ST-HL-AE-1239, Forwards Listed Attachments Describing Details of 850326-29 Review Meetings Re Instrumentation & Controls Design Features & Program Implementation,Including Agenda,List of Attendees,Handouts & Action Items
| ML20117J716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1985 |
| From: | Wisenburg M HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-#285-020, CON-#285-20 OL, ST-HL-AE-1239, NUDOCS 8505150191 | |
| Download: ML20117J716 (175) | |
Text
The Light Company nosm upw n- m us im n-
.wxasm>i m3mmi May 13, 1985 ST-HL-AE-1239 PFN: G4.2 Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Ra.gulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Notes from Review Meeting with Instrumentation & Controls Systems Branch
Dear Mr. Knighton:
During the week of March 26 through March 29, 1985, Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P) representatives met with members of the NRC staff in the Houston offices and at the jobsite to discuss issues and questions regarding the South Texas Project (STP) instrumentation and controls design features and program implementation.
The attachments listed below describe the details of the week's activities including agenda, attendees, sumary sheets of each agenda item, list of handouts, and action items.
New agenda items which were raised and discussed during the week dre also shown in Attachment 1 and are provided with a summary sheet in Attachment 3.
On March 29 the meeting was summarized and the open items and action items were listed and reviewed. This is provided in Attachment 5.
As a result of the discussions the NRC staff requested that one set of all of the drawings reviewed during the week be provided to them.
One complete set of drawing packages (sub-sets) arranged by agenda items has since been provided to the NRC staff via the HL&P Bethesda licensing office during the week of April 8,1985.
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A ADOCK 0500049s i I PDR W2/NRC2/m N
ST-HL-AE-1239 PFN: G4.2 Houston Lighting & Power Company - Page 2
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.If.you should have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. -Michael E. Powell at (713) 993-1328. ,
Verytrlyyours, t
. T. Wi 6 n urg Manager, Nuclear Lice sing CAA:yd Attachments: (1 Meeting Agenda (2 List of Attendees (3 Summary Sheets-for each Agenda Item (4 Handouts (5 Action Items Listing / Schedule
.W2/NRC2/m
ST-HL-AE-1239 PFN: G4.2 flouston Lighting & Power Company Page 3 cc:
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr. , Director J. B. Poston/A. vonRosenberg Division of Licensing City Public Service Board Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation P.O. Box 1771 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission San Antonio, TX 78296 Washington, DC 20555 Brian E. Berwick, Esquire Robert D. Martin Assistant Attorney General for Regional Administrator, Region IV the State of Texas Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Austin, TX 78711 Arlington, TX 76011 Lanny A. Sinkin N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager 3022 Porter Street, N.W. #304 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20008 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Oreste R. Pirfo, Esquire Hearing Attorney Claude E. Johnson Office of the Executive Legal Director Senior Resident Inspector /STP U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 P. O. Box 910 Bay City, TX 77414 Charles Bechhoefer, Esquire Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Dan Carpenter U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector / South Texas Project Washington, DC 20555 c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 2010 Dr. James C. Lamb, III Bay City, TX 77414 313 Woodhaven Road Chapel Hill, NC 27514 M. D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire Baker & Botts Judge Ernest E. Hill One Shell Plaza Hill Associates Houston, TX 77002 210 Montego Drive Danville, CA 94526 J. R. Newman, Esquire Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. Mr. Ray Goldstein, Esquire 1615 L Street, N.W. 1001 Vaughn Building Washington, DC 20036 807 Brazos Austin, TX 78701 Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Citizens for Equitable Utilities, Inc.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Ms. Peggy Buchorn Washington, DC 20555 Route 1, Box 1684 Brazoria, TX 77422 E. R. Brooks /R. L. Range Central Power & Light Company Docketing & Service Section P. O. Box 2121 Office of the Secretary Corpus Christi, TX 78403 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 H. L. Peterson/G. Pokorny City of Austin P. O. Box 1088 Austin, TX 78767 W2/NRC2/m Revised 3/4/85
ATTACHMENT 1 REVISED SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ICSB REVIEW MEETING AGENDA Tuesday, March 26, 1985 Time 8:00 a.m. - End of Agenda NRC Item Subject Introduction 1 Design Status 4 Electrical Distribution System 23 Loss of Instrument Power 32 Auxiliary Feedwater System 38 RCS Boration 42 VCT Level Interlock 44 CVCS Seal Injection Interlock 46 Reactor Coolant Purity Control Interlock 37 RCS Letdown 45 Letdown Valves Interlock 36 RHR System 41 RHR Interlock 26 PORV and Block Valve 39 Shutdown Outside Control Room 13 Bypass /Inop Monitoring 22 ECCS Switchover 43 Spray Additive Tank Interlock 34 Control Room HVAC
- Summary of Day's Open Items 5291N:0230N/l
ATTACHMENT 1 REVISED SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ICSB REVIEW MEETING AGENDA Wednesday, March 27, 1985 Time 8:00 a.m. - End of Agenda NRC Item Subject
- Review of Any Open Items from Previous Day 35 FHB HVAC 31 HVAC-ESF Support / Safe Shutdown Areas 21/47 Power Lockout 7 Non-IE to~IE Control 48 Control System Failures 28 Common Sensing Lines 20 RCS Pressure Sensors 6 Sensing Lines / Freeze Protection 49 Control System Malfunctions due to HELB 2 Open TMI Items 3 PAM(II.F.1) Accuracies 40 QDPS Status 8 QDPS Control Functions New SI Signal to MSIVs (in Attachment 3, behind Item 19) 19 MSIV Failure on MSLB 18 Excessive Cooldown Protection 33 SSPS Slave Relay Undetectable Failure 14 Single Failure Criterion (RG 1.53) 30 FMEAs 27 Interlocks - Range and Accuracy 25 RCP Undervoltage and Underfrequency New MSIVs (in Attachment 3, behind Item 19)
- Summary of Day's Open Items l
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ATTACHENT 1 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ICSB REVIEW MEETING AGENDA Thursday, March 28, 1985 Time 7:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.
STP Site Visit Time 1:30 p.m. - End of Agenda NRC Item Subject
- Review of Any Open Items from Previous Day 24 P-4 17 SSPS 2/3 Testing 16 SSPS Urgent Alarm 15 Auto Shunt Trip 29 RTD Manifold FIS 5 Isolation Devices 10 Equipment Testing 11 Testing (RG 1.118) 9/12 Setpoint Methodology New CCW System (in Attachment 3, behind Item 49)
- Summary of Day's Open Items 5291N:0230N/3
ATTACHENT 1 i
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ICSB REVIEW MEETING-AGENDA Friday, March 29, 1985 Time 8:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.
NRC Item Subject
- Review of Any Open Items from Previous Day New ECW System (in Attachment 3, behind Item 49)
New MFIVs (in Attachment 3, behind Item 49) i New TestingProcedures(inAttachment3,behindItem49)
- Wrap-Up/ Exit l
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ATTACHENT 2.
Attendance Sheet Tom Dunning NRC/ICSB N. Prasad Kadambi NRC/NRR/DL Hulbert Li NRC/NRR/ICSB Mary B. Moreton Bechtel - Control Systems Tony DiPerna Bechtel - Control Systems Juan Botello Bechtel - Control Systems Yvonne I. Williams Bechtel - Control Systems George Boghosian* Bechtel - Control Systems Uzy Giveon* . Bechtel - Control Systems R. Paulson* Bechtel - Control Systems R. H. Pence
- Bechtel - Control Systems EGS G. Jones
- Bechtel - Deputy Project Manager M. Molduddin Bechtel - Electrical J. Polu* Bechtel - Electrical D. F. Cherry Bechtel - Electrical Charles Radnoty* Bechtel - Electrical Fred Y. Tajaddadi Bechtel - Electrical John G. Singer
- Bechtel - L.A. Chief Engineer -
Control Systems Lee Barrett* Bechtel - Mechanical C. J. Robertson* Bechtel - Mechanical Wayne Varnell* Bechtel - Mechanical V. Starks* Bechtel - Mechanical Bruce D. Moreton* Bechtel - Mechanical EGS Paul G. Trudel* Bechtel - Nuclear Group Supervisor William W. Watson Bechtel - Nuclear Licensing Ronald L. Everett Bechtel - Nuclear Licensing Roger G. Smith
- Bechtel - Project Engineer - E&IC Don H. Ashton* Bechtel - Project Engineer - Systems E. W. Dotson* HL&P - Manager, Engineering T. Crawford HL&P - I&C Engineering M. R. Wisenburg* HL&P - Licensing Mark McBurnett* HL&P - Site Licensing Pete VandeVisse HL&P - Lead I&C Eng.
Michael E. Powell* HL&P - Licensing Charlie A. Ayala HL&P - Licensing Glen Lang* W - I&C Licensing Andrea Sterdis* W - Licensing Phil Marasco* W - I&C Licensing George Madden
- W - Process Control Engineering Ken Slaby* W - Systerrs Engineering Jim McNamara* W - Nucletr Control Systems Eng.
Bill Miller
- W - Nuclet.r Control Systems Eng.
Kathy Handerhan W - Licen'.ing J. C. Mesmeringer W - I&C Licensing
- Part-time attendees 5374N:0232N
ATTACHMENT 3
SUMMARY
SHEETS FOR EACH AGENDA ITEM 5415N:0232N
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- 1. Identify any plant safety related system or portion thereof, (7.1) for which the design is incomplete at this time.
Resolution: See STP Response (Handout for Topic No.1).
The status of design as far as W FCNs was questioned. BEC l took an action item to review the design status list. (The' i . item discussed in particular was the Auto Shunt Trip.)
l I Status: Closed (Revisedlistwasprovided.)
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- 2. As called for in Section 7.1 of the Standard Review Plan, provide (7.1) information as to how your design conforms with the following:
a) II.D.3 - Relief and Safety Valve Position Indication b) II.E.1.2 - Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication c) II.K.3.10 - Proposed Anticipatory Trip Modification In FSAR Appendix 7A, responses to NUREG-0737 requirements, the aDeve 3 items are indicated "later." Please provide the current ststus.
Resolution: Handout for Topic No. 2 was provided with responses to each item.
The items were discussed, with no open items. Item a is in Am. 44. SAR changes are forthcoming; Item b will be included in Am. 46; Item c will be included in a later amendment.
Status: Closed Action - Provide formal submittal noted above.
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[ 3. In your response to NUREG-0737, item II.F.1 Accident Monitoring (7.5) Instrumentation Position (4), (5) and (6), you have not addressed the instrument accuracy requirements. This information should be provided and justified to be adequate for their intended function.
Resolution: Approximate accuracies and functions were provided as follows:
Containment Pressure: accuracy approximately 2-3%
Function: determine potential for breach of containment Containment Water Level: accuracy approximately +,6 inches Function: diagnosis of LOCA Containment Hydrogen Monitors: accuracy approximately 5%
Function: input for manual actuation of hydrogen recombiners Status: Closed Action - Update FSAR to include enveloping values of accuracy and functions.
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14 . Provide a brief overview of the plant electrical distribution (7.1) system, with emphasis on vital buses and separation divisions l
(8.3) as background for addressing various Chapter 7 concerns.
Describe the backup power source for the plant annunciator system.
Resolution: The design was reviewed using the handouts for Topic No. 4 and plant arrangements. No open issues were identified.
Status: Closed 1
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- 5. Describe design criteria and tests performed on the isolation (7.1) devices in the Balance-of-plant systems. Address results of analysis or tests performed to demonstrate proper isolation between separation groups and between safety and non-safety systems.
Resolution: For QDPS, the WCAP will be available as discussed in Topic No. 40.
A handout for Topic No. 5 was provided and discussed for the remaining B0P isolators.
NRC Question: Have isolators been tested for maximum credible voltages applied to the output? (for items C, D and G on the handout.)
Status: Open Item. Provide results of tests or, if no testing has been performed, provide rationale for testing not being done.
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- 6. Describe features of the South Texas Units 1 and 2 environmental (7.1) control system which insure that instrumentation sensing and sampling lines for systems important to safety are protected from freezing during extremely cold weather. Discuss the use of environmental monitoring and alarm systems to prevent loss of, or damage to systems important to safety upon failure of the environmental control system. Discuss electrical independence of the environmental control and monitoring system circuits. Please address your conformance with R.G.1.151 which reflects current staff practice.
Resolution: No safety-related sensing lines require freeze protection.
RWST is inside a building (MAB). AFST level sensors are in a bunkered compartment; freeze protection is not required.
Based upon this, no further questions or issues.
Status: Closed l
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- 7. Provide a list of any non-Class lE control signals that provide (7.1) input to Class lE control circuits. Discuss how these non-Class lE control signal circuits are designed so that they do not degrade the capability of safety components to perform their safety function.
Resolution: A handout was provided for discussion purposes. CCW ltems were deferred into the discussion of the CCW System (Thursday).
RMW System - remarks for non-essential valves item should be revised to more closely identify why there is no problem.
In general, for these interfaces, the SI overrides or SI sends to same position.
Open Item 1) Revise handout to clarify safety impact
- 2) Provide discussion on pressurizer heaters
- 3) Provide discussion on RMW isolation valves Resolution of Open Items
- 1) Handout was revised and reviewed during review of CCW System. (Note: Subsequently handout was revised after the meetingandisincludedinAttachment3.)
- 2) Further review of pressurizer heater controls / logic was provided. No unresolved issues remain.
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- 7. (Cont'd)
- 3) Further review of interf ace to RMW isolation valves was provided. No unresolved issues remain.
Status: Closed l
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10 of 69 March 29,1985 DRAWINGS CCW/ECW: P&ID'S: 9F05038 Rev. 4 9F05017 Rev. 4 9F05018 Rev. 4 9F05019 Rev. 4 9F05020 Rev. 4 9F05021 Rev. 3 LOGICS: 9Z42040 .Rev. 3 9Z42045 Rev. 2 9Z42053 Rev. 2 9Z42054 Rev. 3 SZ42061 Rev. 2 ELECTRICAL: 9-E-CC30-01 Rev. 2 ,
9-E-CC19-01 Rev. 2 9-E-CC15-01 Rev. 3 9-E-CC36-01 Rev. 2
- 9-E-CC01 -01 Rev. 2 RMW
- P& IDS: 9F05033 Rev. 2 I
L LOGICS: 9Z40070 Rev. 3 9Z40071 Rev. 2 :
I 9Z40072 Rev. 3
} ELECTRICAL: 9-E-RM01 -01 Rev. 1 9-E-RM03-01 Rev. 2 4
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11 of 69 March 29,1985 CONTROL ROOM HVAC: P&ID'S: 9V25004 Rev. 4 9V25005 Rev. 3 LOGICS: 9Z40065 Rev. 0 9Z41597 Rev. 3 9Z41702 Rev. 2 ELECTRICAL: 9-E-HE02-02 Rev. 1 9-E-FP20-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE07-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE07-02 Rev. 2 RCS: P&ID'S: 9F05003 Rev. 2 (see item 26)
LOGICS: 9Z42151 Rev. 4 9Z42160 Rev. 4 (see item 26)
CVCS: P&ID'S: 9F05009 Rev. 4 LOGICS: 9Z42401 Rev. 2 ELECTRICAL: 9-E-CV27-01 Rev. 2 FEE 0 WATER : P&ID'S: 9F00063 Rev. 3 LOGICS: 9Z40116 Rev. 2
- ELECTRICAL: 9-E-FWO7-01 Rev. 1 9-E-FWO7-02 Rev. 0 9-E-FWO7-03 Rev. 0 5415N:0232N
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- 8. Discuss the computer based Qualified Display Processing System (7.1) (QDPS) to perform the Class lE control functions such as:
(7.3) Auxiliary feedwater control, main steam PORV control and address the conformance with-IEEE-279 requirements.
Resolution: SG PORV - P&ID and 0IM (operator interface module) drawings (preliminary) were reviewed as typical. Control from main control room and ASP.
AFW Control - No 0IM on control board. As shown on logic for AFW regulating valve, reset capability is provided.
Conformance with IEEE-279 requirements is given in FSAR Section 7.5.6.2. Section is being updated at this time to provide more discussion of conformance.
There is a bumpless transfer between control room and ASP.
No unresolved items remained.
Status: Closed Action - Update FSAR to amplify conformance to IEEE-279.
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- 9. We will request that the setpoint methodology for each Reactor (7.1) Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safeguard Features (ESF) trip setpoint values be provided for both NSSS and 80P scope of supply at the time the Technical Specifications are submitted for review. Discuss the approach you are taking to establish the basis for trip setpoints.
Resolution: Item was discussed in conjunction with Item 12. The correct equations and values will be provided in the Tech Specs.
Status: Closed. [ Note: The B0P parameter setpoint values will be shown in the final Tech Specs.]
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- 10. Identify,and justify any Balance-of-plant scope safety related
.,!\ /(7.1) ' equipment (other than those 6 items listed in FSAR Section 7.1.2.5) that cannot be tested during reactor operation. Include auxiliary relays and other components in the safety-related systems.
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Resolution: HL&P is currently reviewing draft Tech Specs and developing' surveillance testing procedures. Specific equipment which
!.bcannotbereasonablyexpectedtobeactuate-testedduring
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operation will be identified during this time. HL&P will I identify and provide justification for equipment which should not be actuate-tested during operation; this review will be completed and a list provided by September,1985. Update to u
FSAR commitments will be provided as required.
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Status: Close,d 1
Action - A list of equipment which should not be actuate-tested during plant operation (according to the guidelines of Aeg. Guide 1.22, position D.4) will be provided to the NRC by
'Septembe r, 1985.
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- 11. Regulatory Guide 1.118 Rev. 2, " Periodic Testing of Electrical (7.1) Power and Protection Systems", endorsed IEEE Standard 338-1977,
" Criteria for the Periodic Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety System". This guide reflects current NRC staff practice. FSAR Section 7.1.2.11 only stated conformance to IEEE Std. 338-1971. Please address your conformance to this guide.
Resolution: A response to Q430.14N was provided (by Handout). This response will be provided formally in Amendment 45.
Surveillance test program development is expected to identify areas where design changes or exceptions would be needed.
Draf t procedures will be finished by the 1st quarter of 1986. Any exceptions or clarifications would be identified as changes to the FSAR; design changes would be made where feasible. (HL&P has committed to conform to the intent of R.G.1.118; however, STP was not designed to meet Rev. 2 of R.G. 1.118.)
Status: Closed I
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- 12. FSAR Table 3.12 Note 28 states that instrument spans and setpoints (7.1) are discussed in Sections 7.2.7.5 and in the Technical Specifications. However, there is no section 7.2.7.5 in FSAR.
Please address your conformance with R.G. 1.105 on instrument setpoints. This guide reflects current NRC staff practice.
Resolution: FSAR table in Section 3.12 will be corrected to show proper reference sections, i.e., 7.1.2.1.9 and 7.2.2.2.1.
STP is using the W Statistical Setpoint Methodology. Results of this methodology will be reflected in the Tech Specs.
Similar methodology will be used for safety-related B0P setpoints.
A handout for Topic No. 12 was provided listing the W scope setpoints covered by this methodology.
NRC wants to see the output tables of the setpoint methodology (not Tech Spec tables, but methodology tables).
Status: Closed. [ Note: a copy of the output tables (channel error allowances) will be made available at the HL&P Bethesda Licensing Offices.]
Action - correct references in Section 3.12.
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- 13. FSAR Table 3.12 states the STP design conforms to the intent of (7.1) R.G.1.47, rather than conforms to R.G.1.47. Use schematic and (7.5) panel layout _ drawings to discuss your design of the bypass and
. inoperable status monitoring system.
Resolution: This table will be revised to state we conform to RG 1.47.
ESF status monitoring drawings were reviewed.
Status: Closed Action - Update FSAR Table 3.12.
DRAWINGS: Indicator Light Panels: 9-Z-47528 Sh.1 Rev. I 9-Z-47528 Sh.1-1 Rev. 0 9-Z-47528 Sh.1-2 Rev. O Logics: 9-Z-41810 Rev. 2 9-Z-41811 Rev.-2 9-Z-41812 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
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" (7.1) R.G. 1.53, rather than conforms to R.G. 1.53. Use schematic (7.2) drawings to discuss your design of plant protection systems with respect to the R.G. 1.53 recommendations.
Resolution: B0P conforms to R.G.1.53, in that B0P safety-related systems (1E) conform to R.G.1.53. W uses alternate approach (see Section 7.1.2.7).
i Status: Closed 4
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- 15. Using detailed plant design drawings, discuss the reactor trip (7.2) breaker and undervoltage relay testing procedures, and the capability of independent verification of the operability of reactor trip breaker shunt and undervoltage coils.
Resolution: Bypass breaker position indication lights are provided in the control room, as shown on design drawings.
Generic Letter 83-28: Next submittal to NRC is scheduled for June, 1985. ,
Status: Closed (subject to response to Generic Letter 83-28)
DRAWINGS:
Logic: 9Z42110 Rev. 4 Electrical: 9-E-SP18-01 Rev. 1 5415N:0232N
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- 16. Describe the Solid State Logic Protection System Urgent Alarm (7.2) logic which was shown on FSAR Fig. 7.2-2.
1 j . Resolution: Covered with Item 17 Status: Closed i
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- 17. Describe the reactor trip logic when 2/3 actuation trains or safe-(7.2) guards test cabinets are inadvertently tested simultaneously (refer to FSAR statement in Section 7.3.1.2.2.5.1).
Resolution: Using Handout for Topic No.17 a description of the circuit was provided. There were no open items regarding the logic.
Status: Closed. [ Note: A copy of the SSPS and Safeguards Test Cabinet Technical Manuals will be made available at the HL&P Bethesda Licensing offices.]
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- 18. Using schematic drawings, discuss the excessive cooldown protec-(7.2) tion system (refer to FSAR Figure 7.2-9 and Table 7.1-2).
(7.3)
Resolution: No credit was taken in FSAR Chapter 15 analyses for the low-low compensated Tcold, which is an anticipatory feature provided for commercial considerations to avoid extra stress on equipment. Sensors are fast-response RTD's in the RCS loop (not manifold).
Status: Closed l
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- 19. Your response to 032.11 does not address the signal that would (7.3) assure the closure of turbine stop valves or any other steam valves for an MSLB, should the MSIV fail to close. Please discuss this concern.
Resolution: STP specific analysis has been performed to address blowdown of two SG's following a MSLB. Because STP has 3 trains of safety injection, the Chapter 15 analyses bound this case of failure of an MSIV after a MSLB.
Copy of letter given to NRC (ST-HL-AE-ll24, dated 9/28/84)
The staff asked that an item be added to the agenda for a review of the MSIV closure on SI and controls. See next two pages.
Status: Closed 5415N:0232N
24 of 69 March 29,1985 NEW ITEM SI SIGNAL TO MSIV's Discussion The MSIV's are isolated by the SI signal for two reasons: 1) Isolation on an SI signal will give less mass / energy / radiation release to secondary system, and 2) internal W criteria (since modified) on subcriticality.
The NRC noted that spurious actuations of the MSIV's would possibly result in commercial considerations.
For SGTR, the main steam bypass valve could be used to allow steam dump and cooldown.
Some concern could be raised on more frequent MSIV closures, potentially resulting in more safety valves lif ting and possibly sticking,
-over-pressurization of the SG, weakening of the SG tubes, etc.
RSB apparently has same concern.
Resolution: Concern noted. No further formal action. HL&P will take under advisement.
Status: Closed 5415N:0232N
25 of 69 March 29,1985 NEW ITEM MSIV CIRCUIT Resolution: Using design drawings, the MSIV operation was discussed.
During review of the MSIV schematic, concern was raised about a possible failure detection in the circuit, specifically in the "open permissive" switch contact remaining closed. This closed contact is not detected during block testing, and would only be detected during the actuate test, which is 1 perf ormed at a less frequent interval. This closed contact would prevent the safeguards signal of its train frcm effecting closure of the MSIV.
Status: Open Item. Address potential failure detection.
DRAWINGS:
Logic: 9Z40076 Rev. 3 Electrical: 9-E-MS13-01 Rev. 1 9-E-MS13-02 Rev. 1 9-E-M513-03 Rev. 1 5415N:0232N i . .
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- 20. Your response to Q32.29 is inadequate. Using instrument layout (7.2) drawings, discuss conformance of the RCS pressure sensors, which (7.6) are located outside the containment, to the recommendations of R.G.1.11 - Instrumentation Lines Penetrating Reactor Containment.
Resolution: Response to Q32.29 references Section 7.6, which refers to Section 6.2.4 for containment isolation provisions. In Section 6.2.4, it states that the RCS pressure sensors are handled in a manner similar to the containment pressure sensors, i.e., using double bellows design and hydraulic isolators.
The equipment drawings were reviewed, showing the design. No open items.
Status: Closed I
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- 21. Using schematic drawings, discuss the power lockout design for (7.3 ). certain ESF system valves which are listed in your response to Q32.32.
Resolution: A) CCW valves - The design and circuit were reviewed.
Power lockout for spurious actuation due to flooding is not required because of circuit design. Power lockout is retained however. Question response for Q32.32 will be revised to delete these valves. No open items (FSAR change to follow).
B) Accumulator isolation valves - The design and circuit were reviewed. The annunciator and bypass /inop alarms were reviewed.
C) Hot leg isolation valves - see item 47 0 pen Items
- 1. Provide discussion on power lockout breaker motor
- 2. Provide discussion on need for bypass /inop of power lockout 1
Resolution of Open Items
- 1. Switches for breaker motor are snap-action. Indication and breaker actual position are the same. No further questions or issues were raised.
- 2. Power lockout and valve positions are monitored frequently (draft Tech Specs were also examined).
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- 21. (Cont'd)
Status: Closed Action - Revise formal response to Q32.32.
' DRAWINGS:
P& IDS: 9F05018 Rev. 4 (CCW) 9F05013 Rev. 3 9F05014 Rev. 3 9F05015 Rev. 3 > (SI) 9F05016 Rev. 3 9F20000 Rev. 3, Logics: 9Z42043 Rev. 2 (CCW) 9Z42005 Rev. 3' 9Z42028 Rev. 4 > (SI) 9Z42029 Rev. 4 ;
Electrical: 9-E-CC26-01 Rev. 2 9-E-SIO3-01 Rev. 2 9-E-SI34-01 Rev. 2 9-E-SIl4-01 Rev. 1 9-E-SIl4-02 Rev. 1 5415N:0232N a .
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- 22. Using schematic drawings, discuss the automatic switchover design (7.3) from ECCS injection mode to recirculation mode. Address the (7.6) design in conformance with the IEEE Std. 279 requirements.
Resolution: The system design was reviewed with no open items.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID's 9F05013 Rev. 3 9F05014 Rev. 3 9F05015 Rev. 3 Logics 9Z42001 Rev. 2 9Z42002 Rev. 3 9Z42004 Rev. 2 9Z42114 Rev. 5 9Z42115 Rev. 4 9Z42117 Rev. 3 9Z42123 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
30 of 69 March 29,1985
- 22. (Cont'd)
Elementary 9-E-SIO4-01 Rev. 2 9-E-SIO7-01 Rev.' 1 9-E-SIO8-01 Rev. 2 9-E-SIO9-01 Rev. 2 9-E-SIl l-01 Rev. 1 9-E-SI12-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
31 of 69 March . 29,1985
- 23. Please provide the response to Q32.42 on IE Bulletin 79-27 (7.5) concerns.
Resolution: The response was reviewed and a copy of the response given to the NRC reviewers. . No open items were identified.
Status: Closed f
! Action - Submit formal response to Q32.42. (Completed by Letter -ST-HL-AE-1220, dated April 3,1985.)
i
[-
l 4
i-I
-5415N:0232N
7--
32 of 69 March 29,1985
- 24. Discuss the testing provision in the engineered safety feature (7.3) P-4 interlocks.
Resolution: P-4 is reactor tripped interlock. The concern is based on a
}[ reportable deficiency. HL&P is currently developing surveillance testing procedures. HL&P has some concerns relative to the )[ proposed solution (voltmeter).
Status: Open Item. NRC position is that new plants must have permanently installed test features. HL&P will address this concern by July 15, 1985, as noted in Attachment 5.
E f-
- 5415N:0232N
h.
33 of 69 March 29,1985
- 25. Using instrument installation drawings, discuss the sensors (7.2) installation and signal cable routing arrangement for RCP undervoltage and underfrequency measurements and their conformance to safety grade requirements.
Resolution: Cubicles for the RCP UV/UF relays are Class lE. The pump switchgear is non-Class lE.
f Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
Logic: 9Z42111 Rev. 4 Electrical: 9-E-SP28-01 Rev. 0 Vendor: 14926-4151-01016-AGX Single Line: 9-E-PCAA-01 Rev. 2 4
L 5415N:0232N
34 of 69 March 29,1985
- 26. Using schematic drawings, describe the design of pressurizer PORY (7.2) control and the block valve control, and verify that no single (7.6) failure will preclude the automatic actuation logic for all modes of operation.
Resolution: Westinghouse and Bechtel went through the design with no open items.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P& ids 9F05003 Rev. 2 Logics 9Z42160 Rev. 4 9Z42155 Rev. 4 i
Elementary 9-E-RC13-01 Rev. 2 9-E-RC05-01 Rev. O i
5415N:0232N
4 35 of 69 March 29,1985 '
- 27. Please expand Table 7.2-3 to include typical ranges and trip (7.2) accuracy for protection system interlocks P6, P7, P8, P9, P10, and P13.
Resolution: Westinghouse recommends leaving this information in the Tech Specs rather than adding to Table 7.2-3. Interlock ranges and trip accuracies are specifically addressed in the Tech
- Spec Table 3.3-4. NRC agrees to review this information with the Tech Specs.
Status: Closed 5415N:0232N
36 of 69 March 29,1985
- 28. Identify where instrument sensors or transmitters supplying (7.2) information to more than one protection channel are located in (7.3) a common instrument line or connected to a common instrument tap. The intent of this item is to verify that a single failure in a common instrument line or tap (such as break or blockage) cannot defeat required protection system redundancy.
Resolution: See response to Q32.45 (Item 48)
Different protection channels only applies to loop flow transmitters, which is addressed in response to Q03?.45.
No B0P sensors / transmitters in this issue.
Status: Closed 5415N:0232N 1
. - . . -_ . . _ . . _ - . - _ +
37 of 69 March 29,1985
- 29. FSAR Fig. 5.1-2 indicates that the flow indicator (FIS) for RCS (7.2 ) bypass loop RTD manifold is located outside the containment.
Please address that the design is in conformance with R.G. 1.11 "Instre... ant lines penetrating primary reactor containment." Also please verify that technical specifications will include surveillance requirements for these indications. (Ref: IE Information Notice 83-65).
Resolution: Symbol on P&ID is for shielding, not containment wall. The location drawings were reviewed to show that these devices are inside containment.
Tech Specs is not the proper place to address surveillance requirements for these instruments.
HL&P is committed to inclusion of surveillance requirements (addressing IE Information Notice 83-65) in the STP preventive maintenance program.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID: 9F05002 Rev. 2 Instrument Piping: 9Z00209 Rev. 5 9Z00210 Rev. 6 9Z00211 Rev. 3 9Z00212 Rev. 5 5415N:0232N
38 of 69 March 29,1985
- 30. Provide Failure Modes and Effects Analyses on the ESFAS as (7.3 ) by R.G.1.70 " Standard Format and Content of FSAR". Please note that the FEA of the ESFAS should be addressed on actuation system including the NSSS & B0P scope of supply. The interfaces with power sources, instrument air system and the cooling water system to vital equipment should also be addressed. In Amendment 41 Section 7.3.2.1, there was a statement on this subject, however, in Amendment 43, that section and Tables 7.3-12,13 and 14 were deleted. The staff finds that this further deviates from the R.G. 1.70 requirements.
Resolution: Amendment 43 - W and B0P FSAR sections are split.
7 3.1 - W ESFAS 7.3.2 - Control Room HVAC ESFAS 7.3.3 - Fuel Handling Building HVAC ESFAS B0P FEA's cover loss of power, failure of air supply, etc.
(Handout for Topic No. 30 lists FEA's)
Concern The ICSB raised a question concerning WCAP's on the FEAs which relate to 2 train (not 3 train) design being applicable to STP.
The NRC requested additional 3 train information.
5415N:0232N
7 39 of'69' March 29,1985
- 30. (Cont'd)
Westinghouse subsequently addressed the question of FMEA WCAP applicability to STP. Usingoverviews(handout), Westinghouse reviewed the 2 train SSPS design for safeguards components and for reactor trip breakers. For STP, the reactor trip function is handled'in the same way, except R = A and S = B. For safeguards components, the voting logics in R and S each drive up to 3 relay drivers, one for each actuation train (A, B and C). The relay drivers then interface with master relays, which then interface with slave' relays. Reliability is improved in that testing of a logic train leaves all 3 actuation trains operable; testing of an actuation train leaves both logic trains and the other actuation trains operable.
The hardware used is the same; it is tested in a similar fashion. The only real difference is an additional contact used in actuating the slave relays.
The SSPS design drawings were reviewed, including provisions for testing, separation, etc.
Based upon this review, the WCAP is seen by the staff reviewers as applicable to STP.
Status: Closed.
Action Item: Reference the WCAPs in Chapter 7, with justifying words for applicability. Address interface criteria being met also.
5415N:0232N
40 of 69 March 29, 1985 31.- Using detailed drawings, describe the ventilation systems used to (7.3) support engineered safety features areas including areas contain-(7.4) ing systems required for safe shutdown. Discuss the design bases for these systems including redundancy, testability, etc.
Resolution: The systems (listed in Handout for Topic No. 31) were reviewed with P&ID's and logics.
No open items were identified.
The staff asked that an item be added to the agenda for an overview of the ECW system.
Status: Closed' DRAWINGS:
, _P&ID'S: 9V10001 Rev. 4
, 9V10002 Rev. 3 9V10020 Rev. 3 9V10003 Rev. 4 9V00008 Rev. 4 9V10004 Rev. 3 9V00009 Rev. 3 9V00012 Rev. 3 9V25008 Rev. 4 9V00013 Rev. 3 9V00015 Rev. 4 9V00017 Rev. 4 0 e 4 5415N:0232N 2
41 of 69 March 29, 1985
- 31. (Cont'd.)
Logics: 9-Z-41553 Rev. 3 9-Z-41554 Rev. 3 9-Z-41724 Rev. 2 9-Z-41725 Rev. 1 9-Z-41726 Rev. 1 9-Z-41570 Rev. 1 9-Z-41592 Rev. 2 9-Z-41593 Rev. 1 9-Z-41634 Rev. 2 9-Z-41621 Rev. 3 9-Z-41622 Rev. 1 9-Z-41674 Rev. 2 9-Z-41675 Rev. 2 9-Z-41630 Rev. 3 9-Z-41657 Rev. 3 9-z-41572 Rev. 3 9-Z-41703 Rev. 2 9-Z-41573 Rev. 3 9-Z-41700 Rev. 2 9-Z-41581 Rev. 3 9-Z-41708 Rev. 1 9-Z-41705 Rev. 1 9-Z-41770 Rev. 0 Electrical: 9-E-HM08-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HM12-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HM18-02 Rev. 2 9-E-HM19-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
V I r-3
.r 42 of 69 March 29, 1985 A
i
- 31. (Cont'd.)
Electrical (Cont'd) ' 9-E-HM18-01 Rev. 2
<t <
9-E-HM20-01 Rev. 2 )
9-E-HM17-01 Rev. 2 2,s 9-E-HM22-01 Rev. 2 l 1
7 9-E-HC01 -01 Rev. 2 '
4 9-E-HC01-02 Rev.'2 9-E-HG01 -01 Rev. 2 j-
,/ 9-E-HG01 -02 Rev. 1
' 9-E-HZ01 -01 Rev. 2
( 9-E-HZ02-01 Rev. 2
.j 9-E-HZ03-01 Rev. 1
( 9-E-HCll-01 Rev. 2 9-E-hcl 2-01 Rev. 1 i
i 9-E'-hcl,3-01 Rev. 2
/ 9-E 7HC1'4-01 Rev. 1 9-E-HCZ8-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE09-01 Rev. 1 9-E-HE03-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE09-02 Rev. 2 9-E-Hell-03 Rev. 1 l 9-E-Hell-01 Rev. 0 i l
/
I
). ,
y '
1 ,
i i
541hN:0232N i
4 .
i 43 of 69 March 29, 1985 l
l
- 32. Using detailed system schematic drawings, describe how the (7.3) auxiliary feedwater system design meets the requirements of
( 7.4 ) NUREG-0737, item II.E.1.2. Include the following information in the discussion:
a) the effects of all switch positions on system operation.
l Status - no open issues identified b) the effects of single power supply failures on auxiliary feedwater control after automatic initiation circuits have been reset in a post accident sequence.
1 Status - no open issues identified l l
l c) the interface between non-safety-grade manual speed control for the AFW pump turbine to the safety grade initiation system.
Action - Update FSAR and Drawings (Logic and Elementary) d) the adequacy of steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump which is supplied by a single main steam line.
Status - no open issues identified e) any bypasses within the system.
l Status - no open issues identified f) the water sources of the auxiliary feedwater system and the capability to transfer from one source to the other.
5415N:0232N
44 of 69 March 29, 1985
- 32. (Cont'd)
Resolution: The AFST is the single source of water.
Status - No open issues identified g) design features provided to terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a steam generator affected by either a steam line or feed line break.
Resolution: Operator action to trip pumps within 30 minutes.
Status - no open issues identified h) system features associated with shutdown from outside the control room.
Status - no open issues identified Resolution: The. design was reviewed using system design drawings. Responses to items specifically questioned earlier by NRC are noted above. No open issues for item a, b, d, e, f, g, and h were identified. BEC took an action item to update the FSAR to reflect design changes for the auxiliary feedwater turbine driven pump control and provide logics and elementaries to the NRC.
Status: Closed Action - The FSAR will be revised to reflect the auxiliary feedwater turbine control design. Updated drawings will be provided as part of Section 1.7 package.
5415N:0232N
45 of 69 March 29,1985 DRAWINGS P&ID 9F00024 Rev. 4
'9F00020 Rev. 5 LOGICS ' 9Z40131 Rev. 2 9Z40132 Rev. 2 9Z40133 Rev. 2 9Z40134 Rev. 2 9Z40140 Rev. 1 9Z40142 Rev. 0 9Z40136 Rev. 2 9Z40141 Rev. 2 ELEMENTARY 9-E-AF01-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF06-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF08-01 Rev. 2 9-E-AF13-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF05-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF14-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF03-01 Rev. 2 9-E-AF07-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
46 of 69 March 29,1985
- 33. On August 6,1982, Westinghouse notified the staff of a potential undetectable failure in online tests circuitry for the master (7.3) relays in the engineered safeguards systems. The undetectable failure involves the output (slave) relay continuity proving
'."^ lamps and their associated shunts provided by test pushbuttons.
If after testing, a shunt is not provided for any lamp because of
~
a switch contact failure, any subsequent safeguards actuation could cause the lamp to burn out before its associated slave relay is energized. This would then prevent actuation of any associated safeguards' devices for that slave relay. Until an acceptable circuit modification is designed, Westinghouse has provided test procedures that ensure that the slave relay circuits operate normally when testing of the master relays is completed. Discuss this issue as applied to South Texas Units 1 and 2.
Resolution: }[ discussed the undetectable f ailure issue as it applies to STP.
No open items for ICSB; HL&P committed to incorporating the }[
wiring fix.
FCN's will be issued in April,1985.
Status: No open item for ICSB; HL&P to update response for 50.55e item.
5415N:0232N
47 of 69 March 29,1985
- 34. Using detailed plant design drawings, discuss the control room (7.3) HVAC system.
Resolution: ThE system was reviewed using P&ID's and logics.
No open items were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID'S: 9F25003 Rev. 4 9F25004 Rev. 5 9F25005 Rev. 4 Logics: 9-Z-41901 Rev. 2 9-Z-42124 Rev. 3 9-Z-41571 Rev. 2 9-Z-41587 Rev. 3 9-2-41707 Rev. 2 9-Z-41706 Rev. 0 9-Z-41597 Rev. 3 9-Z-41599 Rev. 2 9-Z-41594 Rev. 2 9-Z-41574 Rev. 3 9-Z-41575 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N a
48 of 69 March 29,1985
- 34. (Cont'd.)
-Logics (Cont'd) 9-Z-41595 Rev. 3 9-Z-41598 Rev. 3 9-Z-41596 Rev. 2 9-Z-41702 Rev. 2 Electrical: 9-E-HE14-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE14-02 Rev. 2 9-E-HE17-01 Rev. O.
9-E-HE02-02 Rev. 1 9-E-H E06-01 Rev. 1 9-E-HE04-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE05-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE15-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE01-01 Rev. 1 9-E-HE05-02 Rev. 1 9-E-HE02-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE07-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HE07-02 Rev. 2 l
l
\
5415N:0232N i * ,
49 of 69 March 29,1985
- 35. Using detailed plant design drawings, discuss the Fuel Handling (7.3) Building HVAC system.
Resolution: The system was reviewed using P&ID's and logics.
No open items were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID'S: 9V00012 Rev. 4 9V00013 Rev. 2 Logics: 9-Z-41903 Rev. 2 9-Z-42125 Rev. 2 9-Z-41601 Rev. 2 9-Z-41602 Rev. 2 9-Z-41617 Rev. 1 9-Z-41609 Rev. 1 9-Z-41608 Rev. 1 9-Z-41618 Rev. 2 9-Z-41600 Rev. 2 9-Z-41614 Rev. 3 9-Z-41741 Rev. 1 9-Z-41740 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
n-50 of 69 March 29,1985
- 35. (Cont'd.)
Electrical: 9-E-HF05-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HF06-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HFil-02 Rev. 2 9-E-HF07-02 Rev. 2 9-E-HF07-01 Rev. 1 9-E-HF03-01 Rev. 2 9-E-HF12-01 Rev. 1 9-E-HF18-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
51 of 69 March 29,1985
- 36. Using detailed plant design drawings, discuss the residual heat (7.4) removal system inlet isolation valves power sources and inter-(7.6) locks arrangements. Since all three RHR loops are located inside the containment, please demonstrate the operability of the RHR system assuming a single failure. What is the design basis for RHR system safety function capability? If only one RHR train is available, what is the impact on long term cooling?
Resolution: BEC went through the P& ids, logics, and schematics, with no open items. There is no automatic actuation of the RHR pumps and they are not-required for safety injection.
Status: Closed. (Power lockout addressed by Topic No. 21/47)
DRAWINGS:
P&ID's 9F20000 Rev. 3 Logics 9Z42180 Rev. 4 9Z42181 Rev. 2 9Z42182 Rev. 4 9Z42183 Rev. 3 9Z42185 -Rev. 3 L
Elementary 9-E-RH05-01 Rev. 1 9-E-RH04-01 Rev. 2 9-E-RH03-01 Rev. 1 9-E-RH02-01 Rev. 2
. 9-E-RH08-01 Rev. 2 9-E-RH01-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
52 of 69 March 29,1985
- 37. Using detailed plant drawings ~, discuss RCS letdown capability (7.4) including the reactor vessel head vent system.
Resolution: The drawings were reviewed with no open items.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS: Normal / Excess Letdown Head Vent P&ID 9F05005 Rev. 4 9F05001 Rev. 3 9F05006 Rev. 2 9F05004 Rev. 2 Logics 9Z42408 Rev. 3 9Z42163 Rev. 3 9Z42411 Rev. 3 9Z42410 Rev. 3 Elementary 9-E-CV13 Rev. 2 9-E-RC19-01 Rev. 1 9-E-CV13-02 Rev. 2 9-E-CV12-01 Rev. 2 9-E-CV12-02 Rev. 1 9-E-CV29-01 Rev. 1 9-E-CV32-01 Rev. 1
)
1 5415N:0232N l
, . I
53 of 69 March 29,1985
-38. Using detailed plant drawings, discuss the boration of RCS for (7.4) all modes of operation.
Resolution: Using system design drawings, the design for RCS boration was reviewed with one open concern identified.
Status: Closed - STP analysis on boron dilution is ongoing and due to be complete in mid-August 1985. (This is an open issue with RSB.)
DRAWINGS:
P& ids 9F05005 Rev. 4 9F05007 Rev. 4 9F05009 Rev. 4 5415N:0232N
]
s
54 of 69 March 29,1985 39.- Using detailed plant drawings, discuss the safe shutdown from (7.4)- outside the control room. Address the design in conformance with GDC-19.
Resolution: Safe shutdown from outside the control room was discussed.
No open items were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS: Equipment Layout SZ349Z44511 Rev. 1 SZ349Z44512 Rev. 1 4Z359Z44532 Rev. 1 4Z359Z44533 Rev. 2 4Z359Z44534 Rev. 1 4Z359Z44535 Rev. 1 4Z359244536 Rev. 1 4Z359Z44537 Rev. 2 Elementaries 9-E-AF03-01 Rev. 2 9-E-hcl 2-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF01-01 Rev. 1 9-E-AF01-20 Rev. 1 5415N:0232N
55 of 69 March 29,1985
- 40. Provide status of Qualified Display Processing System (QDPS)
(7.5) (Hardwareinstallationandsoftwaredevelopment).
Resolution: Handout for_ Topic No. 40 was provided on the QDPS status.
Suggested NRC audit dates were proposed:
June 15,1985 Verification of Software November 15, 1985 System Validation Testing Audit February 15, 1986 Final V&V Audit Formal transmittal of the V&V Plan Rev. 2 was provided (ST-HL-AE-1214 dated 3/28/85). (A copy was given to the reviewers.)
Status: Closed 5415N:0232N
56 of 69 March 29,1985
- 41. Using schematic drawings, discuss the RHR pump low flow interlock (7.6) and its effect on RHR system reliability.
Resolution: The drawings and interlock were discussed with no open items.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS: Same as 36.
i 1
5415N:0232N
r 57 of 69 March 29,1985
- 42. Using schematic drawings, discuss the Volume Control Tank level (7.6) interlock and its effect on Charging pump reliability.
Resolution: BEC walked through the design. The charging pumps are not started on SI for ECCS. It was concluded there was no concern related to the design.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P& ids 9F05007 Rev. 4 Logics 9-Z-42414 Rev. 2 9-Z-42415 Rev. 2 Elementary 9-E-CV05-01 Rev. 2 9-E-CV31-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
_ . . . - - ~
58 of 69 March 29,1985
- 43. Using schematic drawings, discuss the Spray Additive Tank level (7.6) interlock.
Resolution: The design drawings and process block diagrams were reviewed with no open items.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID 9F05037 Rev. 4 Logics 9Z42131 Rev. 4 Elementary 9-E-CS03-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
59 of 69 March 29,1985
- 44. Using schematic drawings, discuss the CVCS Seal Injection (7.6) Isolation Valves Charging Header Pressure interlock.
Resolution: BEC wa'1k'ed through the design. The CVCS Seal Injection Isolation Valves are isolated on Containment Isolation Phase A coincident with low charging header pressure. No action or open items were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P& ids 9F05005 Rev. 4 9F05007 Rev. 4 (See Item 42)
Logic 9-Z42413 Rev. 2 Elementary 9-E-CV08-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
60 of 69 March 29,1985
- 45. Using schematic drawings,-discuss the Letdown Valves Pressurizer (7.6) low level interlock.
Resolution: The drawings were reviewed with no concerns identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID 9F05003 Rev. 2 9F05005 Rev. 4 (See Item 44)
Logics 9Z42408 Rev. 3 9Z42411 Rev. 3 9Z42410 Rev. 3 Elementary 9-E-CV13-01 Rev. 2 9-E-CV13-02 Rev. 2 9-E-CV32-01 Rev. 1 9-E-CV29-01 Rev. 1 9-E-CV12-02 Rev. 1 9-E-CV12-01 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
61 of 69 March 29,1985 ,
- 46. Using schematic drawings, discuss the Reactor Coolant Purity
_(7.6) Control interlock.
Resolution: BEC walked through the design. No concerns were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID 9F05009 Rev. 4 Logics 9Z42449 Rev. 1 Elementary 9-E-CV43-01 Rev. 1 o
5415N:0232N
i 62 of 69 i March 29,1985 47.- Using schematic drawings, discuss the Hot Leg Recirculation (7.6) Operated valves power lockout design.
Resolution: The design and circuit were reviewed. Review was done in conjunction with Item 21. No remaining open issues.
Status: Closed 1
1
~
5415N:0232N etw---qap ,-vy evvw1,wer* w g- y opw w-v--es- y 1---w' q- ere--r~ g--g-w-ow ,ww-c9----y9.-,ae-, m-..>--mye%e&4eT97 f r----tm-T M 1F,WP"M-----Tw**'~>
9- &.m.,,,,
-63 of 69' March 29,1985 H- 48. Please provide the response to Question 32.45 on Control System Failures. L (7.7)
' Resolution: A response was provided to the ICSB; the response will be provided formally.
Status: Closed Action - Submit formal response to Q32.45. (Completed by Letter ST-HL-AE-1220, dated April 3, 1985.)
5415N:0232N
I 64 of 69 t March 29,1985 I
- 49. Please provide the response to Question 32.44 on IE Information
.(7.7) -Notice 79-22 concern.
Resolution: Response provided
.i Status: Closed Action . Submit formal response to Q32.44. (Completedby Letter ST-HL-AE-1220, dated April 3,1985.) ,
5415N:0232N
65 of 69 March 29,1985 NEW ITEM CCW SYSTEM OVERVIEW Resolution: Using system design drawings, the operation of the CCW system was reviewed.
No open issues were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS:
P&ID'S: 9F05017 Rev. 4 9F05018 Rev. 4 9F05019 Rev. 4 9F05020 Rev. 4 9F05021 Rev. 3 Level Setting Diagrams: 9Z45101 Sht. 4 Rev. 1 Sht. 5 Rev. 1 Sht. 6 Rev. 1 Sht. 7 Rev. 0 Logics: 9Z42040 Rev. 3 9Z42041 Rev. 2 9Z42042 Rev. 2 9Z42043 Rev. 2 5415N:0232N
66 of 69 March 29,1985 Logics (Cont'd) 9Z42044 Rev. 2 9Z42045 Rev. 2 9Z42046 Rev. 2 9Z42047 Rev. 2 9Z42049 Rev. 3 9Z42050 Rev. 2 9Z42051 Rev. 3 9Z42052 Rev. 3 9Z42053 Rev. 2 9Z42054 Rev. 3 9Z42055 Rev. 2 ,
9Z42056 Rev. 2 9Z42057 Rev. 2 9Z42058 Rev. 3 9Z42059 Rev. 3 9Z42060 Rev. 1 9Z42061 Rev. 2 9Z42062 Rev. 2 9Z42064 Rev. 0 9Z42065 Rev. 0 9Z42066 Rev. 0 9Z42067 Rev. 0 5415N:0232N
67 of 69 March 29, 1985 NEW ITEM ECW SYSTEM OVERVIEW Resolution: Using system design drawings, operation of the ECW System was discussed. Particular attention was paid to the control (by QDPS) of the essential chiller ECW control valves and ECW pump discharge valves use for venting.
No open issues were identified.
Status: Closed DRAWINGS P&ID 9F05038Rev.4(withDCNsandIDCNs) 9F05039 Rev. 4 IDCN's for 9V10001 (Essential Chilled Water System) also used 5415N:0232N
r ,
r 68 of 69 March 29, 1985 NEW ITEM MFIV CIRCUIT Resolution: Using design drawings, the valve operation we.s reviewed.
Open Concern: During testing, operation of both solenoids for venting the hydraulic fluid (causing valve to fail in closed position) is not being monitored to' assure proper operation.
Status: lOpen Item to address concern.
DRAWINGS Logic: 9Z40116 Rev. 2 Electrical: 9-E-FWO7-01 Rev. 1 9-E-FWO7-02 Rev. 0 9-E-FWO7-03 Rev. 0 .
- [ f i
5415N:0232N ,
t j b 4
69 of 69 March 29,1985 NEW. ITEM ;
TESTING PROCEDURES Provide a list of cases where leads are lifted or jumpers are used during surveillance testing. Provide justification for perfonning these actions. (For example, administrative checks and controls could be followed by testing after reconnection to verify that system has been restored to normal status.)
Resolution: Question was asked during last day of review meeting, and was recognized as an item for which no response could be available during the meeting.
Status: Open Item. List to be provided as indicated in question.
f 5
5 5415N:0232N
i ATTACHENT 4
- LIST OF HANDOUTS t e (ByTopicNumber) 1 Design Status 2 Open TMI Items 4 Electrical Distribution System l '$ 5 . Isolation Devices 6 Sensing Lines / Freeze Protection f
I 7 Non-IE to IE Control 11 Testine)(RG1.118) 12 Setpoin,t, Methodology S
/
r 17 SSPS 2/3 Testing l23 - Loss of Instrument Power
[! *
~
f , 30 FMEAs I
t 4 31 HVAC,ESF Support / Safe Shutdown Areas
, r. , ,,
f, . -
l( 40 QDPS Status /
\
's !,
Y 48 Control System Failures
~
f 49 Control System! Malfunctions due to HELB
\ '
- t. >,
i ,
4
', i
,1 ,
r-N
(
5291N:0230N/5-
O g HANDOUT FOR TOPIC 1 DESIGN COMPLETION STATUS
- SUBJECT DESIGN STATUS High Energy Line Break Ongoing effort to determine zones of and Hazards Reviews influence and appropriate protection of instrumentation. Design changes approved and partially implemented to terminate auxiliary steam flow in MAB on detection of 1
high flows and high room temperatures and to terminate letdown flow in MAB on high room l
temperatures. .
P-9/ Anticipatory Trip Design change approved and implemented on
! Modification STP Functional Diagrams. Incorporation (NUREG-0737II.K.3.10) in design documents ongoing. CCP/FCN in preparation.
Urgent Alarm Design change initiated to incorporate alarm into plant annunciator.
l Non-lE input to IE Control Design change identified to modify CCW pump of CCW pumps protective logic to upgrade flow switches (STP 10CFR50.55e Item) to lE qualification and to delete non-1E level switches from pump logic.
Power lockout implementation Design change identified to delete of Train B CCW RCFC redundant valve position indication. Valve Isolation Valves control circuit design currently alleviates need for power lockout to prevent spurious valve operation due to flooding. Power lockout design will not be modified, to prevent degradation of Class 1E power source following flooding of valve.
l
- i. Emergency Containment Design change approved to add NaOH tank and i
Sump pH Control discharge valves inside containment.
Instrumentation and control systems design ongoing. CCP/FCN activities initiated.
03999/0009g
SUBJECT DESIGN STATUS Design ongoing.
Qualified ProcessingDisplay System (QDPS)
ECW Chiller Control Design change approved. Incorporation of design into QDPS and STP design documents ongoing. CCP in preparation.
ECW Pump Discharge Design change approved. Incorporation in Valve Control (Protection design documents ongoing. CCP in againstwaterhammer) preparation.
AFW Turbine Speed Control Design change approved to delete Non-lE speed control. Incorporation in design documents ongoing.
s Emergency Response Facilities Display development ongoing.
Data Acquisition and Display System (ERFDADS)/ Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Displays lolidStateProtection Design changes approved. Incorporation in System (SSPS) relays and design documents ongoing. FCN in wiring changes for preparation.
sequencer and STP specific interfaces SSPS Undetectable Design change approved. Incorporation in failure design documents ongoing. FCN in preparation.
Auto Shunt Trip Dasign change approved. Incorporation in' design documents ongoing. FCN in preparation.
Closure of Letdown Design change approved and incorpot-ated in Isolation Valves on design documents. FCN.in Containment Isolation preparation.
Phase A HVAC Electrohydraulic Design Change approved to:
Controllers for Dampers A) FHB: Remove closed loop control on (Control Room and flow and incorporate vendor Fuel Handling Building) design interface B) Control Room: Incorporate vendor design interface Incorporation in design documents ongoing.
CCP in preparation.
03999/00099
I'
- HAposur arrm 2
- 2. As called for in Section 7.1 of the Standard Review Plan, provide (7.1) information as to how your design conforms with the following:
a) II.D.3 - Relief and Safety Valve Position Indication b) II.E.1.2 - Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation and Flow Indication c) II.K.3.10 - Proposed Anticipatory Trip Modification In FSAR Appendix 7A, responses to NUREG-0737 requirements, the above 3 items are indicated "later." Please provide the current status.
5244N:0228N/3 .. . ,
. . II.D.3 DIRECT INDICATION OF RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE POSITION Position (NUREG 0737)
Reactor coolant system relief and safety valves shall be provided with a positive indication in the control room derived from a reliable valve position detection device or a reliable indication of flow in the discharge pipe.
Clarification (1) The basic requirement is to provide the operator with unambiguous indication of valve position (open or closed) so that appropriate operator actions can be taken, ,
(2) The valvc position should be indicated in the control room. An alarm should be provided in conjunction with this indication.
1 (3) The valve position indication may be safety grade. If the position indication is not safety grade, a reliable single-channel direct' indication powered from a vital instrument bus may be provided if backup methods of determining valve position are available and are discussed in the emergency procedures as an aid to operator diagnosis of an action.
(4) The valve position indication should be seismically qualified consistent with the component or system to which it is attached.
(5) The position indication should be qualified for its appropriate 44 environment (any transient or accident that would cause the relief or safety valve to lift) and in accordance with Commission Order, May 23rd,
~1 980 (CLI-20-81).
(6) It is important that the displays and controls added to the control room as a result of this requirement not increase the potential for operator error. A human-factors analysis should be performed, taking the following into consideration:
(a) The use of this information by an operator during both normal and l.
abnormal plant conditions.
(b) The integration into emergency procedures.
(c) The integration into operator training.
(d) Other alarus during emergency and need for prioritization of alarms.
STP Response Position indication is provided for each safety valve and power-operated relief valve (PORV) that indicates when the valve is not in its fully closed position. The position detectors are seismically and environmentally qualified. Position indication for each valve is displayed in the control room, and an alarm is provided if any of the PORVs or safety valves is not fully closed. Relief and safety valve position indication is further described in Sections 5.4.13, 7.5, and Appendix 7B.
Amendmnet 4 7A.II.D.3-1
- STP FSAR Appsndix 7A Other nonsafety-related instrumentation is provided on the valve discharge piping and the pressurizer relief tank to provide alternate means of assessing the status of the safety valves and PORVs (see- Figures 5.1-3 and 5.1-4). 44 The integration of the position indication and alarms into the control room design was performed taking into consideration human factors concerns as described in Appendix 7A, Items I.D.1 and S.S.
7A.II.D.3-2 Amendment 44
.i
II.E.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AUTOMATIC INITIATION AND FLOW INDICATION PART 1: Auxiliary Feedwater System Automatic Initiation Position (NUREG 0737)
Consistent with satisfying the requirements of General Design Criterion 20 of Appendix A to 10CFR50 with respect to the timely initiation of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS), the following requirements shall be implemented in the short term:
(1) The design shall provide for the automatic initiation of the AFWS.
(2) The automatic initiation signals and circuits shall be designed so that a single failure will not result in the loss of AFWS function.
(3) Testability of the initiating signals and circuits shall be a feature of the design.
(4) The initiating signals and circuits shall be powered from the emergency buses.
(5) Manual capability to initiate the AFWS from the control room shall be retained and shall be implemented so that a single failure in the manual circuits will not result in the loss of system function.
(6) The ac motor-driven pumps and valves in the AFWS shall be included in the automatic actuation (simultaneous and/or sequential) of the loads onto the emergency buses.
(7) The automatic initiating signals and circuits shall be designed so that their failure will not result in the loss of manual capability to initiate the AFWS from the control room.
In the long term, the automatic initiation signals and circuits shall be upgraded in accordance with safety-grade requirements.
Clarification The intent of this recommendation is to assure a reliable automatic initiation system. This objective can be met by providing a system that meets all the requirements of IEEE Standard 279-1971.
The staff has determined that the following salient paragraphs of IEEE 279-1971 should be addressed as a minimum:
IEEE 279-1971, Paragraph 4.1 General Functional Requiremer.ts 4.2 Single Failure 4.3 & 4.4 Qualification 4.6 Channel Independence 5339N:0231N/l A
4.7 Control and Protection System Interaction 4.9 & 4.10 Capability for Testing 4.11 Channel Bypass 4.12 Operating Bypass 4.13 Indication of Bypass 4.17 Manual Initiation STP Response Safety-grade atitomatic initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is provided as described in Sections 7.3 and 10.4.9. The automatic initiation meets the appropriate requirements of IEEE 299-1971.
I 5339N:0231N/2 E - _ . - , . _.
0 II.E.1.2 PART 2: Auxiliary Feedwater System Flowrate Indication Position (NUREG 0737)
Consistent with satisfying the requirements set forth in General Design Criterion 13 to provide the capability in the control room to ascertain the
' actual performance of the AFWS when it is called to perform its intended function, the following requirements shall be implemented:
(1) Safety-grade indication of auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator shall be provided in the control room.
(2) The auxiliary feedwater flow instrument channels shall be powered from the emergency buses, consistent with satisfying the emergency power diversity requirements of the auxiliary feedwater system set forth in Auxiliary Systems Branch Technical Position 10-1 of the Standard Review Plan, Section 10.4.9.
Clarification The intent of this recommendation is to assure a reliable indication of AFWS performance. This objective can be met by providing an overall indication system that meets the following appropriate design principles:
(1) For Babcock and Wilcox Plants (not applicable to STP)
(2) For Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering Plants (a) le satisfy these requirements, W and C-E plants must provide as a minimum one auxiliary feedwater flowrate indicator and one wide range steam generator level indicator for each steam generator or two flow rate indicators.
(b) The flow indication system should be:
(i) Environmentally qualified (ii) Powered from highly reliable, battery-backed non-Class 1E power source (iii) Periodically testable (iv) Part of plant quality assurance program (v) Capable of display on demand It is important that the displays and controls added to the control room as a result of this requirement not increase the potential ror operator error. A human factors analysis should be performed taking into consideration:
(1) The use of this information by an operator during both normal and abnormal plant conditions.
(2) The integration into emergency procedures.
5339N:0231N/3 4
1 (3) The integration into operator training.
(4) Other alarms during emergency and need for prioritization of alarms.
STP Response Safety-grade auxiliary feedwater flow indication to each steam generator is pro /ided as described in Sections 7.5 and 10.4.9 and Appendix 7B.
Safety-grade wide range steam generator water level indication is provided as described in Section 7.5 and Appendix 7B.
The integration of the auxiliary feedwater and wide range steam generator water level displays into the control room was performed taking into consideration human factors concerns as described in Appendix 7A (Items I.D.1 and S.5) and Appendix 78.
l 5339N:0231N/4 l
STP FSAR APPENDIX 7A II.K.3.10 PROPOSED ANTICIPATORY TRIP MODIFICATION Position (NUREG 0737)
The anticipatory trip modification proposed by some licensees to confine the range of use to high-power levels should not be made until it has been shown on a plant-by-plant basis that the probability of a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) resulting from a stuck-open power-operated relief valve (PORV) is substantially unaffected by the modification.
Clarification The evaluation is required for only those licensees / applicants who propose the modification.
STP Response This anticipatory trip modification (deletion of reactor trip on turbine trip below 50% power) is included in the STP design.
The West aghouse analysis report, in response to Three Mile Island action item !* ' 3.;", shows that the design for South Texas is such that a
' urb:- ertu *thout a direct or immediate reactor trip presents no hazard
'c .ne reactor i.oolant system or the main steam supply system.
2 analysis w4el be submitted in a near-future amendment to the FSAR.
.=
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B.O.P. SYSTEMS The various class-1E isolation devices used between separation groups and/or between safety and nonsafety systems are:
A. FERRO RESONANT TRANSFORMRS FOR Essentiallighting sr B. CIRCUIT BREAKERS (imwt:u ON.SIG4AL)
FOR: 480 V sys, press, HTR's and non-class 1E MCC's.
C. DIGTTAL ISCLATORS (OPTICAL)
FOR: Emergerraf response facility data acquisition display (ERF/ DAD) sys. cc vger irputs, md class 1E DG panels, rad. mort sys.
D. ANALOG ISOLATORS (TRAS S.COUPL(D)
FOR: ERF/ DAD sys. corrper i@. -
E. CONTROL SWITCES (WITH 6" SEPARATION OR BARRIERS)
~
, FOR: Class 1E DG panels.
F. CONTROL CIRCUIT FUSES FOR Class 1E DG panels,4.16 kV swgr. and ECW traveling
- -water screens.
' G. RELAYS (POTTER APO BRUWIELD TYPE MJR ROTARY)
FOR: aux. relay ISQ, panels for process systems.
(
H. CURRENT TRANSFORMERS (DONLK TYPE)
FOR: main control board indicatiort J
. t
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1 l
l TESTS ON ISOLATION DEVICES (PROCRXJRES OR PERFORfED)
The isolation devices are seismically [R.G.1.100 (IEEE 344-1975)]
and environmentally [R.G.1.89 (IEEE 323-1974)] qualified.
Additionalinformation:
FERRO RESONANT TRANSFORMERS Routine test included short circuit and surge withstand test l DIGITAL ISOLATORS Bum-Irs functional, hi pot (3 kV de and 15 kV ac) f ANALOG ISOLATORS (ERF/ DADS) l Bum-in, functional, hi pot (3kV do and 1.5 kV ac), linearity, power l drift. saturation, failure modes DIGITAL As part ofAIO theANALOG isolationISOLATORS device (ERF/ DADS) l IEEE 472 surge withstand c@ panel testing ility test (Energy was per Incorporated) formed l
I CONiNOL CIRCUIT FUSES Test pr%wii is under develers.wsnt, vendors are being asked to provide fuse resistance values. including tolerance and temperature condition REl_AYS -
Test procedure includes; hi pot (1000 volt + 2 times nominal voltage for 1 minute, or the above + 20% for 1 second)
( - - - - - - - - -
~
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN COMPARISONS ON POSITIONS FOR REGULATORY GUIDE 1.151, INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES Regulatory Position STP Position Section 5.1 - A single process tap is used in cases where it is j impracticable to have redundant process pipe taps (e.g., reactor coolant flow). A single failure in a common tap will not defeat l
required protection system redundancy.
I Section 6.1.8 - Conform, except:
l 0 Pipe thread connections at instruments may be used, and are normally 3/4" NPT or less.
o Pipe thread connections may be used for connections to valves 2nd/or other accessories.
Section 6.3.2 - Conform, except the restriction device is installed in the outlet of the root valve. The root valve is the same piping l
classification as the process pipe.
Section 6.3.3 - The instrument lines that penetrate containment are containment pressure and reactor coolant wide range pressure (RCWRP) sensing lines. These lines are sealed systems with bellow seals inside containment with sealed, liquid-filled capillaries between these seals and the sensing element outside containment. RCWRP l
includes a secondary isolation seal
! outside the containment. Contain-
! ment atmosphere sample lines are equipped with remote-operated isolation valves inside and outside containment.
Section 6.4 - Flow check valves are not used on STP instrument sensing lines.
5282N/5283N 0229N/2
. SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT 4
DESIGN COMPARISONS ON POSITIONS FOR REGULATORY GUIDE 1.151, INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES Regulatory Position STP Position
- 1. The requirements for instrument 1. Conform.
sensing lines in section 4.1 of ISA-567.02 should be supplemented with the following: a single instrument sensing line should not be used to perform both a safety-related function and a nonsafety-related function unless it can be shown that:
- a. The failure of the common sensing line would not simulta-neously (1) cause an action in a nonsafety-related system that results in a plant condition requiring protective action and (2) also prevent proper action of a protection system channel designed to protect against the
-condition; or
- b. If the failure of the common sensing line can cause an action in a nonsafety-related system that results in a plant condi-tion requiring protective action and can also prevent proper action of a protection system channel designed to protect against the condition, the remaining redundant protection channels are capable of provid-ing the protective action even when degraded by a second random failure. The rupture of a second instrument sensing line need not be considered as a second random failure.
Provisions should be included so that this requirement can still be met if-a channel is bypassed or removed from service for test or 5282N/5283N.
0229N/3' J
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN COMPARISONS ON POSITIONS FOR REGULATORY GUIDE 1.151, INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES
. Regulatory Position STP Position maintenance purposes. Acceptable provisions include reducing the required coincidence, defeating the signals taken from the same sensing line in nonsafety-related systems, or initiating a protective action from the bypassed channel.
- 2. The mechanical design require- 2. Conform, except as noted above.
ments in tables 1 and 2 and figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8 of ISA-567.02 for instrument sensing lines con-nected to ASME Class 1 and 2 pro-cess piping and vessels should be supplemented with the following:
- a. Instrument sensing lines 2.a. Conform.
that are connected to ASME Class 1 or 2 process piping or vessels should not be less than ASME Class 2, Seismic Category 1, from their connections to the process piping or vessel to and including the accessible isola-tion valve.
- b. Instrument sensing lines 2.b. Conform.
that are connected to ASME Class 1 or 2 process piping or vessels and that are used to actuate or monitor safety-related systems should not be less than ASME Class 2, Seismic Category 1, from their connections to the process piping or vessel to the sensing instrumentation.
- 3. The mechanical design require- 3. Conform, except as noted above.
ments in tables 1 and 2 and figures 5, 6, and 9 of ISA-S67.02 for instrument sensing lines connected to ASME Class 3 process piping and vessels should be supplemented with the following:
5282N/5283N 0229N/4
)
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN C0t@ARIS0NS ON POSITIONS FOR REGULATORY GUIDE 1.151, INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES
. Regulatory Position STP Position Instrument sensing lines that are connected to ASME Class 3 process piping and vessels and that are used to actuate or monitor safety-related systems should not be less than ASME Class 3, Seismic Category 1, from their connection to the process piping or vessel to the sensing instrumentation.
- 4. Freezing temperatures should be 4. Conform.
added to the environmental and installation conditions listed in section 5.2.1(5) of ISA-S67.02 that sensing lines should be able to withstand and continue to perform
.their function.
- 5. The special considerations in 5. Regulatory position C.5 does section 5.2.2 of ISA-S67.02 that not apply to STP in that no should be addressed in the design safety-related instruments have and installation of instrument sen- sensing lines that are considered sing lines should be supplemented to be subject to freezing.
with the following:
- a. Instrument sensing lines that can be exposed to freezing temperatures and that contain or can be expected to contain a condensable mixture or fluid that can freeze should be pro-vided an environmental control system (heating and ventilation or heat tracing) to protect the 1 lines from freezing during I I
extremely cold weather.
- b. The environment associated )
with those instrument sensing lines in item a that are safety related should be monitored and alarmed so that appropriate cor-rective action can be taken to prevent loss of or damage to the lines from freezing in the event of loss of the environmental control system.
5282N/5283N 0229N/5 ,
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT DESIGN COMPARISONS ON POSITIONS FOR REGULATORY GUIDE 1.151, INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES
-Regulatory Position STP Position
- c. The environmental control system recomended in item a, and for which item b applies, should be electrically indepen-dent of the monitoring and alarm system so that a single failure in either system, including their power sources, does not affect the capability of the other system.
- d. The environmental control and monitoring systems of items a and b should be designed to standards comensurate with their important to safety and with administrative controls that are implemented to address events or conditions that could render the systems inoperable.
- 6. The Sumer 1981 Addenda to 6. STP conforms to an earlier,Section III of the ASME Boiler and more stringent edition of ASME Sec-Pressure Vessel Code deleted tion III for design and installa-Paragraphs NB-3676, NC-3676, and tion of instrument sensing lines.
ND-3676 in their entirety.
References to these paragraphs in sections 4.2.1, 6.2, and 7 of ISA-S67.02 should be disregarded.
Conclusion While the implementation statement of this guide specifically excludes the South Texas Project, the design and installation of STP instrument sensing lines does comply with R.G.
l 1.151 and ISA-S67.02, as described i above.
l l
l l 5282N/5283N 0229N/6 , ,_ _ , , _
t HMOON FOK ZTw' 1 NON 1E/IE DEVICE INTERFACE SupMARY INTERFACING COPPONENT(S) FUNCTION (S) FAILURE RESULT (S) REMARKS SYSTEM Component Component Cooling Water Trip Pump on Low Surge Trip & Possibly Maintain Delete Surge Tank Low Level Trip Cooling Water Pump 1A Tank Level / Trip Pump Trip on CCW Pump Upgrade or Delete Flow Loop on Low Flow - pump protection Component Component Cooling Water Trip Pump on Low Surge Trip & Possibly Maintain Delete Surge Tank Low Level Trip Cooling Water Pump 1B Tank Level / Trip Pump Trip on CCW Pump Upgrade or Delete Flow Loop on Low Flow - pump protection Component Component Cooling Water Trip Pump on Low Surge Trip & Possibly Maintain Delete Surge Tank Low Level Trip Cooling Water Pump IC Tank Level / Trip Pump Trip on CCW Pump Upgrade or Delete Flow Loop on Low Flor - pump protection Component Cooling Component Cooling Water Auto Start Standby Failure to Auto Start o Pumps can be manually operated Water / Essential Pump 1A/ Essential Cooling Water Pumps Standby Pump (s) on Low Pressure from CR or Relay Room Cooling Water Pump 1A o Pumps Auto Start on 51 o Pumps Start on LOOP Component Cooling Component Cooling Water Auto Start Standby Failure to Auto Start o Pumps can be manually operated Water / Essential Pump IB/ Essential Cooling Water Pumps Standby Pump (s) on Low Pressure from CR or Relay Room Cooling Water Pump 1B o Pumps Auto Start on $1 o Pumps Start on LOOP Component Cooling Component Cooling Water Auto Start Standby Failure to Auto Start. o Pumps can be manually operated Water / Essential Pump IC/ Essential Cooling Water Pumps Standby Pump (s) on Low Pressure from Control Room or Relay Room Cooling Water Pump IC o Pumps Auto Start on 51 o Pumps Start on LOOP Component Cooling Component Cooling Water Close Valves on Low Failure to Close Valves on o Valves can be manually operated Water to NNS Loads isolation Valves Surge Tank Level - Low Surge Tank Level from Control Room anticipatory NNS o Header Isolated by 1E Surge Tank load isolation Low-3 Level Sensors Rtactor Makeup Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Auto Start RMW Pump (s) Failure to Auto Start RMW Pump (s) can be manually operated from Water System from CVCS Pump (s) Control Room - not safety function Reactor Makeup Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Stop RMW Pump (s) on Stop & Possibly Prevent Both pumps can be manually operated Water System 10-10 Tank Level Start of RMW Pump (s) from from Relay Room - System requirements Control Room allow adequate time for action outside Control Room RIactor Makeup Reactor Makeup System Non- Close Valves on Low Failure to Close Valves on o Valves can be manually operated from Water System Essential Services Valves Tank Level - Low Tank Level Control Room anticipatory NNS o Calculated leakage is much less than
- services isolation maximum makeup into tank o Tank level indication and low level alarm 03629/0008g
r' NON 1E/IE DEVICE INTERFACE SIMERT SYSTEM INTERFACING CopFONENT(S) FUNCTION (S) FAILURE RESULT (S) REMARKS Control Room Control Room Makeup Close Control Room Failure to Close Dampers o Dampers can be manually operated Envelope HVAC Isolation Dampers Isolation P3mpers ' from Control Room on Smoke or Chemical o Failure cannot defeat safety action Release Ccntrol Room Relay Room Fire Close Control Room Failure to Close Dampers o Dampers can be manually operated Envelope HVAC Protection Dampers Fire Protection from Control Room Damoers on Halon o Failure cannot defeat safety action; release to computer 51 signal opens dampers room Rractor Coolant Pressurizer Heaters Operate Backup Heaters Failure to Operate Heaters o Manual Operation of Backup Heaters System (Backup Group 1A, 18) on Pressure & Level from Auxiliary shutdown panel to for normal control re-load onto ESF bus.
(Auto Mode / Manual Mode) o Breaker position indication in Control Room (lights and ERFDADS display)
Rtactor Coolant Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Open Pressurizer PORV ' Failure to Open Pressurizer PORY o Valves can be manually operated from System Power Operated Relief Valves for normal pressur? - Control Room or Switchgear Room control #
o Manually operated valve in series can be used if required Chemical & Boric Acid Transfer Auto Start Boric Failure to Auto Start Pumps can be manually operated from Volume Control Pumps lA, 18 Transfer Pumps in Pumps IA, 1B Control Room or Switchgear Room - nut System Reactor Coolant a safety function Makeup Mode Feedwater Feedwater Isolation Valves Valve open permissive Failure to Close Valves o Valves can be manually operated from on: Control Room o SG Water Level o Valves Close Automatically on o SG Pressure Feedwater Isolation Signal o Feedwater o Failure cannot defeat safety action Temperature o Bypass Flow
( Anti-water hansner protection)
RCB HVAC Normal RCB Normal & Supplementary Close valves on Failure to Close Valves o Valves can be manually operated
& Supplementary Purge Isolation Valves HI RCB Atmosphere from Control Room Purge Radiation o Valves also provided with close signals from quallfled, redundant purge monitors or from 51 signal 0362g/0008g 1
O r
HAHoovr foK ITEM ll STP FSAR Ouestion 430.14N l
In Table 3.12-1 you state that Regulatory Guide 1.108, 1.118 and 1.128 are not applicable to STP due to implementation date. These Regulatory Guides reflect staff practice used in evaluating plants for a year or more prior to implemer,tation dates. Provide a detailed discussion of compliance or justification for noncompliance. Your discussion of Regulatory Guide 1.108 should include the criteria for first out alarm !
for diesel generator protection and the testability of the protection l system for the diesel generator. Modify your FSAR accordingly.
Response
'- As stated in Section 8.3.2.2.5, the Class IE DC System at STP is in compliance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.128.
STP will conform to the intent of R.G. 1.118 concerning IEEE 338-77, Section 6. " Testing Program," however, during procedures development, exceptions and clarifications may be identified. Table 3.12..I and applicable FSAR sections shall be revised to reflect any exceptions.
STP will comply with the inte'nt of RG 1.108 with the interpretations and exceptions presented in Section 8.3.1.2.10.
Section 8.3.1.2.10 and Table 3.12-1 have been revised to incorporate the above changes.
Surveillance test requirements will be incorporated into the STP Technical Specifications.
i Vol. 2 Q&R 3.12-2N Amendment 45-4
. - - . ~ . , _. ._. .__.--, .__ _._._ _ . _ _ _ ,__ _ __. _ _ _ _ , ,___
H AsIOoor f'og jren\ og WESTINGHOUSE SETPOINT METHODOLOGY REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS FEATURES TRIP SETPOINT CALCULATIONS UTILIZING STATISTICAL SETPOINT METHODOLOGY
- 1. : POWER RANGE, NEUTRON FLUX-HIGH AND LOW SETPOINTS
- 2. POWER RANGE, NEUTRON FLUX-HIGH POSITIVE RATE AND HIGH NEGATIVE RATE
- 3. INTERMEDIATE RANGE, NEUTRON FLUX
- 4. SOURCE RANGE, NEUTRON FLUX
- 5. OVERTEMPERATURE AT
- 6. OVERPOWER AT
- 7. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE - LOW AND HIGH, REACTOR TRIPS
- 8. PRESSURIZER WATER LEVEL - HIGH
- 9. LOSS OF FLOW
- 10. STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL - L0w-LOW
- 11. CONTAINMENT PRESSURE - HIGH AND HIGH-HIGH-HIGH
- 12. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE - L0w, SAFETY INJECTION
- 13. STEAMLINE PRESSURE - LOW
- 14. NEGATIVE STEAMLINE PRESSURE RATE - HIGH
- 15. STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL - HIGH-HIGH
- 16. TAVG - LOW
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- 23. Please provide tne response to Q32.42 on IE Bulletin 79-27 ;
(7.5) concerns.
l 1
l l
l 5244N:0228N/24 -
)
Attachment 1 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 1 of 4 Question 032.42 If reactor controls and vital instruments derive power from common-electrical distribution systems, the failure of such electrical distribution systems may result in an event requiring operator action concurrent with failure of important instrumentation upon which these operator actions should be based. This concern was addressed in IE Bulletin 79-27 (enclosed). On November 30, 1979, IE Bulletin 79-27 was sent to operating license (OL) holders, the near term OL applicants (North Anna 2, Diablo Canyon, McGuire, Salem 2, Sequoyah, and Zimser), and other holders of construction permits (CP), including South Texas Project. Gf these recipients, the CP holders were not given explicit direction for making a submittal as part of the licensing review. However, they were informed that the issue would be addressed later.
You are requested to address these issues by taking IE Bulletin 79-27 Actions 1 thru 3 under " Actions to be Taken by Licensees". Within the response time called for in the attached transmittal letter, complete the review and evaluation required by Actions 1 thru 3 and provide a written response describing your reviews and actions.
e e
e e
6 e
M -
M b bO blassic a s h a ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 2 of 4 BEEEQNSE The responses to each action item of IE Dulletin 79-27 are given below by .
cction item number. I
- 1. A review of the instrumentation and control systems which could affect th3 ability to achieve a hot standby condition (see Section 7.4) and a cola shutdown condition (see Appendix 5.4A) has been performed. Each of 1 th se systems is supplied power from one of the redundant Class 1E 120 vac or 125 vdc buses. Refer to Figure 8.3-3.
Tha Class 1E 120 vac power is provided from one of the six 120 volt vital cc channel distribution panels. Each panel is supplied power through manual transfer circuit breakers from an individual inverter. There are two panels each for Channels I and IV and one panel each for Channels II cnd III. See also Section 8.3.1.1.4.5.
Tha Class 1E 125 vdc power is provided from one of the four 125 vdc dictribution switchboards. Each switchboard is connected to a separate battery and two battery chargers. See also Section B.3.2.1.1.
Turbine, non-safety-related reactor and other non-safety-related inctrumentation and control systems are provided power from non-Class 1E p nels and switchboards. Refer to Figure 8.3-3. The non-Class 1E 120 vac power f or the EAB is provided f rom one of two 120 volt vital ac i
dictribution panels, each connected to an automatic transfer switch and an individual inverter. Another 120 volt vital at distribution panel is provided in the TGB; this panel is connected to an inverter package with cn internal static transfer switch. Two 120 vac regulated power j diotribution panels are also provided for non-Class 1E instrumentation and control systems.
I Tha non-Class 1E 125 vdc power is provided from two 125 vde distribution twitchboards, each connected to one battery and two battery chargers. A
<8 vdc distribution switchboard supplying power only to the plant cnnunciator system is connected to one battery and two battery chargers.
A non-Class 1E 250 vdc distribution switchboard is provided in the TGB, ccrving motors and the main generator breaker control panels; it is connected to one battery and two battery chargers.
A caparate non-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply system (120 vac) is provided for the plant computer. The ERF computer is powered from non-Class 1E 480 vac and has an uninterruptible power supply system to cupport its functions during a loss of power.
Tha Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) computer is powered from non-Class 1E 480 vac and has an uninterruptible power supply system to support its I
f unctions during a loss of power.
Non-Class 1E power is not required to support the ability to achieve hot otendby or cold shutdown conditions. However, the non-Class 1E power cupports indications to the operator (such as computer alarms and cnnunciation) of abnormal conditions and control systems normally used during plant operating modes.
n u%. m.s . . . .
ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 3 of 4 10.' Loss of power to each of the six Class 1E 120 volt vital at
] distribution panel buses is alarmed individually in the control room on a window of the ESF status monitoring system. A ground fault on any of thase panel buses is alarmed individually on a window of the plant cnnunciator as Panel Trouble. The ERF computer also indicates that a loss of power or a ground fault has occurred. Alarms are provided for each inverter through the ERF computer and either the annunciator or the ESF ctatus monitoring system.
Loss of power to each of the four Class 1E 125 vdc distribution twitchboard buses is alarmed individually in the control room on a reflash window of the plant annunciator, along with other bus and battery charger alcres, as System Trouble. The ERF computer indicates whether bus or chcrger trouble has occurred.
Lens of power or a ground fault to the two EAB non-Class 1E 120 volt vital cc distribution panel buses is alarmed individually in the control room l through the plant computer. Alarms are provided for each inverter through thm annunciator and the plant computer.
Loss of power or a ground f ault to the TGB non-Class 1E 120 volt vital ac diotribution panel bus is alarmed in the control room through the plant computer. Inverter / rectifier alarms are provided through the plant computer and the annunciator.
' Loss of power to either of the two non-Class 1E 120 vac regulated power dictribution panel buses is alarmed in the control room through the plant computer.
Loss of power to either of the two non-Class 1E 125 vdc switchboard buses to clarmed individually in the control room on a reflash window of the plcnt annunciator, along with other bus and battery charger alarms, as System Trouble.
The plant computer indicates whether bus or charger trouble has occurred.
Lons of power to the non-Class 1E 48 vdc switchboard bus is alarmed in the control room via the plant computer. Other bus and battery charger alarms cro provided on a reflash window of the plant annunciator as System Trouble. The plant computer indicates whether bus or charger trouble has occurred.
Loss of power to the non-Class 1E 250 vdc switchboard bus is alarmed in th9 control room on a reflash window of the plant annunciator, along with l cthcr bus and battery charger alarms, as System Trouble. The plant l computer indicates whether bus or charger trouble has occurred.
l Loss of power or a ground f ault to the non-Class 1E 120 vac distribution penol bus for the plant computer is alarmed in the control room. Various battery, charger and inverter alarms for the computer UPS are given in the I
control room on two reflash windows of the plant annunciator, one for
, BOttery/ Charger Trouble and one for Inverter Failure. The ERF computer
- indicates which signal caused the annunciator alarm.
A d3scription of the alarms for loss of power to the ERF computer and to th3 RMS computer will be provided later.
I
Attachrunt 1 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 4 of 4 1b. The review and evaluation of the Class 1E and non-Class 1E buses daccribed above indicate that loss of power to any one instrumentation and control bus will not inhibit the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition.
1c. The review and evaluation indicate that design modifications are not rcquired.
- 2. The operating procedures used by control room operators will be roviewed with respect to loss of power to each Class 1E and non-Class 1E bus supplying power to instrumentation and control systems.
- 20. The procedures will define symptoms and specify actions to be taken by the operators upon loss of power to Class 1E or non-Class 1E inntrumentation and control systems.
2b. Where necessary, the procedures will specify alternate inntrumentation and control circuits for use by operators.
2c. The procedures will include methods and precautions for restoring power to each Class 1E and non-Class 1E bus supplying power to instrumentation and control systems.
Should any design modifications or administrative controls be required as o result of the development of these procedures, descriptions of these will be provided.
- 3. IE Circular No. 79-02 has been reviewed in relation to the ocfety-related power supply inverters. All safety-related power supply inverters are Class 1E. For these inverters, relative to the Circular rcquirements:
- a. Class 1E inverters do not use time delay circuitry.
- b. The ac input to each Class 1E inverter is to a transformer /
rectifier section. The transformer has taps that will be set according to the recommendations of the manufacturer. A relay trips the transformer / rectifier supply circuit breaker if overvoltage occurs.
- c. The alternate 120 volt source ic supplied by manual operation of interlocked circuit breakers. This manual bypass of the Class 1E inverters allows maintenance to be performed.
- d. Administrative controls will confirm the position of transformer taps and manual bypass circuit breakers when maintenance or testing have been completed.
No design modifications or additional administrative controls are rcquired.
e Hi}sIOovT for. trs% 30 s
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSES APPLICABLE TO STP 83eLYSIS IIILE LggellQN R; actor Trip System WCAP-7706-L W ESF Actuation System WCAP-8584 Control Rod Drive System WCAP-8976 Cold Shutdown -- including boration capability, Table 5.4.4-2 reactor vessel head vent system, accumulator isolation, Residual Heat Removal System, and pressurizer power-operated relief valves Containment Heat Removal Systems -- including Table 6.2.2-3 Containment Spray System and Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Containment Isolation System Table 6.2.4-1 Hydrogen Recombiners Table 6.2.5-2 Ecergency Core Cooling (Safety Injection) System Table 6.3-5 Table 6.3-6 Table 6.3-10 Post Accident Monitoring System -- including Table 7.5-4 the Qualified Display Monitoring System Class 1E DC System Table 8.3-8 Class 1E AC System (except 120 vac Vital) Table 8.3-9 Class 1E Vital 120 vac System Table 8.3-13 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Table 9.1-5 Ecsential Cooling Water System Table 9.2.1-2 Component Cooling Water System Table 9.2.2-3 Air-Operated Valves Table 9.3-2 Chemical and Volume Control System Table 9.3-12 i m _ ,- __
i FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSES APPLICABLE TO STP BNBLygig III(E (QC@IlgN R3 actor Trip System WCAP-7706-L W ESF Actuation System WCAP-8594 Control Rod Drive System WCAP-8976 Cold Shutdown -- including boration capability, Table 5.4.A-2 reactor vessel head vent system, accumulator isolation, Residual Heat Removal System, and pressurizer 90wer-operated relief valves Containment He temoval Systems -- including Table 6.2.2-3 Containmer _ iray System and Reactor Containment Fan Coolers Containment luolation System Table 6.2.4-1 Hydrogen Recombiners Table 6.2.5-2 Emergency Core Cooling (Safety Injection) System Table 6.3-5 Table 6.3-6 Table 6.3-10 Post Accident Monitoring System -- including Table 7.5-4 the Qualifird Display Monitoring System Class 1E DC System Table 8.3-8 Class 1E AC System (except 120 vac Vital) Table B.3-9 Class 1E Vital 120 vac System Table 8.3-13 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Table 9.1-5 Essential Cooling Water System Table 9.2.1-2 Component Cooling Water System Table 9.2.2-3 Air-Dperated Valves Table 9.3-2 Chemical and Volume Control System Table 9.3-12
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DILESI9NE D@lg Ship Unit 1 Cabinets RECEIVED Finalize details of the V&V plan 02/28/85 Verification program begins 03/01/85 Complete generic test plan for noise and isolation testing 05/01/95 Complete hardware integration 05/30/85 Complete software test plans 06/01/85 Complete isolation tests 08/01/85 Complete subsystem tests 08/26/85 Start factory acceptance tests 08/27/85 Ship Unit i hardware 09/04/85 Issue WCAP on noise and isolation 10/04/85 Complete system validation test plan 10/14/85 System validation testing begins 10/15/85 Testing complete 01/31/86 Final Report 04/02/86 Ship Unit 2 hardware 05/86
ITEM Hg Attachment 3 pag 0adT FROM ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 1 of 51 Question 032.45 The analyses reported in Chapter 15 of the FSAR are intendeo to demonstrate the adequacy of safety systems in mitigating anticipated operational cccurrences and accidents.
Based on the conservative assumptions made in defining these design-basis events and the detailed review of the analyses by the staff, it is likely 7
that they adequately bound the consequences of single control system failures.
To provide assurance that the design basis event analyses adequately bound other more fundamental credible failures you are requested to provide the following information:
(1) Identify those control systems whose failure or malfunction could seriously impact plant safety.
(2) Indicate which, if any, of the control systems identified in (1) receive power from common power sources. The power sources considered should include all power sources whose failure or malfunction could lead to failure or malfunction of more than one control system and should extend to the offects of cascading power losses due to the failure of higher level distribution panels and load centers.
(3) Indicate which, if any, of the control systems identified in (1) receive input signals from common sensors. The sensors considered should include, but should not necessarily be limited to, common hydraulic headers or impulse lines feeding pressure, temperature, level i or other signals to two or more con::rul systems.
(4) Provide justification that any simultaneous malfunctions of the control syste:::s unidentified in (2) and (3) resulting from failures or malfunctions of the applicable common power source or sensor are bounded by the analyses in Chapter 15 and would not require action or response beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.
O e
O J
1 i
a
ST-HL-AE-1220
, Page 2 of 51
Response
The evaluation required to answer this question consists of postulating failures which affect the major NSSS control systems and demonstrating that for each failure the resulting event is within the bounds of existing accident ,
analyses. The events which are considered are:
l a) Loss of any single instrument +
b) Break of any single common instrument ifne c) Loss of power to all systems powered by a single power supply system (f.e.
single inverter)
( d) Loss of power to individual protection, control, or auxiliary process cabinets
( The analysis 'is conducted for all five major NSSS control systems:'
. 1) Reactor control system
- 2) Steam dump system
- 3) pressurizer pressure control system
- 4) pressurizer level control system
- 5) Feedwater control system l The initial conditions for the analysis are assumed to be anywhere within the full operating power range of the plant (i.e. 0-1405), where applicable.
The results of the analysis indicate that, for any of the postulated events considered in a) through d) above, the ANS Condition II accident analyses given in Chapter 15 of the South Texas FSAR are bounding.
l 0
0
r\LLdCflilleflL J <
ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 3 of 51 4
LOSS OF ANY SINGLE IMSTRUMENT (Iter a)
(
Table 0032.45-1, Loss of Any Single Instrument, is a sensor-by-sensor evaluation of the effect on the control systems itemized above caused by a sensor failing either high or low. The particular sensor considered is given, along with the number of channels which exist, the failed channel, the control systems impacted by the sensor, the effects on the' control systems for failures in both directions, and the bounding FSAR accident. Where no control action occurs or where control action is in a safe direction, no bounding accident is given.
The table clearly shows that for any single instrument failure, either high or low, the condition II events itemized in FSAR Chapter 15 are bounding.
LOSS OF POWER (Items c and d)
The South Texas NSSS instrument power supply consists of eight instrument distribution panels receiving power through eight inverters hereafter labelled I-I through VIII for convenience. Figure 0032.45-1 provides a schematic of the power distribution arrangement. As shown, the instrumentation which comprf'ses Protection Set I is housed in Protection Cabinets 1 and 1A. Similarly, the instrumentation for Protection Sets II and III is assigned to Protection Cabinets 2/2A and 3/3A respectively. Protection Set IV instrumentation
.' resides in a single cabinet. The Control Groups are assigned to four separate cabinets ~ powered from two non Class IE inverters. Finally, four addf tional Auxiliary Process Cabinets are shown. These cabinets are part of the Qualified Disp 1gy Processing System (QDPS). They are considered in this analysis because a few of the signals of interest (specifically, charging flow, pressurizer water level, and narrow range steam generator water level) are routed from the field to these cabinets first and are then passed on to the MSS $ 7300 process cabinets. As indicated in the schematic, the Auxiliary Process Cabinets are aligned in a channel oriented manner corresponding to the
)
associated protection channels so as to maintain separation; the signal channels are assigned and routed accordingly.
o n .
attacnment 4 -
i ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 4 of 51 l l.
1 I
! i I
i i Tables 0032.45-13 through Q032.45-20 Loss of Power to Inverters I through VIII respectively, analyze the effects on the control systems caused by the
- most limiting failure, loss of power to an entire instrument distribution 4
panel. The control systems affected, the sensors affected, the failure ,
direction, the control system responses, and the bounding FSAR accident are i given in the tables. Where no control action occurs or where control action l is in a safe direction, no bounding accident is given. !
Besides the loss of an inverter, there is also a chance of losing power to a single control cabinet, protection cabinet, or auxiliary process cabinet (for example, through the failure of a fuse or circuit breaker). The consequences of a loss of power to a protection cabinet are tabulated in Tables Q032.45-2 through 0032.45-8. Loss of power to a control cabinet (group) is addressed in Tables Q032.45-9 through 0032.45-12. Finally, Tables Q032.45-21 and l 0032.45-22 consider loss of power to the individual auxiliary process cabinets not covered by the loss of an inverter analyses. In each case, the data is l presented in a similar manner to that for the loss of an inverter described in the previous paragraph. Loss of power to individual NIS channels is not l explicitly considered since the responses are identical to the low failure of b an individual NIS instrument in Table QO32.45-1.
Besides the loss of power to an entire cabinet, there is the chance of having an electrical fault on one of the control system circuit cards. The control systems are designed so that each card is used in only one control system. A
. circuit card failure cannot directly impact more than one control system. A failure on a control card would cause the controller to generate either an "off" or a " full on" output, depending on the type of failure. This result would be similar to having a fault in a sensor feeding the control system.
Therefore, the failure of or loss of power in any control system circuit card would be bounded by the Loss of Any Single Instrument analysis described in Table 0032.45-1.
The tables show that for a loss of power to any inverter, protection cabinet, control cabinet, or auxiliary process cabinet, the Condition II events analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15 are bounding.
u' m--.. _-...---...----.-,,-,.m,,--.- - , -..c - -
Attachment 3 -
J ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 5 of 51
. . l i
l BREAK OF COMMON INSTRUMENT LINES (Item bl j
! i Table 0032.45-23 Loss of Comon Instrument Lines, considers the scenario ,l whereby an instrument 1tne which supplies more than one signal ruptures, causing faulty sensor readings.
- Two sets of sensors are located in common Ifnes as indicated below
j l
- 1) Loop steam flow (control groups 1 and 2 for each steam generator) and 4
narrow range steam generator water level (Protection Sets I and II for
! each steam generator). Each control group 1 flow sensor considered shares
! a tap with a Protection Set I level sensor; each control group 2 flow sensor shares a tap with a Protection Set II level sensor.
l 2) Pressurizer water level and pressurizer pressure (Protection Sets I, II, j III, or IV). The level and pressure sensors on common taps are in the i same protection set.
i Table 0032.45-23 shows that in the event of a common instrument line break,
- (
t the Condition II events itemized in FSAR Chapter 15 are bounding.
1 .
I Not shown on the table since they are not part of the plant control system but .
are used just for protection are the RCS loop flow transmitters. There are
- three flow transmitters in each loop, with each transmitter having a comon high pressure tap but separate and unique low pressure taps. Therefore, a j break at the high pressure flow transmitter tap would result in disabling all l
three flow transmitters in one loop, resulting in a low flow reading for all three transmitters. This would result in a reactor trip if the plant is above the P-8 setpoint, or an annunciation if it is below P-8.
l l The only malfunction mode explicitly analyzed was a break in the connon instrument line at the tap. Another possibility is to have a complete blockage in the sensor tap, causing the sensor to read a constant (before l
i blockage) value. However, this last failure mode is not analyzed since it is c
!D
l Attacnment 3 -
{ ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 6 of 51 ;
k really not a credible event. There is no anticipated agent available that would cause a tap blockage. The Reactor Coolant System piping and fittings and the instrument impulse line tubing are all stainless steel, so no products of corrosion are expected. Also the water chemistry is of' high quality which,
.along with high temperature operation, precludes the presence of solids in the water and assures the maintenance of the solubility of chemicals in the water. In addition, prior to startup, and during any shutdown as well, it is routine maintenance and servicing practice for instrument lines to be blown down to a canister. Since the building of sludge is a slow process, any l
buildup would be detected during response time testing done during shutdown.
i Therefore, the hypothesis of complete blockage of the sensor tap is not sufficiently credible to warrant its consideration as a design basis.
In the extremely unlikely event that a complete instrument line blockage were to occur, the condition is detectable because the reading would become static (no variations over time). In an unblocked channel, a reading would always very somewhat due to noise (e.g. flow induced noise in flow channels) or slight controller action (e.g. cycling operation of spray and heaters in the 4 (- pressurizer). By a comparison of the static channel to the redundant '
unb1ceked channels, the operator would be informed that a blockage in one channel has occurred.
.,, CONCLUSIONS, j The accompanying tables have illustrated that failures of individual sensors, j losses of power to inverters, losses of power to individual protection,
! ' control, and auxiliary process cabinets, or breaks in common instrument ifnes j all result in events which are bounded by FSAR Chapter 15 analyses. )
! Therefore, the FSAR adequately bounds the consequences of these fundamental failures.
l 1
i Y l b
Attacnment J -
ST-HL-AE-1220
. Page 7 of 51 LIST OF TABLES
(
1 Table No.
0032.45 Loss of Any Single Instrument
! 0032.45 0032.45 Loss of Power to Protection Cabinet 1 0032.45 Loss of Pcwer to Protection Cabinet 1A 0032.45 Loss of Power to Protection Cabinet 2 0032.45 Loss of Power to Protection Cabinet 2A 0032.45 Loss of Power to Protection Cabinet 3 Loss of Power to Prrtection Cabinet 3A 0032.45 Loss of Power to Protection Cabinet 4 0032.45 Loss of Power to Control Group 1 I 0032.45 Loss of Power to control Group 2 0032.45 Loss of Power to control Group 3 4032.45 Loss of Powr to Control Group 4
' 0032.45 Loss of Power to Inverter I (Protection Cabinets 1 and 1A, EIS Channel !)
Q032.45 '
Loss of Power to Inverter II (Protection Cabinets 2 and 2A, NIS Channel II, Aux. Process Cabinet II) 0032.45 ! Loss of Power to Inverter III (Protection Cabinets 3 and 3A, NIS Channel III, Aux. Process Cabinet III)
! 0032.45 Loss IV) of Power to Inverter IV (Protection Cabinet 4 NIS
- 0032.45 Loss of Powr to Inverter V (Control Groups 1 and 3) 0032.45 0032.45 Loss of Power to Inverter VI (Aux. Process Cabinet I) 0032.45 Loss of Power to Inverter VII (Aux. Process Cabinet IV)
Loss of Power to Inverter VIII (Control Groups 2 and 4) 0032.45 Loss of Power to Aux. Process Cabinet II 0032.45 Loss of Power to Aux. Process Cabinet III 0032.45 Loss of i Cosmon Instrument Lines i
f
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 t
Page 8 of 51 '
FIGURE Q032.45-1
(_ SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC OF SOUTH TEXAS NSSS POWER DISTRIBUTION A (note 3) l INVERTER I l l Class IE I l INVERTER II i l 7.5 KVA l Class 1E l l l 7.5 KVA 1 (3E241EIV1201)I l l
I (3E241EIV1202)I 1 i l--Protection Cabinet 1 (note 1) l--Protection Cabinet 2 I
l 4
I--Protection Cabinet IA l--Protection Cabinet 2A I
I l--NIS Channel I l--NIS Channel II i
I l--Aux. Process Cabinet II l INVERTER III l l INVERTER IV I l Class IE I l Class IE l 7.5 KVA l l l 7.5 KVA I (3E241EIV1203)I l .
1 (3E241EIV1204)I 1
i i l--Protection Cabinet 3 l--Protection Cabinet 4 I ,
l '
l--Protection Cabinet 3A l--NIS Channel IV i l g l--NIS Channel III
\ l I
1--Aux. Process Cabinet III l INVERTER V l l INVERTER VI l l Non IE l l Class 1E l 25 KVA I l l 25 KVA l J (8E241EIV002) l I (3E241EIV001) I i
- l i l--Control Cabinet 1 (note 2) l--Aux. Process Cabinet I I
l--Control Cabinet 3 i
l INVERTER VII l l INVERTER VIIII
25 KVA l l I i 25 KVA l l
' 1 (3E241EIV002) 1 I (8E241EIV001) l I I i I--Aux. Process Cabinet IV l--Control Cabinet 2 l
i i l--Control Cabinet 4 NOTES:
t
- 1) Protection cabinets 1/1A,2/2A,3/3A comprise Protection Sets I/II/III M respectively. , ;
S 2) Control cabinets also referred to as ' Control Groups'. i i 3) Only cabinets of interest are shown.
I l
i
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Pag 9 of 51 TA8LE 0032.45-1 L0ss 0F ANY sinsLE lusTaunENT (Sheet 1 of 15)
NUNSER ASSUMED OF FAILED FAILURE SOUN0!NG 5tusoe MAnnELS CHAmmEL SYSTEM OIRECTION EFFECT EVENT Feedpump 1 per o Feedwater to FW pump speed increases if in if FW pump in manual -
Olscharge plant Control auto mode. (FW control valves no event. If FW pump Pressure close due to increased flow and FCVs in auto - new if in auto mode.) steady state w/hlgher pump speed and decreas-ing FCV lift. If FW pump in auto and FCVs in manual - bounding event is FW System Malfunction Resulting in an increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2)
Hi FW pump speed decreases if in if FW pump in manual-auto mode. (FW control valves no event. Other modes open due to decreased flow if result in a decreased in auto mode). FW flow over time, hence bounding event is Loss of Normal FW Flow (Section 15.2.1)
Steam 1 per o Feedwater to FW pump speed decreases if in if FW pump in manual -
Header plant Control auto mode. (FW control valves no event. Other modes Pressure o Steam Dump open due to decreased flow if result in a decreased (T,q node) in auto mode). FW flow over time, hence bounding event is Loss of Normal FW Flow (Section 15.2.1) 1000e:1d/031985
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 TAsLE 0032.45-1 (Coatinad) Paga 10 of 51 LDSS OF ANY 5th6LE INSTRUNENT (Sheet 2 of 15)
AS$uMED muns[a SOUNOING FAILED FAILueE OF EVENT DIRECTION EFFECT CnAsgIELS CHANNEL SYSTEM 5tm50s FW pump speed increases if in If FW peup in manual N1
- no event. If FW pump auto mode. (FW control valves close due to increased flow if and FCVs in auto - new in auto mode). steady state w/hlgher pump speed and decreas-ing FCV lift. If FW pump in auto and FCVs in manual - bounding event is FW System Malfunction Resulting in an increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2)
FW pump speed decreases if in If FW pump in manual -
Steam 1 per o Feedwater to auto mode. (FW control valves no event. Other modes Needer plant Control o Steam Dump open due to decreased flow if result in a decreased Pressure FW flow over time, (Pressure Mode) in auto mode).
hence bounding event is Loss of Normal FW Flow (Section 15.2.7)
It00e:14/031085 I
Attcchment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 11 of 51 TA8LE 0032.45-1 (Continued)
LOSS OF AN- $1m6LE INSTRUMENT (Sheet 3 of 15) htSSER ASSUMED OF FAILED FAILuaE 80DuelNG SEn508 CMANNELS CHANNEL SYSTEM DIRECTION EFFECT EVENT
- Hi FW pump speed increases if in Steam dump in pressure auto mode. (FW control valves mode at het standby close due to increased flow or very low power only.
If in auto mode). Hence, dump valves Dump valves open unless will open for only a steam dump blocked on very short time, until lo-lo T,,, (P-12). lo-lo T,,, (P-12) is reached. If FW pump is in manual or FW pump and FCVs in auto, then this event is bounded by Excessive Increase in Secondary Steam Flow (Section 15.1.3). If FW pump in auto and FCV in manual, result is increase in FW flow causing excessive cooltag. Sounding event is FW System Malfunction Resulting in an increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2) e 1800e:1d/032785
.a _ _ _ . __ __ -
g a E Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 12 of 51 TASLE 9032.45-1 (Continued)
LOSS OF ANY SluGLE INSTRUMENT (Sheet 4 of 15) homeER ASSUMES OF FAILES
$(uSQt FAILUGE CMaNmELS CHANNEL 300N0 LNG SYSTEM BIRECTION EFFECT EVENT Loop 2 per 1 selected o Feeenter to Steam loop FW pump speed decreases if in for control Control If FW pump and FCV in Flow auto mode. FW control valves manual - no event.
close if in auto ende. Other modes result in decreased FW flow; bounding event is Loss of Noran) FW Flow (Section 15.2.1)
Hi FW pump speed increases if in If FW pug and FCV in auto mode. FW control valves manual - no event.
open if in auto mode.
Other modes result in increased FW flow; bounding event is FW System Malfunction Resulting in an Increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2)
Loop FW 2 per 1 selected o Feedwater to fik loop FW costrol valve opens if in for control Control If FCV in manual - no auto mode event. If FCV in auto, result is bounded by FW System Malfunction Resulting in an increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2)
Ite0e:1d/031eeS
o 0 - a Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 13 of 51 Ta4LE 0032.45-1 (continued)
LOSS Cf AmY SleELE IN5itumENT (Sheet 5 of 15) muimEE AS$UnlD OF FAILED FAILutE SENSOR CMANIEL.5 80MmBING CnanmEL SYSTEM BlaECTION EFFECT EVENT M1 FW control valve closes if in If FCV in manual - no auto mode event. If FCV in auto, result is decreased FW flow. Sounding event is Loss of Normel FW Flow (Section 15.2.1) 5 team 4 per steam I selected o Feedwater seeeratar Generator to FW control valve opens if in If FCV in annual - no for control Coetrol auto mode marrcne (two asallable (I or II) event. If FCV in auto, Range inster for control) bounding event is FW Level System Malfunction Resulting in an Increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2)
N1 FW control valve closes if in If FCV in manual - no auto mode, event. If FCV in auto. (
result is decreased FW flow. Bounding event (
1s Loss of morsel FW Pressartier 4 per 1 selected Flow (Section 15.2.7) <
o Presserizer to Charging flow increases.
teater Level plant for control Bounding event is Level Control heaters turn off (except for (Control) . (I or III) CVCS nelfunction That
- local control). If Channel I lacreases Beactor is failed, letdown isolated by Coolant Inventory Chamael I protection signal (Sectica 15.5.2)
~ (VCT empties, charging pumps =
take suction from aWST.)
It00e:Id/032795 g
O e -
O Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 14 of 51*
TAGLE 0032.a5-1 (contissed)
LOSS OF ANY SleGLE tusitunEmi (Sheet 6 ef 15) musta assamts GF FAILED FAILUoE 80uuBING 5(usos CMAmEts Cumm4[L 575TER BlaECTION EFFECT EVENT N1 Charging flow decreases. Idt11e heaters are en.
Backup heaters on (Later let- no net depressurization deist 1selatten free Chamael IV of RC5. After heaters protectlen signal. heaters blocked are blocked decreased from interlock channel.) charglag flew acts te (
depressurize BCS.
Depressurizatten event (
1s therefore benaded by inadvertent opentag (
ef a Pressurizer safety or Relief valve (
(Section 15.6.1)
(
Pressarlier 3 per 1 selected for o Pressurizer Le Pressertzer heaters blocked be event.
teater Level plant control Level Centrol (except for local centrol). (
(laterlock) (11 or III)
N1 No Centrol actles, get (
high level aamunciatten. Not applicable
(
Presser 1:er 4 per 17 e Presserizer Le Letdown 1selated. Soundlag event is taster Level plant Level Centrol CVCS Nelfunction That C (Prstecties (Letdeme lacreases teacter 6rade acttee (Isolatten) Coelant Inventory C cals)
(Section 15.5.2) e Nt me centrol acties. Not applicable.
e
,1880e:14/032705
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 P ge 15 cf 51 Tastr 0032.45-i (contiawa)
LOSS OF Amf SinELE ImSThuntai (Sheet 7 of 15) musett As5unEs GF FAILES fAILust 80MNOING SEE5m M CMAMEL sv5TEp gINCTlWI Lf.flil EVEmi ,
Chargtog 1 per I e Presser 12er Le Charging flew increases until New steady state reached flew plant Level Castrel integral centre 11er en level at high level. Dependlag error generates zero flew en engattede of level demand. increase, beneding event is CVCS Ralfuncties That Increases teacter Coolant Inventory (Section 15.5.2).
M1 Charging flew decreases untti New steady state reached integral centre 11er en level at low level; transient error generates easiews flew mitigated en letdown demaad; possibly letdens isolattee. Ne event.
1selatten en law level.
Pressartrer 4 per I e Pressurtzer Le PORY PCV4554 blocked. Spray neaters being on causes Pressere plant Pressere Centrol remales off. All back-up heaters lacrease in pressurizer (Pes. I cr 2)* en. pressure to Potv PCV456A actuaties. No event.
M1 Variable heaters turned off. Result is beended by P0tv PCV455A opeas, laadwertent opeatag of blocked on low pressere due to a Pressurizer Safety or interlock. Spray turned on. Bellef Valve (Secties 15.6.1) 1000e:14/831995
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 16 Gf 51 TatLE 0832.45-1 (continued)
L955 0F ANY SINGLE IN5ituuENT (Sheet 8 of 15) namara astera GF FAILES fAILEGE SAMEBING sea 5Gp M M Hilgg staECTIEW EffECT Evimi Pressertzer 4 per II e Pressertzer La me centrol action. Met applicable Pressere plant Pressere Centrol pett KW-6%A blocked free spealag.
(Pes. 2 er 3)* PORT KE.6554 still available for normal centrol.
N1 P0tv KV4%A opens. closes teen Result is beended by pressure falls below Inadvertent Opeatag of 1sterlock setpelat. a Presserizer Safety or Relief valve (Sectica 15.6.1)
Pressartzer 4 per III e Pressarizer Le P0tv KV4%A blocked. If channel Heaters belag en causes Pressere plaat Pressere Centrol III selected for centrol. PetV lacrease in pressurizer KV455A aise blocked, spray re- pressere possibly to sa-estas off, and all back-up beat- fety valve actuation.
ers tera en. Result is beended by laadwertent Spealag of a Pressertzer Safety or mellef valve (Section 15.6.1).
N1 PetV KV4%A unblocked. If thea- Result is bounded by nel III selected for control. Potv Inadvertent Opealag of KV4s54 opens, blocked en a Pressurizer safety or law pressere due to interlock. Belief valve (Sectlen spray termed en and variable boat- 15.6.1) ers termed off.
JBeGe:14/032795
. e __J Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 17 of 51 TA4LE 0832.45-1 (continued) l LD55 Of ANY SINGLE INSTaumEmi j (Sheet 9 of 15) mueta AS5umES OF FAILES FAILURE SE450s C M LS 80MuSINE Cheauft ly1TLa glaECTim EFFECT EVEmT Pressarizer 4 per IV a Pressertzer Lo No centrei action. P0tV PCV455A Pressare plaat mot applicable Pressere Control blacked free epontag. If channel IV selected for centrol, Peev PCV4%A aise blocked.
ut PetV PCV4554 unblocked. If chan- Besult is beended by nel IV selected for control, Peev Inadvertent spealog of a pct 4%A opens, closes ideen pres- pressortaer Safety or Be-sure falls below laterlock set- lief Valve (Section pelat.
15.6.1)
T,q ene per Amy Aect. o Turblae Leading to Step turbine loading (C-17);
leap seet applicable 4 to annunciation occurs.
Aect. o Steam Swap N1 Rods la (safe direction). he event unless ut (T Itode) Charglag flew increases untti reactor trips, then full power pressurtzer water d g walves open o Beactor Centrol level is reached (if at reduced and bounding event is power) . If reactor trips, steam Escessive Increase in o Pressurtzer emp enabled and dump valves Secondary Steam Flow Level Centrol open. Steam dump stops whea (Sectica 15.1.3) low-law Tave is reached.
IBAGe:14/1k32705
I R l
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Pcge 18 cf 51 TAGLE 0832.45-1 (continued)
LOSS OF Amf SINGLE INSTelmIENT (Sheet 10 of 15)
-a A55umEs GF FAILES FAltutt tsumtius 5Lu500 m M SYSTEN 31RECTik EFFECT EKai Y
q ene per any e Terttee Leedlag Le Step turbine leedlag (C-11); Det applicable leap Auct.
-letten occurs La Aect. _ e steam Swup mt Reds la (safe directica). Steady state reached (
M1 Charglag flew increases entti at full power pres-e seacter Central fell power presserizer water l
serizer water level. (
M1 level is reached (if at reduced me event.
o Presser 12er Level power).
(
Centrol C
Termine 2 per I e Steam Sump
(
tapelse to teds la (safe direction), met applicable plant (Centrol) (T, feede) Steam dump signaled to spea rummer C e teacter Centrol but is blocked by interlock.
Pressere o Hs Centrol (If reacter trip occurs, 4 steam emp entlocked and deep waives endulate entti no lead e T,q 1s reached).
We effect en FM Centrol since t 54 level progres is constant.
If selector switch ta norme1 4 positten, ante red withdraus) blocked (C-5). If switch in t.
. e 10ste:14/832795 t l
O a Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 19 of 51
! TAett ges2.es-i (centlemed) 1 i L955 SF ART SleELE le51auiENT (sneet u of is) i useEn A55mMES OF FAILES
' FAILueE SEE55 CM CMAMEL SYSTER 80MMBlas
) 91 REC 11MB EFFECT
! EVEmi alternate positien, no effect en (
J red block.
l N1 Step turbine leading (C-17). Besult is beended by mods est estil blocked by uncontrolled Red high fles, everpener er ever- Cluster Centrol temperatore red step. or Atsently Senk with-
> entti programmed Tg 11ett drausi at power is reached. If reacter trip (Section 15.4.2) occars, steam dump unblocked i and dump walves open until no lead T is reached. me 1
effect en fu Centrol since
% level program is constant.
Torstee 2 per I e steen say Le tapelse plant (Centrol) Reds in. (safe directlen). met applicatie (pressere mode) i Chaseer me offect en Fw centrol since Pressere e Beector Centrol % level program 15 constant.
e Fw Centrol i If selector switch in nemel i
positten, ante red withdramel hiecked (C-5). If switch i
in alternate positten, no i effect en red block.
k i
i
\
) 1880e:14/E31495
I O E Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220-TAGLE 4032.45-1 (continued)
LOSS OF Any SINGLE 1m51tWMENT (Sheet 12 of 15) assueER A554sIES OF FAILES fAlLuet SEe50m ChemIEL5 CNNEIEL BoulselmG SYSTEM OIRECTIQs EFFECT tuteT 41 Step turbine leading (C-17). sesult is beended by Be4s set until blocked by uncontrolled Red high flex. overpower er over- Cluster Centrol temperatore red step. (Steam Assently Bank With-dimp valves open if required drawal at power to keep steam header pressure (Sectlen 15.4.2).
at er below setpelst.) me effect en FW centrol since 56 level program is constant. -
1erstae 2 per II e Steam Dune La lapelse plant Unblock steam deep. If selector Not applicable (Interlock) (T made)
Chamber switch la alternete positten.
pressere auto red withdrewal blocked (C-5). If switch la normal positten, no effect en red block.
M1 Steam dump on turbine trip Isot applicable only; steam desup blocked en lead rejectlen.
Isratae 2 per 11 e Steae Dump to or M1 tapelse plant Steam dump functions normally. Not applicable (laterlock) (Pressure Itode)
Chamber If selector Switch in alternate pressere positten, auto red withdrawal blocked (C-5). If switch 14 aermal positten, no effect en red block.
Itete:1s/831905
. . o i Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 P:ge 21 of 51 TAtLE C03?.45-1 (continued)
LOSS C4 Anv 51m6LE InsitunEmi (Sheet 13 of 15)
InseEn assimas 3 0F FAILED FAILURf SounSING 5tm50t MS Cugus[L SYSTEM SIRECTION EFFECT EVENT poner Range 4 per Amy e Beactor Control Lo no control action. not applicable
- Flan plaat e FW Control I
M1 Auto and manual red withdrawal Steady-state reached blocked (C-2), rods in (safe with higher SG water (
direction). FW bypass control level. No event.
valves open if in auto. (If (
reactor trip occurs, dump valves open untti no-load
(
T,,, is reached.) Rising SG water level causes main FW
(
walves to cisse untti steam l
and feed flows match. (
j T,q 1 per o Steam Sump to C1gm plant Steam dump blocked (T,q mode). Result is bounded by (
e Beactor Control Backup htrs, on, charging flow uncontrolled Red auctioneer o Pressurizer decreases till no-load pres- Cluster Control (
Level Control surizer water level reached. Assently Sant With-Reds out. T and core power increase untti blocked drawal at power
(
(Sectica 15.2.2) by high flux, overpower l
or overtemperature rod stop.
(
l C 1
N1 Identical to T,,, channel See above C falling high, see analysts
. above (sheet 3). C
'A80e 1d/832Tt5
ST-HL-AE-1220
- P ge 22 cf 51 i
TaeLE 0032.45-1 (continued) i LOSS OF ANY SINGLE INSTRUNENT l (Sheet 14 of 15) 8 i
- anseEn ASSUMES 0F FAILED 8 FAILueE i SEW 50s BOUNDING CumanELS CMANNEL SYSTEN 31RfC M EFFECT EVENT I i
power aange 1 per plant o teactor Control to i Flas NigM Beds out. T, and core power Result is bounded by 8 o Feedwater increase entil blocked by high 4
Auctleneer Uncontrolled Rod Centrol flux, overpower or overtoo-1 Cluster Control i (bypass valves) perature red stop. If FW bypass Assembly Bank With-control valve in auto (typically drawal at power i Iow power levels, 0-255), valve (Section 15.2.2); FW flow closes initially; 56 water level transient is ses11 in i i
restored by automatic re- comparison, opening of bypass control valve 4
on level error.
i
- e H1 Identical to power Range Flux j See above. ~
l channel falling high; see t
analysts above (sheet 13).
Camdesser 1 per t o 5 team Sump to Available plant No control action-steam dump Not applicable blocked, condenser unavailable.
t M1 No control action-steam dump Not applicable e unblocked, condenser available, i
! steam Fles 2 per leep control t o steam Flow to Identical to Loop steam Flow
! Pressure Channel See above i
Campeesator channel falling low. See 8
analysts above (sheet 4),
i i
1980e:Id/032795 t
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 '
Page 23 cf 51 TAeLE 003r.45-1 (continued)
O LOSS OF ANY SINGLE Is5TaunteT e
i
! (Sneet 15 of 15)
\
naneEn e.
3' 0F ASSUMES FAILES O SEus00 CuespEt3 FAILURE CIWWIEL SYSTEN SOUNDING
! BIRECTION EFFECT EVENT
! S 1'
M1 Identical to Loop Steam Flow See above 6 channel falling high. See analysis above (sheet 4).
G i e i
G 4
i e i
1 e e
4 l
i i
i 4 I
l e
}
i
' e l
!
- Signals for presser 12er water level, presser 12er pressure. and tertine impulse chanter pressure ca selectlen is achieved by annual switches in the centrol room.
2 n be obtained from different channels. Channel e Resulting effect due to failed instrument is dependent on switch positions.
k
} *
! 1000e:Id/032705 4
y W e .
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 P ge 24 cf 51 TAeLE 0032.45-2 LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CASINET 1 C1 min 0L SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED 90UN01NG AFFECTES AFFECTES SIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT 5tese Sump o Turtine tapelse Chaser Low Steam dump demanded but blocked Pressure (Control) free interlock. (If reactor trips, o T, (Loop 1) Low steam dump performs as designed).
No control action from T due Bounding event for loss of cabinet to auctioneer, power is either FW System Malfunc-Reactor Control o Tertine tapelse Chamber Low Rods in (safe direction), power de- tion Resulting in an Increase in FW Pressure (Control) creases. Stop turbine loading (C-17). Flow (Section 15.1.2), or Loss of o TATE (Loop 1) Low If turbine tapelse chamber pressure Norinal Feedwater Flow (Section switch in normal position, auto rod 15.2.7), depending on channels used, withdrawal blocked (C-5). Increased charging flow and pres-surtzer transients have little ef fect in comparison.
F3 Control o Narrow Range 56 Water Low Depending on the relative switch Level (Any Loop) positions in each loop for steam o 5 team Flow Pressure Low flow and narrow-range 56 water Compensation (Any Loop) level, FW valves could open, close, or remain fixed; thus, a FW transient may occur in these loops.
1800e:Id/031995 W em e
ST-HL-AE-1220 P ge 25 cf 51 O
i TASLE 4032.45-2 (Continued)
O LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CASINET 1 0'
CONTAOL
- SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED BOUNOING G AFFECTED AFFECTES DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT 1
e Pressurizer o Pressurtzer teater Level Low No control action on T,q due to Level (Control) auctioneer. If affected level signal G e T (Loop 1) Low used for control, charging flow increases and heaters blocked. G e Charging Flow Low Otherwise, level channel not connected.
1, Bee to low flow signal, charging flow G i
increases untti integral controller on level error generates zero flow 4 ,
1 demand and a new steady state is reached. G l
]
Pressurizer o Pressurtzer Pressure Low If affected pressure signal used 4 j Pressure (PORV PCV-655A) for control, PORY PCV-655A stays l closed, back-up heaters on (but 4 could be blocked on level signal, see above). Spray off. (PORV 4 j PCV-656A available if required.)
Otherwise, channel not connected. O no control action.
I e I
J e
l 8
l e
i e
1 4
) It00e:1d/032785 d
u - . '
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 26 cf 51 TABLE 0032.45-3 LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CASINET 1A CONTBOL SYSTERS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED SOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump e None -
No signals affected, no control action.
Reactor Control o None -
No signals affected, no control Bounding event for loss of cabinet action. power is FW System Malfunction Resulting in an Increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2)
F'J Control o Feedwater Flow Low If failed FW channel selected (any loop) for control. FCV opens. Otherwise, no control action.
Pressuriter o None -
No signals affected, no control Level action.
Pressurtzer o None -
No signals affected, no control Pressure action.
leece:Id/031885
- E E E
e ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 27 cf 51 g TABLE 0032.45-4 LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CASINET 2 CONTROL I SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump o Turbine Impulse Chamber Low Steam dump unblocked. (If reactor Pressure (Interlock) trips, steam dump performs as o T,,, (Loop 2) Low designed.) No control action Sounding event for loss of f rom T,,, due to auctioneer, cabinet power is either FW System Malfunction Resulting in an j Reacttr Control o T (Loop 2) Low No control action due to auctioneering Increase in FW Flow (Section of T,,g. Stop turbine loading 15.1.2), or Loss of Normal FW (C-17) . Flow (Section 15.2.7), depending on channels used.
FU Control o Narrow Range SG Water Low Depending on the relative switch Level (Any Loop) positions in each loop for steam o steam Flow Pressure Low flow and narrow-range 56 water level.
Compensation (Any Loop) FW valves could open, close, or remain fixed; thus, a FW transient may occur in these loops.
Prcssrrtzer o Pressurizer Water Low If affected level signal used for interlock, Level Level (Interlock) block heaters; otherwise, channel not o T (Loop 2) Low connected, ne control action. No control action on T,q due to auctioneer.
Pressertzer o Pressurizer Pressure Low If affected pressure signal used for control.
Pressir2 (P0AV PCV-656A) P0tv PCV-656A stays closed. (PORV PCV-655A available if required.) Otherwise, channel not connected, no control action.
I 1880e:1d/031885 i
3 e e
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ s
. . - . -= - -.
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Taste 0032.45-5 Paga 28 cf 51 LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CASINET 2A CONTROL SYSTERS SIGNALS FAILURE ITERIZED B0UNDING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Steam Bunp o None -
No signals affected, no control action. Sounding event for loss of cabinet power is FW System Reactor Control o None -
No signals affected, Malfunction Resulting in an no control action. Increase in fW Flow (Section 15.1.2) 4 F3 Control o Feedwater Low If failed FW channel selected i Flow (any loop) for control. FCV opens. Otherwise, no control action.
4 1
Pressurt rer o None -
No signals affected.
Lcvel no control action.
Press:rizer o None No signals affected.
l Pressire --
No control action.
4 4
I s
1980e:1d/031885 g . - - , ,
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Pag 2 29 of 51 TABLE C32.45-6 LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CASINET 3 CONTROL SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED AFFECTES AF[ipig B0UNDING DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT
- Steam Dusy o T (Loop 3) Low No control action due to auctioneer.
Reactor Control o T ,,(Loop 3) Low No control action due to auctioneer. Stop turbine Combining effects of pressurizer loading (C-17).
level and pressure control sys-tems, could have either increasing FU control o none - charging flow with heater off No signals affected, causing a depressurization, or
- no control action.
else heaters cause pressure to
) Pressurizer o Pressurizer Water Level Low increase untti safety valve opens.
tswel If affected level signal used for (Control or Interlock) In one case, event is bounded by o control, charging flow increases T,,, (Loop 3) Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurizer and heaters blocked. If used for Safety or Relief Valve (Section interlock, heaters blocked.
15.6.1).For the other case, bounding Otherwise, channel not connected, event for loss of cabinet power is no control action. No control
' CVCS Nelfunction That Increases 4ction on 1,,9 due to auctioner. Reactor Coolant Inventory (Section 15.5.2).
Press:rizer o Pzr. Pressure Low Presstra PORY PCV-656A stays Closed. 'If (PORY PCV-655A Control, signal selected for control, pres-POAV PCV-6564 Interlock) surizer heaters on (if allowed by level signal, see above), spray off, and PORY Pti-6554 stays closed.
1 1
1 l
l 1000e:1d/031005
]
g- . .
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Paga 30 of 51 TABLE QO32.45-7 LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CA81 NET 3A CONTROL SYSTENS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED O!RECTION EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump o None -
No signals affected, no control actica.<
R Kctar Control o Mone -
No signals affected, l no control action.
fW Control o None -
No signals affected, Not applicable no control action.
l Pr355xr12er o None !
No signals affected, Lsval no control action.
I Prs' s surizer o None -
No signals affected, Pr255urs No control action, l
1880e:Id/031885 s- - . .
Attachment 3 ,
ST-HL-AE-1220 Pag 3 31 of 51 m
TABLE QO32.45-8 9
LOSS OF POWER TO PROTECTION CA81 NET 4 CONTROL O
SYSTENS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED AFFECTED 8OUNDING O AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Stian Dump o e
T,,g (Loop 4) Low No control action due to auctioneer.
Rnctor Control o 4
T,,g (Loop 4) Low No control action due to auctioneer.
Stop turbine loading (C-11).
l FW Control o None 4 P3 signals affected, no control No event is initiated due to action. loss of power to this cabinet. E therefore bounding event is not applicable, g Prsssurizer o T,,g (Loop 4) Low No control action due to auctioneer. O
- Lsv21 o Pressurizer Level No letdown isolation since b1 stables are energize to actuate.
G Pressurizer o Pressurizer Pressure Low PORY PCV-655A stays closed. If signal G Pressure (PORY PCV-656A Control or selected for control, PORV PCV-656A PORY PCV-655A Interlock) also stays closed.
W G
l e
i G g
G 1880e:Id/032785 G b
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 32 of 51 TABLE 0032.45-9 LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL GROUP 1 CONTROL SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED 800N0 LNG AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Stian Dump o All (System Off/ Closed No initiating event, steam Deenergtred) dump system unavailable. (If except Condenser reactor trip occurs, S6 power-
) Available operated relief valves available.)
Riactir Control o None -
No signals affected, no Sounding event for loss of control action cabinet power is Loss of Normal FW Flow (Section 15.2.7). (Plant trips on low-low water level in SG 1.)
FW Contr31 o All (System FW Control Valve Loss of main FW in SG 1 r.nd FW Pump Deenergized, closes, pumps' If FW pumps in auto mode, pumps' ISpeedControl $6 1) speed decreases speed decreases causing FCV's to I (all pumps, open in SG 2, 3 and 4 unless Auto mode only) failed steam flow selected far
{ o Steam flow Low control, in which case FCV's may (any loop) close on steam flow /feedwater flow mismatch. (Plant trips on low-low water level in SG 1)
.i 1 Presstr1rer o Pressurizer Water Off iLevel No control action (bistable is Level (LS 666A) energize to actuate).
iPressurizer o Pressurizer Pressure Closed No initiating event, PORV PCV-655A Pr2ssure (PORV PCV-655A Control) remains closed, heaters and spray remain off. (PORY PCV-656A available if o Spray and Heater Off needed.)
) Actuation 1880e:1d/031885 24 i r . . .
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Pag? 33 of 51 TABLE Q032.45-10 LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL GROUP 2 CONTROL SYSTERS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED AFFECTED BOUNDING AFFECTED DIRECTIDN EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump o None -
No signals affected, no control action.
Rzctir Control o None -
No signals affected, no control action.
FW Control o All (System FW Control Valve Loss of main FW in SG 2. Bounding event for loss of Deenergized, 56 2) Closes (Plant trips on low-low water level cabinet power is Loss of o steam flow Low in 56 2.) If failed steam Normal FW Flow (Section (any loop) flow channel selected for control, 15.2.7) (Plant trips on FCV's close in remaining loops low-low water level in 56 2.)
and FW pump speed decreases.
Prasstrizer o All (System Off Charging flow increases, backup LGwel Deenergized) heaters of f.
(Except LB 666A)
Pr:sstrizer o Pressurizer Pressure Closed PORV PCV-656A blocked closed.
Prcsstre (PORV PCV-6564 Control) (PORY PCV-655A available if needed.)
1880e:Id/031885 g e e
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 TASLE C132.45-11 Pag 2 34 of 51 LOSS OF POWER TO CONTROL GROUP 3 CONTROL SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZE0 AFFECTED AFFECTED BOUNOING DIRECTIDN EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump o none -
No signals affected, no control action.
Reactir Control o None -
No signals affected, no control action.
i FW Control o All (System FW Control Valve Loss of main FW in SG 3.
(56 3) Deenergized) Bounding event for loss of Closes (Plant trips on low-low water cabinet power is Loss of level in 56 3.)
4 Nonnel FW Flow (Section 15.2.7)
(Plant trips on low-low water level in 56 3.) ,
) PressYrizer o None -
I Lsvel No signals affected, i
no control action.
j Pr:sstrizer o Pressurizer Pressure Deactuated Pr35stro No control action. PORV Interlock (PORY PCV-656A, PCV-656A blocked, PORV bistable PS 651) PCV-655A still available.
l 1
1 l
1880e:1d/03188S i
(
a e = =
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 8 Pag 3 35 of 51 0
4 TABLE 0032.45-12 0
LOSS OF PONER TO CONTROL GROUP 4 CONTROL 6
l SYSTutS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED
, AFFECTED AFFECTED BOUNOING DIRECTION G i iff.iGIl_ EVENT 1
St:aa Dug o Auctioneered Low No initiating event, steam dump system
(
T, ,,
o unavailable. (If reactor trip occurs, T,,, (from Rod Control) Low 4 56 power-operated relief valves available.)
1
) Reactor Control o All (System (
Off Rods stay stationary. Stop turbine l Deenergized) loading (C-17).
(
FW Control o All (System Bounding event for loss of cabinet FW Control Valve 6 (56 4) Deenergized) Loss of main FW in SG 4. (Plant power is Loss of Norinal FW Flow Closes trips on low-low water level in 56 4.)
(Section 15.2.1) since increased 4 Prcssurizer o Auctioneered charging flow has little effect in I Low Charging flow increases. ,
Level comparison. (Plant trips on low-T, ,, 1 I
o Charging Flow Controller Low low 56 4 water level.)
4 l j Pr:sstrizer o Pressurtter Pressure Deactuated
) Pressure Interlock (PORV PCV-655A, PORV PCV-655A blocked from automatic 4
j opening. PORV PCV-656A still available. l b1 stable PB 658)
No control action.
- 4 l
G l
- e 1
4 l 1980e:Id/032785 21 N m = 8
Attachment 3 8
ST-HL-AE-1220 Paga 36 cf 51 0
TA8LE 13032.45-13 e
. LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER I (PROTECTION CASINETS 1 ANO 1A, Nis CHANIIEL 1) c' CONTROL 8 SYSTEMS SIGIIALS FAILURE ITENIZED 80U1101116 AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECT 1000 EFFECTS EVENT 8 Steam Dump o Turbine Impulse Chamber Low Steam dump demanded but blocked 8 Pressure (Control) from interlock. (If reactor trips, o T,,, (Loop 1) Low steam dump performs as designed). I Bounding event for loss of inverter power is either FW System Malfunc- 8 Reactor Control o Power Range Flux (Ch. I) Low Rods in (safe direction), power tion Resulting in an Increase in FW o Turbine Impulse Chamber Low decrea<es. Stop turbine loading Flow (Section 15.1.2), or Loss of 8 Pressure (Control) (C-17). If turbine impulse chamber Normal Feedwater Flow (Section o
T,,, (Loop 1) Low pres' :re selector switch in normal 15.2.7), depending on channels '
position, auto rod withdrawal used. Increased charging flow blocked (C-5), and pressurizer transients have '
little ef fect in comparison.
e F'J Control o marrow Range $6 Water Low Depending on the relative switch Level (Any Loop) positions in each loop for steam '
o Steam Flow Pressure Low flow, feedwater flow, and narrow-Compensation (Any Loop) range 56 water level, FW valves could
- o Feedwater Flow (Any Loop) Low open, close, or remain fixed; thus, a o Power Range Flux (Ch. I) Low FW transient may occur in these loops.
1880e:Id/032785 W -
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 '
Pag: 37 cf 51
(
TASLE 0032.45-13 (Continued) f LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER I (PROTECTION CAtlNETS 1 AND 1A, NIS CHANNEL I)
CONTROL e
SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITENIZED AFFECTED SOUNDING AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS '
EVENT Pressurizer o Pressurtzer Water Level Low Level If affected level signal used for control. *
(Control) charging flow increases and heaters o (Loop 1)
T,,, Low blocked.
- o Charging Flow No control action on T,,g Low due to auctioneer. On low flow signal, charging flow increases untti integral e controller on level error generates zero flow demand. New steady state reached at higher level.
Pressurtzer o Pressurtzer Pressure Low If affected pressure signal used Pressure (PORY PCV-655A) for control, PORV PCV-655A stays closed, back-up heaters on (but could be blocked on level signal, see above). Spray off. (PORV PCV-656A available if required.)
Otherwise, channel not connected, no control action.
1880e:1d/032185 s == =
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Pag 2 38 cf 51 TASLE Q032.45-14 LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER 11 (PROTECTION CAtl#E15 2 AND 2A, NIS CHANNEL 11, AUK. PROCESS CAtlNET II)
CONTROL SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITEMilED BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump o Turbine impulse Chamber Low Steam dump hnblocked. (if reactor Pressure (Interlock) trips, steam dump performs as o T (Loop 2) Low designed.) Sounding event for loss of inverter power is either FW System Malfunc-tion Resulting in an increase Reactor Control o Power Range Flux Low No control action due to auctioneering in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2), or (Channel !!) of flux and T,,,. Stop turbine o (Loop 2) Loss of Normal FW Flow (Section T,,, Low loading (C-17). 15.2.1), depending on channels used.
F3 Control o Narrow Range SG Water Low Depending on the relative switch Level (Any Loop) positions in each loop for steam o Steam Flow Pressure Low flow and narrow-range 56 water Compensation (Any Loop) level, FW control valves could open, o Feedwater Flow (Any Loop) Low close, or remain fixed; thus, a FW o Power Range Flux Low transient may occur in these loops.
(Channel !!)
Presstrizer o Pressurizer Water Level Low if affected level signal used for tsvel (Interlock) interlock, block heaters; otherwise, o T,,, (Loop 2) Low channel not connected, no control action.
No control acti e on T,,, due to auctioneer.
1880e:1d/031885 e
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 39 cf 51 TABLE 0032.45-14 (Continued)
LOSS OF P0bER TO INVERTER II (PA0TECTION CASINETS 2 AND 2A. NIS CHANNEL II, AUA. PROCESS CHANNEL II)
CONTROL SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILUAE ITENIZED BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Pressurtzer o Pressurizer Pressure Low If affected pressure signal used for
_; Press:re (PORV PCV-6564) control. P0tv PCV-656A stays closed.
(PORY PCV-655A ave 11able if required.)
Othemise, channel not connected, no j control action.
l f
I1880e:14/031885 i
5 m a '
W.tachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 40 of 51 TABLE 0032.45-15 LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER III (PROTECTION CASINETS 3 ANO 3A. NIS CNANNEL III. AUX. PROCESS CASINET I!!)
CONTROL SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE IIENIZED BOUN0lWG AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT i
Steam Dump o (Loop 3)
T,,, Low No control action due to auctioneer.
1 Reactor Control o Power Range Flux Low No control action due (Channel !!!) to auctioneers. Stop turbine Costining effects of pressurizer l o T,,,(Loop 3) Low loading (C-11). level and pressure control sys-tems, could have either increasing charging flow with heater of f FW Control o Power Range Flux --
No control action due to auctioneer. causing a depressurization, or (Channel III) else heaters cause pressure to increase untti safety valve opens.
Pressurizer o Pressurizer Water Level Low If affected level signal used for In one case, event is bounded by --
tsvel (Control or Interlock) control, charging flow increases Inadvertent Opening of a Pressurtzer ..
o T,,, (Loop 3) and heaters blocked. If used for Safety or Relief Valve (Section interlock, heaters blocked. 15.6.1). For the other case, bound-Otherwise, channel not connected. ing event for loss of inverter power no control action. No control is CYCS Malfunction That Increases action on T g due to auctioneer. Reactor Coolant Inventory (Section 15.5.2).
Pressurtzer o Pressurtzer Pressure Low PORV PCV-654A stays closed. If Press:r2 (PORY PCV-655A Control, signal selected for control, pres-PORV PCV-656A Interlock) surizer heaters on (if allowed by level signal, see above), spray off.
and PORV PCV-655A stays closed.
I800e:Id/031885 e
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 8 Page 41 cf 51 i
TASLE 4032.45-16 8
LDSS OF POWER TO INVERTER IV (PROTECTION CASINET 4. NIS CHANNEL IV) I~
CONTROL e
$1STEsts .i A LS FAILutE ITENIZE0 SOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT '
Steam Dump o (Loop 4)
T,,, Low No control action due to auctioneer. '
Reactor Control o Power Range Flux Low No control action due to auctioneers.
(Channel IV) Stop turbine loading (C-11),
o T,,, (Loop 4) Low FW Control o Power Range Flus -
No control action due to auctioneer. No event is initiated due to (Channel IV) loss of power to this inverter; therefore bounding event is not applicable.
Pressurizer o T,, (Loop 4) Low Level No control action due to auctioneer.
o Pressurizer Level No letdown isolation since b1 stables are energize to actuate.
Pressurizer o Pzr. Pressure Low PORV PCV455A stays closed. If signal Pressure (PORV PCV456A Control or selected for control. PORV PCV-656A PORV PCV455A Interlock) also stays closed. -
1000e:1d/032705 g E 5
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 '
P ge 42 cf 51 e
TA8LE 0032.45-17 0
LOSS OF p0WER TO INVERTER V (CONTROL GROUP 5 1 ANS 3)
I CouT80L SYSTEles SIGNALS 4 FAILUtt ITEMIZEB SOUNOIIIG AFFECTE9 lFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT 4
Steam Dump o All (System Off/ Closed IIe initiating event, steam doenergized) dug system unavailable. 4 except Condenser (If reactor trip occurs, SG Available power-operated relief valves 4
available.)
4 Reactor Control o leone leo signals af fected; no control 6
action.
8 F'3 Control o All (Systen FW Control Loss of main FW in SG 1 and 3.
(SG 1 and 3)
If Sounding event for loss of deenergized, SG 1 and 3) Valves close, 4 FW pumps in auto mode, pumps' speed inverter power is Loss of Normal and FW pumps' speed decreases causing FCV's to open in pump speed FW Flow (Section 15.2.7). (plant 4 control decreases (all SG 2 and 4 unless failed steam trips on low-low water level in pugs, AUTO flow selected for control, in which SG 1 and 3) 4 mode only) case FCV's may close on steam flow /
o Steam flow (any loop) Low feedwater flow mismatch. (plant t
trips on low-low water level in SG 1 and 3).
4 pressurtter o. pressertzer Water Off No control action (b1 stable is Level I Level (LSH6A) energize to actuate),
t e
4
!t00e:Id/032795 e
Attachment 3 ,
ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 43 cf 51 e
TABLE 4032.45-17 (Continued) e LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER V (CONT 80L GROUPS 1 Amt 3) 6 Comte 0L 8
SYSTEMS SIEmALS FAILURE ITEMIZED BOUNDING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT 4 Pressertzer o Presseriter Pressure Off/ closed PORVs PCV455A and PCV456A remain 4 Pressure (PORY PCV455A Control; closed, heaters and spray reamla off.
Interlock on PORY PCV456A. (Nanual PORY and heater actuation 8 bistable Ps 651) available if needed.)
o Spray and Heater Actuation Off 8
8 e
4 4
4 4
4 4
e t
t 1800e:Id/032705 e
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 P ge 44 cf 51 TASLE 4032.45-18 LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER VI (AUE. PROCESS CASINET !)
CONTROL SYSTEMS SIENALS FAILURE ITENIZED BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT 5 team cump o None -
No signals affected, no control action.
Reactor Control o None -
No signals affected, no control action.
F3 Control o marrow Range SG Water Low If failed level channel Level (Any loop) selected for control. FCV opens and SG water level increases.
Otherwise, no control action.
Pr:ssurizer o Pressurizer Level Low Letdown isolated (protection grade). Sounding event for loss of Lev 01 (Control) If affected level signal used for inverter power is FW System o Charging Flow Low control, charging flow increases and Malfunction Resulting in an hesters blocked. Otherwise level Increase in FW Flow (Section channel not connected; due to low 1$.1.2) since increased flow signal, charging flow increases charging flow has little effect untti integral controller on level error in cogarison.
generates zero flow demand; new steady state reached.
Pressurizer o None -
No signals affected.
Pressure no control action.
1000e:14/031005 e
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 8 Page 45 cf 51 0
TASLE 0032.45-19 9
LOSS OF POWER TO INVERTER VII (AUX. PROCESS CASINET IV) I CONTROL 8
SYSTEMS SIGNALS FAILURE ITERIZEB BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTED DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT 4 Steam Dump o None -
No signals affected. 4 no control action.
4 Reactor Control o None -
No signals affected, no control action. 4 FW control o mone -
No signals affected. Bounding event for loss of inverter 4 no control action. power is CVCS Malfunction That Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory 4 (Section 15.5.2).
4 Pressurizer o Pressurizer Level Low Letdown isolation.
Level (Control) (protection grade).
(
Pressurizer o None -
No signals affected. 4 Pressure no control action.
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 1980e:1d/032705
Attachment 3 ,
ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 46 cf 51 a
TAetE 0032.45-20 4
LOSS OF POWER TO INvLRTER VIII (CONTROL GROUPS 2 AIIS 4) 8 CouTROL SYSTEles 4 51GI6ALS FAILURE ITEMIZE 0 tountIIIE AFFECTED AFFECTED SIRECTIOI8 EFFECTS EVENT 8
Steam Dump o Auctioneered Low too initiating event, steam dump 8
T, system unavailable. (If reactor o Tref (free Rod Control) Low trip occurs, 56 power-operated 8
re11ef valves ave 11able.)
Reactor Control e All (System Des.iergized) Off 4
Rods stay stationary. Stop turbine loading (C-17). '
F3 Control Bounding event for loss of inverter o all (System Deenergized. FW Control Loss of main FW in 56 2 and 4. power is Loss of Morinal FW Flow I SG 2 and 4) Valve closes (Plant trips on low-low water level o Steam flow (any loop) (Section 15.2.1) since increased Low in these loops.) If failed steam charging flow has little effect in i flow channel selected for control, comparison. (Plant trips on low-FCV's close in remaining loops and low water level in SG 2 and 4.) 8 FW pump speeds decrease.
Pressurizer o All (System Deenergized, Off t
Charging flow increases, backup Level except LS M6A) heaters off. e o Auctioneered T Low o Charging FCV Corarol Low t
Pressurizer o Pressurizer Pressure Closed PORVs PCV-655A and PCV-656A Pressure (P0tv PCV-656A control; 8 remala closed. Planual Interlock on PORV PCV-655A, actuation available if needed. -
8 bistable PS 658) e e
1980e:1d/032705 e
__ _-___-J
r------------.-.-----
ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 47 cf 51 TASLE Q032.45-21 LOSS OF POWER TO AUX. PROCESS CA8IIIET 11 COIITROL SYSTEIIS SIGIIALS FAILUtt ITEMlZED 00U1101116 AFFECTES AFFECTED BIRECTIOll EFFECTS EVEIIT steam sump o isone -
Iso signals af fected, no control action.
Reactor Control o leone -
No signals affected. Bounding event for loss of cabinet no control action. power is FW System Malfunction Resulting in an Increase in FW Flow (Section 15.1.2).
F3 Control o marrow Range SG Water Low If failed level channel selected Level (any loop) for control. FCv opens and 54 water level increases. Otherwise, no control action.
Pressurtzer o Pressurizer Level Low Lcvel If failed level channel selected.
(Interlock) heaters blocked. Otherwise, no control action.'
Pr255urtzer o Ilone --
Ito signals affected.
Pressure no control action.
1980e:1d/031805 E
W I l
i Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 P:ge 48 cf 51 TABLE 0032.45-22 LOSS OF PCMER TO Aux. PROCESS CASINET III CONTROL SYSTEMS SIENALS FAILutt ITERIZED BOUNOING AFFECTED AFFECTES DIRECTION EFFECTS EVENT Steam Dump o mone -
No signals affected, no control action.
Reactor Control o None -
No signals affected, no control action.
F3 Control o None -
No signals affacted, no control action. .
Pressurtzer o Pressurtzer Level Low If failed level channel Sounding event for loss of cabinet Level (Control or Interlock) selected for control, charging power is CVCS Malfunction That flow increases, heaters blocked; Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory if selected for interlock, (Section 15.5.2).
heaters blocked. Otherwise, no control action.
Pressurizer o mone -
No signals affected, Pressure no control action.
1980e:Id/031005 e
J
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 8:
Page 49 cf 51 e-TASLE 0032.45-23 0
LOSS OF COIUION INSTauMENT LINES 4
(ASSUMES BREAK IN LINE) 4 FAILES FAILUBE 80uu0llIG SEIIS005 CMAlueELS SYSTEll DIRECTION EFFECT ACCIDENT 4 Loop Steam Flow to if steam flow and/or narrow- Bounding event is Loss of 4 and range SG water level selectors Normal FW Flow (Section learrow Range I or II Feedwater H1 switched to failed channel FW 15.2.7)
SG unter Level Control
(
control valve closes in affected SG(s). All FW pump 4 speeds decrease if in auto mode.
G Pressurizer Level Fressurizer Level Con- Hi If switch positions not as shown, 4 (Control) I trol (Sw. Pos. 2 or 3) no control actions.
and If level selector switch in 4 Pressurizer Pressure Pressurtzer Pressure to position shown: charging flow (P0tv PCV-455A, Control Control (Sw. Pos. I or 2) decreases, backup heaters on. These offects at worst G (Later, on low level, heaters result in a depressur-blocked and letdown isolated 12ation which is bounded 4 from interlock channel.) by Inadvertent opening If pressure selector switch in of a Pressurizer Safety e position shown: PORY PCV-655A or Relief Valve (Section stays closed, spray unavall- 15.6.1). 4 able, backup heaters on.
4 4
4 4
' 4 1300e:Id/032785
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 0 P ge 50 e.f 51 0
TAGLE 0032.45-23 (Continued)
LOSS OF CWWON INSTRUNENT LINES 9
(ASSURED BREAK IN LINE) 4 FAILES FAILURE SOUNDING SEB50R5 CMANNELS SYSTEN DIRECTION EFFECT ACCIDENT 4 Presser 12er Level Pressurizer Level M1 If switch positions not as 4 (Interlock) II control (Sw. Pos.1 or 2) shown, no control actions. Not applicable.
and If level selector switch in 4 Pressertzer Pressere Pressurtzer Pressure to position shown: no control (P0tv PCV456A. Control) Control (Sw. Pos. 2 or 3) action, get high level 4 annunciation.
If pressure selector switch in 4 position shown: PORY PCV456A stays closed. 4 Pressurizer Level Pressuriter Level H1 Regardless of switch positions. 0 (Control or Interlock) III (Control or Interlock. PORV PCV456A blocked closed and switch positions 1 or 3 (by Ps 657). 4 Pressurizer Pressure respectively) These effects at worst (PORY PCV455A. Control; Presser 12er Pressure Lo If level selector switch in result in a depressur- 4 P0tv PCV456A. Interlock) Interlock, also position 1 (control). charging 12ation which is bounded Control (Sw. Pos. 3) flow decreases, backup heaters by Inadvertent Opening 4 on. (Later, on low level let- of a Pressurizer Safety down isolated and heaters or Relief Valve (Section 4 bloc W from interlock 15.6.1).
chann-1.) If level selector 4 switch in position 3 (inter-lock): no control action. e get high level annunciation.
If pressere selector switch in 4 position 3. PORV PCV455A also stays closed, spray unavailable. N backup heaters on.
e 1800e:18/032705
)
Attachment 3 ST-HL-AE-1220 8 Page 51 cf 51 4
TA8LE 0032.45-23 (Continued) e LOSS OF CENWIDN INSTatsEENT LIIIES 4
(A554sIES BAEAK IN LIeIE) t FAILES FAILutt BOUNtileG 5Eu50R5 C M LS 1.Y11[8 BIE CTION EFFECT ACCIDENT 4 Presser 1rer Level Presseriger Level M1 No actlee (protectlen er 4 (Protection Grade IV Centrol control) result 1ng from test applicable.
Actlen Only)
(Letdown Isolatlea) level senser falling high. I and Le PORV PCV455A blocked Presserizer Pressere Pressurizer Pressure closed. If pressure 6 (Pety PCv455A, Interlock Interlock, aise Centrol selector switch in positten PetV PCV4544. Centrol) (Sw. Pos. 1) 1. P0tv PCV456A aise blocked. t I
e I
e e
e e
t c
0 0
1 % :14/032195 J
ifANoovf IM 41 i 49. Please provide tne response to Question 32.44 on IE Information (7.7 ) Notice 79-22 concern.
t 5244N:0228N/50 ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 1 of 2 8 9 Question 032.44
( Operating reactor licensees were informed by IE Information Notice 79-22, issued September 19, 1979, that certain non-safety grade or control equipment, if subjected to the adverse environment of a high energy line break, could impact the safety analyses and the adequacy of the protection functions performed by the safety grade equipment. Enclosed is a copy of
-IE Information Notice 79-22, and reprinted copies of an August 20, 1979 Westinghouse letter and a September 10, 1979 Public Service Electric and Gas Company letter which address this matter. Operating Reactor licensees conducted reviews to determine whether such problems could exist at operating facilities.
We are concerned that a similar potential may exist at light water facilities now under construction. You are, therefore, requested to perform a review to determine what, if any, design changes or operator actions would be necessary to assure that high energy line breaks will not cause control system failures to complicate the event beyond your FSAR analysis. Provide the results of your reviews including all identified problems and the manner in which you have resolved them to NRR.
The specific " scenarios" discussed in the above referenced Westinghouse letter are to be considered as examples of the kinds of interactions which might occur. Your review should include those scenarios, where applicable, but should not necessarily be limited to them. Applicants with other LWR designs should consider analogous interactions as relevant to their designs.
( Response IE Information Notice 79-22 specifically identified four (4) potential interaction scenarios between non-safety grade and safety grade equipment which could occur because of the effect of an adverse environment follow- ,
ing a high energy line break. The four systems identified are: '
Steam Generator PORY Control System 1
Pressurizer PORY Control System
)
Main Feedwater Control System Automatic Rod Control System A discussion of each scenario and affected system and its applicability to l STP follows. ;
i It has been postulated that a failure of the steam generator PORV control '
system, due to adverse environment following a feedline rupture, could 1 cause a depressurization of the unaffected steam generators. The STP steam generator PORV system is a Class lE system. In addition, all portions of the steam generator PORV system that could be exposed to an k.
5341N:0231N
m m. ... . . -
- ST-HL-AE-1220 Page 2 of 2 i .
adverse environment are isolated in the IVC structure on a loop-by-loop basis. Only one PORY could be affected by adverse conditions and that
( PORY would be in the affected steam generator loop. For these reasons, ,
the scenario concerning the steam generator PORY control system is not i applicable to STP, 1
The second scenario assumes that the pressurizer PORV's fail in the open t position, due to an adverse environment following a feedline rupture.
This would cause a depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System, which may result in a voiding of the RCS and potentially uncovering the core. {
However, all portions of the pressurizer PORV control system located inside Containment have been environmentally qualified for the adverse environment. For this reason, the scenario involving the pressurizer PORV i control system is not applicable to STP.
The third scenario assumes a failure of the main feedwater control system, !
due to adverse environment following a small feedline rupture which occurs between the main feedline check valve and the Containment penetration.
Such a failure could cause the liquid mass in the intact steam generators at the time of reactor trip to be less than was assumed in the FSAR analysis. The STP steam flow and steam generator water level transmitters are located within the Containment and are environmentally qualified for ,
1 the adverse environment. The feedwater flow transmitters are located inside the Turbine Generator Building and the feedwater process controls are located in the Mechanical and Electrical Auxiliary Building. Because of their respective locations, the transmitters and the feedwater controls would not be exposed to an adverse environment following a feedline rupture between the main feedline check valve and the Containment penetra-f( tion. In addition, the feedwater isolation valves and associated instru-mentation are compartmentalized by loop within the isolation valve cubicle, thus restricting exposure to the harsh environment to the loop with the break. For thesd reasons, the scenario involving a failure of the main feedwater control system is not applicable to STP.
The fourth scenario assumes that the automatic rod control system fails, due to adverse environment following a small steamline rupture, in such a way that the control rods begin stepping out prior to receipt of a reactor trip signal on overpower delta-T. This could result in a DNB ratio less than the limiting value. For a steamline rupture, the excore detectors which supply inpat to the rod control system could be exposed to the adverse environment and initiate rod withdrawal. In STP, these excore detectors (and associated safety-related equipment) are part of the reactor trip system and have been environmentally qualified for a limited period of time (5 minutes) after a MSLB. For this reason, the scenario involving the automatic rod control system for a steamline rupture is not applicable to STP.
k 5341N:0231N
Q
'~
Attachment 5
'ST-HL-AE-1239
' ~
Page 1 of 2
. ACTION ITEMS ITEM ACTION SCHEDULE 2- FSAR change to provide response to TMI Item FSAR Amendment 46-II.E.1.2. 5/3/85 2' FSAR change to provide 1 response to TMI Item FSAR' Amendment 49
-II.K.3.10: 7/15/85 3 .FSAR change required to add instrument FSAR Amendment 49 accuracies and functions (App. 7A, II.F.1) 7/15/85
. Provide test' results for isolators or
~
-5 Letter 6/30/85 justify not testing 8 FSAR change to update ~IEEE-279 conformance FSAR Amendment 49
.(Section 7.5.6.2) 7/15/85 9 Final Technical Specifications to include Tech. Specs.
B0P parameter setpoints 12/31/85.
. 10 List of equipment which should not be. Letter 9/30/85 _.
. actuate-tested during plant operation
~
11 Response to Q430.14N Complete ,
(FSAR Amendment 45)
~ 12 - Channel error allowances table'will be 12/31/85 available at HL&P Bethesda' office 12 Correct references in Section 3.12 for. FSAR Amendment.49 RG 1.105 7/15/85 13 FSAR change to revise conformance to RG FSAR Amendment 49' 1.47 in Section 3.12 7/15/85 1
~ 15 Respond to Generic Letter 83-28 Next report 6/30/85 17 Provide SSPS and Safeguards Test Cabinet Complete Technical Manuals at' the HL&P Bethesda Office
.21. FSAR change'to revise response to NRC Q32.32 FSAR Amendment 49 7/15/85
-23 FSAR change to revise response to'NRC Q32.42 Complete (ST-HL-AE-1220)
Revised 3/4/85 W2/NRC2/m k
Attachment 5 ST-HL-AE-1239 Page 2 of 2 ITEM ACTION SCHEDULE 24 Testing provision for P-4 interlocks Letter 7/15/85 30 FSAR change to reference WCAPS in FSAR FSAR Amendment 49 Chapter 7 and address interface criteria 7/15/85 being met 32 FSAR change to reflect the auxiliary feed- FSAR Amendment 49 water turbine control design 7/15/85 33 Revise response to 50.55(e) item (IRC #129) Letter 8/30/85 48 FSAR change to response to NRC Q32.45 Complete (ST-HL-AE-1220) 49 FSAR change to respond to NRC Q32.44 Complete (ST-HL-AE-1220)
New Address potential failure detection in Letter MSIV "open permissive" switch, with contact 6/15/85 remaining closed New Address concern regarding unmonitored Letter MFIV operation of solenoids for venting 6/15/85 ,
hydraulic fluid during testing New Provide safety related I&C tests where leads Letter Testing are lifted or jumpers are used during sur- 6/30/86 veillance testing; provide justification for the acceptability of these actions Gen. Update FSAR Section 1.7 list to provide (as FSAR Amendment 49 minimum) all safety-related instrumentation 7/15/85 and electrical drawings needed for FSAR review Gen. Provide all safety-related instrumentation Letter and electrical drawings needed for FSAR 5/17/85 review by letter to NRC W2/NRC2/m Revised 3/4/85 k