Text

Changes to Emergency Plan Procedures
	ML033010223
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	10/21/2003
From:	Serra P; South Texas
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	ER 20030047, NOC-AE-03001624, STI:31665347
	Download: ML033010223 (206)
	v • d • e

I Nuclear Operating Company

~ngeminSabton PO Bar2.82 Psych, Th South Txsl'w/cctEkcfrk 77483 October 21, 2003 NOC-AE-03001624 STI: 31665347 FILE NO: Z18 ER 20030047 I OCFR50.4(b)(5) 10CFR50 App E U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 STP NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498; STN 50499 Changes to Emergency Plan Procedures In accordance with I OCFR50.4(b)(5) and I OCFR50, Appendix E,Section V, the STP Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits the attached Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure revisions.

If there are any questions regarding this matter, please contact Aubrey Morgan at (361) 972-7004.

P. L. Serra Manager, Plant Protection ACM/Ink

Enclosure:

Letter of Receipt Description of Changes OERP01-ZV-IN01, Emergency Classification, Rev. 6 OERPO1-ZV-IN02, Notifications To Offsite Agencies, Rev. 17 OERPO1-ZV-1N07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations, Rev. 9 OERP01-ZV-SH01, Shift Supervisor, Rev. 18 OERPO1-ZV-TPO1, Offsite Dose Calculations, Rev. 14 04ko

I NOC-AE-03001624 STI: 31665347 FILE NO: Z18 ER 20030047 Page 2 cc:

(paper copy) (electronic copy)

Emergency Planning Coordinator (2 copies) A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Regional Administrator, Region IV Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 L. D. Blaylock/W. C. Gunst Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 City Public Service U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mohan C. Thadani Attention: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike R. L. Balcom/D. G. Tees Rockville, MD 20852 Texas Genco LP Division of Reactor Safety A. Ramirez Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector City of Austin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 C. A. Johnson/A. C. Bakken III Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 AEP - Central Power and Light Company Jeffrey Cruz Jon C. Wood U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Matthews & Branscomb P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MNI 16 Wadsworth, TX 77483 C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 Richard A. Ratliff Bureau of Radiation Control Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189

NOC-AE-03001624 STI: 31665347 FILE NO: Z18 ER 20030047 Page 3 To: P. L. Serra Manager, Plant Protection STP Nuclear Operating Company P. 0. Box 289 Wadsworth, TX 77483 From: Emergency Planning Coordinator Region IV Office of the Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064

Subject:

Receipt Acknowledgment for Changes to STP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure I hereby acknowledge having received changes to the STP Nuclear Operating Company's Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

Signature Date

Description of Changes These revisions do not reduce the effectiveness or change the intent of the Emergency Response Program.

OERP01-ZV-IN01, Emergency Classification, Rev. 6 NO CHANGE REASON

1. Page 2, step 2.1, added definition of Affecting Clarification.

Safe Shutdown.

2. Page 3, step 2.11, added definition of Hatch Clarification.

Monitor

3. Page 3, step 2.12, added definition of Imminent. Clarification.

4. Page 3, step 2.16, added definition of Potential Clarification.

Loss.

5. Page 4, step 2.25, added definition of Transient. Clarification.

6. Page 4, step 2.30, added definition of Valid. Clarification.

7. Page 5, step 5.2, added Anytime Emergency Clarification.

Operating Procedures (EOPs) or Off-Normal Procedures are initiated, this procedure should be reviewed to determine if an emergency action level has been reached.

8. Page 6, step 5.6, Added when a declaration of an Describes how to handle missed or short duration emergency class is not required (NUREG-1022). events.

9. Page 7, step 6.20, Added Reference 03-ZE-003, Added new monitor due to TSC-288.

RT8050/RT8051 Contingency Conversion Constant for Post-Accident Failed Fuel Monitoring

10. Page 10, Added "OR Hatch Monitor greater than Added new monitor due to TSC-288. Dose rate 222 mR/hr" to Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier calculation 03-ZE-003, RT8050/RT8051 Contingency Conversion Constant for Post-Accident Failed Fuel Monitoring

11. Page 10, Added "OR Hatch Monitor greater than Added new monitor due to TSC-288 2,222 mR/hr" to Containment Barrier

12. Page 15, Changed HL&P to Texas Genco LP, and Editorial name change.

ECDC to STP Coordinator (QSE).

13. Page 23, RG2, Added "OR Valid reading on Added new monitor due to TSC-288 Hatch Monitor greater than 2,222 mR/fr"

14. Page 23, RS2, Added "OR Valid reading on Added new monitor due to TSC-288 Hatch Monitor greater than 222 mR/hr"

15. Page 36, EAL-5, Added "OR 222 mR/hr on the Added new monitor due to TSC-288 Hatch Monitor"

16. Page 38, EAL-5, Added "OR 222 mR/hr on the Added new monitor due to TSC-288 Hatch Monitor"

17. Page 46, Changed HL&P to Texas Genco LP, and Editorial name change.

ECDC to STP Coordinator (QSE).

18. Page 81, EAL-1, Added "OR Hatch Monitor Added new monitor due to TSC-288 greater than 222 mRlhr"

19. Page 81, Bases, Added "OR Valid reading on 222 Added new monitor due to TSC-288 mR/hr on the Hatch Monitor"

20. Page 84, EAL-1, Added "OR Valid reading on Added new monitor due to TSC-288 Hatch Monitor greater than 2,222 mR/hr" OERP01-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies, Rev. 17 NO CHANGE REASON 1 Page 2, Step 1.2, Added missed classification Clarification.

notification method to procedure scope.

2 Page 3, Step 3.4, added notification instructions Clarification.

for missed EALs in accordance with guidance in NUREG-1022.

3 Page 4, Step 4.7, changed TSC communicator Changed from having the TSC Communicator requirement to notify the NRC along with the state contact NRC, that is done in the Control Room and county. Instructed the TSC communicator to and EOF.

make contact with the NRC using the bridge line when directed.

3 Page 6, Step 5.1.1.6, Added direction to include Clarification.

PAR in General Emergency Notification 4 Page 16, New Data Sheet 5, Non-Emergency Added form top use by the Control Room for Offsite Agency Notification Message Form. informing the state & county.

OERP01-ZV-IN07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations, Rev. 9 NO CHANGE REASON 1 Page 6, Added Zones to 5 Mile Radius Clarification 2 Page 8, Added Hatch Monitor and instructions. Clarification due to TSC-288.

OERP01-ZV-SH01, Shift Supervisor, Rev. 18 NO CHANGE REASON 1 Page 6, Added Zones to 5 Mile Radius Clarification 2 Page 7, Added Hatch Monitor and instructions. Clarification due to TSC-288.

OERP01-ZV-TPO1, Offsite Dose Calculations, Rev. 14 NO CHANGE REASON I Page 3, step 2.6, Added definition of Hatch Clarification due to TSC-288.

Monitor.

2 Page 12, step 1, added Hatch Monitor. Clarification due to TSC-288.

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION D0527 STI: 31663159 OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page I of 104 Emergency Classification Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: IN HAND Effective Date: 10/16/03 Max Kcyes Namc Namc Emergency Responsc Division PREPARER TECHNICAL USER COGNIZANT ORGANIZATION Table of Contents Page

1.0 Purpose and Scope

..................................... 2 2.0 Definitions ..................................... 2 3.0 Precautions and Limitations ..................................... 5 4.0 Responsibilities ..................................... 5 5.0 Procedure .................................... 5 6.0 References ..................................... 7 7.0 Support Documents ..................................... 7 Addendum 1, Emergency Classification Tables .................................... 8 Addendum 2, Bases for Emergency Action Levels .................................... 33 Addendum 3, Exclusion Area Boundary .................................... 104

I 7OERPO1-ZV-INO1 IRev. 6 1 Page2of 104 Emergency Classification

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.1 This procedure provides guidance to the Emergency Director for determination of the appropriate Emergency Classification.

1.2 This procedure implements the requirements of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) Emergency Plan specific to Emergency Classification.

2.0 Definitions 2.1 Affecting Safe Shutdown: An event in progress has adversely affected functions that are necessary to bring the plant to and maintain it in the applicable HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN condition. Plant condition applicability is determined by Technical Specification LCOs in effect.

2.2 Alert

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any radioactive releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) exposure levels.

2.3 Emergency Action Level (EAL): A pre-determined, site specific, observable threshold for a plant Initiating Condition that is used to place the plant in a given emergency class.

[EALs can be in the form of: instrument readings, measurable parameters (on or off site), a discrete observable event, equipment status, certain natural phenomena or via Emergency Operating Procedure guidance.]

2.4 Emergency Classification: One of a set of four titles established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for grouping off-normal nuclear power plant conditions according to:

(1) their relative radiological consequences; and (2) the time sensitive onsite and offsite radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions. The existing radiological emergency classifications in ascending order of seriousness are Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.

2.5 EPA PAG: Environmental Protection Agency Protective Action Guidelines for exposure to a release of radioactive material.

2.6 Exclusion Area Boundary: The boundary of the Exclusion Area, as shown in Addendum 3.

The Exclusion Area is oval shaped such that any point on the Exclusion Area Boundary is at least 1430 meters from the center of either containment building. The licensee has control over all activities within the Exclusion Area.

2.7 Facility

The area and buildings within the Protected Area and the switchyard.

I OERPO1-ZV-INO1 IRev. 6 l Page 3of 104 Emergency Classification 2.8 Fission Product Barrier: The three boundaries for preventing the release of fission products to the environment. They are:

Fuel Cladding

Reactor Coolant System

Reactor Containment Building

2.9 Functional

A component is fully capable of meeting its design function. It would be declared inoperable if unable to meet Technical Specifications.

2.10 General Emergency (GE): Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Radioactive releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels offsite beyond the exclusion area boundary.

2.11 Hatch Monitor: Temporary monitor installed when Containment Monitors RT-8050 and RT-805 1 are out of service. A correction factor has been calculated to relate Hatch Monitor dose rate to the dose rate inside Containment. (CR 01-3566) 2.12 Imminent: Mitigation actions have been ineffective and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur within 1 or 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

2.13 Initiating Condition: One of a predetermined subset of nuclear power plant conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency, or such an emergency has occurred.

2.14 Inoperable: A component does not meet Technical Specifications. The component may be functional, capable of meeting its design function.

2.15 Loss: A component is inoperable and not functional.

2.16 Potential Loss: Mitigation actions are not effective and trended information indicates that the parameters are outside desirable bands and not stable or improving.

2.17 Protected Area: That area inside the physical security boundary of the site that includes the nuclear reactor plant.

2.18 Radiological Release: Any radiological release from the plant that exceeds the EAL limits established for an Unusual Event.

2.19 Recovery: That phase of an emergency when the emergency condition no longer exists and the plant is in a stable, shutdown, and safe condition; major repairs, if required, have been identified in order to return the plant to operation; and the potential for uncontrolled releases of radioactive material to the environment no longer exists.

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 IRev. 6 l Page 4of 104 l Emergency Classification 2.20 Security Alert: A security related situation that requires an increased level of readiness on the part of the Security Force.

2.21 Security Emergency: A security related emergency situation for which prompt response by the Security Force, immediate action by plant personnel, and/or assistance from offsite agencies may be required to apprehend intruders and mitigate the effects of or prevent radiological sabotage.

2.22 Site Boundary: The edge of the plant property whose access may be controlled by the licensee. This boundary is congruent with the Exclusion Area Boundary for the purpose of dose assessment.

2.23 Site Area Emergency (SAE): Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any radioactive releases are not expected to result in exposure levels that exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels outside the Exclusion Area Boundary.

2.24 Steam Generator Tube Rupture: A Steam Generator tube leak greater than the capacity of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) to maintain pressurizer level.

2.25 Transient: A planned reactor trip in which the expected post-trip response did not occur.

2.26 Termination: Exiting the emergency condition.

2.27 Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE): Total committed dose from internally deposited radionuclide over subsequent 50 year period to the Thyroid.

2.28 Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE): The sum of external dose exposure to radioactive plume, to radionuclides deposited on the ground by the plume, and the internal exposure due to inhaled radionuclides deposited in the body.

2.29 Unusual Event: Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

2.30 Valid: An Indication, report or condition is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

2.31 Vital Area: Locations within the Protected Area as defined by security procedures which contain equipment that directly affect the safety of the plant.

OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 1 Page5of 104 Emergency Classification 3.0 Precautions and Limitations 3.1 The Emergency Director is the only individual who can declare an emergency or change an Emergency Classification. The normal progression for Emergency Director is:

3.1.1 Shift Supervisor to 3.1.2 TSC Manager to 3.1.3 EOF Director 4.0 Responsibilities 4.1 The Emergency Director is responsible for declaring or changing an Emergency Classification based on the EALs contained in Addendum 1, Emergency Classification Tables.

4.2 Emergency Response personnel are responsible for alerting the Emergency Director of conditions which may change the emergency classification.

5.0 Procedure NOTE Addendum 1, Emergency Classification Tables, may be removed from the basic procedure for use in classifying emergencies.

5.1 Upon recognition of the potential for an event or plant condition to represent an emergency OR as directed from other procedures, refer to Addendum 1, Emergency Classification Tables.

5.2 Anytime Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) or Off-Normal Procedures are initiated, this procedure should be reviewed to determine if an emergency action level has been reached.

5.3 IF the event or condition meets EALs applicable to more than one Emergency Classification, THEN declare the highest Emergency Classification and implement the appropriate procedure.

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 IRev. 6 l Page6of 104 Emergency Classification 5.4 Based on the judgement of the Emergency Director, an emergency can be declared at any level even if it is not specifically covered in Addendum 1.

5.5 Any person recognizing an emergency or potential emergency condition should notify the Emergency Director and/or Shift Supervisor.

5.6 Declaration of an emergency class is not required if:

5.6.1 The event or condition which met an EAL threshold no longer exists at the time of discovery.

AND 5.6.2 The event or condition was due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification.

5.6.3 Reporting requirements of 10CFR50.72 are applicable and the guidance of NUREG-1022 should be applied.

5.7 The classification of an emergency may be downgraded by the Emergency Director if appropriate for the conditions.

5.8 Use the following criteria/guidance to determine entry into Recovery or Termination:

5.8.1 Recovery

A Site Area or General Emergency has been declared;

the emergency condition no longer exists and the plant is in a stable, shutdown, and safe condition;

major repairs, if required, have been identified in order to return the plant to operation;

the potential for uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment no longer exists; and

concurrence from the NRC, State, and County has been obtained.

5.8.2 Termination

One of the following applicable conditions exists 5.8.2.1 From Recovery

Repairs identified during the recovery phase are complete and the plant is ready to return to normal operations.

5.8.2.2 From Alert or Unusual Event

The emergency condition no longer exists and the plant is ready to return to normal operations; or

The emergency condition no longer exists, repair activities are minor, and the plant is in a stable shutdown mode.

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 IRev. 6 l Page 7of 14 Emergency Classification 5.9 Addendum 2, Bases for Emergency Action Levels may be used in explanation of why a particular EAL was selected in classifying an emergency.

6.0 References 6.1 STPEGS Emergency Plan 6.2 UFSAR 6.3 OPOP05-EO-ECOO, Loss of All AC Power 6.4 OPOPO5-EO-FO02, Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree 6.5 OPOP05-EO-FO04, Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree 6.6 OPOP05-EO-FO05, Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree 6.7 OPOP05-EO-FRC 1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling 6.8 OPOP05-EO-FRH1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 6.9 OPOP05-EO-FRS1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation - ATWS 6.10 OPOP04-ZO-0002, Natural and Destructive Phenomena Guidelines 6.11 OPOP04-SY-0001, Seismic Event 6.12 OPOP04-ZO-0001, Control Room Evacuation.

6.13 Regulatory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors.

6.14 NUMARC/NESP-007. Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, January, 1992 6.15 OPOPOI-ZA-0018, Emergency Operating Procedure User's Guide 6.16 Safeguards Contingency Plan 6.17 OSDPO1-ZS-001 1, Implementing Procedures for Safeguards Contingency Events 6.18 Calculation No. 91-RA-0001 6.19 Calculation No. 01-RA-001, Radiation Monitor Calculations for Emergency Action Levels 6.20 03-ZE-003, RT8050/RT8051 Contingency Conversion Constant for Post-Accident Failed Fuel Monitoring 7.0 Support Documents 7.1 Addendum 1, Emergency Classification Tables 7.2 Addendum 2, Bases for Emergency Action Levels 7.3 Addendum 3, Exclusion Area Boundary

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 8 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables I Page 1 of 25 TABLE OF CONTENTS Cateaorv Pe Fission Product Barriers

- Fission Product Barrier Degradation 3 Systems

- Electrical 4

- Reactor Protection/Technical Specification Shutdowns 6

- Communications/Alarms/Assessment 7

- Shutdown Maintenance 9

- Fission Product Barrier- Threshold Levels 11 Radiological

- Radiological Release 12

- Radiation Levels 16 Hazards

- Security 18

- Fire/Explosion 19

- Toxic/Flammable Gas 21

- Natural or Destructive Phenomena 22

- Control Room Evacuation 24

- Miscellaneous Events 25

IOERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 l Page9ofl04 Emergency Classification Addendum I I Emergency Classification Tables I Page 2 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY F FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX Determine which combination of the three barriers are lost or have a potential loss and use the following matrix to classify the event. Also, an event (or multiple events) could occur which result in the conclusion that the loss or potential loss is IMMINENT (within 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ). In this IMMINENT loss situation use judgement and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

UNUSUAL EVENT (1-2) ALERT (3-4) SITE AREA EMERGENCY (5-8) GENERAL EMERGENCY (9.10)

FUl ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss FAI ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss FSI Loss of BO1TI Fuel Clad and FGI Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND of Containment of Fuel Clad or RCS RCS OR Potential Loss of BOTH Potential Loss or Loss of Third Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier FU2 Fuel Clad Degradation See SU6 FU3 RCS~ Lekae- T1e7 OR FV3 Leakage RCS - See Loss of EMTIER Fuel SU7lPotential Clad or RCS AND

____________________________________ ~~~~~~Loss of ANY Additional Barrier Operating Modes 1 through 4 Note: 1. At the Site Area Emergency level, there must be some ability to dynamically assess how far present conditions are from General Emergency.

2. The ability to escalate to higher emergency classes as an event degrades must be maintained. RCS leakage steadily increasing would represent an increasing risk to public health and safety.

Determination of Emergency Classification Level Select values from the top of the columns on the next page, which describe specific Fission Product Barrier degradation. Select the higher value that applies from each barrier. Add the values to arrive at the total challenge to the Fission Product Barriers. The emergency classification is determined from the range of values shown in parentheses in the table above.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 Page 10 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 3 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY F FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX FUEL CLAD RCS CONTAINMENT EAL POTENTIAL LOSS (3) LOSS (4) POTENTIAL LOSS (3) LOSS (4) POTENTIAL LOSS (1) LOSS (2)

I CSOE £SFE f Core Cooling - Orange Core Cooling -Red RCS Integrity- Red Core Cooling. Yellow Containment - Red OR OR with subcooling < 0 F OR Heat Sink -Red_ Heat Sink - Red' Core Cooling - Orange > 15 min.

2 RCS Activit RCS ActivitY RCS Leak Rate RCS Leak Rate Containment Pressure Containment Pressure Failed Fuel Monitor, Dose Equivalent Iodine Unisolable leak exceeding the Leak rate greater than CVCS Greater than 6% hydrogen Initial increase followed by rapid RT-8039, equal toot greater greater than 300 liCi/gm capacity of one centrifugal System's ability to maintain RCS concentration in containment unexplained decrease than 870 ipCi/ml charging pump in the normal inventory as indicated by loss of OR OR charging mode. RCS subcooling. Containment pressure greater than containment pressure or sump 9.5 psig with neither containment level not increasing as expected spray nor RCFC running. with LOCA conditions.

3 CoreThlrmocough Exit Core Exit Thermocouple SG TIb Rbe R u pt ur SG Tubeak 2 708°F 1200°F SG Tube has ruptured and SG Tube is ruptured and has a Primary to secondary leakage the primary to secondary leak non-isolable secondary steam greater than 150 gpd through any rate is greater than the capacity release one steam generator with direct ofone centrifugal charging secondary side leakage to pump. atmosphere 4 Reactor Vessel Water g Lno cntj Bypass Containmcnt Isolation Plenum level less then 20%/ VALID increase in reading on area Containment isolation signal or ventilation monitors in areas AND

_ _ adjacent

_ to the containment Valves not closed boundary with a known LOCA AND inside containment. A pathway to the environment exists.

RCB Rad Monitor RCB Rad Monitor RCB Rad Monitor 5 _ RT-8050 or RT.8051 _ RT-8050 or RT-8051 RT-8050 or RT-8051 greater than greater than 100 R/hr greater than 100 R/hr 1,000 R/hr OR OR OR Hatch Monitor greater Ilatch Monitor greater than 222 Hatch Monitor greater than 2,222

.____________ _ .than 222 mR/hr_ mR/hr mRlhr .

Note: 1. The Fuel Clad barriers and the RCS barrier are weighted more heavily than the Containment Barrier. Unusual Event Initiating Conditions (ICs) associated with RCS and Fuel Clad barriers are addressed under SU6 and SU7.

2. CSF indicators must be valid; outside the immediate control of the operator.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page II of 104 ,

Procedure Title Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 4 of 25 1 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX ELECTRICAL INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SG1 EAL-1 GE Prolonged Loss of Offsite and Onsite Entry into OPOP05-EO-ECOO, Loss of ALL AC Power to All Three 4160V AC ESF Power, for greater than 15 minutes.

Busses.

AND Modes: 14 Either of the following conditions exists:

a. Restoration of at least one 4160V AC ESF Bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is not likely.

OR

b. Degradation of core cooling is indicated by a valid Red or Orange path on the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

SS1 EAl1 SAE Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power to All No voltage on all 4160 VAC ESF busses for greater Three 4160V AC ESF Busses. than 15 minutes.

Modes: 14 SS3 EAL-1 SAE Loss of All Class I E DC Power. Less than 107 volts DC on ALL four (4) ESF DC battery busses for greater than 15 minutes.

Modes: 14 SA1 EAL-1 ALERT Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power to All No voltage on all 4160 VAC ESF busses for greater Three 4160V AC ESF Busses During Cold than 15 minutes.

Shutdown or Refueling.

Modes: 5,6, and Defueled

I OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 12 of 104 Procedure Title Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 5 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX ELECTRICAL ll INITIATING CONDITION l EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SA5 EAL-I ALERT AC Power Capability to the Three 4160V The following conditions exist:

AC ESF Busses is Reduced to a Single a. Loss of power to the STBY 1 XFMR, Power Source for Greater than 15 Minutes STBY 2 XFMR, UAT, and 13.8 KV Such that Any Additional Single Failure Emergency bus 1(2)L for greater than 15 Would Result in loss of ALL AC power. minutes.

AND Modes: 1-4 b. Onsite power capability has been degraded to a single ESF diesel generator capable of supplying power to at least one ESF bus.

EAL-2 The following conditions exist:

a. One of the following offsite power supplies is providing power to ALL of the energized 4160 ESF busses:

- STBY 1 XFMR

- STBY 2 XFMR

- UAT

- 13.8 KV Emergency bus 1(2)L AND

b. ESF DGs 11(21), 12(22), AND 13(23) are not capable of providing power to their

+

respective bus. I Sul EAL-1 Loss of Offsite Power to ESF Busses for The following conditions exist:

Greater than 15 Minutes. a. Loss of power to the STBY 1 XFMR, STBY 2 XFMR, UAT, and 13.8 KV Modes: 1-6, Defueled Emergency bus 1(2)L for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. At least 2 ESF DGs are supplying power to their respective busses.

SU5 EAL-1 Unplanned Loss of Class I E DC Power Loss of ESF DC Power to Channel I and During Cold Shutdown or Refueling for Channel 4 based on Battery Bus Voltage less than Greater than 15 Minutes. 107 volts DC for greater than 15 minutes.

Modes: 5 and 6

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 13 of 104 Procedure Titlej Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 6 of 2 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX REACTOR PROTECTION/TECLINICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWNS INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SG2 EAL-1 GE Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Entry into OPOP05-EO-FRS1, Response to Nuclear Complete an Automatic Reactor Trip. Power Generation - ATWS.

AND AND Manual Reactor Trip Was NOT Successful. Either of the following:

AND a. Degradation of core cooling is indicated There is Indication of an Extreme by a valid Red path on the Core Cooling Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core. Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

OR Modes: 1 and 2 b. Degradation of heat sink is indicated by a valid Red path on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

SS2 EAL-1 SAE Failure of Reactor Protection System Entry into OPOP05-EO-FRS1, Response to Nuclear Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Power Generation - ATWS.

Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded.

AND Manual Reactor Trip Was NOT Successful.

Modes: 1 and 2 SA2 EAL-1 ALERT Failure of Reactor Protection System Reactor Protection System setpoint exceeded with NO Instrumentation To Complete or Initiate an automatic trip.

Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor AND Protection System Setpoint Has Been A manual reactor trip was required for plant Exceeded and Manual Reactor Trip Was shutdown.

Successful from the Control Room.

Modes: 1-3 SU2 EAL-1 UE Operation Outside the Plant Safety The plant cannot be brought to the required operating Envelope As Defined By Technical mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Specifications. Statement Time.

Modes: 14

OERPOl-ZV-INOl I Rev. 6 Page 14 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 7 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX COMMUNICATIONS/ALARMS/ASSESSMENT INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SS6 EAL-1 SAE Inability to Monitor a Significant The following conditions exist:

Transient in Progress. a. Loss of Control Room Indicators and Annunciators associated with Safety Systems.

Modes: 1-4 AND

b. Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications are Unavailable (e.g. QDPS, ICS, ERFDADS, Control Board, or Local Alarms).

AND

c. Significant transient in progress.

SA4 EAL-1 ALERT Unplanned Loss of Most Control The following conditions exist:

Room Safety System Annunciation a. Loss of most (>50%) of Control Room Safety or Indication with Either (1) a System annunciators or indicators for greater Significant Transient In Progress, or than 15 minutes.

(2) Compensatory Indicators are AND Unavailable. b. The Shift Supervisor determines that the loss of Modes: 1-4 the annunciators or indicators requires increased surveillance of compensatory indicators (e.g.

Control Board Indicators, Local Indicators, QDPS, ICS, ERFDADS) to safely operate the unit.

AND

c. Annunciator or Indicator Loss does not result from planned action.

AND

d. Either of the following conditions exist:

1. A significant plant transient is in progress.

OR

2. Compensatory indications are unavailable or cannot be adequately monitored with on-shift personnel.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 Page 15 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page8 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX COMMUNICATIONS/ALARMS/ASSESSMENT INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SU3 EAL-1 UE Unplanned Loss of Most The following conditions exist:

Control Room Safety System Annunciation or Indication for a. Loss of most (>50%) of Control Room Safety System Greater than 15 Minutes. annunciators or indicators for greater than 15 minutes.

Modes: 1-4 AND

b. Compensatory indications are available and can be adequately monitored with on-shift personnel.

AND

c. The Shift Supervisor determines that the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires increased surveillance of compensatory indications (e.g. Control Board Indicators, Local Indicators, QDPS, ICS, ERFDADS) to safely operate the unit.

AND

d. Annunciator or indicator loss is not the result of planned action.

SU4 EAL-1 UE Unplanned Loss of All Onsite Unplanned loss of ALL onsite telephone, radio and headset or Offsite Communications communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine Capabilities. operations.

Modes: At all times EAL 2 Unplanned loss of ALL onsite to offsite telephone and FAX communications capability: Plant telephone system, DPS/MCSO Ringdown Line, Texas Genco LP Line, STP Communicator (QSE)

Ringdown Line, NRC ENS Line.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 16 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 9 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX SHUTDOWN MAINTENANCE INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SS4 EAL-1 SAE Complete Loss of Any Function Modes 1 Loss of all feedwater function (main, startup, Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot and auxiliary) indicated by SG narrow range level less than Shutdown. 14% [34%] in ALL SGs AND total feedwater flow less Modes: 1-4 than 576 gpm.

EAL-2 Mode 4 - Loss of RHR function indicated by entry into OPOP04-RH-0001, Loss of Residual Heat Removal, AND loss of all feedwater function (main, startup, and auxiliary) indicated by SG narrow range level less than 14% [34%] in ALL SGs AND total feedwater flow less than 576 gpm.

SS5 EAL-1 SAE Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Loss of Reactor Vessel Water Level as indicated by:

Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel. a. Loss of all Decay Heat Removal Cooling as determined by entry into, OPOP04-RH-0001, Modes: 5 and 6 Loss of Residual Heat Removal.

AND

b. The Core is or will be uncovered as indicated by:

RCS Narrow Range Hot Leg Level less than -2 inches (Elev. 32'-1").

0ERP01-ZV-1N01 Rev. 6 l Page 17 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 10 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX SHUTDOWN MAINTENANCE INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SAl EAL-1 ALERT Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power to All Loss of ALL ONSITE AND OFFSITE power to ALL Three 41 60V AC ESF Busses During three 4160 V AC ESF Busses for greater than 15 Cold Shutdown or Refueling. minutes.

Modes: 5,6, and Defueled SA3 EAL-I1 ALERT Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold The following conditions exist:

Shutdown.

a. Less than 2 RHR loops are functional.

Modes: 5 and 6 AND

b. Temperature increase that either:

Results in Tavg exceeding 200 F.

OR Results in uncontrolled temperature rise, causing Tavg to approach 200*F.

SUS EAL1 UE Unplanned Loss of Class IE DC Power Loss of ESF DC Power to Channel I and Channel 4 during Cold Shutdown or Refueling for based on Battery Bus Voltage less than 107 volts DC Greater than 15 Minutes. for greater than 15 minutes.

Modes: 5 and 6

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 18 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page II of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY S SYSTEMS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER - THRESHOLD LEVELS INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS SA6 EAL-1 ALERT Fuel Clad Degradation. Failed Fuel Monitor, RT-8039, indicates greater than or equal to Modes: 1-6 870 ItCifml and this reading is not the result of a crud burst as confirmed by a grab sample.

EAL-2 Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) sample greater than 300 jiCi/gm.

SU6 EAL-1 UE Fuel Clad Degradation. Failed Fuel Monitor, RT-8039, indicates greater than or equal to 300 piCi/ml and this reading is not the result of a crud burst as Modes: 1-6 confirmed by a grab sample.

EAL-2 Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) sample greater than Technical Specification limitations.

SU7 EAL-1 UE RCS Leakage. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm.

Modes: 14 EAL-2 Identified leakage greater than 25 gpm.

OERP01-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 Page 19 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 12 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY R RADIOLOGICAL INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE l INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS l RG1 EAL 1 GE Site Boundary Dose Resulting from A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors an Actual or Imminent Release of that exceeds the value shown.

Gaseous Radioactivity that Exceeds AND 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem An offsite dose assessment using OERPO1-ZV-TPO1, Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Offsite Dose Calculations, using actual meteorology cannot Projected Duration of the Release be completed within 15 minutes.

Using Actual Meteorology.

If an offsite dose assessment is completed, refer to EAL-2.

Modes: At all times UNIT VENT RT-8010B > 2.00 E+8 piCi/sec

MAIN STEAM LINE RT-8046 > 50 pCi/ml RT-8047 > 50 ,uCi/ml RT-8048 > 50 ILCi/ml RT-8049 > 50 .tCi/ml EAL-2 Dose assessment indicates dose consequences greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE and/or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.

EAL-3 Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 1,000 mrem/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR Analysis of field survey samples indicate thyroid dose commitment of 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Main Steam Line Monitors RT-8046 thru RT-8049 assumes a Gap Inventory and a steam release into the environment of 1.05 E+6 lbs.Ihr.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 20 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum I1 Emergency Classification Tables IPage 13 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY R RADIOLOGICAL INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE If INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL I CLASS RS1 EAL-1 SAE Site Boundary Dose Resulting from A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors an Actual or Imminent Release of that exceeds or is expected to exceed the value shown.

Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 100 AND mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid An offsite dose assessment using OERPOI-ZV-TP0I, Offsite CDE for the Actual or Projected Dose Calculations, using actual meteorology cannot be Duration of the Release. completed within 15 minutes.

Modes: At all times If an offsite dose assessment is completed, refer to EAL-2.

UNIT VENT RT-8010B > 2.00 E+7 pCi/sec

MAIN STEAM LINE RT-8046 > 5 pxCi/ml RT-8047 > 5 pCi/ml RT-8048 > 5 giCi/ml RT-8049 > 5 ptCi/ml EAL-2 Dose assessment indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE and/or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.

EAL-3 Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 100 mrem/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR Analysis of field survey samples indicate thyroid dose commitment of 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

Main Steam Line Monitors RT-8046 thru RT-8049 assumes a Gap Inventory and a steam release into the environment of 1.05 E+6 lbs./hr.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 l Rev. 6 I Page 21 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 I Emergency Classification Tables I Page 14 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY R RADIOLOGICAL INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE INITIATING CONDITION I EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL l CLASS RA1 EAL-1 ALERT Any Unplanned Release of A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds the value shown indicating that the release to the Environment that Exceeds may have exceeded the emergency criterion and indicates 25 Times the Unusual Event the need to assess the release with OPSP07-VE-0005, Unit EALs at the site boundary for 15 Vent Effluent Permit.

Minutes or Longer.

UNIT VENT Modes: At all times RT-8010B > 2.50 E+6 IgCi/sec for 15 minutes EAL-2 Confirmed sample analysis for gaseous releases indicates concentrations or release rates with a release duration of 15 minutes or longer in excess of 2.50 E-5 j+/-Ci/ml at the site boundary.

EAL-3 Confirmed sample analysis of liquid releases indicates concentration or release rates in excess of 25 times the Effluent Concentration Limit at the site boundary.

EAL4 Site boundary radiation dose rate 2 3 mremfhr for greater than 15 minutes based on dose projections or field team measurements.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 22 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 15 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY R RADIOLOGICAL INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE Il_INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL J CLASS RUI EALT1 UE Any Unplanned Release of A valid reading on one or more of the following Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity monitors that exceeds the value shown indicating that to the Environment that Exceeds the release may have exceeded the emergency criterion Two (2) Times the ODCM Limit and indicates the need to assess the release with at the site boundary for expected OPSP07-VE-0005, Unit Vent Effluent Permit.

duration of 60 Minutes or Longer.

UNIT VENT Modes: At all times RT-801 OB > 1.00 E+5 pCi/sec for 60 minutes EAL-2 Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases indicates concentrations or release rates with a release duration of 60 minutes or longer in excess of 1.00 E-6 gCi/ml (two times the Effluent Concentration Limit*) at the site boundary.

EAL-3 Confirmed sample analysis for liquid releases indicates concentration or release rates with a release duration of 60 minutes or longer in excess of two (2) times the Effluent Concentration Limit at the site boundary.

EAL-4 Valid dose rate projection 2 0.1 mrem/hr at the site boundary for 60 minutes or longer.

The Effluent Concentration Limit for Xe-133 is 5.00 E-7 glCi/ml.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 23 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 16 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY R RADIOLOGICAL INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX RADIATION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS RG2 EAL-I GE Unexpected Increase in Containment Radiation. Valid reading on RCB High Range Monitors, RT-8050 or RT-8051 greater than 1,000 R/hr.

Modes: 14 OR Valid reading on Hatch Monitor greater than 2,222 mRlhr. I RS2 EAL-1 SAE Unexpected Increase in Containment Radiation Levels. Valid reading on RCB High Range Monitors, RT-8050 or RT-8051 greater than 100 R/hr.

Modes: 14 OR Valid reading on Hatch Monitor greater than 222 mR/hr.

I RA2 EAL-I ALERT Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel Valid readings on one or more of the following monitors:

or Loss of Water Level that has or Will Result in the Uncovering of FHB Exhaust, RT-8035 > 5.00 E-2 pICi/ml Irradiated Fuel Outside the FHB Exhaust, RT-8036 > 5.00 E-2 pCi/n-l Reactor Vessel. Area Monitor (68' FHB), RT-8090 > 5,000 mR/hr Area Monitor (68' RCB), RT-8099 > 5,000 mR/hr Modes: At all times EAL-2 Irradiated fuel uncovered (actual or potential) based on observation OR water level below top of fuel storage racks.

RA3 Valid Readings on any of the following Area Monitors: ALERT Release of Radioactive Material or EAL-1 RT-8066 > 15 mR/hr (35' EAB)

Increases in Radiation Levels that EAL-2 RT-8058 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (10' MAB)

Impedes Operation of Systems RT-8060 >5.00 E+3 mR/hr (10' MAB)

Required to Maintain Safe RT-8061 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (10' MAB)

Operation or to Establish or RT-8062 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (10' MAB)

Maintain Cold Shutdown. RT-8063 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (29' MAB)

RT-8077 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (60' MAB)

Modes: At all times RT-8084 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (-21' FHB)

RT-8085 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (-21' FHB)

RT-8086>5.00E+3 mR/hr (-21' FHB)

RT-8087 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (-21' FHB)

RT-8090 > 5.00 E+3 mR/hr (68' FHB)

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 24 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 I Emergency Classification Tables I Page 17 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY R RADIOLOGICAL INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX RADIATION LEVELS INITIATING CONDITION I EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS RU2 EAL-1 UE Unexpected Increase in Plant Valid Readings on any of the following Area Monitors Radiation Levels or Airborne greater than 1,000 Times 24 hr. average.

Concentrations.

RT-8052, (-11' RCB) RT-8069, (41' MAB) RT-8086, (-21' FHB)

Modes: At all times RT-8053, (-11' RCB) RT-8070, (41' MAB) RT-8087, (-21' FHB)

RT-8054, (19' RCB) RT-8071, (41' MAB) RT-8088, (30' FHB)

RT-8055, (68' RCB) RT-8072, (41' MAB) RT-8089, (68' FHB)

RT-8056, (52' RCB) RT-8073, (41' MAB) RT-8090, (68' FHB)

RT-8057, (10' EAB) RT-8074, (41 ' MAB) RT-8091, (68' FHB)

RT-8058, (10' MAB) RT-8075, (41' MAB) RT-8092, (29' TGB)

RT-8059, (10' MAB) RT-8076, (60' EAB) RT-8093, (29' TGB)

RT-8060, (10' MAB) RT-8077, (60' MAB) RT-8094, (72' EAB)

RT-8061, (10' MAB) RT-8078, (60' MAB) RT-8095, (OSC)

RT-8062, (10' MAB) RT-8079, (60' MAB) RT-8096, (EOF)

RT-8063, (29' MAB) RT-8080, (41' MAB) RT-8097, (68' FHB)

RT-8064, (29' MAB) RT-8081, (68' FHB) RT-8098, (60' MAB)

RT-8065, (29' MAB) RT-8082, (60' MAB) RT-8099, (60' RCB)

RT-8066, (35' EAB) RT-8083,(41' MAB) RT-8100, (35' EAB)

RT-8067, (35' EAB) RT-8084, (-21' FHB) RT-8101, (35' EAB)

RT-8068, (41' MAB) RT-8085, (-21' FHB)

EAL-2

Uncontrolled loss of water level in the Spent Fuel Pool and Fuel Transfer Canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

EAL-3

Uncontrolled decrease of water level in the Refueling Cavity/ICSA with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered with water. (Mode 6 Only).

Outside the immediate control of the operator

OERPO1-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 Page 25 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 18 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX SECURITY INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS HG1 EAL-1 GE Security Event Resulting in Loss of physical control of the Control Room due to security Loss of Ability to Reach and event.

Maintain Cold Shutdown. EAL-2 Modes: 1-6 Loss of physical control of the remote shutdown capability due to security event.

HS1 EAI1 SAE Security Event in a Plant Vital Intrusion into a Vital Area by a hostile force.

Area. EAL-2 Modes: At all times Security Emergency that in the judgement of the Emergency Director could prevent safe shutdown or interfere with maintaining safe shutdown conditions.

EAL-3 Confirmed presence of an explosive device in a Vital Area.

HAI EAL-1 ALERT Security Event in the Protected Intrusion into the Protected Area by a hostile force.

Area. EAL-2 Modes: At all times Security Emergency as defined by the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

HU EAL-1 UE Confirmed Security Event Security Alert as defined by the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

Which Indicates a Potential EAL-2 Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant. Bomb device discovered inside the plant Protected Area, but outside the Vital Area.

Modes: At all times

1I OERPOI-ZV-INO0 l Rev. 6 l Page 26 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables I Page 19 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX FIRE/EXPLOSION

[l INITIATING CONDITION I EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL I CLASS I HA2 EAL-1 ALERT Fire or Explosion in a Vital Area Fire or Explosion potentially affecting Safe Shutdown Potentially Affecting Safe Shutdown Equipment or systems required for decay heat removal.

or Decay Heat Removal.

(Modes: 1-6)

Modes: See specific EAL The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

0 Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building 0 Reactor Containment Building 0 Isolation Valve Cubicle 0 Diesel Generator Building Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure AND

b. Affected system parameter indications show degraded performance or plant personnel report visible damage to systems structures or components within the specified area required for safe shutdown.

EAL-2 Fire or explosion in one or more of the areas listed below which impacts ability to maintain cooling for spent fuel.

Fuel Handling Building

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building (Modes: At all times)

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 27 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 20 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX FIRE/EXPLOSION INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS HU2 EAL-1 UE Fire or Explosion in the Fire within the areas below which is not under control within 15 Protected Area or Switchyard minutes of initial notification.

which Affects Normal Operation. EAL-2 Modes: At all times Explosion in or adjacent to any of the following areas which damages equipment necessary for normal plant operation.

Areas considered for EAL-1 and EAL-2:

Switchyard

Turbine Generator Building

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building

Fuel Handling Building

Reactor Containment Building

Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure

Isolation Valve Cubicle

Diesel Generator Building

Circulating Water Intake Structure

OERPO1-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 Page 28 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 21 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX TOXICIFLAMMALBLE GAS INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS HA3 EAL-I ALERT Toxic/Flammable Gases Confirmed entry of toxic gas into Control Room envelope.

Potentially Affecting Safe Operation. EAL-2 Modes: At all times Uncontrolled entry of flammable gas into a Vital Area.

EAL-3 Uncontrolled entry of toxic gas into the facility in life threatening concentration or into a Vital Area where lack of access constitutes a safety problem.

HU3 EAL-1 UE Toxic/Flammable Gases Onsite toxic or flammable gas release which requires evacuation Affecting Plant Operation. of areas within the Protected Area.

Modes: At all times EAL-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 Page 29 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 22 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX NATURAL OR DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA lINITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS D HA4 EALCH ALERT Natural or Destructive Phenomena Seismic motion exceeding Operating Basis Earthquake Potentially Affecting Safe (OBE) as indicated by Seismic monitor alarm and confirmed Operation. by OPOP04-SY-0001.

EAL-2 Modes: At all times Tornado or high wind causing visible structural damage to any of the following plant structures:

Reactor Containment Building

ECW Intake Structure S Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building 0 Isolation Valve Cubicle 0 Fuel Handling Building 0 Diesel Generator Building EAL-3 Entry of floodwater into safety related structures such that the function of safety related equipment is jeopardized.

EAL-4 Predicted or actual breach of Main Cooling Reservoir retaining dike along North Wall.

EAL-5 Vehicle crash affecting a plant Vital Area.

EAL-6 Turbine failure generated missiles result in any visible structural damage to or penetration of any of the following plant areas:

S Reactor Containment Building 0 ECW Intake Structure 0 Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building 0 Isolation Valve Cubicle 0 Fuel Handling Building a Diesel Generator Building

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 30 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables IPage 23 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX NATURAL OR DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA INITIATING CONDITION I EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL I CLASS i HU4 EAL-1 UE Natural or Destructive Phenomena Earthquake detected by seismic monitoring system and Affecting Plant Operations. confirmed by OPOP04-SY-000 1, Seismic Event.

Modes: At all times EAL-2 Tornado striking facilities within the Protected Area.

EAL-3 Shutdown of the facility required due to actual or predicted natural phenomenon in accordance with OPOP04-ZO-0002, Natural or Destructive Phenomena Guidelines.

EAL-4 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within the Protected Area.

EAL-5 Report of main turbine failure resulting in casing penetration.

OR damage to turbine or generator seals.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 31 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 Emergency Classification Tables Page 24 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION INITIATING CONDITIONS EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS HS2 EAL-1 SAE Control Room Evacuation and 1. The following conditions exist:

Plant Control Cannot be Established. a. Control Room evacuation has been initiated per OPOP04-ZO-OOO1, Control Room Evacuation.

Modes: 1-6 AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established by completion of step 12 of OPOPO4-ZO-0001 within 15 minutes.

HA5 EAL-1 ALERT Control Room Evacuation. The Control Room is evacuated and the plant is being controlled per OPOP04-ZO-O001, Control Room Evacuation.

Modes: 1-6

OERP01-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 lPage 32 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 1 lEmergency Classification Tables l cag 25 of 25 RECOGNITION CATEGORY H HAZARDS INITIATING CONDITION MATRIX MISCELLANEOUS EVENTS INITIATING CONDITION EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASS HG2 EAL-1 GE Miscellaneous Events which May Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Potentially Result in a Hazard to Emergency Director indicate:

the Public.

a. Actual or imminent substantial core degradation Modes: At all times with potential for loss of containment.

OR

b. Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases.

These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG plume exposure levels outside the site boundary.

HS3 EAL-1 SAE Miscellaneous Events Affect the Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Ability to Shutdown the Plant or Emergency Director indicate actual or likely major failures of Maintain it in a Safe Shutdown plant functions needed for protection of the public.

Condition.

Modes: At all times HA6 EAL-1 ALERT Miscellaneous Events Potentially Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) level less than 23.0 ft. mean sea Affecting Safe Plant Operation. level with no make-up available.

EAL-2 Modes: At all times Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

HU5 EAL-1 UE Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) level less than 25.0 ft. mean sea Miscellaneous Events Affecting level.

Plant Operations. EAL-2 Modes: At all times Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

I OERPOI-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 33 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 1 of71 TABLE OF CONTENTS Category Initiating Condition Page Fission Product Barrier Degradation Table 3 System Malfunctions Sul 10 SU2 11 SU3 12 SU4 14 SU5 15 SU6 16 SU7 17 SAI 18 SA2 19 SA3 20 SA4 22 SA5 24 SA6 26 SS1 27 SS2 28 SS3 29 SS4 30 SS5 31 SS6 32 SG1 34 SG2 36 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent RUI 38 RU2 40 RAI 41 RA2 43 RA3 45

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 61 Page 34 of 104 Emergency Classification 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels

=;Addendum IPage 2 of 71 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued!

Category Initiating Condition Page Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent (Continued)

RSI 47 RS2 49 RGI 50 RG2 52 Hazards & Other Conditions Affecting Plant Systems HUI 53 HU2 54 HU3 55 HU4 56 HU5 58 HAl 59 HA2 60 HA3 62 HA4 63 HA5 65 HA6 66 HSI 67 HS2 68 HS3 69 HGI 70 HG2 71

I OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 35 of 104 Emergency Classification I

Addendum 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 3 of 71 FUEL CLAD BARRIER EAL-1, Critical Safety Function (CSF) Status Potential Loss Core Cooling - ORANGE indicates subcooling has been lost and that some clad damage may occur. Heat Sink-RED indicates the heat sink function is under extreme challenge and thus a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. A declaration should not be made if Heat Sink -RED is the result of operator control of auxiliary feedwater flow.

Loss Core Cooling - RED indicates significant superheating and core uncovery and is considered to indicate loss of the fuel-clad barrier.

EAL-2, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Activity Potential Loss A Failed Fuel Monitor reading of 870 microcuries/ml or greater indicates possible clad failure of about 1%.

Loss A coolant activity level of 300 microcuries/gm. Dose Equivalent 1-131 is well above that for iodine spikes and indicates significant clad heating and a loss of the fuel clad barrier.

I OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 36 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 4 of 71 FUEL CLAD BARRIER. CONTINUED EAL-3, Core Exit Thermocouple Potential Loss Core Exit Thermocouple readings of between 2 708'F and 1200'F would indicate a loss of subcooling with the potential for fuel clad damage. This reading is redundant with the value needed to achieve Critical Safety Function Core Cooling - Orange.

Loss Core Exit Thermocouple readings of 1200'F or higher corresponds to significant superheating of the coolant. This is redundant with the value needed to achieve Critical Safety Function Core Cooling - Red and should be considered an indicator of loss of fuel clad barrier.

EAL-4, Reactor Vessel Water Level Potential Loss A Reactor Vessel Water Level plenum reading of less than 20% corresponds to the Critical Safety Function Core Cooling - Orange and is indicative that without corrective actions the top of the active core could become uncovered leading to a core melt sequence.

Loss None EAL-5, Reactor Containment Building (RCB) Radiation Monitors Potential Loss None Loss A reading of greater than 100 R/hr on the RCB Accident Monitors or 222 mR/hr on the Hatch Monitor indicates release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage. This value assumes the instantaneous release and dispersal into the containment of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with 2% gap activity. This value is the same as that in RCS Barrier Loss EAL-5, and this EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers.

I OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 l Page 37 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 5of 71 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) BARRIER EAL-1, Critical Safety Function (CSF) Status Potential Loss A RED path on these Critical Safety Functions indicates an extreme challenge and a potential loss of the RCS barrier. A declaration should not be made if Heat Sink - RED is the result of operator control of auxiliary feedwater flow.

Loss A YELLOW path with subcooling less than 0 0 F in Core Cooling indicates that subcooling has been lost because of inadequate makeup capability.

EAL-2, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Potential Loss Normal RCS make up capacity of one centrifugal charging pump (CCP) is unable to maintain RCS liquid inventory. The capacity of one CCP is 240 gpm which is the approximate design flow of a CCP with the RCS at 2235 psig and is the maximum charging flow identified in OPOPOI-ZA-0018, Emergency Operating Procedure User's Guide. Any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage will result in no lower than an ALERT emergency classification.

Loss Conditions are such that leakage from the RCS is greater than the available inventory control capacity such that a loss of subcooling has occurred. The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory control systems are inadequate.

I OERPO1-ZV-INOI l Rev. 61 Page 38 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 6 of 71 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) BARRIER, CONTINUED EAL-3, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Rupture Potential Loss Normal operation of CVCS is unable to maintain RCS liquid inventory. The capacity of one CCP is 240 gpm which is the approximate design flow of a CCP with the RCS at 2235 psig and is the maximum charging flow identified in OPOPOI-ZA-0018. Any event that results in significant RCS inventory shrinkage will result in no lower than an ALERT emergency classification.

Loss This EAL indicates that there is a direct release of radioactive fission and activation products to the environment. This EAL also means Containment Loss EAL-3 is exceeded.

EAL-5, Reactor Containment Building (RCB) Radiation Monitors Potential Loss None Loss A reading of greater than 100 R/hr on the RCB Accident Monitors Monitors or 222 mR/hr on the Hatch Monitor indicates release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage. This value assumes the instantaneous release and dispersal into the containment of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with 2% gap activity. This value is the same as that in Fuel Clad Barrier Loss EAL-5, and this EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers.

I OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 39 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 7 of71 CONTAINMENT BARRIER EAL-1, Critical Safety Function (CSF) Status Potential Loss A RED path on the Containment Critical Safety Function indicates an extreme challenge to the containment barrier and its potential loss due to pressure greater than design.

A Core Cooling ORANGE path represents an imminent melt situation which could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. In conjunction with the Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier EALs, this EAL results in the declaration of a General Emergency. Fifteen (15) minutes is chosen to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. This EAL should be entered as soon as it is recognized that the function restoration procedures have not been, or will not be, effective.

Loss None EAL-2, Containment Pressure Potential Loss Six percent (6%) hydrogen is the minimum explosive mixture in the Westinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines and represents a potential loss of containment barrier. The second EAL means that containment heat removal systems are not functioning properly when they are needed.

Loss A rapid unexplained loss of pressure, not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects, following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity. If containment pressure and sump levels do not increase as expected following a LOCA, then a loss of containment integrity is also indicated.

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 40 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 8 of 71 CONTAINMENT BARRIER. CONTINUED EAL-3, Steam Generator (SG) Tube Leak Potential Loss None Loss Greater than Technical Specification primary to secondary leakage with a pathway to the environment outside normal plant design or operations.

The release to the environment must be due to the failure to isolate an abnormal pathway (e.g.,

nonisolable stuck open Safety, PORV, or steam line break outside containment).

Examples of pathways to atmosphere that are NOT considered a direct secondary side release path to atmosphere when evaluating plant conditions for the applicability of this EAL:

Normal operation of the PORV to decrease Steam Generator pressure or control plant temperature.

Pathways that result from the plant operational design such as the Condenser Air Removal System discharge.

Pathways that are incidental to normal operation of the plant such as minor leakage from degraded secondary system components.

EAL-4, Containment Bypass Potential Loss An increase in area or ventilation radiation monitor readings located in areas adjacent to containment with a LOCA in progress could be due to penetration leakage. Other causes for increases could be interfacing system LOCAs involving systems (e.g. HHSI, LHSI) located in these areas, and leakage from systems recirculating containment sump water. All of these conditions are associated with a known LOCA and are indicative of a potential loss of the containment barrier.

Unexplained increases in monitor readings without a LOCA should be classified in accordance with the Radiological section. Adjacent areas are those spaces immediately outside the containment boundary that are monitored by area or ventilation radiation monitors.

I OERPOI-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 41 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 9 of 71 CONTAINMENT BARRIER, CONTINUED EAL-4, Containment Isolation Loss This EAL indicates incomplete containment isolation that allows direct release to the environment and loss of the containment barrier.

EAL-5, Reactor Containment Building (RCB) Radiation Monitors Potential Loss This EAL indicates significant fuel damage, equivalent to 20% gap activity, in excess of Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier EALs. Regardless of whether containment is challenged, the amount of activity associated with fuel damage of this magnitude, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is treated as a potential loss of containment, which would lead to a classification of General Emergency.

Loss None

I OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 Page 42 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 10 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT Sul Loss of All Offsite Power to ESF Busses for Greater than 15 Minutes OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-6, Defueled EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of power to the STBY 1 XFMR, STBY 2 XFMR, UAT, and 13.8 KV Emergency bus 1(2)L for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. At least 2 ESF DGs are supplying power to their respective busses.

BASES:

Prolonged loss of offsite AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

I OERP01-ZV-IN01 IRev. 6 Page 43 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 11 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT SU2 Operation Outside the Plant Safety Envelope as defined by Technical Specifications OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The plant cannot be brought to the required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASES:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) often require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b) non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shutdown within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate declaration of an Unusual Event is required when the plant cannot be brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications, as the plant is outside its safety envelope. Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 Page 44 of 14 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 12 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT SU3 Unplanned Loss of Most Control Room Safety System Annunciation or Indication for Greater Than 15 Minutes OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 14 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of most (>50%) of Control Room Safety System annunciators or indicators for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. Compensatory indications are available and can be adequately monitored with on-shift personnel.

AND

c. The Shift Supervisor determines that the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires increased surveillance of compensatory indications (e.g. Control Board Indicators, Local Indicators, QDPS, ICS, ERFDADS) to safely operate the unit.

AND

d. Annunciator or indicator loss is not the result of planned action.

BASES:

This IC and its associated EAL is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

Unplanned loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 lPage 45 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 13 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Compensatory Indications: Includes any alternate source of information such as computers, Control Board indication or Local indication, which can be monitored to compensate for the loss of alarm functions or other indications.

Quantification of Most is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 50% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgement threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions. This judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Shift Supervisor that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit.

The loss of specific, or several, safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status. This will be addressed by the specific Technical Specification. The initiation of a Technical Specification imposed plant shutdown related to the instrument loss will be reported via IOCFR50.72. If the shutdown is not in compliance with the Technical Specification action, the Unusual Event is based on SU2 Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 l Page 46 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 14 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT SU4 Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications Capabilities OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Unplanned loss of ALL onsite telephone, radio and headset communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

EAL-2 Unplanned loss of ALL onsite to offsite telephone and FAX communications capability: Plant telephone system, DPS/MCSO Ringdown Line, Texas Genco LP Line, STP Communicator (QSE) Ringdown Line, NRC ENS Line.

BASES:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff's ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than that addressed by 10CFR50.72.

Onsite communications loss encompasses the loss of all means of routine two-way communications.

Offsite communications loss encompasses the loss of all means of communications with offsite authorities. This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

OERP01-ZV-IN01 Rev. 6 Page 47 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 15 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT SU5 Unplanned Loss of Class IE DC Power During Cold Shutdown or Refueling for Greater than 15 Minutes OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5 and 6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Loss of ESF DC Power to Channel 1 and Channel 4 based on Battery Bus Voltage less than 107 volts DC for greater than 15 minutes.

BASES:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EAL is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations.

This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

Unplanned is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities. Routinely STP performs maintenance on a Train related basis during shutdown periods. It is intended that the loss of the operating (operable) train is to be considered. If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert will be per SA3 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

Class 1E bus voltage should be used as the minimum bus voltage necessary for the operation of safety related equipment. This voltage value of 107 volts DC incorporates a margin of at least 15 minutes of operation before the onset of inability to operate those loads.

I OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 Page 48 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 16 of71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT SU6 Fuel Clad Degradation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Failed Fuel Monitor RT-8039 indicates greater than or equal to 300 giCi/mI and this reading is not the result of a crud burst as confirmed by a grab sample.

EAL-2 Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) sample greater than Technical Specification limitations.

BASES:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. 300 gCi/ml reading on RT-8039 is based on 0.1% of the gap inventory. Grab sample verification is required in case of radiation monitor failures or high background radiation errors. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs.

OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 Page49 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 17 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT SU7 RCS Leakage OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage greater than 10 gpm.

EAL-2 Identified leakage greater than 25 gpm.

BASES:

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 1O-gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through the time-consuming RCS Inventory surveillance test. The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC SA3, Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 50 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage I8 of71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT SA1 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power To All Three 4160V AC ESF Busses During Cold Shutdown or Refueling OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5 and 6, and Defueled EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-l No voltage on all 4160 VAC ESF busses for greater than 15 minutes.

BASES:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert because of the significantly reduced decay heat and lower temperature and pressure, which allows increased time to restore one of the emergency busses relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Director Judgement ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

I OERP01-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 51 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 19 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT SA2 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Trip Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Reactor Trip Was Successful from the Control Room OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Reactor Protection System setpoint exceeded with NO automatic trip.

AND A manual reactor trip was required for plant shutdown.

BASES:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual reactor trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) in the Control Room which causes control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical.

Failure of manual reactor trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

mOERPcl-ZV-INOI at Rev. 6 Page 52 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 20 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT SA3 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5 and 6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Less than 2 RHR loops are functional.

AND

b. Temperature increase that either:

Results in Tavg exceeding 2000 F.

OR

Results in uncontrolled temperature rise causing Tavg to approach 2000 F.

BASES:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions required for core cooling during refueling and cold shutdown modes. Escalation to Site Area Emergency or General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent or Emergency Director Judgement ICs.

This IC and its associated EAL are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal. A number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator U-tube draining, RCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost. Under these conditions, RCS integrity is lost and fuel clad integrity is lost or potentially lost, which is consistent with a Site Area Emergency.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 53 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 21 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Indicators for this EAL are those methods used by the plant in response to Generic Letter 88-17 which include core exit temperature monitoring and RCS water level monitoring. In addition, radiation monitor readings may also be appropriate as an indicator of this condition.

Uncontrolled means that system temperature increase is not the result of planned actions by the plant staff. The EAL guidance related to uncontrolled temperature rise is necessary to preserve the anticipatory philosophy of NUREG-0654 for events starting from temperatures much lower than the cold shutdown temperature limit.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by IC SS5, Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel, or by Radiological ICs.

OERP01-ZV-INO1 I Rcv. 6 @Page 54 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 T Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 22 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT SA4 Unplanned Loss of Most Control Room Safety System Annunciation or Indication With Either (1) A Significant Transient In Progress, or (2) Compensatory Indicators Are Unavailable OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 14 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of most (>50%) of Control Room Safety System annunciators or indicators for greater than 15 minutes.

AND

b. The Shift Supervisor determines that the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires increased surveillance of compensatory indicators (e.g. Control Board Indicators, Local Indicators, QDPS, ICS, ERFDADS) to safely operate the unit.

AND

c. Annunciator or Indicator Loss does not result from planned action.

AND

d. Either of the following conditions exist:

1. A significant plant transient is in progress.

OR

2. Compensatory indications are unavailable or cannot be adequately monitored with on-shift personnel.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 55 of 104 Emergency Classification I Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 23 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS BASES:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient.

Planned loss of annunciators or indicators includes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

Quantification of Most is arbitrary; however, it is estimated that if approximately 50% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgement threshold for determining the severity of plant conditions. This judgement is supported by the specific opinion of the Shift Supervisor that additional operating personnel will be required to provide increased monitoring of system operation to safely operate the unit(s).

The loss of specific, or several, safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status. This will be addressed by the specific Technical Specification. The initiation of a Technical Specification imposed plant shutdown related to the instrument loss will be reported via 10CFR50.72. If the shutdown is not in compliance with the Technical Specification action, the Unusual Event is based on SU2, Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits.

Significant Transient includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as Reactor Trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Compensatory Indications includes any alternate source of information such as computers, Control Room indication or Local indication, which can be monitored to compensate for the loss of alarm functions or other indications. If both a major portion of the annunciation system and all computer monitoring are unavailable to the extent that additional operating personnel are required to monitor indications, the Alert is required.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor a transient in progress.

OERP01-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 56 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 24 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT SA5 AC Power Capability To The Three 4160V AC ESF Busses Is Reduced To A Single Power Source For Greater Than 15 Minutes Such That Any Additional Single Failure Would Result In Loss of ALL AC Power OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of power to the STBY 1 XFMR, STBY 2 XFMR, UAT, and 13.8 KV Emergency bus 1(2)L for greater than 15 minutes, AND

b. Onsite power capability has been degraded to a single ESF diesel generator capable of supplying power to at least one ESF bus.

OR EAL-2 The following conditions exist:

a. One of the following offsite power supplies is providing power to ALL of the energized 4160 ESF busses:

STBY 1 XFMR STBY 2 XFMR UAT 13.8 KV Emergency bus 1(2)L AND

b. ESF DGs 11(21), 12(22), AND 13(23) are not capable of providing power to their respective bus.

I OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 l Page 57 of 104 Emergency Classification R Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels l Page 25 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. CONTINUED BASES:

This IC and the associated EALs provide an escalation from IC SUI, Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes. The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout.

This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of two ESF diesel generators to supply power to their emergency busses. Another related condition could be the loss of all but one offsite power source, or the loss of two 4160V AC ESF busses. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC SS 1, Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 58 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 26 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS ALERT SA6 Fuel Clad Degradation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Failed Fuel Monitor RT-8039 indicates greater than or equal to 870 giCi/ml and this reading is not the result of a crud burst as confirmed by a grab sample.

EAL-2 Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) sample greater than 300 jICi/gm.

BASES:

This IC is included as an Alert because it is considered to be a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. 870 jiCi/ml reading on RT-8039 is based on 1% of the gap inventory. Grab sample verification is required in case of radiation monitor failures or high background radiation errors.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 IPage 59 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 27 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SS1 Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power to All Three 4160V AC ESF Busses OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 No voltage on all 4160 VAC ESF busses for greater than 15 minutes.

BASES:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovery and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC SGI. Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 lPage 60 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels l Page 28 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SS2 Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation To Complete or Initiate An Automatic Reactor Trip Once A Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded AND Manual Reactor Trip was NOT successful OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: I and 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Entry into OPOP05-EO-FRS 1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation - ATWS.

BASES:

Automatic and manual reactor trip are not considered successful if action away from the main Control Room was required to trip the reactor.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response. Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 61 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 29 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SS3 Loss of All Class IE DC Power OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Less than 107 volts DC on ALL four (4) ESF DC battery busses for greater than 15 minutes.

BASES:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions. Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Escalation to a General Emergency would occur by Radiological or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 62 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 30 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SS4 Complete Loss of any Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Mode 1 Loss of all feedwater function (main, startup, and auxiliary) indicated by SG narrow range level less than 14% [34%] in ALL SGs AND total feedwater flow less than 576 gpm.

EAL-2 Mode 4 - Loss of RHR function indicated by entry into OPOP04-RH-000 1, Loss of Residual Heat Removal, AND loss of all feedwater function (main, startup, and auxiliary) indicated by SG narrow range level less than 14% [34%] in ALL SGs AND total feedwater flow less than 576 gpm.

BASES:

These EALs address complete loss of functions required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. These EALs are only applicable in Modes 1-4. The conditions described above could be initiated in Modes 1 or 2 leading to a transition to Mode 3. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Radiological or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs. The SG narrow range level of 34%, as indicated by the brackets, is to be used as indication during adverse containment conditions.

I OERPOI-ZV-INO1 IRev. 6 Page 63 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 31 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SS5 Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5 and 6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Loss of Reactor Vessel Water Level as indicated by:

a. Loss of all Decay Heat Removal Cooling as determined by entry into step 14, OPOP04-RH-0001, Loss of Residual Heat Removal.

AND

b. The Core is or will be uncovered as indicated by:

RCS Narrow Range Hot Leg Level less than -2 inches (Elev. 32'L1).

BASES:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage can occur and reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity may not be assured.

This IC covers sequences such as prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via Radiological Effluent IC RG1.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 64 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 32 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SS6 Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The following conditions exist:

a. Loss of Control Room Indicators and Annunciators associated with Safety Systems.

AND

b. Compensatory Non-Alarming Indications are Unavailable (e.g. QDPS, Integrated Computer System (ICS), ERFDADS, Control Board, Local Alarms).

AND

c. Significant transient in progress.

BASES:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the Control Room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the Control Room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public.

STP plant annunciators for this EAL should be limited to include those identified in the Off Normal Operating Procedures, in the Emergency Operating Procedures, and in other EALs. (e.g., radiation monitors, etc.)

Compensatory non-alarming indications in this context includes computer-based information such as QDPS, ICS, ERFDADS, etc. This should include all computer systems available for this use depending on specific plant design and subsequent retrofits.

Significant Transient includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as reactor trips, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

I OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 65 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 33 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS STP plant indications needed to monitor safety functions necessary for protection of the public must include Control Room indications, computer generated indications and dedicated annunciation capability.

The specific indications should be those used to determine such functions as the ability to shut down the reactor, maintain the core cooled and in a coolable geometry, to remove heat from the core, to maintain the reactor coolant system intact, and to maintain containment intact.

Planned actions are excluded from this EAL since the loss of instrumentation of this magnitude is of such significance during a transient that the cause of the loss is not a more tolerable factor.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 66 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 34 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY SG1 Prolonged Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power to All Three 4160V AC ESF Busses OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Entry into OPOP05-EO-ECOO, Loss of All AC Power, for greater than 15 minutes.

AND Either of the following conditions exist:

a. Restoration of at least one 4160V AC ESF Bus within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is not likely.

OR

b. Degradation of core cooling is indicated by a valid Red or Orange path on the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

BASES:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment. The four hours to restore AC power is based on a site blackout coping analysis performed in conformance with 10CFR50.63 and Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout, with appropriate allowance for offsite emergency response. Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

This IC is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 67 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 35 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded.

Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Director a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations.

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Director judgement as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 68 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 36 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY SG2 Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Reactor Trip AND Manual Reactor Trip was NOT Successful AND There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1 and 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Entry into OPOP05-EO-FRS1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation - ATWS.

AND Either of the following:

a. Degradation of core cooling is indicated by a valid Red path on the Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

OR

b. Degradation of heat sink is indicated by a valid Red path on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree.

BASES:

Automatic and manual reactor trip are not considered successful if action away from main control room is required to trip the reactor.

Under the conditions of this IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed. Although there are capabilities away from the reactor control console, such as emergency boration, the continuing temperature rise indicates that these capabilities are not effective. This situation could be a precursor for a core melt sequence.

The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 12000F or that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of active fuel. This EAL equates to a core cooling RED condition.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 69 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 37 of 71 SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence. If feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist. This EAL equates to a Heat Sink RED condition.

In the event either of these challenges exist at a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design (5% power) a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 l Page 70 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 38 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT RU1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two (2) Times the ODCM Limit at the site boundary for expected duration of 60 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-l A valid reading on the following monitor that exceeds the value shown indicating that the release may have exceeded the emergency criterion and indicates the need to assess the release with OPSP07-VE-0005, Unit Vent Effluent Permit.

RT-80 10B Unit Vent (Release Rate) >1.00 E+5 jtCi/sec for 60 Minutes Note: If the monitor reading is sustained for longer than 60 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid reading.

EAL-2 Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases indicates concentrations or release rates with a release duration of 60 minutes or longer in excess of 1.00 E-6 tiCi/ml (two times the Effluent Concentrations*) at the site boundary.

EAL-3 Confirmed sample analyses for liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates with a release duration of 60 minutes or longer in excess of two (2) times the Effluent Concentration Limit at the site boundary.

EAL-4 Valid dose rate measurement at the site boundary Ž 0.1 mrem/hr for 60 minutes or longer.

BASES:

The term "Unplanned," as used in this context, includes any release for which a radioactive discharge permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit.

Valid means that an unexpected radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

The Effluent Concentration Limit for Xe-133 is 5.00 E-7 gCi/ml.

OERPOI-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 71 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 39 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT The Unusual Event Limit is an unplanned release in excess of twice the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) limits that continues for 60 minutes or longer. Such an event is outside the permissible operating limits for South Texas Project and presumably represents an uncontrolled situation involving degradation in the level of plant safety. For a release to the offsite atmosphere, the limits of Control 3.11.2.1 apply (500 mrem/yr noble gas whole body and 1,500 mrem/yr organ dose rates). The final integrated dose (which is very low in the Unusual Event emergency class) is not the primary concern; it is the degradation in plant control implied by the fact that the release was not isolated within 60 minutes. For example, a release of eight times the ODCM limits for 15 minutes does not exceed this initiating condition. Further, the Emergency Director should not wait until 60 minutes has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is evident the release will not be stopped within 60 minutes.

There is generally more than one applicable Site Radiological Effluent Limit (e.g., air dose rate, other Technical Specifications may be more limiting). For this reason, the EALs should trigger an assessment of all applicable ODCM and NRC limits.

The methods for calculating offsite dose for routine releases as described in the ODCM do not correspond to the methods used to assess doses during an accident. Specifically, the ODCM uses sector average X/Q dispersion that is smaller than the centerline X/Q used in emergency release calculations. Moreover, the ODCM uses a 500 hour0.00579 days 0.139 hours 8.267196e-4 weeks 1.9025e-4 months average X/Q (averaged over all 16 sectors, 5.30 E-06 sec/m 3 ) whereas emergency calculations typically use the X/Q for the sector into which the wind is blowing at the time of the release.

In addition, the ODCM uses dose conversion factors calculated as described in Regulatory Guide 1.109 while emergency doses are calculated using Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) dose factors. The methodology of the ODCM produces a Unit Vent high alarm set point for noble gases of about 5.00 E+04 pCi/sec. When this alarm set point is evaluated using STAMPEDE*, the emergency offsite dose calculation method, and the assumptions below the resulting dose rates are about 540 mrem/yr (0.1 mrem/hr) TEDE, 150 mrem/yr (0.02 mrem/hr) gamma, and 550 mrem/yr thyroid CDE rate. These dose rates are in general agreement with the limits of ODCM Control 3.11.2.1. Consequently, adopting twice the Unit Vent high alarm set point is consistent with the criteria of twice the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1.

EAL 1 is set at 2 times the ODCM Limit which approximately corresponds to two (2) Effluent Concentration Limit for Xe-133 (5.00 E-7 pCi/ml specified in 10CFR20, Appendix B) which is the nuclide likely to dominate the release for this type of accident. The Unit Vent release rate of 1.00 E+5 plCi/sec produces concentrations at the site boundary of 1.00 E-6 pCi/ml when evaluated with the default meteorological conditions (X/Q = 1.00 E-5 sec/m 3 ).

EAL-4, the measured dose rate criteria is based on two times the ODCM Limits or 1,000 mrem/yr.

Typical exposure rate instruments may detect radiation at 1,000 mreni/yr or 0.1 mrem/hr. Therefore, if radiation is detected, twice the Effluent Concentrations of 10CFR20, Appendix B are exceeded and the criterion of EAL- I is also met.

Assumed default meteorological conditions (X/Q = 1.00 E-5 sec/m 3 ), coolant inventory radionuclide release at 5.00 E+4 gCi/sec, and one (1) hour of decay before release.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 72 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 40 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT RU2 Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation Levels or Airborne Concentrations OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Valid readings on any of the following Area Monitors RT-8052 through RT-8101 greater than 1,000 times 24 hr. average.

EAL-2 Uncontrolled loss of water level in the Spent Fuel Pool and Fuel Transfer Canal with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered by water.

EAL-3 Uncontrolled decrease of water level in the Refueling Cavity/ICSA with all irradiated fuel assemblies remaining covered with water (Mode 6 only).

BASES:

Valid means that an unexpected radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low.

EAL-1 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

This EAL escalates to an Alert per IC RA3, if the increases impair safe operation.

Explicit coverage of EALs-2 and-3 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff.

Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 73 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 41 of 71 _

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT RA1 Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 25 Times the Unusual Event EALs at the site boundary for 15 Minutes or Longer OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors that exceeds the value shown indicating that the release may have exceeded the emergency criterion and indicates the need to assess the release with OPSP07-VE-0005, Unit Vent Effluent Permit.

RT-8010B Unit Vent (Release Rate) >2.50 E+6 pCi/sec for 15 Minutes NOTE: If the monitor reading(s) is sustained for longer than 15 minutes and the required assessments cannot be completed within this period, then the declaration must be made based on the valid reading. IF multiple release paths are indicated by elevated radiological monitor readings, THEN sum readings.

EAL-2 Confirmed sample analysis for gaseous releases indicates concentrations or release rates with a release duration of 15 minutes or longer in excess of 2.50 E-5 [tCi/cc at the site boundary.

EAL-3 Confirmed sample analysis of liquid releases indicates concentration or release rates in excess of 25 times the Effluent Concentration Limit at the site boundary.

EAL-4 Site boundary radiation dose rate 2 3 mrem/hr for greater than 15 minutes based on dose projections or field team measurements.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI Rev. 6 Page 74 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 42 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT BASES:

Valid means that an unexpected radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be valid.

The Alert limit has historically been set at 100 times the ODCM Control 3.11.2.1 limits. Although the Alert action level should be well above the Unusual Event action level to indicate significantly worsening radiological conditions, it should remain well below the Site Area action level. The accident is not sufficiently severe to assume fuel damage so the coolant inventory of radioactive material is appropriate for evaluating this accident level. If 100 times the ODCM Control were used, the Alert limit would be very close to the Site Area limit. For this reason, the bases for this limit was reduced to 25 times the Unusual Event action level.

EAL 1 is set at 25 times the Unusual Event action level. The release rate 2.00 E+6 gCi/sec would produce dose rates at the site boundary of about 30 rem/yr (TEDE) for the design basis coolant inventory of radionuclides. The design basis coolant inventory of radionuclides includes iodines and some corrosion products in addition to noble gases (as specified in the emergency offsite dose calculation code STAMPEDE). It is anticipated that a release of this magnitude would involve at least the activity available in the reactor coolant and therefore this mixture of radioactive materials is appropriate.

EAL-4, the measured dose rate criteria is based on the external dose rate component of EAL 1 above.

The external dose component of 30 rem/yr (TEDE) is about 3 mrem/hr.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 1Page 75 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 43 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT RA2 Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Valid readings on one or more of the following radiation monitors:

Fuel Handling Building Ventilation Monitor RT8035 or 8036 > 5.00 E-2 pCi/ml Fuel Bridge Area Radiation Monitor RT8090 >5,000 mR/hr Refuel Floor Area Radiation Monitor RT8099 >5,000 mR/hr EAL-2 Irradiated fuel uncovered (actual or potential) based on observation OR water level below top of fuel storage racks.

BASES:

NUREG-0818, Emergency Action Levels for Light Water Reactors, forms the basis for these EALs.

There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage.

In addition, NUREG/CR-4982, Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82, July 1987, indicates that even if corrective actions are not taken, no prompt fatalities are predicted, and that risk of injury is low. In addition, NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel presents the following in its discussion:

In the event of a serious accident involving decayed spent fuel, protective actions would be needed for personnel on site, while offsite doses (assuming an exclusion area radius of one mile from the plant site) would be well below the Environmental Protection Agency's Protective Action Guides.

I I OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 76 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 44 of7l ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Accordingly, it is important to be able to properly survey and monitor for Kr-85 in the event of an accident with decayed spent fuel.

Licensees may wish to reevaluate whether EALs specified in the Emergency Plan and procedures governing decayed fuel handling activities appropriately focus on concern for onsite workers and Kr-85 releases in areas where decayed spent fuel accidents could occur, for example, the spent fuel pool working floor. Furthermore, licensees may wish to determine if emergency plans and corresponding implementing procedures address the means for limiting radiological exposures of onsite personnel who are in other areas of the plant. Among other things, moving onsite personnel away from the plume and shutting off building air intakes downwind from the source may be appropriate.

Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Radiological ICs.

I 0~ERP01-ZV-1N01 I Rev. 6 1tPage 77 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 45 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT RA3 Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels That Impede Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Valid radiation monitor readings GREATER THAN 15 mrem/hr in areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions:

RT-8066 - Control Room EAL-2 Valid radiation monitor readings GREATER THAN 5 R/hr in areas requiring infrequent access to maintain plant safety functions.

RT8058, 8060, 8061, 8062, 8063, indicate accessibility to plant support equipment.

RT8077, 8084, 8085, 8086, 8087, 8090 indicate accessibility to safety injection equipment in the Fuel Handling Building.

NOTE: The Emergency Director should determine the cause of the increase in radiation levels and review other ICs for applicability.

BASES:

Valid means that an unexpected radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

This IC addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause and/or magnitude of the increase in radiation levels is not a concern of this IC. The Emergency Director must consider the source or cause of the increase radiation levels and determine if any other IC may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mremlhr in the Control Room or TSC may be a problem in itself.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 78 of 104 Emergency Classification R Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 46 of 71 .

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT However, the increase may also be indicative of high dose rates in the containment due to LOCA. In this latter case, an SAE or GE may be indicated by the fission product barrier matrix ICs.

This IC is not meant to apply to increases in the containment dome radiation monitors as these events are addressed in the fission product barrier matrix ICs. Nor is it intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events. (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

The only area requiring continuous occupancy is the Control Room; however, other control stations that are manned continuously, such as a radwaste control room, a central security alarm station, or an operator station in the plant should be alerted if Control Room radiation levels reach the action level. The value of 15 mrem/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 rem in 30 days with adjustment of expected occupancy times. Although Section III.D.3 of NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, provides that the 15 mren/hr value can be averaged over the 30 days, the value is used here without averaging, as a 30 day duration implies in event potentially more significant than an Alert.

For areas requiring infrequent access, the values are based on radiation levels which result in exposure control measures intended to maintain doses within normal occupational exposure guidelines and limits (i.e., IOCFR20), and in doing so, will impede necessary access.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 79 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 47 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY RS1 Site Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors that exceeds the value shown.

AND an offsite dose assessment using OERPOI-ZV-TP01, Offsite Dose Calculations, using actual meteorology cannot be completed within 15 minutes.

If an offsite dose assessment is completed, refer to EAL-2.

RT-8010B Unit Vent (Release Rate) >2.00 E+7 ItCi/sec RT-8046 thru RT-8049 Main Steam Line Monitors >5 igCi/ml Note: IF multiple release paths are indicated by elevated radiological monitor readings, THEN sum readings.

Note: RT-8046 thru 8049 Main Steam Line Monitors assumes Gap Inventory and a steam release into the environment of 1.05 E+6 lbs./hr.

EAL-2 Dose assessment indicates dose consequences greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem thyroid CDE.

EAL-3 Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 100 mrem/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; or analysis of field survey samples indicate thyroid dose commitment of 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev.6 lPage8oof104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 48 of71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT BASES:

Valid means that an unexpected radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

The Site Area Emergency limit is 0.1 times the Protective Action Guides (PAGs) (0.100 rem TEDE or 0.500 rem Thyroid CDE at the site boundary). The 100 mrem TEDE and 500 mrem Thyroid CDE dose were adopted at one-tenth the EPA Protective Action Guideline doses. Doses at these levels would generally require action within the site boundary to protect personnel.

EAL 1 uses a source term that is representative of a postulated accident mixture of noble gases and iodine.

The mixture assumes a gap inventory (as defined in the STAMPEDE emergency offsite dose calculation code) about one hour after the reactor ceases to be critical. This mixture is consistent with fuel damage that would be necessary for generating the dose rates associated with a site area emergency. The average centerline X/Q is assumed to be 1.00 E-5 sec/m3 to be consistent with the value used for emergency offsite dose calculations.

The 100 mrem TEDE and 500 mrem integrated thyroid dose were adopted at one-tenth the EPA Protective Action Guideline doses. Doses at these levels would generally require action within the site boundary to protect personnel. Note that the gap inventory radionuclide mixture contains sufficient iodine to exceed the 500 mrem/hr thyroid CDE criteria before the 100 mrem/hr TEDE is exceeded.

Integrated doses are generally not monitored in real-time. In establishing the emergency action levels, a duration of one hour is assumed, and the EALs are based on a site boundary dose rate of 100 mrem/hr TEDE or 500 mrem/hr thyroid, whichever is more limiting (depends on source term assumptions). If the Radiological Director/Emergency Director indicates a longer or shorter duration for the period in which the substantial portion of the activity is released, these dose rates should be adjusted.

OERPO1-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 l Page 81 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 49 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY RS2 Unexpected Increase in Containment Radiation Levels OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-l Valid reading on RT-8050 or RT-8051 greater than 100 R/hr.

OR Valid reading on Hatch Monitor greater than 222 mR/hr.

I BASES:

A reading of greater than 100 R/hr on the RCB Accident Monitors Monitors or 222 mR/hr on the Hatch Monitor indicates release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage. This value I assumes the instantaneous release and dispersal into the containment of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with 2% gap activity. This EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers.

I : OERPOI-ZV-IN01 Rev. 6 Page 82 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 50 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY RG1 Site Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity that Exceeds 1,000 mrem TEDE or 5,000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 A valid reading on one or more of the following monitors that exceeds the value shown.

AND An offsite dose assessment using OERPO1-ZV-TPO1, Offsite Dose Calculations, using actual meteorology cannot be completed within 15 minutes.

If an offsite dose assessment is completed, refer to EAL-2.

RT-8010B Unit Vent (Release Rate) >2.00 E+8 jtCi/sec RT-8046 thru RT-8049 Main Steam Line Monitors >50 p.Ci/ml Note: IF multiple release paths are indicated by elevated radiological monitor readings, THEN sum readings.

Note: RT-8046 thru RT-8049 Main Steam Line Monitors assumes a Gap Inventory and a steam release into the environment of 1.05 E+6 lbs./hr.

EAL-2 Dose assessment indicates dose consequences greater than 1,000 mrem TEDE and/or 5,000 mrem thyroid CDE.

EAL-3 Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 1,000 mrem/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; or analysis of field survey samples indicate thyroid dose commitment of 5,000 mrem for one hour of inhalation.

OERPO1-ZV-IN01 Rev. 6 Page 83 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 51 of 71 _

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT BASES:

Valid means that an unexpected radiation monitor reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

Doses in excess of 1 rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE at the site boundary warrant declaration of a General Emergency. The Emergency Action Level (EAL) is based on a dose rate consistent with the release rate that would have to be sustained for one hour to produce the 1 rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE at the site boundary. Integrated doses are generally not monitored in real-time. In establishing the EALs, a duration of one hour is assumed, and the EALs are based on site boundary doses for either TEDE or Thyroid CDE, whichever is more limiting (source term dependent). The severity of the General Emergency requires fuel damage to have sufficient activity for significant offsite dose consequences. If the Radiological Director or Emergency Director indicates a longer or shorter duration for the period in which the substantial portion of the activity is released, these dose rates should be adjusted.

The release rate was derived using the centerline X/Q, 1.00 E-5 sec/m3, associated with average annual meteorology for emergency offsite dose calculations. Actual meteorology is used when calculating dose projections using OERPO1-ZV-TPO1, Offsite Dose Calculations.

Actual meteorology is specifically identified in the initiating condition since it gives the most accurate dose assessment. Actual meteorology (including forecasts) should be used whenever possible.

OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 l Page 84 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 52 of 71 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY RG2 Unexpected Increase in Containment Radiation Levels OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Valid reading on RT-8050 or RT-8051 greater than 1,000 R/hr.

OR Valid reading on Hatch Monitor greater than 2,222 mR/hr.

BASES:

This EAL indicates significant fuel damage, equivalent to 20% gap activity. Regardless of whether containment is challenged, the amount of activity associated with fuel damage of this magnitude, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is treated as a loss ofcontainment, which would lead to a classification of General Emergency.

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 85 of 104 Emergency Classification I Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 53 of71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS UNUSUAL EVENT HU1 Confirmed Security Event Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the Level of Safety of the Plant OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Security Alert as defined by the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

EAL-2 Bomb device discovered inside the Protected Area, but outside the Vital Area.

BASES:

These EALs are based on the STPEGS Safeguards Contingency Plan Events. Security events which do not represent at least a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant, are reported under 10CFR73.71 or in some cases under IOCFR50.72. Bomb devices discovered within a Vital Area would result in EAL escalation.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 lPage 86 of 10 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 54 of71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS UNUSUAL EVENT HU2 Fire or Explosion in the Protected Area or Switchyard which Affects Normal Operation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Fire within the areas below which is not under control within 15 minutes of initial notification.

EAL-2 Explosion in or adjacent to any of the following areas which damages equipment necessary for normal plant operation.

Areas considered for EAL-I and EAL-2:

Switchyard

Turbine Generator Building

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building

Fuel Handling Building

Reactor Containment Building

Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure

Isolation Valve Cubicle

Diesel Generator Building

Circulating Water Intake Structure BASES:

The purpose of this IC is to address the magnitude and extent of explosions or fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems or for initiation of plant transients. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings, wastebasket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas. The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (e.g., warehouses) or areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. Initial Notification is a credible notification a fire is occurring or verification of a fire detection system alarm. Verification of the alarm includes actions that can be taken within the Control Room or other plant specific locations to ensure the alarm is not spurious, but does not include dispatch of personnel to the scene to confirm a fire exists (NUMARC Q&A, June 1993). Fifteen minutes is allowed to verify that the fire alarm is valid and that initial fire fighting efforts have not been effective.

Escalation to a higher emergency class is by IC HAI, Fire or Explosion in a Vital Area Potentially Affecting Safe Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal.

I OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 { Page 87 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 55 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS UNUSUAL EVENT HU3 Toxic/Flammable Gases Affecting Plant Operation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Onsite toxic or flammable gas release which requires evacuation of areas within the Protected Area.

EAL-2 Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

BASES:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or affect the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (e.g., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.) The evacuation area is as determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials, in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS UNUSUAL EVENT HU4 Natural or Destructive Phenomena Affecting Plant Operations OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-l Earthquake detected by seismic monitoring system and confirmed by OPOP04-SY-0001 Seismic Event.

EAL-2 Tornado striking facilities within the Protected Area.

EAL-3 Shutdown of the facility required due to actual or predicted natural phenomenon, in accordance with OPOP04-ZO-0002, Natural or Destructive Phenomena Guidelines.

EAL-4 Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within the Protected Area.

EAL-5 Report of main turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

BASES:

EAL-1: Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Method of detection can be based on instrumentation, validated by seismic event procedure OPOP04-SY-0001.

EAL-2: Based on the assumption that a tornado striking (touching down) within the Protected Area boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

EAL-3: This EAL raises awareness that the potential exists for loss of electrical power or station blackout. It also represents a threshold beyond which special provisions for additional support are likely.

EAL 4: Addresses events such as aircraft crash that may damage plant structures containing systems and functions required for safe shutdown. If the crash is confirmed to affect a Vital Area, the event may be escalated to an Alert.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 89 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 57 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS EAL-5: Intended to address main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via HU2 and HU3. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by missiles generated by the failure or by radiological releases in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the radiological ICs or Fission Product Barrier ICs.

NOTE If generator seal damage is observed after the generator has been purged for disassembly, declaration of an Unusual Event is not required. In this case, there is no report of a leak, no detection of hydrogen, and no explosion or fire. In effect, the amount of gas that leaked did not affect normal operations of the plant. (Ref. NUMARC Questions and Answers, June 1993)

OERP01-ZV-IN01 I Rev. 6 Page 90 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 58 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS UNUSUAL EVENT HU5 Miscellaneous Events Affecting Plant Operations OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) level less than 25.0 ft. mean sea level.

EAL-2 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

BASES:

EAL-1 Based on the requirement to shutdown the plant for ECP level less than 25.5 ft. mean sea level.

(STPUFSAR 9.2.5.1.1.5).

EAL-2 This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

From a broad perspective, one area that may warrant Emergency Director judgement is related to likely or actual breakdown of site specific event mitigating actions. Examples to consider include inadequate emergency response procedures, transient response either unexpected or not understood, failure or unavailability of emergency systems during an accident in excess of that assumed in accident analysis, or insufficient availability of equipment and/or support personnel.

Specific example of actual events that may require Emergency Director judgement for Unusual Event declaration are listed here for consideration. However, this list is by no means all inclusive and is not intended to limit the discretion of the site to provide further examples.

Missile(s) impacting safety related structures.

Near-site explosion which may adversely affect normal site activities.

Near-site release of toxic or flammable gas which may adversely affect normal site activities.

Uncontrolled RCS cooldown due to Secondary Depressurization.

It is also intended that the Emergency Director's judgement not be limited by any list of events as defined here or as augmented by the site. This list is provided solely as examples for consideration and it is recognized that actual events may not always follow a preconceived description.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 91 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 59 of 7 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS ALERT HA1 Security Event in the Protected Area OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Intrusion into the Protected Area by a hostile force.

EAL-2 Security Emergency as defined by the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

BASES:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Unusual Event. For the purposes of this IC, a civil disturbance which penetrates the Protected Area boundary can be considered a hostile force. Intrusion into a Vital Area by a hostile force will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 Page 92 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 60 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT HA2 Fire or Explosion in a Vital Area Potentially Affecting Safe Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: See Specific EAL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Fire or Explosion potentially affecting Safe Shutdown Equipment or systems required for decay heat removal (Modes 1-6).

The following conditions exist:

a. Fire or explosion in any of the following areas:

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building

Reactor Containment Building

Isolation Valve Cubicle

Diesel Generator Building

Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure AND

b. Affected system parameter indications show degraded performance or plant personnel report visible damage to systems, structures or components within the specified area required for safe shutdown.

EAL-2 Fire or explosion in one or more of the areas listed below which impacts ability to maintain cooling for spent fuel. (Mode: At all times)

Fuel Handling Building

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 93 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 61 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY BASES:

EAL-1 & 2: The areas above contain functions and systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant. This EAL addresses a fire and not the degradation in performance of affected systems. System degradation is addressed in the System Malfunction EALs. The reference to damage of systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire and to discriminate against minor fires. The reference to safety systems is included to discriminate against fires in areas having a low probability of affecting safe operation.

The significance here is not that a safety system was degraded but the fact that the fire was large enough to cause damage to these systems. The designation of a single train is appropriate when the fire is large enough to affect more than one component and an Alert is justified.

Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Director Judgement ICs. With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation within the identified plant area should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. The inclusion of a report of visible damage should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The declaration of an Alert and the activation of the TSC will provide the Emergency Director with the resources needed to perform these damage assessments.

The Emergency Director also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosions, if applicable.

Potential loss of decay heat removal during shutdown conditions or loss of spent fuel cooling capability can result in challenges to operators and plant response mechanisms.

Vulnerabilities for the consequences of fire or explosion may be increased in Mode 4, 5 and 6 because of the likelihood of support systems being out of service for maintenance and reduced requirements for electrical power.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 94 of14 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 62 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS ALERT HA3 Toxic/Flammable Gases Potentially Affecting Safe Operation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At all times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-l Confirmed entry of toxic gas into Control Room envelope.

EAL-2 Uncontrolled entry of flammable gas into a Vital Area.

EAL-3 Uncontrolled entry of toxic gas into the facility in life threatening concentration or into a Vital Area where lack of access constitutes a safety problem.

BASES:

This IC is based on gases that have entered a plant structure affecting the safe operation of the plant. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant Vital Areas or other significant buildings or areas.

The intent of this IC is not to include buildings (e.g., warehouses) or other areas that are not contiguous or immediately adjacent to plant Vital Areas. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to the higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Abnormal Rad Levels/Radioactive Effluent ICs.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 l Page 95 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels IPage 63 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS ALERT HA4 Natural or Destructive Phenomena Potentially Affecting Safe Operation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Seismic motion exceeding Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by a Seismic monitor alarm and confirmed by OPOP04-SY-0001.

EAL-2 Tornado or high wind causing visible structural damage to any of the following plant structures:

Reactor Containment Building

ECW Intake Structure

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building

Isolation Valve Cubicle

Fuel Handling Building

Diesel Generator Building EAL-3 Entry of flood water into safety related structures such that the function of safety related equipment is jeopardized.

EAL-4 Predicted or actual breach of Main Cooling Reservoir retaining dike along North Wall.

EAL-5 Vehicle crash affecting a plant Vital Area.

EAL-6 Turbine failure generated missiles result in any visible structural damage to or penetration of any of the following plant areas:

Reactor Containment Building

ECW Intake Structure

Mechanical/Electrical Auxiliary Building

Isolation Valve Cubicle

Fuel Handling Building

Diesel Generator Building

OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 96 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 64 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS BASES:

EAL-1: Based on STPEGS UFSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL-2: Based on actual evidence of wind damage regardless of wind speed.

EAL-3: Based on potential for uncontrolled or ineffectually controlled flooding of vital structures which potentially affects systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

EAL-4: Based on potential for a design basis flood event resulting from breach of the dike. (Ref.

UFSAR 3.4. 1)

EAL-5: Addresses items such as airplane, helicopter, or machinery crash into plant vital areas.

EAL-6: Is intended to address the threat to safety related equipment imposed by missiles generated by main turbine rotating component failures. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if missiles have damaged or penetrated areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Each of these EALs is intended to address events that may have resulted in a plant Vital Area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Radiological ICs.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 l Rev. 6 l Page 97 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 65 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS ALERT HA5 Control Room Evacuation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 The Control Room is evacuated and the plant is being controlled within 15 minutes per OPOP04-ZO-0001, Control Room Evacuation.

BASES:

With the evacuation of the Control Room, additional support, monitoring and direction through the TSC and for other Emergency Operations Centers is necessary. Inability to establish control from outside the Control Room within 15 minutes will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency (HS-2). Step 12 of OPOP04-ZO-0001 places the control transfer switches in the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) position.

At this point the operators can determine that actual control is achieved at the ASP. If the Emergency Director is not confident that the appropriate plant controls are functioning at the ASP, escalation to a Site Area Emergency is indicated.

As stated in NUREG-0654, the rationale for the Alert class is to provide prompt notification of minor events which could lead to more serious consequences given operator error or equipment failure or which might be indicative of more serious conditions which are not yet fully realized. When an Alert is declared, based upon control room evacuation or any other EAL, the Technical Support Center is staffed.

Declaration of an Alert is appropriate to notify onsite and offsite emergency organizations that a control room evacuation is taking place and that the possibility exists, however small, that control cannot be established outside of the control room.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 ]Page 98 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 66 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS ALERT HA6 Miscellaneous Events Potentially Affecting Safe Plant Operation OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-l Essential Cooling Pond (ECP) level less than 23.0 ft. mean sea level. with no make-up available.

EAL-2 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded and that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASES:

EAL-I Based on continued depletion of ECP with no make-up. EAL allows 1.5 ft. margin to minimum ECP level described in UFSAR Table 9.2.5.3.

EAL-2 Intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the Alert emergency class.

OERPO1-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 @Page 99 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 67 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS SITE AREA EMERGENCY Hsi Security Event in a Plant Vital Area OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Intrusion into a Vital Area by a hostile force.

EAL-2 Security Emergency which in the judgement of the Emergency Director could prevent safe shutdown or interfere with maintaining safe shutdown conditions.

EAL-3 Confirmed presence of an explosive device in a Vital Area.

BASES:

This class of security events represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert IC in that a hostile force has progressed from the Protected Area to a Vital Area, or that other events (e.g.

sabotage) have been found which could affect safe shutdown.

I 0~ERP01-ZV-1N01 I Rev. 6 l Page 100 of104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 1 Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 68 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS2 Control Room Evacuation and Plant Control Cannot be Established OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I 1. The following conditions exist:

a. Control room evacuation has been initiated per OPOP04-ZO-0001, Control Room Evacuation.

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established by completion of step 12 of OPOP04-ZO-0001 within 15 minutes.

BASES:

Step 12 of OPOP04-ZO-0001 places the control transfer switches in the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) position. At this point, the Operators can determine they have control at the ASP. Expeditious transfer of safety systems has not occurred but fission product barrier damage may not yet be indicated. Time for transfer based on analysis or assessments as to how quickly control must be reestablished without core uncovering and/or core damage. In cold shutdown and refueling modes, operator concern is directed toward maintaining core cooling such as is discussed in Generic Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal. In power operation, hot standby and hot shutdown modes, operator concern is primarily directed toward maintaining critical safety functions and thereby assuring fission product barrier integrity.

Escalation of this event, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Radiological ICs.

If the Emergency Director is not confident that adequate plant controls are functioning at the ASP, escalation to a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

OERPOI-ZV-INO1 Rev. 6 lPage 101 of 104 R

Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 69 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS SITE AREA EMERGENCY HS3 Miscellaneous Events Affect the Ability to Shutdown the Plant or maintain it in a Safe Shutdown Condition OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-I Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

BASES:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

OERP01-ZV-INO1 I Rev. 6 1Page 102 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 l Bases for Emergency Action Levels I Page 70 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS GENERAL EMERGENCY HG1 Security Event Resulting in Loss of Ability to Reach and Maintain Cold Shutdown OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1-6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Loss of physical control of the Control Room due to security event.

EAL-2 Loss of physical control of the remote shutdown capability due to security event.

BASES:

This IC encompasses conditions under which a hostile force has taken physical control of a Vital Area required to reach and maintain safe shutdown.

I ~~0ERP01-ZV-1N01 I Rev. 6 1tPage 103 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 2 Bases for Emergency Action Levels Page 71 of 71 HAZARDS & OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SYSTEMS GENERAL EMERGENCY HG2 Miscellaneous Events Which May Potentially Result in a Hazard to the Public OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: At All Times EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

EAL-1 Other conditions exist which in the judgement of the Emergency Director indicate:

a. Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment.

OR

b. Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases. These releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG plume exposure levels outside the site boundary.

BASES:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

I OERPO1-ZV-INOI I Rev. 6 l Page 104 of 104 Emergency Classification Addendum 3 l Exclusion Area Boundary IPage I of I E-0Q0O DWC REV. 0

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY D0527 STI 31662988 l OERPO1-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page 1 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: N/A Effective Date: 10/16/03 Max Keycs NIA N/A Emergency Response Division PREPARER TECHNICAL USER COGNIZANT ORGANIZATION Table of Contents Page

1. 0 Purpose and Scope .............................................................. 2

2. 0 Definitions ............................................................. 2

3. 0 Precautions and Limitations ............................................................. 2

4. 0 Responsibilities ............................................................. 4

5. 0 Procedure .............................................................. 5 6.0 References ............................................................. 10 7.0 Support Documents ............................................................. 10 Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form (Typical) .............................................. 11 Data Sheet 2, Supplemental Notification Form (Typical) ............................................................. 12 Data Sheet 3, Offsite Agencies Log ............................................................. 13 Data Sheet 4, NRC Event Notification Worksheet (Typical) .......................................................... 14 Data Sheet 5, Non-Emergency Offsite Agency Notification Message Form ............... ................... 16 Addendum 1, Responsibilties for Notification ............................................................. 17 Addendum 2, Special Instructions for Completing Supplemental Notification Form .......... .......... 18 Addendum 3, Emergency Communications (SPR 91-0447) ........................................................... 20 Addendum 4, Instructions for Operating Emergency Response Data Systems (ERDS) ......... ........ 24 Addendum 5, Atmospheric Stability Classification ............................................ ................. 26 Addendum 6, Suggested Wording for Event Description ............................................................. 27

l OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 2 of28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.1 This procedure specifies the actions to be taken for notifying offsite agencies and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a declared emergency at the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS).

1.2 This procedure specifies the actions to be taken for notifying offsite agencies and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of discovery of an undeclared (or miss-classified) event.

2.0 Definitions 2.1 Emergency Notification System (ENS) - FTS, 2001 Telephone System, used for initial notification of an emergency to the NRC.

3.0 Precautions and Limitations NOTE Addendum 3, Emergency Communications provides information on the following communications links:

NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

State and County Ringdown Line

Health Physics Network (HPN)

STP Coordinator (QSE) Ringdown Line

800 Mhz Radio 3.1 Notifications to offsite agencies shall meet the following time limits and criteria:

3.1.1 The State of Texas and Matagorda County shall be contacted within 15 minutes of the Emergency Director declaring:

Initial classification of the emergency;

Change in the classification; or

Change in Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the public, including changes in wind direction resulting in PARs affecting additional zones.

II OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 1 Page 3of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Once contacted, the information contained in Items 1-8 and 12 of Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form shall be transmitted. All information shall be provided after message Number 1.

3.1.2 Notify the NRC Operations Center immediately following notifications to the State/County and no later than one hour after the emergency has been declared.

Use Data Sheet 4, NRC Event Notification Worksheet, as a record of conversation. If more than one communicator is available, NRC notification may be made concurrently with State/County notification.

3.1.3 The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) shall be activated at the time the NRC Operations Center is notified of the Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency (see Addendum 4, Instructions for Operating Emergency Response Data System).

3.1.4 Issue updates to the State and County approximately hourly unless a State/County consensus is obtained for a reduced frequency (e.g. a static condition).

3.1.5 Immediately update the NRC, via the open line of communications, per Section 5.2.1.4 of this procedure.

3.1.6 After Offsite Agency Notification Message Number 1, all subsequent notifications shall be completed in entirety.

3.2 If the Emergency Classification or PARs are changed during the 15 minute notification period, then continue to complete notifications to the State/County prior to initiating the new notification, and inform the agencies that a change in classification or change in PAR will be forthcoming. (LCTS 9100453-936) 3.2.1 An exception to this situation is when termination is declared before the offsite agencies are notified of the emergency condition. For this situation, issue both notification forms concurrently.

3.3 Notifications to offsite agencies shall follow the guidelines in Addendum 3, Emergency Communications, when communication system deficiencies exist.

3.4 To report an event or condition that met an EAL threshold and no longer exists at the time of discovery and the event or condition was due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification.

3.4.1 State and County notifications shall be made within one hour of discovery by completing Data Sheet 5, Non-Emergency Offsite Agency Notification Message Form, and use the ring down line ensuring to document the event condition has cleared.

l OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page4of28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies 3.4.2 Make NRC notifications within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or miss-classified) event and use the ENS Line for NRC notification.

I 3.5 Any revisions to this procedure that directly or indirectly affect the format or usage of Data Sheet 1 shall be reviewed by the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) prior to becoming effective.

4.0 Responsibilities NOTE Refer to Addendum 1, Responsibilities for Notification.

4.1 The individual with Emergency Director authority is responsible for approving all notifications to offsite agencies and ensuring notifications are made within the required time frames.

4.2 The Shift Supervisor is responsible for implementation of this procedure while functioning as the Emergency Director. Actual completion of forms may be delegated to the communicators.

4.3 The Control Room ENS Communicator is responsible for maintaining the open line with the NRC, unless otherwise directed by the NRC. This responsibility shall not transfer to the Technical Support Center (TSC) or Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

4.4 The Control Room ENS Communicator is responsible for activating the ERDS at the time the NRC Operations Center is notified of the Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency (see Addendum 4).

4.5 The Control Room State/County Communicator is responsible for notifications to the State/County and for maintaining Data Sheet 3, Offsite Agencies Log, while the Shift Supervisor has Emergency Director authority.

4.6 The Chemical/Radiochemical Manager in the TSC is responsible for gathering information and preparing Data Sheet 1 and implementation of this procedure while the TSC Manager has Emergency Director authority. The Chemical/Radiochemical Manager is responsible for ensuring the correctness and timeliness of Data Sheet 1.

4.7 The TSC Communicator in the TSC is responsible for completing notifications to the State and County when provided completed notification forms from the Chemical /

Radiochemical Manager, and maintaining Data Sheet 3. The TSC Communicator shall contact the NRC using the ENS line as directed by the Chemical/Radiochemical Manager.

The TSC Communicator shall maintain a file containing copies of all Data Sheet 1 that originate from either the Control Room or Technical Support Center.

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page 5of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies 4.8 The Engineering Assistant in the EOF is responsible for implementation of this procedure while the EOF Director has Emergency Director authority. The Engineering Assistant is responsible for gathering information and preparing Data Sheet 1, and has primary responsibility for the correctness and timeliness of Data Sheet 1. The Engineering Assistant should also, if time permits, routinely complete Data Sheet 2.

4.9 The Offsite Agency Communicator in the EOF is responsible for completing notifications to the State/County, when directed by the Emergency Director, and for maintaining Data Sheet 3. The Offsite Agency Communicator shall maintain a file containing a copy of all Data Sheet 1 from the start of the event to recovery.

4.10 The Licensing Director in the EOF is responsible for completing notifications to the NRC over the ENS once the EOF is activated.

5.0 Procedure CAUTION The State and County are required to be contacted within 15 minutes of the Emergency Director declaring any of the following:

Initial classification of the emergency, (Item 4)

Change in the classification, (Item 4) or

Change in Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the public, including changes in wind direction resulting in PARs affecting additional Zones, (Item 6).

5.1 Offsite Agency Notification (State/County)

NOTE Print the information on Data Sheet 1 (black ink should be used).

ONLY BLOCKS 1-8 AND 12 ARE REQUIRED TO BE COMPLETED UPON INITIAL NOTIFICATION. ALL INFORMATION SHALL BE PROVIDED AFTER MESSAGE NUMBER 1.

5.1.1 Complete Data Sheet I

I OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 6of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies NOTE The Communicator, at the time of contact, enters the names of the persons contacted at DPS Pierce and Matagorda County at the top of each form. Record the time of contact.

5.1.1.1 ITEM I - Name of the STPEGS person communicating information to offsite agencies. Mark the applicable Unit. If the event is common unit, then mark Unit 1.

5.1.1.2 ITEM 2 - Mark if notification is or is not a drill.

5.1.1.3 ITEM 3 - Start with number one (1). Number sequentially, independent of facility originating Data Sheet 1, and indicate which facility is originating the message.

5.1.1.4 ITEM 4 - Mark if the classification is new or unchanged. Fill in the date and time the current classification was declared. Mark the event classification.

5.1.1.5 ITEM 5 - A radiological release is defined as exceeding the Emergency Action Level (EAL) for an Unusual Event.

5.1.1.6 ITEM 6 - Mark if the recommended protective actions are new or unchanged.

a. A General Emergency Classification shall contain a Protective Action Recommendation.

b. Refer to OERPO 1-ZV-IN07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations for PARs. Mark Block A or B. If Block A is marked then go to Step 5.1.1.7.

c. Ensure correct notations are used for zones and sectors. Zones range from 1 to 11. Sectors range from A to R Refer to Addendum 5 in OERPO1-ZV-1N07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations, for a cross reference of zones and sectors.

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Rev. 17 Page 7 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies 5.1.1.7 ITEM 7 - Indicate BRC disposition on PARs recommendation or BRC Not Contacted.

5.1.1.8 ITEM 8 - Mark if the event description is new or unchanged.

Enter the alphanumeric designator in the initiating condition line.

a. Addendum 6 contains suggested wording that may be used by the communicator as an aid.

b. If wording other than that provide in Addendum 6 is used, then, include a brief explanation of the event in lay terms for clarification to offsite agencies. Legibly print a non-technical description of the event. DO NOT USE ACRONYMS.

NOTE Only Blocks 1, 8 and 12 are required to be completed upon initial notification. The remainder of the form should be completed if time allows. The entire form shall be completed on all subsequent notifications or updates.

5.1.1.9 ITEM 9 - Mark NEW or UNCHANGED. Meteorological data is available on the Integrated Computer System (ICS)

Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition Display System (ERFDADS). Ensure 15 minute average lower wind speed and wind direction is used.

See Addendum 5, Atmospheric Stability Classification.

5.1.1.10 ITEM 10 - MarkNEWorUNCHANGED. A radiological release is defined as exceeding the EAL for an Unusual Event. Use a default 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months value if the release duration unknown.

5.1.1.11 ITEM 11 - Additional remarks, if any.

5.1.1.12 ITEM 12 - Signature of Emergency Director authorizing release of Data Sheet 1.

5.1.2 Complete notifications using Data Sheet 3.

5.1.2.1 Contact State/County on ringdown line or alternate numbers.

l I OERP01-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 8 of28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies

Read ITEMS 1-8.

Supply information in Items 9-11, if available.

5.1.2.2 Fax notification forms. Log time fax completed and confirmed.

5.1.2.3 If the Communicator is also making NRC notifications, complete Section 5.2 of this procedure prior to continuing.

5.1.2.4 Contact BRC and issue information on Data Sheet 1.

5.1.2.5 Notify unaffected Unit Control Room that an emergency fax notification has been made.

5.1.2.6 Notify the STP Coordinator (QSE) that emergency fax notification has been made. This step is not required by the Offsite Agency Communicator located in the EOF.

5.1.3 Issue update notifications to State and County approximately hourly unless a State/County consensus is obtained for a reduced frequency (e.g. a static condition).

5.1.3.1 Update notifications are made using Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form.

5.1.3.2 If the Emergency Director is located in the Emergency Operations Facility and events are not rapidly changing, then, following issuance of Data Sheet 1, issue Data Sheet 2, Supplemental Notification Form. (Guidance for issuing Data Sheet 2 is found in Addendum 2, Special Instructions for Completing Supplemental Notification Form.)

5.1.4 If Data Sheet 1 or Data Sheet 2 is issued with incorrect information, then immediately contact the notified agencies correct the information and follow-up with a corrected Data Sheet 1 or Data Sheet 2.

5.1.5 If Data Sheet 1 or Data Sheet 2 is being transmitted with incorrect information, then immediately stop transmission, gather the correct information, and re-transmit a corrected Data Sheet 1 or Data Sheet 2.

OERPOI1-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page 9 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies 5.2 NRC Notification NOTE Complete Data Sheet 4 (black ink should be used) for initial NRC notification. Complete all applicable blocks on the worksheet.

5.2.1 Notify the NRC Operations Center immediately following initial notification of State/County agencies and no later than one hour after the emergency has been declared. If more than one communicator is available, these notifications may be done concurrently. Use Data Sheet 4 as a record of initial conversation.

Additional records of conversation may be made on Emergency Action Log Sheets.

5.2.1.1 Description, Provide a description of the event to include systems affected, actuation's and initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. Additional space is provided on back of Data Sheet 4. Check block when Control Room Log Book entry is made.

5.2.1.2 Radiological Releases, Complete this section if the event is radiologically based. Information from Data Sheet 1 may be used if information described in Data Sheet 4 is not available and obtaining it would likely cause a late notification.

5.2.1.3 Activate the ERDS at the time the NRC Operations Center is notified of the Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency (see Addendum 4).

5.2.1.4 The Control Room ENS Communicator must maintain an open telephone line with the NRC, unless otherwise directed by the NRC. During the course of the event, immediately report any further degradation in the level of safety of the plant or other worsening conditions, including those that require declaration of any of the emergency classes, or may change from one emergency class to another, or a termination of the emergency class.

Immediately report the results of ensuing evaluations or assessments of plant conditions, the effectiveness of response or protective measures taken, and information relating to plant behavior that is not understood.

5.2.2 Notify NRC Resident Inspector. Log time of contact on Data Sheet 4.

I OERP01-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 1 Page 10 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies 6.0 References 6.1 STPEGS Emergency Plan 6.2 OPGP05-ZV-0004, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Users Guide 6.3 OERPO 1-ZV-IN07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations 6.4 OERPO1-ZV-INO1, Emergency Classification 6.5 10CFR50.72(a)ii.3 6.6 Inspection Report 91-03-01 (LCTS 9100453-936) 6.7 10CFR50 Appendix E, IV.D.3 6.8 IEN 89-89 7.0 Support Documents 7.1 Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form (Typical) 7.2 Data Sheet 2, Supplemental Notification Form (Typical) 7.3 Data Sheet 3, Offsite Agencies Log 7.4 Data Sheet 4, NRC Event Notification Worksheet (Typical) 7.5 Non-Emergency Offsite Agency Notification Message Form 7.6 Addendum 1, Responsibilities for Notifications 7.7 Addendum 2, Special Instructions for Completing Supplemental Notification Form 7.8 Addendum 3, Emergency Communications 7.9 Addendum 4, Instructions for Operating Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) 7.10 Addendum 5, Atmospheric Stability Classification 7.11 Addendum 6, Suggested Wording for Event Description

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 Page 1I of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Data Sheet I Offsite Agency Notification Message Form (Typical) Page I of I STP 1690 (04/02) SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION Rev. 13 OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FORM Roll call: _ T DPS Pierce I Matagorda County I Time A 1. Communicator: Name L OUl OU2 W 2. O This is a drill 0 This is NOT a drill A 3. Message Number Originating From: 0 CR 0 TSC 0 EOF Y 4. Emergency Classification: 0 New 0 Unchanged S Declared at: Date: Time:

0 Unusual Event 0 Alert 0 Site Area Emergency 0 General Emergency 0 Terminated

5. Radiological release in progress: 0 Yes 0 No C 6. Recommended Protective Actions: 0 New 0 Unchanged O A. O No recommended protective actions at this time M B. 0 Recommended protective actions are:

P 1. Evacuate from zones:

L 2. Sectors affected:

E 7. Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) concurs with recommendations in 6 above:

T 0 Yes 0 BRC Not Contacted O No E 8. Event

Description:

0 New 0 Unchanged Classification Pathlinitiating Condition:

Explain:

F 9. Meteorological data: 0 New 0 Unchanged O A. Wind direction from Degrees Wind speed MPH L B. Stability Class (Check One): OA OB OC OD OE OF OG L C. Precipitation (Check One): 0 None O Rain 0 Sleet O Snow 0 Hail O Fog O 10. Release Involves: 0 New 0 Unchanged W A. O Radiological release in progress: Expected Duration: - hrs. Started: Date - Time U B. 0 Radiological release which has ended: Duration: _ _ hrs. Terminated: Date - ime P 11. Remarks:

A L 12. Approved: Date Time L

WHEN COMPLETED, THIS RECORD SHALL BE RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCUMENT TYPE LIST (DTL).

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 Page 12 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Data Sheet 2 Supplemental Notification Form (Typical) Page I of 1 STl 686C (0"t2) Sount TEXAtSPROJEClT GENERATIMGSTATION

.CTRPC F] THIS IS A DRILL REV. 9 SUPPLEMENTAL NOTIFICATION FORM I [:1 THIS IS NOT A DR1LL

i. MESSAGE S- 3. EMERGENCY DIRECTOR LOCATION: ( ) CR ( ) TSC ( ) EOF

( )AEOF

2. UNIT STATUS: UNIT I POWER UNIT 2 POWER COMMUNCATOR NAME:

STATUS OF BOUNDARY 4. FUEL 5. REACTOR 6. CONTAINMENT CLADDING COOLANT SYSTEM INTACT ( ) (

POTENTIALLOSS () () )

LOSS ( ) ( )

RE-ESTABLISHED N/A ( ) (

7. PROGNOSIS OF SITUAT`ION 10. OFmSITE SurPORT REQUESTED (LMPROVING ( ) STABLE ( ) NONE DEGRADING SLOWLY ( ) DEGRADING QUICKLY ( ) AMBULANCE UNXNOWN.UNDERASSESSMENT ( ) FIRE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT S. EAL 0: ( ) WESTINGHOUSE

( ) BECITEL

9. NUMBER OF FUNCTIONAL SAFETY TRAINS: ) I(NFO

( ) NRC OTHER IL ONSE PROTECTIVE MEASURES ORDERED YES NO 12. ORGANIZATION JFAClLTES ACTIVATED ACCOUNTABILITY ( )TSCtOSC EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIALS ( )EOF CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION ( ) ALTERNATE EOF TSCtOSC RELOCATION ( )JIC EOF RELOCATION POTASSIUM IODIDE ISSUED 14. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION MEDICAL EMERGENCY OFFSITE TRANSPORT OTHER

13. PROJECTED OFFSFTE DOSES (CENTERLINE)

TEDE THYROID (REM) CDE (REM)

A. EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY B. 2MILES C. 5 MILES D. 10 MILES E. ESTIMATED RELEASE DURATION lS P. RELEASE RATE 11ci/s

15. EIMERGENCY DIRECTOR APPROVAL SIGNATURE DATE TIME

16. ACKNOWLEDGMENTOFRECEIPT:

SIGNATURE DATE TIME WHEN COMPLETED, THIS RECORD SHALL BE RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCUMENT TYPE LIST (DTL).

OERPO1-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page 13 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Data Sheet 3 Offsite Agencies Log Page I of i MESSAGE *MATAGORDA *DPS, PIERCE FAX *TEXAS DEPT. UNAFFECTED NOTIFICATIONS COMPLETED NUMBER COUNTY COMPLETED OF HEALTH UNIT CONTROL AND (BRC) ROOM CONFIRMED STP COORDINATOR CONSOLE CONSOLE 512-834-6688 U1-8614/8610/ BY: NAME/LOCATION OR OR (Refer to Addendum 2) OR 8595/7732 979-245-5526 979-543-6878 512-458-7460 U2-7953/8549/

OR OR 8683/8156 979-244-1178 979-532-1740 CONSOLE OR l ____________ _ l(When EOC Activated) l l _l_l_713-207-2740 l l

I. t 1 I 15 MINUTE NOTIFICATION REQUIRED

LOG THE TIME OF CONTACT.

WHEN COMPLETED, THIS RECORD SHALL BE RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCUMENT TYPE LIST (DTL).

I OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 14 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Data Sheet 4 T NRC Event Notification Worksheet (Typical) I Page 1of 2 NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000) REACTOR PLANT OPERATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN#

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY-301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469- BACK UPS-[1st] 301-95140550 or 800-449-3694',

[2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd] 301415-0553 'Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.

NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

ET CT EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWERIMODE BEFORE POWERIMODE AFTER CT / I EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) 3] (v)(A) Safe SAD Capability AINA

GENERALEMERGENCY GENIAAEC Cl TS Deviation ADEV El (v)(B) RHRCapability AINB Q SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR50.72(b)(2) El (v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC 3 ALERT ALE/AAEC O (I) TS Required St! ASHU O3 (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND

UNUSUALEVENT UNUIAAEC Cl (0)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS ACCS Ol (Ai) Offsite Medical AMED 0 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) El (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS El (xiii) Loss Comm/AsmtlResp ACOM p PHYSICAL SECURrrY(73.71) DODD O (x Offsite Notification APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) p MATERIAL/EXPOSURE 8??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) Invarid Specified System Act AINV E FITNESS FOR DUTY HFnT E ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecifled Requirement (identify) 3 OTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT (see Lastcolumn El Ci)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA Cl NONR 3 INFORMATION ONLY NN El (v)(A) Specified System Actuation AESF Cl NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their Initiating signals, causes, effect on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (Continue on back)

D] Control Room Log Book entry made.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR E YES (explain above) 0 NO NRC RESIDENT 0 O _ NOT UNDERSTOOD?

STATE(s) 0 O _ DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION E YES E NO (explain above)

LOCAL O O _ AS REQUIRED?

OTHER GOV AGENCIES E O O__ MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATE FOR ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK MEDIAWPRESS RELEASE O O O UNTIL CORRECTED: RESTART DATE: I0 YES E NO NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)

WHEN COMPLETED, THIS RECORD SHALL BE RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCUMENT TYPE LIST (DTL).

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 Page 15 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies l Data Sheet 4 NRC Event Notification Worksheet (Typical) Page 2 of 2 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE 2 OF 2 RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES: CHECK OR FILL INAPPLICABLE ITEMS (specific detallslexplanations should be covered In event descripton) o UQUID RELEASE GASEOUS RELEASE 03 UNPLANNED RELEASE 1[3 PLANNED RELEASE 03 ONGOING 3 TERMINATED o3 MONITORED Ii UNMONITORED 0 OFFSITE RELEASE T.S. EXCEEDED [3 RM ALARMS 13 AREAS EVACUATED o PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED 10 OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED 'State release path In description.

Release Rate (CUsec) %T.S. Limit HOO Guide Total Activity (Ci) %T.S. Limit HOO Guide Noble Gas 0.1 Cllsec 1000 Ci Iodine 10 pCVsec 0.01 CI Particulate I pClsec 1 mCI Uquid (excluding tritium and 10 pCmin 0.1 CI Dissolved noble gases) __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _

Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Cllmn 5 CI Total Activity PLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM LINE SG BLOWDOWN OTHER RAD MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOINTS

%T. S. LIMIT (if applicable)

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS (specIfIc detallslexplanatlons should be covered In event descrlptlonj LOCATION OF THE LEAK (e.g., SG #, valve, pipe, etc)

LEAK RATE lIUNITS: gpm/gpd l T. S. LIMITS ISUDDEN OR LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE: TIME: COOLANT ACTIVITY AND UNITS: PRIMARY - SECONDARY -

MST LIST OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL:

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued from front) INITIALS AND DATE Rcviscd 01/29/2001 WHEN COMPLETED, THIS RECORD SHALL BE RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCUMENT TYPE LIST (DTL).

II0OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 16 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Data Sheet 5 l Non-Emergency Offsite Agency Notification Message Form I Page I of I SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION NON-EMERGENCY OFFSITE AGENCY NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FORM Roll call: l l DPS Pierce Matagorda County Time Communicator Name:

A condition existed that met the Emergency Plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of the discovery.

Missed Emergency Classification: 0 Unusual Event Date/Time:

El Alert oSite Area Emergency oGeneral Emergency Event

Description:

Initiating Condition:

Explain:

Approved: Date: Time:

WHEN COMPLETED, THIS RECORD SHALL BE RETAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCUMENT TYPE LIST (DTL).

OERPO1-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page I7of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 1 Responsibilities For Notification Page 1 of I RESPONSIBILITY RESPONSIBLE PERSON BASED ON LOCATION OF EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CR TSC EOF Complete Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency SaeCutComncor hmia adceialM agr Engineering Notification Message Form State/County Communicator Manager AChemicalRadiochemical Assistant Complete Data Sheet 4, NRC Event Notification Worksheet and Maintain Open ENS Communicator N/A N/A line _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Update NRC on event status ENS Communicator Chemical/Radiochemical Manager Licensing Director Complete Data Sheet 2, Supplemental N/A N/A Engineering Notification Form Assistant Log State/County Notifications using Data State/County Communicator TSC Communicator Offsite Agency Sheet 3, Offsite Agencies Log Communicator

OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 18 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 2 Special Instructions for Completing Supplemental Notification Page I of 2 NOTE

Data Sheet 2 should be completed using black ink. No items are to be left blank even if information is unchanged.

The Engineering Assistant should, if time permits, routinely complete Data Sheet 2.

ITEM 1 - Use same number as on Data Sheet 1, which will be completed in conjunction with this form.

ITEM 3 - Identify the location of the Emergency Director and the name of the Communicator.

ITEM 9 - Enter the number of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) trains in the affected unit which are finctional.

ITEM 10 - Mark offsite support requested which will be responding to the site. This block is completed to facilitate the support group requested through county established roadblocks.

ITEM 14 - Examples of miscellaneous information:

a. Estimate of quantity of radioactive material released or being released and the points and heights of releases.

b. Chemical and physical form of released material, including estimates of the relative quantities and concentration of noble gases, iodines and particulates.

c. Estimate of any surface radioactive contamination in plant, onsite or offsite.

d. Any licensee emergency response actions underway.

GENERAL - a. Enter unavailable if information is not known.

b. Enter N/A if item is not applicable.

I OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 Page l9of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 2 1 Special Instructions For Completing Supplemental Notification Form Page 2 of 2

c. Fax the completed and approved Data Sheet 2 to all agencies listed below:

Matagorda County Sheriff's Office Dispatcher

Matagorda County Emergency Operations Center

Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), Pierce, TX

Texas Department of Health, BRC

Division of Emergency Management

Texas Department of Public Safety, Houston, TX

Emergency Operations Facility

Affected Unit's TSC

Affected Unit's Control Room (when Emergency Direction is not in Control Room)

Unaffected Unit's Control Room

Site Public Affairs (EOF)

Joint Information Center (JIC) (if activated)

Energy Control Data Center NOTE Fax numbers can be found in the STPEGS Emergency Communications Directory.

I OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 Page 20 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 3 l Emergency Communications (SPR 91-0447) l Pagel of4 1.0 Emergency Communications System 1.1 Emergency Notification System (ENS) 1.1.1 The ENS is a telephone circuit provided by the NRC.

1.1.2 The ENS is activated to notify the NRC of a declared emergency or drills/exercises and to maintain communications with the NRC Operations Center as needed.

1.1.3 If the ENS is activated, then a person SHALL remain on the line until the NRC agrees that the ENS may be terminated.

1.1.4 There are seven (7) methods to notify the NRC. These are:

ENS telephone

Outside phone lines

Control Room direct phone line to Bay City

Microwave line to Texas Genco LP and call forwarded to the NRC

Ringdown line to STP Coordinator (QSE) and call forward to the NRC

800 MHz Radio to communicate with STP Coordinator (QSE) and call forward to the NRC

Security radio communications to Matagorda County Sheriff's Office and forwarded to the NRC 1.1.5 The principal method of communications with the NRC is the ENS. The circuit may also be activated by the NRC.

1.1.6 If the ENS is out of service, then use outside phone lines to notify the NRC at one of the following telephone numbers (in order ofpriority) AND remain on the line.

9-1-301-816-5100

9-1-301-951-0550

I OERP01-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 21 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 3 1 Emergency Communications (SPR 91 0447) l Page 2 of 4 1.1.7 If the outside telephone lines are out of service, then use the Control Room direct phone line to Bay City and notify the NRC at one of the following telephone numbers (in order of priority) AND remain on the line.

1-301-816-5100

1-301-951-0550 1.1.8 If the Control Room direct telephone line to Bay City is out of order, then use the microwave tower line (32-0) to Texas Genco LP and have the Operator/Security complete the phone call to the NRC AND remain on the line if requested by the NRC.

1.1.9 If the microwave tower line is out of service, then use the STP Coordinator (QSE)

Ringdown line and have the dispatcher forward the call or information to the NRC AND remain on the line if requested by the NRC.

1.1.10 If the STP Coordinator (QSE) Ringdown line is out of service, then use the 800 MHz Radio to communicate with STP Coordinator and have the dispatcher forward the information to the NRC AND remain on the radio if requested by the NRC.

1.1.11 If the 800 MHz Radio is out of service, then use the Security radio console to contact the Matagorda County Sheriff's Office and request the information be forwarded to the NRC. Stay on the radio with the Matagorda County Sheriff's Office.

1.2 State and County Ringdown line 1.2.1 The State and County ringdown line is provided to notify State and County officials of a declared emergency.

1.2.2 The State-County ringdown line is an automatic ringdown telephone circuit terminated on a communications console or an ORANGE telephone (EOF).

1.2.3 There are seven (7) methods to notify the State/County. These are:

State/County ringdown telephone

Outside telephone lines

Control Room direct telephone line to Bay City

Microwave line to Texas Genco LP and call forwarded to the State and County

IOERPO1-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page 22 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 3 l Emergency Communications (SPR 91 0447) l Page 3 of 4

800 MHz Radio Communications with the State/County

Ringdown line to STP Coordinator and call forward to the State/County

Security radio communications with the County 1.2.4 If the State/County ringdown line is out of service, then use outside telephone lines to notify the State and County at one of the following telephone numbers:

State/DPS-Pierce

9-1-979-543-6878 OR

9-1-979-532-1740

Matagorda County Sheriff's Office

9-1-979-245-5526 1.2.5 If outside telephone lines are out of service, then use the Control Room direct telephone line to Bay City to notify the State/County.

1.2.6 If the Control Room direct telephone line to Bay City is out of service, then use the microwave line (32-0) to Texas Genco LP and have the Operator/Security complete the telephone calls to the State/County.

1.2.7 If the microwave line is out of service, then use the 800 MHz Radio to communicate with the State/County.

1.2.8 If the 800 MHz Radio is out of service, then use the STP Coordinator (QSE)

Ringdown line and forward the telephone call or information to the State/County.

1.2.9 If the STP Coordinator (QSE) Ringdown line is out of service, then use the Security radio to notify the County and request they forward the information to the State.

1.3 Health Physics Network (HPN) 1.3.1 The HPN is terminated on an FTS, 2001 telephone.

1.3.2 The HPN is to be used only at the request of the NRC.

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 23 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 3 l Emergency Communications (SPR 91 0447) l Page 4 of 4 1.3.4 If the outside telephone lines are out of service, then use the microwave line (32-0) to Texas Genco LP and have the Operator/Security complete the telephone call to the NRC/HPN.

1.3.5 If the HPN telephone line is out of service, then notify the NRC Operations Center.

(IEN 89-19)

NOTIFY the NRC when the telephone set has been returned to service. (IEN 89-19) 1.3.6 The HPN telephone is designed to provide communications with the NRC Health Physics Section and/or other nuclear power plants during a declared emergency or drill/exercise. STPEGS health physics personnel MAY request a conference call with other nuclear power plants on the HPN by asking the NRC to connect the desired plant(s).

1.4 STP Coordinator (QSE) Ringdown line 1.4.1 The STP Coordinator (QSE) ringdown line is an automatic ringdown between the Co-owners and the plant.

1.5 800 MHz Radio 1.5.1 Press HOME on keypad to ensure channel 65 is on the LCD display. Channel 65 is monitored by the dispatcher.

1.5.2 If unnecessary traffic is coming over the radio, use MODE on the keypad until the prompt appears to put the radio to sleep. Entering 0 will put the unit to sleep.

Pressing any button on the keypad will wake the unit up. Traffic will again be monitored.

1.5.3 To contact STP Coordinator, press STP Coordinator (QSE) on the keypad.

Channel 65 should be displayed, and momentarily, the STP Coordinator will acknowledge the unit calling. The handset is a push to talk handset.

1.5.4 The 800 MHz has many additional capabilities, including, use as a radiotelephone.

Contact the EOF Communications System Supervisor for additional instructions.

I OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 lPage 24 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 4 l Instructions for Operating Emergency Response Data Systems (ERDS) I Page I of 2 1.0 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Activation, Termination, and Error Handling Instructions:

2.0 Steps to Activate the ERDS from Integrated Computer System / Emergency Response Facility Data Acquisition Display System (ICS/ERFDADS) Main Menu:

2.1 Click on the Menu UP Arrow (WDPF Main Menu) 2.2 Select Custom Graphics 2.3 Select Top Level Menu 2.4 Select AF, AM, AP, BR, & CC DISPLAYS 2.5 Select NRC Link Control 2.6 Click in ACTIVATE Block to connect with the NRC ERDS Computer at the NRC Operations Center in Rockville, Maryland, via a dedicated telephone line.

2.7 The dial-up should generally succeed within one minute, at which time the NRC Link Control screen will indicate ACTIVE and ONLINE and will begin counting GOOD CYCLES. Otherwise, the ICS/ERFDADS will automatically re-dial and attempt to connect with the NRC ERDS computer several additional times. If no connection is established within approximately five minutes, then NRC Link Control screen will indicate the link status via error messages. If more than five minutes elapses without a successful response, then site personnel should notify the NRC before terminating efforts to establish the ERDS data link.

2.8 The display terminal may now be used for other purposes while the ERDS data continues to be transmitted to the NRC. Whenever the ERDS is active, it is suggested that NRC Link Control or NRC Link Status screen be used to monitor the status of the ERDS data link.

3.0 Steps to terminate the ERDS:

3.1 If NRC Link Control screen is not present on an ICS/ERFDADS terminal, repeat the ERDS activation steps 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.

3.2 When NRC Link Control screen is present on the terminal CLICK in the TERMINATE Block. This action causes the ICS/ERFDADS to disconnect the telephone connection with the NRC ERDS computer in Rockville, Maryland.

3.3 When the ERDS is terminated by STP, the NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status screens will show the message Terminated and the Link Status Block with the message OFFLINE. When STP terminates the ERDS, then 15 minutes must lapse before attempting to activate the ERDS again from the same STP Unit.

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 I Page25of28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 4 lInstructions For Operating Emergency Response Data Systems (ERDS) I Page 2 of 2 4.0 Steps to handle ERDS error conditions:

4.1 If an error condition occurs, then the error messages will be displayed on NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status screens. If an error condition occurs, then obtain a hardcopy of the error message using Print Screen.

4.2 When the ERDS is active and no errors are occurring, then displays NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status screens will tag the ERDS Messages block with the message Active, the Link Status block with the message Online, the Read Error block with the message OK, the Nonsensical error block with the message OK, and the Write Error block with the message OK.

4.3 If an attempt is made to activate the ERDS by STP and all telephone lines at NRC are busy, then displays NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status screens will tag the ERDS Messages block with the message NRC lines busy. Obtain a hardcopy of the display showing the NRC lines busy message and then follow the steps to terminate the ERDS.

Periodically try again to activate the ERDS, producing a hardcopy of the display each time the NRC lines busy message is shown.

4.4 If an attempt is made to activate the ERDS by STP and NRC denies access to the ERDS computer system in Rockville, Maryland, then displays NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status will tag the ERDS Messages block with the message Unaccepted by NRC. Obtain a hardcopy of the display showing the denied access by NRC message and then follow the steps to terminate the ERDS. Periodically try again to activate the ERDS, producing a hardcopy of the display each time the denied access by NRC message is shown.

4.5 NRC has the ability to terminate an active ERDS link. If NRC terminates such a link, then displays NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status will tag the ERDS Messages block with the message Terminated by NRC and the Link Status block with the message Offline.

Obtain a hardcopy the display showing the ERDS link termination by NRC.

4.6 If the ERDS link is active and the telephone line is disconnected, then the ICS/ERFDADS will automatically re-dial and attempt to reconnect with the NRC ERDS computer system.

If the telephone line is disconnected, then displays NRC Link Control and NRC Link Status will tag the ERDS Messages block with either the message Active or with the message Modem trouble, the Link Status block with the message Offline, and the remainder of the status messages blocks with the message OK or the message TRBL.

If the ERFDADS is not able to reconnect with the NRC ERDS computer system, then hardcopy the displayed error messages and contact the ERFDADS System Engineer.

I OERPO1-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 1 Page 26 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 5 l Atmospheric Stability Classification I Page I of I Stability Classification Class Delta T (60m-lOm) 0F *Sigma-Theta Extremely Unstable A < -1.7 2 22.5 Moderately Unstable B -1.71 TO -1.53 17.5 TO 22.5 Slightly Unstable C -1.52 TO -1.35 12.5 TO 17.5 Neutral D -1.34 TO -0.45 7.5 TO 12.5 Slightly Stable E -0.44 TO 1.35 3.8 TO 7.5 Moderately Stable F 1.36 TO 3.60 2.1 TO 3.8 Extremely Stable G > 3.60 <2.1

Do not use Sigma-Theta if wind speed is less than 5 mph, use default Stability Class D.

OERPOI-ZV-IN02 Rev. 17 Page 27 of 28 Notifications To Offste Agencies Addendum 6 Suggested Wording for Event Description Page I of 2 NOTE Obtain Initiating Condition alphanumeric designation from the Emergency Director. Match designation with list below and enter into item 8 of Data Sheet 1.

Fission Product Barrier Degradation FUI Loss or potential loss of Containment barrier FAI Loss or potential loss of Fuel Clad or Reactor Coolant System barrier FSI Loss or potential loss of two fission product barriers FG1 Loss of two fission product barriers with potential loss or loss of the third barrier Svstem Malfunction SUI Loss of offsite power to safety systems. Multiple sources of emergency power are available.

SU2 Plant operation determined to be outside of plant safety specifications.

SU3 Unplanned loss of most Control Room safety system alarm indications.

SU4 Unplanned loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities.

SU5 Unplanned loss of safety related battery power causing difficulty monitoring plant conditions while shutdown.

SU6 Indication of degradation or potential loss of the Fuel Clad fission product barrier.

SU7 Indication of degradation of Reactor Coolant System fission product barrier.

SAI Loss of all power to safety systems while the plant is shutdown and cooled down.

SA2 Reactor failed to automatically shutdown when required. Manual shutdown was successful.

SA3 Inability to maintain appropriate cooled down temperature while shutdown.

SA4 Difficulty monitoring changing plant conditions due to unplanned loss of most Control Room safety system alarm indications.

SA5 Electrical power to safety systems has degraded to a single source.

SA6 Indication of potential loss of the Fuel Clad fission product barrier.

SS I Loss of all electrical power to safety systems.

SS2 Reactor failed to automatically shutdown when required. Initial attempts at manual shutdown were not successful.

SS3 Unplanned loss of safety related battery power compromising the ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

SS4 Complete loss of systems required for plant cooldown.

SS5 Loss of water level in the Reactor Vessel that has or will uncover the fuel in the Reactor Vessel while the plant is shutdown and cooled down.

SS6 Inability to monitor changing plant conditions due to unplanned loss of most Control Room safety system alarm indications.

SGI Prolonged loss of all electrical power to safety systems which will lead to a loss of all three fission product barriers unless restored.

SG2 All attempts to shutdown the reactor have been unsuccessful which may lead to loss of all three fission product barriers.

I OERPOI-ZV-IN02 I Rev. 17 l Page 28 of 28 Notifications To Offsite Agencies Addendum 6 l Suggested Wording for Event Description I Page 2 of 2 Abnormal Radiological Levels RUI Unplanned release to the environment of very low levels of radioactivity which exceed effluent limits and indicates a degradation in plant radiological controls.

RU2 Unexpected increase in plant radiation levels.

RAI Unplanned release to the environment of low levels of radioactivity which significantly exceed effluent limits and indicates a substantial degradation in plant radiological controls.

RA2 Potential damage or damage to spent nuclear fuel outside of the Reactor Vessel.

RA3 Elevated plant radiation levels impede necessary access to plant operating stations.

RSI Actual or projected radiological dose at the site boundary has reached a level which is equal to 10% of the dose which would prompt an offsite protective action recommendation.

RS2 An unexpected increase in containment radiation levels indicate a loss or potential loss of two fission product barriers.

RGI Actual or projected radiological dose at the site boundary has reached a level which requires an offsite protective action recommendation.

RG2 An unexpected increase in containment radiation levels indicate a loss of two fission product barriers with potential loss or loss of third barrier.

Hazards and Other Cnnditinns HUI Security event affecting normal operation of the plant.

HU2 (Fire or Explosion) in the (Protected Area or Switchyard) which affects normal plant operations.

HU3 (Toxic or Flammable) gasses are affecting normal plant operations.

HU4 (Describe destructive event) is affecting normal plant operations.

HU5 Conditions exist, not specifically covered by the Station Emergency Plan, which are impacting normal plant operations and, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, warrants declaration of an Unusual Event.

HAI Security event inside the Protected Area may potentially affect safe operation of the plant.

HA2 (Fire or Explosion) in a plant vital area may potentially affect safe operation of the plant.

HA3 (Toxic or Flammable) gasses may potentially affect safe operation of the plant.

HA4 (Describe destructive event) may potentially affect safe operation of the plant.

HA5 Evacuation of Main Control Room. Plant controls established at Auxiliary Shutdown Panel.

HA6 Conditions exist, not specifically covered by the Station Emergency Plan, which may affect safe operation of the plant, and, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, warrants the declaration of an Alert.

HSI Security event in a plant vital area which could affect safe shutdown.

HS2 Evacuation of Main Control Room and plant controls cannot be established.

HS3 Events affect the ability to shutdown the plant or maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.

HGI Security event resulting in loss of ability to reach and maintain safe shutdown.

HG2 Conditions exist, not specifically covered by the Station Emergency Plan, which may potentially result in a hazard to the public, and in the judgment of the Emergency Director, warrants the declaration of a General Emergency.

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION D0527 STI 31662989 OERPO1-ZV-1N07 Rev. 9 Page I of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: N/A Effective Date: 10/16/03 Max Keyes N/A N/A Emergency Response Division PREPARER TECHNICAL USER COGNIZANT ORGANIZATION Table of Contents Page

1. 0 Purpose and Scope ................................................. 2

2. 0 Definitions ................................................ 2

3. 0 Precautions and Limitations ................................................ 3

4. 0 Responsibilities ................................................ 3

5. 0 Procedure ................................................. 4

6. 0 References ................................................ 5 7.0 Support Documents ................................................ 5 Addendum 1, Initial Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart ............................................... 6 Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table ................................................. 7 Addendum 3, Radiological Release Table ......... 8......................

Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones Map ................................................. 9 Addendum 5, Protective Response Zones ................................................ 10

lIl OERPO1-ZV-IN07 I Rev. 9 l Page 2of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.1 This procedure provides instructions for determining Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) for the general public.

1.2 PARs may be based on any of the following:

1.2.1 Declaration of a General Emergency.

1.2.2 Projected and/or actual measured doses offsite exceeding the EPA Protective Action Guidelines of 1 REM TEDE or 5 REM Thyroid CDE.

1.3 No PARs are required for the Unusual Event, Alert or Site Area Emergency classification.

1.4 This procedure implements the requirements of the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) Emergency Plan specific to PARs.

2.0 Definitions 2.1 COMMITTED DOSE EQUIVALENT (CDE): Total dose from internally deposited radionuclides over subsequent 50 year period to a specific organ.

2.2 EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY: An oval shape that is at least 1,430 meters (4,692 feet, 0.889 miles) from the center of either containment building, see Addendum 3 of procedure OERPO1-ZV-INOI, Emergency Classification. The Site Boundary and Exclusion Area Boundary are considered the same for dose assessment purposes.

2.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS: Any action taken to avoid or reduce a projected radiological dose to the public.

2.4 PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDE (PAG): The projected dose to reference man, or other defined individual, from an unplanned release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended.

2.5 PROTECTIVE RESPONSE ZONES: Designated areas that divide the ten mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) by geographical boundaries, access roads and natural landmarks to facilitate evacuation of the public.

2.6 RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE: Any radiological release from the plant that exceeds the EAL limits established for an Unusual Event.

2.7 SECTOR

The emergency planning zone is divided into 16 sectors (22.5° each). Sectors are used to provide a visual representation of the location of the plume.

2.8 TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE): The sum of the deep dose equivalent (external exposure) and the committed effective dose equivalent (internal exposure).

I OERPO1-ZV-IN07 I Rev. 9 1 Page 3of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations 3.0 Precautions and Limitations 3.1 PAR development is expected to be made promptly following indications that conditions have exceeded Protective Action Guides (PAGs). PARs shall be developed and given to the Emergency Director within 15 minutes of initial indications.

3.2 The PARs determined by this procedure are to be issued to State and County agencies as RECOMMENDATIONS. State and County agencies are responsible for determining and implementing protective actions for the general public.

3.3 Offsite agency notifications and Protective Action Recommendations should not be delayed until a dose assessment can be completed. Follow-up notifications can address the results of dose assessments.

3.4 Upon declaration of a General Emergency, a PAR shall be issued. This recommendation shall accompany notification of the emergency declaration and shall be issued within 15 minutes of the declaration of the Emergency Classification.

3.5 Changes in wind direction, stability class, or increase in release rates may result in the need to revise PARs to include additional protective response zones.

3.6 Wind direction changes that only affect additional downwind sectors shall be communicated to the Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC).

3.7 Any change to a PAR shall be issued on OERPOI-ZV-IN02, Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form within 15 minutes of approval of the revision by the Emergency Director.

3.8 Any recommendation to relax protective measures implemented for the public requires joint concurrence by the State of Texas, Matagorda County, and the NRC.

3.9 If PARs have been made beyond 10 miles, then wind direction changes that affect additional sectors may result in the need to revise PARs.

4.0 Responsibilities 4.1 The Emergency Director shall be responsible for implementation of this procedure and the approval and release of PARs to offsite agencies.

4.2 The Radiological Director shall be responsible for making PAR recommendations to the Emergency Director.

4.2.1 If the Emergency Operations Facility is not activated and Command and Control is in the Technical Support Center, then the Radiological Manager is responsible for making Protective Action Recommendations to the Emergency Director.

I OERPO1-ZV-IN07 I Rev.9 l Page 4 oflO Offsite Protective Action Recommendations 4.2.2 If neither the Technical Support Center nor the Emergency Operations Facility is activated, then the Acting Radiological Manager is responsible for making Protective Action Recommendations to the Emergency Director.

5.0 Procedure 5.1 Based on the judgement of the Radiological Director, Protective Action Recommendations are developed using the guidance provided in Addendum 2 or Addendum 3 and recommended to the Emergency Director.

5.2 Determine PARs at a General Emergency by one of the following methods:

5.2.1 IF a radiological release is in progress AND time does not permit the calculation and evaluation of downwind doses OR personnel are not available to complete these calculations, THEN determine the PAR using Addendum 1, Initial Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart.

5.2.2 IF a radiological release is NOT in progress, THEN determine the PAR using Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table.

5.2.3 IF a radiological release is in progress, THEN use Addendum 3, Radiological Release Table. Refer to OERPO1-ZV-TPO1, Offsite Dose Calculations, to determine projected downwind doses.

Conditions presented in Addendum 3 are listed in order of preference based on available data.

Any single condition or combination of conditions may be used to determine the most appropriate PAR.

5.2.4 IF a PAR has been calculated and issued using Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table, and a radiological release begins, THEN determine PAR expansion using dose assessment or field monitoring results and Addendum 3, Radiological Release Table.

5.2.5 IF a PAR has been calculated and issued using dose assessment, and the radiological release is terminated, THEN determine PAR expansion using field monitoring results.

5.2.6 IF dose assessment results indicate PAGs are exceeded at 10 miles, THEN

Verify dose projection with field team measurements.

I OERPOI-ZV-IN07 I Rev. 9 l Page 5of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations

If field team measurement supports the dose projection, then recommend to the Emergency Director that PARs be expanded to include the 10-mile radius and the downwind sectors greater than 10-miles in 2-mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

5.3 If weather conditions (such as frontal passage) are or would cause frequent revisions to the PAR due to downwind zone changes (frequently changing wind direction), then recommend protective actions affecting the entire radius.

5.4 Use Addendum 5, Protective Response Zones, and determine the affected zones and sectors. Use Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones Map, for a visual representation of PARs.

5.5 Provide PARs to the Emergency Director for approval and issuance.

6.0 References 6.1 STPEGS Emergency Plan 6.2 OERPOI-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies 6.3 OERPO1-ZV-TP0I, Offsite Dose Calculations 6.4 EPA 400, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents 6.5 NUREG 0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 6.6 OPGP05-ZV-00004, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Users Guide 6.7 NEI 99-02, Revision 1, Regulatory Assessment Performance Guideline 7.0 Support Documents 7.1 Addendum 1, Initial Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart 7.2 Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table 7.3 Addendum 3, Radiological Release Table 7.4 Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones Map 7.5 Addendum 5, Protective Response Zones

I OERPOI-ZV-IN07 I Rev. 9 l Page 6 of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Addendum 1 I Initial Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart Page I of I ENTRY REOUIREMENTS: A General Emergency AND a radiological release is in progress AND time does not permit the calculation and evaluation of downwind doses OR personnel are not available to complete these calculations.

[

IS A GENERAL EMERGENCY NO - NO PAR DECLARED?

YES DOES TIME AND

[ PERSONNEL PERMIT DOSE ASSESSMENT?

YES NO EVACUATE 5 MILE RADIUS (Zones: 1,2,3,4,5)

GO TO ADDENDUM 3

Toselect the appropriate downwind sectors, refer to Addendum 5, Protective Response Zones.

I' OERPO1-ZV-IN07 Rev. 9 Page 7 of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Addendum 2 Core/Containment Status Table Page I of I ENTRY REQUIREMENTS: General Emergency AND a radiological release is NOT in progress.

Containment High (bEvacuation Range Radiation (a)Hatch Monitor Containment Pressure Protective Action Monitor (Rt-8050, 8051) Recommendations Less Than 200 R/hr Less Than 444 mRJhr N/A 2 Mile Radius (Zone: 1)

< 5 psig 2 Mile Radius & 5 Miles

<5 psigDownwind 200 R/hr to 1,000 R/hr 444 mR/hr to 2,222 mnRhr

> 5 psig 5 Mile Radius (Zones:

>5psig1,2,3,4,5)

< 5 psig 5 Mile Radius & 10 Miles Downwind Greater Than 1,000 R/hr Greater Than 2,222 mR/hr

. 5 psig 10 Mile Radius (Zones:

> 5 psig 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11)

(a) If the Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (RT-8050 and RT-805 1) are out of service then use the Hatch Monitor.

( To select the appropriate downwind evacuation zones and sectors refer to Addendum 5, Protective Response Zones.

NOTE: Evaluated using Revision 7.0 of the STAMPEDE code. The evaluation involved running a series of calculations and comparing the offsite doses to the PAGs at 1, 5, and 10 miles. The gap inventory existing about I hour after reactor shutdown was assumed to best represent the nuclide mix. STAMPEDE defaults were assumed for the meteorology. The "containment leakage" method was used to calculate the release rate because this method allows the entry of both the containment pressure indications and the containment exposure rate measured by the RT8050 or RT8051 radiation monitors. (see CR 01-1243-1)

I OERP01-ZV-IN07 I Rev. 9 1 Page8 of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Addendum 3 l Radiological Release Table I Page I of I ENTRY REQUIREMENTS: General Emergency WITH a radiological release in progress. The below List is in order of preference based on available data.

PROTECTIVE ACTION CONDITION EVACUATE

1. PROJECTED DOSES (For Short Duration Puffs only

<30 min)

a. Projected doses < PAG a. Two mile radius (1 rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) b. Two mile radius and zones in any sector projected to

b. Projected doses > PAG exceed PAG (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE)

11. PROJECTED DOSES BEYOND EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

a. Projected doses < PAG (1 rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) a. Two mile radius b.Projected doses> PAG 1-5 miles b. Two mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) to 5 miles

c. Five mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors

c. Projected doses > PAG 5-10 miles to 10 miles (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) d. Ten mile radius and affected downwind sectors in 2-mile d.Projected doses > PAG at greater than 10-miles and increments until PAG is not exceeded.

dose projection is supported by field team measurements (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) 111. DOSE RATES MEASURED AT PLUME CENTERLTNE ON EXCLUSION AREA a. Two mile radius BOUNDARY b. Two mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors a.<100 mRhr to S miles

b. 100 nmR/hr to 1,000 mR/hr c. Five mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors to 10 miles c.>1,000 mRlhr IV. RELEASE RATES

a. Five mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors

a. > EAL for General Emergency to 10 miles V. DEFAULT VALUES (Addendum l!

a. Five mile radius

a. General Emergency To select the appropriate evacuation zones and downwind sectors, refer to Addendum 5, Protective Response Zones.

I OERPOI-ZV-IN07 7 Rev. 9 l Page 10 of 10 Offsite Protective Action Recommendations Addendum 5 l Protective Response Zones I Page I of I AFFECTED ZONES: Determine affected sectors and protective response zones and enter onto OERPO1-ZV-IN02, Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form.

TWO MILE RADIUS: Protective Response Zone: 1 FIVE MILE RADIUS: Protective Response Zones: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 TEN MILE RADIUS: Protective Response Zones: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 WIND AFFECTED PROTECTIVE RESPONSE ZONE KEY HOLE FROM IS DOWNWIND 2 Mile Radius & 5 5 Mile Radius & 10 BETWEEN SECTORS Miles Downwind Miles Downwind 164 0to 1740 Q,RA,B 1,2,5 1,2,3,4,5,6,10,11 175 0to 1850 R,A,B 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 186 0to 196° R,A,B,C 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 197 0to2080 A,B,C 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 209 0to219 0 A,B,C,D 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6, 11 220 0to230 0 B,C,D 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6 231Ito241I B,C,D,E 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 242° to 253° C, D, E 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 254 0to264' C,D,E,F 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 265° to 2750 D, E, F 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 276 0to286' D,E,F,G 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 287 0 to 2980 E, F, G 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7 299 0 to309' E,F,G,H 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 3100 to3200 F,G,H 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 321 0 to3310 F,G,H,J 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 332° to 3430 G, H,J 1 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 3440 to354° G,H,J,K 1 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9 3550°to5 H,J,K 1 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 6°to16° H,J,KL 1 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 170to280 J,KIL 1 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 29°to39° JK,L,M 1,4 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 40°to500 KL,M 1,4 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 510to610 KL,M,N 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,8,9,10 620 to730 L,M,N 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10 740to840 L,M,N,P 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9, 10 85°to95 0 M,N,P 1, 4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10 96° to 106 0 M,NP.Q 1, 4, 5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,11 1070 to 118 0 N,P,Q 1,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,11 1190 to 1290 NP,Q,R 1,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,11 1300 to 1400 P,Q,R 1,5 1,2,3,4,5,10,11 1410to 1510 P,Q,R,A 1,2,5 1,2,3,4,5,10,11 152 0 to 1630 Q,R,A 1,2,5 1,2,3,4,5,10,11

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION D0527 STI 31662990 l OERPOI-ZV-SHO l Rev. 18 Page I of 34 Shift Supervisor Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: N/A Effective Date: 10/16/03 Max Keyes N/A N/A Emergency Response Division PREPARER TECHNICAL USER COGNIZANT ORGANIZATION Table of Contents Page

1. 0 Purpose and Scope ............................................ 2

2. 0 Responsibilities ........................................... 2

3. 0 References ........................................... 3

4. 0 Procedure ............................................ 3

5. 0 Support Documents ........................................... 5 Addendum 1, Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart .................... ....................... 6 Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table ............................................ 7 Addendum 3, Radiological Release Table ....... 8......................

Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones ............................................ 9 Data Sheet 1, Unusual Event Checklist ........................................... 10 Data Sheet 2, Alert Checklist ........................................... 16 Data Sheet 3, Site Area Emergency Checklist ........................................... 22 Data Sheet 4, General Emergency Checklist ........................................... 28 Data Sheet 5, Termination Checklist ........................................... 34

I OERPOI-ZV-SHOI I Rev. 18 l Page 2 of 34 l I Shift Supervisor I0

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.1 This procedure specifies the actions to be completed by the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room during a declared emergency.

2.0 Responsibilities 2.1 The Shift Supervisor of the affected Unit is responsible for:

2.1.1 Recognizing, classifying and declaring the emergency.

2.1.2 Assuming the responsibilities and authorities of the Emergency Director until relieved by the TSC Manager or EOF Director.

2.1.3 Completing notifications and Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to offsite agencies until relieved of Emergency Director responsibility and authority.

2.1.4 Directing initial onsite emergency response activities.

2.1.5 Monitoring plant conditions for changes in emergency action levels (EALs) and emergency classification.

2.1.6 Directing Control Room response to mitigate the emergency condition.

2.1.7 Approving departures from license conditions per 10CFR50.54(x) for Control Room Operator actions and equipment manipulations.

2.1.8 Directing notification of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), until relieved of Emergency Director responsibility and authority.

2.1.9 Approving, or delegating approval of, press releases prior to issuance until relieved of Emergency Director responsibility and authority.

2.2 The Shift Supervisor of the unaffected Unit is responsible for:

2.2.1 Assuming the responsibilities and authority of Emergency Director if the Shift Supervisor of the affected Unit is unable to assume or continue to perform the duties of the Emergency Director.

2.3 The Unit 1 Shift Supervisor is responsible for:

2.3.1 Assuming the responsibilities and authorities of Emergency Director for events common to both Units.

I OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 I Rev. 18 l Page 3of 34 Shift Supervisor 3.0 References 3.1 STPEGS Emergency Plan 3.2 OERPOI-ZV-IN01I, Emergency Classification 3.3 OERPOl-ZV-1N02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies 3.4 OERPO I-ZV-IN03, Emergency Response Organization Notification 3.5 OERPO1-ZV-1N04, Assembly and Accountability 3.6 OERPO1-ZV-IN05, Site Evacuation 3.7 OERPOI-ZV-TSO1, TSC Manager 3.8 OERPOI-ZV-RE02, Documentation 3.9 OPOP04-ZO-0004, Personnel Emergencies 3.10 OPOP02-HE-0002, Technical Support Center HVAC System 3.11 OPGPO9-ZA-0002, Fitness for Duty Program 3.12 OERPOI-ZV-TP03, Severe Accident Management 3.13 NRC Inspection Report 90-10-03 (LCTS #9000789-936) 3.14 OPGP05-ZV-0004, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Users Guide 4.0 Procedure 4.1 If an Unusual Event or higher emergency classification is declared, implement the appropriate Data Sheet (1, 2, 3, or 4) based on the emergency classification declared. Use these Data Sheets to direct emergency activities.

4.2 If the emergency classification changes, then terminate completion of the current Data Sheet and initiate a new Data Sheet (2, 3, 4, or 5) based on the new emergency classification.

4.3 Request a licensed Reactor Operator from the unaffected Unit (if available) be dispatched to assist.

4.4 Consider restricting hand held radio transmissions during security events that include explosive or electronic controlled devices.

l OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 l Rev. 18 l Page4of34 Shift Supervisor 4.5 Assume the responsibilities and authorities of the Emergency Director. The Emergency Director is responsible for making certain key decisions and ensuring their implementation.

The responsibilities which CANNOT be delegated include:

4.5.1 Declaring a new emergency classification.

4.5.2 Approving Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) issued to State and County authorities.

4.5.3 Approving required notifications to the State and County.

4.5.4 Approving exposures in excess of 10CFR20 limits and authorizing the use of Potassium Iodide (KI).

4.5.5 Approving departure from license conditions per 10CFR50.54(x).

4.5.6 Declaring entry into Severe Accident Management Guidelines.

4.6 The following Emergency Director responsibilities and authorities MAY be delegated:

4.6.1 Requesting federal assistance.

4.6.2 Approving press releases prior to issuance.

4.6.3 Approving commitments to the NRC.

4.6.4 Approving required communications with the NRC.

4.7 Upon arrival of the TSC Manager or EOF Director, provide a turnover briefing per OERPO 1-ZV-TSO1, Data Sheet 2, Emergency Director Turnover Briefing.

4.8 When Emergency Director responsibilities have been transferred to the TSC Manager or EOF Director, then the Shift Supervisor shall perform the following:

4.8.1 Keep the Emergency Director informed of any plant conditions which could change the EAL or PARs.

4.8.2 Provide ongoing assessment and interface with the Operations Manager, including recommending priorities for repair activities.

4.8.3 Approve departure from license conditions per 10CFR50.54(x) for Control Room Operator actions and equipment manipulations.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI I I I Rev. 18 l Page 5 of 34 l I Shift Supervisor -I 5.0 Support Documents 5.1 Addendum 1, Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart 5.2 Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table 5.3 Addendum 3, Protective Response Sectors 5.4 Data Sheet 1, Unusual Event Checklist 5.5 Data Sheet 2, Alert Checklist 5.6 Data Sheet 3, Site Area Emergency Checklist 5.7 Data Sheet 4, General Emergency Checklist 5.8 Data Sheet 5, Termination Checklist

I OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 I Rev. 18 l Page6of34 Shift Supervisor Addendum 1 I Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart Page I of I ENTRY REOUIREMENTS: A General Emergency AND a radiological release is in progress AND time does not permit the calculation and evaluation of downwind doses OR personnel are not available to complete these calculations.

( IS A GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED?

I YES NO INO PAR DOES TIME AND EVACUATE 5 MILE PERSONNEL PERMIT RADIUS DOSE ASSESSMENT? NO (Zones: 1,2,3,4,5)

I IYES GO TO ADDENDUM 3 0To select the appropriate downwind sectors, refer to Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 7of 34 Shift Supervisor Addendum 2 Core/Containment Status Table Page I of I ENTRY REOUIREMENTS: General Emergency AND a radiological release is NOT in progress.

Containment High (b)Evacuation Range Radiation (a)Hatch Monitor Containment Pressure Protective Action Monitor (Rt-8050, 8051) Recommendations Less Than 200 R/hr Less Than 444 mnR/hr N/A 2 Mile Radius (Zone: 1)

< 5 psig 2 Mile Radius & 5 Miles

<5 psigDownwind 200 R/hr to 1,000 R/hr 444 mR/hr to 2,222 niR/hr

. 5 psig 5 Mile Radius (Zones:

?5psig 1,2,3,4,5)

< 5 psig 5 Mile Radius & 10

<5 psigMiles Downwind Greater Than 1,000 R/hr Greater Than 2,222 mRlhr

. 5 psig 10 Mile Radius (Zones:

>5psig 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,1 1)

(a)If the Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (RT-8050 and RT-805 1) are out of service then use the Hatch Monitor.

( To select the appropriate downwind evacuation zones and sectors refer to Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones.

NOTE: Assumptions used in the calculation ofthis table are in procedure OERPO1-ZV-IN07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations, Addendum 2.

OERP01-ZV-SH01 Rev. 18 Page 8 of 34 Shift Supervisor Addendum 3 Radiological Release Table Page 1 of I ENTRY REQUIREMENTS: General Emergency WITH a radiological release in progress.

(The below List is in order ofpreference based on available data)

PROTECTIVE ACTION CONDITION EVACUATE

1. PROJECTED DOSES (For Short Duration Puffs only

<30 mn)

a. Projected doses < PAG a. Two mile radius (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) b. Two mile radius and zones in any sector projected to exceed PAG

b. Projected doses > PAG (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE)

II. PROJECTED DOSES BEYOND EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

a. Projected doses < PAG (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) a. Two mile radius

b. Two mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors

b. Projected doses > PAG 0-5 miles to 5 miles (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) c. Five mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors

c. Projected doses > PAG 5-10 miles to 10 miles (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) d. Ten mile radius and affected downwind sectors in 2-mile

d. Projected doses > PAG at greater than 10-miles increments until PAG is not exceeded.

and dose projection is supported by field team measurements (I rem TEDE or 5 rem Thyroid CDE) 111. DOSE RATES MEASURED AT PLUME CENTERLINE ON EXCLUSION AREA a. Two mile radius BOUNDARY b. Two mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors

a. <100I nThr to S miles

b. 100 mR/hr to 1000 mR/hr c. Five mile radius and zones in affected downwind sectors to 10 miles

c. >10OmR/hr IV. RELEASE RATES

a. > EAt for General Emergency a. to Five10 mile milesradius and zones in affected downwind sectors V. DEFAULT VALUES (Addendum l

a. Five mile radius

a. General Emergency To select the appropriate evacuation zones and downwind sectors refer to Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones.

I OERPO1-ZV-SHOI I Rev. 18 l Page 9of 34 Shift Supervisor Addendum 4 l Protective Response Zones I Page 1 of I AFFECTED ZONES: Deternmine affected sectors and protective response zones and enter onto OERPO 1-ZV-IN02, Data Sheet 1, Offsite Agency Notification Message Form.

TWO MILE RADIUS: Protective Response Zone: 1 FIVE MILE RADIUS: Protective Response Zones: 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 TEN MILE RADIUS: Protective Response Zones: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 11 WIND AFFECTED PROTECTIVE RESPONSE ZONE KEY HOLE DIRECTION DOWNWIND 2 Mile Radius & 5 5 Mile Radius & 10 FROM(') SECTORS Miles Downwind Miles Downwind 164-174 Q,R,A,B 1,2,5 1,2,3,4,5,6,10,11 175-185 R,A,B 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 186-196 R,A,B,C 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 197-208 A, B. C 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 209-219 A,B,C,D 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6,11 220-230 B, C, D 1,2 1,2,3,4,5,6 231-241 B,C,D,E 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 242-253 C, D, E 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 254-264 C, D, E, F 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 265-275 D, E, F 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 276-286 D, E, F, G 1,2,3 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 287-298 E, F, G 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7 299-309 E, F, G, H 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 310-320 F,G,H 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 321-331 F,G,H,J 1,3 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 332-343 G, H, J 1 1,2,3,4,5,7,8 344-354 G,H,J,K 1 1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9 355-5 H,J,K i 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 6-16 H,J,K,L 1 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 17-28 J,K,L 1 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 29-39 J,KL,M 1,4 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 40-50 K,L,M 1,4 1,2,3,4,5,8,9 51-61 K, L, M, N 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,8,9,10 62-73 L,M,N 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10 74-84 L,M,N,P 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10 85-95 M,N,P 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10 96-106 M, N, P, Q 1,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,11 107-118 N,P,Q 1,5 1,2,3,4,5,9,10,11 119-129 N, P, Q, R 1,5 1,2,3,4, 5,9,10,11 130-140 P, Q, R 1,5 1,2,3,4,5,10,11 141-151 P, Q, R, A 1,2,5 12,3, 4,5,10,11 152-163 Q, R, A 1,2,5 1,2,3,4,5,10,11

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 10 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 1 Unusual Event Checklist Page I of 6 (Name) (Date) (Unit)

Action Time 1.0 INITIAL ACTIONS 1.1 Announce to Control Room personnel the declaration of an Unusual Event and the assumption of Emergency Director responsibilities by the Shift Supervisor.

1.2 Ensure the following announcement (or similar announcement) is made over the public address system using the Unit Override button:

CAUTION Public Address Announcements may be changed or delayed due to the following conditions:

Severe weather conditions which could threaten safe transport, a significant radiological hazard which could be encountered, a security threat occurring which could have an adverse impact on personnel moving around or leaving the site.

(READ SLOWLY) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL; ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. AN UNUSUAL EVENT HAS BEEN DECLARED IN UNIT(S) -. ALL PERSONNEL SHOULD CONTINUE WITH THEIR NORMAL DUTIES UNLESS ASSIGNED EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS FOR AN UNUSUAL EVENT." (Optional:

Give brief description of the event).

1.3 Direct the Control Room Communicators or available personnel to complete the required notifications as described in OERPOI-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 11 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet I Unusual Event Checklist Page 2 of 6 Action Time

No PARs are required for an Unusual Event.

State/County shall be contacted within 15 minutes of declaration of the Unusual Event to make emergency notifications.

NRC notification shall be made immediately upon completion of State/County notification and no later than one hour after declaring the Unusual Event. If more than one Communicator is available, NRC notification may be made concurrently with State/County notification.

1.4 As appropriate, upon the Onsite Communicator arrival, direct him/her to complete asterisked steps of this Checklist.

1.5 Contact the Duty Operations Manager and brief him/her on the situation.

1.6 Contact the Duty Plant Manager and brief him/her on the situation.

1.7 Contact the STP Coordinator (QSE) and advise him/her of the nature of the emergency.

1.8 Contact the Alarm Station Operator at extension 6042 to verify Emergency Notification and Response System (ENRS) activation.

1.9 If ENRS fails, then direct the Onsite Communicator to notify select management personnel listed in the Onsite Communicator Position Manual.

OERP01-ZV-SH01 Rev. 18 Page 12 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 1 Unusual Event Checklist Page 3 of 6 Action Time

1.10 Ensure that the following on-shift personnel have responded to their emergency duty station or have contacted the Control Room and are available to respond if needed:

Onsite Communicator (Control Room)

State/County Communicator (Control Room)

ENS Communicator (Control Room)

Acting Radiological Manager

Shift Technical Advisor (Control Room)

Acting OSC Coordinator

Acting Security Manager 1.11 If early staffing of the Emergency Response Facilities is desirable, then contact the Alarm Station Operator at extension 6042 and request ENRS activation for Staffing ERO Facilities.

1.12 If any of the following conditions exist, then consider establishing the OSC in accordance with procedure OERP01-ZV-IN03, Emergency Response Organization Notification, Form 1, Amplifying Information:

In-plant radiological conditions are deteriorating;

Search and rescue efforts are necessary;

Security threat is in progress;

Offsite chemical plant release occurs which may impact site operations;

Vital equipment in the plant is in a degraded condition;

Shift Supervisorjudgment.

OERP01-ZV-SH01 Rev. 18 Page 13 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 1 Unusual Event Checklist Page 4 of 6 Action Time 2.0 SPECIAL ACTIONS 2.1 Consider restricting hand held radio transmissions during security events LOG that include explosive or electronic controlled devices.

2.2 Early Dismissal of Non-Essential Personnel 2.2.1 Consider early dismissal of non-essential personnel for the following conditions:

The event is declared due to radiological problems and the condition could worsen.

A Security event is in progress and removal of personnel from the site would facilitate the ability of Security to respond.

Notification of severe weather has been received which could impact the safety of personnel onsite.

Notification of an incident at a nearby chemical facility has been received that could impact the site.

An orderly shutdown of activities and movement of personnel offsite is warranted.

A situation which has a significant potential to develop into unsafe or hazardous conditions onsite exists.

2.2.2 Discuss with the Duty Operations Manager the advisability of conducting early dismissal.

2.2.3 If early dismissal of non-essential personnel in the Protected Area is determined appropriate, then make the following announcement:

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 14 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 1 Unusual Event Checklist Page 5of 6 Action Time

(READ SLOWLY) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL; ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR HAS ORDERED THE EARLY DISMISSAL OF ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL. ALL MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION REPORT TO YOUR FACILITIES. ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL SHALL SECURE THEIR WORK AREA, INFORM THEIR SUPERVISOR OF JOB STATUS, AND EXIT THE SITE UNLESS DIRECTED OTHERWISE BY SUPERVISION. MONITOR LOCAL RADIO BROADCASTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION."

2.2.4 If early dismissal of non-essential personnel in the Owner Controlled Area is determined appropriate, then contact the Security Force Supervisor (Acting Security Manager) and request notification of personnel in the Owner Controlled Area.

2.3 Assembly and Accountability 2.3.1 Implement OERPO 1-ZV-1N04, Assembly and Accountability.

2.3.2 If the OSC has been activated, then instruct Plant Operators that have not been assigned tasks to proceed to the OSC for accountability and remain there to support OSC operations.

2.3.3 If persons are determined to be missing as a result of performing Assembly and Accountability, then contact the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) and provide names and last known locations of the missing persons. Direct the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) to form and dispatch Search and Rescue teams.

2.4 Site Evacuation 2.4.1 Implement OERPOI-ZV-IN05, Site Evacuation.

2.5 Personnel Emergencies 2.5.1 Implement OPOP04-ZO-0004, Personnel Emergencies. LOG

OERPO1-ZV-SH01 Rev. 18 Page 15 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet I Unusual Event Checklist T Page 6 of 6 Action Time 2.6 Potential for Radiological Release Occurring or Imminent 2.6.1 Place the affected Unit's TSC HVAC System in emergency/isolation mode or verify automatic transfer has occurred using OPOP02-HE-0002, TSC HVAC System.

2.6.2 Contact unaffected Unit's Shift Supervisor and recommend placing the unaffected Unit's TSC HVAC in emergency/isolation mode.

2.7 Toxic Gas/Chemical Release from Nearby Chemical Facilities 2.7.1 If time permits, then initiate OERPO1-ZV-IN04, Assembly and Accountability and OERPO I-ZV-IN05, Site Evacuation.

2.7.2 Otherwise, announce over the public address system for all personnel to seek shelter in buildings and turn off ventilation systems. Direct the Security Force Supervisor (Acting Security Manager) to warn personnel outside the Protected Area.

3.0 ONGOING ACTIONS 3.1 Continuously assess plant conditions against OERPO 1-ZV-INO 1, LOG Emergency Classification, to determine if changes to the current emergency classification are warranted.

3.2 Evaluate the need for continued staffing of ERO positions and release LOG unnecessary personnel to return to normal duties.

3.3 Review and approve press releases as applicable. LOG

Maintain an Emergency Action Log.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOl Rev. 18 Page 16 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 2 Alert Checklist Page I of 6 (Name) (Date) (Unit)

Action Time 1.0 INITIAL ACTIONS 1.1 Announce to Control Room personnel the declaration of an Alert and the continuation (or assumption) of Emergency Director responsibilities by the Shift Supervisor.

1.2 Ensure the following announcement (or similar announcement) is made over the public address system using the Unit Override button:

CAUTION Public Address Announcements may be changed or delayed due to the following conditions:

Severe weather conditions which could threaten safe transport, a significant radiological hazard which could be encountered, a security threat occurring which could have an adverse impact on personnel moving around or leaving the site.

(READ SLOWLY) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL; ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. AN ALERT HAS BEEN DECLARED IN UNIT(S) -. ALL DESIGNATED MEMBERS OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION REPORT TO YOUR FACILITY. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL ARE TO CONTINUE WITH THEIR NORMAL DUTIES UNLESS FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN." (Optional: Give brief description of the event.)

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 l Page 17 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 2 T Alert Checklist I Page 2 of 6 Action Time 1.3 Direct the Control Room Communicators or available personnel to complete the required notifications as described in OERPOI-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies.

No PARs are required for an Alert.

State/County shall be contacted within 15 minutes of the declaration of the Alert to make emergency notifications.

NRC notification shall be made immediately upon completion of State/County notification and not later than one hour after declaring the Alert. If more than one Communicator is available, NRC notification may be made concurrently with State/County notification.

Activate Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) at the time the NRC Operations Center is notified of the Alert.

1.4 As appropriate, upon the Onsite Communicator arrival, direct him/her to complete asterisked steps of this Checklist.

1.5 Contact the Alarm Station Operator at extension 6042 to verify Emergency Notification and Response System activation.

1.6 Contact the Duty Operations Manager and brief him/her on the situation.

1.7 Contact the Duty Plant Manager and brief him/her on the situation.

1.8 Contact the STP Coordinator (QSE) and advise him/her of the nature of the emergency.

1.9 Ensure that the following on-shift personnel have responded to their emergency duty station:

Onsite Communicator (Control Room)

State/County Communicator (Control Room)

ENS Communicator (Control Room)

OERPOI-ZV-SHO1 lRev. 18 Page 18 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 2 Alert Checklist Page 3 of 6 Time Action

Shift Technical Advisor (Control Room)

Acting Radiological Manager

Acting OSC Coordinator

Acting Security Manager 2.0 SPECIAL ACTIONS 2.1 Consider restricting hand held radio transmissions during security events LOG that include explosive or electronic controlled devices.

2.2 Early Dismissal of Non-Essential Personnel 2.2.1 Consider early dismissal of non-essential personnel for the following conditions:

The event is declared due to radiological problems and the condition could worsen.

A Security event is in progress and removal of personnel from the site would facilitate the ability of Security to respond.

Notification of severe weather has been received which could impact the safety of personnel onsite.

Notification of an incident at a nearby chemical facility has been received that could impact the site.

An orderly shutdown of activities and movement of personnel offsite is warranted.

A situation with a significant potential to develop into unsafe or hazardous conditions exists onsite.

2.2.2 Discuss with the Duty Operations Manager the advisability of conducting early dismissal.

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 19 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 2 Alert Checklist Page 4 of 6 Action Time 2.2.3 If early dismissal of non-essential personnel in the Protected Area is determined appropriate, then make the following announcement:

(Read Slowly) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL; ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR HAS ORDERED THE EARLY DISMISSAL OF ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL. ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL SHALL SECURE THEIR WORK AREA, INFORM THEIR SUPERVISOR OF JOB STATUS, AND EXIT THE SITE UNLESS DIRECTED OTHERWISE BY SUPERVISION. MONITOR LOCAL RADIO BROADCASTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION."

2.2.4 If early dismissal of non-essential personnel in the Owner Controlled Area is determined appropriate, then contact the Security Force Supervisor (Acting Security Manager) and request notification of personnel in the Owner Controlled Area.

2.3 Assembly and Accountability 2.3.1 Implement OERPO 1-ZV-IN04, Assembly and Accountability.

2.3.2 Instruct Plant Operators that have not been assigned tasks to proceed to the OSC for Accountability and remain there to support OSC operations.

2.3.3 If missing persons are discovered as a result of performing Assembly and Accountability, then contact the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) and provide names and last known locations of the missing persons. Direct the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) to form and dispatch Search and Rescue teams.

2.4 Site Evacuation 2.4.1 Implement OERP01-ZV-IN05, Site Evacuation.

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 20 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 2 Alert Checklist Page 5 of 6 Action Time 2.5 Personnel Emergencies 2.5.1 Implement OPOP04-ZO-0004, Personnel Emergencies. LOG 2.6 Radiological Release Occurring or Imminent 2.6.1 Place the affected Unit's TSC HVAC System in emergency/isolation mode or verify automatic transfer has occurred using OPOP02-HE-0002, TSC HVAC System.

2.6.2 Contact the unaffected Unit's Shift Supervisor and recommend placing the unaffected Unit's TSC HVAC in emergency/isolation mode.

2.6.3 Direct all Plant Operators to report to the 41'RCA Access Control Point and obtain an electronic dosimeter.

2.6.4 Direct the Dose Assessment Specialist in the EOF to perform dose projections. If the Dose Assessment Specialist is not available, then direct the Acting Radiological Manager to perform dose projections.

2.7 Toxic Gas/Chemical Release from Nearby Chemical Facilities 2.7.1 If time permits, then initiate OERPOI-ZV-IN04, Assembly and Accountability and OERPO 1-ZV-IN05, Site Evacuation.

2.7.2 Otherwise, announce over the public address system for all personnel to seek shelter in buildings and turn off ventilation systems. Direct the Security Force Supervisor (Acting Security Manager) to warn personnel outside the Protected Area.

3.0 ONGOING ACTIONS 3.1 Continuously assess plant conditions against OERPO1-ZV-IN0I, LOG Emergency Classification, to determine if changes to the current emergency classification are warranted.

OERP01-ZV-SH01 I Rev. 18 l Page 21 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 2 1Alert Checklist I Page 6of 6 Action Time 3.2 Evaluate the adequacy of the current Operations staffing and request LOG assistance from the unaffected Unit and/or call out additional personnel.

3.3 Make periodic site public address announcements on the status of the LOG emergency including any radiological hazard precautions.

3.4 Until relieved as the Emergency Director, update off-site agencies (State, LOG County, BRC) about hourly (or more frequently if warranted) on the status of the emergency.

3.5 Keep Plant Operators in the field advised of plant status and radiological LOG conditions as applicable.

3.6 Review and approve press releases as applicable. LOG

Maintain an Emergency Action Log.

4.0 FOLLOWING EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TURNOVER TO THE TSC MANAGER OR EOF DIRECTOR

Maintain ENS communications with the NRC if requested.

Advise the Emergency Director of conditions which may change the emergency classification.

Periodically brief Control Room staff of the status of the emergency and ongoing repair efforts.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 22 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 3 Site Area Emergency Checklist Page I of 6 (Name) (Date) (Unit)

Action Time NOTE Continue with this checklist only if the TSC Manager or EOF Director has not assumed Emergency Director responsibilities and authorities.

1.0 INITIAL ACTIONS 1.1 Announce to Control Room personnel the declaration of a Site Area Emergency (SAE) and the continuation (or assumption) of Emergency Director responsibilities by the Shift Supervisor.

1.2 Ensure the following announcement (or similar announcement) is made over the public address system using the Unit Override button:

CAUTION Public Address Announcements may be changed or delayed due to the following conditions:

Severe weather conditions which could threaten safe transport, a significant radiological hazard which could be encountered, a security threat occurring which could have an adverse impact on personnel moving around or leaving the site.

(READ SLOWLY) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL; ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED IN UNIT(S) _."

(Optional: Give brief description of the event.)

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 23 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 3 Site Area Emergency Checklist Page 2 of 6 Action Time 1.3 If Assembly and Accountability has not been completed, then determine wind direction (from) and implement Assembly and Accountability by sounding the assembly alarm for about 15 seconds and make the following announcement:

"ATTENTION. ATTENTION. ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY HAS BEEN ORDERED FOR ALL PERSONNEL IN THE PROTECTED AREA. ALL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA AND IMMEDIATELY CARD-IN ON ACCOUNTABILITY CARDREADERS. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL EXIT THE PROTECTED AREA VIA THE FOLLOWING ROUTE:

(Read one of the following as determined by wind direction [from])

[Wind Direction From: 000-0901 PERSONNEL SHOULD GO NORTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE EAST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE NUCLEAR SUPPORT CENTER. NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

OR

[Wind Direction From: 091-1801 PERSONNEL SHOULD GO SOUTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE EAST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE NUCLEAR SUPPORT CENTER. NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

OR

[Wind Direction From: 181-270] PERSONNEL SHOULD GO SOUTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE WEST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE CENTRAL PROCESSING FACILITY.

NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

OR

[Wind Direction From: 271-3591 PERSONNEL SHOULD GO NORTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE WEST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE CENTRAL PROCESSING FACILITY.

NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

(Repeat the assembly alarm and announcement as appropriate to ensure personnel accountability is complete).

OERPOI-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 24 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 3 Site Area Emergency Checklist Page 3 of 6 Action Time 1.4 Direct the Control Room Communicators or available personnel to complete the required notifications as described in OERPO 1-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies.

No PARs are required for a Site Area Emergency.

State/County shall be contacted within 15 minutes of the declaration of the SAE to make emergency notifications.

NRC notification shall be made immediately upon completion of State/County notification and not later than one hour after declaring the SAE. If more than one Communicator is available, NRC notification may be made concurrently with State/County notification.

Activate Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) at the time the NRC Operations Center is notified of the Site Area Emergency, if not previously activated.

1.5 As appropriate, upon the Onsite Communicator arrival, direct him/her to complete asterisked steps of this Checklist.

1.6 If not already accomplished, then contact the Alarm Station Operator at extension 6042 to verify Emergency Notification and Response System activation.

1.7 Instruct Plant Operators that have not been assigned tasks to proceed to the OSC for Accountability and remain there to support OSC operations.

Ensure Plant Operators that remain under Control Room direction obtain an electronic dosimeter.

1.8 Contact the STP Coordinator (QSE) and advise him/her of the nature of the emergency.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 25 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 3 Site Area Emergency Checklist Page 4 of 6 Action Time 1.9 Verify that the following on-shift personnel have responded to their emergency duty station:

Onsite Communicator (Control Room)

State/County Communicator (Control Room)

ENS Communicator (Control Room)

Shift Technical Advisor (Control Room)

Acting Radiological Manager

Acting OSC Coordinator

Acting Security Manager 1.10 If the event is radiologically based and the TSC HVAC has not been transferred to emergency/isolation mode, Then:

1.10.1 Place the affected Unit's TSC HVAC System in emergency/isolation mode or verify automatic transfer has occurred using OPOP02-HE-0002, TSC HVAC System.

1.10.2 Contact the unaffected Unit's Shift Supervisor and recommend placing the unaffected Unit's TSC HVAC in emergency/isolation mode.

1.11 If site evacuation has not been completed, then implement OERPO 1-ZV-lN05, Site Evacuation upon completion of Assembly and Accountability.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 26 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 3 Site Area Emergency Checklist Page 5 of 6 Action Time 2.0 SPECIAL ACTIONS 2.1 Consider restricting hand held radio transmissions during security events LOG that include explosive or electronic controlled devices.

2.2 Personnel Emergencies 2.2.1 Implement OPOP04-ZO-0004, Personnel Emergencies. LOG 2.3 Radiological Release Occurring or Imminent 2.3.1 Direct all Plant Operators to report to the 41' RCA Access Control Point and obtain an electronic dosimeter.

2.3.2 Direct the Dose Assessment Specialist in the EOF to perform dose projections. If the Dose Assessment Specialist is not available, then direct the Acting Radiological Manager to perform the dose projections.

2.4 Toxic Gas/Chemical Release from Nearby Chemical Facilities

2.4.1 If conditions did not permit Assembly and Accountability and Evacuation, announce over the public address system for all personnel to seek shelter in buildings and turn off ventilation systems. Direct the Security Force Supervisor (Acting Security Manager) to warn personnel outside the Protected Area.

2.5 Missing Persons

2.5.1 If missing persons are discovered as a result of performing Assembly and Accountability, then contact the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) and provide names and last known locations of the missing persons. Direct the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) to form and dispatch Search and Rescue teams.

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 27 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 3 Site Area Emergency Checklist Page 6 of 6 Action Time 3.0 ONGOING ACTIONS 3.1 Continuously assess plant conditions against OERPO I -ZV-INO1, LOG Emergency Classification to determine if changes to the current emergency classification are warranted.

3.2 Evaluate the adequacy of the current Operations staffing and request LOG assistance from the unaffected Unit and/or call out additional personnel.

3.3 Make periodic site public address announcements of the status of the LOG emergency including any radiological hazard precautions.

3.4 Until relieved as the Emergency Director, update off-site agencies (State, LOG County, BRC) about hourly (or more frequently if warranted) on the status of the emergency.

Maintain an Emergency Action Log.

4.0 FOLLOWING EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TURNOVER TO THE TSC MANAGER

Maintain ENS communications with the NRC if requested.

Advise the Emergency Director of conditions which may change the emergency classification.

Periodically brief the Control Room staff of the status of the emergency and ongoing repair efforts.

Keep Plant Operators in the field advised of plant status and radiological conditions as applicable.

Review and approve press releases as applicable.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 28 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 4 General Emergency Checklist Page I of 6 (Name) (Date) (Unit)

Action Time NOTE Continue with this checklist only if the TSC Manager or EOF Director has not assumed Emergency Director responsibilities and authorities.

1.0 INITIAL ACTIONS 1.1 Announce to Control Room personnel the declaration of a General Emergency (GE) and the continuation (or assumption) of Emergency Director responsibilities by the Shift Supervisor.

1.2 Ensure the following announcement (or similar announcement) is made over the public address system using the Unit Override button:

CAUTION Public Address Announcements may be changed or delayed due to the following conditions:

Severe weather conditions which could threaten safe transport, a significant radiological hazard which could be encountered, a security threat occurring which could have an adverse impact on personnel moving around or leaving the site.

(READ SLOWLY) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL; ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A GENERAL EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED IN UNIT(S) _." (Optional: Give brief description of the event.)

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 29 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 4 General Emergency Checklist Page 2 of 6 Action Time 1.3 If Assembly and Accountability has not been completed, then determine wind direction (from) and implement Assembly and Accountability by sounding the assembly alarm for about 15 seconds and make the following announcement:

"ATTENTION. ATTENTION. ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY HAS BEEN ORDERED FOR ALL PERSONNEL IN THE PROTECTED AREA. ALL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA AND IMMEDIATELY CARD-IN ON ACCOUNTABILITY CARDREADERS. ALL OTHER PERSONNEL EXIT THE PROTECTED AREA VIA THE FOLLOWING ROUTE:

(Read one of the following as determined by wind direction [from])

[Wind Direction From: 000-0901 PERSONNEL SHOULD GO NORTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE EAST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE NUCLEAR SUPPORT CENTER. NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

OR

[Wind Direction From: 091-1801 PERSONNEL SHOULD GO SOUTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE EAST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE NUCLEAR SUPPORT CENTER. NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

OR (Wind Direction From: 181-2701 PERSONNEL SHOULD GO SOUTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE WEST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE CENTRAL PROCESSING FACILITY.

NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

OR

[Wind Direction From: 271-359] PERSONNEL SHOULD GO NORTH OF UNITS 1 AND 2 AND EXIT THE WEST GATEHOUSE, AND ASSEMBLE IN THE CENTRAL PROCESSING FACILITY.

NO EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, OR CHEWING IS ALLOWED BY EVACUEES."

(Repeat the assembly alarm and announcement as appropriate to ensure personnel accountability is complete).

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 30 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 4 General Emergency Checklist Page 3 of 6 Action Time 1.4 Direct the Control Room Communicators or available personnel to complete the required notifications as described in OERPOI-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies.

State/County shall be contacted within 15 minutes of the declaration of the GE to make emergency notifications.

NRC notification shall be made immediately upon completion of State/County notification and not later than one hour after declaring the GE. If more than one Communicator is available, NRC notification may be made concurrently with State/County notification.

Activate Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) at the time the NRC Operations Center is notified of the GE, if not previously activated.

1.5 Instruct Plant Operators that have not been assigned tasks to proceed to the OSC for Accountability and remain there to support OSC operations.

Ensure Plant Operators that remain under Control Room direction obtain an electronic dosimeter.

1.6 PAR development is expected to be made promptly following indications that conditions have exceeded Protective Action Guides (PAGs). PARs shall be developed within 15 minutes of initial indications.

1.6.1 IF a radiological release is in progress, AND time does not permit the calculation and evaluation of downwind doses OR personnel are not available to complete these calculations, then determine the Protective Action Recommendation using Addendum 1, Initial Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart.

1.6.2 IF a radiological release is NOT in progress, THEN determine the PAR using Addendum 2, Core/Containment Status Table.

OERPOI-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 31 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 4 General Emergency Checklist Page 4 of 6 Action Time 1.6.3 IF a radiological release IS in progress, AND Computerized Dose Assessment is available, THEN obtain the Protective Action Recommendation from the printout.

1.6.4 IF a radiological release is in progress, AND Computerized Dose Assessment is NOT available, THEN use manual dose assessment, actual field readings, or release rates to determine the Protective Action Recommendation using Addendum 3, Radiological Release Table.

1.6.5 IF dose assessment results indicate 2 1 rem TEDE or 2 5 rem Thyroid CDE (PAGs) are exceeded at 10 miles, and field team measurements verify projected dose, THEN recommend evacuation of 10 mile radius and downwind sectors greater than 10-miles in 2-mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

1.6.6 Determine affected downwind sectors and zones using Addendum 4, Protective Response Zones.

1.7 As appropriate, upon the Onsite Communicator arrival, direct him/her to complete the asterisked steps of this Checklist.

1.8 If not already accomplished, then contact the Alarm Station Operator at extension 6042 to verify Emergency Notification and Response activation.

1.9 Contact the STP Coordinator (QSE) and advise him/her of the nature of the emergency.

1.10 Verify that the following on-shift personnel have responded to their emergency duty station:

State/County Communicator (Control Room)

ENS Communicator (Control Room)

Shift Technical Advisor (Control Room)

Acting Radiological Manager

Acting OSC Coordinator

Acting Security Manager

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 32 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 4 General Emergency Checklist Page 5 of 6 Action Time 1.11 If the event is radiologically based:

1.11.1 Place the affected Unit's TSC HVAC System in emergency/isolation mode or verify automatic transfer has occurred using OPOP02-HE-0002, TSC HVAC System.

1.11.2 Contact the unaffected Shift Supervisor and recommend placing the unaffected Unit's TSC HVAC in emergency/isolation mode.

1.11.3 Direct the Dose Assessment Specialist in the EOF to perform dose projections. If the Dose Assessment Specialist is not available, then direct the Acting Radiological Manager to perform dose projections.

1.12 If site evacuation has not been completed, then implement OERPO1-ZV-IN05, Site Evacuation upon completion of Assembly and Accountability.

2.0 SPECIAL ACTIONS 2.1 Consider restricting hand held radio transmissions during security events LOG that include explosive or electronic controlled devices.

2.2 Personnel Emergencies 2.2.1 Implement OPOP04-ZO-0004, Personnel Emergencies. LOG 2.3 Missing Persons

2.3.1 If missing persons are discovered as a result of performing Assembly and Accountability, then contact the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) and provide names and last known locations of the missing persons. Direct the Duty Maintenance Supervisor (Acting OSC Coordinator) to form and dispatch Search and Rescue teams.

3.0 ONGOING ACTIONS 3.1 Continuously assess plant conditions against OERP0l-ZV-IN0l, LOG Emergency Classification to determine if changes to the current emergency classification are warranted.

OERPO1-ZV-SHOI Rev. 18 Page 33 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 4 General Emergency Checklist Page 6 of 6 Action Time 3.2 Evaluate the adequacy of the current Operations staffing and request LOG assistance from the unaffected Unit and/or call out additional personnel.

3.3 Make periodic site public address announcements of the status of the LOG emergency including any radiological hazard precautions.

3.4 Until relieved as the Emergency Director, update off-site agencies (State, LOG County, BRC) about hourly (or more frequently if warranted) on the status of the emergency.

3.5 Keep Plant Operators advised of Plant Status and radiological conditions LOG as applicable.

3.6 Review and approve press releases as applicable. LOG 3.7 If severe reactor core damage is identified, then implement procedure LOG OERPO1-ZV-TP03, Severe Accident Management.

Maintain an Emergency Action Log.

4.0 FOLLOWING EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TURNOVER TO THE TSC MANAGER

Maintain ENS communications with the NRC if requested.

Advise the Emergency Director of conditions which may change the classification of the emergency.

Periodically brief the Control Room staff of the status of the emergency and ongoing repair efforts.

OERPO1-ZV-SHO1 Rev. 18 Page 34 of 34 Shift Supervisor Data Sheet 5 Termination Checklist Page I of I (Name) (Date) (Unit)

Action Time 1.0 TERMINATION ACTIONS 1.1 Announce termination of the emergency condition over the public address system.

1.2 Complete notifications to offsite agencies per OERPO 1-ZV-IN02, Notifications to Offsite Agencies, if applicable.

1.3 For termination of an Unusual Event, notify all individuals notified on declaration of the event that the event is terminated.

1.4 Determine if Fitness for Duty post-accident screening should be initiated per OPGP09-ZA-0002, Fitness For Duty Program.

1.5 Provide a list of any supplies or forms needing replenishment to the Supervisor, Emergency Response.

1.6 Develop a list of activities and tasks which should be completed using OERPO1-ZV-RE02, Form 1, Corrective Action Items List.

1.6.1 Collect the lists developed by the Acting Radiological Manager, Acting Security Manager, and the Acting OSC Coordinator. Review the lists and forward them to the Manager, Emergency Response.

1.7 Following termination from an Unusual Event, collect all logs and data sheets pertaining to the event and forward to the Supervisor, Emergency Response.

1.8 Following termination from an Alert or higher classification, forward all control room documentation to the Assistant TSC Manager.

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION D0527 STI 31663158 OERPO1-ZV-TPO l Rev. 14 l Page I of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Quality Non Safety-Related Usage: N/A Effective Date: 10/16/03 Max Keycs N/A N/A Emergcncy Responsc Division PREPARER TECHNICAL USER COGNIZANT ORGANIZATION Table of Contents Page

1. 0 Purpos and eScope ............................................ 2

2. 0 Definitions ............................................ 2

3. 0 Precautions and Limitations ............................................ 4

4. 0 Responsibilities ............................................ 5

5. 0 Procedure ............................................ 5

6. 0 References ............................................ 6

7. 0 Support Documents ............................................ 6 Form 1, Offsite Dose Calculations Transmittal Form (Sample) ........................... 7.................7 Addendum 1, Offsite Dose Calculation Input Worksheet ............................................. 8 Addendum 2, UFSAR Accident Assumptions ............................................ 10 Addendum 3, Use of OPDA Program ............................................ 11 Addendum 4, Containment Leakage Nomograph ............................................ 12 Addendum 5, Use of STAMPEDE Program ............................................ 15 Addendum 6, Emergency Dose Rate Tables ............................................ 16 Addendum 7, Method Selection Flowchart ............................................ 24

I OERPO1-ZV-TPOI I Rev. 14 l Page 2of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.1 This procedure provides instructions for performing offsite dose calculations by estimating offsite dose rates and integrated doses to the general public during a declared event when radioactive material is released from the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS).

1.2 Methods that may be used for dose calculations included in this procedure are STAMPEDE, Emergency Dose Rate Tables, and OPDA.

1.3 This procedure implements the requirements of the STPEGS Emergency Plan specific to calculating offsite doses to the General Public.

2.0 Definitions 2.1 ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASS: A letter designator indicating the relative stability or instability of an air mass.

2.2 DEFAULT RELEASE DURATION - The amount of time in hours, automatically used by dose projection programs as the release duration. This default value is selected to best characterize release duration based on maximum evacuation times and historical meteorological data.

2.3 DELTA TEMPERATURE: The temperature differential measured between the 60 meter and 10 meter levels of the primary meteorological tower ( 60 m (1F) - 10 m (1F)).

2.4 GROUND LEVEL RELEASE: All releases at the STPEGS are assumed to be best modeled as though at ground level and are dispersed based on 10 meter meteorological data.

2.5 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION METHODS:

2.5.1 South Texas Assessment Model Projecting Emergency Dose Evaluation (STAMPEDE)

A computer program used to perform offsite dose calculations, TEDE dose rates, inhalation thyroid CDE dose rates and doses integrated through the duration of the release are calculated.

I OERPO1-ZV-TPOI I Rev. 14 l Page3of24 Offsite Dose Calculations 2.5.2 Emergency Dose Rate Tables Tables which predict TEDE and thyroid CDE dose rates at 1 to 10 miles from the STPEGS are based on an estimated release rate (iiCilsec) and the atmospheric stability class (A through G). The default isotopic mix was based on a gap inventory using STAMPEDE. Wind speed varies per stability class as indicated on each table.

2.5.3 Onshift Prompt Dose Assessment (OPDA)

A computerized calculation program which operates in a Windows environment to estimate TEDE and thyroid CDE dose based on an estimated release rate (jtCi/sec), atmospheric stability class and release pathway. This method may be used by onshift Health Physics technicians in performing a prompt dose assessment.

2.6 HATCH MONITOR: Temporary monitor installed when Containment Monitors RT-8050 and RT-805 1 are out of service. A correction factor has been calculated to relate Hatch Monitor dose rate to dose rate inside containment. Reference 6.6 2.7 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION: A calculation of the estimated offsite dose to the general public based on releases of radioactive material, meteorological conditions, time since reactor shutdown, and the expected release duration. The offsite dose calculation is helpful in formulating offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PAR).

2.8 PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDE (PAG): An action to be taken to avoid or reduce a projected dose as identified in EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents.

2.9 RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE: Any radiological release from the plant that exceeds the EAL limits established for an Unusual Event.

2.10 SIGMA-THETA: A method to assign atmospheric stability classes based on the standard deviation of the wind direction in degrees ()*.

2.11 SOURCE TERM: With respect to offsite dose calculations, the characteristics and release rates of the radioactive material.

I OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 I Rev. 14 l Page4of24 Offsite Dose Calculations 3.0 Precautions and Limitations 3.1 For Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) events with 100% S/G water level, the steam flow reported on the Integrated Computer System (ICS) will be high and result in an over conservative PAR. Use the default MSL flow rate specified by the dose assessment program.

3.2 The dose projection capabilities of all methods depend upon models that become less exact at greater distances from the release point.

3.3 When collecting wind speed and wind direction meteorological data from the primary or backup meteorological tower, or the National Weather Service Forecast Office, care must be taken to ensure that a 15 minute average value is used in dose calculations and not an instantaneous value.

3.4 Regional meteorological data may be required to help evaluate offsite dose calculations.

This information can be obtained from the National Weather Service in Dickinson, Texas.

The types of information that can be obtained include temperature, wind speed, wind direction, cloud height, and cloud cover. As time permits, forecast data may be used to supplement dose projections.

3.5 Default parameters are built into the STAMPEDE program for ground wind velocity, ground level wind direction, and atmospheric stability class. These parameters are displayed on screen while working with STAMPEDE.

3.6 IF dose assessment results indicate Protective Action Guides (PAGs) exceeded at >10 miles, AND the Emergency Director resides in the affected Unit Control Room, THEN as available, verify dose assessment results with field teams and notify the Emergency Director. Discuss with the Emergency Director expanded PARs for downwind sectors >10 miles in 2 mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

3.7 IF dose assessment results indicate PAGs exceeded at >10 miles, AND the Emergency Director resides in the TSC, THEN verify dose assessment results with field teams and notify the Radiological Manager. Discuss with the Radiological Manager expanded PARs for downwind sectors >10 miles in 2 mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

3.8 IF dose assessment results indicate PAGs exceeded at >10 miles, AND the Emergency Director resides in the EOF, THEN verify dose assessment results with field teams and notify the Radiological Director. Discuss with the Radiological Director expanded PARs for downwind sectors >10 miles in 2 mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

lIl OERIPO1-ZV-TPO1 I Rev. 14 l Page 5of24 Offsite Dose Calculations 3.9 If multiple release paths are indicated by elevated radiological monitor readings, then calculate each pathway and sum result. (Example: Two S/G Tube Ruptures with two stuck open PORV's results in the following - Calculate Main Steam Line Monitors RT-8046 and RT-8049 and sum results).

4.0 Responsibilities 4.1 Prior to activation of the TSC or EOF, the Acting Radiological Manager is responsible for implementation of this procedure (i.e., Onshift Dose Assessment). Offsite dose calculation results shall be provided to the Emergency Director.

4.2 Upon activation of the TSC, the Radiological Manager is responsible for implementation of this procedure. Offsite dose calculation results shall be provided to the Emergency Director.

4.3 Upon activation of the EOF, the Radiological Director is responsible for implementation of this procedure. The Dose Assessment Specialist shall perform offsite dose calculations as directed by the Radiological Director and provide results.

4.4 Offsite dose calculations are updated as requested by the Emergency Director, Radiological Manager, or Radiological Director.

5.0 Procedure 5.1 Use the appropriate sections of Addendum 1, Offsite Dose Calculation Input Worksheet, as needed, to perform offsite dose calculations.

5.2 Review Addendum 2, UFSAR Accident Assumptions, as necessary.

5.3 Select the appropriate Dose Assessment tool using Addendum 7, Method Selection Flowchart.

5.4 Changes to any of the following parameters requires additional offsite dose calculations:

5.4.1 Increased release rates or wind speed (that add additional zones downwind) 5.4.2 Wind direction (that add additional zones) 5.4.3 Atmospheric stability classification (that add additional zones) 5.5 If a prompt dose assessment is required from onshift Health Physics personnel, the OPDA program as described in Addendum 3, Use of OPDA Program, may be used. The program is available in both unit Control Rooms and at the 41 ft. Health Physics control point, and can be run by double-clicking on the OPDA icon and inputting the requested data.

I OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 I Rev. 14 1 Page 6 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations 5.6 IF the type of accident is a Loss of Coolant Accident, Fuel Handling Accident inside the Reactor Containment Building, Control Rod Ejection or Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Seizure and Containment Leakage directly to the environment is the release pathway, THEN Addendum 4, Containment Leakage Nomograph, may be used to estimate containment source term in the absence of better indications of a release.

5.7 STAMPEDE may be used for performing offsite dose calculations, implement Addendum 5, Use of STAMPEDE Program.

5.8 IF all computer based dose assessment methods are unavailable, THEN implement Addendum 6, Emergency Dose Rate Tables.

5.9 Complete Form 1, Offsite Dose Calculations Transmittal Form.

6.0 References 6.1 STPEGS Emergency Plan 6.2 OERPOI-ZV-EF15, Dose Assessment Specialist 6.3 OERP01-ZV-1N07, Offsite Protective Action Recommendations 6.4 OPGP05-ZV-0004, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Users Guide 6.5 ZV-0001, STAMPEDE Users Manual 6.6 03-ZE-003, RT8050/RT8051 Contingency Conversion Constant for Post-Accident Failed Fuel Monitoring 7.0 Support Documents 7.1 Form 1, Offsite Dose Calculations Transmittal Form (Sample) 7.2 Addendum 1, Offsite Dose Calculation Input Worksheet 7.3 Addendum 2, UFSAR Accident Assumptions 7.4 Addendum 3, Use of OPDA Program 7.5 Addendum 4, Containment Leakage Nomograph 7.6 Addendum 5, Use of STAMPEDE Program 7.7 Addendum 6, Emergency Dose Rate Tables 7.8 Addendum 7, Method Selection Flowchart

OERPO1-ZV-TPOl Rev. 14 Page 7of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Form 1 Offsite Dose Calculations Transmittal Form (Sample) l Page I of I RESULTS Method of Projection:

E STAMPEDE OPDA El EMERGENCY DOSE RATE TABLES Offsite Dose Projection:

1 mile 2 mile 5 mile 10 mile TEDE (Rem)

CDE (Rem)

Projected duration of release IF dose assessment results indicate PAGs exceeded at >10 miles, AND the Emergency Director resides in the TSC, THEN verify dose assessment results with field teams and notify the Radiological Manager. Discuss with the Radiological Manager expanded PARs for downwind sectors >10 miles in 2 mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

IF dose assessment results indicate PAGs exceeded at >10 miles, AND the Emergency Director resides in the EOF, THEN verify dose assessment results with field teams and notify the Radiological Director. Discuss with the Radiological Director expanded PARs for downwind sectors >10 miles in 2 mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

PERFORMED BY:

Name Date/Time REVIEWED BY:

Radiological Director Date/Time

OERPOI-ZV-TPOl I Rev. 14 l Page8of24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 1 Offsite Dose Calculation Input Worksheet Page I of 2 1.0 Atmospheric Stability Classification Stability Classification Class Delta T (60m-1Om)°F *Sigma-Theta Extremely Unstable A < -1.71 > 22.5 Moderately Unstable B -1.71 to -1.53 17.5 to 22.5 Slightly Unstable C -1.52 to -1.35 12.5 to 17.5 Neutral D -1.34 to -0.45 7.5 to 12.5 Slightly Stable E -0.44 to 1.35 3.8 to 7.5 Moderately Stable F 1.36 to 3.60 2.1 to 3.8 Extremely Stable G > 3.60 <2.1

Do not use Sigma-Theta if wind speed is less than 5 mph, use default Stability Class D.

2.0 Estimating Release Rates:

2.1 If the release point is the unit vent 2.1.1 The release rate can be obtained from the RM-1 1 channel (1 or 2) UV6 10.

2.1.2 If the Unit Vent release rate channel is unavailable, the following calculation applies

=__ __ __ __ _ _ _ x _ _ _ x Release Rate = Flow Rate x Concentration x Conversion Factor (pCilsec) (scfm) (1iCi/cc) (4.72 E + 2) 2.2 If the release point is the Main Steam Line PORV or Safety Valve, either of the following calculations applies.

NOTE Use .2% Iodine for coolant leakage through the S/G.

2.2.1

-= x x Release Rate = MSL Flow x MSL Activity x Conversion Factor (ItCi/Sec) (lb. mass/hr) (iPCi/cc) (2.54)

ICS (FW Display) RT-8046-49 FW-15

OERPOI-ZV-TPOl I Rev. 14 Page 9 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 1 Offsite Dose Calculation Input Worksheet Page 2 of 2 2.2.2

=__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ x x Release Rate = Primary to Secondary x RCS Activity x Conversion Factor (pCilSec) Leak Rate (PiCi/mil) (63.08)

(GPM) 2.3 If the release point is containment leaking directly to the environment then either estimate the release rate from field team data or use the containment leakage nomograph, Addendum 4 (if the proper conditions apply).

3.0 Release Estimates From Field Radiological Data: _____ Time Location Date Time Location NOTE Field measurements taken off centerline of the plume will not estimate source terms accurately using this method.

This method will underestimate the release rate if particulates and lodines are present.

3.1 Release estimates from DDE (Deep Dose Equivalent) dose rates taken in plume

a. Determine DDE dose rate at plume centerline mrem/hour.

b. Approximate distance downwind that the measurement in Step a. was made miles.

c. Use STAMPEDE to perform the following steps.

1. Enter the appropriate meteorological data.

2. Select the Field Data option.

3. Enter the approximate distance and dose rate estimated in Steps a. and b.

above.

4. The estimated release rate is . Use this value to reexamine emergency classification and PARs.

d. Perform additional calculations as necessary to correct for wind speed.

II OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 I Rev. 14 l Page 10 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 2 l UFSAR Accident Assumptions I Page I of I Type of Accident UFSAR Section/Table Release Locations LOCA 15.6.5/15.6-10 RCB Leakage Unit Vent Fuel Handling Accident 15.7.4/15.7-9 RCB Leakage Unit Vent Parameters For Other Accidents Listed Below: Misc. Chapter 15 As Indicated Below Mainsteam Line Break 15.1.5/15.1-2 Turbine Building Isolation Valve Cubicles Locked Rotor 15.3.3/15.3-3 RCB Leakage Unit Vent (*)

RCCA Ejection 15.4.8/15.4-4 RCB Leakage Unit Vent (*)

CVCS Letdown Line Break 15.6.2/15.6-13 Unit Vent Outside RCB Steam Generator Tube Rupture 15.6.2/15.6-13 PORV's Turbine Building Isolation Valve Cubicles Unit Vent Recycle Holdup Tank Rupture 15.7.1/15.7-1 Unit Vent Liquid Tank Rupture 15.7-2 Ground Seepage Unit Vent

(*) IF primary-to-secondary leakage is present, THEN the Turbine Building, Isolation Valve Cubicles, and Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) are additional release points.

OERPO1-ZV-TPOI I Rev. 14 l Page 11 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 3 l Use of OPDA Program I Page I of I OPDA is a computerized calculation loaded into selected computers at STPEGS. The Met Data entry button allows the operator to set the stability class, affected zones and sectors by entering a delta temperature and wind direction. If the release rate is known, push Unit Vent Release button, enter the monitored release rate, and push the Calculate Projection button. If the release rate is not know but may be estimated from other information, select the most appropriate of the following buttons:

MAJOR LEAK FROM RCB

S/G TUBE RUPTURE

SLOW PRESSURE DROP - RCB After entering the required information, click on the Calculate Projection button.

The results are displayed for review. They may be printed if a printer is available by selecting the Print button.

IF dose assessment results indicate Protective Action Guides (PAGs) exceeded at >10 miles, AND the Emergency Director resides in the affected Unit Control Room, THEN as available, verify dose assessment results with field teams and notify the Emergency Director. Discuss with the Emergency Director expanded PARs for downwind sectors >10 miles in 2 mile increments until PAGs are not exceeded.

I NOTE Four hours is automatically used by the OPDA dose projection programs for the release duration.

I OERPO1-ZV-TPOl I Rev. 14 l Page 12 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 4 T Containment Leakage Nomograph I Page I of 3

1. The containment activity concentration may be estimated by use of the High Range Containment Monitor (RT-8050, RT-805 1 or Hatch Monitor):

RT-8050 R/hr @Time RT-8051 R/hr @Time Hatch Monitor mR/hr x .450 = CTMT R/hr @ Time

2. Time after reactor trip (in hours):

3. Estimate the release rate by recording the initial pressure in containment:

a. Record the initial pressure and time [ICS Screen Z]

pressure PI _ _ atT,

b. Record the subsequent pressure and time [ICS Screen Z]

pressure P2 _ _ at T2 -

Calculate pressure drop:

P - P2 = P Calculate time in hours:

T2 _ T _ = T(hrs)

c. IF a decrease in pressure is recorded, AND containment spray is NOT in progress, THEN calculate decrease in pressure per hour:

P/ . T(hrs) = P/hr

4. Using the Containment Leakage Nomograph (page 3 of 3), connect point for radiation level on line A THRU time after reactor trip on line B, to concentration (Ci/m 3 or JtCi/cc) on line C. Connect point on line C THRU point on line D (decrease in pressure per hour) to value on line E (ttCi/sec release rate).

5. Complete dose projections using Addendum 5, Use of STAMPEDE Program or Addendum 6, Emergency Dose Rate Tables.

I OERPO1-ZV-TPOI Rev. 14 Page 13 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 4 1 Containment Leakage Nomograph I Page 2 of 3 EXAMPLE CALCULATIONS:

EXAMPLE NUMBER 1

1. Data: RT-8050/8051 = 2E+4 R/hr, 10 hrs after reactor trip.

No RCB pressure decreases A C are noted!

Find: RT-8050 reading of 2E+4 R/hr on A scale, and 10 hrs on B scale. Connect the two points with a straight line through C scale to find 2000 Ci/m 3 (2000 piCi/cc). Connect the point at 2000 Ci/m3 to FSAR LEAK LIMIT (0.3% containment volume/day) on D scale. Extend line from C scale through D scale to read 4.0E+6 J4Ci/sec release rate.

2. Data: RT-8050/8051 = l.lE+2 R/hr, EXAMPLE NUMBER 2 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after the reactor trip, with 0.1 psi pressure drop per hour. A C E Find: 1.1E+2 R/hr on A scale. Draw a

\ 0 line through 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months on B scale to find 5 Ci/m3 (5 iiCi/cc) on C scale.

Connect the point from C scale through 0.1 psi/hr on D scale to find 1E+6 pCi/sec release rate on E scale.

IOERPO1-ZV-TPO1 l Rev. 14 l Page 14 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 4 l Containment Leakage Nomograph I Page 3 of 3 SOURCE TERM ESTIMATOR A C E RM-1 1 Fission RA-8050/8051 Product Release Rote Concentration R/Hr Ci/m 3 I.iCi/sec B 'il- I/CC D 1.0 E+1- _ -T- 10000 -T 1.0 E+5 Containment TIME AFTER Pressure REACTOR TRIP -4000 Differential TOTAL HOURS -2000 A P/hr 1.0 E+2 - - - 1000 FSAR - - 1.0 E+6

-LEAK LIMIT -

-400

-0.01 244-

-200

- 14 1.0 E+3 - 10- -100 - 1.0 E+7 1-

8 i -0.1 -

-O

-40

-1.0

-20

-10.0 -

1.0 E+4 -_ -10 ' 1.0 E+8 D

-4 B -2 1.0 E+5 -1.0 - 1.0 E+9

-0.4

-0.2 1.0 E+6 - _J -0.1 _ 1.0 E+1 0 A C E CD100580 oal3=00 I WARNING I I Do NOT use this Nomograph greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after reactor shutdown due to isotopic decay.

OERPO1-ZV-TPOl I Rev. 14 l Page 15 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 5 Use of STAMPEDE Program Page I of I 1.0 The STAMPEDE computer program and its associated data tables are loaded on the LAN and onto selected computers at STPEGS and the Texas Bureau of Radiation Control. The program is accessed from the MicroSoft Windows display by clicking on the appropriate icon.

2.0 Although the code is generally self-explanatory. Detailed operating instructions (User Manual) are located at each work station as an aid to operation. Default values are provided for all entries should actual data not be available.

3.0 Should the work area require evacuation, stored data should be copied to a diskette transported and loaded into a computer at an alternate location as described in Desktop Guide Instruction ZV-0001, STAMPEDE Users Manual.

U I OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 Rev. 14 Page 16 of 24 U Ii l ~~OERP01-ZV-TPOI I Rev. 14 l Page 16of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 Emergency Dose Rate Tables Page 1of 8 I-1.0 Use the following Emergency Dose Rate Table that corresponds to the current stability class.

[DEFAULT: Stability Class D]

2.0 Locate the TEDE and thyroid CDE dose rate (Rem/hr) for the one, two, five and ten-mile radii that corresponds to the release rate.

3.0 Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

4.0 Data in the tables was generated by STAMPEDE, Revision 7.0, using the GAP Inventory at time 00:00 after reactor trip.

I OERPO1-ZV-TPOl Rev. 14 Page 17 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 l Emergency Dose Rate Tables I Page 2 of 8 STABILITY CLASS A Delta T OF < -1.71 DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE

([tCi/sec) 1.OOE+06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00E+06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00E+08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+08 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.OOE+09 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 2.OOE+09 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 4.00E+09 0.12 0.50 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.05 1.OOE+10 0.29 1.20 0.14 0.62 0.05 0.24 0.02 0.12 2.00E+10 0.58 2.44 0.27 1.26 0.10 0.49 0.04 0.23 4.OOE+10 1.16 4.76 0.54 2.45 0.19 0.96 0.08 0.46 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 14.8 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

I OERPO1-ZV-TPOl Rev. 14 l Page 18 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 l Emergency Dose Rate Tables I Page 3 of 8 STABILITY CLASS B (Delta T0 F -1.71 to -1.53)

DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE

([iCi/sec) 1.00E+06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00E+06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+06 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+08 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+08 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+08 0.09 0.38 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.OOE+09 0.22 0.92 0.05 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 2.OOE+09 0.43 1.78 0.09 0.43 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 4.OOE+09 0.86 3.62 0.19 0.88 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.06 1.OOE+10 2.17 9.29 0.48 2.25 0.06 0.34 0.03 0.16 2.OOE+10 4.31 17.94 0.94 4.35 0.13 0.66 0.05 0.31 4.OOE+10 8.65 36.49 1.90 8.85 0.25 1.33 0.11 0.62 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 14.2 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 Rev. 14 Page 19 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 Emergency Dose Rate Tables Page 4 of 8 STABILITY CLASS C (Delta T °F -1.52 to -1.35)

NOTE IF the release rate is between two values, THEN interpolate.

DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE (pCi/sec) .

1.OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00E+06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+07 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+07 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+08 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+08 0.12 0.50 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 4.OOE+08 0.24 1.01 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 1.OOE+09 0.59 2.45 0.15 0.68 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.03 2.OOE+09 1.18 5.01 0.29 1.38 0.04 0.23 0.01 0.06 4.OOE+09 2.33 9.70 0.58 2.68 0.09 0.45 0.02 0.11 1.OOE+10 5.88 25.04 1.47 6.91 0.22 1.16 0.05 0.29 2.00E+10 11.80 50.75 2.96 14.01 0.44 2.35 0.10 0.58 4.OOE+10 23.43 98.62 5.84 27.23 0.86 4.57 0.20 1.13 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 13.6 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

OERPOl-ZV-TPOl I Rev. 14 l Page 20 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 Emergency Dose Rate Tables I Page 5 of 8 STABILITY CLASS D (Delta T °F -1.34 to -0.45)

DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE (PCi/sec) l .OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+07 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+07 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+07 0.08 0.33 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 1.OOE+08 0.19 0.80 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 2.OOE+08 0.39 1.65 0.12 0.58 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.04 4.OOE+08 0.78 3.34 0.25 1.18 0.05 0.27 0.02 0.09 1.OOE+09 1.95 8.15 0.62 2.87 0.12 0.66 0.04 0.21 2.OOE+09 3.86 16.35 1.23 5.76 0.25 1.33 0.07 0.42 4.OOE+09 7.75 33.18 2.47 11.69 0.50 2.70 0.15 0.86 1.OOE+10 19.23 80.62 6.08 28.40 1.23 6.56 0.36 2.09 2.OOE+10 38.72 161.74 12.34 58.38 2.52 13.49 0.74 4.30 4.00E+10 77.75 336.78 24.88 118.62 5.10 27.42 1.44 8.73 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 13.2 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

l OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 Rev. 14 Page 21 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 Emergency Dose Rate Tables Page 6 of 8 STABILITY CLASS E (Delta T 0F -0.44 to 1.35)

NOTE IF the release rate is between two values, THEN interpolate.

DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE (piCi/sec) 11.OOE+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00E+05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+06 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00E+06 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00E+06 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+07 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 2.OOE+07 0.09 0.42 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 4.OOE+07 0.18 0.83 0.06 0.31 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 1.OOE+08 0.46 2.12 0.15 0.78 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.07 2.00E+08 0.92 4.16 0.30 1.54 0.07 0.38 0.02 0.13 4.OOE+08 1.85 8.47 0.61 3.130 0.13 0.78 0.04 0.27 1.OOE+09 4.56 20.47 1.49 7.57 0.32 1.88 0.10 0.64 2.00E+09 9.17 41.63 3.02 15.38 0.65 3.81 0.21 1.31 4.OOE+09 18.50 88.17 6.12 31.47 1.33 7.80 0.42 2.68 1.OOE+10 46.12 211.50 15.24 78.16 3.31 19.38 1.04 6.65 2.00E+10 91.24 411.27 29.93 151.98 6.46 37.69 2.03 12.93 4.00E+10 184.06 841.05 60.75 310.81 13.16 77.07 4.15 26.45 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 9.3 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 I Rev. 14 Page 22 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 Emergency Dose Rate Tables Page 7 of 8 STABILITY CLASS F (Delta T °F 1.36 to 3.60)

NOTE IF the release rate is between two values, THEN interpolate.

l_________________ DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE (pCi/sec) 1.001E+04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00E+04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00E+05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 2.00E+06 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 4.OOE+06 0.05 0.27 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 1.OOE+07 0.14 0.70 0.05 0.29 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 2.OOE+07 0.27 1.38 0.10 0.58 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.06 4.OOE+07 0.55 2.74 0.20 1.15 0.05 0.31 0.02 0.11 1.OOE+08 1.36 6.78 0.51 2.85 0.12 0.77 0.04 0.28 2.OOE+08 2.77 14.00 1.03 5.90 0.24 1.57 0.08 0.57 4.OOE+08 5.47 27.29 2.03 11.50 0.48 3.12 0.16 1.12 1.OOE+09 13.80 69.46 5.14 29.26 1.21 7.93 0.40 2.85 2.OOE+09 27.13 134.70 10.04 56.73 2.35 15.38 0.78 5.51 4.00E+09 54.79 274.09 20.36 115.44 4.78 31.29 1.58 11.21 1.OOE+10 138.64 699.83 51.72 294.76 12.17 79.89 4.04 28.63 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 5.9 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

II OERPO1-ZV-TPOl Rev. 14 Page 23 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 6 r Emergency Dose Rate Tables I Page 8 of 8 STABILITY CLASS G (Delta T 'F > 3.60)

DOSE RATE (Rem/hour)

Release 1 Mile 2 Mile 5 Mile 10 Mile Rate TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE TEDE CDE (pCi/sec) 1.OOE+04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.OOE+05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.OOE+05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.OOE+05 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00E+06 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 2.OOE+06 0.05 0.26 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 4.OOE+06 0.10 0.51 0.05 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 1.OOE+07 0.25 1.26 0.11 0.64 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.07 2.OOE+07 0.50 2.58 0.23 1.31 0.06 0.40 0.02 0.15 4.OOE+07 0.99 497 0.44 2.53 0.12 0.77 0.04 0.29 1.OOE+08 2.49 12.63 1.12 6.43 0.30 1.97 0.10 0.73 2.OOE+08 5.02 25.65 2.26 13.05 0.60 3.99 0.21 1.48 4.OOE+08 9.84 49.56 4.39 25.24 1.16 7.71 0.40 2.86 1.OOE+09 24.88 126.18 11.14 64.20 2.95 19.64 1.01 7.28 2.OOE+09 50.23 256.47 22.57 130.48 5.99 39.92 2.05 14.80 4.OOE+09 98.73 498.20 44.12 253.47 11.66 77.54 4.00 28.75 1.OOE+10 249.38 1267.20 111.79 644.71 29.61 197.24 10.15 73.12 TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent Wind Speed: 5.5 mph (External + Internal)

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent (Thyroid)

Multiply the dose rates by the expected duration of the release. (Use 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months release duration if actual duration not known.)

I OERPO1-ZV-TPO1 I Rev. 14 l Page 24 of 24 Offsite Dose Calculations Addendum 7 l Method Selection Flowchart I Page 1 of I IS DOSE ASSESSMENT BEING PERFORMED ONSHIFT? [ IS DOSE ASSESSMENT BEING PERFORMED IN THE TSC OR EOF?

EMERGENCY DOSE RATE TABLES

NOC-AE-03001624, Changes to Emergency Plan Procedures

Contents

Text

Enclosure:

Subject:

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.0 Purpose and Scope

2.2 Alert

2.7 Facility

2.9 Functional

5.8.2 Termination

1.0 Purpose and Scope

Description:

Description:

1.0 Purpose and Scope

2.7 SECTOR

1.0 Purpose and Scope

1.0 Purpose and Scope

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