ML18139B817

Submits nine-month Response to NRC 801222 Ltr Re NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. Also Forwards Bechtel Nine-Month Response to NRC Ltr Dtd 801222 on Control of Heavy Loads for Vepco North Anna Units 1 & 2.

ML18139B817
Person / Time
Site:	Surry, North Anna, 05000000
Issue date:	03/22/1982
From:	LEASBURG R H VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	EISENHUT D G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18139B818	List: ML18139B817 ML18139B819
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR 171, NUDOCS 8203260142
Download: ML18139B817 (32)

Text

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMP. R.H. LEA.SBURG VICE PJ<ESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS RICHMOND.., VIRGINIA 23261 March 22, 1982 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Attn: Mr. D. G. Eisenhut, Director mi..ll¥~,-~

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Dear Mr. Eisenhut:

• ~ -~/7lTf('<A NUREG-0612 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Serial No. 171 PSE&C/WSM:

j dm Docket Nos. 50-280 50-281 50-338 50-339 License Nos. DPR-32 DPR-37 NPF-4 NPF-7 In accordance with letters 388 and 388A, Vepco to Harold R. Denton, dated July 1, 1981 and September 30, 1981 respectively, Vepco is providing the nine month response to -.the NRC letter dated December 22, 1980 on NUREG-0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 and Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2. Westinghouse Electric Corporation is in the process of performing a reactor vessel head drop analysis for North Anna Units 1 and 2 and Surry Units 1 and 2. The results of this analysis will be submitted at a later date. As stated in our six month responses, Vepco has requested a proposal from Westinghouse Electric Corporation to verify conformance of the reactor vessel head lifting rigs, reactor vessel internals lifting rigs, load cells, and reactor coolant pump motor lifting rigs at Surry Units 1 and 2 and North Anna Units 1 and 2 with ANSI Nl4.6-1978 as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.(4).

The results of these analyses will be submitted at a later date. The new fuel container lifting rig at Surry Power Station is currently under review for compliance with NUREG-0612.

The results of this analysis will be submitted upon completion.

As stated in our letter 688, dated December 22, 1981, the six month response for Surry Power Station requires final editing. The safe load path sketches are currently being redrafted and will be forwarded to you upon completion.

8203260142 820322 PDR ADOC~ 05000280 p PDR

., i -e *VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY TO Should you have any questions, please advise. Enclosures cc: Mr. J.P. O'Reilly -NRC Region II Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing

• DOCKET NO. 50-280/281

... VEPCO.~SURRY 1 and 2 NINE MONTH REPORT NUREG-0612 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS Rec'd w/ltr 3/22/82 ... 8203260142 NOTICE THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OfFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIVISION OF DOCUMENT CONTROL. THEY HAVE 8EEN CHARGED. TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS

• FACILITY BRANCH 016.. PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS

'CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION.

MUST

• BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL.

DEADLINE RETURN DATE , RECORDS FACILITY BRANCH

[ . ' ..

• y

• NINE MONTH REPORT NUREG -0612 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS SURRY POWER STATION -UNITS 1 & 2 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY ,, '

TABLE OF CONTENTS

• SECTION TITLE PAGE Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling ..........

1 Systems Operating in the Vicinity of Fuel Storage Pools 2.3 Specific Requirements of Overhead Handling ............

3 Systems Operating in the Containment

2.4 Specific

Requirements for Overhead Handling ...........

4 Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Core Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Cooling 2.1.3f Supplemental Information to Vepco's Six Month ........ 5

• Report -Verification of Crane Design APPENDICES A. TABLES Table I -Load/Impact Area Data Page 1 of 9 INTRODUCTION In accordance with letters 388 and 388A, Vepco to Harold R. Denton, dated July 1, 1981 and September 30, 1981 respectively, Vepco is providing the nine month report on NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear. Power Plants" for Surry Power Station -Units 1 & 2. This nine month report is structured in direct response to the information requested in Sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 of Enclosure 3 of the NRC letter, dated December 22, 1980, concerning control of heavy loads. Also included in this report is supplemental information to Section 2.1.3f of Vepco's Six Month Report previously submitted.

The following sections are numbered to correspond to the information as requested in Enclosure 3 of the NRC letter dated December 22, 1980. 2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS 2.2.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, RESPONSE land or fall into the spent fuel pool. Name: Type: Fuel Building Trolley Electric Overhead Top Running Trolley Capacity:

125 Tons & 10 Tons Equipment Designation:

1-CR-15 Name: Type: Capacity:

Equipment Motor Driven Platform & Hoists Single Girder Electric Traveling Gantry 2 -2 Tons (each) Designation:

1-FH-13 2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel-storage po61. RESPONSE The new fuel crane (1-CR-20, 1-CR-23, & 1-CR-24) is excluded since this crane is not capable of moving its hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the spent fuel pool boundary.

The new fuel crane has three equipment I.D. numbers due to its particular design.

• 2.2.3 Page 2 of 9 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load d!OP extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).

For each crane so evaluated, provide the handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment

1. RESPONSE The fuel building trolley and the motor driven platform and hoists are not single failure proof cranes. 2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied.

Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance.

RESPONSE Alternative 4 of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2 has been selected for discussion of the cranes list in Section 2.2.1 above. The fuel building trolley (1-CR-15) does not carry any heavy loads, including the spent fuel cask, over any stored spent fuel. The fuel building trolley moves only in a north-south direction over an area at one end of the fuel pit; A built-up pad of energy absorbing material is located over the base of the fuel pit in the area w~ere the spent fuel cask is loaded. This built-up pad was designed to reduce the consequences of a spent fuel cask drop, such that structural damage to the reinforced concrete fuel pit structure, including cracking, will not occur. Therefore, significant leakage of fuel pit water through the concrete structure will not occur. The consequences of a dropped fuel cask into the fuel pool was addressed in the Surry Final Safety Analysis Report as part of the original plant design and licensing.

However, Surry Technical Specification 3.10 prohibits movement of a spent fuel cask into the Fuel Building until such time as the NRC has reviewed and approved the spent fuel cask drop evaluation.

Upon resolution of this issue, compliance with NUREG 0612 shall be determined.

The motor driven platform and hoists (1-FH-13) does not carry any heavy loads, including the transfer canal door, over any stored spent fuel. The motor driven platform spans the spent fuel pit and may be maneuvered over any part of the fuel building area. However, Surry Technical Specification 3.10 prohibits the movement of heavy loads exceeding 110 percent of the weight of a fuel assembly (not including fuel handling tool) over spent fuel.

• *

• 2.2.4 Page 3 of 9 RESPONSE-(cont'd.)

The only "heavy load" handled by the motor driven platform and hoists are the transfer canal doors. The movement of the tranfer canal doors are administratively controlled through Surry Technical Specification 3.10 and Surry Operating Procedure 4.18. Through the use of these adminstrative controls, the consequences of a load drop are within the acceptance criteria of NUREG 0612. 2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE CONTAINMENT

2.3.1 Identify

by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel. RESPONSE:

2.3.2 Name: Reactor Containment Polar Cranes Type: Electric Overhead Circular Traveling Top Running Double Girder Crane Capacity:

Trolley No. 1 main hook 125 tons aux. hook 15 tons Trolley No. 2 main hook 125 tons Equipment Designator:

1-CR-1 (Unit 1) & 2-CR-1 (Unit 2) Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel. RESPONSE The reactor cavity manipulator cranes (l-CR-5 and 2-CR-5) are excluded in this area since the maximum loads lifted by these cranes are not classified as "heavy loads". The neutron detector carriages (1-CR-16 and 2-CR-16) do not have the load handling capability to lift a "heavy load" and therefore excluded.

The reactor containment annulus monorails (1-CR-19 and 2-CR-19) and the reactor containment jib cranes (one per unit) are excluded since they are incapable of carrying heavy loads either directly over the reactor vessel or to a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel .

• Page 4 of 9 2.3.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.3-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features_

to make the likelihood of a load drop e~tremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).

For each crane so evaluated, provide the handling-systems (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment

1. RESPONSE The reacto_r containment polar cranes are not single failure proof cranes. 2.3.4 For cranes identified in 2.3-1, above, not categorized according to 2.3-3, demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NlJREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied.

Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation_

in the containment and your determination of compliance.

RESPONSE The reactor containment polar cranes are of the polar configuration and are supported on the circular crane walls. The polar cranes main hooks have access to the entire area within the crane walls. The polar cranes auxiliary hooks have access ta the area inside and outside the crane walls. The movement of the polar cranes are not restricted by mechanical stops or electrical interlocks.

However, the operations of the cranes are adminstratively controlled by Technical Specification 3.10 to prevent handling heavy loads over the reactor vessel when there is fuel in the vessel, unless the load lift is specifically required for refueling operations.

The effects of load drops on the reactor vessel shall be performed by Westinghouse.

Results of these analyses shall be submitted at a later date. Load drops which are not on or into the reactor vessel have no radiological consequences as outlined in evaluation criteria I through III. Therefore for load drops which do not impact the reactor vessel, criteria I through III are satisfied.

2.4 SPECIFIC

REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS* CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL COOLING 2.4.1 Identify any cranes in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG 061"2, Section 5. 1. 6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional des1gn features).

For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment

1. . RESPONSE None of the cranes identified in 2.1-1 are single failure proof cranes .

• 2.4.2 Page S of 9 For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as proof in 2.4-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided.

RESPONSE See attached Table I, "Load/Impact Area Data". 2.1.3.f All load drops postulated inside the reactor containment buildings are postulated to occur at "hot standby" plant conditions .or lower. Cranes within the reactor buildings are not normally used during power generating plant conditions.

Credit for the operability of the Chemical and Volume Control System is taken for any postulated load drops within the reactor containment.

Technical Specification

3.2 requires

that when fuel is in a reactor, there shall be at least one flow path to the core for boric acid injection.

The minimum capability shall be equivalent to that supplied from the refueling water storage tank. The effects of postulated load drops onto the reactor vessel shall be submitted at a later date. Vepco has contacted Westinghouse to perform a reactor vessel head drop analysis.

Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

RESPONSE:

CMAA Specification 70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 apply to the reactor containment polar cranes (1/2-CR-1), fuel building trolley (l-CR-15) and the new fuel crane (1-CR-20, 1-CR-23, & 1-CR-24).

These cranes were designed and fabricated, prior to the issuance of the above referenced standards, in accordance with Electric Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. -Specification

1. 61. The ences between these two specifications are addressed below with respect to these cranes. 1. Impact Allowance CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.1.3 requires that crane design calcu-lations include an impact allowance of 0.5% of the load per foot per minute of hoisting speed but not less than 15%. EOCI-61 specifies only a minimum allowance of 15%. Therefore, for cranes with hoist speeds in excess of 30 feet per minute, it is possible that the impact allowance applied under EOCI-61 will be less than that required by CMAA-70. All of the above cranes have hoist speeds below 30 fpm with the exception of the auxiliary hoist for the reactor containment polar crane, which has a hoist speed of 42 fpm. However, the impact allowance criteria is only applicable to the design of the girders themselves, for which the main hoist is the governing factor for impact allowance.

• Page 6 of 9 2. Torsional Forces 3. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting moments due to hanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder be calculated on the basis of the.distance between the center of gravity of the load or force center line, and the girder shear center measured normal to the force vector. EOCI-61 states that such moments are to be calculated with reference to the girder center of gravity. For girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis, such as box sections or I-beam girders, used in these cranes, the shear center coincides with the centroid of the girder section and there is no difference between the two requirements.

These cranes use symmetrical box section girders in their construction, thereby complying with the above article. Bending Stress CMAA-70, Article 3.3.2.2 requires that bending stress calculations include a wind load of 5 pounds per square foot in design stress calculations based on the sum of dead and live loads. The reactor containment polar crane and the fuel building trolley were both designed to be operated in 35 mph winds and to withstand 90 mph winds when not in use. The new fuel crane has been designed for outdoor duty and storage, in accordance with EOCI-61 requirements for wind loading, which specifies a design wind load force of 10 pounds per square foot of projected crane area. Also, in the area where a load drop could result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, the new fuel crane is not subject to wind loading. 4. Longitudinal Stiffeners CMAA-70, Article 3. 3. 3. 1 specifies (1) the maximum allowable web depth/ thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners.

EOCI-61 allows the use oi longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance.

Longitudinal stiffeners have been supplied on the only applicable box girder, that for the reactor containment polar crane, as indicated below, complying with all requirements of CMAA-70: h/t 197 C (K + 1) / 17

• 6 / fc M 324 376 No. of Stf. by CMMA-70 1 No. Stf. Provided 2 Note that the most conservative approach has been used for a symmetrical girder, which is the case where the maximum stresses are assumed to equal the basic allowable stresses, Using this approach the C(K+l) ./17.6/fc equation governing the longitudinal web plate stiffeners reduces to 2C, which is the smallest possible value for this equation.

• *

• 5. Page 7 of 9 Allowable Compressive Stress CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies allowable compressive stresses to be approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommended structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38. On the reactor containment polar crane box girder, the b/c ratio equals 17, complying with the CMAA-70 Article. 6. Fatigue Considerations

7. 8. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads. EOCI-61 does not address fatigure failure. However, these cranes will perform only a limited number of lifts (much less than 20,000) throughout the life of the plant; therefore fatigue failure is unlikely.

Hoist Rope Requirements CMAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the bottom block, divided by the number of parts of rope, not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength.

EOCI-61 requires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength.

The fuel building trolley and the main hoists of the reactor containment polar crane meet the ments of this CMAA-70 article. The auxiliary hoist on the polar crane and the new fuel crane hoist were designed in accordance with EOCI-61 . Drum Design CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads. EOCI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load bending and crushing loads with no stipulation that these loads be combined.

The drum designs of the cranes were based upon the combination of crushing and bending loads thereby complying with the requirements of CMAA-70. 9. Drum Groove Design CMAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recommended drum groove depth and pitch. These cranes were designed in accordance with EOCI-61. The CMAA-70 article represents a codification of the same good engineering practice that would have been used in the cranes buil~-to EOCI-61 specifications.

10. Gear Design . CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower ratings be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association (AGMA) standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower.

EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance.

However, the gear horsepower ratings of and design allowable horsepower for these cranes were based upon the AGMA standards referenced in the CMAA-70 article .

• Page 8 of 9 11. Bridge Brake Design CMAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge m~tor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of bridge motor torque for similar configurations.

The control station arrangement with the cab located on the trolley was not provided for the following cranes as indicated below: Fuel Building Trolley Control Station Locations Cab on trolley -no bridge is provided Reactor Cont. Polar Cranes New Fuel Crane Cab mounted on bridge Bridge motion controlled from a pendant pushbutton station 12. Hoist Brake Design CMAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of control brake employed.

The reactor containment polar crane and the fuel building trolley have three hoist holding brakes, an eddy current brake and 2 double shoe load brakes, with a minimum torque rating of 150% of the hoist motor torque. The new fuel crane was designed in accordance with EOCI-61, and was furnished with mechanical load brakes and electric motor brakes. 13. Bumpers and Stops CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the ends of bridge and trolley travel. This guidance is not provided in EOCI-61. However, bumpers are provided for the bridge and trolley of the following cranes as indicated below: Polar Crane Fuel Bldg. Trolley New Fuel Crane Bridge Bumpers None provided, crane operates on circular runway N/A Rubber -Trolley Bumpers Spring Spring Polyurethane Page 9 of 9 14. Static Control Systems CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. These cranes are equipped with magnetic type motor controls, so this article is not applicable.

15 Restart Protection CMAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not equipped with return controllers or momentary contact push buttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the "OFF" position.

Since all these cranes were designed with motor controllers of the "dead-man" type with spring returns to the "OFF" position, this article is not applicable.

16. Material Requirement CMAA-70, Article 3.1 requires ASTM A36 structural steel. All of these cranes were designed with this material.

The reactor containment annulus monorails (1/2-CR-19), the 6 and 10 ton monorail systems (l-CR-8 & 1-CR-8A), the decontamination building crane (1-CR-25 & 1-CR-22), new fuel crane (1-CR-20, 1-CR-23 & 1-CR-24), and the motor driven platform and hoists (l-FH-13) were designed in accordance with EOCI-61. These cranes and monorials meet the ments of ANSI B30.11 and ANSI B30.16.

IDENTIFICATION:

T LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Reactor Containment Polar Crane (l-CR-1) Page 1 of 18 LOCATION:

Unit 1 Reactor Containment, El. 103' -1 1/2" (Top of bridge) LOAD WEIGHT LOAD (TONS) Reactor Vessel Head 122.5 with Lifting Rig Reactor Upper Internals 52.0 with Lifting Rig Reactor Cavity Inner 12.2 Seal Ring CRDM Missile Shield 36.5 Stud Carriers (Full) 3.6 Reactor Coolant Pump Motor with Sling Operating Floor Removable Plugs Octagonal Floor Plug 41.0 13.0 (Max) 31.5 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary No identified safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment below load path LOCATION ( SEE NOTE 1 7) Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-5)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-5)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-5)

Containment . (See 13936.12-MSK-5)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-5)

• HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Containment Note 2 & 7 (See 13930.12-MSK-5,6,&7)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-5)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-6)

Note 2 & 7 Note 3 :w*us k1$MM:Ziff!'S&,WiiC¥¥!iHM45&5Sl:~li!IMB!l!Mil!l!l!!I

________________________________

_

IDENTIFICATION:

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Reactor Containment Polar Crane (l-CR-1) LOCATION:

Unit 1 Reactor Containment, El. 103' -1 1/2" (Top of bridge) LOAD Polar Crane -Bottom Block & Hook Containment Recirc. Spray Cooler Regenerative Heat Exchanger Residual Heat Removal Exchanger Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 2.4 23.7 2.4 12.8 2.4 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP No safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment below limit switch testing location Recirc. Spray & Component cooling piping Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Chemical & Volume Control Piping RHR and Component Cooling Piping RHR and Component Cooling Piping LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Containment Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-5 Containment (See 13930 .12-MSK-7)

Containment (See 13930 .12-MSK-7)

Containment (See 13930. 12-MSK-7)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 3 & 8 Note 2 thru 8) Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 Note 2

• IDENTIFICATION:

TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Reactor Containment Polar Crane (2-CR-1) Page 3 of 18 LOCATION:

Unit 2 Reactor Containment, El. 103' -1 1/2" (Top of bridge) LOAD Reactor Vessel Head with Lifting Rig Reactor Upper Internals with Lifting Rig Reactor Cavity Inner Seal Ring CRDM Missile Shield Stud Carriers (Full) Reactor Coolant Pump Motor with Sling Operating Floor Removable Plugs Octagonal Floor Plug LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 122.5 52.0 12.2 36.5 3.6 41.0 13.0 (Max) 31.5 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure RHR Heat Exchanger Reactor Vessel Refueling Cavity Structure Refueling Cavity Structure Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary RHR System Boundary RHR System Boundary Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-l)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-l)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1&3)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-l)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1&3)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1&3)

• HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 Note 6 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 & 7 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 & 7 IDENTIFICATION:

TAaLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Reactor Containment Polar Crane (2-CR-1) Page 4 of 18 tt LOCATION:

Unit 2 Reactor Containment, El. 103' -1 1/2" (Top of bridge) LOAD Polar Crane -Bottom Block & Hook Containment Recirc. Spray Cooler Regenerative Heat Exchanger Residual Heat Removal Exchanger Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 2.4 23.7 2.4 12.8 2.4 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP No safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment below limit switch testing location Recirc. Spray & Component Piping Piping Chemical & Volume Control Piping Safety Injection Piping Chemical & Volume Control Piping RHR Component Cooling Piping RHR and Component Cooling Piping LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Containment Containment HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 8 (See 13930.12-MSK-2 thru 4) Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-3)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-3)

Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-3)

Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Undefined

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Reactor Containment Annulus Monorail (l-CR-19 & 2-CR-19) Unit 1 & Unit 2 Reactor Containments, El. 78'-10" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 5.0 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Safe shutdown and decay heat removal equipment in annulus area Page 5 of 18 LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1&5)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Undefined*

TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Reactor Containment Jib Cranes Unit 1 & Unit 2 Reactor Containments, El. 86 1-0 11 LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 8.0 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Page 6 of 18

• LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Containment (See 13930.12-MSK-1&5)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2 & 7.

IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD New Fuel Container (Full) Removable Slabs

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA New Fuel Crane (l-CR-20, l-CR-23, l-CR-24) Fuel Building & Yard, El. 44 1-8 11 LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 3.3 1.0 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Spent Fuel Pit Pumps Motor Control Centers Spent Fuel Pit Pump Fuel Pit Cooler Spent Fuel Pit Pumps Motor Control Center Page 7 of 18

• LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Fuel Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-9&10)

Fuel Bldg (See 13930.12-MSK-9)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 3 & 9 Note 2,3 & 9 Note 2,3 & 9 Note 3 & 9 IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Fuel Pool Gate 'i'Al3LE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Motor Driven Platform & Hoists (l-FH-13)

Fuel Building & Yard, El. 47' -9 1/2" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 1.8 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Spent Fuel Pool Page 8 of 18~ LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Fuel Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-10)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 3 & 10

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Spent Fud Shipping Cask Fuel Building Trolley -Bottom Block & Hook Spent Resin Shipping Container

& Cask Irradiated Specimen Shipping Cask

• Page 9 of 18 TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Fuel Building Trolley (1-CR-15)

Fuel Building, Decontamination Building, and Yard, El. 81' -4" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 125.0 (Max.) -Z. 4 3.7 11.3 EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Spent Fuel fool Fuel Pit Cooling System Piping No safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment below limit switch testing location No s:;ife shutdown or decay heat removal equipment under load path Spent Fuel Pool LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Fuel Bldg. (See 13930.l2-MSK-10)

Fuel Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-10)

Decou. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-11)

Fuel Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-10)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 11 Note 3 & 9 Note 8 Note 3 Note 11

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Undefined

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Decontamination Building Crane, (1-CR-25, 1-CR-22) Decontamination Building, El. 43' -4" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 5.0 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP No safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment under load path Spent Fuel Shipping Container Page 10 of 18 LOCATION * (SEE NOTE 17) Decon. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-11)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 3 Note 12

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Removable Slabs Undefined Loads TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA 10 Ton Monorail Sytem (1-CR-84)

Auxiliary Building, El. 40'-7 3/4" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 8.5 (Max.) 8.5 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Seal Water Heat Exchangers and Non-Regen.

Heat Exchangers Chemical & Volume Control Piping Chilled Component Cooling Exchanger

& Piping Same as removable slabs above Page 11 of 1 LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-12)

Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-12)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 3 & 13 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2, 3, 13, 14 IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Component Cooling Water Pump Component Cooling Water Pump-Motor Charging Pump Charging Pump-Motor Removable Slabs

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA 6 Ton Monorail Sytem (l-CR-8) Auxiliary Building, El. 22'-1" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 2.7 3.2 1.3 2.1 4.5 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Component C60liilg Piping Component Cooling Piping Chemical & Vol. Control Piping & Comp. Cooling Piping Chemical & Vol. Control Piping & Comp. Cooling Piping Unit 1 Charging Pump Discharge Heads Piping -4"-CH-89-1503

& 4"-CH-80-1503 Unit 1 Safety Injection Piping -10"-SI-6-153, 8"-SI-14-153, & 8"-SI-92-153 Unit 2 Charging Pump Discharge Headel's Piping -4"-CH-389-1503 4"-CH-380-1503 Unit 2 Safety Injection Piping 10"-SI-206-153, 8"-SI-214-153, & 8"-SI-292-153 Page 12 of 18. LOCATION ( SEE NOTE 1 7) Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

Aux. Bldg. El. 2'-0" Aux. Bldg. El. 2'-0" Aux. Bldg. El. 2' -0" Aux. Bldg. El. 2' -0" HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Removable Slabs Undefined Loads

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA 6 Ton Monorail Sytem (l-CR-8) Auxiliary Building, El. 22'-l" LOAD* WEIGHT (TONS) 4.5 (Max.) 4.5 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Charging Pump Seal Cooler Surge Tank (l-CC-TK-3 or 2-CC-TK-3)

Service water piping to charging pump intermediate seal coolers (2-WS-71-136, 2-WS-73-136, 2-WS-173-136, 2-WS-171-136)

Component Cooling Piping to Fuel Pit Coolers (lO"-CC-67-121

& 10"-CC ..70-121) Same as removable slabs above LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Aux. Bldg. El. 2' -0" Aux. Bldg. El. 2' -0" Aux. Bldg. El. 2' -0" Aux. Bldg. El. 2' -0" Page 13 of 1 HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2 Note 2,5 & 14 Note 2,5 & 14 Note 2,5 & 14

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Motor-Generator Set-Motor (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Unit #1 Switchgear Room Monorail Service Building, El. 53'-6" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 2.0 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Misc. Cables & Conduits Control Room Roof Page 14 of 18 LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Service Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-14)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2 Note 5 & 15

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Undefined

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Filter Cartridge Removal Monorail Auxiliary Building, El. 23'-0" LOAD WEIGHT (TONS) 2.0 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Reactor coolant pump seal water injection filter and associated piping Page 15 of 18. LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Aux. Bldg. (See 13930.12-MSK-13)

HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2,3 & 13

• IDENTIFICATION:

LOCATION:

LOAD Diesel-Generator Parts TABLE I (cont'd) LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA Emergency Diesel Generator Room Monorails Service Building, El. 27' -0" . LOAD WEIGHT (TONS). 10 (Max.) EQUIPMENT IMPACTED BY A LOAD DROP Emergency Diesel Generator LOCATION (SEE NOTE 17) Service. Bldg. El. 27 1-0 11 Page 16 of* 18 HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORY (SEE NOTES ON PAGE 17) Note 2 & 16

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA NOTES: HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORIES EXPLANATIONS

1) Crane travel for this area/load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops~ Page 17 of 1 2) System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safe shutdown.

or decay heat removal function following this load drop in this area. 3) Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load/equipment combination.

4) Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e. section 5. 1. 6 NUREG 0612 satisfied).

5) Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safe shutdown or decay heat removal. equipment.

6) Results of analysis to be supplied later. Vepco has requested Westinghouse to analyze load drops onto the reactor vessel. Postulated load drops into the reactor vessel shall not be addressed.

Westinghouse has never performed any previous .analyses of heavy load drops into the reactor vessel. 7) Load drops which damage the refueling cavity structure or reactor coolant pressure boundary do not prevent qecay heat removal by alternate systems available for operation if required, i.e. RHR system, Safety Injection System or Chemical & Volume Control System. 8) The crane limit switch testing location shall be administratively controlled.

9) The spent fuel storage rack configuration is designed to remain subcritical under unborated water conditions.

Temporary make-up to the spent fuel pool using unborated water, while repairs are made to damaged equipment, will maintain spent fuel cooling and shielding.

10) Surry Technical Specification 3.10 and Surry Operating Procedure 4.18 provide adminstrative controls to ensure safe movement of the spent fuel pool gates.

• TABLE I (cont'd.)

LOAD/IMPACT AREA DATA NOTES: HAZARD ELIMINATION CATEGORIES EXPLANATIONS

-(cont'd.)

Page 18 of 1 11) Surry Technical Specification 3.10 prohibits movement of a spent fuel cask into the Fuel Building

• until such time as the NRC has reviewed and approved the spent fuel cask drop evaluation.

Upon resolution of this issue, compliance with NUREG 0612 shall be determined.

Resolution of the spent fuel cask drop evaluation shall also be applicable for the irradiated speciment shipping cask. 12) A postulated load drop from the Decou. Bldg. Crane may impact and strike a spent fuel shipping container due to load swing. The spent fuel shipping container is closed prior to its movement into the Decou. Building so that any possible spillage of its contents is a remote possibility.

13) As addressed in FSAR Section 9.1.3.5, a postulated loss of all seal water injection flow does not affect the operability of reactor coolant pumps if component cooling water is available.

Since a postulated load drop does not affect the component cooling system, the consequences of a load drop are acceptable per NUREG 0612. 14) Load carrying height restrictions shall be adminstratively controlled.

A one foot maximum load carry height restriction shall be imposed on all lifting operations in the Auxiliary Building on elevations 27'-6" and 13 I -:0 11* 15) The control room roof is designed to withstand a tornado generated missile. The kinetic energy developed from a postulated load drop is significantly less than the kinetic energy developed by a tornado generated missile. Therefore, the postulated load drop is within the acceptance criteria of NUREG 0612. 16) Two 5 ton capacity monorails are located in each Emergency Diesel Generator Room for maintenance purposes.

No permanently attached hoist or trolley is mounted on either monorail under normal conditions.

A postulated load drop would impact the diesel generator under repair. Redundant diesel generators, located in separate rooms are available to perform their functions.

17) Sketches referenced were provided in Vepco's Six Month Report concerning "Control of Heavy Loads."