IR 05000334/2018011

Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000334/2018011 and 05000412/2018011

ML18263A253
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/20/2018
From:	Dentel G T NRC Region 1
To:	Bologna R FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR 2018011
Download: ML18263A253 (14)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BOULEVARD, SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406

-2713 September 20, 2018 Mr. Richard Bologna Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station P.O. Box 4 Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077 SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2

- TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2018011 AND 05000412/2018011

Dear Mr. Bologna:

On August 10, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On August 10, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.

The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555

-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley Power Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR ), Part 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA Raymond McKinley for

/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket N o s.: 50-334 and 50-412 License No s.: DPR-66 and NPF

-73 Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000334/2018011 and 05000412/2018011 cc w/encl:

Distribution via ListServ

ML18263A253 SUNSI Review x Non-Sensitive Sensitive x Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DR S RI/DR P RI/DR S RI/DR S NAME DKern MYoung CCahill GDentel/RMcK DATE 09/13/18 9/19/18 9/18/18 9/20/18 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 50-334 and 50

-412 License Numbers: DPR-66 and NPF

-73 Report Numbers: 05000334/20 18 0 11 and 05000 412/20 18 0 11 Enterprise Identifier:

I-2018-011-0038 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)

Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, PA 15077 Inspection Dates: July 23, 2018 to August 10, 2018 Inspectors:

D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Lead)

C. Bickett, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Elkhiamy, Reactor Inspector C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector D. Szwarc, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: G. Dentel, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC's) performance at Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2 by conducting the triennial fire protection team inspection in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations Duties of the Shift Technical Advisor for Control Room Evacuation during a Fire Event.

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Inspection Results Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000334/2018011

-01 Closed None 71111.05XT The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(a), Procedures, related to the duties of the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) in response to a serious fire requiring control room evacuation.

Specifically, procedure 1OM

-56C.4.E, Shift Technical Advisor's Procedure, Revision 23, directs the STA to perform substantial plant equipment operations outside of the control room (i.e., opening breakers, operating valves, electrical switching, etc.). These duties preclude the STA from maintaining sufficient independence to provide advisory technical support to the Unit 1 and 2 Operating Shift Crews as required by NOP-OP-1002 Conduct of Operations, Revision 12, and Unit 1 TS 5.2.2.f.

3

INSPECTION SCOPE

S This inspection was conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedure (IP) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading

-rm/doc-collections/insp

-manual/inspection

-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light

-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase."

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards."

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.05XT

- Fire Protection

- NFPA 805 (Triennial)

The inspectors evaluated the following from July 23, 2018 to August 10, 2018

Fire Protection Inspection Requirements (3 Samples

) The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas and/or fire zones

(1) Fire Area 1

-CR-4, Process Instrument Room;

(2) Fire Area 1

-CV-2, East Cable Vault;

(3) Fire Area 2

-CB-1, Control Building (instrument & relay room, cable spread room & tunnel); In performing this review, the inspectors performed an analysis of the following electrical circuits:

(1) PCV-1RC-455C, Unit 1 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve 455C

(2) MOV-SI-867B, Unit 1 Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isolation Valve

(3) TI-RC-420, Unit 1 RCS Loop B Wide Range Cold Leg Temperature Instrumentation

(4) 4KVS-1AE-1E10, Unit 1 River Water Supply Pump 1A Breaker

(5) 2RCS-PT-444, Unit 2 Pressurizer Pressure Control Instrumentation

(6) 2SVS-PCV-101B, Unit 2 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve for Steam Generator B B.5.b Inspection Activities (2 Samples

) The inspectors evaluated feasibility of the following B.5.b Mitigating Strategies:

(1) 1/2OM-53C.4A.100.6, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, Attachments 1.3 and 2.3, Manual Operation of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

(2) 1/2OM-53C.4A.100.6, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, Attachments 1.6 and 2.6, Containment Flooding with Portable Pump

INSPECTION RESULTS

Duties of the Shift Technical Advisor for Control Room Evacuation during a Fire Event.

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000334/2018011

-01 Closed None 71111.05XT The inspectors identified a Green non

-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(a), Procedures, related to the duties of the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) in response to a serious fire requiring control room evacuation. Specifically, procedure 1OM

-56C.4.E, Shift Technical Advisor's Procedure, Revision 23, directs the STA to perform substantial plant equipment operations outside of the control room (i.e., opening breakers, operating valves, electrical switching, etc.). These duties preclude the STA from maintaining sufficient independence to provide advisory technical support to the Unit 1 and 2 Operating Shift Crews as required by NOP

-OP-1002 Conduct of Operations, Revision 12, and Unit 1 TS 5.2.2.f. Description

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's safe shutdown (SSD) strategy for alternative shutdown and noted procedure 1OM

-56C.4.E included time critical operator actions outside of the main control room (MCR) that were specified to be performed by the STA. The procedure required the STA to de

-energize main control center (MCC) loads, perform electrical switching activities, lockout a fire suppression system, operate numerous valves to restore and maintain charging flow, and connect and calibrate source range nuclea r instrumentation in accordance with 1OM

-56C.4.F-1, BIP Activation, Revision 22. The Backup Indicating Panel (BIP) is the Unit 1 alternate shutdown station for monitoring plant parameters and is required to be installed and connected within 80 minutes (License Action 11.24). Procedure 1OM

-56C.4.E also directed the STA to perform several actions prior to exiting the MCR. The inspectors determined the STA actions in the MCR take only a few minutes to perform and were reasonably within the STA's role.

The requirement to include the STA position in the staff organization was imposed upon licensees by the NRC in September 1979 as a result of a lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident. The NRC communicated to licensees about the required role of the STA, including NRC Generic Letter 79

-056, Discussion of Lessons Leaned Short Term Requirements, dated October 30, 1979 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031320403), in which the NRC stated "the duties of the STA should not include the manipulation of controls or supervision of operators." Further discussion about the need for the STA to maintain an independent role was communicated in NRC Information Notice (IN) 93

-81, Implementation of Engineering Expertise On

-Shift, dated October 12, 1993 (ML031070314), in which the NRC described observations that some licensees were assigning STAs to concurrent roles such as fire brigade leader. The IN, reiterated statements from the September 25, 1985, Notice in the Federal Register promulgating the NRC's "Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift" (50 FR 43621), in which the NRC explained the STA's function is "to provide engineering and accident assessment advice to the Shift Supervisor in the event of abnormal or accident conditions." The Policy Statement clarifies that accident assessment means "immediate actions needed to be taken while an event is in progress." NRC IN 93

-81 further described the NRC's position that assigning STAs to concurrent responsibilities can potentially distract from or interfere with their required role.

Procedure NOP

-OP-1002, established requirements to ensure plant operations activities are conducted in a professional manner that contributes to safe and reliable plant operation. This procedure required the STA to maintain a sufficient level of independence commensurate with plant conditions to act as an advisor to the Shift Manager/Unit Supervisor during both normal plant operations and abnormal and emergency conditions. Additionally, Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS 5.2.2.f required "An individual shall provide advisory technical support to the unit operations shift crew in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. This individual shall meet the qualifications specified by the Commission Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift." The STA is the operations crew member assigned the duties required by TS 5.2.2.f.

Based on operator interviews and walkdowns, the inspectors determined the 1OM

-56C.4.E time critical equipment operations outside of the MCR would take the STA about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to perform. The inspectors determined that assigning the STA to perform field equipment operator duties would distract the STA from their independent advisory role to the operating shift crews for both units, particularly in an event where there was a loss of offsite power coincident with a fire. This type of event would significantly challenge the STA to perform both plant monitoring activities and time critical equipment operator actions necessary to restore Unit 1 nuclear instrumentation indication at the same time. The inspectors concluded that performing this equipment operations outside the MCR for this substantial time period, precluded the STA from maintaining sufficient independence to provide advisory technical support to Unit 1 and 2 Operating Shift Crews as required by NORM

-OP-1002 and TS 5.2.2.f.

Corrective Actions

FENOC entered this issue into their corrective action program as Issue Report (IR) 2018

-07052 and implemented additional night order compensatory measures for assigned STA duties. These actions included training select plant personnel to perform the safe shutdown duties currently assigned to the STAs, which would allow the STA to remain available to perform independent advisory technical support duties during a control room evacuation due to a fire event.

Corrective Action Reference

IR 2018-07052 Performance Assessment

Performance Deficiency: FENOC did not properly establish, implement, and maintain procedures (related to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33) for a Fire in the MCR or Forced Evacuation of the MCR

. Screening:

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, not maintaining the STA available to provide advisory technical support to the Unit 1 and 2 operating shifts adversely impacted reliability of mitigating systems.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that this finding did not represent a n actual loss of function of at least a single train of a mitigating system. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the decision to use the STA to perform safe shutdown actions occurred in the 1983 revision to the procedure and did not reflect current licensee performance.

Enforcement

Violation: Beaver Valley Unit 1 TS 5.4.1(a), Procedures, requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of NRC RG 1.33, Revision 2. NRC RG 1.33, Appendix A recommends procedures for Fire in the MCR or Forced Evacuation of the MCR (Paragraph 6.p) and Authorities and Responsibilities for Safe Operation and Shutdown (Paragraph 1.b).

Procedure 1OM

-56C.4.E, directs STA actions in response to a MCR fire or forced evacuation of the MCR. Procedure NOP-OP-1002, specifies responsibilities for operations personnel for safe operation and shutdown and requires the STA to maintain a sufficient level of independence commensurate with plant conditions to act as an advisor to the Shift Manager/Unit Supervisor during both normal plant operations and abnormal and emergency conditions. TS 5.2.2.f, requires an individual (the STA) to provide advisory technical support to the unit operations shift crew with regard to safe operation of the unit.

Contrary to the above, as of August 8, 2018, FENOC did not adequately establish, implement, and maintain procedures for a Unit 1 fire in the MCR or forced evacuation of the MCR event. Specifically, procedure 1OM

-56C.4.E was deficient because it directed the STA to perform substantial plant equipment operations outside of the control room (i.e., opening breakers, operating valves, and electrical switching) which would preclude the STA from maintaining a sufficient level of independence commensurate with plant conditions to provide advisory technical support to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operating Shift Crews during both normal plant operations and abnormal and emergency conditions.

Disposition

This finding is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy

.

EXIT MEETING S AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On August 10, 2018, the inspectors presented the triennial fire protection team inspection results to Mr. Richard Bologna, Site Vice President, and other members of the Beaver Valley Power Station staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

71111.05 X T Fire Protection Licensing Documents

ARS-BV1-11-022, Fire Risk Evaluation of Process Instrument Room (1

-CR-4), Revision 1

ARS-BV1-11-025, Fire Risk Evaluation of East Cable Vault (1

-CV-2), Revision 1

ARS-BV2-11-013, Fire Risk Evaluation of Instrument and Relay Room (2

-CB-1), Revision 1

ARS-BV 3-13-172 , Fire Area Transition Review, Revision 5

BVPS-1, Exemption dated 3/14/83, Request for Exemption from some Requirements of

Appendix R to CFR Part 50

BVPS-1 License Amendment 301 for Transition to NFPA

-805, Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants dated 1/22/2018

BVPS-1 SER dated 1/5/83, SER for Appendix R to 10CFR50, Items III.G and II

I.L

BVPS-1 SER dated 6/6/79, SER Related to Amendment No. 18 to Facility Operating License

No. DPR-66 BV PS-1 UFSAR, Section 9.10, Fire Protection

BVPS-1 Updated Fire Protection Appendix R Report, Revision

BVPS-2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report, Addendum 39

BVPS-2 License Amendment 190 for Transition to NFPA

-805, Performance Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants dated 1/22/2018

BVPS-2 UFSAR, Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System

BVPS-2 UFSAR, Section 9.5A, Fire Protection Evaluation Report

DPR-66, Beaver Valley Unit 1 Operating License, Amendment 290

NPF-73, Beaver Valley Unit 2 Operating License, Amendment 187

Safety Evaluation Related to Order No. EA

-02-026, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit

Nos. 1 and 2

Procedures

1-PMP-E-37-011, General Electric Low Voltage Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test Model

AK-3A & 7A-25, Revision 13

1-PMP-E-37-013, Square D Low Voltage Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test Model Masterpact NT and NW, Revision 10

1/2-ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program, Revision 40

1/2-ADM-1900, Fire Protection Program, Revision 41

1/2-ADM-1906, Control of Transient Combustible and Flammable Materials, Revision 13

1/2-ADM-2024, Fuse Control Program, Revision 2

1/2-CMP-E-75-014, Testing of

G.E. Verastrip Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Revision 1

1/2-CMP-75-MCB-2E, Testing of ITE 480V Molded Case Circuit Breakers, Revision 8

1/2-CMP-75-MCP-5E, Electrical Test Procedure for Inspection, Verification, and Calibration Testing of 480V Motor Control Center Motor Circuit Protectors, Revision 2

1/2OM-53C.4A.100.6, Extreme Damage Mitigation Guidelines, Issue 1

Revision 10

BV-2OST-6.8, Pressurizer PORV Stroke Test, Revision 20

BVRM-OPS-0018, Fire Protection Surveillance Requirements, Revision 0

Operations Procedures

1OM-56C.1.B, Summary Description, Revision

1OM-56B.4.H, Safe Shutdown Following a Serious Fire in Safeguards, Revision

1OM-56C.4.F-14, Water to Water Heat Exchanger, Revision

1OM-56C.4.F-10, Dedicated AFW Pump Startup, Revision 6 1OM-56C.4.A, Intent and Methodology, Revision 11 1OM-56C.4.B, Shift Manager Procedure, Revision

1OM-56C.4.C, NCO Procedure, Revision

1OM-56C.4.D, Nuclear Operator #1 Procedure, Revision

1OM-56C.4.E, Shift Technical Advisors Procedure, Revision

1 OM-56C.4.F, BIP Activation, Revision

1OM-56C.4.G, Nuclear Operator #2 Procedure, Revision 3 1OM-56C.4.H, Nuclear Operator #3 Procedure, Revision 0 1OST-33.16A, Operating Surveillance Test

- Early Warning Fire Detection Test DGP

-1FP-1 Loops, Revision 5

1/2OST-33.33, Fire Protection Equipment Inventory Verification, Revision 14

1/2OST-33.34, Fire Protection Equipment Readiness Checks, Revision 7

1/2OST-56B.1, Fire Emergency Equipment Verification, Revision 15

1/2PFP-MUTUAL AID, Mutual Aid and Large Area Fire Pre

-Fire Plan, Revision 1

2OM-56C.4.B, Unit Supervisor Procedure, Revision

2OM-56C.4.C, NCO Procedure, Revision 20 2OM-56C.4.D, Nuclear Operator #1 Procedure, Revision 25 2OM-56C.4.H, Nuclear Operator #3 Procedure, Revision

2OM-56C.4.F-1, ASP Activation, Revision

2OM-56C.4.F-13, Alternate Supply of Cooling Water to Station Air Compressors for Long ter

m Cooling, Revision

NOP-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations, Revision 12

NOP-OP-1013, Control of Time Critical Operator Actions, Revision 2

NORM-OP-1002, Conduct of Operations, Revision 6

NORM-OP-1009, SRO Review of Condition Reports, Revision 8

OTG-B5b OVERVIEW, Security Threat B.5.b. Overview, Revision 0

Issue Reports

(* written as a result of the NRC inspection)

2004-03320 2007-26399 2009-55022 2009-62244 2009-62461 2009-62461 2009-62471 2009-62532 2009-63473 2010-75120 2012-07558 2012-08570 2012-09757 2012-11302 2012-11398 2012-11877 2012-12055 2012-12055 2012-12142 2013-11708 2014-07961 2014-07964 2015-09055 2015-09600 2015-09601 2015-09643 2015-09643 2015-09643 2015-09643 2015-10527 2015-10546 2015-11044 2015-11116 2016-01778 2016-03480 2016-03800 2016-07764 2016-09298 2017-10250 2017-11687 2018-00072 2018-06253* 2018-06755* 2018-06756* 2018-06752* 2018-06753* 2018-06897* 2018-06925* 2018-06955* 2018-07021* 2018-07009* 2018-07010* 2018-07052* 2018-07053* 2018-16744* 2018-16745 2018-16858*

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

200133663 200248758 200397517 200467988 200507707 200531715 200531735 200531736 200551830 200569969 200603143 200603145 200611262 200637740 200637741 200645424 200645425 200688743 200688744 Calculations, Analysis, and Engineering Evaluations

2701.620-000-024, Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria, Revision 0

2701.620-000-100, Early Warning and Actuation Fire Detection Spacing Report, Revisio

n 0 8700-01.062-0038, Results Report for BV1

- Fire Suppression Activities Effect on NSPC, Revision 0

8700-01.062-0083, Early Warning and Actuation Fire Detection Spacing Report, Revision 0

8700-DMC-3079, Fire Pump Minimum Operating Curve, Revision 0

10080-DMC-0710, Evaluation of Appendix R Safe Shutdown Requirement of Achieving Cold

Shutdown Conditions within 72 Hours with Excess Letdown Flow Path Open, Revision 0 12241-ESK-123N, 480V MCC

-2-11 Time-Current Curves, 3/31/87

ARS-BV1-MSO-001, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Expert Panel Review Report, Revision 2

ARS-BV2-MSO-001, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Expert Panel Review Report, Revision 2

ECP 06-0346, 480V MCC

-1-E14 Time-Current Curves, Revision 3

ECP 07-0002, 480V MCC

-2-E10 Time-Current Curves, Revision 2

ECP 10-0839, 480V MCC

-1-E06 Time-Current Curves, Revision 4

ECP 11-0078, Fire Detector Relocations in Process Rack Area (CR

-4) to Meet Code Requirements, Revision 0

ECP 14-0656, Unit 2 PORV Isolation Switches, Revision 1

FPPCE 06-038, Installation of Penetration through Concrete Wall from Each Cable Vault to the PCA Shop, Revision 0

FPPCE 12-122, Engineering Evaluation of the Smoke Detector Spacing in Fire Area CR

-4, Revision 1 FPPCE 13-110, Revision of 1/2

-ADM-1900 to Address the Fire Protection Expert Permit Tracking Program, Revision 0

FPPCE 17-091, NFPA 805 Compensatory Measure Review, Revision 0

I-TCP-18-378738, Transient Combustible Permit for 2

-CB-1, 07/02/2018

I-TC P-18-402084, Transient Combustible Permit for 1

-CR-4, 01/02/2018

I-TCP-48-437027, Transient Combustible Permit for 1

-TB-1, 05/09/2018

I-TCP-18-440994, Transient Combustible Permit for 1

-PA-1E, 06/04/2018

SCI-177 56-09, Attachment W, Fire PRA Insights, Revision 1

Drawings and Wiring Diagrams

10080-E-11L, Unit 2 Elementary Diagram, 125 VDC Circuits Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves, Sheet 1, Revision 17

10080-E-11Q, Unit 2 Elementary Diagram, Miscellaneous Circuits, Sheet 3, Revision 1

10080-RE-10F, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, 125VDC Panel DC2

-10 & DC2-11, Revision 14

10080-RE-11K, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, 120VAC Panel AC2

-E9 & AC2-19, Revision 9

10080-RE-11Q, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, 120 VAC Vital Bus 2

-1B, 2B, 3B, & 4B, Revision 9

10080-RE-36X, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Penetration 2RCP

-17A, Revision 10

10080-RE-36Y, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Electro Hydraulic Operator Assembly, Sheet 1, Revision 12

10080-RE-36Y, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Penetration 2RCP

-17B, Revision 8

10080-RE-3AAP, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Bench

Board Section A3, Sheet 14, Revision 10

10080-RE-3ABF, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Vertical Board Section A6, Sheet 6, Revision 12

10080-RE-3BAE, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Bench Board Section B1, Sheet 5, Revision 10

10080-RE-3BAU, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Vertical

Board Section B6, Sheet 6, Revision 14

10080-RE-3DAC, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Emergency Shutdown Panel Section 1, Sheet 3, Revision 7

10080-RE-3DAG, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Emergency Shutdown Panel Section 2, Sheet 3, Revision 8

10080-RE-3EAC, Unit 2 Wiring

Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Panel Section 1, Sheet 3, Revision 2

10080-RE-3EAG, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Panel Section 2, Sheet 3, Revision 2

10080-RE-3EM, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Auxiliary Emergency Relay Panel 242, Revision 22

10080-RE-3HQ, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Transfer Relay Panel 250, Sheet 3, Revision 12

10080-RE-3HV, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Alternate Shutdown Transfer Relay Panel 281, Sheet 1, Revision 9

10080-RE-3HW, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Shutdown Transfer Relay Panel 282, Sheet 1, Revision 4

10080-RE-4AT, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Auxiliary Reactor Protection Safeguard Test Rack B, Sheet 2, Revision 6

10080-RE-4BH, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Primary Process Rack Control Group 4, Cabinet 8, Revision 13

10080-RE-4CH, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Secondary Process Rack Cabinet A1, Revision 11

10080-RE-4GY, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Misc. Inst. Pipe Tunnel Main Steam Pipe Area and Cable Vault, Revision 10

10080-RE-4JD, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Analog Termination Cabinet 1, Sheets1

-3, Revision 10

10080-RE-4JH, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, Analog Termination Cabinet 2, Sheet 2, Revision 9

10080-RE-9JC, Unit 2 Wiring Diagram, 480V MCC 2

-E13, Sheet 2, Revision 23

10080-RE-370, Concealed Conduit & Sleeves Aux Building SH

-1, Revision 22

10080-RM-0656B-001, Valve Operator Normal Diagram Site Fire Protection, Revision 6

10080-RM-421-2, AFW Pump Steam, Revision 17

10080-RY-0002A, Site Plan, Revision 13

10080-TLD-006-088, Unit 2 Test Loop Diagram, Pressurizer 2RCS*PRE21 Pressure Control, Sheets 1-5, Revision 5

10080-TLD-21A-091, Unit 2 Test Loop Diagram, Main Steam System Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve, Sheets 1

-6, Revision 3

8700-RE-10D, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, 125 VDC Dist. Panel 3, Revision 16

8700-RE-11B, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, 120 VAC Vital Bus 2&4, Revision 29

8700-RE-14C, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Diesel Generator Auto Sequence Relay Panel, Revision 11

8700-RE-1AR, Unit 1 480V One Line Diagram, MCC

-1-E14, Sheet 18, Revision 10

8700-RE-21JQ, Unit 1 Elementary Diagram, Reactor Cooling, Sheet 4, Revisio

n 13 8700-RE-21JT, Unit 1 Elementary Diagram, Reactor Cooling, Sheet 7, Revision 13

8700-RE-36F, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Penetration RCP

-4F, Sheet 6, Revision 9

8700-RE-3AC, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Bench Board Section A, Sheet 27, Revision 18

8700-RE-3AQ, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Bench Board Section A, Sheet 39, Revision 9

8700-RE-3AR, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Bench Board Section B, Sheet 40, Revision 17

8700-RE-3AV, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Bench Board Section B, Revision 15

8700-RE-3BU, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Misc. Wiring Details, Revision 15

8700-RE-4BJ, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Auxiliary Relay Rack A, Revision 17

8700-RE-4BL, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Reactor Protection Rack 3A, Revision 42

8700-RE-4BS, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Auxiliary Reactor Protection Test Rack Train A, Revision 7

8700-RE-4GC, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Primary Process Rack 4, Revision 5

8700-RE-4GF, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Primary Process Rack 9&10, Revision 6

8700-RE-4GG, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Primary Process Rack 11&12, Revision 12

8700-RE-4GH, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Primary Process Rack 13&14, Revision 7

8700-RE-4HL, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, Secondary Process Rack M (Left Half), Revision 3

8700-RE-8BG, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, 4160V Breaker 1E7, Supply to Emergency Bus 1AE, Revision 12

8700-RE-8L, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, 4160V Breaker 1E10, Supply to River Water Pump

1WR-P-1A, Revision 16

8700-RM-0059F, Arrangement Intake Structure Sheet No. 2, Revision 11

8700-RM-0424-002, Feedwater System, Revision 20

8700-RM-0424-001, Feedwater System, Revision 20

RE-0001F, Unit 1 4160V One Line Diagram, Emergency Bus 1AE, Sheet 3, Revision 20

RE-0001N, Unit 2 480V One Line Diagram, MCC

-2-11, Sheet 4, Revision 15

RE-0001T, Unit 1 480V One Line Diagram, MCC

-1-E10, Sheet 12, Revision 53

RE-0001W, Unit 2 480V One Line

Diagram, MCC

-2-E10, Sheet 12, Revision 29

RE-0010E, Unit 1 Wiring Diagram, 125 VDC Bus No. 1

-1, 1-2, 1-3, & 1-4, Revision 13

RM-0041A, Unit 2 Flow Diagram, Main Steam Piping, Revision 31

RM-0059E, Arrangement Intake Structure Sheet No. 1, Revision 16

RM-0 406-002, Unit 1 P&ID, Reactor Coolant System, Op. Manual Fig. No. 6

-2, Revision 24

RM-0411-001, Unit 1 P&ID, Safety Injection System, Op. Manual Fig. No. 11

-1, Revision 29

RM-0421-001, Unit 2 P&ID, Main Steam System, Op. Manual Fig. No. 21

-1, Revision 17

RM-0430-001, Unit 1 P&ID, River Water System, Op. Manual Fig. No. 30

-1, Revision 37

Completed Tests and Surveillances

BV-2RCS-PCV455D-SW, Install PORV 2RCS

-PCV455D & 456 Isolation Switches, 5/13/17

BV-2RCS-PCV455C-SW, Install PORV 2RCS

-PCV455C Isolation Switch, 5/13/17

BV-1 O ST-45.9, BIP Instrumentation and Source Range Indication Test, 10/18/16

BV-2OST-45.9B, Alternate Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 4, 5, 6, and Defueled, 10/20/15

BV-2OST-45.9A, Alternate Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 4, 5, 6, and Defueled, 4/25/17

BV-1OST-45.10, BIP Valve Control Switch Test, 10/13/16

1/2-CMP-75-MCB-1E, Testing of Westinghouse and Cutler

-Hammer Molded Case Circuit Breakers, 10/17/13

1/2-CMP-75-MCB-1E, Testing of Westinghouse and Cutler

-Hammer Molded Case Circuit Breakers, 5/13/13

1/2OST-33.33, Fire

Protection Inventory, 04/29/18 1/2-PMP-E-37-010, ITE Low Voltage Circuit Breaker Inspection and Test, 10/9/12

1/2-PMP-37EJS-BKR-2E, 480V Station Service System Supply Breaker Inspection, 10/10/12

BV-2OST-45.9, Alternate

Shutdown Panel Checks in Modes 1, 2, and 3, 10/31/16

Fire Brigade Drills and Critiques

Fire Drill Scenario 1DG

-02, 06/25/2018

Fire Fighting Strategies (i.e., Pre

-Fire Plans)

1PFP-SFGB-735-East, East Cable Vault Fire Compartment 1

-CV-2, Revision 2

1PF P-SRVB-713-Process, Process Instrumentation Room Fire Compartment 1

-CR-4, Revision 5 2PFP-AXLB-773, Cable Tunnel, Cable Tunnel Fan Room Fire Compartment 2

-CB-1, Revision 2

2PFP-CBLT-712, Cable Tunnel Fire Compartment 2

-CB-1, Revision 6

2PFP-CNTB-707, Instrumentation and Relay Area Fire Compartment 2

-CB-1, Revision 7

2PFP-CTNB-725, Cable Spreading Area Fire Compartment 2

-CB-1, Revision 6

Operating Experience

OE-2013-0456-2-FA001, Information Notice 2013

-02 Review, 08/22/2013

OE-2013-0486-4, NRC Information Notice 2013-06 Corrosion in Fire Protection Piping Due to Air and Water Interaction, 03/28/2013

Vendor Manuals

Cirrus Pro Aspirating Fire Detector Engineer's Manual, dated 2005 Cirrus Pro Aspirating Fire Detector User Manual and Responsibilities, dated 2005 Miscellaneous

1PL-162, Operations Job Performance Measures (JPM)

- STA Alternate Safe Shutdown, Revision 0

B.5.b. Response Information Training Presentation, dated 01/13/15

FENOC Training Plan

- BVPS Shift Technical Advisor Initial Training Program, Revision 13

Godwin Dri

-Prime HL150M Test Data, dated 08/26/14, 09/27/13, 09/28/12

NORM-ER-3743, Nuclear Operating Reference Manual

- FLEX Pumps Horizontal, Revision 2

NORM-ER-3730, Nuclear Operating Reference Manual

- FLEX Equipment, Revision 1

NRC Generic Letter No. 86

-04, Policy Statement on Engineering Expertise on Shift

NRC Information Notice 19

93-81: Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift

NRC Information Notice 2010-13, Failure to Ensure Post Fire Shutdown Procedures Can Be Performed NRC Information Notice 2014

-10, Potential Circuit Failure

-Induced Secondary Fires or Equipment Damage, 9/16/14

PKM-NFPA-09-0001, NFPA 805 Thermoset and Thermoplastic Cable Types at BVPS

PRA-BV1-14-002-R01, BVPS-1 Potential Secondary Fire Due to Unfused DC Circuit

Issue, Revision 1

PRA-BV2-14-002-R00, BVPS-2 Potential Secondary Fire Due to Unfused DC Circuit Issue, Revision 0

Shippingport Volunteer Fire Department Letter of Agreement Review for 2018, dated 01/24/18

Volunteer Fire Department Letters of Agreement, dated 04/18/14