Informs That Util Is in Process of Revising fitness-for-duty Program,Developed in Accordance with 10CFR26.Util Will Continue to Use Dept of Health & Human Svcs Certified Test Facility for Majority of Tests During Yr
ML17265A5561999-02-22022 February 1999
Forwards FFD Performance Data Rept for Six Months Ending 981231,per 10CFR26.71(d)
ML17265A5451999-02-12012 February 1999
Forwards Simulator Four Year Certification Rept,Per 10CFR55.45(b)(5)(ii)
ML17309A6491999-02-12012 February 1999
Forwards Ginna Station EOPs
ML17265A5431999-02-0909 February 1999
Supplements 980806 Relief Request with Attached Table.Util Third 10-Yr ISI of Reactor Vessel Being Performed During 1999 Refueling Outage,Beginning on 990301
ML17265A5361999-02-0202 February 1999
Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue USI A-46.Util Does Not Agree with NRCs Interpretation.Detailed Bases,Encl
ML17311A0691999-01-25025 January 1999
Forwards Revs to Ginna Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (Epips).Previous Rev Had Incorrect Effective Date
ML17311A0671999-01-14014 January 1999
Forwards Revised Emergency Operating Procedures for Re Ginna NPP
ML17265A5131999-01-12012 January 1999
Forwards Revised Cover Page for Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (Trm), Rev 7,correcting Error in Effective Date
1999-09-30
[Table view]
Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML17250B3041999-10-20020 October 1999
Forwards Changes to Tech Specs Bases for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.Change Bars Indicate Those Revs Which Have Been Incorporated
ML17265A7651999-10-0808 October 1999
Forwards Fifteen Relief Requests That Will Be Utilized for Ginna NPP Fourth Interval ISI Program That Will Start on Jan 1,2000.Attachment 1 Includes Summaries & Detailed Description of Each Relief Request
ML17265A7631999-10-0505 October 1999
Requests Approval for Use of Relief Request Number 43 to Address Volumetric Examination Limitations (Less than 90%) Associated with a & B RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Nozzle to Shell Welds.Approval Is Requested by Dec 31,2000
ML17265A7641999-10-0505 October 1999
Requests Approval for Use of Relief Request Number 42 to Address Volumetric Examinations Limitations (Less than 90%) Associated with Eight Class 1 Identified Welds or Areas of Reactor Pressure Vessel
ML20212J3561999-09-30030 September 1999
Forwards Four Copies of Re Ginna NPP Training & Qualification Plan for Security Officers, Rev 7,dtd 990930. Synopsis of Changes,Encl.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR73.21
ML20212J3801999-09-30030 September 1999
Forwards Four Copies of Rev to Re Ginna NPP Security Plan.Rev Changes Contingency Weapons Available to Response Force to Those Most Effective in Current Defensive Strategy.Encl Withheld Per 10CFR73.21
IR 05000244/19990051999-09-24024 September 1999
Forwards More Detailed Response Re Main Steam Check Valve Performance Questions Arising from NRC Insp Rept 50-244/99-05 Following Completion of Independent Assessment Being Performed by Duke Engineering & Svcs
ML17265A7571999-09-24024 September 1999
Forwards More Detailed Response Re Main Steam Check Valve Performance Questions Arising from NRC Insp Rept 50-244/99-05 Following Completion of Independent Assessment Being Performed by Duke Engineering & Svcs
ML17265A7461999-08-31031 August 1999
Submits Response to NRC Administrative Ltr 95-03,rev 2, Availability of Reactor Vessel Integrity Database,Version, Dtd 990726
ML17265A7401999-08-26026 August 1999
Requests Approval for Use of Relief Request Number 35 Re Use of ASME Section XI Code,1995 Edition,1996 Addenda.Code Will Be Used to Develop Plant Fourth 10-year Interval ISI Program on Class 1,2 & 3 Components
ML17265A7411999-08-26026 August 1999
Forwards LER 99-004-01 Re Plant Being Outside Design Basis Due to Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Being Incorrectly Installed.Part 21 Notification of 990512 Is Being Rescinded
ML17250B3021999-08-23023 August 1999
Informs That Util & NRC Had Conference Call on 990816 to Review Approach in Responding to Questions,As Result of Questions Re Main Steam Check Valve Performance Included in Insp Rept 50-244/99-05,dtd 990806
ML17265A7451999-08-23023 August 1999
Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data Rept for Six Months Ending 990630,per 10CFR26.71(d)
ML17265A7271999-07-30030 July 1999
Forwards 10CFR21 Interim Rept Per Reporting of Defects & Noncompliance,Section 21 (a) (2).Interim Rept Prepared Because Evaluation Cannot Be Completed within 60 Days from Discovery of Deviation or Failure to Comply
ML17265A7151999-07-23023 July 1999
Forwards LER 99-007-01 Re Personnel Error Which Caused Two Channels to Be in Tripped Condition,Resulting in Reactor Trip.Further Investigation of Event Identified Addl Corrective Actions
ML17265A7061999-07-22022 July 1999
Forwards LER 98-003-02,re Actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.All Creats Actuations,Including Those Originally Believed to Be Valid Actuations,Were,In Fact Invalid Actuations
ML17265A7191999-07-21021 July 1999
Forwards Ginna Station ISI Rept for Refueling Outage Conducted in 1999
ML17265A7141999-07-21021 July 1999
Withdraws Relief Request 35 for Plant Inservice Insp Program Section XI Requirements,Submitted on 980806.Licensee Plans to Resubmit Relief Request,Which Includes Addl Level of Detail,In Near Future
ML17265A7041999-07-16016 July 1999
Submits Info Re Specific Licensing Actions Which May Be Expected to Generate Complex Reviews,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02,dtd 990603
ML17265A6911999-06-30030 June 1999
Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants.Gl 98-01 Requested Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness by 990701.Readiness Disclosure Attached
ML17265A6871999-06-22022 June 1999
Forwards Response to RAI Made During 990225 Telcon Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves. Calculation Encl. Encl
ML17265A6841999-06-21021 June 1999
Informs That Util Wishes to Amend Extend of Alternate Exams Provided for Relief Request Re ISI Program ASME Section XI Require Exams for First 10-Yr Interval for Containment
ML17265A6741999-06-15015 June 1999
Submits Annual ECCS Rept IAW 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii) Requirements.No Changes Have Been Made to Large Break LOCA PCT & Small Break LOCA PCT
ML17265A6751999-06-11011 June 1999
Responds to NRC RAI Re Licensee GL 96-05 Program.Encl Info Verifies That Util Is Implementing Provisions of JOG Program on MOV Periodic Verification
ML17309A6551999-06-0707 June 1999
Responds to NRC 990310 RAI Re Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment
ML17265A6671999-06-0101 June 1999
Requests Approval of Ginna QA Program for Radioactive Matl Packages,Form 311,approval Number 0019.Ginna QA Program for Station Operation, Was Most Recently Submitted to NRC by Ltr Dtd 981221 & Supplemented on 990301
ML17265A6641999-05-25025 May 1999
Forwards Addl Info on Use of GIP Method a for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.Copy of Re Ginna Station USI A-46 Outlier Resolution Table as Requested
ML17265A6611999-05-24024 May 1999
Forwards LER 99-007-00 Re Personnel Error Which Caused Two Channels to Be in Tripped Condition,Resulting in Rt.Util Is Planning to Submit Suppl to LER by 990730
ML20206U0921999-05-13013 May 1999
Forwards Four Copies of Rev R to Gnpp Security Plan,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Clarifies Armed Response Team Assignments & Does Not Degrade Physical Security Effectiveness.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21
ML17265A6461999-05-12012 May 1999
Forwards 1998 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept & 1998 Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept, for Re Ginna NPP
ML17265A6411999-05-12012 May 1999
Forwards LER 99-004-00 IAW 10CFR50.73 & 10CFR21.Further Assessment Will Be Provided in Suppl to LER by 990630
ML20206E7221999-04-29029 April 1999
Forwards Four Copies of Rev Q to Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Degrade Physical Security Effectiveness.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21
ML20206H6911999-04-22022 April 1999
Forwards Info Requested During Informal Telcon on 980408 Concerning Upcoming Osre at Ginna Station.Info Requested Listed.Without Encls
ML17265A6271999-04-19019 April 1999
Forwards Rev 0 & Rev 1 to Colr,Cycle 28 for Re Ginna NPP, Per TS 5.6.5
ML17309A6501999-04-14014 April 1999
Forwards Revised Ginna Station EOPs & Procedures Index
ML17265A6121999-03-29029 March 1999
Forwards Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Re Ginna Npp,For Which Rg&E Is Sole Owner,Per 10CFR50.75. Data Presented Herein,Current as of 981231
ML17265A6041999-03-24024 March 1999
Forwards LER 99-001-00,IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) & 10CFR21.Addl Analyses Are Being Performed to Support Future Cycle Operation & Supplemental LER Is Scheduled to Be Submitted by 990618
ML17265A5641999-03-0101 March 1999
Forwards Response to NRC 990217 RAI Concerning Changes to QA Program for Re Ginna Station Operation.Rg&E Is Modifying Changes Requested in 981221 Submittal.Modified QA Program,Encl
ML17265A5671999-03-0101 March 1999
Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-18,to Revise TSs Battery Cell Parameters Limit for Specific Gravity (SR 3.8.6.3 & SR 3.8.6.6).Supporting Tss,Encl
ML17265A5551999-02-25025 February 1999
Informs That Util Is in Process of Revising fitness-for-duty Program,Developed in Accordance with 10CFR26.Util Will Continue to Use Dept of Health & Human Svcs Certified Test Facility for Majority of Tests During Yr
ML17265A5561999-02-22022 February 1999
Forwards FFD Performance Data Rept for Six Months Ending 981231,per 10CFR26.71(d)
ML17265A5451999-02-12012 February 1999
Forwards Simulator Four Year Certification Rept,Per 10CFR55.45(b)(5)(ii)
ML17309A6491999-02-12012 February 1999
Forwards Ginna Station EOPs
ML17265A5431999-02-0909 February 1999
Supplements 980806 Relief Request with Attached Table.Util Third 10-Yr ISI of Reactor Vessel Being Performed During 1999 Refueling Outage,Beginning on 990301
ML17265A5361999-02-0202 February 1999
Forwards Response to NRC 981203 RAI Re Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue USI A-46.Util Does Not Agree with NRCs Interpretation.Detailed Bases,Encl
ML17311A0691999-01-25025 January 1999
Forwards Revs to Ginna Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (Epips).Previous Rev Had Incorrect Effective Date
ML17311A0671999-01-14014 January 1999
Forwards Revised Emergency Operating Procedures for Re Ginna NPP
ML17265A5131999-01-12012 January 1999
Forwards Revised Cover Page for Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (Trm), Rev 7,correcting Error in Effective Date
ML17265A5111999-01-11011 January 1999
Requests Relief Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) from Certain Requirements of Section XI of ASME Bp&V Code for ISI Program.Relief Requests 37,38 & 39 Encl
ML17265A5101999-01-11011 January 1999
Requests Relief Per to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) from Certain Requirements of Section XI of ASME B&PV Code for ISI Program.Relief Request 40 Encl
1999-09-30
[Table view]
Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L4481990-09-18018 September 1990
Forwards Responses to Rer 900709-13 Team Visit Findings, Per .Responses Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)
ML17309A4491990-09-13013 September 1990
Forwards Slides Presented by Facility & Westinghouse to NRC in 900724 Meeting.Encl Withheld
ML17262A1331990-09-11011 September 1990
Responds to Violations & Several Unresolved Items Noted in SSFI Rept 50-244/89-81.Update of Appropriate Unresolved Items Encl.Specific Actions Re All NRC Unresolved Items Being Tracked to Completion
ML17261B1511990-08-29029 August 1990
Forwards Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept Jan- June 1990 & Rev 3 to Process Control Program for Ginna Station, Per Tech Specs 6.9.1.4 & 6.16,respectively
ML17261B1481990-08-28028 August 1990
Lists Understanding of Issues Util Planning to Address Re Containment Integrity,Per 900718 Telcon.Any Concerns or Action Items Different from Listed Submittal Should Be Provided to Util Prior to NRC 900905 & 06 Visit to Plant
IR 05000244/19880261990-08-20020 August 1990
Submits Update on Util Plans to Provide Appropriate Ventilation to Intermediate Bldg Clean Side,Per Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/88-26.Extensive Program to Manually Close All External Openings Implemented
ML17261B1501990-08-20020 August 1990
Submits Update on Util Plans to Provide Appropriate Ventilation to Intermediate Bldg Clean Side,Per Violation Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/88-26.Extensive Program to Manually Close All External Openings Implemented
ML17261B1371990-08-17017 August 1990
Forwards Rev 0 to, Inservice Insp Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999),First Period,First Outage (1990) at Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
ML17309A4481990-08-16016 August 1990
Responds to NRC 900717 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/90-80.Corrective Actions:Westinghouse Drawing E-2508 Approved & Issued to Central Records
ML17261B1351990-08-15015 August 1990
Provides Info & Assessment on Integrity of Connection of Containment Bldg to Foundation,Per 900808 Telcon.Util Believes That Existing Condition Not Safety Concern & No Reason Exists to Suspect Joint Will Not Perform Function
ML17261B1361990-08-14014 August 1990
Responds to Commitment Tracking Concerns Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/90-09 & Planned Corrective Actions.Util Confirms Commitments Dates for Implementation of Effective Shelf Life Program & Comprehensive Preventive Maint Program for Parts
ML17261B1331990-08-13013 August 1990
Recommits to Performing Enhanced primary-to-secondary Leak Rate Monitoring,Per NRC Bulletin 88-002
ML17261B1261990-07-30030 July 1990
Clarifies Commitment Made in 900316 RO Re Restoring Inoperable Fire Damper I-411-21-P.Util Plans to Design Removable Track Which Will Allow Charcoal Drawer to Be Manipulated.Definitive Schedule Will Be Provided in 60 Days
ML20055H9291990-07-23023 July 1990
Forwards Revised Page 6:4 of Plant Security Plan.Page Withheld Per 10CFR73.21
ML17261B1091990-07-20020 July 1990
Advises That Structural Evaluations of Containment Sys Being Performed in Response to Containment Integrity Insp
ML17309A4471990-07-17017 July 1990
Forwards Decommissioning Rept, for Plant,Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b)
ML17261B0881990-07-13013 July 1990
Provides Update to Util 860616 Ltr Re Implementation of NUREG-0737,Item 6.2,Suppl 1, Emergency Response Capability.
ML17261B0921990-07-11011 July 1990
Responds to 900709 Request for Addl Info Re Containment Integrity Insp.Util Will Provide Preliminary Results by 900716 Re Where Groundwater Entering Annular Access Area. Meeting Proposed for Wk of 900723
ML20044B0481990-07-10010 July 1990
Discusses Review of Station Blackout Documentation,Per 10CFR50.63.Licensee Will Complete Enhancements to Station Blackout Documentation Identified in Attachment 1 as Indicated & Other Items Will Be Completed within 2 Yrs
ML17309A4461990-07-0909 July 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04 Re Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/ Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions
ML17261B0931990-07-0909 July 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 88-14, Instrument Air Supply Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Util Completed All Actions Requested in Generic Ltr & Will Retain Documentation Verification for Min of 2 Yrs
ML17261B0901990-07-0909 July 1990
Advises That Licensee Will Install Containment Isolation Signal Going to Valve AOV 745 by End of 1992 Refueling Outage,Per Util 900608 Ltr Notifying of Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant Under 10CFR50.72 Criterion
ML17250B2151990-06-29029 June 1990
Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-18, Reformatting Auxiliary Electrical Sys Tech Specs & Action Statements for Offsite & Onsite Power Sources Available for Plant Auxiliaries
ML17261B0851990-06-28028 June 1990
Forwards LER 89-016-02 Re 891117 Failure of Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch Which Could Render Both Trains of Safety Injection Sys Inoperable.Also Reported Per Part 21
ML17250B1991990-06-0808 June 1990
Responds to NRC 900509 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-81.Corrective Actions:Improved Battery Load Profile Developed Incorporating Calculational Improvements Contained in Current Industry Std IEEE 485-1983
ML17250B1951990-06-0505 June 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Util Developed Erosion/Corrosion Program for Single & Two Phase Sys Consistent W/Requirements of NUREG-1344 & NUMARC 870611 Rept
ML17250B1851990-06-0101 June 1990
Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-18,providing Guidance for Action Statements Associated W/Power Distribution Limit Specs
ML17261B0691990-06-0101 June 1990
Discusses Testing Frequency for Insp of Incore Neutron Monitoring Sys Thimble Tubes,Per NRC Bulletin 88-009.Thimble Tube Indicating Greatest Wear Recently Repositioned in Effort to Minimize Future Wear
ML17250B1811990-05-31031 May 1990
Forwards Addl Info Re Response to Notice of Violation from Insp Rept 50-244/90-04.Info Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)
ML17250B1801990-05-29029 May 1990
Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. Util Does Not Need to Develop Enhanced Surveillance Program to Monitor Currently Installed Transmitter Based Upon Limited Installed Quantity
ML17250B1841990-05-29029 May 1990
Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel (SS) Internal Pre-Load Bolting.... Valves Disassembled & 410 SS Studs Removed & Visually & Liquid Penetrant Examined
ML17261B0961990-05-29029 May 1990
Responds to NRC 900427 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/90-07.Corrective Actions:Worker Records Immediately Corrected Indicating That Worker Received No Significant Exposure for Time While Error Occurred
ML17250B1721990-05-18018 May 1990
Forwards Rev 1 to Summary Exam Rept for 1990 Steam Generator Eddy Current Insp. Rept Summarizes Observations & Corrective Actions Resulting from Insps Performed During 1990 Outage
ML20042G8931990-05-0808 May 1990
Forwards Revised Emergency Operating Procedures,Including Rev 3 to AP-RHR.2,Rev 1 to ES-0.3 & Rev 11 to ES-1.3
ML17261B0611990-04-26026 April 1990
Advises of Changes to 890201 Commitments Made Under Programmed Enhancement Response to Generic Ltr 88-17.Changes Will Not Reduce Capability to Operate Safely in Reduced Inventory Condition or Scope of Programmed Enhancements
ML17261B0591990-04-17017 April 1990
Advises That No Interlocks Required for RHR motor-operated Valves 701 & 720 Based on Present Arrangement.Listed Failures Would Have to Occur in Order for Potential Overpressurization of RHR Sys to Occur
ML17261B0461990-04-12012 April 1990
Responds to Issues Discussed During 900323 Telcon Re Inservice Testing Program Status & Relief Request.Current Test Methodology for Seat Leakage Acceptable Based on Application of Direct Measurement Sys
ML17262A1431990-04-12012 April 1990
Responds to NRC 900202 Ltr Re Weaknesses Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-80.Corrective Actions:Procedure ES-0.3 Modified to Provide Guidance for Rapid Cooldown & Depressurization W/ & W/O Reactor & Vessel Instrumentation Sys
ML17250B1451990-04-0606 April 1990
Discusses Impact of SER Issuance for Inservice Insp & Inservice Testing Programs & Advises That Timing Will Not Affect Util Implementation Plans for Programs,Except as Listed
ML17250B1441990-04-0505 April 1990
Responds to NRC 900309 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/90-02.Corrective Actions:Positive Indicator Will Be Installed for All Check Valves to Enhance Visible Positive Position Verification Ability & to Avoid Confusion
ML17261B0401990-03-30030 March 1990
Advises That Final Results of Station Blackout Documentation Review Will Be Submitted to NRC on or About 900501
ML17261B0321990-03-28028 March 1990
Forwards Annual Rept of ECCS Model Revs as Applicable to Facility,Per 10CFR50.46.Mods to Model for Small Break LOCA Do Not Affect Calculated Peak Clad Temp
ML17261B0331990-03-28028 March 1990
Forwards Info Re Reactor Vessel Issues,Per 900305 Telcon Concerning Change of License Expiration Date
ML17261B0231990-03-26026 March 1990
Responds to NRC 890222 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-244/89-17.Corrective Actions:Personnel Verified Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch in Proper Position & Operator Procedure 0-1.1 Changed as Indicated
ML17261B0281990-03-23023 March 1990
Forwards Addl Info Re Proposed Tech Spec Amend Concerning Use of Reconstituted Fuel,Per 900315 Telcon.During Fuel Assembly Reconstitution,Failed Fuel Rods Will Be Placed W/ Filler Rods
ML17261B0221990-03-22022 March 1990
Provides Revised Test Schedule for motor-operated Valve Diagnostic Test Program,Per IE Bulletin 85-003.NRC Notification of Changes to Valve Operability Program Required by Generic Ltr 89-10,dtd 890828
ML17261B0411990-03-20020 March 1990
Forwards Summary of Onsite Property Damage Coverage Currently in Force at Plant,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(4)
ML17261B0151990-03-19019 March 1990
Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19, Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Plants (USI A-47). Overfill Protection Provided Through Trip Bistables in Reactor Protection Racks Powered from 120-volt Instrument Buses
ML17261B0101990-03-15015 March 1990
Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-18,allowing Use of Reconstituted Fuel Assemblies
ML20012D2831990-03-14014 March 1990
Responds to Issues Discussed During 900307 Telcon W/Util & Eg&G Re Inservice Testing Program Status & Relief Request. Valves 5960A & 5960B Will Be Disassembled to Verify Forward Flow.Relief Requests PR-8 & VR-25 Encl
1990-09-18
[Table view] |
Text
BEGULAT(g INFORMATION DISTBIBUTIONyYSTEM (RIDE>
ACCESSION NBR-7902210226 DOC.DATEi 79/02/16 NOTARIZED~ NO DOCKET 0 FACILt50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear .Power Plant, Unit I,Roches 05000244 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION WHITE,L.D. Rochester Gas 8, Electric Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ZIEMANN,.D.L. ,
Operating Rector+ Branch 2 SUBJECTS Forwards review of safety actuation..circuits w/manual override. Concludes reset operation does not prevent equipment from .operating .whi'ch is necessary to nitigate a postulated accident.
~ SIZE<~
e DISTBIBUTI(>N CODEF AOOI S COPIES RECEIVED(LTR M ENCL TITLE( GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOB AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LIC ~
NOTES.t ( (-~ll ~~a <o 45 RFC I P I ENT COPIES RECAP I ENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID'ODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION - 05 BC A@6+ ~ 7 7 I NTERNAL-t 03. EG FILE .I I 02 NRC PDR .I I 1.2 2 2 I'((I TA/ED() I .I 15 KORE,PERF BR .I .I 16 A D 5 YS/P RO J I I
.I7 ENGR BR ,I 18 REAC SFTY BR .I I 0 19 PLANT .S YS BR 21 EFLT TRT .SYS
~ 1 I 20 EEB .I I I .I 22 BRINKMAN .I I EXTERNAL.i 03 LPDR ,I I 04 NS IC .I I 23 ACRS 16 16
~((U fgQ t 6 Ad~s g agric~
TOTAL NUMBER. OF COPIES REQUIRED'TTR 38 ENCL 38
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- February 16, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Review of Safety Actuation Circuits with Overrides R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Ziemann:
4 Your letter dated November 29, 1978 requested restrictions be placed on containment purging during normal operation and that a review of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate manual override features be made. The Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RGB) letter dated January 2, 1979 transmitted the RG6E commitments on purging during normal operation and stated that the required review of override features would be completed by mid February 1979. The purpose of this letter is to transmit the results of that review. Details of the review are presented in Appendix A.
The review of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature indicates that actuating a particular override (reset) does not cause the bypass of other safety actuation signals. The reset switches described in Appendix A are push button switches located on the control board with no physical restraints.
In all cases where the safety actuation signal is generated automatically and the reset switch is actuated, the safety actu-ation signal will be inhibited until all logic paths for auto-matically generating the safety actuation signal have opened.
Once all logic paths open, the particular safety actuation signal reset relays de-energize and re-establish the ability to auto-matically generate the safety actuation signal. Since the reset remains actuated only if the input signals causing the automatic safety actuation signal persist and these input signals are annunciated, no separate annunciation for the reset actuation is necessary. The operator has sufficient information to deduce a certain system is in the reset mode. p0
~
v80zzaoww4 e,'g~(g',
ROCHFST=R GwS AiVO L= CTR)C CORP. ryEET,VO February 16, 1979 Tc Mr. D.L. Ziemann, Chief does actuation of a particular reset switch 1
Zn no case prevent the operator from manually operating the equipment from the control board. Therefore, operation of a reset does not prevent equipment from operating which is necessary to mitigate the consequences of a postulated accident.
Very truly yours,
~~+
L. D. White, Jr.
LDW:np Attachment
Appendix A Review of Safety Actuation Signal Circuits Incorporating manual Overrides The following summaxizes the results of a review of safety actu-ation signal circuits which incorporate a manual override feature.
The purpose of the review is to ensure that overriding of one safety actuation signal does not also cause the bypass of any other safety actuation signals:
SAFETY INJECTION CIRCUIT:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting safety injection one- minute or longer after initiation. Actuation of the reset. swatch in itself does not change the state of any equipment, but permits the operator to place the equipment affected by safety injection to the position desired.
If safety in]ection is caused by automatic actuation, and the reset switch is actuated, automatic safety ingection will be inhibited until all logic paths for automatic safety injection have opened. Once all logic paths open, the safety injection reset relays de-energize and re-establishes automatic safety injection capabilities.
Manual safety injection initiation is available at all times.
There is no annunciation of the safety xngection circuit being in the reset mode.
The purpose of the reset switch on the safety injection system is to allow equipment to be realigned for the recirculation phase of a postulated LOCA.
- 2. CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION CIRCUIT:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the opexator the means of resetting containment ventilation isolation.
Once the reset switch has been actuated, most 'of tne equipment. will automatically return to the state selected prior to the isolation signal.
If containment ventilation isolation was caused automatically, either by safety injection or high radiation alarm on containment gas and/or particulate monitors, and this condition continues to exist: after the xeset switch has been actuated, then containment ventilation isolation cannot be achieved automatically or by the manual isolation switches until th'is logic clears. Once the automatic logic clears, the containment ventilation isolation reset relays de-energize and re-establishes automatic or manual isolation capabilities.
Manual operation of the valves from the control board is available at all times.
There is no annunciation of the automatic containment ventilation isolation system being in the reset mode.
IJ The purpose of the reset switch on the containment venti-lation isolation system is to allow purging of containment in order to limit potential hydrogen concentration buildup following a postulated LOCA when high containment activity and safety injection signals could be present.
- 3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CIRCUIT:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting containment .isolation. Once the reset switch has been actuated, some equipment will return
,automatically to the position selected prior to the iso-lation signal.
If containment isolation was caused automatically by an automatic safety injection signal, and containment iso-lation reset switch is actuated without resetting safety injection, containment isolation cannot be obtained injec-by the manual containment isolation switches until safety tion is reset.
Actuation of the reset permits the operator to place the valves affected by the containment isolation signal in the position~desired. This capability is necessary so that the operator has flexibility in dealing with post accident conditions within containment.
There is no annunciat'ion of the automatic containment isolation being in the reset mode.
- 4. CONTAINMENT SPRAY CIRCUIT:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting containment spray. Once the reset switch has been actuated the spray additive tank discharge valves will return automatically to the position called for by the controller prior to the containment spray signal. The containment spray pumps and their discharge valves would require operator action to change state.
If containment spray was caused automatically by the high containment pressure logic, and this logic continues to exist after reset, containment spray cannot be initiated by the manual spray switches. Once the high pressure logic has cleared, the containment spray reset relays de-energize and re-establishes automatic or manual contain-ment spray capabilities.
Actuation of the reset permits the operator to place the valves and pumps affected by the containment spray signal in the state desired. This capability is necessary so that the operator has flexibility in dealing with post accident conditions within containment.
There is no annunciation of the automatic containment spray system being in the reset mode.
- 5. FEEDNATER ISOLATION RESET:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting the isolation signal to the feed-water bypass valves only. The main feedwater valves will remain closed until the isolation logic clears, and then they automatically assume the position requested by their control circuit.
If feedwater level logic, isolation is caused by high steam generator and this condition still exists after the reset switch is actuated,-a safety injection sign'al would not cause an isolation to that particular feedwater bypass valve. It should be noted that a safety injection signal also causes the main feedwater pumps to be tripped, therefore, closing the feedwater bypass valves on a safety injection signal is redundant.
There is no annunciation of the automatic feedwater iso-lation system being in the reset mode.
6 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM DEFEAT ~ BYPASS g AND BLOCK SWITCHES:
~
This system has several switches which are used for the following purposes:
(a) Defeat Switches - Defeats a permissive which rein-states a trip logic.
(b) Bypass Switches Bypasses a trip or runback function for calibration or maintenance purposes. Protection is still provided by redundant channel or channels.
(c) Block Switches Blocks trips generated by source,
.intermediate, and power range channels. These switches are actuated as permissive setpoints are reached to permit taking reactor critical and up in power. These blocks automatically reset as power is decreased below its particular setpoint.
All the above switches if actuated, are indicated by one or more of the following: status light, alarm on the computer, or actuate an annunciator.
- 7. INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL DEFEAT SWITCHES:
The following switches and their circuits were reviewed to insure that they are only performing their intended function, and no other safety functions are being bypassed. The
-purpose for these switches is to be able to switch control from one sensor loop to another for testing, calibration and maintenance purposes. In all cases, reactor trip and safety injection signals are generated prior to defeat switches, and are not affected by switch position.
(a) P/429A Pressurizer Pressure Selector Switcn Used to select two of the four pressurizer pressure channels for controlling pressurizer heaters, sprays, and power relief valve PCV-430.
(b) L/428A Pressurizer Level Selector Switch - Vsed to sele'ct two of the three pressurizer level channels for controlling charging pump speed, letdown iso-lation, and pressurizer heaters.
(c) T/405E and T/405F Delta T Defeat Switches Vsed to defeat a channel from the over temperature and over power turbine runback circuit, and to remove a channel Delta T signal from the input of the summer for generating the average Delta T signal or the Rod Insertion Limit Circuit.
(d) T/401A and T/401B Tavg Defeat Switches Used to defeat a Tavg channel from the input to the average Tavg summer which is used for full length rod control, condenser steam dump, and pressurizer level setpoint.
