ML20248H812

Performance Improvement Plan

ML20248H812
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	04/30/1989
From:	Creel G BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20248H790	List: ML20248H788 ML20248H812
References
PROC-890430, NUDOCS 8904140230
Download: ML20248H812 (81)

Text

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CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

. PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN Prepared by the Nuclear Energy Division of Baltimore Gas & Electric Com; any APRIL 1989 D.t. Creel 1, Vice President - Nuclear nergy l

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I CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT PLAN  !

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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'I. ~ INTRODUCTION A. . Management Overview I-l

< 1, Management Policy Changes I-1

2. Management Leadership Changes I-3

3. Change Management I-4

.B. Summary of Findings " I-5 C. Managing Action Plans I-6 D. . Report Format I-7 II. EXPECTATIONS. ACCOUNTABILITY. AND COMMUNICATIONS 11- 1 A. Definition B. Management Improvements

1. Planning Process . 11- 2

2. Performance Objectives ' II-3 Management Expectations 11- 3 3.

Communications Plan 11- 4 4.

5. Nuclear Information Project 11- 5

6. Commitment Management Project II-6

7. Team Building Workshops ,

Il-7 l 8. Quality Circle Program 11-7

9. Performance Management Process 11- 8 l

10. Procedures Upgrade Project 11- 8

11. Leadership Conferences II-9 f

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TABLE OF CONTEhTIS PAGE C. Functional Improvements-11-1 0

1. Project Management 11- 1 0

2. _ System Circles 11-11

3. System Engineer Job Description Combined Maintenance and Operations Department 11-11

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Surveillance Test Program 11-12

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Technical Manual Improvements I!-12 6.

III. PROBLEM CORRECTION 111 - 1 A. . Definition .

B. Heightened Awareness Related to Safety Off-Site Safety Review Committee III-2 1.

Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee III-3 2.

Safety Evaluations in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 III-3

3. ,

111- 4

4. Configuration Management Unit

. Engineer Training Ill-4 5.

Duke Engineering Evaluation III-5 6.

Visiting Other Plants III-6 q 7.

Reliability-Centered Maintenance Project III-6 8.

C. Problem Identification and Resolution Self-Evaluations III-7 1.

i Independent Safety Evaluation III-8 l 2.

111- 9

i. 3. Internal Assessment Process Root Cause Analysis III-9  ;

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5. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations III-10 Significant Operating Experience Reports

-6. Procurement Program Project III-10  ;

Post-Maintenance Testing 111- 1 1

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IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION A. Definition IV-1 B. Resource Allocation Improvements

1. Budget and Staffing IV-2

2. Engineering Planning IV-2

' 3. Daily and Outage Work Activities IV-2

4. Auxiliary Systems Engineering Unit IV-3

5. Managing Organization and Program Changes IV-3 APPENDIX A - SINMARY OF PROCESS ,

APPENDIX B - PRELIMINARY ACTION PLAN SUMMARIES FIGURES 1 - Nuclear Energy Division Management Changes

'2 - Corrective Actions Database Entry Form i

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INTRODUCTION

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.I. INTRODUCTION 1 J A. Manacement Overview The objective of the Performance Improvement ~ Plan (the Plan) is to develop Land implement a manageable set of t focused actions that with

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e. Address previously. unidentified causes . of Calvert Cliffs' ll L decline in performance.

Complement actions already underway to return Calvert. Cliffs 1 eL

. to high-level L performance - consistent with' the' expectations of

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i the public, . our regulators,- the - nuclear . industry, ' our stock-holders, and employees.

. e. Institutionalize a: ' process - that will: systematically identify p and J provide for timely resolution ~ of.- performance problems.

y This. process- will include. performance problems addressed in

' this report, as well as ' existing problems not yet . identified l

and future problems ' as they arise,

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e Institutionalize a- ' process that will systematically monitor F

the progress of 'these actions. This process will also redi-L rect efforts - on those . actions failing to achieve , the desired results, t

The Plan's focus is ' on management and organizational effectiveness. We

- believe only through an effectively managed organization can long-term problem resolut_ ion be achieved. Only through an effectively managed

'- organization can safety and quality expectations be met.

We agree that additional actions are needed to return Calvert Cliffs to its position of excellence in the > industry. We have not stood idle while performance declined, however. Significant changes in management policy -

and leadership were made in the past two years. The full. impact of these changes, some of which are discussed below, has yet to be realized.

1. Management Policy Changes U Emphasis on -corporate-wide cost limitations and staff reductions y has been substantially reduced. The Nuclear Energy Division's 1988 and 1989 work program budgets and staffing levels reflect considerable increases over previous years. These changes are discussed in more detail in Section IV.B.1, Budget and Staffing.

In September 1988, the Nuclear Operations and Nuclear Maintenance h; ,

Departments were combined. The purpose of this change was ' to I

establish a single focal point for addressing plant problems and issues and to improve coordination and communications between operations and maintenance employees.

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- During thebSeptember l1988 reorganization, the quality control ' (QC) function was. transferred from . the 'line organization.. to the Quality.

LAssurance L &. Staff Services o Department. ^ Initially, . benefits focused primarily on streamlining - the . line . organization. : However, issues

' associated . with; thei QC organization's : lack L of ' independence - while

- assigned to L thei line organization, _ ' morale , problems, procedural I

inadequacies, and: personnel training. .and qualifications have since been identified. ' We. think these issues even more . strongly support - i the :value , of this' move from a quality assurance standpoint.

We 'are ' committed to ensuring:our QC Program meets both regulatory ando Company L expectations. Resources will be. applied . as necessary to improve .'the. program. The new General Supervisor-Quality Assur- .;

ance has made' QC's . credibility as, a dedicated, qualified, ~ well-trained, well-motivated, and : effective quality; organization his number-orie ' priority. This in' fluence is already ~ being . felt.

Another . major ' change - at Calvert Cliffs involved . the ' restructuring

- and redirection of the ~ Nuclear Program Plan, - the site's master planning document. . In.. October 1988, our mission statement and '

values: were reevaluated. Short- and long-range goals' were devel-

• - oped .and prioritized. To establish accountability for results ~ and to ensure departmental activities are consistent - with the goals,

'the Nuclear Energy Division Managers' performance objectives were incorporated into the plan.

The . 1989 Nuclear - Program Plan outlines the actions necessary to improve performance - at Calvert Cliffs. It ' clearly reflects our most important goal --- to improve safety and quality at Calvert -

Cliffs.' The importance of the Institute of. Nuclear Power Opera-tions (INPO) and the Nuclear' Regulatory Commission- (NRC) evalua-tions of our operation has been emphasized and the production and budget goals, de-emphasized. We recognize that a safely operated plant. will, in the long term, be well operated with high avail-ability. We see our strengthened commitment to ' excellence in safety leading to excellence in operation. Our production and cost goals. may temporarily be affected while we more strongly emphasize safety and quality. We are prepared to accept that consequence.

We recognized these changes to the Nuclear Program Plan were j essential to reinforce our commitment to operating Calvert Cliffs '

in a safe, quality-conscious manner. Our efforts are .not complete.

t We are still in the process of ensuring that existing and planned l- programs, projects, and activities conform to the Nuclear Program Plan goals.

Management involvement in communicating the Nuclear Program Plan

, goals is ongoing. We know the communications aspect of the plan is crucial and have developed a formal Communications Plan accord-ingly. This plan is described more fully in Section II.B.4.

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2. Management Leadership Changes Figure 1 ? illustrates changes in management leadership made in the past year. These changes were made to bring fresh focus and new ideas into the " Calvert Cliffs organization.

e Since January 1988, the General Supervisors of the Nuclear Operations, Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical &

Controls Maintenance, Quality . Assurance, Design Engi- -

Le neering, Technical Services l Engineering, and' Planning- &

Support _ Sections have been reassigned to positions both -

within 'and outside the Nuclear ' Energy Division.

e -Since ' July 1988, new Managers have been assigned to. the

< ~ Nuclear Engineering Services and Quality Assurance &

Staff Services Departments. : Both came~ from off-site positions. . Both ' possess strong nuclear . backgrounds and-proven managerial . experience. They were selected for ,

these positions because ' of ~ their leadership experience.

o A new Vice President of the . Nuclear Energy Division was

- appointed in February 1989. -He too was reassigned from

. another Division - and brings to ' Calvert Cliffs extensive nuclear and managerial experience - and - a strong leader-ship style.

The site management team currently in place possesses the necessary leadership; and experience to effect a return to event-free perfor-mance at ' Calvert Cliffs. Our challenge is to implement an effec-tive strategy for e .. stressing safety and quality in spite of possible near-term cost and electrical production effects, e clearly communicating performance expectations, e recognizing accomplishments and behaviors consistent

. with these expectations, and a maintaining accountability for results.

l We know that creating a work envir w ent in which safety and quality are paramount --- one in whien a safe, careful, and con-l' servative approach to the job is second nature to all e'mployees ---

will take time. Our job is to aggressively pursue creating this kind of environment.

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3. Change Management i The site management team, assisted by other members of the Nuclear i Energy Division and an . organization ' development - consultant on special assignment to - Calvert Cliffs, conducted extensive investi-gation and analyses of - Calvert Cliffs' . weaknesses identified 'in  ! '

selected internal and external ' reports. Their efforts have not yet been completed. However, . they have identified three categories of root causes associated. with Calvert Cliffs' performance problems:

e The tasks of establishing and communicating expectations throughout the organization a;" holding people ac-countable for their actions were not adequately per--

formed.

e The process of identifying, analyzing, and resolving problems was not always adequately performed. Timely action did not always occur before ' problems affected or threatened to affect the safe and continued operation of the plant.

e . Management did not always allocate sufficient resources, nor did site management always utilize existing re-sources in the most effective manner.

A preliminary review of NRC's 1988 Systematic Assessment of Licensees Performance results indicates that plant performance

' deficiencies are included in the above root cause categories and the associated corrective - actions. .

"'he Plan highlights many issues and corrective actions associated with the categories. of root causes mentioned above. For com-pleteness, actions started before 1988 which were identified as '

l contributing factors to the resolution of the - root causes are included in the Plan. Other actions described in ' the Plan are in the planning and implementation stages. Other actions may be identified.

Addressing - the root causes will be a long-term effort involving, l

among other things, change management. The change management process is discussed in Section IV.B.5. It has received, and will continue to receive, high level attention to achieve an effective, lasting transition to a quality and safety focused culture.

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L The Plan is transitional. it will be used to develop and implement lasting improvements necessary to restore Calveit Cliffs' reputa-tion as a safe, top-performing plant in the nuclear industry.

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People at all levels of the Calvert Cliffs organization must recognize their responsibility for their personal safety, the y

l safety of their fellow employees, and the safety of the public. We i

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F all must ' accept responsibility for the quality of our . efforts ---

for' ' doing the job ' right the first time and being accountable for.

results.

Our objective is ' to'. instill an operating . philosophy throughout the H organization .where our' day-to-day approach to the . job reflects a commitment to safety and quality fjnt --- where strict adherence to procedures is second nature --- where a safe, careful, conser-vative and . questioning attitude , is demonstrated all the time ' ---

and where people enjoy working as a team. We believe our people have the exceptional dedication, courage,. and talent to make this happen.

I We believe our people at all levels. are slowly but surely beginning to realize and accept what ~ we firmly believe that performing all whether engineering, quality' control, operations, or our - work ---

9 maintenance -- in a safe, done-right-the-first-time mode will -lead to. a truly more productive way of life at Calvert Cliffs.

B. Summary of Findings .

'In. brief, we identified symptoms of our declining performance, identified l-

' root causes associated with the symptoms, and developed corrective l actions that address the root causes. This process is described in more

. detail in Appendix A.

'We found our declining performance could be attributed to eleven root ,

causes:

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1. Insufficient expectations and performance standa,rds,

- 2. Insufficient accountability,

3. Insufficient vertical and horizontal communications,  ;

4 Insufficient communication of vision, direction, and W. n nce expectations by senior management,

5. Insufficient definition of interdepartmental roles, interfaces, and responsibilities,

6. Insufficient planning,

7. Insufficient depth of assessment and root cause analysis,

8. Insufficient monitoring, follow-up, and trending,

9. Insufficient issue discovery,

10. Insufficient scheduling and prioritization, and

11. Insufficient resource allocation.

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The first six root causes contributed to ineffective use of personnel.

These are management problems related to communicating expectations and holding people accountable. The . next three root causes contributed to ineffectiveness in recognizing problems and solving them. The last two root causes contributed to not having the right resources on the right

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job at the right time. Grouping the root causes in this way helps the presentation of corrective actions later in the report.

In determining corrective actions, the eleven root causes were rephrased as objectives. For example, to determine what corrective actions are needed to address the first root cause, we asked ourselves: What should we do to establish or improve expectations and performance standards?

Having transformed each of the root causes into objectives, we developed corrective actions which are described in Chapters 11, Ill, and IV.

Some corrective actions have already been implemented; others are already underway. For those that require substantial additional work, we are developing action plans to help us plan, schedule, and track the work.

Each action plan, developed by a departmental team most closely associ- {

ated with the work will include: l e OUTCOME /RESULE - The desired outcome and results to be achieved by the action plan.

e METHODS - The activities that make up the action plan.

e RESOURCES - The time, people, money, and material that are needed to complete the action plan.

o RESPONSIBILITY - The specific individuals who are responsible for implementing the action plan.

e VERIFICATION - The means of verifying that the completed activities achieved the desired results.

We find the above information to be crucial in managing the action plans.

METHODS, RESOURCES, and RESPONSIBILITY will aid us in the mechanics of completing the specified activities. More important to the goal of restoring the plant to a position of excellence are OUTCOMES /RESULE and VERIFICATION. We will not consider an action plan successful until we are satisfied that the desired results have been achieved.

If necessary, we will modify or replace plans that fail to provide the f desired results.

C. knanine Acv a Plans Many of the actions described in the Plan are underway. By July 31, 1989, we will complete the identification of resources needed to implement each action, schedule the necessary activities associated with the various plans, and develop verification actions and performance indicators (See Appendix B for details).

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The. Nuclear Program . Plan. (NPP) has been, and will continue to be, the central document to provide goals, priorities, and resource allocations for; Calvert Cliffs activities.' . The Performance Improvement Plan is a transitional program to develop and implement improvements that will be reflected in the ' development, ' implementation, and monitoring of future NPPs.-

' The . planning process described in Section II.B.1 will be used to develop the next revision to the _ NPP. The planning ~ process will also be the mechanism by which periodic reassessment of priorities contained in each NPP, starting in 1989, will be accomplished. This will accommodate new issues that may' arise ' during the year.

The management of the NPP has been assigned to the Management Systems Unit under the _ Quality - Assurance & Staff Services Department. The unit is responsible for updating' the NPP es required. They will implement the issues-based planning process to ensure the NPP has a feedback mechanism based on! assessment data. They will abc monitor performance indicators I that reflect current results and feedback those results to responsible l Line Managers. Managers of the line departments are the people held ,

accountable for - their respective part. of th' NPP.

I D. Reoort Format The rest of this ' report is structured around our findings described in

. Section 1.B. Earlier, we grouped the eleven root causes into three categories: expectations, accountability, and communications; problem correction; . and resource kilocation. Many corrective actions address ,

several root causes within the same category of root causes. Therefore, corrective actions are" presented under the category of root causes rather than under the : individual root causes.

Each chapter that follows represents one of the categories of root causes:

II. EXPECTATIONS. ACCOUNTABILITY. AND COMMUNICATIONS III. PROBLEM CORRECrlON IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION L

Chapters begin with a section defining the category of root causes.

Sections that follow summarize the corrective actions that address the l category of root causes for that chapter.

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Appendix A summarizes the process we used to arrive at our symptoms, root causes, corrective actions, and action plans.

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4 e : Appendix 'B'- provides a ' summary of - the . preliminary action- plans.' We are .

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• providing;only outcome /results and methods as;they have been developed at L: this .' point. In;- addition' - not all action plans' have ' been - developed. We ' -1 will bej developing . more action plans than those ' that appear in - Appendix

, B. Although we have determined what is to be achieved, the details and.

[-~ schedule of how. it. is to . be done have yet to. be defined. We will fully-

l. -,-  : develop all action plans by. July. 31, 1989.

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EXPECTATIONS. ACCOUNTABILITY. AND COMMUNICATIONS  !

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11l EXPECTATIONS. ACCOUNTABILITY. AND COMMUNICATIONS A. Definition A summary sta'tement of the root causes associated with this category _ is:

1 The management tasks of establishing and communicating expectations - ]

throughout the organization and holding- people accountable for their q actions were -not adequately performed. l Root causes which we have grouped under this category are: l

~1 e- Insufficient expectations and performance standards; j l~ I e Insufficient accountability; I l

(; -e Insufficient ' vertical and horizontal . communications; f i

e insufficient communication of vision, direction, and per-formance expectations by senior management; e Insufficient definition of interdepartmental roles, inter-faces, ; and responsibilities; and e Insufficient planning.

L Someisymptoms that led us to the root causes are:

o Problems with adherence _ to procedures ' and attention to detail have contributed to plant events and .to performance that

l. deviates inom established requirements. (INPO Evaluation)

.e. - Maintenance activities are often nct conducted to sufficiently l

high standards. Areas where problems exist are industrial safety practices, procedure and work instruction adherence, use of tools, and control of non-plant personnel. (INPO Evaluation) e Many surveillance test procedures contain human factor defi-ciencies that increase the possibility of performance errors.

Lack of surveillance procedure guidance has led to errors resulting in plant events and unnecessary component shutdowns.

(INPO Evaluation) l e The roles and responsibilities of each member of the pro-

. curement . process are not well understood. (Duke Engineering Assessment) e Many Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) recom-mendations have not been implemented. In addition, corrective actions taken in response to several SOER recommendations do l

! not address some aspects of the recommendations. (INPO Evaluation) 11-1

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-i Corrective actions developed to address this category of root causes include management and functional improvements.- The management improve-ments, described in Section . II.B. are enhanced management processes applicable sitewide. They apply to, and will affect, all Calvert Cliffs employees. The functional . improvements, described in Section II.C, address ' specific areas with a smaller scope of applicability.

B. Manacement Improvements

1. Planning Process Improvements to the current planning process are needed to ensure i

focus, prioritize goals, provide accountability. for the accom-l plishment of these goals, and develop a budget to support the plan.

Previously, our planning process was not explicitly based on the correction of observed problems or - on issues that, if addressed, would prevent future problems. We are developing an - improved ,

f planning process' that .will incorporate these elements. Some parts of the process are already in place; - others are still being devel- ,

! oped.

L The process begins with a management planning conference attended by the Vice President-Nuclear Energy, Managers, and General Super-s

j. visors. They will assess issues that have been raised by . the independent Safety Evaluation Unit (See Section Ill.C.2), the existing ' Nuclear Planning Group, and other appropriate sources including the line organizations, Quality Assuiance, NRC, and INPO.

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! (The Nuclear Planning Group is part of the corporate planning system composed of the Managers of the Nuclear Energy Division and Managers of major support departments.) The process to be used in

- the management planning conference will be similar to the process used to develop the Plan.

1ssues derived from the management planning conference will be L

assigned to department planning teams by the Vice President-Nuclear Energy. Each team sets department goals for the issues assigned to l it. Once goals are approved by the Vice President-Nuclear Energy, l

they become part -of the Nuclear Program Plan (NPP) for the follow-ing year.

In addition to setting department goals, the department planning teams will develop a budget and a human resources plan needed to achieve those goals. Each Department's goals, budget, and . human l

resources plan will be integrated and approved on a division basis l in the fall. When approved, this becomes the NPP for the following year.

l Line management will regularly review performance against the NPP goals. Mid-course" changes may need to be made based on new issues that arise during the year. The Independent Safety Evaluation Unit will report to the Off-Site Safety Review Committee and site management to assist them in determining if such changes need to be made, 11- 2 l

' The NPP will - be translated into action by the development . of performance objectives in support of each goal. Performance objectives are part of the existing corporate management system and are developed for Managers, General Supervisors, Supervisors, . and '

key professional employees, l 4

2. Performance Objectives . \

In s'upport. of the Corporation's Management-By-Objectives System, performance objectives are developed each year for all Managers, ,

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' General Supervisors, Supervisors, and key- professional employees, l

This system provides a written contract" between employees who have performance objectives and their supervisor.  !!

1 To strengthen accountability in the Nuclear Energy Division, these objectives have been carefully written in 1989 to reflect the NPP goals . and the actions necessary to attain those . goals. Also, the (

relative priority of each performance objective is matched to the priority . of the NPP goals. To reflect the relative priority, each j 1

Manager's performance objectives are weighted heavily toward safety and quality improvements.

Additional strengthening of accountability will be provided by 1

regoiring a formal review of performance objectives on a quarterly

' basis. These reviews will be documented and the results will be a 3 major factor in the year-end appraisal and merit salary adjustment.

The action plans described in Section I.B and shown in Appendix B l will be entered into appropriate performance objectives to ensure clear accountability for completion.

3. Management Expectations A set of " management expectations" has been developed. While these words can be viewed as rhetoric, the real value is in the leader-ship ._ message, delivery, and interpretation of these words. This represents an opportunity for dialogue between Supervisors and employees to define important new behaviors and explain their importance.

One way to help employees to understand these expectations is to use focus meetings. Focus meetings are discussions between Supervisors and their employees. They are described in more detail in Section II.B.4. For each level of supervision to accurately l understand these expectations, focus meetings must start at the top of the organization and cascade downward.

Other ways of communicating these expectations are explained under Communication Plan,Section II.B.4. -

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'The expectations . are:

SAFETY ANDOUALITY ARE MOREIMPORTANTTHAN PRODUCTION-e M AN AGEMENT W ANTS PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED ' -  ;

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l e ' A QUESTIONING ATTITUDE IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF SAFETY -]

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fi: WHEN IN DOUBT, PROCEED CONSERVATIVELY ;

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l e . PROCEDURES AND SAFETY PRACTICES MUST BE FOLLOWED e . RESOURCES WILL BE PR( NIDED TO DO THE JOB RIGHT e DO THE JOB RIGHTTHE-FIRST TIME e~ P'AY ATTENTION TO DETAIL SAFETY AND OUALITY WILL LEAD TO EFFECITVE TRODUCTION

' . We recognize the difficultyc in changing our behaviors. For these ,

expectations to . become more than rhetoric, it .will . require all

'Calvert ' Cliffsfieaders to set the example in.- word and deed con-Isistently over time.'

+ These . expectations will be . reinforced from the ' top ' level of the

' Nuclear Energ) Division and included as comments during the per- i formance appraisal . discussion. This means that salary will be af-fected based on this performance. I

4. Communications Plan The initial purpose of the Communications Plan is twofold: (1) make' employees at Calvcit. Cliffs aware of the . contents of- the NPP and (2) strengthen the communication of the' ' management expectations. This will be - accomplished using written material and personal delivery.

e Written communications begin with the distribution of the NPP and management expectations' to all Supervisors.

e Focus meetings are held to explain the NPP and managee L

expectations. Focus meetings are discussions l ment between Supervisors and their employees. The purpose of the meetings is to allow two-way -discussion and accep-tance of key ideas and plans. The Supervisor of the i Supervisor conducting the meeting will be present to provide visible support. and to listen to the concerns that are expressed.

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o Management and supervision. will 'be expected to routinely observe their- employees ;at work, . reinforce examples ~ of-b J expected , behavior and ' ' correct inappropriate behavior. ,

' This. will verify and L reinforce management expectations, j It will ! also create opportunities for problems, q concerns, and ' ideas to' be brought to management's atten- i tion.-

-). Continual reinforcement of the NPP and management s' l expectations ' will oe . accomplished by bulletin board I notices, Calvert Cliffs Newsletter articles, J and a. video. l

' presentation for .new employees. The video will feature '

the Vice President-Nuclear Energy and the Manager- ' l]

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, i 11

-e . Quarterly ' communications meetings based on departnuntal  :

safety . meetings will be conducted by departmental .

personnel . at all levels. The Vice President-Nuclear Energy, the Managers, and Supervisors will be , present . to voice and listen to safety concerns and to address such issues promptly.

. 5. . Nuclear Information Project Computerized information systems development at Calvert Cliffs have historically been structured - to meet individual departmental needs,'  ;

often missing opportunities to share benefits between ' organiza-tions.

The site information systems are presently inadequate to meet the increasing business, industry, and ' regulatory demands in areas including commitment tracking, root cause analysis, configuration management, and plant life extension.

The Nuclear Information Project created in January 1988 will develop a sitewide information management plan. Phase . I of . the project was completed in 1988. It produced a comprehensive 5-year plan to computerize the - information needed to safely operate and maintain Calvert Cliffs.

Specific projects / initiatives currently underway or planned to begin in 1989 include:

Eauioment Technical Database Project - The project, sponsored by the Manager-Nuclear Engineering Services, will create the Equipment Technical Database (ETD). This database will be a central reposi-tory for all component-related data. The ETD will be maintained as a single, controlled source of component information. A user will 7

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' be able to query the system for a given component to get informa-tion- such as e nameplate data; e references to drawings, procedures, and technical manuals; e Q-List information; e instrument setpoints; and o electrical power sources.

This information will also support other automated systems, such as the Maintenance Planning System, materials management / procurement, l.

procedures, and design documents.

Maintenance Planninn ' System Project - The Maintenance Planning System Project, sponsored by the Manager-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, will define, design, and install an improved Mainte-nance Planning System (MPS). The . current Nuclear Maintenance

- System does not provide sufficient functionality or interfaces 'to other systems. The new MPS will provide much more support for automated planning, maintenance request initiation, parts ordering, and repetitive work. The MPS will interface with other computer-ized systems, such as the Equipment Technical Database and the Corporate Materials System.

6. Commitment Management Project in 1988, we began a project to enable us to manage and monitor our key activities in a well-coordinated and integrated way. The Commitment Management Project, sponsored by the Manager-Quality Assurance & Staff Services, will provide automated and manual methods to track and communicate key activities including priori-ties, responsibilities, deliverables, and target dates. (in this

• use, a commitment is any- key activity and is not limited to those activities related to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.)

A prototype system will be developed to provide a single, common, accessible tool to monitor commitments made at the departmental level. The prototype system will also consolidate existing prior-ity schemes and lists now used to monitor department-level items.

This will be expanded to lower levels of the organization later.

The project will develop clear and workable guidance for e defining a commitment, e initiating a commitment and determining its impact, 11- 6

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' s e monitoring the status and results of a commitment, and '(

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e providing a method of' assigning priorities for new commitments.

7. Team Building Workshops In our organization groups; working together ' across organizational lines must understand and support common goals.

Interdependent work groups. will meet periodically to clarify roles

and identify common goals, thereby decreasing the amount of. misun-l.

derstanding and potential . conflict .between . the groups. Workshops

' will be conducted by a person experienced in conflict resolution who is not a member of- either group.

L The following ' participants and issues were chosen for the initial series of. workshops based on' out, symptoms, the NRC's 1988 System-atics Assessment of Licensee's Performance, and our judgment that they would lead to the most improvements.

e Plant & Project Engineering and Mechanical Maintenance on project management and line ' functions.

e System Engineers and Maintenance on " system experts."

e - Maintenance Supervisors and Operations on prioritization and conduct of maintenance.

e Quality Control and Maintenance on procedural compli-ance.

e Design Engineers and Operations on how equipment should perform, e Radiation Safety and Maintenance on support.

e System Engineers and Design Engineers on roles.

8. Quality Circle Program We ' intend to get more effective communications from all levels via a new, rejuvenated Quality Circle Program.

Baltimore Gas & Electric has a well functioning and effective l Quality Circle Program. This program has provided an effective  !

means of communicating new ideas and concepts. At one time, there i t

was an extremely effective Quality Circle Program in areas at Calvert Cliffs. In the past ' several ' years, this program has drifted into disuse.

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A Quality Circle Program presentation was held with site management in early March 1989. At this meeting, a proposed implementation schedule for reinstating former circles and establishing new ones was presented.

As a first priority, Quality Circles comprised of Quality Control and Maintenance workers will be established. Wc feel very strongly that the Quality Circle process will be an effective tool for building mutual trust and respect between these groups.

We anticipate that the efforts of these groups, as well as the other dozen-or-so circles proposed between now and the end of 1990, will produce significant resuhs. These results include plant improvement ideas which will enhance our safety performance, operating . effectiveness, teamwork, and morale.

9. Performance Management Proces's The performance management process uses performance standards, appraising skills, and communication skills to improve the under-standing of . job expectations between Supervisors and their employees. A corporate training program started in 1988 teaches Supervisors how to write results-oriented performance standards.

Non-defensive communication skilis and appraising skills are also stressed. This corporate program has been well received by line Supervisors who have participated in it.

We will develop a pilot workshop for a work group on site. The workshop will be patterned after the corporate training ' program and will be conducted by a person trained in the performance management process. Based on the results of the pilot, the program will be selectively expanded to other parts of the site organization where expectations and accountability need to be strengthened.

10. Procedures Upgrade Project The Procedures Upgrade Project began in February 1989 to improve the usability of procedures and to provide training on procedures.

This will be accomplished by e rewriting procedures, as necessary, to ensure they are technically correct and unambiguous, e training / retraining personnel, e reinforcing management expectations regarding procedure compliance, e strengthening existing organizations responsible for procedure development, i

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e capturing the basis for procedure changes as they are made, e providing more detail in procedures to rely less on worker knowledge and experience, and e improving the human-factors elements of procedures to reduce the potential for human error.

The Project Manager reports directly to the Manager-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. He directs the work of the procedure upgrade Task Managers from the various site organizations. The primary users of procedures are responsible for ensuring the adequacy of them, for rewriting them if necessary, for developing training modules, and for conducting. training. They are aided by training specialists and personnel dedicated to procedure- development. The procedure development personnel are responsible for reviewing, upgrading, and validating procedures.

Integral to this project, the Quality Assurance Program is being clearly state procedure compliance requirements.

revised to Presently, procedure compliance requirements are not uniformly addressed for all procedures potentially affecting safety. Clearer expectations will result from these improvements.

I1. .cedership Conferences We recognize the need to improve leadership skills among our key employees. These skills must be developed not only in supervision, but in other employees who have strong influences on our perfor-mance, such as Systems Engineers and Shift Technical Advisors.

We will develop a .!1 des of leadership conferences by July 31,1989. These half-day conferences will be conducted by the Vice President-Nuclear Energy, Managers, selected General Supervi-sors, and others with leadership roles. The conferences will focus on leadership skills rather than management skills and will mini-mize theory.

The topics that we consider of initial importance are:

l e Values and ethics - Trust, honesty, and their place in I

business, l

e Customer service, l' e The Management Team - Us and them, j

o Performance - Individual, organizational, and divisional, and e Corporate mindedness and effectiveness.

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Our goal (is . to. develop our leaders so they can more positively affect the ' morale and' performance of our employees.

C. Functior al 1morovements

l. Project Management We recognize that our way of ' working requires a good understanding r and; practice - of project management techniques. Therefore, a f comprehensive project management policy has been developed to

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direct the conduct of projects at Calvert Cliffs. Training on the

~ policy was provided to those . directly involved in projects as Project Managers 'or Task Managers .durirag 1988. The presentations f- consisted of a three-day training session .and a one-day refresher course. The refresher course was held to update participants on the changes made to the policy as a result of f"ggestions made

~ during' the . three-day training sessions.

Similar training will be provided to new employees involved in L . projects. Periodic refresher courses will be provided as well.

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Proper implementation of the policy will improve quality, budgetary L

control, and schedule completion for assigned projects as well as

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promote better understanding of project roles. Therefore, we - will develop and conduct an additional one-day training session for those directly and indirectly involved in support of project management. Participants will .use an example project to " walk through" the project management process. To promote the exchange of ideas, personnel from each Department will attend. The ' project management process will be monitored by the Principal Engineer-Project Engineering to ensure that we continue to conduct business in accordance 'with the policy, and that we make changes to the policy when they are . warranted.

2. System Circles A " System Circle" program,. started in August 1988, provides a l.

u framework for the System Ergineer to work with system experts from other organizations (primarily Operations, Maintenance, and Design Engineering) to identify problems and solutions to problems with systems, to work together developing system improvements, and to establish working relationships among people who have the same interest in improving a' system. The circle meets formally on'ce or twice a year (depending on the state of the system and its impor-tance) to discuss . current operating and material condition, planned or recommended improvements, and any joint efforts that are appro-priate to improve the system. Subject to ALARA considerations, meetings will also include a joint system walkdown. A report of the circle meeting results is generated. Planned actions and accountability are documented.

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j System Engineer Job Description 3.

The System Engineer is the focal point for the technical and engineering support function. An expanded description of the i

System Engineer's job was developed in 1988 to better define what.

is expected of the System Engineer and what can be expected of others. The job description was developed collaboratively with the operations and maintenance organizations. These organizations are the System Engineer's customers and are also the organizations upon which the System Engineer must rely for support. (The exercise of agreeing upon these working relationships was of significant value.) All System Engineers received training on the job ascrip-tion. Training will be expanded to . include Supervisors of other site organizations which interact with the System Engineer.

Training will be provided periodically for new personnel.

4. Combined Maintenance and Operations Department .

To improve the interface between maintenance and operations the two organizations were consolidated into a single department in September 1988. Functional groups .within the new department include operations, maintenance, and chemistry.

Other improvements made:

e Maintenance scheduling was assigned to operations to facilitate prioritization of maintenance jobs.

e The number of maintenance planners, instrument and electrical technicians, and mechanics was increased to cope with the increased volume of maintenance.

e The outage coordination staff was increased to improve control and management of outage activities.

e Electrical and Instrumentation Units were separated to provide additional supervisory knowledge in the disci-plines, o Quality control and radiation safety functions were assigned to the Quality ' Assurance & Staff Services Department to provide closer ties to the QA organization and to provide a more independent review of operations and maintenance, o Maintenance planners were reassigned from the central-ized planning unit to the maintenance line organization to provide better control of maintenance jobs. They have been kept phyt,ically close to help the planning of joint jobs.

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' ". " 5. - Surveillance Test Program Although the surveillance . test program . complies with the . require-L. 4 I~ 1 ments .of -our: Technical- Specifications, . ' implementation of this ;

program is too decentralized. As ' a consequence, our ' ability to'.

p 6 ' make improvements or 1 revisions to' existing procedures : thus avoid-L

.ing reliance . on - the expertise of the technician performing the test,is weakened.

We 'are taking / steps to catablish strongicentral program control and

. to = strengthen the lines - of responsibility.' Comequently, :the governing procedure has been restructured to provide; central .

control through a Site Surveillance ~ ~ Test ~ Coordinator' (SSTC).

Through - our- matrix organization,- Functional Surveillance Test Coordinators' (FSTC) will report to the SSTC. Examples of . func-tional surveillance areas are fire protection, snubbers, and l-L in-service testing. The ~ new structure is being - put in place ' and 5 staffed. .

We ; expect to fully implement .the . revised governing procedure by.

mid-1989. As part of the Procedures Upgrade Action Plan,. critica!

- surveillance test procedures requiring upgrade will be rewritten by.

• August 1989. The balance of' surveillance' test ' procedures will be-

' revised' by ' January 31, 1991.

6. Technical Menual Improvements In response to Generic Letter g3-2g, INPO . Good Practices, and Oper'ating Experience item 1959, ~ improvements for the control . and upgrade. of . vendor - technical manuals were developed. The governing procedure is being revised to- address e the receipt, technical review, distribution, and change control . of vendor technical information including

' Service Advice Letters, Technical Information Bulletins, etc., and e newly developed engineering technical review criteria.

We plan to provide additional resources and personnel to support the thorough and prompt technical review of new or revised vendor technical manuals. In addition, we plan to backfit the new engi-neering technical review criteria to selected technical manuals already on file. The Principal Engineer-Configuration Management is responsible for overseeing the technical review process.

A vendor interface program was also established based on the Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program with modifications sug-gested by INPO Good Practice for Technical Manual Improvement and Operating Experience Item 1959 (covering Service Advice Letters).

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PROBLEM CORRECTION 1

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. .j 111. PROBLEM CORRECTION

'A. Definition .

A summary statement of the root causes associated with this category is:

The process of.' identifying, analyzing, and resolving problems was not always adequately ~ performed. Timely action did not always occur before problems affected or threatened to affect the ' safe and continued opera-tion of the plant.

Root causes .which we have grouped under this category are:

e Insufficient depth of assessment and root cause analysis; e Insufficient monitoring, . follow-up, and trending; and e Insufficient issue discovery.

Some symptoms that led us to the root causes are:

o Investigations of problems E often are not performed in suffi-cient depth to identify . root causes and major contributing factors. As' a result, the corrective actions taken may not be adequate to prevent recurrence. (INPO Evaluation) e Written guidelines defining the required scope' and depth of investigations have not been developed except for - events significant . enough to be identified in Calvert Cliffs Event Reports. (INPO Evaluation) .

e Few investigations are performed on events determined not to be reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (INPO Evaluation) e Potential weaknesses were seen in. the ab'ility of senior management to perceive plant problems and determine root causes and in the safety committees' abilities to provide independent views of plant activities to management. (NRC 1987 SALP) e Certain types of changes to the plant do not appear to be adequately screened for applicability to 10 CFR 50.59 re-quirements. (NRC 1988 Inspection Report) f e Weaknesses were noted in the timeliness in which potential safety issues were recognized. (NRC 1986 SALP)

The following sections describe corrective actions developed to address the root causes in this category. Section Ill.B describes actions developed to heighten our awareness of the plant and potential safety issues. This includes improving our collective awareness of generic 111-1

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issues, industry practices, our own practices, and our knowledge of the Ji plant as they all relate' to safety.- Section Ill.C describes actions developed to improve how we identify and resolve problems.

B. Hei2htened Awareness Related to Safety

1. Off-Site Safety Review Committee j l

As defined in Section E5.2 ' of Calvert Cliffs Technical Specif - l j

cations,- the . Off-Site Safety Review Committee ~ (OSSRC) provides independent review and audit of designated activities in the areas of operations, engineering, chemistry, metallurgy, instrumentation and control, radiological safety, and quality assurance. Members are appointed by the Vice President-Nuclear Energy and collectively have expertise in the above areas. I To strengthen the OSSRC's performance, the Vice President-Nuclear Energy will make his expectations clear at an April 1989 meetir.s.

In brief, his expectations are that the Committee is to function as Baltimore Gas & Electric't top-level nuclear safety oversight group. Nuclear safety is their one and only consideration.

Production and scheduling will be addressed by the line organiza-tions. Members will probe issues in depth and pay r,ttention to the

" people-side" .of issues, such as organizational considerations.

BG&E's goal is to raise significant safety concerns and have line management correct these concerns before such matters are pointed out by INPO or the NRC.

The Committee's ability to identify and address safety issues has been improved. A subcommittee was formed in the second quarter of 1988 to identify significant safety issues for review by the full committee. Members are being encouraged to probe issues in more depth to identify problems. When required, line management and supervision will present safety issues to the Committee. To i

provide for additional discussion time, the number of regular l meetings was increased from four to six per year. l The Committee's ability to provide independent assessments of plant activities free of operational bias was enhanced by membership changes. More members were added such that a majority of the Committee members do not report to the Vice President-Nuclear Energy. The number of OSSRC members who also serve on the. Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee was red iced. The Chairman was changed from an on-site to an off-site member. An additiona!

non-BG&E consultant was added to the Committee.

A revised training and qualification program for OSSRC members has been put in place. New members will complete the program. In addition, all members will receive periodic refresher training.

The General Supervisor-Nuclear Training will periodically meet with the Chairman to discuss training needs and results.

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'2. Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee

~As defined in - Section . 6.5.1 of Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifi-4 cations, the Plant Operations - and Safety Review Committee (POSRC) advises the L Manager-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant on all matters related to nuclear safety.

The Vice President-Nuclear Energy. recently met with the members and alternates to clarify his expectations relative to their role on the Committee.~ His remarks included:

o POSRC pursues issues of -safety significance and recom-mends to the . - Plant Manager (Manager-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear ' Power Plant) the right thing to do from a nuclear-safety perspective.-

e The POSRC does not determine ways to get the plant back on line . or to keep it on line -- that is the. role of line management, o The POSRC should be " nuclear safety conservative", its members must professionally fill their roles as the on-site' corporate experts on plant safety issues. They must take on more of an oversight role in the conduct of

- their Committee activities.

The POSRC charter will be revised to include these expectations.

This charter will be signed by the Manager-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power. Plant and incorporated into the POSRC Manual.

To increase the safety focus and perspective' of Committee members, training; will be provided on 10 CFR 50.59 and other appropriate subjects.

The Chairman recently added two internal consultants to the Com-mittee to provide additional expertise in the areas of operations and licensing.

To allow the ' Committee to focus on the more significant safety matters, other safety committee formats and organizations will be considered. such as subcommittee and line organization reviews.

To provide members of plant management not on the POSRC with. more

-- knowledge of the safety issues and concerns discussed in Committee, 1

more detailed minutes will be developed and disseminated. More detailed information will serve to provide better understanding for the demands and priorities placed on supporting organizations.

3. Safety Evaluations In Accordance With 10 CFR 50.59 Beginning in 1988, training to clarify the need for, and to assure proper preparation of, safety evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR ,

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( 50.59 was given to Design Engineering, Plant & Project Engineering, and other appropriate plant personnel. Additional follow-up training is_ ~ planned for - 1989. This ' training will be ' structured so i

( 'it can be used by new employees and internal transfers.  !

A _10' CFR 50.59 screening process -has been incorporated into Design Endneering Section procedures to clarify the need for a 50.59 evaluation for plant modifications. We plan to reference this screening ' criteria in other plant procedures to further clarify 10 t-CFR 50.59 requirements for temporary modifications and test proce-dures.

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4. Configuration Management Unit l-I A significant amount of research is required to prepare facility change packages. Due to th.e lack of an easily accessible design .

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basis, this research is time , consuming and often duplicated or l

applied _ inconsistently. To address this, a Configuration Man-agement Unit was formed in the Design Engineering Section in January 1989. -This unit has an initial task of consolidating the

- Calvert Cliffs design basis and making it more accessible ' to site

. personnel. This ready access will enhance our ability to assess the impact of proposed plant activities on the design basis.

To consolidate the site fire protection program and to provide -

long-term programmatic overview of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R compliance, a Fire Protection Engineer has been ' included in this unit. This engineer will be responsible for managing and maintaining the aspects of . the Fire Protection Program associated with the plant configuration and design bases.

5. Engineer Training A comprehensive three-month' training program has been developed that includes reactor theory, thermodynamics, fluid flow, electri-cal science, plant systems, integrated plant operations, and codes and ' standards. The program will be offered at least once a year.

The first group of engineers completed training in December 1988.

The next training session will begin in September 1989.

A second level of system-specific training will be provided for about 30 major systems. Qualification standards will be ' developed by engineering 'and Nuclear Training. Once developed, these stan-dards will be used by System Engineers to document the training process. Qualification, among other things will, require field assignments to familiarize System Engineers with the configuration and operation of their systems in the plant. This training will also address leadership, work relations, and customer service roles relative to operations. and maintenance.

Particular emphasis will be placed on the leadership role of the System Engineer in a customer support position.

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6. Duke Engineering Evaluation -

In 1988', Duke ' Engineering Services, Inc., conducted an independent assessment of our ' Nuclear Engineering Services ' Department (NESD).

Duke reviewed and evaluated organizational structure functional

' responsibilities, and current practices. They conducted 62 inter-views with personnel from NESD and from major interfacing groups outside of NESD.

Duke's report contained 28 short-term and 26 long-term recommen-dations. Implementation of all but one of the short-term recom-mendations is complete. Some of the more important short-term recommendations include:

e implement a short training course to familiarize inex-perienced System Engineers with plant systems, o Establish single-point ' contacts within Design Engineer -

ing to provide immediate support to important short-term

' issues.

-o. Confirm Design Engineering staffing levels.

e, Identify and schedule Design Engineering work items for the next two years.

e Complete the approved Licensing Unit staffing. .j

-i e . Establish the Licensing Unit as a key interface for the  !

NRC Regional Office and a contact for the NRC Resident Inspector.

e Reassign the sponsorship of Licensee Event Reports to the Licensing Unit to assure uniform, timely and thor-ough reports.

implementation of ten of the long-term recommendations is con $leie.

'The long-term recommendation to expand the career path for techni-cally-oriented personnel was rejected. We performed surveys of industry practices and determined that our current career path for l-i these personnel is sufficient. The width of our salary range for professional employees allows for continued salary growth of top performers. Special positions can also be created to attract or retain a specific individual whose skills are needed.

Fhrt are in place to implement the remaining 15 long-term recom-mendations with emphasis on:

e Developing a facility change request (FCR) ranking list.

o Moving System Engineers closer to the plant (inside the protected area) to provide a closer and more effective i

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3 interface between _ the System ' Engineer and the equipment operators' and mainte' nance - personnel.

e Establishing : a minor-modifications ~ program = which will improve the efficiency of the ' engineering process by _

tailoring 2 the - level of design input and ' review to the '

complexity ' of the job.'

o- Updating = the Calvert Cliffs design basis.-

o: Evaluating' the present Project Engineering Unit staff in.

light of the proposed ~ increase in plant modification and scheduling responsibilities.

7. Visitin~g Other Plants To improve the awareness and recognition of issues, problems, and

. good' practices, we ~ will improve our communication with other plants. We will make more. informal visits to other plants when we believe . we ' can benefit from such a visit. We will . participate more in formal visits sponsored by INPO and the International Atomic Energy ~ Agency to the extent that these organizations can support us.

Every Manager and ' General Supervisor will participate in an INPO assessment of another plant. Our. goal is that within - three years, each Manager and General Supervisor who has 'not previously done so will participate in at least one visit. A continuing goal is that each Manager and General Supervisor will participate in at least one visit . every three years. ; These goals will "be ' subject to the limitations that may be imposed upon us by INPO.

A pre-visit guidance document will be provided to' focus each participant's objectives and preparations. Participants will develop specific' objectives to be accomplished during their visit.

Upon return, participants will document benefits ' derived from their visit and will also brief ' their- counterparts on lessons learned during the assessment.

8. Reliability-Centered Maintenance Project To provide enhanced assurance of the operability of safety-related systems, we started a reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) pilot project in 1988 for the auxiliary feedwater, safety injection, service water, and ' saltwater systems. The project will systemati-cally assess the effectiveness of current preventive maintenance I

(PM) activities. The RCM program is used to identify and provide l' PM - tasks that' focus on maintaining system functions that are n

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I important to plant safety and to plant availability. The product i' of the program will be e a rational and documented basis for the PM tasks per- .

I formed on systems that are important to both safety and availability, .

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e an optimized PM program identifying the minimum level of PM activity, necessary to . preserve a high availability of important systems, e system models to support a program to enhance manage-ment's ability to assess risk from a reliabili-ty/ availability perspective, and e the groundwork for further development of the plant life extension program.

Assessment of the first four systems will be completed by July .

1989. Assessment of four more systems will begin in the second half of 1989. We anticipate that at least 20 systems will be covered in the RCM program.

C. Problem Identification and Resolution

1. Self-Evaluations in 1987, we performed a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) l of the auxiliary feedwater system. We will continue to perform this type of critical self-evaluation on aspect,s of plant opera-tion.

Quality Assurance recently conducted a maintenance inspection of the emergency AC power system and the feedwater system. They were assisted by representatives from engineering, maintenance, and operations, as well as three consultants. The emergency- AC power

' system was chosen because of its importance in mitigating the consequences of accidents. The feedwater system was chosen because of its history of initiating plant trips. The inspection used the NRC's Maintenance insoection Guidance. issued in June 1988. The inspection team reviewed 47 separate elements of the maintenance function and reported their findings to the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Department. That department is developing and imple-l menting plans' to address the inspection team's findings.

A second SSFI is planned for the summer of 1989. The inspection team will perform a thorough review of the low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) system. The team will review the design, opera-tion, maintenance, modification, testing, training, and management activities that support the LPSI system and its support systems.

Personnel from engineering, operations, maintenance, and quality assurance will be part of the inspection team. They will be aided by contractors with previous experience in conducting SSFis.

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5 We intend to continue this program' of periodic focused assessments.

These assessments may take the form of additional SSFis or another i proven technique. Our - goal is. to be proactive in identifying our l weaknesses. Therefore, we . intend to use existing techniques or to modify - these - techniques to suit our needs.

2. Independent Safety Evaluation We have formed a new unit that will have the capability and clearly

- defined responsibility to determine the underlying root causes of l deficiencies observed ' by ourselves or by others, such as INPO or j the NRC. l The Independent Safety Evaluation Unit (ISEU) reports to the Vice j President-Nuclear Energy through the General Supervisor-Quality Assurance and the Manager-Quality Assurance and Staff Services.

This ensures that ISEU deliberations are independent of the organ-izations directly charged with operating and maintaining the plant.

Staffing of the unit will begin in April 1989. We expect the unit will be fully functional by the end of 1989. The unit will be staffed by analysts and engineers trained in in-depth event analy-sis techniques . to permit a structured method to independently assess and identify the underlying root causes of plant events and  ;

deficiencies. The unit will perform independent assessments of l operations, maintenance, and engineering activities that could '

affect nuclear safety. The unit will provide feedback to supervi-sion and management.

The unit' will also incorporate INPO's Human Performance Evaluation

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System. (HPES). This system will help reduce the potential for human error and provide an additional channel for the identifica-  ;

tion of nuclear safety concerns. Several people were trained in 1988 and early 1989 on HPES. One person is working part-time on HPES.

The root cause analysis process _ used to develop the Plan will be i

refined and= institutionalized within the ISEU. This on-going process will evaluate deficient performance and bring the resulting issues before . site management. These issues will become part of

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planning prccess (Section II.B.1). Since this

the issues-based process is driven by an annual planning cycle, ISEU will' also report to the POSRC, the OSSRC, and ' plant management on a more l

frequent basis. Our goal is to have quarterly reports.

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In addition to HPES and root cause analysis responsibilities, the ISEU will be responsible for leading investigations of significant

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l' Calvert Cliffs events. Personnel in this unit will also be in-volved in Licensee' Event Report analysis and the review of industry I operating experience.

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l  : 3. .-Internal ~ Assessment Process

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In : certain 1 instances, such' as equipment qualification, line organ-issues l raised , by izations. have '- been ineffective in . resolving Quality; Assurance. To ensure appropriate attention is paid to -

potential. issues, we have set out to improve ' our Quality Assurance -

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l ' audit process by e'- increasing management involvement, l

I- e . improving the knowledge and experiences of auditors and inspectors, e -increasing the number and depth of inspections, and -

e . utilizing' the analyses prpvided by the ISEU to focus

l. audits and evaluations on areas of significant concern.

p' Managers and ' General Supervisors will become more involved in audit activities by attending briefings regarding aud.its in their areas of responsibility.

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Additional root cause training and technical training will be given

.to auditors and inspectors. This does not supplant line . manage-ment's responsibility for root cause analysis of conditions adverse to quality.' Interdepartmental rotations will be made to improve the - knowledge and - experience of inspectors. As described in Section Ill.C.2, the ISEU will improve m the quality of event analy-sis, improving our ability to - detect underlying root causes of i.

deficient performance. Root cause analysis . training' for QA per-

' sonnel will improve audits and their accompanying technical evalu-ations.

We will increase the number and depth of Quality Control inspec-

? tions. ' More ' time will be allowed for . preparation prior to the I

inspection and for the inspection itself. We believe our recent organizational changes and emphasis will restore the QC inspection function to the position of needed effectiveness.

4.- Root Cause Analysis g

Personnel involved in root cause - analysis 'from - those first on the  ;

scene to those who resolve the problem - should understand the root l cause ' analysis process. Work groups will be given individualized l

training that will emphasize the importance of a' questioning

' attitade . and. preservation of failure evidence. System Engineers and Maintenance ' Supervisors will receive in-depth training. Lesson t.

plans are. being developed in-house and should be completed in late 1989. This training will be structured so it can be used by new emplo'.rees and internal transfers. i l

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In addition to. 'the ' training -described above, we have found some

' issues. are so specialized or difficult they are beyond the 'capa-

< bilities of a System Engineer. One ' solution under consideration ' is 4

! to form a dedicated L group ~ devoted to failure analysis. System Engineers .can call on such a group of specialists to resolve li problems beyond their capability.

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5. Institute of- ' Nuclear Power . Operations Significant Operating i I

Experience Reports The ultimate goal of the - Plant Operating Experience Assessment

Committee (POEAC) is to - improve plant : operational safety. The POEAC is a subcommittee of the Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee '(POSRC) ..and includes representatives from engineering, operations, maintenance, and training. The POEAC regularly reviews and evaluates industry operating experience to determine their applicability to Calvert Clifft. The POEAC then communicates

< significant information to . the appropriate people. Over the past several years, this method of doing business has suffered from a lack of . control and accountability.

Additional . control . and accountability ~ was established by institut-ing the following measures:

e A Project Manager is assigned to manage each SOER response to assure that all recommendations, . including interim measures, are addressed in a coordinated manner.

e For expediency, POEAC assigns items (SOERs' and others) to individuals. To assure assignments . are appropriately prioritized, POEAC notifies ' Supervisors of assignments made to their subordinates. The Supervisor may regt est that POEAC change the assignment to another individual should conflicts arise.

e. Extensions to completion dates will require the Super-

. visor's approval.

e The POSRC reviews the final response to SOERs.

Henceforth, the POEAC activities will be audited annually for effectiveness by Quality Assurance. Specifically, the .incorpo-  !

ration of SOER recommendations into design, operations, mainte-nance, and training activities will be evaluated.

6. Procurement Program Project The Procurement Program Project resulted from a detailed assessment completed in 1988 of practices for identifying, processing, and controlling replacement parts, new parts, and services.

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Specific objectives: include : improving the process . for obtaining basic - components, . a commercial grade procurement process ' which meets EPRI's Nuclear . Construction- Issues Group Standard-07, and an --

efficient . process. for- obtaining - non-nuclear - components. The~

n Project Manager was assigned in March 1989 and supporting personnel 1

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. are expected to be in place by May 1989.

7. Post-Maintenance Testing h

'A comprehensive post-maintenance test (PMT) program has been y-developed to confirm ' thef successful completion . of. maintenance -

"- activities. Engineering and . maintenance personnel developed specific testing requirements for typical maintenance activities associated with generic equipment. ' Eighteen PMT modules have been developed to date and will he issued for implementation shortly.

An individual will be assigned to review and manage.PMT to minimize ,

the impact on the . operating shift organization. Post-mainteriance testing ' results will be trended and ' abnormal- condition reports will be issued to Component .. and System Engineers. - As the program

- evolves,' it is expected that tests now performed tg demonstrate operability will be incorporated into this program.

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RESOURCE ALLOCATION s

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IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION A. Definition <;

A summary statement of the root causes associated with this category is: 1 Managerne.nt did not always allocate sufficient. resources, nor did site management always utilize existing resources _ in the most effective manner.

Root-causes which we have grouped under this category are:

e- Insufficient scheduling and prioritization, and-e Insufficier,t resource allocation.

Some symptoms' that led us to the root causes are:

e _ The 1 facility change request backlog is increasing and a plan for reducing ~ the backlog does not exist. In addition, long-standing backlogs of design engineering work exist in audit finding close-outs, hant Operating Experience Assess-ment Committee reviews,.and Off-Site Safety Review ' Committee support assignments. (INPO Evaluation) e Project engineering needs additional resources to handle future increases in workload due to facility change requests.

(Duke Engineering Assessment) e System engineers are too involved in the unexpected questions and problems that develop daily. (Duke Engineering Assessment)

Section IV.B. describes corrective actions that we developed to address these root causes and improve our. performance. These include budget and personnel increases, a new ~ unit' to relieve System Engineers of some of their' functions, and use of a more structured approach to making organ-

'izational and programmatic changes.

The following corrective actions described in Chapters II and Ill of this report also address these root causes:

e Implementing the planning process described in Section II.D.1, o Implementing the planning and scheduling improvements de-scribed in Section II.B.6, and o Using the project management techniques described in Section ll.C.I.

IV-1

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B. Resource Allocation Improvements j

1. Budget and Staffing i

Emphasis on corporate-wide cost limitations and staff reductions i has been substantially reduced. We have demonstrated our commitment to providing the necessary resources to improve performance at Calvert Cliffs. Our intent is to ensure Calvert l Cliffs has sufficient people, tools, materials, and equipment to wisely address problems proactively. l The Nuclear Energy Division's 1988 actual expenditures increased by 20% over 1987. Projected spending for 1989 is expected to increase by another 30%. Nuclear Energy's approved staffing levels reflect considerable increases as well. In the past year, we increased

- staffing by 80 positions. Another 25 positions are expected to be added by the end of 1989. Our goal is to add staff in a managed, controlled manner.

Future budget and manpower needs will be monitored through improved planning and scheduling. Resource allocation will be consistent with the goals and priorities set forth by the Nuclear Program Plan.

2. Engineering Planning We believe that gaining effective control of the planning and scheduling of engineering and project activities is essential to our improvement.

An Engineering Planning Unit was formed in November 1988 in the Nuclear Engineering Services Department (NESD). The complement for this unit is 13 of which 4 are now in place. Our goal is to fully staff the unit by the end . of 1989. The unit will implement a computer-based planning process for engineering activities.

The unit will improve the delivery of NESD work. The unit will also aid management and supervision in more effectively integrating NESD activities into overall site activities.

The unit already has issued an 18-month schedule for engineering for facility change requests and has developed plans for 1989 post-refueling outage projects. It will expand its planning and scheduling to the Plant & Project Engineering Section as well as the Technical Services Engineering Section.

3. Daily and Outage Work Activities The Operations & Maintenance Coordination Unit is responsible for scheduling work and coordinating resources to accomplish on-site maintenance. To improve the coordination of work activities among IV-2

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,, work .

J J groups (e.g., mechanics, - electricians), support groups (e.g.. .

' health physics, safety - tagging), : and engineering ' (i.e., - Engineering

~

Planning tUnit) and. to ; achieve quality. work while consistently meeting maintenance ' and outage schedules, the following ' steps ' were takent 1 Le- Complement increases were approved in September 1988.to add personnel to Post-Maintenance Testing, Safety ~

s. ,

Tagging,L ALARA, Outage . Management, and Operations to improve the . scheduling of work.

e . All schedulers received ' specialized training.

e1 Tools, computers, . printers,i and plotters were provided.

e- The Operations & Ma'irrtenance Coordination Unit was relocated ' to promote improved communication among work

[  : groups.

4.-  : AuxiliaryiSystems Engineering Unit

.To give System Engineers more time to' provide maintenance and operations support their primary function the need for . experts in equipment common to many systems became apparent. To accomplish this, a unit,- with a complement of 15 members, was formed in February 1988. This unit has'one group of System Engineers and two groups of Component Engineers. The Component Engineers are being developed to be the experts on various individual components rather than entire systems.

< LThe Component Engineer will assume component problems from the System ' Engineer and coordinate a resolution using vendor in-depth component expertise, as required. He directs maintenance and testing needed to resolve the problem and retains data that will be helrful in resolving future component problems.

5. hunaging Organization and Program Changes We recognize the need to better1 manage change at Calvert Cliffs.

Our . goal'is ~ a process that allows organization and program . changes with - minimal . disruptions of- people . while enhancing their understanding and acceptance of the change.

y f, . First, we must determine what this new process will cover, what is specifically wrong with current methods, and develop criteria for a desired process. Next, we will search for alternative methods to

meet the criteria. These may be developed internally or through a

- vendor. After the process methods are determined, we will train appropriate people in the process and utilize it in implementing one or more organization or ' program changes. After evaluating the effectiveness of the new change process, we will make adjustments Land prepare applicable procedures.

IV-3

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APPENDIX A ,

SUMMARY

OF PROCESS l

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SUMM ARY OF PROCESS The goal of the process was to find the root causes for our declining safety perfor-mance and determine corrective actions to address them. In brief, we identified symptoms of our declininE performance, grouped them under postulated root causes, s analyzed the results more carefully to develop the root causes, and developed cor-

- rective actions and action plans to address the root causes. Each section that follows - Symptoms, Database, and Action Plans - describes a portion of the process.

It was not our intent to identify every-root cause and every corrective action.

Rather, our intent was to identify the major root causes and corrective actions and to develop a process to address current and future issues. We recognize the need to institutionalize a process that will help us continue to improve our performance.

1. Symotoms .

Our first step was an examination of our performance focused on 1987 "

and 1988. Our objective was to se' lect a manageable but comprehen-sive sample that was highly likely to include symptoms that would lead to the major root causes.

. Hundreds of symptoms were identified from numerous sources of information. Licensing engineers combed through our 1987 and 1988 NRC inspection reports and Licensee Event Reports. They reviewed the 1986 and 1987 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance Reports and the Duke Engineering Services 1988 evaluation of engi-neering. Quality Assurance reviewed past audit findings, the 1987 Safety System Functional Inspection of the auxiliary feedwater system, and the 1988 reports of the Institute ' of Nuclear Power Operations Plant Evaluation and Corporate review.

Each person conducting a review recorded any statement supporting a finding that our performance was not adequate. These statements emerged as our symptoms. A few examples are:

e Individuals involved in multi-disciplinary tasks are not

. given the responsibility and authority to effectively complete their task. (NRC 1986 SALP) e Problems were noted with the quality of procedures in that procedures cannot be performed as written, and procedural text was inconsistent with section headings.

(INPO Evaluation) f i

e There is a lack of clear assignment of responsibility for multi-discipline tasks. (NRC 1987 SALP)

Symptoms were loaded into a database using input forms. A sample input form is shown in Figure 2.

A-2

--._____m.__ m__m._u

1

~~2. Datab'ase

' A . comprehensive ! set of potential root causes was identified -in the M Niagara Mohawk Restart" Action. Plan for Nine Mile Point which was -

used L to e screen a subset . of the symptom database. This screening R determined .11 more specific root causes, at least one of which could -

l' be associated with each . of the - symptoms in the subset. The purpose -

'of this screening' was to provide a manageable set of postulated root u 4 .causes - for teams comprised of - Managers, General . Supervisors, and selected ' Supervisors to assign to symptoms.

L

~

lEach team was assigned a portion 'of the symptom database t'o assign

! root J causes to each symptom = and to assess whether additional root '

causes were applicable. During the screening process that developed the 11 ' root causes, it was recogni_ zed that in many cases a symptom b, could be, attributed to more than one root cause. Therefore, the-l ,

teams- were permitted to associate up to three ' root causes with each symptom.'!!n ' this manner, . the task was kept manageable while pro-viding reasonable. assurance that symptoms with the same or similar l

root .cause. 'were grouped together for later steps in the process.

?- The next step in the process was to group symptoms by root cause and i

to . develop. corrective actions that were less focused on the indi-

l. vidual symptoms - but- 'that addressed the root cause. This - process proceeded slowly and required several iterations, due in part to the tendency to foc'us the corrective actions on the individual symptoms.

This resulted in more comprehensive corrective actions for some of the symptoms ' but ~ was missing the objective of addressing the root causes.

The teams 1 were, therefore, provided with only the root causes and the. specific corrective actions for the symptoms, but were not I

provided with the symptoms. This approach minimized the ability and tendency to focus the corrective actions on the . specific symptoms and resulted in corrective action statements that better addressed the root causes. Examples of these are:

e Increase- use of INPO Peer Evaluator opportunities to learn from other plants.

e Conduct inter- and intradepartment team building work-shops.

-e Establish focus meetings to convey expectations and obtain feedback.

3

3. Action Plang The corrective action statements were then assigned to individual departments for . refinement and for development of more detailed plans. Later team and group meetings refined these plans, provided i

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, ' recommendations - for further pursuit,' subjectively assessed the

- probability and consequences of failure of- each, and -defined :likely causes . of failure. ~ The plans ' include expected results, methods,

, resources' needed, responsibility,- and verification...

s..

~ManyE of the detailsL of . the . plans are still . 'being ~ developed. As '

described ' in . Section ~ 1.C, resource loading, . ' scheduling, prioritiza-tic.i'., and' sponsorship will be defined by July - 31, 1989,

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l APPENDIX B PRELIMINARY ACTION PLAN SU.M MARIES

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II.B.1 PLANNING PROCESS.

1. _ OUTCOME /RESUL*IS An. annual Nuclear. Program Plan'(NPP) and Division budget that reflects:

e Programmatical corrective actions for deficient performance observed in -

the prior year.

e Goals (objectives) ' established to cope with future issues in the nuclear field, o A rationale set 'o f Performance Objectives that clearly align to the Divi-sion priorities stated in the NPP. ,

11. METHODS A. Develop a manual; to control and institutionalize the Nuclear Program Planning process.

B. Staff the Independent Safety Evaluation Unit (ISEU) and train people in Root Cause Analysis.

C. Institutionalize the Root Cause Analysis process now being used by Plan-ning & Support to develop the Performance improvement Plan.

D. Institute a better method of identifying and researching . " Nuclear issues" via the Nuclear Plannins Group (NPG) to feed -into the " Issues-Based" Planning Process.

E. Develop and institute a Management _ retreat (Vice President, Managers, and General Supervisors) once a year to participate in the root cause analy-

-n sis / issues identification input to the NPP.

F. Develop integrated Planning Calendar, including NPG meetings, Budget development, ISEU ' Root Cause Analysis, Management retreats, etc., that ensures a rationale flow for the process and ensures it compliments the Corporate process).

G. Include a policy requiring quarterly accountability for Performance Objectives.

Ill. RESOURCES y: To be determined.

IV. RESPONhlBILITY To be -determined.

V. VERIFICATION i

(; To be determined.

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H.B.4 COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS -

A. People are aware of the contents of the' Nuclear. Program Annual Goals.

l 'Bi People understand N'uclear Energy Division Management Expectations.

s

= II. METHODS A'. Nuclear Program Plan (NPP)

-t

1. Written

a. NPP is . distributed: to all supervisors.

b. Three dedicated ' bulletin board . slots have been. made available^

' on ten new bulletin boards for' the ' Division. These slots-will be ,used to _ communicate the ' goals,' indicate ' individual

- ' behaviors ' needed to accomplish the goals, and provide feed-

. back . on goal accomplishment,

c. . Calvert - Cliffs Newsletter will carry articles . written .by Supervisors citing examples of . individual contribution to goal' attainment. Articles complimenting jobs done well and conforming to the new: philosophy will. also be published.

l

~ 2. Penonal Delivery

a. Quarterly Communications Meetings will be conducted for all personnel to be focused around Department Safety meetings.

Single topics will ' be chosen that - represent . timely events needing emphasis by' the ' Vice President . Nuclear Energy, Managers, and General Supervisors.

- b. Management By Walking Around (MBWA) will be expected of all supervisors. ' Purpose of MBWA is to get z out in the " field,"

observe people at work, and reward examples of expected -

behavior around quality and safety. Our existing,' effective Supervisory Observation . Program will be expanded.

c. Focus meetings will be conducted explaining the 'NPP.

1

'- B. NED Mananement Expectations

1. Written

a. Incorporate and deliver with NPP.

b. Display on the Bulletin Boards.

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4. .

c.  : Managers, ' General Supervisor, AGSs. Supervisors, and ' craft-

. level employees ~ ' write articles for . the Newsletter interpret-

.in g and personalizing these ' expectations. Articles will be answers to ."What they mean to me."

2. ' Personal Delivery a .- MBWA' will be used: to verify / reinforce expectations.

b. A . video featuring the VP-Nuclear Energy and the Manager -

Calvert Cliffs. Nuclear Power Plant will be developed to explain the expectations. This video will be used during

. General Orientation Training and for new employees.

c. Focus Meetings will be held throughout the site to; explain and help people to accept the expectations.

111. R ESOURCES '

To' be determined.

IV. ' RESPONSIBILITY 4-To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION ,

. To 'be determined.

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B-4

II.B.5 NUCLEAR INFORM ATION PROJECT

1. OUTCOME /RESULE A site-wide information plan.

11. METHODS A. Develop a database that will be a central repository for all component-related data.

B. Define, design, and install an improved maintenance planning system.

C. Implement a comprehensive five-year plan to computerize the information needed to safely operate and maintain Calvert Cliffs.

Ill. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

I B-5

i II.B.6 COMMITMENT MANAGEMENT PROJECT i

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I. OUTCOME /RESULTS  !

Provide a' single sitewide system for tracking and monitoring site commitments.

. - II. . METHODS (Phase 1 - Develop and Test the Concept)

A. Define' the scope and basic functions that a Site / Department Commitment Management system must support to be effective at Calvert Cliffs.

B. Develop a prototype system to support Commitment Management requirements.

C. Implement the prototype system within the management level of NED '

D. Adapt the prototype to meet changes requested after initial usage.

(Phase II - Expand the Concept Sitewide)

< Approach to be determined based upon results of prototype >

111. RESOURCES To be determined.

~ ,

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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I B-6 mm__mm_.m__ , _ _ _ ____...m

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II.B.7 TEAM BUILDING WORKSHOPS

1. ' OUTCOME /R ESULTS To decrease the conflict between interdependent working. groups by c!ari-fying roles and identifying common goals.

II. METHODS A. Conduct . a ' workshop for the appropriate leadership of each organization, usually the General Supervisor, _ supervisors,, work leaders, and some craft-level employees. Design of the workshop would depend on the nature of the . results but would be a choice ' of two or three design options.

Each option would take from one-ha.lf to two days, and would be determined by a' satisfactory resolution of the issues. The designs would have in common activities that allow the two groups to communicate their differ-ences and agree on methods to circumvent the differences. These work-shops will be facilitated by an ' organizational " outsider."

B. Possible' candidates for the first workshops are:

~

1. Plant & Project Engineering and Mechanical Maintenance on project management and line functions.

2. System -Engineers and Maintenance on " system experts."

3. Maintenance Supervisors and Operations on' prioritization and conduct of maintenance.

4. Quality Control and Maintenance on procedural compliance.

5. Design Engineers and Operations on how equipment should perform.

6. Radiation Safety and Maintenance on support.

7.- Systems Engineering and Design Engineering on roles.

111. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY l

To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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_II.B.8 OUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM 1

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1. OUTCOME /RESULTS i Restore Quality Circle program at Calvert Cliffs. Quality Circle groups to generate plant ' improvement ideas that will enhance our safety performance, operating effectiveness, teamwork, and . morale.

II. METHODS A. Develop implementation schedule for reinstating former c.ircles and-establishing new ones.

B. Establish .. Quality Circles for Quality , Control and Maintenance workers.

C. Establish all Quality Circles, based on implementation schedule.

!!I.' RESOURCES To.be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

' .V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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' II B.9 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PROCst" o

)

1. - OUTCOME /RESULTS A .' Train ~ supervision' in Performance Management techniques.

B. Develop a pilot program to write Performance Standards for. 'all attendees.

ba l: C., Shared ~ understanding ' between supervisor; and employee of job expectations.

D. ' Understand the relationship of Performance Standards to BG&E Performance .

Objectives ' and Job . Descriptions outlined in 'Section 11 of Monthly 1 Em-ployee Information manual.

. IL METHODS A. Staff Services (Corporate) facilitate workshops for development of Per-formance - Standards for people included ~in the ; pilot program.

1. Use Focus Meeting format (i.e., Supervisor + Direct ' Reports +

+, Supervisor's Boss)

- 2. Steps Involved:'

a .' ' Brief attendees on purpose and structure, of workshop.

- b.

• Each person fills out activity list.

c. Four-to-six hour workshop to develop - Performance Standards for each attendee.

d. = GS conducts review of Performance Standards and approves for use.

e. Transition' into use of Performance Standards for next avail-

- able appraisal period.

B. Staff ' Services conducts training programs for appropriate members of the pilot program. An alternative method is atts.ndance at the Corporate Training. program given monthly. Details are in the 1989 Training Direc-tory. ,

1. Attendees understand and require the use of Performance Management techniques.

2. . Techniques consist of:

Non-defensive communication skills, a.

b. Developing Performance Standards skills.

c. Appraising performance skills.

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=-III.'s. RESQURCES

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. To' be' determined!

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IVs RESI'ONSIBILITY

1. .

To be '~determined.

P.

LV. VERIFICATION

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1To be- determined.

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- 'II.B.10 ~ PROCEDURES UPGRADE PROJECT

\

I, OUTCOME /RESUUIS

-~

' A .' Provide' technically . correct . and unambiguous procedures.

B. Provide retraining on existing and ~ revised procedures.

C. Reinforce expectations regarding procedure compliance.

. D. . Strengthen ! existing procedure development units.

E. Estab!ish ..the .. basis for procedure steps and requirements.

F. Establish long-term mechanisms to.. ensure upgraded procedures are main-tained and further enhanced.

II. METHODS

~A.- Review . and upgrade .as' necessary administrative procedures.

~

"- . Develop - lesson . plans for ~ 4:ritical administrative procedures.

C. . Retrain . personnel on critical administrative ' procedures.

D. Develop . writer's guides for implementing procedures. .

E. Upgrade and validate implementing procedures as requir.ed.

F. Train' personnel ~ on revised implementing procedures.

G. Revise the Quality Assurance Program to clearly state procedural compli-ance expectations.

111. RESOURCES

. To , be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY 4 To be ' determined.

i p V. . VERIFICATION f~

To be determined.

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s II.B.II- LE ADERSHIP CONFERENCES t

1 .

I. OUTCOME /RESULTS Improve the leadership effectiveness of key Calvert Cliffs employees.

II. METHODS A. Establish . a ' series of 1/2-day leadership conferences to be conducted on an annual basis, B. All Supervisors and key employees (System Engineers, Shift Technical f

I

. Advisors, Project Managers, Work Leaders) would attend.

C. Conference segments will be conducted by the Vice President-Nuclear Energy, Managers, selected General Supervisors, and others with leadership roles, f D. Programs . will focus on leadership skills and minimize leadership theory.

1 E. Topics for the conferences will include:

1

1. Values and Ethics - Rhetoric vs. Behavior;-

2. Trust - Its role in - business;

3. Honesty - With yourself and others; .

4. Customer Service - Dealing with Internal Customers;

5. The Management Team & Performance;

6. Corporate Mindedness - Organizations as Systems;

7. Others to be determined.

III. RESOURff4 To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

B-12

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l II.C. I PROJECT M ANAGEMENT

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS l

Understanding of the Project Management process and the directly or indirectly j involved individuals' role in this process.

)

! Assigned projects to be completed on schedule, within budget, and ' within the agreed to scope, t

-11. ME'IHODS

A. Prepare material for one-day Project' Management training. Primarily will use format utilized in previous training sessions.

B. Conduct two one-day training sessions.

t-

1. Arrange for Managers to be present during the opening of the workshop while the Manager-Nuclear Engineering Services and the Vice President-Nuclear Energy make opening remarks.

2. Ensure training . sessions have attendance from each department to facilitate exchange of ideas.

3. Obtain attendee comments on the Policy Memoranda and make changes as necessary.

C. Use a generic FCR as a test case to validate the project management process.

Ill. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To 'be determined.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION ANDMONITORING To be determined.

B-13

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II.C.5 SURVEILLANCE TEST PROGRAM {

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS A central program with strong control and lines of responsibility.

II.' METHODS

~

A. Implement revised governing procedures.

l B. Upgrade surveillance test procedures.

C. Staff matrix orge.nization including Site Surveillance Test Coordinator

[ ': and Functional Surveillance Test ' Coordinators.

l.

l' . lli, RESOURCES

.To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY

. .To ' be determined.

l- V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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B-14' e 'l

H.C.6 TECHNICAL MANUAL IMPROVEMENT 1.- OUTCOME /RESULTS An upgraded process for revising and maintaining updated technical manuals for ,

I selected plant equipment.

11. METHODS To be determined.

III, RESOURCES -

To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY .

To be determined,

' V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

f o

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' lII.B. I OFF-SITE SAFETY REVIEW COMMTITEE li OUTCOME /RESULTS A. The OSSRC understands the expectations of the Vice President-Nuclear Er-rgy.

B. OSSRC meetings will be run more effectively with broad in-depth partici-pation and appropriate emphasis on recommendations to the Vice Presi- ,

dent-Nuclear Energy for actions on safety issues.  !

I

11. METHODS A. Vice President to present a formal statement of his expectations to the  !

OSSRC.

B. Incorporate the statement in the new members' training program.

C. Revise the OSSRC Charter to reflect these expectations.

D. General ~ Supervisor - Nuclear Training will provide facilitatory training for the Chairman - OSSRC.

l 111. RESOURCES To be determined.

-IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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, l B-16 l i

III.B.2 PLANT OPERATIONS AND SAFETY REVIEW COMMTTTEE

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS A. Develop methods that allow full Committee to focus on significant safety matters and concerns.

B. Promptif disseminate essence of Committee deliberations on significant safety matters to division management (not POSRC members).

C. Increase. the conservatism of safety recommendations by - the Committee.

11. METHODS A. Establish features to allow. focus o'f full Committee primarily on signifi-cant safety matters.

'l. Obtain suggestions from members /NRC.

2. Visit / call plants with excellent' POSRC.

3. Consider subcommittees.

4. Incorporate Vice President-Nuclear Energy expectations into POSRC charter.

B. Assign responsibility . for written detailed rr.inutes. .

(- . C. Training

1. Complete 10 CFR 50.59 training of Committee members.

2. Consider additional training pertaining to safety perspective.

Ill. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

B-17

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j III.B.3 ' SAFETY EVALUATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS e I

{'

.I L Improved consistency and quality. in ' the application of safety evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

11. METHODS t-A. Institute screening process for applicability to ' 10 CFR 50.59. 1 1 '

1. Upgrade design procedures.

)

l' 2. Train personnel.

V

.. B. Develop Follow-up' Site Specific Training Program, l

111. RESOURCES 1

l To be determined.

t IV. RESPONSIBILITY

To be determined.

l.

V. VERIMCATION To be determined, t

B-18

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l Ill.B.4 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT UNIT j i

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1. OUTCOME /R ESULTS . l

)

1 A. Readily available ' files 1 of design basis source documents. -

B. Increased efficiency and consistency in the modification process. .

l

11. METHODS To be determined.

111.- RESOURCES To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY

'i To be determined.

.V, VERIFICATION To be determined.

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B-19

_:_________1-..___ _____________

t Ill.B.5 ENGINEER TRAINING

. I. OUTCOME /RESUL'IS A. Optimize performance level of System Engineers during early phases of their assignment. )

B. Improve communications between System Engineers and Operations and Main-

' tenance personnel, t II. METHODS A. Nuclear . Training provides initial technical staff training program for

~ System Engineers. .

1. Program to be offered at least once annually and twice if needed.

2. Program will be ' of about three-months duration and will include reactor theory, thermodynamics, fluid flow, electrical science, plant systems, integrated plant operations and codes / standards, and leadership / customer roles.

B. Develop individual system training and qualification.

1. Develop ' qualification standards for about 30 major systems.

2. Include field familiarization assignments.

111. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined. 1 V. VERIF1 CATION To be determined.

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B-20 1

ID .D.7 VISITING _OTHER PLANTS

1. OUTCOME /R ESU L'I3 Observation of problems, practices, and solutions at other plants improve Calvert Cliffs issue recognition and problem tolution.

II. METHODS A. Within three years, each Manager and General Supervisor who 1.as not previously done so, pardeipates in at least one INPO assessment of another plant (subject to INPO limitations).

B. Each Manager and General Supervisor participates in at least one INPO assessment every three years (subject to INPO limitations).

C. Prepare pre-visi' guidance document.

RESOURCES 111.

To be determined.

l IV. RESPONSIBILITY I. To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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'I I B-21 I

III.B.8 RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE PPOJECT

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS A. A rational and documented basis for the preventive maintenance (PM) tasks performed on systems that are important to safety and to availability.

B. An optimized . PM program ' identifying the minimum level of PM activity

, necessary to preserve a high availability of important systems.

. C. System models to support u program to enhance Management's ability to  ;

assess risk from a reliability / ' availability perspective. l D. The groundwork for further development of the plant life extension l program.

II. METiiODS A. Complete pilot project for the auxiliary feedwater, safety injection, '{'

- . service water, and saltwater systems. .

B. ~ Based. on results of pilot project, continue project to include other systems.

Ill. RESOURCES To be determined.

1V. B_ESPONSIBILIT_Y To be determined.

V. . VERIFICATION To be determined.

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III.C.2 INDEPENDENT SAFETY EVALUATION

' I. OUTCOME /R ESUL'IS A. Centralize event- analysis / trend analysis capability.

B. Improve'. quality of event analysis and ability to detect underlying root causes of deficient performance.

C. Establish HPES capability.

D. Better base for Divisional planning.

11. MET 110D3 .

A. Establish and staff the Independent Safety Evaluation Unit (ISEU).

B. Establish and staff the HPES Coordinator function.

C. Use ISEU analyses as input to Nuclear Program Plan and budget process.

111. RESOURCES

To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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III.C.3 INTERNAL ASSESSMENT PROCN i

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS l

I A. Management support through action on audit results and NCRs.

Root-cause analysis and technical / effectiveness evaluations will be I

B '.

improved. ,

1

11. METHODS A. Semiannual Divisional issues-based planning process will have as input ISEU and QA/QC concerns.

~ B. Involve Managars and OSSRC members in pre- and post-audit meetings.

(

C. Provide ' root-cause analysis training and technical training to audi- .

tors / inspectors.

experience of auditors / inspectors through interdepartmental l D. Enhance rotation.

E. By the end of 1989, complete remaining staffing of ISEU with suitably

. experienced personnel.

F. Improve audit team make-up, allow more time for each audit,-and perform real-time surveillance.

G. Increase number of QC inspections and allow more preparation time for each QC inspection.

H. Increase management attention so . that the problems identified in audit findings and NCRs are more objectively evaluated, as necessary.

I!!. RESOURCES l To be deterreined.

i-IV. RESPONSIBILITY To be deterinined.

V. VERIFICATION ,

To be determined.

B-24 i'

Ill.C.4 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

1. OUTCOME /RESULTS A. Institutionalize root cause analysis philosophy.

- B. Decision on whether to supplement root cause/ failure analysis capability of System Engineers.

. C. Detailed implementation plan and schedule if decision above is affirma-tive.

II. METHODS .

A. To institutionalize philosophy:

1. Receive results from consultant.

2. Evaluate' other'. firms offering training.

3. Compare proposals.

4. ' Draft lesson plans.

training " individualized" to specific groups, ultimately

5. Provide teaching most of the site population with System Engineers receiv-ing in-depth training.

6. Create a group of specialized individuals.

B. To supplement capability of System Engineers:

1. Complete on-going assessment which will include a proposal on how we should organize.

2. Make decision.

III. RESOURCES

) To be determined.

IV. RESPONSIBILITY f.1

!~ l To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

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1 a.

.i IILC.6 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM PROJECT I. - OUTCOME /RESUL'IS Develop a procurement program consistent with the EPRl/ Nuclear Construction issues Group (NC1G) guidelines.

II. METHODS

. Establish a project team consisting of Calvert Cliffs and consultant personnel to . revamp the procurement process at Calvert Cliffs. The resulting changes will be documented in an approved Calvert Cliffs Instruction. Scope of project will consist of the following:

A. Develop an integrated procurement, program for identification, processing, and control of all procured items including:

i

1. Safety-related items whether processed as a basic component or as a commercial grade item;

2. Non-safety-related items;

3. Receipt inspection of critical characteristics; 4.' Audit program;

5. Training of personnel involved in procurer.ient process.

B. Develop a process for conducting a technical evaluation of safety-related items at the piece-parts level.

C. Recommend appropriate organizational changes to carry out the program changes in an effective and efficient manner.

D. Work with Purchasing & Materials Management, Design Engineering, and the Nuclear Information Planning & Support organizations to develop a pro-curement database.

III. EEiOURCES To be determined.

IV. . RESPONSIBILITY L

To be determined.

l V. y]IRIFICATION i

To be determined.

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IV.B.2 ENGINEERING PLANNING

' I. OUTCOME /RESULTS A. Improve the delivery of Nuclear Engineering Services Department (NESD) committed work items.-

-B. Effectively integrate the planning function into NESD and the NESD work-load into site priorities. .

C. Identify the resources required to accomplish NESD work. 1

.11. METHODS i A. Extend Engineering Planning Unit function to sections and units in the

• following order:

1. Design -' Engineering Section - all units

2. Performance Engineering Unit i

3. Remainder of Plant & Project Engineering Section - Primary, Secon-dary, and Auxiliary Systems . Units

4. Technical . Services Engineering Section B. - Broaden , the scope of . EPU's planning and scheduling responsibilities as manpower and resources become available.

1. DES

a. FCRs - use detailed and generic schedules to generate 18 1 month look-ahead

b. . NCRs - pick up existing DES NCR scheduling program

c. Balance of DES work - schedule all major activities

' d, Analyze resource - loaded schedule

2. PEU t.

a. FCRs - incorporate existing schedules into the DES FCR network 1 l

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u 3. Remainder of P& PES j

a. Take over and update- existing work lists

b. Merge P&PE lists with. DES lists

c. Produce detailed plans for all major activities

4. TSES

a. Generate tracking lists for all major work activities

b. Merge TSES list with P& PES and DES C. Produce a NESD schedule

1. Merge DES, P& PES, and TSES work lists to generate a NESD schedule.

2. Generate a Maintenance / Operations / Engineering priority list. by cortbining the NESD schedule, the Schedule Review Group list, ~ and the Calvert Cliffs Key Items List, and Work Management Committee priorities list, all based on appropriate management-approved

- priorities.

111. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV.' RESPONSIBILITY To be determined.

V. VERIFICATION To be determined.

1 B-28

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,, IV.B.5 MANAGING ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM CHANGES

- I.  : OUTCOME /RESUL'IS A' process is developed to ensure organization and program changes are completed and maintained efficiently and' effectively, II. METHODS .

A. Conduct an assessment to determine the scope. of a process, the problems with current methods, and develop criteria for a desired process.

B. Search for alternative methods .or . vendors that have a process available and determine which best meets the desired criteria.

C. Choose a process, train appropriate people, and utilize the new process in developing the plan to effectively implement the program change. Use this as a test.

D.- Evaluate the test for lessons learned and write the process into applica-ble procedures.

III. RESOURCES To be determined.

IV.' RESPONSIBILITY -

To be determined.

V. ' VERIFICATION To be determined, l

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1 i

FIGURES 9

FIGURE 1 NUCLEAR ENERGY DIVISION MANAGEMENT CHANGES MARCH 1989 NUCLEAR INERGY DIVISION VICE PRESIDENT l

CAL CIJFFS NUC QA k STAFF PWR PLANT DEPT '

SERYlCES DEPT '

MANAGER MANAGER l

NUCl2AR QUAalTY PlanNENG CHEHISTRY OPERATIONS. ASSURANCE k SUPPORT GEN SUPERVISDR GEN SUPERVISOR GEN SUPERWSOR GEN SUPERRSOR l

MECHANICAL ELEC1'RICAL NUCLEAR RADIATIDN MAINTENANCE & CONTROIS TRAINING SAFETY i CEN SUPERWSCR GEN SUPERVISOR GEN SUPERVISDR GEN SUPERVISDR I

NUC ENGINEERING SsRnCs3 DEPT l MANAGER 1

DESIGN PLANT & PROJECT ENGINEERING ENGINEERING l GEN SUPERVISOR GEN SUPERVISDR l l..

TECH SERV ENGINEERING GSN SUPERVISOR

~

INCUMBENT POSITIONS FIILED FROM CHANGES SINCE OUTSIDE THE NUCLEAR i JANUARY 1, f 888 RNERGY DIVISION l

. )

FIGURE 2 4

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS D ATAB ASE ENTRY FORM

. v..

ITEM NUMBER:

(Assigned by Management Systems Unit)

IDENTIFYING AGENCY:

(e.g., NRC,' INPO, etc.)

.- TYPE OF REPORT:

(e.g., SALP, E&C, IR, etc.)

REPORT DATE:

REPORTID NUMBER:

REVISION NUMBER:

PAGE NUMBER:

PARAGRAPH NUMBER:'

(Use when Section # not used)

'SECTION NUMBER:

RELATED ISSUES: PRIMARY ,,

(e.g., PC, ES, CA, MC)

SECONDARY 1: _

SECONDARY 2:

i INSTRUCTIONS SYMPTOM NUMBER:

(Provide specific directions or add text here)

Y

- . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _