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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATO'NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM<BIDS)ACCESSION NBR: 8709280186 DOC.DATE: 87/09/21 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATO 'NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION             STEM <BIDS)
NO ,.FACI~: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co.WATSON'.A.Carolina Poeer ic Light Co.REC IP.NAME REClPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400
ACCESSION NBR: 8709280186         DOC. DATE: 87/09/21     NOTARIZED: NO            DOCKET
,.FACI~: 50-400 Shearon   Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit           ii Carolina   05000400 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER       Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co.
WATSON'. A.         Carolina Poeer ic Light Co.
REC IP. NAME         REClPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 87-043-00:
LER 87-043-00: on 870820> discovered that six manual isolation valves not j,nc luded in Oper ations Surveillance Test OST-1029. Caused bg personnel error. Test r evised to include valves in monthly verification of position. W/870'F21 ltr.
on 870820>discovered that six manual isolation valves not j,nc luded in Oper ations Surveillance Test OST-1029.Caused bg personnel error.Test r evised to include valves in monthly verification of position.W/870'F21 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR~ENCL~SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpt etc.NOTES: Application for permit reneeal Wi led.05000400 REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 LA BUCKLEYiB INTERNAL: ACRS M ICHELSON AEOD/DQA AEOD/DSP/RQAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEBT/RSB NRR/DLPG/HFB NRR/DQEA/E*B NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/ILRB RES DEPY GI RES/DE/EIB EXTERNAL: EG5G GROHi M LPDR NSIC HARRIS'COP IES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 REC IP IENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEBT/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/DREP/RAB NRR//SIB EG FIL 0&R ELFORDi J RGN2 FILE 01 H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYST G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1'1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COP I ES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 43  
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ~ ENCL                 ~
~w NRC Fore 308 (943)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)UA.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPAOVED OMB NO.31504104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME 0)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKKT NUMBER (2)PAQK 31 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 O 1.OFQ 4 SIX OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.
SIZE:
ISOLATION VALVES WERE OMITTED FROM MONTHLY POSITION C ECK DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR IN PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT.
TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpt               etc.
KVKNT DATE (5)MONTH DAY YEAR LEA NUMBFR (6)YEAR ggj SEQUENTIAL
NOTES: Application for permit reneeal       Wi led.                               05000400 REC IP IENT       COP IES            REC IP IENT            COPIES ID CODE/NAME       LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME          LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA               1      1    PD2-1 PD                      1    1 BUCKLEYiB             1 INTERNAL: ACRS     M ICHELSON             1    ACRS MOELLER                2    2 AEOD/DQA               1            AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/RQAB         2      2    AEOD/DSP/TPAB                1' DEDRO                  1      1    NRR/DEST/ADS                  1  0 NRR/DEST/CEB          1      1    NRR/DEBT/ELB                  1 NRR/DEST/ ICSB        1      1    NRR/DEST/MEB                  1    1 NRR/DEST/MTB                        NRR/DEST/PSB                  1 NRR/DEBT/RSB          1     1     NRR/DEST/SGB                  1 NRR/DLPG/HFB          1            NRR/DLPG/GAB                  1    1 NRR/DQEA/E*B                  1    NRR/DREP/RAB                      1 NRR/DREP/RPB          2      2    NRR/       /SIB              1  1 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB        1      1      EG FIL         0&         1  1 RES DEPY  GI          1      1    R     ELFORDi   J               1 RES/DE/EIB            1            RGN2     FILE     01         1  1 EXTERNAL: EG5G GROHi    M          5      5    H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR                  1            NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS'          1            NSIC MAYST G TOTAL NUMBER OF COP I ES REQUIRED:     LTTR     44   ENCL     43
'VMSKR gYg'.REVISION 46 NVMSKR MONTH OAY YEAR REPORT DATE (7)DOCKtT NUMBEA(S)0 5 0 0 0 FACILITY NAMES OTHER FACILITIES INVOI.VED (S)~0 5 0 0 0 OPEAATINO MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)20A02(b)20A05(~)(1)(il 20A05(e)(I)(ii)
.20A05(~)(1)(iii)20A05(c)(I)(Ir)20A05(e)5048(cl(1) 50.38(c)l2)50.73(e)(2)li)50.73(e)121(ill 50,73(e)(2) lirl 50.73(el(2) lrl 50.73(e)(2)(rii)50.73(e)(2)(xiii)(A)50,73(e)(2)(rid)(B)
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R g: (Check one or more of the follorflnFI (11)73.71(bl 73.71(cl OTHKR (Specify In Ahttrect heforr end ln Text, IIRC Form 3ESAJ NAME 20AOS(c)(I)(r)
D HW N 50.73(el(2)
Ail)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA (12)REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 50.73(e)(2)(xl AREa COOP.TELEPHONE NUMBER 62-2 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR tACH COMPONENT FAILUAE DESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURKR rrscco EPORTABLE'~ig+)'O NPROS 16'r CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER EPORTABLE A TO NPRDS r>.r.~SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT KXPECTED (IC)YEs Ilf yet, complete ExpEcTED sUshtlssloff DA TEI AdsTRAcT ILlmlt to Ie00 tpecet, I e., epproxlmeteiy fllteen tlnoleepece typewrinen llneel 118)ABSTRACT EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR The plant was operating at 100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation, on August 20, 1987.During a review of containment isolation valves, it was discovered at 1400 hours that six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations Surveillance Test (OST)-1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required.OST-1029',satisfies.
Technical Specifications item 4.6.l.l.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and locked.Upon'iscovery, a check of the six isolation valves was made and it was found that'll six valves were closed and locked as required.There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed position prior to initial criticality of the plant.The cause of the event was personnel error in omitting the six isolation valves from OST-1029 for verification of their locked closed position as required.The immediate corrective action upon discovery was to verify that the six valves were in the closed and locked position as required, which they were.Action to prevent recurrence is that OST-1029 has been revised to include these six valves in the monthly verification of position.NRC Form Sdd This event is being violation of Technical 870'7)280l86 PDR ADOCK reported in accordance with lOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a Specifications Action item 4.6.1.1.a.
870%1 0S000O00 rl PDR'r/
RC For)SISSSA (94)3)4 LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATI U.S.NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.3(50M(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 TEXT/1/'mora 4/>>cv/4 vr/Vtrad, v44 add/dor>>/NRC Form 35543/(13)DOCKET NUMBER (3)LER NUMBER (8)SaavaNTIAL NUMaaR YEAR@g"o s o o o 4 00 87 0'ASVISION NVMSSR PACE (3)0 0 020F0 The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent reactor power on August 20, 1987.'lant personnel were implementing a program to identify and tag containment isolation valves[see LER-87-014-00 corrective action no.(1)j.This program involved a review of procedures, drawings, and a plant walkdown.During the review, it was discovered that the following six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations Surveillance Test (OST)"1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required.1FP-355: Fire Protection water supply to containment.(EIIS:KP)1DW-63: Demineralized water supply to containment.(EIIS:KC)1SI-302 and 1SI-304: Drain valves off of the safety injection recirculation sump valve chambers.(EIIS:BP)1CT-103 and 1CT-106: Drain valves off of the containment spray recirculation sump valve chambers.(EIIS:BE)OST-1029 satisfies Technical Specifications item 4.6.1.1.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and locked.Upon discovery that the six valves were missing from OST-1029's monthly position check, operations personnel immediately verified that the valves were in the closed and locked position as required.There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed position prior to initial criticality of the plant.Plant conditions during and following this event was 100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation.
OST-1029 has been revised to include the six valves which were omitted from the procedure.
NRC FORM 348A*U.S.OPO: I 988.0.834 538/455 J NRC FosiyrXSA (94)3)a s LICENSEE EYIO REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATI U.S.NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.3150&)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACIUTY NAME (1)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1.TEXT///mead 4Pddd 1I/sdv)dd, I/w a/s//I/dsas////I C hmi 3584'4/(IT)COCKET NUMBER (3)YEAR oo s7 LER NUMBER (6)I': "g>>SEOVENTIAL NVMSER 043 REVISION NUMSER-0 0 PACE (3)0 30F 0 4 Cause: The reason for the errors in the procedure was investigated.
The results of that investigation are as follows'.-
1)1FP-355" In the original design, this valve had an air operator and was closed by a phase A isolation signal.The actuator was deleted by a subsequent change that was not reflected in the flow drawings until the spring of 19S7.Thus, the valve was not included in the early drafts of the procedure.
2)1DW-63" In the initial draft of the procedure, this valve was included but with the incorrect"noun name".It was listed as"Primary Water Supply" vice the real title of"Demineralized Water Makeup".Since Primary Water Supply is not a containment isolation valve, 1DW-63 was deleted from the procedure.
3)1SI-302, 1SI-304, 1CT-103, 1CT"106-The initial draft of the procedure did not include these valve chamber drain valves.The investigation concluded that these valves were omitted because they do not connect directly to containment.
In each case listed, the system valve lineup checklist which is separate from OST-1029 put the valves in the required locked closed position.The root cause of the event is personnel error in omitting the valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position.~anal sis: Operation of plant components and systems and the health of the general public were unaffected by this event as the valves were in their proper position when checked'.In the case of 1FP-355 and 1DW-63 additional check valves are in series to provide redundant containment isolation capability.
Had the valves'been open during accident'conditions, the potential for additional containment releases to the Reactor Auxiliary Building is minimized.
In the case of the valve chamber drain valves, a chamber does not communicate directly with the containment.
The valve chamber serves to collect and isolate potential leakage from the containment sump isolation valves and from the pipe penetration to the containment sump.If these valves were left open the leakage would be released into the Reactor Auxiliary Building drains or leak-off holdup tanks.Releases into the Reactor Auxiliary Building would either be monitored by area radiation monitors andlor the Plant Vent Stack radiation monitors.This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of Technical Specifications Action Item 4.6.1.1.a.
There have not been any similar events reported of this nature.NRC FORM SOdA*U.S.QPO:1988 0 834 538/455 RC For)drSSBA (34)3)'ICENSEE'EVIO REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATI U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACIUTY NAME (1)SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMSER l21 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEOUENTIAL NUMSER'.Ir r REVISION NUMSER PAOE (3)TEXT/((more 4/reoe/4/lr/rer/Iree////oee/HRC Ferrrr 3//543/(17)0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 7 043 0 0 0 4 OF 0 4 Corrective Action: The valves were checked and verified to be in their proper position upon discovery that they were omitted from OST-1029.Action to Prevent Recurrence:
l.OST-1029 has been revised to include the six valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position, and has been performed.
2.A review of drawings for all systems with fluid*penetrations into the containment building was done to verify that OST-1029 is complete and has no additional errors.'NRC FORM SSSA*U.S.GPO:1988 0-824 538/45S


Carolina Power 5 Light Company gsgPC-0>(ggse~>~HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O.Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 SEP2 Ilg87 File Number,'HF/10-13510C Letter Number: HO-870498 (0)U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555.SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-043-00 Gentlemen:
~ w NRC Fore 308                                                                                                                                    UA. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
APPAOVED OMB NO. 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                        EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME 0)                                                                                                                    DOCKKT NUMBER (2)                              PAQK    31 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1                                                                                        0 5 0 0 0 4                        0 O 1.OFQ                4 SIX OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. ISOLATION VALVES WERE OMITTED FROM MONTHLY POSITION C ECK DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR IN PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT.
This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30)days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.Very truly yours, R.A.Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:acm Enclosure cc'.Dr.J.Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)Mr.B.Buckley (NRR)Mr.G.Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)MEM/LER-87-043/1/OS1}}
KVKNT DATE (5)                      LEA NUMBFR (6)                          REPORT DATE (7)                      OTHER FACILITIES INVOI.VED (S)              ~
MONTH    DAY      YEAR      YEAR    ggj SEQUENTIAL
                                                  'VMSKR 46 gYg'. REVISION NVMSKR MONTH            OAY  YEAR          FACILITYNAMES                            DOCKtT NUMBEA(S) 0  5    0    0    0 0  5    0    0    0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R g: (Check one or more              of the follorflnFI (11)
OPEAATINO MODE (9) 20A02(b)                                  20A05(e)                        50,73(e)(2)  lirl                                73.71(bl POWER                            20A05( ~ ) (1)(il                          5048(cl(1)                      50.73(el(2)  lrl                                73.71(cl LEVEL (10)                          20A05(e)(I)(ii)                            50.38(c) l2)                    50.73(e) (2) (rii)                              OTHKR (Specify In Ahttrect heforr end ln Text, IIRC Form
                                    . 20A05( ~ )(1)(iii)                        50.73(e) (2) li)                50.73(e) (2) (xiii)(A)                          3ESAJ 20A05(c ) (I ) (Ir)                        50.73(e) 121(ill                50,73(e)(2)(rid)(B) 20AOS(c)(I)(r)                            50.73(el(2) Ail)                50.73(e) (2)(xl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA (12)
NAME                                                                                                                                                      TELEPHONE NUMBER AREa  COOP.
D      HW        N                                          REGULATORY COMPLIANCE COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR tACH COMPONENT FAILUAE DESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13) 62        -2 rrscco CAUSE    SYSTEM      COMPONENT            MANUFAC            EPORTABLE    '~ig+) '    'O CAUSE SYSTEM  COMPONENT MANUFAC.            EPORTABLE      A TURKR                NPROS            16      r                                              TURER            TO NPRDS r>. r.
                                                  ~ SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT KXPECTED (IC)                                                                                MONTH      DAY      YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
YEs Ilfyet, complete  ExpEcTED sUshtlssloff DA TEI AdsTRAcT ILlmlt to Ie00 tpecet, I e., epproxlmeteiy fllteen tlnoleepece typewrinen llneel    118)
ABSTRACT The      plant      was      operating at                100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation, on August 20, 1987.                          During      a  review of containment isolation valves, at 1400 hours that six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations it    was discovered Surveillance Test (OST)-1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required.                                            OST-1029 ',satisfies. Technical Specifications                                                    item 4.6.l.l.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and                                                                          locked.
              'll Upon'iscovery, six a check of the six isolation valves was made and valves were closed and locked as required. There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed it    was found that position prior to initial criticality of the plant.
The cause            of the event                was      personnel error in omitting the six isolation valves from OST-1029          for verification of their                                  locked closed position as required.
The      immediate              corrective action upon discovery was to verify that the six valves were      in the closed and locked position as required, which they were.
Action to prevent recurrence is that OST-1029 has been revised to include these six valves in the monthly verification of position.
This          event is being reported in accordance with lOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)                                                                                      as        a violation of Technical Specifications Action item 4.6.1.1.a.
NRC Form Sdd 870'7)280 l 86 870%1 PDR            ADOCK 0S000O00                                                                                              rl
                                                                                                                                                              'r/
 
RC For)SISSSA                                                                                                          U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION (94)3) 4                            LICENSEE EV                  REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATI                            APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50M(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1)                                                            DOCKET NUMBER (3)                                                      PACE (3)
LER NUMBER (8)
YEAR    SaavaNTIAL        ASVISION
                                                                                                              @g    NUMaaR          NVMSSR SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT      1                                                                "o  s  o  o    o 4  00 87          0
                                                                                                                      '
0    0      020F0 TEXT /1/'mora 4/>>cv /4 vr/Vtrad, v44 add/dor>>/NRC Form 35543/ (13)
The      plant        was      operating in            Mode 1, Power    Operation, at      100  percent reactor power on August 20, 1987.                    'lant            personnel were implementing a program to identify and tag containment isolation valves [see LER-87-014-00 corrective action no. (1)j. This program involved a review of procedures, drawings, and a plant walkdown. During the review,            it    was discovered that the following six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations Surveillance Test (OST)"1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required.
1FP-355:              Fire Protection water supply to containment.                          (EIIS:KP) 1DW-63:              Demineralized water supply to containment.                          (EIIS:KC) 1SI-302 and 1SI-304:                                Drain valves off of the safety          injection recirculation                    sump valve chambers.      (EIIS:BP) 1CT-103            and        1CT-106:              Drain valves off of the containment                  spray      recirculation sump valve chambers.        (EIIS:BE)
OST-1029            satisfies Technical Specifications item 4.6.1.1.a for                            a 31-day        verification that the valves are closed and locked.
Upon        discovery that the six valves were missing from OST-1029's monthly position check, operations personnel immediately verified that the valves were in the closed and locked position as required.                              There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed position prior to initial criticality of the plant.
Plant conditions during                            and  following this event        was  100  percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power                 Operation.
OST-1029            has      been    revised to include the six valves which were omitted from the procedure.
NRC FORM 348A                                                                                                                        *U.S.OPO: I 988.0.834 538/455
 
NRC FosiyrXSA                        s                                                                                  U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION (94)3) a                                        LICENSEE            EYIO REPORT        ILER) TEXT CONTINUATI                          APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150&)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACIUTY NAME (1)                                                                COCKET NUMBER (3)              LER NUMBER (6)                    PACE (3)
YEAR I': SEOVENTIAL "g>>
NVMSER REVISION NUMSER SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT      1.
oo s7          043 0                0 0      30F      0 4 TEXT ///mead 4Pddd 1I /sdv)dd, I/w a/s//I/dsas////I C hmi 3584'4/  (IT)
Cause:
The reason              for the errors in the procedure                          was investigated.      The    results of that investigation are as follows'.-
: 1)        1FP-355 " In                  the original design, this valve had an air operator and was closed by a phase A                  isolation signal. The actuator was deleted by a subsequent change that was not reflected in the flow drawings until the spring of 19S7. Thus, the valve was not included in the early drafts of the procedure.
: 2)        1DW-63          " In          the initial draft of the procedure, this valve was included but with the incorrect "noun name". It was listed as "Primary Water Supply" vice the real title of "Demineralized Water Makeup". Since Primary Water Supply is not a containment isolation valve, 1DW-63 was deleted from the procedure.
: 3)        1SI-302, 1SI-304, 1CT-103, 1CT"106  The initial draft of the procedure did not include these valve chamber drain valves.                                  The investigation concluded that these valves were omitted because they do not connect directly to containment.
In each case listed, the system valve lineup checklist which                                                  is separate            from OST-1029 put the valves in the required locked closed position.
The      root cause of the event is personnel error in omitting the valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position.
              ~anal      sis:
Operation of plant components and systems and the health of the general public were unaffected by this event as the valves were in their proper position when checked'.
In the case of 1FP-355 and                                1DW-63 additional check valves are in series to provide redundant              containment                    isolation capability.          Had the valves 'been open during accident 'conditions,                              the potential for additional containment releases to the Reactor Auxiliary Building is minimized.
In the          case          of the valve                chamber drain valves, a chamber does not communicate directly with                      the    containment.          The valve chamber serves to collect and isolate potential leakage                          from the containment sump isolation valves and from the pipe penetration to the                          containment sump.            If these valves were left open the leakage would be released                          into the Reactor Auxiliary Building drains or leak-off holdup tanks.
Releases            into the Reactor Auxiliary Building would either be monitored                                                by area radiation monitors andlor the Plant Vent Stack radiation monitors.
This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as                                                a  violation of Technical Specifications Action Item 4.6.1.1.a.
There have not been any similar events reported of this nature.
NRC FORM SOdA                                                                                                                        *U.S.QPO:1988 0 834 538/455
 
RC For)drSSBA                                                                                                      U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (34)3)
                                          'ICENSEE'EVIO                REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATI                        APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACIUTY NAME (1)                                                            DOCKET NUMSER l21            LER NUMBER (6)                      PAOE (3)
YEAR  SEOUENTIAL          REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT                                                                            NUMSER    '.Ir r NUMSER UNIT      1 TEXT /((more  4/reoe /4 /lr/rer/ Iree ////oee/HRC Ferrrr 3//543/ (17) 0  5   0  0    0 4 0 0  8 7      043              0    0    0 4 OF 0        4 Corrective Action:
The valves were checked                              and verified to    be  in their proper position          upon      discovery that they              were      omitted from OST-1029.
Action to Prevent Recurrence:
: l.          OST-1029          has been revised to include the six valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position, and has been performed.
: 2.          A    review of drawings for all systems with fluid* penetrations into the containment building was done to verify that OST-1029 is complete and has no    additional errors.
'NRC FORM SSSA                                                                                                                      *U.S.GPO:1988 0-824 538/45S
 
gsgPC-0>
Carolina Power 5 Light Company (ggse~> ~
HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New   Hill,   NC 27562 SEP2   I lg87 File Number,'HF/10-13510C Letter Number: HO-870498 (0)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
            .SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT       UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-043-00 Gentlemen:
In accordance with Title     10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.             This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.
Very   truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:acm Enclosure cc'. Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC     RII)
Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)
MEM/LER-87-043/1/OS1}}

Revision as of 06:02, 22 October 2019

LER 87-043-00:on 870820,discovered That Six Manual Isolation Valves Not Included in Operations Surveillance Test OST-1029.Caused by Personnel Error.Test Revised to Include Valves in Monthly Verification of position.W/870921 Ltr
ML18004B944
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/21/1987
From: Schwabenbauer, Watson R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870498-(O), LER-87-043, LER-87-43, NUDOCS 8709280186
Download: ML18004B944 (7)


Text

REGULATO 'NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM <BIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8709280186 DOC. DATE: 87/09/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET

,.FACI~: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Poeer 5 Light Co.

WATSON'. A. Carolina Poeer ic Light Co.

REC IP. NAME REClPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-043-00: on 870820> discovered that six manual isolation valves not j,nc luded in Oper ations Surveillance Test OST-1029. Caused bg personnel error. Test r evised to include valves in monthly verification of position. W/870'F21 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ~ ENCL ~

SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)i Incident Rpt etc.

NOTES: Application for permit reneeal Wi led. 05000400 REC IP IENT COP IES REC IP IENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEYiB 1 INTERNAL: ACRS M ICHELSON 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DQA 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/RQAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1' DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEBT/ELB 1 NRR/DEST/ ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/PSB 1 NRR/DEBT/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DQEA/E*B 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 NRR/ /SIB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ ILRB 1 1 EG FIL 0& 1 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1 R ELFORDi J 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG5G GROHi M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD LPDR 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS' 1 NSIC MAYST G TOTAL NUMBER OF COP I ES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 43

~ w NRC Fore 308 UA. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (943)

APPAOVED OMB NO. 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME 0) DOCKKT NUMBER (2) PAQK 31 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 O 1.OFQ 4 SIX OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. ISOLATION VALVES WERE OMITTED FROM MONTHLY POSITION C ECK DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR IN PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT.

KVKNT DATE (5) LEA NUMBFR (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOI.VED (S) ~

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR ggj SEQUENTIAL

'VMSKR 46 gYg'. REVISION NVMSKR MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKtT NUMBEA(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CF R g: (Check one or more of the follorflnFI (11)

OPEAATINO MODE (9) 20A02(b) 20A05(e) 50,73(e)(2) lirl 73.71(bl POWER 20A05( ~ ) (1)(il 5048(cl(1) 50.73(el(2) lrl 73.71(cl LEVEL (10) 20A05(e)(I)(ii) 50.38(c) l2) 50.73(e) (2) (rii) OTHKR (Specify In Ahttrect heforr end ln Text, IIRC Form

. 20A05( ~ )(1)(iii) 50.73(e) (2) li) 50.73(e) (2) (xiii)(A) 3ESAJ 20A05(c ) (I ) (Ir) 50.73(e) 121(ill 50,73(e)(2)(rid)(B) 20AOS(c)(I)(r) 50.73(el(2) Ail) 50.73(e) (2)(xl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREa COOP.

D HW N REGULATORY COMPLIANCE COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR tACH COMPONENT FAILUAE DESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13) 62 -2 rrscco CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC EPORTABLE '~ig+) ' 'O CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTABLE A TURKR NPROS 16 r TURER TO NPRDS r>. r.

~ SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT KXPECTED (IC) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YEs Ilfyet, complete ExpEcTED sUshtlssloff DA TEI AdsTRAcT ILlmlt to Ie00 tpecet, I e., epproxlmeteiy fllteen tlnoleepece typewrinen llneel 118)

ABSTRACT The plant was operating at 100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation, on August 20, 1987. During a review of containment isolation valves, at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> that six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations it was discovered Surveillance Test (OST)-1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required. OST-1029 ',satisfies. Technical Specifications item 4.6.l.l.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and locked.

'll Upon'iscovery, six a check of the six isolation valves was made and valves were closed and locked as required. There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed it was found that position prior to initial criticality of the plant.

The cause of the event was personnel error in omitting the six isolation valves from OST-1029 for verification of their locked closed position as required.

The immediate corrective action upon discovery was to verify that the six valves were in the closed and locked position as required, which they were.

Action to prevent recurrence is that OST-1029 has been revised to include these six valves in the monthly verification of position.

This event is being reported in accordance with lOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of Technical Specifications Action item 4.6.1.1.a.

NRC Form Sdd 870'7)280 l 86 870%1 PDR ADOCK 0S000O00 rl

'r/

RC For)SISSSA U.S. NUCLEAR RECULATORY COMMISSION (94)3) 4 LICENSEE EV REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATI APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50M(04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (3) PACE (3)

LER NUMBER (8)

YEAR SaavaNTIAL ASVISION

@g NUMaaR NVMSSR SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 "o s o o o 4 00 87 0

'

0 0 020F0 TEXT /1/'mora 4/>>cv /4 vr/Vtrad, v44 add/dor>>/NRC Form 35543/ (13)

The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent reactor power on August 20, 1987. 'lant personnel were implementing a program to identify and tag containment isolation valves [see LER-87-014-00 corrective action no. (1)j. This program involved a review of procedures, drawings, and a plant walkdown. During the review, it was discovered that the following six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations Surveillance Test (OST)"1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required.

1FP-355: Fire Protection water supply to containment. (EIIS:KP) 1DW-63: Demineralized water supply to containment. (EIIS:KC) 1SI-302 and 1SI-304: Drain valves off of the safety injection recirculation sump valve chambers. (EIIS:BP) 1CT-103 and 1CT-106: Drain valves off of the containment spray recirculation sump valve chambers. (EIIS:BE)

OST-1029 satisfies Technical Specifications item 4.6.1.1.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and locked.

Upon discovery that the six valves were missing from OST-1029's monthly position check, operations personnel immediately verified that the valves were in the closed and locked position as required. There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed position prior to initial criticality of the plant.

Plant conditions during and following this event was 100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation.

OST-1029 has been revised to include the six valves which were omitted from the procedure.

NRC FORM 348A *U.S.OPO: I 988.0.834 538/455

NRC FosiyrXSA s U.S. NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSION (94)3) a LICENSEE EYIO REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATI APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150&)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACIUTY NAME (1) COCKET NUMBER (3) LER NUMBER (6) PACE (3)

YEAR I': SEOVENTIAL "g>>

NVMSER REVISION NUMSER SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1.

oo s7 043 0 0 0 30F 0 4 TEXT ///mead 4Pddd 1I /sdv)dd, I/w a/s//I/dsas////I C hmi 3584'4/ (IT)

Cause:

The reason for the errors in the procedure was investigated. The results of that investigation are as follows'.-

1) 1FP-355 " In the original design, this valve had an air operator and was closed by a phase A isolation signal. The actuator was deleted by a subsequent change that was not reflected in the flow drawings until the spring of 19S7. Thus, the valve was not included in the early drafts of the procedure.
2) 1DW-63 " In the initial draft of the procedure, this valve was included but with the incorrect "noun name". It was listed as "Primary Water Supply" vice the real title of "Demineralized Water Makeup". Since Primary Water Supply is not a containment isolation valve, 1DW-63 was deleted from the procedure.
3) 1SI-302, 1SI-304, 1CT-103, 1CT"106 The initial draft of the procedure did not include these valve chamber drain valves. The investigation concluded that these valves were omitted because they do not connect directly to containment.

In each case listed, the system valve lineup checklist which is separate from OST-1029 put the valves in the required locked closed position.

The root cause of the event is personnel error in omitting the valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position.

~anal sis:

Operation of plant components and systems and the health of the general public were unaffected by this event as the valves were in their proper position when checked'.

In the case of 1FP-355 and 1DW-63 additional check valves are in series to provide redundant containment isolation capability. Had the valves 'been open during accident 'conditions, the potential for additional containment releases to the Reactor Auxiliary Building is minimized.

In the case of the valve chamber drain valves, a chamber does not communicate directly with the containment. The valve chamber serves to collect and isolate potential leakage from the containment sump isolation valves and from the pipe penetration to the containment sump. If these valves were left open the leakage would be released into the Reactor Auxiliary Building drains or leak-off holdup tanks.

Releases into the Reactor Auxiliary Building would either be monitored by area radiation monitors andlor the Plant Vent Stack radiation monitors.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of Technical Specifications Action Item 4.6.1.1.a.

There have not been any similar events reported of this nature.

NRC FORM SOdA *U.S.QPO:1988 0 834 538/455

RC For)drSSBA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (34)3)

'ICENSEE'EVIO REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATI APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMSER l21 LER NUMBER (6) PAOE (3)

YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NUMSER '.Ir r NUMSER UNIT 1 TEXT /((more 4/reoe /4 /lr/rer/ Iree ////oee/HRC Ferrrr 3//543/ (17) 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 7 043 0 0 0 4 OF 0 4 Corrective Action:

The valves were checked and verified to be in their proper position upon discovery that they were omitted from OST-1029.

Action to Prevent Recurrence:

l. OST-1029 has been revised to include the six valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position, and has been performed.
2. A review of drawings for all systems with fluid* penetrations into the containment building was done to verify that OST-1029 is complete and has no additional errors.

'NRC FORM SSSA *U.S.GPO:1988 0-824 538/45S

gsgPC-0>

Carolina Power 5 Light Company (ggse~> ~

HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 SEP2 I lg87 File Number,'HF/10-13510C Letter Number: HO-870498 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

.SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-043-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:acm Enclosure cc'. Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)

MEM/LER-87-043/1/OS1