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| issue date = 06/04/1997
| issue date = 06/04/1997
| title = LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined That Previous Auxiliary Control Panel Had Not Verified Operability of Interposing Relays.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tss.Reviewed Other Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer circuitry.W/970604 Ltr
| title = LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined That Previous Auxiliary Control Panel Had Not Verified Operability of Interposing Relays.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tss.Reviewed Other Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer circuitry.W/970604 Ltr
| author name = DONAHUE J W, VERRILLI M
| author name = Donahue J, Verrilli M
| author affiliation = CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY 1~REGULAT.INFORMATION DISTRlRUTION STEM (RIDS)ACCESSION.
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULAT   .
NBR;9706160096 DOC.DATE;97/06/04 NOTARIZED:
CATEGORY INFORMATION DISTRlRUTION 1~    STEM   (RIDS)
NO FACIL,50-400 Shearon Harris Nuc'ear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AF=I'AT.ON VERRILLI,M.
ACCESSION. NBR;9706160096         DOC.DATE; 97/06/04       NOTARIZED: NO             DOCKET FACIL,50-400 Shearon Harris Nuc'ear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina                     05000400 AUTH. NAME           AUTHOR AF=   I'AT.ON VERRILLI,M.         Carolina Power ~ Light       Co.
Carolina Power~Light Co.DONAHUE,J.W.
DONAHUE,J.W.         Carolina Power & light       Co.
Carolina Power&light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000400
RECIP.NAME           RECIPIENT AFFILIATION


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined that previous Auxiliary Control Panel had not verified operability of interposing relays.Caused by misinte.pretation of".Ss.Rev ewed other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry.W/970604 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (lER),.Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.05000400 E RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-1 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POOREiW.NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME ROONEYiV EQ PD/~B XLE ESTER NRR DE/EELB" NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2 FIl E 01 LITCO BRYCEgJ H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D, U'E NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
LER   97-012-00:on 970505,determined that previous Auxiliary Control Panel had not verified operability of interposing relays. Caused by misinte.pretation of ".Ss.Rev ewed other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry.W/970604 ltr.
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD)ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIPED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25  
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR                   ENCL       SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (lER),. Incident Rpt, etc.
E NOTES:Application for permit renewal           filed.                                 05000400 RECIPIENT           COPIES              RECIPIENT            COPIES ID CODE/NAME          LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME         LTTR ENCL PD2-1   PD               1      1      ROONEYiV                  1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS                       1      1        EQ    PD/~B            2    2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB             1      1        XLE    ESTER            1    1 NRR/DE/ECGB               1      1      NRR  DE/EELB"            1    1 NRR/DE/EMEB               1      1      NRR/DRCH/HHFB            1    1 NRR/DRCH/HICB            1     1       NRR/DRCH/HOLB            1    1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB            1      1      NRR/DRPM/PECB             1    1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB            1     1       NRR/DSSA/SRXB            1     1 RES/DET/EIB              1     1       RGN2    FIl E  01        1     1                 D, EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD            1     1       LITCO BRYCEgJ    H      1     1 NOAC POOREiW.            1     1       NOAC QUEENER,DS          1     1 NRC PDR                  1     1       NUDOCS FULL TXT          1     1 U'
E NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIPED: LTTR             25   ENCL   25
 
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Carolina Power&light Company Harris Nvdear Plant PO 8ox 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUN OC 1997 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-97-115 10CFR50.73 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO.50-400 LICENSE NO.NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-012-00 Sir or Madam: In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted.
Carolina Power & light Company Harris Nvdear Plant PO 8ox 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUN OC 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                             Serial: HNP-97-115 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk                                                           10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-012-00 Sir or Madam:
This report describes a surveillance testing deficiency related to the Auxiliary Control Panel.Sincerely, MV J.W.Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant Enclosure c: Mr.J.B.Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)Mr.L.A.Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)Mr.N.B.Le (NRC-NRR Project Manager)9'706i60096 970604 PDR ADQCK 05000400 PDR State Road 113k New Hill NC 11!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIIII NRC FORM 366 l495)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)0 APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY UIFORMATION COLLECTION REDDEST: 50/I HRS.REPORTED lESSONS lEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCEHSING PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO UIDUSTRY.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE UIFORMATION AHO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH irk F33L US.NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 9(5(h OID(L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHIHGTON, OC 205(KL FACIUTY NAME (11 Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 TITLE (4)Auxiliary Control Panel surveillance testing deficiency.
In accordance with Title 10 to the Code   of Federal Regulations,   the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes       a surveillance testing deficiency related to the Auxiliary Control Panel.
OOCKET NUMBER (21 50-400 PAGE (3)1 OF 2 EVENT DATE (5)MONTH OAY YEAR 5 5 97 LER NUMBER (6)SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 97-01 2-00 MONTH OAY YEAR 4 97 REPORT DATE (7)FAC IUTY N AM E FACILITY NAME OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)DOCKET NUMBER OOCKETNUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9)POWER LEVEL (10)D 0%THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)
Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c:     Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)
(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)
Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)
(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 11!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIIII 9'706i60096 970604 PDR     ADQCK 05000400 PDR State Road 113k   New Hill NC
SUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Chock one o 20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii]20.2203(a)(3)(ii}
 
50,73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)
NRC FORM 366                             U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0 APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 l495)
(4)50.36(c)(1) r more)(11)50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71 OTHER SpecIIY in Abstract below or in NRC Form 360A 20.2203(a)
EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE       TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY UIFORMATION COLLECTION REDDEST: 50/I HRS. REPORTED lESSONS lEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                            INCORPORATED INTO THE UCEHSING PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO UIDUSTRY.
(2)(iv)50.36(c)(2)LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(a)(2)(vii)NAME Michael Verrilli Sr.Analyst-Licensing TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)(919)362-2303 CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (lf yos, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).X NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)MONTH OAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten linos)(16)On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-RELIFU) was determined to be reportable.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE UIFORMATION AHO (See reverse for required number of                            RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH   irk F33L US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 9(5(h digits/characters for each block)                            OID(L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHIHGTON, OC 205(KL FACIUTY NAME (11                                                                       OOCKET NUMBER (21                                      PAGE (3)
Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are'17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels.These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not veriTied the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays.The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.
Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1                                                                 50-400                              1  OF 2 TITLE (4)
Corrective actions included a review of other ACP circuits and testing of the ACP interposing relays and their subsequent actuation functions.
Auxiliary Control Panel surveillance testing deficiency.
Procedures will also be revised to ensure that future surveillance testing includes verification of this function.
EVENT DATE (5)                 LER NUMBER (6)               REPORT DATE (7)                       OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)
NRC FORM 366A (49Q LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION US.NUCLEAR REGUIATORT COMMISSION FAGN ITT NAME OI Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant-Unit II'1 OOCXET 50400 EER NUMBER (6)TEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER PAGE r3I 2 OF 2 97-012 OO TEN'r pf more spore rs roqvvorf, vse orfrrrrronal oopios ol A'RC form 36QI II 7)EVENT DESCRIPTION:
FAC IUTY N AME                              DOCKET NUMBER MONTH                                SEOUENTIAL    REVISION OAY    YEAR                                        MONTH    OAY    YEAR NUMBER      NUMBER FACILITY NAME                                OOCKETNUMBER 5        5      97      97    01 2          00                    4    97 05000 OPERATING               THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Chock one o r more) (11)
On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-REL/FU) was determined to be reportable.
MODE (9)          D        20.2201(b)                     20.2203(a)(2) (v)                 50.73(a) (2) (i)                         50.73(a)(2)(viii)
Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are 17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels.These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.CAUSE: This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays.The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.
POWER                      20.2203(a) (1)                 20.2203(a)(3) (i)                 50.73(a)(2) (ii)                         50.73(a) (2)(x)
LEVEL (10)       0%
20.2203(a)(2) (i)              20.2203(a)(3)(ii}                 50.73(a) (2)(iii]                        73.71 20.2203(a) (2) (ii)           20.2203(a) (4)                     50,73(a)(2)(iv)                         OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)            50.36(c)(1)                       50.73(a) (2)(v)                   SpecIIY in Abstract below or in NRC Form 360A 20.2203(a) (2)(iv)             50.36(c) (2)                       50.73(a) (2) (vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME                                                                                         TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing                                                               (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE       SYSTEM                                     REPORTABLE                                                                            REPORTABLE COMPONENT     MANUFACTURER                           CAUSE         SYSTEM       COMPONENT       MANUFACTURER TO NPROS                                                                              TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)                                                                   MONTH        OAY          YEAR EXPECTED YES                                                                                             SUBMISSION (lf yos, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).                       X   NO                       DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten linos) (16)
On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-RELIFU) was determined to be reportable. Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are'17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels. These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.
Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not veriTied the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.
This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays. The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.
Corrective actions included a review of other ACP circuits and testing of the ACP interposing relays and their subsequent actuation functions. Procedures will also be revised to ensure that future surveillance testing includes verification of this function.
 
NRC FORM 366A                                                                                                                 US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORT COMMISSION (49Q LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FAGN ITT NAME OI                                       OOCXET        EER  NUMBER (6)                PAGE r3I SEOUENTIAL      REVISION TEAR NUMBER        NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit II'1                                 50400                                     2     OF     2 97 -     012           OO TEN'r pf more spore rs roqvvorf, vse orfrrrrronal oopios ol A'RC form 36QI II7)
EVENT DESCRIPTION:
On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-REL/FU) was determined to be reportable. Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are 17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels. These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.
Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not verified the operability                                 of the interposing       relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.
CAUSE:
This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays. The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:
There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event.Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.This testing provides confidence that an alternate control power supply path would have existed if a fire had occurred in the control room causing a failure of the primary control power fuses.This event is being reported as a conditon prohibited by Technical Specifications per 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B.
There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS: Previous Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)LERs related to inadequate surveillance testing have been submitted.
This testing provides confidence that an alternate control power supply path would have existed if a fire had occurred in the control room causing a failure of the primary control power fuses.
These include LERs 94-001, 95-001, 95-003, 95-007, and 96-002.Corrective actions contained in LER 95-007 stated that HNP would perform a comprehensive review of the implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements.
This event is being reported                             as a   conditon prohibited by Technical Specifications per 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B.
This review was in progress when the NRC issued Generic Letter 96-01.Surveillance testing deficiencies identified as a result of Generic Letter 96-01 were documented in LER 96-002.A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
Previous Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) LERs related to inadequate surveillance testing have been submitted.
These include LERs 94-001, 95-001, 95-003, 95-007, and 96-002. Corrective actions contained in LER 95-007 stated that HNP would perform a comprehensive review of the implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements. This review was in progress when the NRC issued Generic Letter 96-01.
Surveillance testing deficiencies identified as a result of Generic Letter 96-01 were documented in LER 96-002.
A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:
1.A sample review of other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry was performed during the investigation of this condition.
: 1.         A sample review of other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry was performed during the investigation of this condition. This review concluded that the requirements of TS 4.3.3.5.2. had been met with the exception                         of the     17 circuits identified in this LER.
This review concluded that the requirements of TS 4.3.3.5.2.
: 2.         Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997 per OST-9005T, which verified the operability                                         of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.
had been met with the exception of the 17 circuits identified in this LER.2.Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997 per OST-9005T, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED: 1.Surveillance test procedures will be revised or'developed to ensure that future testing verifies the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.This will be completed prior to the next scheduled perfor'mance of this testing in refueling outage 8.2.A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)}}
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:
: 1.         Surveillance test procedures will be revised or'developed to ensure that future testing verifies the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses. This will be completed prior to the next scheduled perfor'mance of this testing in refueling outage 8.
: 2.         A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)}}

Latest revision as of 05:51, 22 October 2019

LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined That Previous Auxiliary Control Panel Had Not Verified Operability of Interposing Relays.Caused by Misinterpretation of Tss.Reviewed Other Remote Shutdown Panel Transfer circuitry.W/970604 Ltr
ML18012A801
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1997
From: Donahue J, Verrilli M
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-97-115, LER-97-012, LER-97-12, NUDOCS 9706160096
Download: ML18012A801 (5)


Text

REGULAT .

CATEGORY INFORMATION DISTRlRUTION 1~ STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION. NBR;9706160096 DOC.DATE; 97/06/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL,50-400 Shearon Harris Nuc'ear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AF= I'AT.ON VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power ~ Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-012-00:on 970505,determined that previous Auxiliary Control Panel had not verified operability of interposing relays. Caused by misinte.pretation of ".Ss.Rev ewed other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry.W/970604 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (lER),. Incident Rpt, etc.

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Carolina Power & light Company Harris Nvdear Plant PO 8ox 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUN OC 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-97-115 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-012-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a surveillance testing deficiency related to the Auxiliary Control Panel.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 11!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII.IIIIIIIIIII 9'706i60096 970604 PDR ADQCK 05000400 PDR State Road 113k New Hill NC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0 APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 l495)

EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY UIFORMATION COLLECTION REDDEST: 50/I HRS. REPORTED lESSONS lEARNED ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INCORPORATED INTO THE UCEHSING PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO UIDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE UIFORMATION AHO (See reverse for required number of RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH irk F33L US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, OC 205550001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 9(5(h digits/characters for each block) OID(L OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHIHGTON, OC 205(KL FACIUTY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMBER (21 PAGE (3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF 2 TITLE (4)

Auxiliary Control Panel surveillance testing deficiency.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

FAC IUTY N AME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH SEOUENTIAL REVISION OAY YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACILITY NAME OOCKETNUMBER 5 5 97 97 01 2 00 4 97 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Chock one o r more) (11)

MODE (9) D 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a)(3) (i) 50.73(a)(2) (ii) 50.73(a) (2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 0%

20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii} 50.73(a) (2)(iii] 73.71 20.2203(a) (2) (ii) 20.2203(a) (4) 50,73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) SpecIIY in Abstract below or in NRC Form 360A 20.2203(a) (2)(iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a) (2) (vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM REPORTABLE REPORTABLE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION (lf yos, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.o., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten linos) (16)

On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-RELIFU) was determined to be reportable. Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are'17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels. These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.

Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not veriTied the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.

This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays. The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.

Corrective actions included a review of other ACP circuits and testing of the ACP interposing relays and their subsequent actuation functions. Procedures will also be revised to ensure that future surveillance testing includes verification of this function.

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGUIATORT COMMISSION (49Q LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FAGN ITT NAME OI OOCXET EER NUMBER (6) PAGE r3I SEOUENTIAL REVISION TEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit II'1 50400 2 OF 2 97 - 012 OO TEN'r pf more spore rs roqvvorf, vse orfrrrrronal oopios ol A'RC form 36QI II7)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On May 5, 1997, with the plant defueled for refueling outage 7, a condition related to inadequate testing of control power circuitry for the Auxiliary Control Panel (ACP, EIIS Code:EB-REL/FU) was determined to be reportable. Specifically, on a transfer to the ACP from the main control board, there are 17 interposing relays that energize and actuate to transfer the control power supply path through alternate fuses in several 6.9KV and 480V Emergency Bus Panels. These alternate control power fuses provide a back-up power supply path in the event that a fire in the main control room causes a failure of the primary fuses.

Investigation determined that previous ACP testing had not verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer function to the alternate control power fuses.

CAUSE:

This condition was caused by an incorrect interpretation of Technical Specification testing requirements and an incomplete understanding of the function of the interposing relays. The failure to test these components has existed since initial surveillance test procedure development.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no actual safety consequences associated with this event. Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.

This testing provides confidence that an alternate control power supply path would have existed if a fire had occurred in the control room causing a failure of the primary control power fuses.

This event is being reported as a conditon prohibited by Technical Specifications per 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.B.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

Previous Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) LERs related to inadequate surveillance testing have been submitted.

These include LERs94-001, 95-001,95-003, 95-007, and 96-002. Corrective actions contained in LER 95-007 stated that HNP would perform a comprehensive review of the implementation of Technical Specification surveillance requirements. This review was in progress when the NRC issued Generic Letter 96-01.

Surveillance testing deficiencies identified as a result of Generic Letter 96-01 were documented in LER 96-002.

A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. A sample review of other remote shutdown panel transfer circuitry was performed during the investigation of this condition. This review concluded that the requirements of TS 4.3.3.5.2. had been met with the exception of the 17 circuits identified in this LER.
2. Special testing was completed on May 30, 1997 per OST-9005T, which verified the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. Surveillance test procedures will be revised or'developed to ensure that future testing verifies the operability of the interposing relays and the subsequent transfer of control power fuses. This will be completed prior to the next scheduled perfor'mance of this testing in refueling outage 8.
2. A review of surveillance test procedures will continue in conjunction with HNP's conversion to the new Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants (NUREG-1431)