ONS-2015-048, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume 1, Revision 2015-003

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume 1, Revision 2015-003

ML15142A506
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/20/2015
From:	Batson S L Duke Energy Corp
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2015-048, FOIA/PA-2016-0071 RP/O/A/1000/001, Rev 003
Download: ML15142A506 (41)

Text

j DUKE ENERGY, ONS-2015-048 10 CFR 50.54(q)May 20, 2015 Attn: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2746

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Manual Volume 1, Revision 2015-003 Please find attached for your use and review a copy of the revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and does not reduce the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan or the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

If there are any questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Pat Street, Emergency Preparedness Manager, at 864-873-3124.

By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments:

Revision Instructions EPIP Volume 1 -Revision 2015-003 50.54(q) Evaluation

• i-(

ONS-2015-048 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 20, 2015 Page 2 xc: w/2 copies of attachments Mr. Victor McCree, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 w/copy of attachments Mr. James R. Hall, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11555 Rockville Pike Mailstop:

O-8G9Q Rockville, MD 20852 2738 (send via E-mail)Mr. Jeffrey A. Whited, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11555 Rockville Pike Mailstop:

O-8B1A Rockville, MD 20852 (send via E-mail)w/o attachments Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station ELL EC2ZF April 20, 2015 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

SUBJECT:

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume 1, Revision 2015-003 Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume 1.REMOVE Cover Sheet Rev. 2015-002 RP/O/A/1000/001 Rev 002 INSERT Cover Sheet Rev. 2015-003 RP/O/A/1000/001 Rev 003 Pat Street ONS Emergency Preparedness Mgr.

ENERGY.OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Volume 1 APPROVED: Terry L. Patterson Director, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness Date Approved Volume 1 REVISION 2015-003 April 2015 Duke Energy Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Classification Procedure No.RP/0/I1000/001 Revision No.003 Electronic Reference No.OP009A63 Reference Use PERFORMANCE I This Procedure was printed on 04/27/15 at 09:36:16 from the electronic library as: (ISSUED) -PDF Format Compare with Control Copy every 14 calendar days while work is being performed.

Compared with Control Copy* Date Compared with Control Copy* Date Compared with Control Copy* Date Date(s) Performed Work Order/Task Number (WO#)COMPLETION I o] Yes 0 NA Checklists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?

o Yes C NA Required enclosures attached?[o Yes [I NA Charts, graphs, data sheets, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?o Yes 0 NA Calibrated Test Equipment, if used, checked out/in and referenced to this procedure?

[] Yes [] NA Procedure requirements met?Verified By* Date Procedure Completion Approved*

Date*Printed Name and Signature Remarks (attach additional pages, if necessary)

IMPORTANT:

Do NOT mark on barcodes.

Printed Date: *04/27/20150 Enclosure No.: FULL 11111111111 i III I111111111111 I II 11111 11111 11111 IIIII iiiI I 1111MIIIIMililI111Revision No.: "'I l~ lll111 1111 flll li Procedure No.:

I IIllI 1111111111 III II IN 111 III III II11 111111111111 I II 11111 11111 IIII IIIII 1.RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 2 of 6 Emergency Classification TE: This procedure is an implementing procedure to the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Plan and must be: " Reviewed in accordance with IOCFR50.54(q) by Emergency Preparedness prior to approval.* Cross Disciplinary Reviewed by Operations

• Forwarded to Emergency Preparedness within seven (7) working days of approval.Symptoms 1.1 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

1.2 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and their corresponding Emergency Action Levels (EALs).1.3 This procedure provides reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events.1.4 The following guidance is to be used by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director in assessing emergency conditions:

1.4.1 Definitions

and Acronyms are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition.

The definitions are in Enclosure 4.10 (Definitions/Acronyms).

1.4.2 The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director shall review all applicable initiating events to ensure proper classification.

1.4.3 The BASIS Document (Volume A, Section D of the Emergency Plan) is available for review if any questions arise over proper classification.

1.4.4 IF An event occurs on more than one unit concurrently, THEN The event with the higher classification will be classified on the Emergency Notification Form.A. Information relating to the problem(s) on the other unit(s) will be captured on the Emergency Notification Form as shown in RP/0/A/ 1000/01 5A, (Offsite Communications From The Control Room), RP/0/A/1000/015B, (Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center) or SR/O/A/2000/004, (Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility).

2 RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 3 of 6 1.4.5 IF An event occurs, AND A lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN The classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.1.4.6 The Fission Product Barrier Matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) or higher.A. An event that is recognized at Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or lower shall not be classified using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.1. Reference should be made to the additional enclosures that provide Emergency Action Levels for specific events (e.g., Severe Weather, Fire, Security).

1.5 IF A transient event should occur, THEN Review the following guidance: 1.5.1 IF An Emergency Action Level (EAL) identifies a specific duration AND The Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded, (i.e.;condition cannot be reasonably corrected before the duration elapses), THEN Classify the event.1.5.2 IF A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is corrected before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN The event is NOT classified by that EAL.A. Review lower severity EALs for possible applicability in these cases.3 RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 4 of 6.NOTE: Reporting under 1OCFR50.72 may be required for the following step. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a follow up evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.i 1.5.3 IF AND THEN A plant condition exceeding EAL criteria is not recognized at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g.; as a result of routine log or record review)The condition no longer exists, An emergency shall NOT be declared.* Refer to AD-LS-ALL-0006 (Notification/Reportability Evaluation) for reportability 1.5.4 IF An emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been corrected prior to declaration and notification THEN The Emergency Coordinator must consider the potential that the initiating condition (e.g.; Failure of Reactor Protection System) may have caused plant damage that warrants augmenting the on shift personnel through activation of the Emergency Response Organization.

A. IF An Unusual Event condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required.1. The event may be terminated in the same notification or as a separate termination notification.

B. IF An Aler4 Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency condition exists, THEN Make the classification as required, AND Activate the Emergency Response Organization.

1.6 Emergency

conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director assessment determines that the Emergency Action Levels for the Initiating Condition have been exceeded.4 RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 5 of 6 2. Immediate Actions 2.1 Assessment, classification and declaration of any applicable emergency condition should be completed within 15 minutes after the availability of indications or information to cognizant facility staff that an EAL threshold has been exceeded.2.2 Determine the operating mode that existed at the time the event occurred prior to any protection system or operator action initiated in response to the event.2.3 IF The unit is at Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) or higher AND The condition/event affects fission product barriers, THEN GO TO Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).2.3.1 Review the criteria listed in Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix)and make the determination if the event should be classified).

2.4 Review

the listing of enclosures to determine if the event is applicable to one of the categories shown.2.4.1 IF One or more categories are applicable to the event, THEN Refer to the associated enclosures.

2.4.2 Review

the EALs and determine if the event should be classified.

A. IF An EAL is applicable to the event, THEN Classify the event as required.2.5 IF The condition requires an emergency classification, THEN Initiate the following:

• for Control Room -RP/O/A/1000/002, (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure) o for TSC -RP/O/A/1000/0 19, (Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure)" for EOF -SR/O/A/2000/003, (Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility)2.6 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.

5 RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 6 of 6 3. Subsequent Actions 3.1 Continue to review the emergency conditions to assure the current classification continues to be applicable.

4. Enclosures Enclosures 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6.4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 Fission Product Barrier Matrix System Malfunctions Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluents Loss Of Shutdown Functions Loss of Power Fires/Explosions And Security Actions Natural Disasters, Hazards, And Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Radiation Monitor Readings For Emergency Classification Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings Definitions Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications Instructions For Using Enclosure

4.1 References

Page Number 7 8 10 12 14 15 17 20 21 22 27 28 30 6 0 Enclosure

4.1 Fission

Product Barrier Matrix 0 RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 1 of I SEE NOTE BELOW nETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLANNIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW: ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY.RCS BARRIERS (BD 5-7) ..FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (BD 8.9) '-CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD 10-13)Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss 15 Points) Potential Loss (I Point) Loss (3 Points)RCS Leakrat >_ 160 gpm RCS Leak rate that results in a loss Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC _ 1200' F 2t 15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of subcooling.

CETC > 700' F 2! 1200' F OR pressure decrease after increase CETC 700' F > 15 minutes with a OR valid RVLS reading 0" containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR ? 160 gpm Valid RVLS reading of 0" Coolant activity 2! 300 liCi/ml DEI RB pressure _59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG OR results in a direct opening to the RB pressure a 10 psig and no environment with SG Tube Leak NOTE: RVLS is NOT RBCU or RBS > 10 gpm in the SANME SG valid if either of the following exists: Entry into the PTS (Pressurized IRIA 57 or 58 reading ! 1.0 R/hr

• f e or more RCPs a Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 SG Tube Leak > 10 gpm exists in Therml Shock) Operation running Since SD R/hr R/hr Since SD R/hr R/hr one SG.NOTE: PTS is entaezW unde 2 RIA 57 reading > 1.6 R/hr OR AND cither of the following:

2 RIA 58 reading > 1.0 R/hr If LPI pump(s) are 0 -<0.5 >300 >150 0 -<0.5 > 1800 _860 the other SG has secondary side A cooldown below 400F @-r ng AND taig failure that results in a direct* A cooldon belowng0tFo thrweigvirotakin

> l00"Fflr.

has occurred.

3RIA 57 or 58 reading;>

1.0 RPhr suction from the LPI 0.5 -<2.0 _ 80 >40 0.5 -<2.0 >_400 >195 opening to the environment drop line. ANI) is being fed Irom the affected unit.* HPi has operated in the 2.0-8.0 _ 32 _ 16 2.0-8.0 >-280 >130 injection mode while NO RCPs were operating.

HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration 2! 9% Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordbator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency CoordinatorfEOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 TotaW Points) ALERT (4-6 Total Points) .SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-10 Total Points) GENERAL EMERGENCY (11-13 'fotal Points)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3.4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3.4 OPERATING MOI)E: I, 2, 3,4 4.1 .U. i Any potential loss of Containment

4. i.A. I Any potential loss or loss of the RCS 4.1.S.1 Loss of any two barriers 4.1.G.1 Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrier 4.1 .U.2 Any loss of containment 4.1 .A.2 Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel 4.l.S.2 Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either Clad RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers 4.1 .G.2 Loss of all three barriers 4.1.S.3 Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers NOT: e An ven wih mltile vens culdoccr wichwoud rsul intheconluson hatexcedig te ossor otetia los tresoldis MNINEN (ie..witin

-3 our). n tis MMIENTLOS siuaton NOTE: e An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.9 Reftmmcing this matrix frequently will aid in determining a ftssion barrier failure or other upgrade criteria.7 0 Encio 4.2 System Malfunctions RP/O/A/I/001 Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT .ALERT"; SITE-AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 1. RCS LEAKAGE (BD 15)OPERATING MODE: 1. 2.3.4 A. Unidentified leakage ý 10 gpm B. Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm C. Identified leakage L 25 gpm* Includes SG tube leakage 2. UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/

INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM FOR > 15 MINUTES (BD 16)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes: Units I & 3 I SAI, 2,3.4,5,6,7,8,9, 14,15, 16,& IS 3 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6.7.8,9, 14.15, 16,& 18 Unit 2 2 SAI, 2,3,4.5.6,7.8,9,14,15, & 16 AND Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to safely operate the unit (CONTINUED)

UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION/

INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM (BD 20)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes: Units I & 3 I SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 Unit 2 2 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 14, 15, & 16 AND Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to safely operate the unit AND Significant plant transient in progress OR Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications (END)1. INABILITY TO MONITOR A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT IN PROGRESS (BD 22)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3,4 A. Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators on one unit for > 15 minutes: Units I & 3 1 SAi, 2, 3,4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16,& 18 3 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6.7,8,9, 14,15, 16,& 18 Unit 2 2 SAI, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,14,15, & 16 AND AND AND A significant transient is in progress Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications Inability to directly monitor any one of the following functions:

I.2.3.4.5.6.Subcriticality Core Cooling Heat Sink RCS Integrity Containment Integrity RCS Inventory (END)* .. _________________________

I 8 Enclo 4.2 System Malfunctions RP/O/A//001 Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT, .ALERT S-E AREA EMERGENCY j GENERAL EMERGENCY 3. INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN LIMITS (BD 17)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. Required operating mode not reached within TIS LCO action statement time 4. UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS (BD 18)OPERATING .ODE: All A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Plant phone system, PA system.Pager system, Onsite Radio system)affecting ability to perform Routine operations B. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Selective Signaling.

NRC ETS lines, Offsitc Radio System, AT&T line)affecting ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

5. FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION (BD 19)= OPERATING MODE: AU: A. DEI ->5+/-Ci/ml (END)9 Enclo 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent RP/O/A///001 Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ' ALERT .SITE AREA EMERGENCY f GENERAL EMERGENCY ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT EXCEEDS TWO TIMES THE SLC LIMITS FOR 60 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 25)OPERATING MODE: All A. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 of 4.06E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes (See Note I)B. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA-45 of> 9.35E+05 cpm or RP sample reading of> 6.62E-2uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 60 minutes (See Note i)C. Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure D. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.2 for > 60 minutes as determined by RP Procedure 1. ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT EXCEEDS 200 TIMES RADIOLOGICAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 30)OPERATING MODE: All A. Valid indication of RIA-46 of > 2.09 E+ 04 cpm or RP sample reading of> 6.62 uCi/mI Xe 133 eq for> 15 minutes. (See Note 1)B RIA 33 HIGH Alarm Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for > 15 minutes as determined by Chemistry Procedure C. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >15 minutes as determined by RP Procedure (CONTINUED) 1.BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUALMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 35)I.BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM ACTUAL/ IMMINENT RELEASE OF GASEOUS ACTIVITY (BD 39)OPERATING MODE: All A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of > 2.09E+05 cpm or RIA 56 reading of> 17.5 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+01 uCi/mI Xe 133 eq for> IS minutes (See Note 2)B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 2)C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of:> 100 mRem TEDE OR 500 mRem CDE adult thyroid D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding

>100 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of -> 500 mRem CDE (3.84 E 7 lgCi/nl) for one hour of inhalation OPERATING MODE: All A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of > 2.09E+06 cpm or RIA 56 reading of > 175 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+O2uCi/nil Xe 133 eq for>_ 15 minutes (Sec Note 3)B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 3)C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of:_ 1000 mRem TEDE OR 2 5000 mnRem CDE adult thyroid D.Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding

_>1000 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour OR Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment of _> 5000 miRem CDE for one hour of inhalation NOTE 1: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation Monitor reading.NOTE 2: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes. then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

NOTE 3: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid radiation monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.(CONTINUED)(CONTINUED) i __ ____ ____ ____ ____ .. ____ ____ ____ _(END)10 Encio 4.3 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent RP/O/AIS/O001 Page 2 of 2 a UNUSUAL EVENT -j ALERT .SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY' * :Ti. : ' ": ,: ., : " ' ! " : " .:.. : i 2 UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 27)OPERATING MODE: All A. LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage 35M fuel in the core B. Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND Unplanned Valid RIA 3, 6 or Portable Area Monitor readings increase.C. I R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI D. Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure

4.9.2. RELEASE

OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OR INCREASES IN RADIATION LEVELS THAT IMPEDES OPERATION OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN (BD 32)2. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 38)OPERATING MODE: All A. Valid radiation reading ? 15 mRad/hr in CR, CAS. or Radwaste CR B. Unplannedlunexpected valid area monitor readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 NOTE: These readings may also be indicative of Fission Product Barrier concerns which makes a review of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix necessary.

OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A. Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 200' F AND LT 5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup B.Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F 3.MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 33)OPERATING MODE: All AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4.. (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

A.Valid RIA 3", 6,41, OR 49* HIGH Alarm* -Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only B. HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge C. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered (END))(END)NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.(END)II Enclo 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions RP/0IAI@//001 Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENTA AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMRGENCY (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)1. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 44)OPERATING MODE 1, 2,3 A. Valid reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND DSS has inserted Control Rods OR Manual trip from the Control Room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing

2. INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PLANT IN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD 46)1. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 50)1.OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 A. Valid reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND DSS has NOT inserted Control Rods AND Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing OPERATING MODE: 1, 2 A. Valid Rx trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT successful in reducing reactor power to < 5% and decreasing AND Average of the 5 highest CETCs >1200' F on ICCM (END)FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE 2. COMPLETE LOSS OF FUNCTION NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN MODE 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN) (BD 51)OPERATING MODE: 5,6 A. Loss of LPI and/or LPSW AND Inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F as indicated by either of the following:

RCS temperature at the LPI Pump Suction OR Average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display OR Visual observation OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. Average of the 5 highest CETCs > 1200* F shown on ICCM B. Unable to maintain reactor subcritical C. Inability to feed SGs prior to RCS pressure reaching 2300 psig AND HPI Forced Cooling degraded by any of the following: " Unacceptable HPI flow/pressure in either header per EOP Rule 4* Only I HPI Pump available" Either PORV (*RC-66) and/or PORV Block (*RC-4) closed (CONTINUED)(CONTINUED)

Encloe 4.4 Loss of Shutdown Functions RP/0/A* /001 Page 2 of 2 12 UNUSUAL EVENT 1IALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY.'

GENERAL EMERGENCY 1. UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT RADIATION OR AIRBORNE CONCENTRATION (BD 42)OPERATING MODE: All A. LT 5 reading 14' and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B. Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the S-P or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AID~Unplanned Valid RIA 3, 6 or Portable Area Monitor readings increase.C. I R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI D. Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits stated in Enclosure

4.9.3. MAJOR

DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 48)OPERATING MODE. All A. Valid RIA 3*, 6,41, OR 49* HIGH Alarm*Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only B. HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge C Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered 3. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 52)OPERATING NIODE: 5,6 A. Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F AND LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS Makeup B. Loss of all decay heat removal as indicated by the inability to maintain RCS temperature below 2000 F AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup NOTE: This initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3., (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.(END)NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.(END)NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent).

High radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.(END)13 0 Enclosure 4.5 Loss of Power 0 RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 1 of I (4)UNUSAL EENT ALET J SITE AREA EMERGENCY GEERAL EMERGENCY UNSA EVN LR E 1. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 55)OPERATING MODE: All A. Unit auxiliaries are being supplied from Keowee or CTS AND Inability to energize gileb MFB from an offsite source (either switchyard) within 15 minutes.2. UNPLANNED LOSS OF REQUIRED DC POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (RD 56)1.LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 57)1.LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 59)1.PROLONGED LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER AND ONSITE AC POWER (BD 62)OPERATING MODE; 5,6 Defueled A. MFB I and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power 2. AC POWER CAPABILITY TO ESSENTIAL BUSSES REDUCED TO A SINGLE SOURCE FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 58)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. MFB I and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power 2. LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER (BD 60)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss (END)OPERATING MOI)E: I, 2, 3,4 A. MFB I and 2 de-energized AND SSF fails to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby){l)AND I OPERATING MODE: 5.6 A. Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within I5 minutes from the time of loss (END)At least one of the following conditions exist: Restoration of power to at least one MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely OR Indications of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring (END)OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 A. AC power capability has been degraded to a single power source for > 15 minutes due to the loss of all but one of the following:

Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)

Unit SU Transformer Another Unit SU Transformer (aligned)CT4 CT5 (END)Loss of Power -Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment.

ex. -If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160V switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended.

The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.

141 14 EnclI 4.6 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions RP/O/A/IO/001 Page 1 of 2 (2) 43)UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY I. FIRES/EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE PLANT (BD 65)1. FIRE/EXPLOSION AFFECTING OPERABILITY OF PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISHIMAINTAIN SAFE SHUTDOWN (BD 70)(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: Within the plant means: Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Reactor Building Keowee Hydro Translormer Yard B3T B4T Service Air Diesel Compressors Keowee Hydro & associated Transformers SSF OPERATING MODE: All NOTE: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

A. Fire/explosions AND Affected safety-related system parameter indications show degraded performance OR Plant personnel report visible danmage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown (Continued)

A- Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification or verification of a Control Room alarm B. Unanticipated explosion within the plant resulting in visible damage to permanent structures/equipment

• includes steam line break and FDW line breAk (Continued) 15 Encl&e 4.6 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions RP/0/A* /001 12) 13) Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT '.. I -SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 2. CONFIRMED SECURITY CONDITION OR THREAT WHICH INDICATES A POTENTIAL DEGRADATION IN THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE PLANT (HD 67)2 HOSTILE ACTION WITHIN THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA OR AIRBORNE ATTACK THREAT. (BD 72)OPERATING MODE: All A. Security condition that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.

B. A credible site-specific security threat notification C. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat 3. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A NOUE. (BD 69)OPERATING MODE: All A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of salety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.

No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.(END)OPERATING MODE: All A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.

B. A validated notification from NRC of an AIRLINER attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.3. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN ALERT (BD 75)OPERATING MODE: All A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION.Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.(END)1. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA (BD 76)OPERATING MODE: All A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervision.

2. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY. (BD 78)OPERATING MODE: All A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (I) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.(END)1. A HOSTILE ACTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE FACILITY (BD 79)OPERATING NIODE: All A. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions B. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.2. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF A GENERAL EMERGENCY. (BD 81)OPERATING MODE: All A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.(END)I I 16 Encle 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RPaOgAe ofo3 Page I of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT 'ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PROTECTED AREA (BD 83)OPERATING MODE: All A. Tremor felt and valid alarm on the strong motion accelerograph B Tornado striking within Protected Area Boundary C. Vehicle crash into plant structures/systems within the Protected Area Boundary D. Turbine failure eulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals (CONTINUED)

1. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PLANT VITAL AREA (BD 89)OPERATING MODE: All A. Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (0.05g)NOTE: Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy these conditions.

B. Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic event.AND (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)Visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit.OR Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance.(CONTINUED) 17 Encle 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RP/O/AJ/o001 Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT A LERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY.., GENERAL EMERGENCY 2. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING KEOWEE HYDRO CONDITION B (BD 85)OPERATING NIODE: All A. Reservoir elevation Zt 805.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise B. Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particles C New area of seepage or wetness, with large amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments D. Slide or other movement of the dam or abutments which could develop into a failure E. Developing failure involving the powerhouse or appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable

3. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING JOCASSEE HYDRO CONDITION B (BD 86)OPERATING MODE; All A. Condition B has been declared for the Jocassee Dam (CONTINUED)

2. RELEASE OF TOXICIFLAMMABLE GASES JEOPARDIZING SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION OR ESTABLISH/

MAINTAIN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD 91)OPERATING MODE: All A. Report/detection of toxic gases in concentrations that will be life-threatening to plant personnel B. Report/detection of flammable gases in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant:* Reactor Building* Auxiliary Building* Turbine Building* Control Room 3. TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD (BD 93)OPERATING MODE: All A. Turbine Building flood requiring use of AP/l .2,3/A/1700/10, (Turbine Building Rood)4. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS BEEN INITIATED (BD 94)OPERATING MODE: All A. Evacuation of Control Room AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Plant control IS established from the Aux shutdown Panel or the SSF OR Plant control IS BEING established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or SSF (CONTINUED)

1. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION AND PLANT CONTROL CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED (BD 96)OPERATING MODE: All A. Control Room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or the SSF within 15 minutes 2. KEOWEE HYDRO DAM FAILURE (BD 97)OPERATING MODE: All A. Imminent/actual dam failure exists involving any of the following:

• Keowee Hydro Dam U Little River Dam* Dikes A, B, C, orD* Intake Canal Dike* Jocassee Dam -Condition A (CONTINUED)(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)18 Encl1 4.7 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety RP/O/AO/001 Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT. ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4. RELEASE OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE

5. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT 3. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT 1. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT GASES DEEMED DETRIMENTAL TO SAFE CLASSIFICATION OF AN ALERT DECLARATION OF SITE AREA DECLARATION OF GENERAL OPERATION OF THE PLANT (BD 87) (BD 95) EMERGENCY (BD 98) EMERGENCY (BD 99)OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE; All OPERATING MOI)E: All OPERATING NOI)E; All A. Rcport/detection of toxic or flammable gases A. Emergency Coordinator judgment indicates A. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director A. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director that could enter within the site area boundary in that: judgment judgment indicates:

amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant Plant safety may be degraded Actual/imminent substantial core D(END) degradation with potential for loss of B. Report by local, county, state officials for AND containment potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event Increased monitoring of plant functions OR is warranted Potential for uncontrolled

5. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH (END) radionuclide releases that would WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN result in a dose projection at the UNUSUAL EVENT (BD 88) site boundary greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid OPERATING MODE: All A. Emergency Coordinator determines potential (END)degradation of level of safety has occurred (END)19 0 RP/O/A/1000/001 Page I of 1 Enclosure

4.8 Radiation

Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO HOURS SINCE RIA 57 R/hr. RIA 58 R/hr*REACTOR TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 0.0 -< 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 -< 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1. 1E+003 1.1EE+004 1.0 -< 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 -< 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 -< 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 -< 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 -< 3.5 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 -< 4.0 1.0E+003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 -< 8.0 1.0E+003 1.0E+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003* RIA 58 is partially shielded 20 O Enclosure 4.9 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings O RP/O/A/ 1000/001 Page 1 of 1 NOTE: This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.; incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).UNITS 1, 2,3 MONITOR NUMBER UNUSUAL EVENT 1000x ALERT NORMAL LEVELS mRAD/HR mRAD/HR RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop Elevation 796 150 5000 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab Elevation 796 4200 > 5000 RIA 10, Primary Sample Hood Elevation 796 830 > 5000 RIA 11, Change Room Elevation 796 210 5000 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank Elevation 783 800 > 5000 RIA 13, Waste Disposal Sink Elevation 771 650 > 5000 RIA 15, HPI Room Elevation 758 NOTE* > 5000 NOTE: RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis. Applying 1000x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an Unusual Event. For this reason, an Unusual Event will NOT be declared for a reading less than 5000 mRad/hr.21 Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 1 of 5*1. List of Definitions and Acronyms NOTE: Definitions are italicized throughout procedure for easy recognition.

1.1 ALERT

-Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.1.2 BOMB -Refers to an explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.

1.3 COGNIZANT

FACILITY STAFF -any member of facility staff, who by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensee's emergency classification scheme. (Does not include staff whose positions require they report, rather than assess, abnormal conditions to the facility.)

1.4 CONDITION

A -Failure is Imminent or Has Occurred -A failure at the dam has occurred or is about to occur and minutes to days may be allowed to respond dependent upon the proximity to the dam.@ 1.5 CONDITION B -Potentially Hazardous Situation is Developing

-A situation where failure may develop, but preplanned actions taken during certain events (such as major floods, earthquakes, evidence of piping) may prevent or mitigate failure.1.6 CIVIL DISTURBANCE

-A group of persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site.1.7 EXPLOSION

-A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

1.7 EXTORTION

-An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.1.8 FIRE -Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke, such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment, do NOT constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.1.9 FRESHLY OFF-LOADED CORE -The complete removal and relocation of all fuel assemblies from the reactor core and placed in the spent fuel pool. (Typical of a "No Mode" operation during a refuel outage that allows safety system maintenance to occur and results in maximum decay heat load in the spent fuel pool system).22 Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 2 of 5 1.10 GENERAL EMERGENCY

-Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate area.1.11 HOSTAGE -A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure demands will be met by the station.1.12 HOSTILE ACTION -An act toward an NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, takes HOSTAGES, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, PROJECTILES, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.

HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.)1.13 HOSTILE FORCE -One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

1.14 IMMINENT -Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. Where IMMINENT timeframes are specified, they shall apply.1.15 INTRUSION

-A person(s) present in a specified area without authorization.

Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication of INTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.1.16 INABILITY TO DIRECTLY MONITOR -Operational Aid Computer data points are unavailable or gauges/panel indications are NOT readily available to the operator.1.17 LOSS OF POWER -Emergency Action Levels (EALs) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment.

Ex. -If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160v switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended.

The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were de-energized.

1.18 PROJECTILE

-An object directed toward a NPP that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.1.19 PROTECTED AREA -Typically the site specific area which normally encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence.23 Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 3 of 5 1.20 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE -RCS Operational Leakage as defined in the Technical Specification Basis B 3.4.13: RCS leakage includes leakage from connected systems up to and including the second normally closed valve for systems which do not penetrate containment and the outermost isolation valve for systems which penetrate containment.

A. Identified LEAKAGE LEAKAGE to the containment from specifically known and located sources, but does not include pressure boundary LEAKAGE or controlled reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff (a normal function not considered LEAKAGE).LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals, gaskets, or valve packing (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank;LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System (primary to secondary LEAKAGE):

Primary to secondary LEAKAGE must be included in the total calculated for identified LEAKAGE.B. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal water injection or leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE.C. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall.1.21 RUPTURED (As relates to Steam Generator)

-Existence of Primary to Secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection.

1.22 SABOTAGE -Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

1.23 SECURITY CONDITION

-Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.1.24 SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AREA -Any area within the Protected area which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

24 Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 4 of 5 1.25 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT (SLC) -Chapter 16 of the FSAR 1.26 SIGNIFICANT PLANT TRANSIENT

-An unplanned event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback>25%

thermal reactor power (2) Electrical load rejection

>25% full electrical load (3) Reactor Trip (4) Safety Injection System Activation 1.27 SITE AREA EMERGENCY

-Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public, or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious act; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevents effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the Site Boundary.1.28 SITE BOUNDARY -That area, including the Protected Area, in which DPC has the authority to control all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property (1 mile radius from the center of Unit 2).\1.29 TOXIC GAS -A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g.; Chlorine).

1.30 UNCONTROLLED

-Event is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff.1.31 UNPLANNED

-An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance.

Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

1.32 UNUSUAL EVENT -Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.1.33 VALID -An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is conclusively verified by: (1) an instrument channel check; or, (2) indications on related or redundant instrumentation; or, (3) by direct observation by plant personnel such that doubt related to the instrument's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit with this definition is the need for timely assessment.

25 Enclosure 4.10 RP/O/A/1000/001 Definitions/Acronyms Page 5 of 5 1.34 VIOLENT -Force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage plant property.1.35 VISIBLE DAMAGE -Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example damage: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture.1.36 VITAL AREA -An area within the protected area where an individual is required to badge in to gain access to the area and that houses equipment important for nuclear safety. The failure or destruction of this equipment could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

26 Enclosure 4.11 Operating Modes Defined In Improved Technical Specifications MODES RP/O/AI 1000/001 Page 1 of 1 REACTIVITY

% RATED AVERAGE CONDITION THERMAL REACTOR COOLANT MODE TITLE POWER (a) TEMPERATURE (Keff) (OF)I Power Operation

>0.99 >5 NA 2 Startup >0.99 <5 NA 3 Hot Standby <0.99 NA >250 4 Hot Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA 250 > T > 200 5 Cold Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA < 200 6 Refueling (c) NA NA NA (a)(b)(c)Excluding decay heat.All reactor vessel head closure bolts fully tensioned.

One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned 27 Enclosure 4.12 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 1 of 2 1. Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 -Fission Product Barrier Matrix 1.1 If the unit was at Hot S/D or above, (Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4) and one or more fission product barriers have been affected, refer to Enclosure 4.1, (Fission Product Barrier Matrix) and review the criteria listed to determine if the event should be classified.

1.1.1 For each Fission Product Barrier, review the associated EALs to determine if there is a Loss or Potential Loss of that barrier.NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss thresholds is imminent (i.e. within 1-3 hours). In this situation, use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.1.2 Three possible outcomes exist for each barrier. No challenge, potential loss, or loss.Use the worst case for each barrier and the classification table at the bottom of the page to determine appropriate classification.

1.3 The numbers in parentheses out beside the label for each column can be used to assist in determining the classification.

If no EAL is met for a given barrier, that barrier will have 0 points. The points for the columns are as follows: BFmkr Ualm PoQin RCS Potential Loss 4 Loss 5 Fuel Clad Potential Loss 4 Loss 5 Containment Potential Loss 1 Loss 3 1.3.1 To determine the classification, add the highest point value for each barrier to determine a total for all barriers.

Compare this total point value with the numbers in parentheses beside each classification to see which one applies.1.3.2 Finally as a verification of your decision, look below the Emergency Classification you selected.

The loss and/or potential loss EALs selected for each barrier should be described by one of the bullet statements.

28 Enclosure 4.12 Instructions For Using Enclosure 4.1 RP/O/A/1000/001 Page 2 of 2 EXAMPLE: Failure to properly isolate a 'B' MS Line Rupture outside containment, results in extremely severe overcooling.

PTS entry conditions were satisfied.

Stresses on the 'B' S/G resulted in failure of multiple S/G tubes.RCS leakage through the S/G exceeds available makeup capacity as indicated by loss of subcooling margin.Barrier EAL Failure Points RCS SGTR > Makeup capacity of one HPI pump in Potential Loss 4 normal makeup mode with letdown isolated Entry into PTS operating range Potential Loss 4 RCS leak rate > available makeup capacity as Loss 5 indicated by a loss of subcooling Fuel Clad No EALs met and no justification for No 0 classification on judgment I I_ Challenge Containment Failure of secondary side of SG results in a Loss 3 direct opening to the environment RCS 5 + Fuel 0 + Containment 3 = Total 8 A. Even though two Potential Loss EALs and one Loss EAL are met for the RCS barrier, credit is only taken for the worst case (highest point value) EAL, so the points from this barrier equal 5.B. No EAL is satisfied for the Fuel Clad Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 0.C. One Loss EAL is met for the Containment Barrier so the points for this barrier equal 3.D. When the total points are calculated the result is 8, therefore the classification would be a Site Area Emergency.

E. Look in the box below "Site Area Emergency".

You have identified a loss of two barriers.

This agrees with one of the bullet statements.

The classification is correct.29 Enclosure 4.13 RP/O/A/1000/001 References Page 1 of 1 I

References:

1. PIP 0-05-02980

2. PIP 0-05-4697 3. PIP 0-06-0404 4. PIP 0-06-03347

5. PIP 0-09-00234

6. PIP 0-10-1055 7. PIP 0-10-01750

8. PIP 0-11-02811

9. PIP 0-12-1590 10. PIP 0-10-7809 11. PIP 0-12-9201 12. PIP 0-12-9198 13. PIP 0-12-11227

14. PIP 0-14-10064 and PIP 0- 14-11470 15. PIP 0- 13-6662 16. PIP 0-14-13933 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2 4W §50.54(q)

Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

RP/O/A/1000/001, Emergency Classification, Revision 003 Revision 003 of RP/0/A/1000/001 consists of the following change.Protected Service Water replaces the Station Auxiliary Service Pump as a result of a system modification.

Change made to clarify sub-step of EAL 4.4.S.2.C (ComoIete Loss of Shutdown Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)See attached sheet for all changes pertaining to this procedure.

Activity Scope: B -[ The activity is a change to the emergency plan El The activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type: BL Change Type: El The change is editorial or typographical E] The change does conform to an activity that has Z The change is not editorial or typographical prior approval The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Planning Standard Impact Determination:

El §50.47(b)(1)

-Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)§ 50.47(b)(2)

-Onsite Emergency Organization

§50.47(b)(3)

-Emergency Response Support and Resources§50.47(b)(4)

-Emergency Classification System*El §50.47(b)(5)

-Notification Methods and Procedures*

El §50.47(b)(6)

-Emergency Communications El §50.47(b)(7)

-Public Education and Information El §50.47(b)(8)

-Emergency Facility and Equipment El §50.47(b)(9)

-Accident Assessment*

El §50.47(b)(10)

-Protective Response*El §50.47(b)(1

1) -Radiological Exposure Control El §50.47(b)(12)

-Medical and Public Health Support[E §50.47(b)( 13) -Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations El §50.47(b)(14)

-Drills and Exercises El §50.47(b)(I

5) -Emergency Responder Training El §50.47(b)(16)

-Emergency Plan Maintenance

• Risk Significant Planning Standards El The proposed activity does not impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination:

BLOCK 6.El The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

[ The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment I. .," Results: Li.[I The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation LI The activity cannot be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation BLOCK 7,: m I P arer Name: Mike Stephens Dat Reviewer Name: Don Growl Date: '/-T- -/.<Revision 12 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.3 a§50.54(q)

Effectiveness Evaluation Form%ctivity Description and

References:

Revision 003 of RP/O/A/1000/001 consists of the following change.Protected Service Water replaces the Station Auxiliary Service Pump as a result of a system modification.

Change made to clarify sub-step of EAL 4.4.S.2.C (Complete Loss of Shutdown Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

Clarification added to address a total loss of main and emergency feedwater with SSF and PSW unavailable coincident with degraded High Pressure Injection.

See attached change matrix: Activity Type: IBLO I Z The activity is a change to the emergency plan EJ The activity affects implementation of the emergency plan, but is not a change to the emergency plan Impact and Licensing Basis Determination:

Licensing Basis: 1OCFR50.47b (4) A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.NUREG 0654II.D.1 An emergency classification and emergency action level scheme as set forth in Appendix I must be established by the licensee.

The specific instruments, parameters or equipment status shall be shown for establishing each emergency class, in the in-plant emergency procedures.

The plan shall identify the parameter values and equipment status for each emergency class.PiS E-Plan Section D, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM States;*eg Guide 1.101, Rev. 3, August, 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an Alternative Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels. Oconee Nuclear Site used the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergency action levels. The emergency action levels provided in this section have been modified to implement the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, NEI guidance as endorsed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12 and to support the implementation of NEI 03-12.Changes to ONS E-Plan Section D, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM documented under separate 50.54q evaluation.

Reg. Guide 1.219 lists the emergency planning function associated with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

A standard scheme of emergency classification and action level is in use.Compliance Evaluation and

Conclusion:

~BLO9~4A 1.Evaluation:

Basis Information for Fission Product Barrier Reference Table Enc. 4.1 (4) Reactor Coolant System Integrity.

HPI Forced cooling represents the failure of the steam generators to remove heat from the core. To use this mode of cooling indicates that all feedwater (both main and emergency) are not available for use and the pressure of the reactor coolant system is greater than or equal to 2300 psig. The power-operated relief valve must be opened to initiate the cooling through the high pressure injection system. In effect, a self-imposed loss of coolant is established.

This condition is classified as a potential loss of the reactor coolant system. HPI Forced Cooling is classified as an Alert from RP/0/A/1000/001 Enc. 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix.,Conclusion:

The proposed activity 0 does / [] does not continue to comply with the requirements.

Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) Evaluation and

Conclusion:

BL0C- 5!.Evaluation:

Current wording in Enc. 4.4.S.2.C states: "EOP directs feeding SG from SSF ASWP or PSW Pump. The installation of the PSW Pump enabled the Station to not require a blow-down of the SG's in order to commence feeding to achieve shutdown cooling, as the PSW pump is a high discharge head pump. The installation and use of the PSW pump provides a better margin of safety for the plant. The use of the PSW pump remains consistent with the technical bases of the EAL (NUMARC -NESP-007, IC -SS4 -Complete Loss of Heat Removal Capability EAL 1 Loss of core cooling and heat sink (PWR). Core exit thermocouple readings are considered to be the average of the five (5) highest thermocouple reading shown on the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor. The SSF can provide the following:

(1) makeup to the Reactor Coolant Pump seals, (2) low pressure service water to the steam generators, (3) capability to keep the unit in hot shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following an Appendix R fire. This change is then in keeping true to the basis as currently written.The basis provides, "This EAL addresses complete loss of functions core cooling and heat sink required for hot shut down with the reactor at pressure and temperature.

Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted with the total loss of main and emergency feedwater with SSF and PSW unavailable coincident with degraded High Pressure Injection.

Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator Judgment or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs".Conclusion:

The proposed activity F] does / does not constitute a RIE.ffectiveness Evaluation Results LOCK6 The activity does continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness.

Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior approval.F1 The activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness.

Therefore, the activity cannot be implemented without prior approval.Preparer Name: Pre ?Antu a Mike Stephens _... re N a m e ..... ........ ..........

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..... .D ' e -.. ..... ........Reviewer Name: Review Sign re Date-Don Crowl ....r-/ -Approver Name: p ignatlr4 9-1-Date: Pat Street R N I q ]T Revision 12 3.10 IOCFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2 EAL Change Review Form J Rhange Description and

References:

i/l//4-B///b,6/L

/ -'BLOCK", Revision 003 of E-Plan Section D consists of the following change. e,,t ý3 C -a.Protected Service Water replaces the Station Auxiliary Service Pump as a result ot a system modification.

Change made to clarify sub-step of EAL 4.4.S.2.C (Complete Loss of Shutdown Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown)., *_4ýqjý,_j.5 Change Type: E ýB ý[ The change is considered a difference from the approved wording.El The change is considered a deviation from the approved wording.Change Verification:

Item Yes No N/A Resolution/Comments Initiating CondItIoni

"__.-* .."_-__. .________-

._______, IC identification number is correct 0 El fE Click here to enter text.Wording is consistent with the NRC approved IC j 0 [ Click here to enter text.EAL/FPB identification number is correct 0 El El Click here to enter text.Wording is consistent with the NRC approved EAL / FPB 0l 0 Cl PSW modieinstalled antd associated procedure changes tnade.Threshold values or conditions remain specific to ensure generic Z I] El Click here to enter text.teria are not substituted reducing clarity and accuracy of the 1L.Sequencing/nesting logic format is correct 0 El El Click here to enter text.Source document inputs used for calculations and in thresholds are 0 El El Click here to enter text.correct Site specific content wording/tables/values are correct and specific:

0 El El ('lick here to enter text.* Operations procedures are consistent with the change* Instrument/display number and noun name are provided* Alarm sctpoints are equal to or below EAL/FPB values* Radiation monitor values account for background" Procedure references are correct The EAI/FPB Matrix is legible and intuitively organized 0 El El Click here to enter text.Miode Applicability

" Operational mode alignment is consistent with the EAL licensing 1 [ l , (Click here to enter text.basis jj ___Technical Bases -..Site specific bases is consistent with the EAL threshold 0 El El Click here to enter text.Bases for calculations and threshold values are consistent with the 0 1 El E Click here to enter text.technical bases approved by the NRC Source document inputs used for calculations and in thresholds are 0 3 El E Click here to enter text.correct Site specific bases remains accurate and consistent with the EAL 0] El E Click here to enter text.technical bases approved by the NRC pecific bases has appropriate level of detail and is o El E ( Click hcre to enter text.biguous I __

The change does not cause a change to the logic of the EAL scheme 0 El El Click here to enter text.(i.e. gaps in classification thresholds)

Contlicts with the EAI.FPB wording have not been introduced 0 El El Click here to enter text.*evision 12.10 1OCFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2 References Source document references are correct 0 El E I Click here to enter text.Source document references are current 0 E] 11 Click here to enter text.Definition&-:

Wording is consistent with the license basis definitions approved C l l cick here to enter text.by the NRC for the EALs and EAL technical bases I I I Other Manual Content., Wording is consistent with the license basis definitions approved I 0 I l l lick here to enter text.by the NRC for the EALs and EAL technical bases Change Validation:

Me-hod i..,.-0 In-Plant Walk down El Simulator

[ Other (Specify)EOP Changes o Training El Tabletop E- N/A Item Yes No N/A Resolution/Comments

/ "FPB. ':I.rmation and/or values are available in all facilities where 0 El E[ Click here to enter text.classifications are required to be made Instrumentation and computer points are compatible:

Cl Q 0 Click here to enter text.* Instrument/display designation matches* Instrument/display units are correct* Proper significant digits are indicated and within the accuracy capabilities of the instrument/display

• The instrument/display range is on scale for the threshold value* Instrument/display provides separation for escalating values Conditions are easily recognizable and able to support declaration 0 El El Click here to enter text.within 15 minutes.Information and/or values are easily obtained and able to support 0 E El Click here to enter text.declaration within 15 minutes The change does not introduce a time delay to classification 11[]Click here to enter text.Change Justification:

HPI Forced cooling represents the failure of the steamr generators to remove heat from the core. To use this mode of cooling indicates that all feedwater (both main and emergency) are not available for use and the vis pressure of the reactor coolant system is greater than or equal to 2300 psig. The power-operated relief valve must be opened to initiate the cooling through the high pressure injection system. In effect, a self-imposed loss of coolant is established.

Declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted with the total loss of main and emergency feed water with SSF and PSW unavailable coincident

• degraded High Pressure Injection.

I EAL Change Review Results: Z The EAL change can be implemented without prior NRC approval.El The EAL change cannot be implemented without prior NRC approval.parer Name: !P 7 rS-l ike Stephens Reviewer Name: Review r Signature Don Crowl _ _Approver Name: Aeto a-e Pat Street A-...B.LOCK 6.-., Date Date: Revision 12