ML23243A845

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Enclosure 3: Issuance - IP LAR for SE Renewed Facility Licenses and PDTS to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from SFPs
ML23243A845
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/2023
From: Sturzebecher K
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
To:
Holtec Decommissioning International
Sturzberger, Karl, NMSS/RDB
Shared Package
ML23242a275 List:
References
EPID L-2022-LLA-0160
Download: ML23243A845 (15)
v • d • e


Text

SAFETY EVALUATION BY

THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 299 TO RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-26

AND AMENDMENT NO. 275 TO RENEWED FACILITY LICENSE NO. DPR-64

HOLTEC DECOMMISSIONING INTERNATIONAL, LLC,

HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 2, LLC, AND HOLTEC INDIAN POINT 3, LLC

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNITS NO. 2 AND 3

DOCKET NO. 50-247 AND 50-286

1.0 FACILITY BACKGROUND

The Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) and Unit No. 3 (IP3) are located on the east bank of the Hudson River in the Village of Buchanan in upper Westchester County, New York, about 24 miles north of New York City. IP2 and IP3 are part of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 facilities, which is collectively referred to as the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC).

By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Reference 1), pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Paragraph 50.82(a)(1)(i), the licensed owner, Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (Entergy), provided formal notification to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), that they planned to permanently cease power operations at IP2 by April 30, 2020, and at IP3 on April 30, 2021. On November 21, 2019 (Reference 2), Entergy, Holtec International (Holtec), and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI) (together, the Applicants), submitted a License Transfer Application requesting NRC approval to transfer the Indian Point Renewed Facility Licenses for Units 1, 2, and 3, as well as the general license for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), to Holtec as the new licensed owner, and to HDI as the licensed Operator. By letter dated December 19, 2019 (Reference 3),

both Entergy and HDI submitted a Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) for IPEC.

Power operations ceased at IP2 on April 30, 2020, and at IP3 on April 30, 2021, and Entergy certified that all fuel was permanently removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactors and placed in the respective spent fuel pits (SFP) by letter dated May 12, 2020 (Reference 4) and May 11, 2021 (Reference 5), providing formal notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(ii). On November 23, 2020 (Reference 6), the NRC issued an order approving the license transfer and draft conforming license amendments and concluded that Holtec and HDI are financially and technically qualified to own and provide decommissioning activities for IP2 and IP3, as well as to manage the spent fuel at IPEC. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR Part 50 license for IP2 and IP3 no longer authorizes operation of the reactors, or emplacement or

Enclosure 3

retention of fuel into the reactor vessels. As stated in the current licensees PSDAR schedule, HDI has chosen the DECON method to decommission IPEC, where the activities include preparation for, and conduct of, fuel movement to the dry fuel storage facility.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated November 2, 2022 (Reference 7), HDI, on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, requested amendments to Renewed Facility License (RFL) No. DPR-26 for IP2 and RFL No. DPR-64 for IP3 to modify the RFL, the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS) in Appendix A, and the Appendix C, Inter-Unit Fuel Transfer Technical Specifications (TS), to reflect the removal of all spent fuel from the IP3 SFP.

The proposed revisions to IP2 RFL No. DPR-26 would:

  • Delete IP2 License Condition 1.J requirements for actions to manage the effects of aging during the period of extended operation on the functionality of structures and components;
  • Revise the paragraphs in 2.C.(2) with updated references, deletion of the Mitigation Strategy License Conditions, and License Renewal License Condition;
  • Rename IP2 Appendix A, Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS) to ISFSI-Only TS (IOTS); and
  • Relocate various PDTS Appendix A sections to the IP2 Defueled Safety Analysis Reports (DSAR).

The proposed revisions to IP3 RFL No. DPR-64 would:

  • Delete IP3 License Condition 1.I requirements for actions to manage the effects of aging during the period of extended operation on the functionality of structures and components;
  • Revise the paragraphs in 2.C.(2) with updated references, deletion of the Mitigation Strategy License Conditions, and License Renewal License Condition;
  • Rename of IP3 Appendix A, Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS) to IOTS;
  • Relocate various PDTS Appendix A sections to the IP3 DSAR; and
  • Delete the IP3 Appendix C TS in their entirety.

The proposed amendments to the RFLs, PDTSs, and Appendix C TS would modify the IP2 and IP3 requirements to be commensurate with the hazards associated with IP2 and IP3 having all irradiated fuel stored in approved dry casks within either of the site controlled ISFSI storage locations. The proposed amendment would also revise the IP2 and IP3 PDTSs and IP3 Appendix C TS to eliminate operational requirements. The PDTS revision includes relocation of various Appendix A sections to both IP2 and IP3 DSAR.

HDI completed the transfer of the spent fuel from the IP2 SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI on February 1, 2023 (Reference 8) and completed the transfer of the spent fuel from the IP3 SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI on October 16, 2023 (Reference 9).

3.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

This safety evaluation assesses the acceptability of the HDIs proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) based on applicable regulations for the specific modifications and deletions to the IP2 and IP3 RFL, PDTS, and the IP3 Appendix C TS. The regulatory requirements on which the NRC based its evaluation of the IP2 and IP3 changes are as follows.

3.1 Applicable Regulations

In 10 CFR 50.36, the Commission established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TS. In doing so, the Commission placed emphasis on those matters related to the prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident consequences. Specifically, the Commission noted that applicants were expected to incorporate into their TS those items that are directly related to maintaining the integrity of the physical barriers designed to contain radioactivity [see Technical Specification for Facility License; Safety Analysis Reports, 33 Federal Register (FR) 18610; December 17, 1968 (Reference 10)]. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36, TS are required to include items in the following five categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plants TS.

On July 22, 1993, the Commission published a Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (Reference 11). The Policy Statement discussed the scope and purpose of TS for nuclear power plants and included guidance criteria to be used in determining which of the LCOs and associated surveillances should remain in the TS. The Policy Statement established four criteria to define the scope of equipment and parameters to be included in the improved standard TS. These criteria were developed for licenses authorizing operation and focused on instrumentation to detect degradation of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, as well as on equipment or process variables that affect the integrity of fission product barriers during design basis accidents (DBAs) or transients.

The fourth criterion refers to the use of operating experience and probabilistic risk assessment to identify, and include in the TS, those SSCs shown to be significant to public health and safety. These criteria, codified by a revision to 10 CFR 50.36 (60 FR 36953; July 19, 1995), are the source of the TS requirements for facilities licensed under 10 CFR Part 50. A general discussion of these considerations is below.

Criterion 1 at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(A) states that TS LCOs must be established for installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Since the IPEC facility no longer has fuel in the reactor and is no longer licensed to operate, this criterion is not applicable.

Criterion 2 at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(B) states that TS LCOs must be established for a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a DBA or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. The purpose of this criterion is to capture those process variables that have initial values assumed in the DBA and transient analyses, and which are monitored and controlled during power operation. Since the IPEC facility no longer has fuel in the reactor

vessel and is no longer licensed to operate, this criterion is not applicable.

Criterion 3 at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(C) states that TS LCOs must be established for SSCs that are part of the primary success path and which function or actuate to mitigate a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. The intent of this criterion is to capture into the TS those SSCs that are part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis. The primary success path of a safety sequence analysis consists of combinations and sequences of equipment needed to operate (including consideration of the single failure criterion), so that the plant response to DBAs and transients limits the consequences of these events to within the appropriate acceptance criteria.

Since fuel will have been removed from the reactor vessel and SFP at the IPEC facility prior to implementation of this amendment, this criterion is not applicable.

Criterion 4 at 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(D) states that TS LCOs must be established for SSCs which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety. The intent of this criterion is that risk insights and operating experience be factored into the establishment of appropriate TS LCOs. Since fuel will have been removed from the reactor vessel and SFP at the IPEC facility prior to implementation of this amendment, this criterion is not applicable.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(5), Administrative controls, states that administrative controls are the provisions relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to assure operation of the facility in a safe manner. Therefore, the particular administrative controls to be included in the TS are the provisions that the Commission deems essential for the safe operation of the facility that are not already covered by other regulations. Accordingly, the NRC staff has determined (see discussion of NRC Administrative Letter (AL) 95-06, Relocation of Technical Specification Administrative Controls Related to Quality Assurance (Reference 12), below), that administrative control requirements that are not specifically identified under Section 50.36(c)(5), and are not otherwise necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or an event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety, may be relocated to more appropriate documents (e.g., the Quality Assurance (QA) Program, Licensee Controlled Procedures, Physical Security Plan, or Emergency Plan (EP)), which are subject to their own regulatory controls, such as 10 CFR 50.54(a) for QA programs and 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, tests, and experiments. Similarly, while the required content of TS administrative controls is specified in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5), the particular details of these controls may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents, where the 10 CFR 50.59 change evaluation process ensures that adequate regulatory controls are in place.

10 CFR 50.36(c)(6), Decommissioning, applies to nuclear power reactor facilities (like IPEC) that have submitted the certifications required by 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1). For such facilities, TS involving safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control system settings; LCOs; SRs; design features; and administrative controls will be developed on a case-by-case basis.

The regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, establish requirements for NRC-approved QA plans; a QA program change control process is established in 10 CFR 50.54(a). NRC AL 95-06 provides guidance to licensees requesting amendments that relocate administrative controls to NRC-approved QA program descriptions, where subsequent changes are controlled pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(a). NRC AL 95-06 provides specific guidance in the areas of: (1) independent

safety engineering groups, (2) reviews and audits, (3) procedure review process, and (4) records and record retention. Some of the TS relocations requested by NEDA as part of the establishment of ISFSI-Only PDTS for IPEC are specifically discussed in NRC AL 95-06, while others are similar in nature to those discussed in the AL. Relocations not specifically discussed in NRC AL 95-06 are evaluated with respect to the appropriateness of the relocation.

In addition, NRC AL 95-06 states that for the procedure review process, TS administrative controls relocation should be to a QA plan that contains a commitment to process procedures and procedure changes in accordance with an accepted technical standard. The NRC staff determined that relocation of site-specific IPEC PDTS requirements regarding the establishment, implementation, and maintenance of procedures to the QA plan remains acceptable because the change control process of 10 CFR 50.54(a) will govern any future changes to these requirements, as described in NRC AL 95-06.

In 1996, the NRC added regulations, including 10 CFR 50.36(c)(6) and (e) (Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors, 61 FR 39278; July 29, 1996 (Reference 13)), clarifying that existing TS for reactors that are not authorized to operate will remain effective until removed or modified by license amendment. The Commission explained (61 FR 39283) that:

In addition to continuing requirements that the licensee must comply with, such as 10 CFR part 20, regarding protection of workers and the public from radiation, and Appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 regarding quality assurance, the final rule explicitly extends certain technical requirements to cover decommissioning activities (e.g., Secs. 50.36, 50.36a, 50.36b, and Appendix I regarding technical specifications for surveillance requirements, administrative controls, control of effluents, and conditions to protect the environment). Thus, there will be a licensing basis appropriate to the activities undertaken using the Sec. 50.59 process during decommissioning. By maintaining certain requirements throughout the decommissioning process, licensees will be able to use the existing Sec. 50.59 process to perform decommissioning activities and thus provide comparable assurance that protection of the public health, safety, and the environment will not be compromised.

Accordingly, 10 CFR 50.36(e) states that the provisions of 10 CFR 50.36 apply to each nuclear reactor licensee whose authority to operate the reactor has been removed by license amendment, order, or regulation. In addition, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(6) states:

Decommissioning. This paragraph applies only to nuclear power reactor facilities that have submitted the certifications required by § 50.82(a)(1) [1] and to non-power reactor facilities which are not authorized to operate. Technical specifications involving safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control system settings; LCOs; surveillance requirements; design features; and administrative controls will be developed on a case-by-case basis.

1 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i), [w]hen a licensee has determined to permanently cease operations the licensee shall, within 30 days, submit a written certification to the NRC. Per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), [o]nce fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel, the licensee shall submit a written certification to the NRC. Per 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), [u]pon docketing of the certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel,...the 10 CFR part 50 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.

Therefore, when deciding whether to amend the TS for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor such as IP2 and IP3, the NRC staff considers, on a case-by-case basis, whether the proposed amended TS, along with the operating procedures, the facility and equipment, and the use of the facility, collectively provide reasonable assurance that the applicant will comply with the Commission's regulations, and that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered.

4.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensees regulatory and technical analyses in support of the proposed IP2 and IP3 RFLs, and ISFSI-Only PDTS, and IP3 Appendix C TS changes, as described in the LAR application dated November 2, 2022. The proposed amendment deletes portions of the IP2 and IP3 PDTS (Appendix A) that are no longer applicable to a permanently defueled facility with all irradiated fuel in dry storage within an ISFSI and prohibits storage of spent fuel in the IP3 SFP.

4.1 Background

The spent fuel will be stored in dry casks within the ISFSI until it is shipped off site consistent with the schedules described in the IPEC PSDAR (Reference 14) and the irradiated Fuel Loading Plan (Reference 15). During decommissioning with all spent fuel in dry storage within an ISFSI, there are no installed plant systems relied upon for the safe storage of spent fuel. In this condition, there are no credible accidents at IP2 whose prevention or mitigation would need to be addressed by the PDTS. In addition, the NRC-approved spent fuel storage casks and canisters used for spent fuel storage at IPEC are subject to their own Certificate of Compliance and Cask Technical Specifications. With all the spent fuel transferred from the IP3 SFP and placed in dry storage within the ISFSI, many of the requirements in the IP2 and IP3 RFL and TS are inapplicable or are no longer appropriate.

4.2 Renewed Facility License Changes

IP2 License Condition 1.J and IP3 License Condition 1.I

IP2 License Condition 1.J and IP3 License Condition 1.I address the management of aging effects for IP2 and IP3 systems, structures, and components (SSCs) during the periods of extended operation and time-limited aging analyses that require review. The requirements within 10 CFR 54.4 associated with the plant SSCs are no longer applicable to a station with all fuel stored in the ISFSI. Because these License Conditions are no longer applicable, the NRC staff finds the proposed modification to this License Condition acceptable and these conditions can be deleted.

IP2 and IP3 License Condition 2.C.(2)

The licensees proposed to modify License Condition 2.C.(2) for IP2 and IP3 to eliminate the reference to the Appendix C TS, which will be deleted as a result of the proposed amendment.

Following the transfer of all spent fuel from the IP3 SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI, the discreet Conditions, Required Actions, Completions Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies for management of spent fuel in the Appendix C TS will no longer be required or permitted.

Because the Appendix C TS will be deleted and therefore cannot be referenced, the NRC staff finds the proposed modification to this License Condition acceptable.

IP2 License Condition 2.N and IP3 License Condition 2.AC

IP2 License Condition 2.N and IP3 License Condition 2.AC address requirements added to the RFLs to assure that IP2 and IP3 would be capable of mitigating large fires and explosions.

After the IP2 and IP3 irradiated fuel is stored within an ISFSI, the mitigation strategy License Condition is no longer required. As stated in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), this section of the regulation does not apply to a permanently defueled reactor that has submitted the certifications under 10 CFR 50.82(a) for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed modification to this License Condition acceptable.

IP2 License Condition 2.P and IP3 License Condition 2.AE

The licensees proposed to eliminate License Condition 2.P and 2.AE for IP2 and IP3, respectively. These License Conditions originally permitted HDI to conduct inter-unit transfers of the spent fuel from IP3 to the IP2 SFP subject to the conditions listed in the Appendix C TS and permitted the transfer of IP2 and IP3 spent fuel into approved dry storage casks for onsite storage. Following the transfer of all spent fuel from the IP2 SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI, inter-unit transfer of spent fuel from IP3 to IP2 will no longer be permitted and the Appendix C TS will no longer exist. The capability to transfer IP3 spent fuel to dry storage casks for onsite storage will remain, as permitted by the ISFSI general License Conditions specified in 10 CFR Part 72, Licensing-Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste. On this basis, the NRC staff finds the deletion of the License Condition regarding inter-unit spent fuel transfers acceptable.

IP2 License Condition 2.Q and IP3 License Condition 2.AF

The licensees proposed to eliminate License Condition 2.Q and 2.AF for IP2 and IP3, respectively, which involves management of license renewal amendment (LRA) commitments.

The purpose of these License Conditions was to ensure that the aging effects of equipment important to the safe operation of the reactor are managed so that the functionality of SSCs is maintained during the facility's period of extended operation. The IP2 and IP3 license renewal commitments for aging management are maintained in Appendix A, License Renewal, of the IP2 and IP3 DSARs (References 16and 17). The IP2 and IP3 DSARs are updated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e). Changes to these license renewal commitments continue to be evaluated and controlled pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 50.71(e).

The IP2 and IP3 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are no longer be applicable once the spent nuclear fuel is transferred to dry cask storage within an ISFSI, and therefore the SSCs and the parameter limits described in the current TSs are no longer necessary. There are no remaining DBAs or transients and the administrative controls for maintaining the IP2 and IP3 DSARs will be used to address and control license renewal commitments. Because the aging management of the SSCs is no longer applicable after the fuel has been transferred to the ISFSI, and the spent nuclear fuel has been transferred to an onsite ISFSI, the NRC staff finds the deletion of the License Conditions acceptable.

Attachments

The licensees proposed to modify the list of attachments to the IP2 and IP3 FL to rename the IP2 and IP3 PDTS and eliminate the reference to the IP3 Appendix C TS. Because all the spent

fuel assemblies have been transferred to the ISFSI, the remaining LCOs (and associated SRs) in Section 3.0 will no longer be applicable. The renaming and modifying the list of attachments is administrative in nature facilitating the change to an IFSIS-Only PDTS installation, and as described in the previous evaluation of the changes, those sections are either being deleted or relocated and the reference to them in the list of attachments will no longer make sense.

4.3 Technical Specification Changes

Appendix A - Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications

Once the spent fuel assemblies have been transferred to the ISFSI, the remaining LCOs (and associated SRs) are longer applicable for IP2 and IP3. The revised PDTS being evaluated as part of the current change reflect the changes in facility staffing that are commensurate with removal of all spent fuel from the IP3 SFP. In addition, a new PDTS design requirement is being added that prohibits storage of spent fuel in the IP3 SFP. The proposed changes will result in PDTS that will be applicable to IP2 and IP3 after the last spent fuel assembly has been removed from the SFP and placed within the onsite ISFSI.

Section 1.0

The licensees proposed to delete the definitions for Certified Fuel Handler and Non-Certified Operator in IP2 and IP3 PDTS Section 1.1, Definitions, which includes: Logical Connectors, Completion Times, and Frequency. The purpose of these definitions was to provide uniform interpretation of frequently used terms in the PDTS for the existing staffing requirements for IP2 and IP3. After the transfer of spent fuel from the IP2 and IP3 SFP to the ISFSI, and the prohibition for storing fuel in the IP2 SFP is put in place, the IP2 and IP3 staffing requirements related to certified fuel handlers and non-certified operators will no longer be necessary. In addition, the proposed changes to other IP2 PDTS sections would delete the information that references these terms.

As a result of the deletion of any reference to the terms, certified fuel handlers and non-certified operators need not be defined or included in the IP2 and IP3 PDTS. This change is administrative in nature and will not impact the continued safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the ISFSI. Because the staff is approving the deletion of any reference to the terms, the NRC staff finds it acceptable to delete these definitions from Section 1.0 of the IP2 and IP3 PDTS.

Section 3.0

The licensees proposed to delete, for IP2 and IP3, Section 3.0, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability, which contains LCOs that provide for appropriate functional capability of plant equipment required for the safe maintenance and storage of fuel assemblies in the SFP, and SR Section 3.0, Surveillance Requirement (SR) Applicability, which establishes the standards and periodicity used to implement SRs for plant systems, from the PDTS. Removal of these sections reflects the permanent removal of spent fuel from the IP2 and IP3 SFP. After the transfer of spent fuel from the SFP to the ISFSI, the LCOs or SRs in the PDTS are no longer applicable, and the applicable TS bases sections are proposed for removal. Deletion of these sections will have no impact on the continued safe storage and maintenance of irradiated fuel in the ISFSI at IPEC. The NRC staff finds that since IP2 and IP3 will no longer store spent fuel in the SFP after all the fuel is transferred to the ISFSI, these sections of the PDTS may be deleted

in their entirety with no impact on the requirements for spent fuel safety and storage in the ISFSI-Only configuration. Therefore, the proposed deletion is acceptable.

The licensees also proposed to delete IP2 PDTS 3.7.11 and IP3 PDTS Section 3.7.14, Spent Fuel Pit Water Level, which specifies the requirements to ensure that the minimum water level in the SFP is greater than or equal to 23 feet over the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool. The associated LCO requires suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool if level is not above the minimum level. Additionally, the licensee has proposed to delete IP2 PDTS 3.7.12 and IP3 PDTS 3.7.15, which provide requirements to ensure that the IP2 and IP3 SFP boron concentrations are maintained at specified concentrations when fuel assemblies are stored in the IP2 or IP3 SFP, respectively.

As discussed below, the licensee is adding a limitation in the IP2 and IP3 PDTS which prohibits storage of spent fuel in the SFP. Because spent fuel storage will no longer be permissible in the SFP, the specifications in the IP2 PDTS 3.7.11 and IP3 PDTS Section 3.7.14 are no longer needed for the safe storage of spent fuel, and the proposed deletions are therefore acceptable.

Finally, the licensee proposed to delete IP2 PDTS 3.7.13 and IP3 PDTS 3.7.16, Spent Fuel Assembly Storage, which provides requirements to ensure that the IP2 and IP3 fuel assemblies are properly classified and stored in appropriate locations within the IP2 and IP3 SFPs, respectively. The requirements in these sections are related to assuring the ability to safely store spent fuel in the SFP. Following the transfer of all spent fuel to the ISFSI, the SFP will no longer be used for spent fuel storage. As discussed below, the licensee is adding a limitation in the IP2 and IP3 PDTS which prohibits storage of spent fuel in the SFP. Because spent fuel storage no longer permissible in the SFP, the specifications included in PDTS Section 3.7 are no longer needed for the safe storage of spent fuel, and the proposed deletions are therefore acceptable.

Section 4.0

The licensees propose to delete IP2 PDTS 4.1 and IP3 PDTS 4.1, Site Location, which describe the IP2 and IP3 site locations and the minimum distances from the IP2 and IP3 reactor center-lines to the site exclusion area and the outer boundary of the low population zone. Based on submittal of the 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2) certifications, the IP2 and IP3 FLs no longer authorize operation of the reactors or emplacement or retention of fuel in the IP2 and IP3 reactor vessels, respectively. As a result, IP2 PDTS 4.1 and IP3 PDTS 4.1 no longer need to describe the IP2 or IP3 reactor center-line location. This change is administrative in nature to reflect the current IPEC documentation and is therefore acceptable.

Section 4.3 currently provides a description of, and requirements regarding, prevention of criticality of spent fuel in the SFP storage racks, prevention of SFP drainage, and spent fuel capacity limitations. The licensees have proposed to delete all contents of IP3s PDTS Section 4.3 and add the statement: Spent fuel shall not be stored in the IP3 Spent Fuel Pit. Section 4.3 would be revised because there will no longer be any fuel assemblies in the IP3 SFP, and therefore no need for the associated PDTS requirements, or the associated SFP design references. The NRC staff finds that the removal or change of these design feature descriptions will have no impact on the requirements for spent fuel safety and storage in the ISFSI configuration, or the continued safe storage and maintenance of irradiated fuel in the ISFSI, and the proposed changes to Section 4.3 of the IP3 PDTS are therefore acceptable.

Section 5.0: Administrative Controls

Section 5.0, Administrative Controls, of the PDTS establishes the requirements associated with responsibility, organization, and facility staff qualifications for IP2 and IP3. The licensees proposed to revise this section of the PDTS to include only those administrative requirements that are applicable to the facility when all of the spent fuel from the IP2 and IP3 SFP is in the ISFSI. Therefore, portions of Section 5.0 of the IP2 and IP3 PDTS are to be relocated to the IP2 and IP3 DSARs, and other portions will be deleted in their entirety. The proposed revisions modify the PDTS to include only the administrative requirements needed when all of the spent fuel is in the ISFSI. The relocation of administrative controls to the IP2 and IP3 DSARs is acceptable and consistent with guidance in NRC Administrative Letters 95-06 and 96-04 and will have no impact on safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the ISFSI.

Section 5.1 of the IP2 and IP3 PDTS which provide descriptions of the requirements for the plant manager and the designee, as well as the shift manager, are proposed to be deleted. The requirements of IP2 PDTS 5.1.1 and IP3 PDTS 5.1.1 will be relocated to the IP2 and IP3 DSARs, respectively, and the requirements of IP3 PDTS 5.1.2 will be deleted. These changes are administrative in nature and will not impact the continued safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the ISFSI. With all of the spent fuel removed from the IP2 and IP3 SFPs, the plant manager and/or shift manager no longer need to be responsible for the shift command function during spent fuel management, because that function no longer exists. Further, these changes do not change any requirements, qualifications, or responsibilities of the individual in this position, and therefore the NRC staff finds it acceptable to delete Section 5.1.1 of the IP2 and IP3 PDTS and relocate them to the IP2 and IP3 DSARs, and to delete the requirements of Section 5.1.2 of the IP3 PDTS.

Section 5.2.1, Onsite and Offsite Organization, establishes the requirements for plant lines of authority, responsibilities, and requirements for organizational freedom for certain personnel, including those performing health physics or QA functions. Section 5.2.1.d provides requirements for organizational freedom of the Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) trainers, as well as certain personnel including those performing health physics or QA functions. The licensees proposed to eliminate portion of Section 5.2.1(d) and relocate the administrative controls provided in the IP2 and IP3 PDTS 5.2.1 to the IP2 and IP3 DSARs verbatim. The sections remaining in IP2 and IP3 PDST 5.2.1(b) will be revised from referencing the plant manager and will instead reference the manager responsible for overall operational activities.

Additionally, any references to individuals in IP2 or IP3 PDTS 5.2.1.(d) who train the Certified Fuel Handlers will not be incorporated into the IP2 and IP3 DSARs. With spent fuel stored in the ISFSI, there is no longer an organizational need or regulatory requirement for Certified Fuel Handlers or the associated training program. Therefore, this deletion is consistent with the changes discussed above, and is acceptable to the NRC staff.

Section 5.2.2, Facility Staff in IP3 PDTS, establishes the requirements for personnel required at the plant to assure safe facility operation and the safety of the nuclear fuel. This section provided for adequate staff to ensure the safe storage and movement of fuel, including an individual qualified in radiation protection procedures. The licensees proposed to delete IP3s PDTS Section 5.2.2 in its entirety. Following the transfer of all spent fuel to the ISFSI, and the new provision in Section 4.3 of the IP3 PDTS prohibiting storage of fuel in the IP3 SFP, there is no longer a need for CFHs or the other specified personnel requirements in this section.

After implementation of the proposed revisions to the IP3 PDTS, storage of spent fuel in the IP SFP will be prohibited and with the removal of the spent fuel from the IP3 SFP, there are no remaining spent fuel assemblies to be monitored in the IP3 SFP and there are no credible accidents at IP3; accordingly, there will no longer be a need for many of the personnel

described in Section 5.2.2, or the associated training programs. There are no credible accidents at IP3 requiring the actions of a CFH, Shift Manager, or a Non-certified Operator to prevent occurrence or mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, the proposed deletions of the PDTS Section 5.2.2 requirements will have no impact on safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the ISFSI and are therefore acceptable to the NRC staff.

Section 5.3, Facility Staff Qualifications, establishes the minimum requirements for staff qualification. The licensees proposed to delete PDTS Section 5.3.2, which specifies requirements for an NRC-approved CFH training and retraining program, in its entirety. The ISFSI is a passive system, and after removal of the spent fuel from the IP3 SFP, there are no remaining spent fuel assemblies to be monitored and there are no credible spent fuel related accidents that require the actions of a CFH to prevent occurrence or mitigate the consequences.

As such, following the transfer of all IP3 spent fuel to the ISFSI, and the new PDTS Section 4.3 prohibition from storing spent fuel in the IP3 SFP, there is no longer a need for certified fuel handlers, which obviates the need for the associated training or retaining program. Therefore, the proposed deletion of PDTS Section 5.3.2 is acceptable.

Section 5.4, Procedures, addresses requirements for procedures and various programs listed in certain IP2 and IP3 PDTS sections. The licensees proposed to relocate the requirements of this section to the DSAR. Relocating these requirements to the IP2 and IP3 DSAR is consistent with NRC AL 95-06 and will have no impact on safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the IP2 and IP3 ISFSI, and is acceptable.

The licensees proposed to eliminate and relocate certain requirements in Section 5.5, Programs and Manuals, to the DSAR. Section 5.5 provides a description and requirements regarding programs and manuals that are to be established, implemented, and maintained.

Section 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (OCDM), specifies how to document, review, and approve changes to the Offsite Dose Assessment Manual (ODAM). The licensees proposed to delete these requirements from the IP2 and IP3 PDTS and relocate them to the DSAR. After the administrative controls are incorporated into the DSAR, any future changes will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.54(a). This will provide adequate control for a facility with all spent fuel located within the ISFSI. The relocation of these administrative requirements to the DSAR is consistent with NRC AL 95-06 and will have no impact on the safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the ISFSI. Therefore, the proposed relocation of the requirements in this section are acceptable.

Section 5.5.3 for IP2 and Section 5.5.4 for IP3, Radioactive Effluent Controls Program, specify the requirements for the programs to control radioactive effluents, and for limiting doses to the public to within the specified limits. The licensees proposed to relocate these radioactive effluent controls and public dose requirements to the DSAR. The requirements for a Radioactive Effluent Controls Program will be maintained in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.54(a).

Since the intent of this section is to ensure that the Radioactive Effluent Controls Program continues to meet the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190, 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Section 50.36(a), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I, and because these requirements will be maintained in the DSAR, the relocated requirements will continue to be subject to adequate regulatory controls. Therefore, the proposed deletions and relocations of the requirements in this section are acceptable.

Section 5.5.10 for IP2 and Section 5.5.11 for IP3, Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program, currently provide controls for the quantity of radioactivity

contained in unprotected outdoor liquid storage tanks. The licensees proposed to delete these requirements from the PDTS and relocate them to the DSAR. The requirement for an Explosive Gas and Storage Tank Radioactivity Monitoring Program will be maintained in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.59. Since this requirement will be maintained in the DSAR, the relocated requirement will continue to be subject to adequate regulatory controls. Therefore, the proposed relocations of the requirements in this section are acceptable.

Section 5.5.12 for IP2 and Section 5.5.13 for IP3, Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program, establish the requirements to update and maintain the basis for the IP2 and IP3 TSs.

The licensees proposed to delete these requirements from the PDTS. Currently, the TS bases are all related to storage of spent fuel in the SFP; specifically, the bases relate to the requirements in IP2 PDTS 3.0, 3.7.11 through 3.7.13 and IP3 PDTS 3.0, 3.7.14 through 3.7.16 are proposed to be eliminated as previously described. Following transfer of all spent fuel to the ISFSI, the SFP is no longer to be used for spent fuel storage. All of the bases in the existing PDTS are being eliminated. Because the TS bases will be deleted, there will no longer be a need for a TS bases control program. The removal of this section will not reduce the effectiveness of the IP2 and IP3 ISFSI-Only PDTS. Therefore, the proposed deletion of these requirements is acceptable.

Section 5.6, Reporting Requirements, provides a description of, and requirements for, reports that are to be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.4, Written communications.

The licensees proposed to delete this section from the IP2 and IP3 PDTS and relocate the requirements for the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and the Radioactive Material Release Report to the IP2 and IP3 DSAR. After these administrative controls are incorporated into the DSAR, any future changes will be controlled in accordance with 10 CFR Section 50.54(a). The relocation of administrative controls for reporting requirements to the DSAR is consistent with NRC AL 95-06, will have no impact on safe storage and maintenance of spent fuel in the IP2 and IP3 ISFSI, and is therefore acceptable.

Section 5.7, High Radiation Area, provides a description and requirements regarding controls applied to high radiation areas at IP2 and IP3. Specifically, the licensees proposed to review the IP2 and IP3 PDTS Section 5.7.2.a.1 to allow the shift manager, rather than shift supervisor, along with the radiation protection manager or his or her designee, to maintain administrative control of all door and gate keys involved with entry control for the high radiation areas specified in that section. This change is administrative in nature and is consistent with the other proposed changes, and is therefore acceptable to the NRC staff.

IP3 Appendix C - Inter-Unit Fuel Transfer Technical Specifications

The licensees proposed the deletion of the IP3 Appendix C TS, which define requirements that permitted the transfer of spent fuel from IP3 to the IP2 SFP, in their entirety. Following the transfer of all spent fuel from the IP2 SFP to dry storage within the ISFSI, inter-unit transfer of spent fuel from IP3 to IP2 will no longer be permitted. Therefore, this deletion is consistent with the changes discussed above, and is acceptable to the NRC staff.

4.4 Conclusion

Based on the NRC staffs review of the proposed changes to the IP2 and IP3 RFL and PDTS, as described above, the NRC staff concluded that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36, pertaining to the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of accident consequences, are addressed in a satisfactory manner, considering the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the facility,

complemented by the complete transfer of all remaining spent fuel from the IP2 SFP to the onsite ISFSI. Further, the changes proposed by this LAR will delete or modify requirements that are no longer applicable following the transfer of all IP2 or IP3 spent fuel to the ISFSI, as well as update administrative controls. On the basis of its review, the NRC staff concluded that the licensees request adequately addresses the applicable regulatory requirements for a permanently shutdown nuclear power facility with all spent fuel transferred to dry cask storage in an ISFSI. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees proposed changes to the IP2 and IP3 RFL and PDTS are acceptable.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment to the IP2 and IP3 RFL and PDTS includes changes to requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the protected area, as well as changes to the licensees administrative procedures or requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, as published in the Federal Register on December 7, 2022 (87 FR 75071) (Reference 18), and there have been no public comments on this finding.

Additionally, the IP2 and IP3 amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(9) and 10 CFR 51.22(c)(10)(ii). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on August 25, 2023. The State official had no response for comments per an NRC email dated October 31, 2023 (Reference 19).

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

8.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from Anthony J. Vitale (Entergy Nuclear Northwest), to U.S. NRC, Notification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, dated February 8, 2017 (ML17044A004).
2. Letter from A. Christopher Bakken III (Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.), to U.S. NRC, Application for Order Consenting to Transfers of Control of Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendments Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2 and 3, dated November 21, 2019 (ML19326B953).
3. Letter from Andrea L. Sterdis (Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC), to U.S.

NRC, Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report including Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2, and 3, dated December 19, 2019 (ML19354A698).

4. Letter from Anthony J. Vitale (Entergy Nuclear Northwest), to U.S. NRC, Certifications of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations and Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, dated May 12, 2020 (ML20133J902).
5. Letter from Anthony J. Vitale (Entergy Nuclear Northwest), to U.S. NRC, Certifications of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations and Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3, dated May 11, 2021 (ML21131A157)
6. Richard V. Guzman (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), letter package to A.

Christopher Bakken III (Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.), Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3 - Order, Safety Evaluation, and Draft Conforming Amendment for Transfer of Facility Operating Licenses to Holtec International, Owner, and Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Operator, dated November 23, 2020 (ML20297A341).

7. Letter from Jean A. Fleming (Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC), to U.S. NRC, Description and Evaluation of Proposed Changes - License Amendment Request to Revise Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Licenses and Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications and IP3 Appendix C Technical Specifications to Reflect Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from the IP2 and IP3 Spent Fuel Pits, dated November 2, 2022 (ML22306A126).
8. Letter from Jean A. Fleming (Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC) to U.S. NRC, Registration of Spent Fuel Casks and Notification of Permanent Removal of All Indian Point Unit 2 Spent Fuel Assemblies from the Spent Fuel Pit, dated February 15, 2023 (ML23046A102).
9. Letter from Bill Noval (Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC) to U.S. NRC, Registration of Spent Fuel Casks and Notification of Permanent Removal of All Indian Point Unit 3 Spent Fuel Assemblies from the Spent Fuel Pit, dated October 16, 2023 (ML23289A158).
10. NRC Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, dated December 17, 1968 (33 FR 18610).
11. NRC Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors, dated July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).
12. NRC Administrative Letter (AL) 95-06, Relocation of Technical Specification Administrative Controls Related to Quality Assurance, dated December 12, 1995. 13. NRC Final Rule on, Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors, dated July 29, 1996 (61 FR 39278).
14. Indian Point Energy Center, Indian Point Units 1, 2 and 3, Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report, Revision 0, December 2019 as amended by HDI Letter to U.S. NRC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, (Letter HDI-IPEC-22-029) ( ML22084A059) dated March 25, 2022.
15. HI-2210651, Revision 6, Fuel Loading Plan for Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, dated July 8, 2022.
16. Letter from Jean A. Fleming (Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC), to U.S. NRC, Biennial Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, and Regulatory Commitment Change Summary - September 2020 to September 2022, dated September 14, 2022, transmitting IP2 Defueled Safety Analysis Report, Revision 1 ( ML22257A127)
17. Letter from Andrea L. Sterdis (Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC), to U.S.

NRC, Indian Point Unit No. 3 10 CFR 50.71(e) Submittal, dated September 21, 2021, transmitting IP3 Defueled Safety Analysis Report, Revision 0 ( ML21270A055)

18. LAR; opportunity to comment, request a hearing and to petition for leave to intervene, Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, dated December 7, 2022 (87 FR 75071).
19. Email from Alyse Peterson (New York State Energy Research and Development Authority), to U.S. NRC, Formal comments on Holtec License Amendment Request to Revise Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 and 3 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications to Modify Staffing Requirements following Transfer of Spent Fuel to Dry Storage, dated February 23, 2023 (ML23055A111).

Principal Contributor: Karl J. Sturzebecher, NMSS Date of Issuance: November 29, 2023

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