Text

Rev 11 to Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Conversion to Improved Sts,Per NUREG-1432
	ML20198K985
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	01/12/1998
From:	; BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	;
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ML20198K961	List: ML20198K959; ML20198K985;
References
	RTR-NUREG-1432 NUDOCS 9801150143
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IMPROVED TECHNICAL, SPECIFICATIONS, REVISION 11 REVISION BY ITS SECTION

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'. '9001150143 98011'2 PDR ADOCK 05000317 P ADR li:)

9- Baltimore Gas and Electric Company ;

Calvert Clif~s Nuclear Power Plant ;

January 00,1998 l

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Peg? Ripl:ccm::t 11structio s VOLUME 2. .i

, Section 1.0 : )

Nots: Underlined:vles indicate tabs in volumes. RegarJing CTS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit

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, number as wil as t se specipcation number kcated in the upper right-hand corner of the C15page. ]

Key:

DOC = Qiscussic s Of.Qhanges '

l DOD = Qbcussl>n QfTechnical Specipcation Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation REMOVE INSERT .j Dyerview of Channes l.0 1 1.0 1 lift 1.1 1 through 1.1-7 1.1 1 through 1.1-7 1.21 1.2- 1 13-1 and 13-2 1.3 1 and 13 13-8 and 13 9 13-8 and 13-9 IJ-lI through IJ.13 13-11 through IJ 13 1.4-1 and 1.4 2 1.41 and 1.4 2 1.4-4 1.4-4 ITS Baws No pages changed.

~ CTS Markup & Discussion of Channes Speci0 cation 1.0, Unit 1 Specification 1.0, Unit 1 Page 1 of 1I end Page 2 of 1I Page 1 of 1I and Page 2 of 11 Speci0 cation 1.0, Unit 2 Specification 1.0, Unit 2 Page 1 of II through Page 3 of1I Page 1 of 1I through Page 3 of 1I-DOC 1.0-1 through DOC 1.0-7 DOC 1.0-1 through DOC 1.0-6 NSHC Findings 1.0-6 through 1.0-8 1.0-6 through 1.0-7

, ISTS MarkuD & Justification 1 1 1 and 1.12 1.1 1 and 1.1-2 DOD 1.01 DOD 1.0-1 ISTS Bases Markun & Justification No pages changed.

i Note: Italici:cdentroes indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.

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OVERVICW OF CHANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICAT10%

Calvert Cliffs is an Analog Reactor Protective System and Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System plant. Therefore, the Analog portions of NUREG-1432, Section 1.0 were used as the starting point for--

developing the Calvert Cliffs improved Technical Specifications.

The significant differences between the current Technical Specifications and the proposed Improved Technical Specifications are:

-- Several terms are no longer in the Definitions section.

'The term "L," and its definition are added.

Core Alteration is limited to the movement of fuel, sources, or reactivity control componen+.s.

Shutdown Margin is revised to allow the control element assembly ws highest reactivity worth to not be assumed stuck out if all control element assemblies can be verified fully inserted by two independent means.

Staggered Test Basis no longer requires "n equal subintervals."

Sections 1,2,1.3, and 1.4 are added.

The significant differences between the proposed Improved Technical Specifications and NUREG-1432, Revision 1, as modified by generic changes, are:

The definitions of Mode and the Modes table were changed to reflect Calvert Cliffs specific design. The Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis allows some reactor vessel head bolts to be removed without entering Mode 6. The requirement in the Modes table that all the reactor vessel head closure bolts be tensioned in Modes 4 and 5 is revised, accordingly, n

-> CALVERT CLIFFS-UNITS I & 2 1.0-1 Revision 11

Definitions 1.1

'1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.1 Definitions

--------------NOTE------------------ ------------------

The defined terms of this section' appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications and Bases.

Term Definition ACTIONS ACTIONS shall be that part of G Specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under designated Conditions within specified Completion Times.

AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)- ASI shall be the power generated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core, divided by the sum of the power generated 'n the lower and upper halves of the Core.

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Asl =

lower + upper AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (Tq ) AZIMUTHAL P0 lier TILT shail be the maximuntof the difference between the power generated in any core quadrant (upper or lower) (Pqu.o) and the average power of all quadrants (Pavo) in that half (upper or lower) of the core, divided by the average i power of all quadrants in that half (upper or lower) of the core.

quad avg

, g P.,,

CHANNEL CALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy ;

to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the U h

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.1-1 Revisiong I t-

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions-CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL' TEST. The CHANNEL CAllB' RATION' it' i may be performed by means of any- series of requential, overlapping, or total _ char.nel steps so-that the entire channel is' calibrated.

' CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall.be the_ qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the-same parameter.

' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL-TEST shall be:

Analoo Channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, including alarm and/or trip functions. II -

Bistable Channels - the injection of a simulated ,

signal into the channel sensor to verify 0PERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

CORE ALTERATION CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components within l9 the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a coniponent to a safe position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS The COLR is the unit specific document that

!! REPORT (COLR) provides cycle specific parameter limits for the

current reload cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each E reload cycle in accordance with My Specification 5.6.5.- Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

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Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microcuries/ gram) that alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, 1-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, AEC, 1952, " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites.*

l-AVERAGEDISINTEGRATION 2 shall be the average (weighted in proportion to ENERGY the concentration of ear.h radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling) of the sum of the average beta and gama energies per disintegration (in MeV) for isotopes, other than iodines, with half lives > 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the t:tal non-iodine activity in the coolant.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE The ESF RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval (ESF) RESPONSE TIME froni when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays, where applicable. The response time may be measured by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response time is measured.

L. The maximum allowable containment leakage rate, L., shall be 0.20% of containment air weight pe, day at the calculated peak containment pressure (P ) .

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Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions LEAKAGE LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Identified LEAKAGE

1. LLAKAGE, such as that from pump' seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank;

2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or

3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System,

b. Unidentified LEAKAGE All LEAKAGE (except RCP seal leakoff) that is not identified LEAKAGE;

c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE LEAKAGE (except SG LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

MODE A MODE shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, average reactor coolant temperature, and reactor vessel head closcre bolts specified in Table '1.1-1 with fuel in the reactor vessel.

OPERABLE-0PERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.1-4 Revision 0 0

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Definitions:

~1.1 1.1 Definitions

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capable of performing its specified safety function (s) and when all necessary~ attendant instrumentation, controls., normal or emergency-electrical power, cooling and seal' water, lubrication,.and other auxiliary equipment that.

are ; required for~ the system,- subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its- specified-safety function (s) are also capable of performing their related support' function (s).

PHYSICS TESTS PHYSICS TESTS shall- be' those tests perfonned to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the recctor core and related instrumentation.

These tests are:

a. Described in Chapter 13. Initial Tests and Operation of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; Authorized under the provisions of b.

10 CFR 50.59; or g c. Otherwise approvec by the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

RATED THERMAL POWER (RTP) RTP shall be a total reactcr core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2700 MWt. <

REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM The RPS RESPONSE TIME shall be that. time interval V from when the monitored parareter exceeds its RPS (RPS) RESPONSE TIME trip setpoint at the channel sensor until electrical power to the CEAs drive mechanism is lI V interrupted. The response time may be measured by means'of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire response: time is measured.

LSHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)- SDM shall be the instantaneous amount of

, reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would' be subcritical from its present condition s- -

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Definitions '

, 1.1 1.1-: Definitions 4.

assuming all full length control element assemblies (CEAs) (shutdown and-regulating) are-fully inserted except for the single CEA of highest reactivity. worth, which is assumed to be fully withdrawn. However, with' all CEAs verified fully inserted by two independent means.-it is not necessary to account for a stuck CEA in the SDM calculation. With any CEAs not capable of being-fully inserted, the reactivity worth of these CEAs-must be accounted for in the determination of SDM.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall' consist of the testing of one of tne systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components during the interval specified by the Surveillance Frequency, so that all systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated componentL are d

tested during n Surveillance Frequency intervals, where n is the total number of systems, subsystems, channels, or other designated components in the associated function.

THERMAL POWER THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.1-6 Revision'0

Definitions 1.1 Table l'.1-1 (page 1 of 1). O H MODES I

.,t AVERAGE REACTOR REACTIVITY % RATED COOLANT MODE TITLE' CONDITION -THERMAL TEMPERATURE

( k,,r) POWER (*) ( F)

, 1 Power Operation -2 0.99 >5 NA 2 Startup 2.0.99- .s 5 NA

> 3 Hot Standby < 0.99 NA 2 300 4 Hot Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA 300 > T,y > 200-5 Cold Shutdown (b) < 0.99 NA s 200 6 RefuelingI ') NA NA NA I') Excluding decay heat (b)

R m e w ssel W Wl W

) Reactor vessel head unbolted 4

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Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 &~2 1.1-7 Revision /

Logical Connectors i 1.2 i 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.2 Logical Connectors PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to explain the meaning of logical connectors.

Logical connectors are used in Technical Specifications (TS) l 11

. to discriminate between, and yet connect, discrete Conditions, Required Actions, Completion Times, Surveillances, and Frequencies. The only logical connectors that appear in TS are AND and QB. The physical arrangement l4 of these connectors r.anstitutes logical conventions with specific meanings.

BACKGROUND Several levels of logic may be used to state Required Actions. These levels are identified by the placement (or nesting) of the logical connectors and by the number assigned to each Required Action. The first level of logic is identified by the first digit of the number assigned to a Required Action and the placement of the logical connector

- in the first level of nesting (i.e., left justified with the number of the Required Action). The successive levels of logic are identified by additional digits of the Required Action number and by successive indentions of the logical Connectors.

When logical connectors are used to state a Condition, Completion Time, Surveillance, or Frequency, only the first level of logic is used, and the logical connector is left justified with the statement of the Condition, Completion Time, Surveillance, or Frequency.

d EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the use of logical 4 connectors.

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i Completion Times 1.3 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.3 Completion Times PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to establish the Completion Time convention and to provide guidance for its use.

BACKGROUND Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) specify minimum lN ,

requirements for ensuring safe operation of the unit. The ACTIONS associated with an LCO state Conditions that typically describe the ways in which the requirements of the LC0 can fail to be met. Specified with each stated ConditionareRequiredAction(s)andCompletionTime(s).

DESCRIPTION The Completion Time is the amount of time allowed for completing a Required Action. It is referenced to the time ofdiscoveryofasituation(e.g.,inoperableequipmentor variable not within limits) that requires entering an ACTIONS Condition unless otherwise specified, providing the unit is in a MODE or specified condition stated in the Applicability of the LCO. Required Actions must be completed prior to the expiration of the specified Completion Time. An ACTIONS Condition remains in effect and the Required Actions apply until the Condition no longer exists or the unit is not within the LCO Applicability.

If situations are discovered that require entry into more than one Condition at a time within a single LC0 (multiple Conditions), the Required Actions for each Condition must be performeo within the associated Completion Time. When in multiple Conditions, separate Completion Times are tracked for each Condition starting from the time of discovery of the situation that required entry into the Cendition.

Once a Condition has been entered, subsequent trains, subsystems, components. or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not, result in separate entry into the Condition, unless specifically stated. The Required Actions of the Condition il CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2 1.3-1 Revision /

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.i Completion Times ,

1.3 1.3 Completion Times continue to apply to each additional failure, with

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Completion Times based on initial entry into tne Condition.

However, when a subseauent train, subsystem, component, or

-variable expressed in the Condition is discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, the Completion Time (s) may be extended. To apply this Completion Time extension, two criteria must first be met. The subsequent inoperability:

a. Post exist concurrent with the first inoperability; and ,

b. Must remain inoperable or not within limits after the first inoperability is resolved.

The total Completion Time allowed for completing a Required Action to address the subsequent inoperability shall be limited to the more restrictive of either:

a. The stated Completion Time, as measured from the initial entry into the Condition, plus an additional 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ; or

b. The rtated Completion Time as measured from discovery of the subsequent inoperability.

The above Completion Time extensions do not apply to those Specifications that have exceptions that allow completely separate re-entry into the Condition (for each train, subsystem, component, or variable expressed in the Condition),andseparatetrackingofCompletionTimesbased on this re-entry. These exceptions are stated in individual Specifications.

The above Completion Time extension does not apply to a Completion Time with a modified " time zero." This modified

" time zero" may be expressed as a repetitive time (i.e., ',. ice per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ," where the Completion Time is referenced from a previous completion of the Required Action

- versus the time of Condition entry) or as a time modified by l Il the phrase ."from discovery . . ." Example 1.3-3 illustrates li

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Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLE 1.3-4 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restorevalve(s) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months valves to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and I

associated AND Completion Time not B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months met.

A single Completion Time is used for any number of valves inoperable at the same time. The Completion Time associated l ll with Condition A is_ based on the initial entry into Condition A and is not tracked on a per valve basis.

Declaring subsequent valves inoperable, vhile Condition A is still in effect, does not trigger the tracking of separate Completion Times.

Once one of the valves has been restored to OPERABLE status, the Condition A Completion Time is not reset, but continues from the time the first valve was declared inoperable. The Completion Time may be extended if the valve restored to OPERABLE status was the first inoperable valve. The Condition A Completion Time may be extended for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months provided this does not result in any subsequent valve being inoperable for > 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

If the Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months (including the extension) expires while one or more valves are still inoperable. l Il Condition B is entered.

11 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.3-8 Revision g l

Completion Times 1.3

-1.3' Completion Times 1

EXAMPLE 1.3-5 ACTIONS *

............................N0TE----------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each inoperable. .

valve.

CONDITION ' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Restore valve to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months valves OPERABLE status.

inoperable.

B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and associated AND Completion Tim not B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months met.

The Note above the ACTIONS Table is a method of modifying how the Completion Time is tracked. If this method of modifying hu the Completion Time is tracked was applicable only to a specific Condition, the Note would appear in that Condition rather than at 'the top of the ACTIONS Table.

The Note allows Condition A to be entered separately for each inoperable valve and Completion Times tracked on a per l in valve basis. When a valve is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered end its Completion Time starts. If subsequent valves are declared inoperable, Condition A-is entered for each valve and separate Completion Times start-and are tracked for each valve.

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' Completion Times 1.3 .

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Completion Times ;

I EXAMPLE 1.3-6 i

ACTIONS

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CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

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A. One channel A.1 Perform SR Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months inoperable. '3.x.x.x.

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A.2 Reduce THERMAL 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months POWER to s 50% RTP.

T B. Required B,1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and-associated Completion Time not met.

Entry into Condition A offers a choice between Required Action A.1 or A.2. Required Action A.1 have a "once per" Completion Time, which qualifies for the 25% extension, per SR 3.0.2, to each performance after the initial performance. it The initial 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval of Required Action A.1 begins <

when Condition A is entered and the initial performance of Required Action A.1 must be complete within the first 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval. If-Required Action A.1 is followed and the

i. Required Action is not met within the Completion Time (plus !

the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2), Condition B is entered.

If Required Action A.2 is followed and the Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months is not met, Condition B is entered.

If after entry 'into Condition-B Required Action A.1 or A.2 is met Condition B is exited and operation may then continue in Condition A.

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Completion Times 1.3 1.3 Completion Times -

EXAMPLE 1.3-7 ACTIONS

. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ,

A. One A.1 Verify affected I hour subsystem subsystem inoperable. isolated. AND Once per 8' hours thereafter AND A.2 Restore subsystem 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months to OPERABLE

status.

B. Required B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Action and associated AND Completion Time not B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months net. ,

Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter" interval begins upon ,

performance of Required Action A.1.

If after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial I hour or any subsequent 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval from the previous performance (plus the extension allowed by-SR-3.0.2).-Condition B is entered. ,

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Completion Times 1.3 1

1.3 Completion Times The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not 'stop !

after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 i is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, .

provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not i expired. i IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the COMPLETION TIME Required Action should be pursued without delay and in' a controlled manner.

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Frequency i 1.4 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION 1.4 Frequency PURPOSE The purpose of this section is to define the proper use and application of Frequency requirements.

DESCRIPTION EachSurveillanceRequirement(SR)hasaspecifiedFrequency in which the Surveillance must be met in order to meet the associated LCO. An understanding of the correct application of the specified Frequency is necessary for compliance with the SR.

The "specified Frequency" is referred to throughout this section and each of the Specifications of Section 3.0, -

SurveillanceRequirement(SR) Applicability. The "specified l ll Frequency" consists of the requirements of the Frequency column of each SR, as well as certain Notes in the Surveillance column that modify performance requirements.

Situations where a Surveillance could be required (i.e., its Frequency could expire), but where it is not possible or not desired that it be performed until sometime after the associated LCO is within its Applicability, represent potential SR 3.0.4 conflicts. To_ avoid these conflicts, the SR (i.e., the Survaillance or the Frequency) is stated such that it is only " required" when it can be and should be performed. With an SR satisfied, SR 3.0.4 imposes no restriction.

EXAMPLES The following examples illustrate the various ways that Frequencies are specified. In these examples, the ApplicabilityoftheLCO(LC0notshown)isMODES1,2, and 3.

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t Frequency 1.4 :

1.4 ' Frequency-EXAMPLE 1.4-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months i

Example 1.4-1 contains the type of SR most often encountered in the Technical Specifications (TS). The Frequency "

specifies an interval (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) during which the associated Surveillance must be performed at least one time.

Performance of the Surveillance initiates the subsequent' interval. Although the Frequency is stated as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , an extension of the time interval to 1.25 times the stated Frequency is allowed by SR 3.0.2 for operational flexibility. The measurement of this interval continues at all times, even when the SR is not required to be met per SR3.0.1(suchaswhentheequipmentisinoperable,a variable is outside specified limits, or the unit is outside theApplicabilityoftheLCO). If the interval specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO, and the performance of the Surveillance is not otherwise modified (refer to Example 1.4-3), then SR 3.0.3 becomes applicable.

If the interval as specified by SR 3.0.2 is exceeded while the unit is not in a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the LCO for which performance of the SR is required, the Surveillance must be performed within the Frequency requirements of SR 3.0.2 prior to entry into the MODE or other specified condition. Failure to do so would result in a violation of SR 3.0.4. >

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Frequency 1.4 :

1.4 Frequency -

EXAMPLE 1.4-3 ;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

................--N0TE-..--------------

Not required to be performed until '

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after 2 25% RTP.

Perform channel adjustment. 7 days The interval continues, whether or not the unit operation is

< 25% RTP between performances.

As the Note modifies the required performance of the

Surveillance, it is construed to be part of the "specified

- Frequency." Should the 7 day interval be exceeded while operation is < 25% RTP, this Note allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after power reaches 2 25% RTP to perform the Surveillance. The Surveillance is still considered to be performed within the "specified Frequency." Therefore, if the Surveillance were not performed within the 7 day (plus the extension allowed gg by SR 3.0.2) interval, but operation was < 25% RTP, it would not constitute a failure of the SR or failure to meet the LCO. Also, no violation of SR 3.0.4 occurs when changing +

MODES, even with the 7 day Frequency not net, provided operation does not exceed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months with power 2 25% RTP.

Once the unit reaches 25% RTP, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months would be allowed for completing the Surveillance. If the Surveillance were not performed within this 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months interval, there would then be a failure to perform a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, and'the provisions of SR 3.0.3 would apply.

!l CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2 1.4-4 Revision /

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1. DEFINITIONS

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'he DEFINED TERMS of this section appear in capitalized type, bold. 4.- I-are applicable throughout these Technical Specificationsfy Q Qg I evjnire.) *4ciptr_ fa he 4c.Kk M ACTION _shall be that part of a Specification which prescribes

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AZIMLITNAL POWER TILT T, f Odl AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be the maximum difference between the power enerated in any core quadrant (upper or lower) and the average power of all quadrants in that half (upper or lower) of the core divided by the average ower of all quadrants,imat_haEupper or lower) of the core. A , 2.

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CHANNEL CA IBRATION NMl V*0 _

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' , M A CNANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the cTannel out ut such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known va ues of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alann and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

i The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

A CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 1-1 Amendment No. 186 paje Iof II

Spa,k n I.o 1.0's DEFINITIONS CHANNELglg

. ) A CNANNEL CNECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel b~e avior during operation by observation. This detemination sha11 include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and@ status {

with other indications (4n]tler status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CNANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST h A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall bet

a. Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPIRABILITY including alam and/.'r trip functions.

b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the '

channel sensor to verify 0PERA31LITY including alam and/or trip functions.

[CONTAIMNTINTEGRITY' 1.8 CONTAINMEN NTEGR ~all exist when: -

1.8.1 All penet ions required t e closed durtn; ac ent conditi s are either: '

a. apable of being osed by an OPERAB Containment Automatic Isol on Valve System,

b. Closed by nual valves, blin langes, or deac ated autonvt valves secured i eir closed posi ons. -

excepp for valves that a open under admiril trative tfoi as pemitted b pecification 1.1.

1.8.2 Ap quipment hatches closed and sep ,

1.8.3 tach airlock is i compliance with e requirements of Specification 1sL 1.3, 4 '

1 .4 The contai t leakage rate re within the li of l

Specification 3.6.1.2, an 1.8.5 The,s/ ealing mechanism,a sociated with each, enetration ( ..

A.4 welds, bellows or 0-rings) is OPERABLE./ ,

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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 1-2 Amendment No. 187 1

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1. DEFINITIONS

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/fii~DHiNED TERMS of this section appear in capita 11:ed type, bolb . A,/ ,

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AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT M_ T, p j 04,/ h AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT shall be the maximum ifference between the power generated in any core quadrant (upper or lower and the average power of all quadrants in that half (upper or lowat') of the core divided by the average f all quadrants in that hall (upper _or lower) f_the core. 2 T,

CHANNEL CALIBRATION tw/ %>/k'9a _

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A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjettaent as necessary, of the c annel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entiro charnel including the sonsor and alar;.: and/or tiip f;.nctions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

JThe CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 1-1 Amendment No. 149 pay I of ll

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1. DEFINITIONS CRAIMEL CEECK ,

M A CRANNEL CNECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel OAe behavior curing operation by observation. This determination shall '

include, where possible comparison of the channei indication andHi) status with other indications (,tfd/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CRAlelEL FUNCTIONAL TEST h A CNANNEL FUNCTIONAL' TEST shall be:

, s. Analog channels the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify

> OPERABILITY including alars and/or trip functions.

'b. Bibtable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alars and/or trip functions.

IONTAI C ENT I d tITY

1. CONTA INT ITY sha exist who 1 .1 All netrati s required to closed durin ecident c itions eitl6ers

. Cap e of being c1 ed by an OPERAB Containtsnt Au tic Isolati Valve System.

b. losed by man . valves, blind an or de ivated automatic vs es secured in t ir cfesoshpos. tons, except for alves that are n under admi strative control permitted b;' $ cification 3.6 .1.

/1 .. All equi nt hatches ar* osed and seal .

.8.3 Each rlock is in c ance >Ath the utrements f Spe testion 3.6.1.3 1.8.4 e containment I age rates are thin the 1 fts of pecification 3 .1.2 and 1.8 The sealing chanism associ ed with each penetratJ n

_/ (e.g.,wel . bellows orp ings) is SPffd8LE. _/

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 1-2 Amendment No. 164 w .. ,

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1. DEFINITIM$

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CORE ALTERAT!M ,1 fa.e l, S'ou a h CORE ALTERATION shall b movement f any or reachj component within the reactor vessel wit e vessel head removed (cu,fra/

and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERAT!M shall not preclude completion of ;novement of a component to a safe (t,effseniWR) position.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPOR Col Pj The TDMPERATINGMMIT14tNitflis the unit specific document that

@provides cyce specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle, ,

These cycle specific parameter Ilmits shall be determined for each reload o.S.

cycle in addressed limits is accordance in with Specificationpfestions.

individual Speci Plant operation within these l D0SE EQUIVALENT I-131 00$E EQUIVALENT I 131 shall be that concentration of 1-131 s / gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, 1-132, 1-133. I-134 and 1-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in Table III of TID-14844, " Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor $ttes.'

I-AVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGY

, @ I shall be the average (weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of s 1:ng) of the sum of the average beta and gassa energies per disintegration in MEV) for isotopes, other than todines, with half itves greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE RESP M SC TIME

h. The ENGINEERED $AFETY FEATURE RESPONSE TIME shall be that time 1nterval from when the monitored parameter exceeos its ESF actuation setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safet function (i.e., the valves travel to their required gositions pump disc arge pressures reach their required values: etc. . p' 4 imes shaIl include diesel generator starting and sequence loading de sys where applicable._ 6 ___

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DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION ADMINISTRAIlyE CHANGES A.1 The proposed change will reformat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Specifications, with no change of intent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, the Technical Specifications should be more easily readable and, therefore, understandable by plant operators, as well as other users.

During the Calvert Cliffs Improved Technical Specification (ITS) development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional infonnation may also have been added to more fully describe each definition and to be consistent with NUREG 1432. Ilowever, this additionai mlormation does not chacge the intent of the CTS, The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process involves no technical changes to existing Definitions.

A.2 The proposed change will add the equation for Azimuthal Power Tilt to the CTS definition.

He equation will contribute to the clarification of the definition without technically changing it. Also, an acronym for core average power (pos) was added which has no technical implications to the definition. Therefore, this change is considered administrative in nature. %is change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

A.3 Not used. l A.4 The proposed change deletes the CTS dermition of Containment Integrity. This was prompted because the words Containment Integrity are no longer used. This change is administrative because all the requirements specifically addressed in the CTS definition are addressed in the ITS Containment Systems section. His change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

A.5 The proposed change adds three sections to *';e Technical Specifications. These additions aid in the understanding and use of the new format and presentation style. They are unique to the ITS and developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and industry. The addition of these sections are neither more nor less restrictive in principle, and will be discussed specifically in those Specifications where applications of those sections warrant discussion.

Thus, the addition of these sections is administrative. These sections are consistent with the Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG 1432. The added sections are as follows:

e Section 1.2 - Logical ConnectoIS Section 1.2 provides specific examples of the logical connectors "AND" and "OR" and the numbering sequence associated with their use.

e Section 13 - Comnletion Times Section 1.3 provides proper use and interpretation of completion times. The section also provides specific examples that aid the user in understanding completion times.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-1 Revision 11

DISCUSSION OF CliANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION e Section L4 - Freauency Section 1.4 provides proper use and interpretation of the Surveillance Frequency. l The section also provides specinc examples that aid the user in understanding Surveillance Frequency.

A.6 Not used. l A.7 The proposed change deletes the CTS definition of Controlled Leakage. The term Controlled Leakage is no longer used in the ITS. The CTS definition of Controlled Leakage is incorporated into the definition of Identified Leakage. The change also deletes the exclusion of Controlled Leakagc from the definition of Unidentified Leakage, and adds an exclusion for reactor coolant pump seal leakoff. Thes: changes are administrative since it does not result in any change to the definition of Identified Leakage or Unidentified Leakage. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.8 The proposed change deletes the CTS definition of Frequency Notation and dele;es CTS Table 1.2 which lists the frequency notations. The Frequency Notation definition and table are no longer required because the ITS lists the specific frequencies (i.e.,12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,31 days, 18 months, etc., versus S, M, R, etc.). Therefore, listing the specific frequencies in hours, days or months for the Surveillance Requirements climinates the need for frequency notations. This change does not change any Surveillance Requirement frequencies, and is therefore administrative. His change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.9 The proposed change deletes the following C fS definitions:

Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System

. Member (s)of the Public

. Purge - Purging

Reportable Event

. Site Boundary

Solidification

Source Check

Unrestricted Area e Ventilation Exhaust Treatment System

. Venting These definitions were deleted because specific Technical Specifications referring to them no longer contain their use or are no longer retained in the ITS. Discussion of the technical aspects to the deletion of these definitions are addressed as applicable in the specific Technical Specification where the phrase was used. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.10 The C'S definition of Identified Leakage, Pressure Boundary Leakage, and Unidentified Leakage are being in:orporated into one definition called Leakage (which includes three

- categories: Identified Leakage, Unidentified Leakage, and Pressure Boundary Leakage).

The new Leakage dennition incorporates the three definitions with no technical changes.

Administrative changes with respect to the converA to ITS are described in other CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-2 Revision i1

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION administrative discussion of changes. This change is considered administra6ve and is consistent with NUREG 1432.

A.ll ne CTS definition of Offsite Dose Calculations Manual (ODCM) is being deleted. The definition is being i:icorporated into the l'IS Chapter 5 0 which discusses the ODCM. This change is administrative because the ODCM will temain as described in the definition. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

A.12 The proposed change adds the definition oil, which is used in the ITS. This definition does not impose any new requirements to the existing Technical Specifications. It was created to define a term used in the ITS. Any technical changes due to the addition of this definition will be justified as required in the specific section of the Technical Specifications where used. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.13 The CTS definition of Operable - Operability requires the component or device te be able to perform its function (s). The proposed change will require the component or device to be able to perform its specified safety function (s). The ITS intent is te address the " safety" function (s) and not encompass non-safety functions a system may also perform. The incorporation of current practices into the definition is considered an administrative change.

This change is consistent with NUREG-1432 A.14 Current Technical Specification Table 1.1 defines Refueling as the reactor vessel head unbolted or removed and fuel in the vessel. The proposed change will delete the words 'or removed and fuel in the vessel." The change deletes, "or removed," because of the possible confusion that may be caused by using the logical connector "or," which can be misconstrued to allow the head to be removed prior to entering Mode 6. Deleting these words will ensure that the plant is in Mode 6 when the reactor vessel head is unbolted. The words, "and fuel in the vessel," are being moved to the Mode definition. Also, the words "and reactor vessel head closure bolts" were added to the definition of Mode for consistency with the Modes table. These changes are consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.15 The proposed change revises the definition of Staggered Test Basis from dividing the number of systems, components, etc., into the interval, to multiplying the number of systema, components, etc., by the interval to determine the Surveillance Frequency. The change is administrative since the Frequency betvcen Surveillances for the same system.

component, etc., will not be changed due to this definition change. Any changes tc Frequencies will be discussed in the individual section. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.16 The proposed change adds an allowance to the definitions of ESFAS Response Time and Reactor Protective System Response Time to allow response time measurement to be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping or total :;teps. The current definition provides only the definition of the actual response time; it does not describe the manner in which the time is to be measured. Therefore, Calvert Cliffs can currently perfonn the test in any way which will provide the necessary response time data, including by acans of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps. Since the method to perform the test is not currently under regulatory control, adding the details into the ITS could be considered more restrictive, llowever, since the change adds the manner that the tests are currently

'CALVERT CLIFFS , UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-3 Revision i1

DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION + -

performed, as described in plant procedures, and it covers all manners to r2rform the tests, this change is considered administrative.

A.17 The CTS provides the allowance that suspension of Core Alteration shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position. The proposed change will delete the word conservative from this allowance and will allow fuel to be moved to a safe position. This change also deletes the terms "or manipulation" from the definition. When Core Alterations are required to be suspended, a specific movement may have to be completed in order to establish a " safe" configuration (e.g., no fuel assembly suspended from the refueling machine). The requirement to establish a " safe position" is deemmi proper. Eliminating the requirement to also be a " conservative" position avoids pot %tial canfusion since there is no reference on which to base the conservative evaluation.

it is assumed that " conservative" is intendeu to reflect the same context as " safe." Given this understandits, :he wording change is administrative. This is acceptable since " safe" adequate!y controls the allowance to complete the move. The term manipulation is redundant with "roovement" ir this definition because, in order to manipulate components Mhh the msel, " movement" is necessarv. Herefore, this change is also acceptable.

Ese Wnges are consistent with NUREG i432.

A.18 The proposed chnp will add a requirement to account for any control element assemblies (CEAs) that are not capable of being fully interted in the Shutdown Margin (SDM) determination. This change is administrative because it incorporates requirements into the definition that are already assumed in the SDM determination. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.19 Current Technical Specification Table 1.1, " Operational Modes," requires the plant average coolant tmperature to be h 300'F in Modes 1 and 2. The proposed change w!!! delete the average coolant temperature requirement. Other Technical Specifications ensure the coolant temperature is adequate for specific plant conditions in these Modes. Remosal of this limitation does not actually change the requirements for operation in Modes 1 and 2.

Therefore, this change is administrative. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

A.20 Current Technical Specification Table 1.1, " Operational Modes," Note (b) specifies Mode 6, Refueling, epplies whenever the reactor vessel head is unbolted, implicit in this Note is that Modes 4 e.nd 5 are only applicable when the reactor vessel head is bolted. Therefore, the ITS Table 1-1 adds Note (b) to Modes 4 and 5 to explicitly state this fact. This change is considered administrative since it is adding clarification only and not changing the event definitions.

IECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Not used. l M.2 Current Technical Specification Table 1.1 requires the average coolant temperature in Mode 6 to be s; 140 F. The proposed change will delete the average coolant temperature requiren ent. With the CTS, the definition of Refueling wou!d cease to be applicable when the average coolant temperature exceeded 140 F. This would place the plant in an undefined Mode, which could be incorrectly interpreted as not requiring the application of the CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-4 Revision 11

DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION Technical Specifications, which are applicable when the reactor vessel head is " unbolted."

By defining Mode 6 with no specific coolant temperature range, appropriate Technical Specifications will apply when the reactor vessel head is " unbolted." This change ensures that the plant is in a defined Mode when transitioning between Modes 5 and 6. Therefore, this change does not detrimentally affect plant safety. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

IECilNICAL. CIIANGES - RELOCATIONS None TECIINICAL CIIANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS LA.1 The CTS definition of Axial Shape Index (ASI) states, the ASI is, "used for the trip and pretrip signals in the Reactor Protection System," and the value of ASI is niodified by an appropriate multiplier and a constant to determine the true core axial power distribution for that channel. The CTS definition also contains a formula of this determination. Calvert cliffs ITS definition of ASI will not contain this added information on the trip and pretrip signals. The specific calculational methods contained in the CTS definition on the trip and pretrip signals will no longer be specified in the definition. Information on trip values is located in Specification 3.3.1, "RPS Instrumentation - Operation, Specification 3.3.2, "RPS Instrumentation - Shutdown," and their respective Bases. Information on pretrip values is located in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The trip and pretrip information located in the CTS definition is inconsistent with the type of information contained in other definitions, in addition, the information is insufficient to determine trip or pretrip values as the discussion refers to a " constant" and " multiplier" without describing these values, their calculation, or their location. The CTS trip and pretrip details in the definition can be adequately controlled in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and other Specifications.

This approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and provides for a more appropriate change control process. He level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because this information is not needed to use and understand ASI as it appears in the ITS. Furthermore, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant resources associated with processing license amendments to these requirements will be reduced. This change is a less restrictive movement ofinformation change with no impact on safety. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

14.2 Current Technical Specification Table 1.1 requires 14r to be s 0.95 in Mode 6. The proposed change will relocate this requirement to the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

Proposed Technical Specification 3.9.1 requires the boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System and refueling pool to be within limits specified in the COLR. Any changes to the COLR will be in accordance with Chapter 5.0, which will ensure any changes to ihe COLR receive appropriate review. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

LA.3 %e definitions of Total Integrated Radial Peaking Factor and Total Planar Radial Peaking Factor are being relocated to the COLR. Any changes to the COLR will be in accordance with Chapter 5.0, which will ensure any changes to the COLR receive appropriate review.

This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-5 Revision 11

i DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION -

TECHNICAL CIIANGES - LESS RESITRICTIVE L.1 The CTS defines Core Alteration as "the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel." The proposed change wi" relax the requirement from "any compc,nent" to specify the components as fuel, source, o e, activity control components. The specifications which use this definition are those that protect from or mitigate a reactivity excursion _cVent, in keeping with this, the ITS definition reflects movement of components other than fuel, sources, or reactivity control components are not considered Core Alterations. The movement or manipulation of other components will have negligible (if any) affect on core reactivity. Therefore, there is no restriction on the movement of components other than fuel, sources, and reactivity control components. Tnis change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

L.2 The CTS definition of SDM requires the calculation of SDM to account for the single CEA of highest worth being fully withdrawn. The proposed change will allow the single CEA of highest worth being fully withdrawn to not be accounted for in the calculation if all CEAs are verified fully insened by two independent means. This change is acceptable because requiring the CEA of highest reactivity worth to be assumed withdrawn is overly conservative when information on actual CEA position can be obtained by two independent means. This change is consistent with NUREG-!432 L.3 Not used.

L.4 Not used. l L.5 The CTS definition of " Operable - Operability" requires that all necessary normai and emergency electrical power sources be available for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device. The ITS definition of" Operable - Operability" requires either normal or emergency power be available. 'Ilis is acceptable because the AC Sources Technical Specifications will be entered, which ensures that adequate measures (cross-trsin checks to ensure operability of the components, systems, etc. redundant required features) are taken so that a loss of function does not exist. This ensures that the system is capable of meeting its sefety analysis requirements even with a loss of a power source. Also, the Actions limit the time the plant is in this degraded condition. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

L.6 Not used. l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-6 Revision 11

NO SIGNIFICANT liAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS SECTION 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

ne proposed change allows the CEA of highest reactivity worth to not be assemed fully withdrawn if all CEAs can be verified fully insented by two independent means. The margin of safety is not affected by this change because the SDM will still be adquately verified within limits. Assuming the CEA of highest reactivity worth is fully withdrawn is overly conservative when the treans exist to accurately verify that all CEAs are fully inserted (by two independent means). The safety analysis assumption, will still be maintained. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Change L3 Not used.

Change L4 Not used. l

. Change L3

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change will require either normal or emergency power to be available to systems, components, etc., in order to meet the Operability definition. The change does not affect the probability of an accident. Unevailability of one power source to systems, components, etc., is net an initiator of any analyzed event. This change will not affect the consequences of an accident. The system, component, etc., required to mitigate accidents only requires that power be available in order to operate to accomplish its safety functic... Therefore, this change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change will require either normal or emergency power to be available to systems, components, etc., in order to meet the Operabilir definition. This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The change will also not require any new or unusual operator utions. He change will not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis. Therefore, the change will rmt create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change will require either normal or emergency power to be available to systems, components, etc., in order to meet the Operability definition. The change will not significantly afTect the margin of safety. The allowed outage time for the source that is inoperable limits the time the plant is in the degraded condition. Also, cross-train checks are initiated to ensure the redundant systems, components, etc., are not inoperable, which could cause a total loss of function. %crefore , the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0-6 Revision 11

NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS SECTION I.0 - USE AND APPLICATION -

Chamme L6 Not used. l ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT This poposed Technical Specification changes have been evaluated against the criteria for and identification of licens*ng and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessment in accordance with 10 CFR 51.21. It has been determined that the proposed changes meet the criteria for categorical exclusion as provided for under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). The following is a discussion of how the proposed Technical Specification changes meet the criteria for categorical exclusion.

10 CFR 51.22(c)(9): Although F wroposed changes involve changes to requirements with respect to inspection or surveillance requi. 3, (i) proposed changes involve No Significant llazards Consideration (refer to the No Significant llazards Consideration section of this Technical Specification Change Request);

(ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite since the proposed changes do not alTect the generation of any radioactive effluents nor do they affect any of the permitted release paths; and (iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the proposed changes meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Based on the aforementioned and pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22 (b), no environmental assessment or environmental impact statement need be prepared in connection with issuance of an amendment to the Technical Specifications incorporating the proposed changes of this request.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 1.0/i Revision 11

r _ .

p ..

Definitions 1.1 1.0- USE A M APPLICATION 1.1 Definitions blue

nott-- _ - - . - _. --

= The defined terms of this section appear in capitalize Tpe and are applicable throughout these Technical specifications and eases.

13 3 Definitien

'(Y> ACTIONS-~~ Act:0Ns shaii 6e that pah of a specification that prescribes Required Actions to be taken under des 16nated Conditions within specified Completion Times.

AX1AL SHAPE INDEX (ASI) ASI shall be the power generated in the lower half

+

of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core, divided by the sum of the power generated in the lower ar.d upper halves of the core.

ASI =

I'" ~"PP'"

lower + uppr b h it NMhvs M $1 Y U [ 3 @

{ AZINUTH'At POWER TILT (T,)hAnekt AZINUTHAL POWER TILT shall be the maximun'of the '

difference between the power generated in any core quadrant (upper or lower (P power.of all quadrants ( )Tn)that halfandupper the average or lower) of the care, d 'v7ded by the avera(ge power of all quadrants in that half (upper or lower) of the core.

T, = Max **

eg

)CHANNELCALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CAtIBRATION shall encompass 04edTr<, cMannel indeds N eb9*e end u ..u..y,w,e.,3,. 4 f ,,,,,,,,,,,

CE00 STS' 1.1-1 Rev1,04/07/95 4

8 O

m - .

_. ..m_.

Definitions 1.1 (cy3 1.1 Definitions

\0/de~

CHANNEL CALIBRATION fhe . dis tre nel, Ing h (continued) Q av. and o funct}_ptequ

. : .- sa e the CWusEL FlJNL,IIONAL TEST.

f ' ns nt cnannels' n reststance empera detecto (RTD or the ouple senso say c a

N) of an nplace)quali tve assessee of son { il beh or and no calibration tJe ad stable devi in the chan .1 Wheneve aing b Mhsi lesent i saces A ne m rt red \

T CALIBRA shall clude an i ace cross cal ration t compare the other s sing e nts wjf he . y 19514U JtttMagnrr-/)

p t V Th CA 10fdT10N y be perfornied by 4pav[#any series of sequential, overlapping,

. or tTo a channel steps so that the entire channel is calibrated.

Y) CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECX shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This detemination shall include, where possible, comparison of the chanril indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

f)CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a. Analoghtab@ channels-the injection of

, a simulated rar>NcIDsignal into the channel A prim e as close to th sensor as practicable to verU v OP ITY 1ricluding MealamQ*nd/om Qlt (nigrncksMitsr{Dntripfunction$,

b. 644ah.c. nn4 [b7 Digital c uter channels the use or

{ diagnos c programs to st digital comou r

'f4 Tjec4 ten 6 f hardw e and the inj ion of simulated Alded fig.ud?ie 4

pro ss data into channel to vert h (0 JLITY,ine ding alars and tr th ds.n=41 sense r _ - - - _-

io everf OPEAA61LITP k fThe CHANNEL F tTIONAL TEST may Le pe formed by 7 7 l means of a series of sequential, erlappin r -

\ ch nel steps so that the tire chann 10 Insl4% darm a4/** h sNd drens, (continued)

CEOG STS 1.1-2 Rev 1, 04/07/95

^

v

DISCUSSION OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECrlON 1.0 - USE AND APPLICATION PLANT SPECIFIC CIIANGES

1. r Lis change incorporates the Calvert Cliffs-specific in ormation into brackets.

2. The definition of Azimuthal Power Tilt for digital Combustion Engineering (CE) plants is being deleted because the definition is not applicable. Calvert Clifts is an Analog CE plant and will incorporate the definition of Azimuthal Power Tilt for an Analog plant.

3. This change deletes the word " Analog" from the definition of Azimuthal Power Tilt. Itis unnecessary to specify that the Azimuthal Power Tilt is for an Analog plant when the definition is specifically for Calvert Clifts (which is an Analog plant and hasjust one Azimutha! Power Tilt definition).

4. This bracketed information is being deleted because Calvert Cliffs does not remove control element assemblies with the removal of the upper guide structure.

5. The definitions of Mode and the Modes Table (Table 1.1-1) were changed to reflect the Ca' vert Cliffs specific design. The ITS definition uses closure bolt tensioning in the definition, and the Modes table requires all the reactor vessel head closure bolts to be tensioned in Modes 4 and 5, and if at least one is detensioned, the plant is in Mode 6. Calvert Cliffs performed an evaluation to determine the nu nber of reactor vessel head closure bolts which could be removed in Mode 5.

The results showed that only 12 studs are required to be in place to ensure the reactor vessel head is seated at 500 psia; however, to be conservative,18 studs are currently required to be tensioned, per procedure. Therefore, Footnotes (b) and (c) wce changed to reactor vessel head bolted (b) or unbolted (c). The reactor vessel head is considered unbolted at Calvert Cliffs if greater than 36 studs (of 54 total) are detensioned or removed. The definition was changed to use the term closure bolts versus closure bolt tensioning. These changes are consistent with the Calvert Cliffs evaluation.

6. The cronym "FSAR" is being change to "UFSAR" to reflect that Calvert ClitTs has an Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

7. Not used. l

8. Calvert Cliffs has chosen not to incorporate a Pressureffemperature Limits Report because the Calvert Clifls Pressure /femperature Limits are not expected to change through the end of the current Operating Licenses for Units 1 and 2.

9. Calvert Cliffs does not have seal water iajection, therefore, " water injection" was deleted from the definition of Identified Leakage. This change is consistent with Calvert Clifts' current licensing basis.

10. This change retains the Current Licensing Basis definitions for Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 1.0-1 Revision i1 2

i i

Pcge Replac: ment I:structions VOLUME.3 Section 2.0 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CTS markups: Pages are referencedby citing the unit number as well as the specification number locatedin the upper right-hand corner ofthe CISpage.

Key:

DOC = Discussion OfChanges DOD = Qiscussion Of Technice! Specification Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation -

. REMOVE INSERT Overview of Channes No pages changed.-

ILS 2.02 2.0-2 ITS Bases Text CTS Markun & Discussion of Channet No pages changed.

NSHC Findines No pages changed ISTS Markup & Justification No pages changed ISTS Bases MarkUD & Jh. llication No pages changed

.i.

, Note: Italici:edentries indicate uneven exchanges: Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.

e

SLs

. 2.0 -

I i i I i i i i i-UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION $- -

@ D. @ UNACCEPTABLE-580 t----------------~.

- - - - - - - - - OPERATIOf.' ' ' -

' FOR PRE-CLAD COLLAPSE -

- '{ .

OPERATION ONLY - )

g 'g + %* *,

~ #. . LIMITS CONTAIN NO ALLOWANCE FOR INSTRUMENT ERROR OR *g o *g 4*g

~ 54Ct- FLUCTUATIONS _

VALID FOR AXIAL SHAPES AND

{

,. 52C -

ROD RADIAL PEAKING FACTORS WITHIN LIMITS _

50C__ REACTog OPERATION LIMITED TO LESS _

E THAN 580 F BY ACTUATION OF THE f'

EECONDARY SAFETY VALVES ACCEPTABLE.

OPERATION

. 480 .: _

'db '02 '4 46C ' ' ! ' i i ' I i 0 0.2 0.4 - 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 - 1.6 1.8 2.0 FRACTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER s

Figure 2.1.1-1 (page 1 of 1) ,,

Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Core Thermal Margin Safety Limit It CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 2.0-2 Revisiong-

~ . ._ , _

Pcge R:placemrt irstructio:s '

4 VOLUME 4.

4- Section 3.0 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as well as the specapcation number lxated in the upper right-hand corner ofthe CTSpage.

Key:

DOC = Discussion OfChanges -

DOD = Dist ussion Qf TechnicalSpecification Deviation or Discusswn QfBases Deviation _

REMOVE INSERT Overview of Channes No pages changed.

11.5 3.0-3 3.0-3 ITS B4ut

. No pages changed.

CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes No pages changed.

NSHC Findines No pages cheged.

ISTS Markun & Justification No pages changed.

ISTS Bases Markup & Justification

- No pages changed.

';- i -

Note: Italici:edentries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement imtructions carefully.

LCO Applicability I 3.0 3;0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (l.C0,). APPLICABILITY -

When a support system's Required Action directs a supported ,

system to be declared inoperable or directs. entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions.and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LC0 3.0.2.

LCO 3.0.7 Special test exception (STE) LCOs in each applicable LC0 section allow specified Technical Specification-(TS) l - 11 requirements to be changed-to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with STE LCOs is optional. When an STE LC0 is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the STE LC0 shall be met. When an STE LC0 is not desired to be met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made

-in accordance with the other applicable Specifications.

ll

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.0-3 Revision /I

Pcge Replacemrt I:structio:s -

VOLUME 5 l Section 3.1 ]

Note: Underlined titics indicate labs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as util as the spect)1catior number located in the upper right-hand cortwr ofthe LTSpage.

Key:

DOC = Discussion Of. Changes DOD = Discussion Qf TechnicalSpecification Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation i REMOVE INSERT ,

l Overview of Channes No pages, changed.

II.li 3,1.31 through 3.1.3 3 - 3.1.3 1 through 3.1.3-3 y 3.1.6-2 and 3.1.6 3 3.1.6-2 and 3.1.6-3 1 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7-2 3.1.7-1 and 3.1.7 2.

ITS Bases No pages changed.

CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes Specification 3.1.2, Unit 1 ' Specification 3.1.2, Unit i Page 2 of 3 and Page 3 of 3 Page 2 of 3 and Page 3 of 3 Specification 3.1.2, Unit 2 Specification 3.1.2, Unit 2 Page 2 of 3 and Page 3 of 3 Page 2 of 3 and Page 3 of 3 Specification 3.1.4, Unit 1 Specification 3.1.4, Unit 1 Page 4 of 5 Page 4 of 5 Specification 3.1.4, Unit 2 Specification 3.1.4, Unit 2 Page 4 of 5 Page 4 of 5 DOC 3.1.4-4 DOC 3.1.4-4 NSHC Findinas No pages changed.

ISTS Markup & Justification 3.1 1 3.1-1 2nd page ofInsert 3.1.1 (follows Page 3.1 1) 2nd page ofInsert 3.1.1 3.1-3 and 3.1-4 3.1-3 and 3.1-4 3.1 3.1-11 3.1-13 _ . .

3.1 13 Remove page titled " Insert Action A" (follows rage 3.1 13) Insert page titled" Insert Action A" 3.1-16 through 3.1 18 3.1-16 through 3.1-18 i

Not.;:Italici:edentries indicare uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage repte:ement instructions carefully.

. - . - ~ . . . . . = - . . -.- .- . - . . . -

i

~

Pcg2 R:placernent I:structio:s ^ .

1 VOLUME 5- '

- Section 3.1 - ,

,i Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding C15 markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit -

number as wilas the specification number locatedin the upper right-handcorner ofthe CTSpage . >

Key:

DOC = Qiscussion OfChanges DOD = Discussion WTechnicalspecification Deviation or Qiscussion WBases Qeviation ,

REMOVE. INSERT-ISTS Bases Markun & Justification No pages changed.

f i

li Note: Italicked entries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.-

4 4 v - ~

MTC 3.1.3 3.1 ' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.3 ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)

LCO 3.1.3 The MTC shall be maintained within the limits specified in the COLR. The maximum positive limit shall be that specified in Figure 3.1.3-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. HTC not within A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months limits.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

, 4 lt SR 3.1.3.1 Verify MTC is within the upper limit. Prior to a entering MODE I after each fuel loading u

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.1.3-1 Revisionpf A

)

MTC 3.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continue'd)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.3.2- -

NOTE------------------- 4 If the MTC is more negative than.the COLR_.

> limit when extrapolated to the end of cycle, SR 3.1.3.2 may be repeated. Shutdown must '

occur prior to exceeding the minimum allowable boron concentration at which MTC

- is projected to exceed the lower limit. ,

Verify MTC is within the lower limit Each fuel cycle specified in the COLR.. within i 7 effective y full power days ,

(EFPD) of initially reaching an-equilibrium Y condition with THERMAL POWER 2 90% RTP 4

, AND Each fuel cycle within 7 EFPD of reaching i- 2/3ofexpected core burnup

'CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2

.3.1.3-2 Revision /II

)

?i :.

MTC 3.1.3 Nya g PosmVE MICImlTLINE

.t= REGION 6 b (0.7,0.7)

..( ' O.00 _

s o

c 0.60 _

E# -

ACCEPTABLI OPERATION REGION O.80 _

. 0.20 _

(1.0.0.15) 0.10 _

0.00 l l l l _l l l l l 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.8 04 0.5 0.6 0.7 OS 0.9 1.0 FRACTlON OF RATEDTHERMALPOWER J

4-Figun- 3.1.3-1 (page 1 Of 1)

U A11owi ole Positive MTC Limit CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.1.3-3 Revision gli

Regulating CEA Insertion Limits 3.1.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Regulating CEA groups B.1 - Verify short-term 15 minutes !"

inserted between the steady state :

long-term steady insertion limits are !"

state insertion limit not exceeded.

and the transient insertion limit for 08

> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months interval. B.2 Restrict increases in 15 minutes THERMAL POWER to s 5% RTP per hour.

C. Regulating CEA groups C.1 Restore regulating 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months inserted between the CEA groups to within l gg long-term steady limits.

state insertion limit and the transient insertion limit for intervals

> 5 effective full power days (EFPD) per 30 EFPD interval or

> 14 EFPD per 365 EFPD.

D. Power dependent D.1 Perform SR 3.1.6.1. I hour ti insertion limit alarm circuit inoperable. AND Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months thereafter E.. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met.-

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.1.6-2 Revision [li

I Regulating CEA Insertion Limits t 3.1.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _-

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY-l4 SR 3.1.6.1 Verify each regulating CEA group position is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months within its insertion limits.

SR 3.1.6.2 Verify the accumulated times during which 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months the regulating CEA groups are inserted lq beyond the steady state insertion limits, but within the transient insertion limits.

SR 3.1.6.3 Verify power dependent insertion limit _ alarm 31 days IH circuit is OPERABLE.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.1.6-3 Revision B

STE-SDM 3.1.7 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.7 Special Test Exception (STE)-SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)

LCO 3.1.7 The SDM requirements of LC0 3.1.1, " SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM),"

the shutdown control element assembly (CEA) insertion limits of LC0 3.1.5, " Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA)

Insertion Limits," and the regulating CEA insertion limits of LC0 3.1.6, " Regulating Control Element Assembly (CEA)

Insertion Limits," may be t,uspended for measurement of CEA worth, provided shutdown reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated CEA worth (of those CEAs actually withdrawn) is available for trip insertion.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 2 and 3 during PHYSICS TESTS.

--_-------------------------NOTE----------------------------

Operation in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any CEA not fully A.1 Initiate boration to Immediately inserted and less restore required than the above shutdown reactivity.

shutdown reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion.

M 11 l n CALVERT' CLIFFS - UNITS 1 &'2 3.1.7-1 Revision /l

STE-SDM 3.1.7 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COPPLETION TIME A. (Continued)

All CEAs inserted and the reactor g subcritical by less than the above shutdown reactivity equivalent.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.1.7.1 Verify that the position of each CEA not 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months fully inserted is within the acceptance criteria for available negative reactivity addition.

4 SR 3.1.7.2 Verify that each CEA not fully inserted is Within 7 days capable of full insertion when tripped from prior to at least the 50% withdrawn position. reducing SDM to less than the limits of LC0 3.1.1 il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.1.7-2 Revision /

1 s g J . J = 3 . 1.2.

1 INSERT ACTION A & B CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Core reactivity balance 'A.1 Re-evaluate core design -7 days ,

not within limit. and safety analysis and determine that the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation.

)

AMI2 A.2 Establish appropriate 7 days operating restrictions an B. Required Actions and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Associated Completion Time not met. 1 I

Uf4I QM V'N8 mis A

4 4

S

~

pay 2 J3

5 pbh 3.\. 9 w % u... .F S*t W

-4/t.t REACTIVITY CONTROL SY3fEMS D "' *

" $b M - f.9 > 20*. p.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)~

I(. When in MODE 2 with K,, < 1.0 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achievingM l g reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical CEA position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

d. Prior to initial operation above $4 RATED TNERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of (e) below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

e. When in MODES 3 or 4. at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by considerattor 4 g,,; of the following factors:

m.or f ,tk 1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, CEA position.

y jg'7 pk 2.

3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature.

4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5.

E_

Xenon concentration, and tamarf umi ennrantration. /e d g 3, g, g g ' L .:.0 The overall core reactivity balance shall be c red to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within + 1.0% Ak/k at least once hr 11 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD).JThis copparison snes s -icer an J ear;1;nos' ' Tactorr sta';eo m am r wouon 4.1A.1.1.e. aboveJ ine im c<;ec 'vactivity va ues snait De saJussea-tnorma112ed) to correspond to y at s.1.2.\ . '

the actual core conditions prior to. exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective I M4TE.- Full Power Days after each fuel loating., x 4 o M4ccw M eadw M_ g d%r M Ni l'abt

._ i v

I l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 186

.t o

, pay 3 >U s y_.

.- .. . . . _ _ - ~. . - .. .. .

$pe L.+.e, 3. t , ~2. l 1

INSERT ACTION A & D CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Core reactivity balance A.1 Re-evaluate core' design 7 days not within limit. and safety analysis and determine that the reactor core is acceptable for continued operation.

AER A.2 Establish appropriate 7 days operatin restrictions an 1

B. Required Actions and B.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Associated Completion Time not met.

/

f (SardauthAnh. i h i

p,ge 2 oF- 3

$ c. A. +. 4 3. L 2 T, , ' d .. . c . .. ,p F c L g,c, 9.i k i. .C'.c. + .o % 3 t.t.1, 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CallTROL.SY$7Dl3 ' sot 1 - T.g > Qoo F SORVEllAAllCE REQLittDIGITS (Contissed) i

c. unen in IE10E 2 with < 1.0, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months prior to achieving

' reactor criticality varify1 that the redicted critical CEA position is within the limits o Specifica ion 3.1.3.6,

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATD 15 Del 4L POWER after .

each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of (e) below, with the CEA groups at the Transient Insertion Limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

'e r .t. e. When in IqDDES 3 or 4. at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration

,s ,,, nog , of the following factors:

' *E ' * **1 1. Reactor Coolant System boron conce'itration, l 2. CEA position.

.t. a d a d i

3. Reactor Coolant System everage temperature.

4 Fuel turnup based on gross thermal energy . . ration.

5. -

(6. XenonSamariis concentration, concentration. an [d

\' ' l 4.1.1.11 The overall core reactivity balance shall be c red to .

< redicted values to demonstrate a reement ithin + 1.0% Ak/k at least once r :11 Effective Full Peer Days EFPD).

asur. hest facterL eer'hd in 50ecincation M 1.1.1.e.

hFs rison constser at af The h,

. red cled reactivity va ues shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 Effective M 1.l'2.I' / ull Power Days after each fuel loading.

H arv -

\

D'p'*% N.4c* - -- . kJ o r E - - - -

^

Al rego.rel ef4,r 60 d F . wr se k Cu n t io d.k g. q

'J .

' ~~ ]

Kea.u snta Q I

h CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. 163

Spokhon ~4.1d 3/4.1 REACT!YITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMIT!116 C01BITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) jlc77 4 A h.' Vith more therIo'ne CEA (repilating or shutdown) mis ~al gned and N each misaligned CEA is within 15 inches of any other CEA in its

(* g Lgroup (indicated position) restore the misaligned CEAs to within

, heir a cified alignment __ requirements within one hour f t igry

)~ Iv/dellaf4 The 51s4Fligne6/CF)Ls/ngpersole/RE I stf.

ios Fif only one CEA (regulating or shutdown) remains }

@chon mila d at the end of cae hour, implement Aglign g. ._

O

/)c.n.d F E -__ c ___ m w'th g

tethanoneCEAl;regu'atingorshutdown)~misalignedTnd g %g h r more of the misaligned CEAs 1s-15 inches (indicated /k a.

C 2

nosi on) or more from any other CEA in its group, be in at least N+0 E!\

.i 110T STAND 8Y within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . -

W

~

l.. Z' on**!!>1.5 4 a ,

o, am b a,,n SURVEILLAllCE REQUIREMENTS f = _ -

Sa'3.t.f.\ tri-1.3. i .i The position o ach CEA shall be determined to be within 7.5 inches (indicated nefition) of all other CEAs in its aroup at least ca aar 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months & pt during time intervals when the Deviation urcuit

<*"## h nhibit are inoperable, then verify the individual CEA position at le t once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

'Q9 rtl /) crier / 6. [ .t E.) fand/orCEAMotion Qugg 4.1.;.;.2 h CEA net fc11y inserted shall be deterinined to be OPERABLE i-M '3.1.4 t by inserti_ t at least 7.5 inches at least once per 3f days._;: ^n M L4 syvara UT pu ing 6nia LLA operapiti Leat, 11 Enc LLA nas an noperable po on indication channel, alternate indication sys pulse count or voltage dividing net k) will be used to monitor positionbeinestored within ten minutes ror ion 11 a direct atton (full out reed swite tage iding network) cannot w the M'3 oseene nt of CEA motion, or CE withdrawal exceeds the surv lance esti insertion by > 7.5 inche , the position of the CEA s I be assumed .

o vm hamn > 15 inehst from t aroue at the rammancemen f CEA motforia 44J.1.7 The CEA_ Motion Inhibit shall be demonstratec; OPERABLE at least y y' j* I.M onceper3Idas yafnctionaltystwhichverlftsthatthec1 uit

' maintain gro overlap d sequencing r utrements of Speciff tion 3.1.3, and that e circuit also revents any A from bein /).

misali ed from all ther CEAS n its group by re than 7. inches '

L(indidatedpositi _., J e - a .- .

kid 3 Ver.(1 % w has ciru+ u c es.*>%6- \ 3 I cl.s s$

Add.I B 3./.15 Unn , M4 N be< %n.Her e),,4 . Q%%

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-26 Amendment No. 186 l

. _. =. - - ..

(p ,c . fi c. &, e 3.l. F l I

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTDt3 LIMITING ComITION FOR OPERATION (Contiamed) {

g** " A h. With more than cne CEA (regulating or shutdown) misaligned and"

each misaligned CEA is within 15 inches of cny other CEA in its ,

group (indicated position) restore the misaligned CEAs to__within !

pe-ified alignment requirements within one hour _,.fotherwl ately declare tne manened CIAs inopersoie ano impleme i i tion If only one CEA (regulating or shutdown) remains Ashm C misa d at the end of one hour. implement Action g.

90 g & =

w - era M m :._. . . _ - -;--.=_-

ACitok p more than one CEA (regulating or shutdown) misali and l

t,) e or more of the misaligned CEAs is 15 inches (1 icated si on) or more from any other CEA in its group, be in at least- 7

_AW 8Y within 6 ho_urs, tsoth ; , I %~r fo Ioi ' aZ yDEA e

^ " # " ' * ?* 'a *5

Q [g--

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDIENTS

_f C e d

'4*I ". :.:.1- The position of shall be determined to be within

.5 inches (it.dicatedoo n) of all other CEAs in its group at least-_

*'" ** M * *> nee per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sJtxce curt time in6 m ais . .. sne u m ation circui kmd kuoW D.i q.g d/or ctA notion it are noperable, then verify the individual CE sitions y lea nce per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

7Qg - g Sq h S. I.3.1.2- E CEA not fully inserted shall be determined to be OPERABLE

% 3. l. 4.4 by inserting 4tt at least 7.5 inches at least once perX asys.fror tne

--wnn or riorming sne c i.ui n ty test. If t ct.A nas an operabl sition indicati annel, the alterna indication syst i ulse nter er voltage iding network) will used to monitor l siti . fif a direct To nivu ;r.d estion (Tui eut . - switcn or stage)

I ing network) canno restored within t minutes from the 4' 3 ncement of CEA ton, or CEA withdrawa exceeds the survei nce sting insertion b 7.5 inches, the pos ton of the CEA sha assumed j '

i

(

J_o have been > 1 nches from its group a the commencement CEA motion s

% 11.4.7 idad.7 The CEA Motion Inhibit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 d by a func nel test union s iiies sn 6 ihe 6. uit group h-erlap and sequ ng requirements o Specif ation 3.3.3.6 d that the ci t also prevents a in L A.

mis gned from all her CEAs in it group by more than .5 inches EAfrombej i l' dicated positi .f kN m .r u ~ . _

31 d 7s A4) :

W 5. i . + 5 T % - M+7 reeJ >J M b (yWW 3r.. ~.4ec j b ej i ~ tk5 CALvERT Ctirrs - uMIT 2 3/4 1-26 Amendment No.163 1

l l

l pay 4 .F 5

l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.1.4 - CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY ALIGNMENT l

LA.3 Current Technical Specification 4.1.3.1.2 describes other acceptable methods to be used when the CEA being tested has an inoperable position indication channel (i.e., by use of the pulse counter or voltage divider network), while verifying each CEA not fully withdrawn can be moved 7.5 inches. These details will be relocated to the Bases. Thme details are not necessary to ensure the CEAs are inserted 2 7.5 inches to verify trippability of the CEA. The requirements ofITS LCO 3.1.4, CEA Alignment, and ITS SR 3.1.4.4 are adequate to ensure the CEA is trippable. Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the provisions of the Bases Control Program described in Chapter 5 of the ITS. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.

LA.4 Current Technical Specilication 3.13.1 Action f requires that if a CEA 3s misaligned by 215 inches, operation in Modes I and 2 may continue provided the misaligned CEA is restored to within its specified alignment requirements within the time allowance determined by the full core power distribution monitoring system, if available, or the core Operating Limits Report, if the last Total Integrated Radial Peaking Factor measurement was taken within the previous five days. If neither is available or if the CEA alignment cannot be-restored, CTS 3.1.3.1 Action g must be taken. For clarity and consistency, all the details concerning how to determine the time allowed to restore a misaligned CEA are now being relocated to the COLR. Improved Technical Specification 3.1.4 ACTION B will require the l misaligned CEA to be aligned within the time provided in the COLR. Current Technical Specificatian 3.13.1 Action f already specifies that the time to restore the misaligned CEA is provided in the COLR under certain circumstances. Therefore, these requirements are not necessary to ensure the time to restore the misaligned CEA are properly determined and applied. The requirements o. ~ fS LCO 3.1.4 ACTION B is adequate to ensure the misaligned CEA is restored to its alignment limit. Changes to the COLR will be controlled by the provisions of the COLR change control process described in Chapter 5 of the Bases.

LA.5 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.1.3.4 requires that CEA drop time be measured from when the electrical power is interrupted to the CEA drive mechanism until the CEA reaches its 90% insertion position, from a fully withdrawn position, with T , is 2 515 F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating. These details of the methods to perform the CEA drop time surveillance are being moved to the Bases ofITS SR 3.1.4.6 which measures CEA drop time. These details are not necessary to ensure the CEA drop times are maintained within limits. The requirements ofITS 3.1.4 and ITS SR 3.1.4.6 are adequate to ensure CEA rod drop time are maintained within limits. Any changes to these details in the Bases will be made in accordance with the Bases Change Control Program. The Bases Change Control Program will ensure that changes receive appropriate review. This change is a less restrictive movement of details with no affect on safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.

TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RFSTRICTIVE L.1 Current Technical Specifications 3.1.3.1 Action h describes the Required Actions when 2 or more CEAs are misaligied < 15 inches. The Actions require the CEAs to be aligned within one hour if more that, one remains misaligned at the end of I hour, the Unit must be g shutdown per CTS 3.1.J.1 Action g. Improved Technical Specifications 3.1.4 Action B will defer the shutdown requ'rements for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . it will require power to be reduced to 70% RTP within I hour and the CEAs to be aligned within two hours. This change l

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.1.4-4 Revision 1 I

. . - - - . - . . . . . - . . . .. - . . . - - , . . . . - . - . . . ~ . - .

j b

, +.

g 'TsTF (2I,, "

I SON 4J FJ(T}fAnelegf '@

3.1.1 1

[CT5).

3.1 RE4CTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS j

3.1.1. *HilTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)6TM WMW 3 l, t.

I;mt+s as sodiedisk cof4k 13fM l LC0 3.1.1 SDN shall be 3.(i l.

c._, -

g g, ggggg,e p 3 levet (40 inckes, &c, Reader CorMSys'.ee b t

APPLICA8ILITY: MODES 3 nd levelM be, cheve he,' W4,mM 4e kt 143 neutes .M d sourch ,0 m. bred j. kp' ACTIONS (do.ter sbl\ he. 4 2f *9 mp- .,

CONDITION ' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET10h TIME-

,$ L i.I ~

4/,5

'3. l. l 3-SDM not within lisij

.Cor reasons oker1 n 1 Initiate boration to.

&reDKtowithin

. 5 9"* -

pf, h

A* #'" '

enktrim A 'er S'. )

1 1NSEP.T nesa ALTIos)S A t 8 .

L _. ;

, SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY b h h mi Y s kc.' '?. f4 i 4.1,l.l.l I SR 371.1.1 Verify SON is ? . - ;- - ,-. - - cota 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

f.l,1,7./1 A ~N i 73$ E P.T ne so S R. 3, l. l. 2. 4 SR ,3.1,l.3 1

6

! ..CEOG STS 3.1-1 Rev 1. 04/07/95 7

e h

6 l

.. . . . - . .-.. - .- l .. J

a

<.\V e.

t+

- w

_. 3 ~^ .

7

',[t 1 i

- INSERT -'3. lil'

+,

D '

f----------------NOTE----------------

SR .3.1.1.2c Only required;in. MODE:5_with '

pressurizer' level- < 90 inches.-- N Veri fy44actorC(oolant5fystem . level Once within- . '7 A is above the bottom of the hot leg I hour after -

nozzles, achieving MODE 5-with pressurizer y level '< 90 inches -

h 6_NQ 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter i

i, SR 3.1.1.3 ----

NOTE---------------- '

3 Only required in MODE 5 with .1

! .f .. .. . .. ......

t.

-Verify non-borated water sourcesi Once within: -

s 88 gpm. '

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after achieving MODE 5

with pressurizer

level < 90 inches.

AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter ll 4

I l-i

,j:

3 s

9

, f k', (

' i) l )

,u

'l 9

-ps}

Reactivity Balance *-aat 3.l!hL @

'TsiF-Ib6 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1 Reactivity Balance '^r' d LCO 3.1 L I'l The core reactivity balance shall be within i 1% ok/k of predicted values.

I APPLICABILITY:

MODE / 1 @ 75 TF-IHf ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TINE i A. Core reactivity A.1 Re-evaluate core F -s balance not within design and safety limit, analysis and detemine that the reactor core is Ac */ c ope ation. *1# Ib"IN -

E A.2 Establish appropriate operating g

~ restrictions and h tpL%.

N B. Required Action and B.1 BeinMODEf. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

M gjs associated Completion -

Time not met. T57F-/41 i

CEOG STS 3.1-3 Rev 1. 04/07/95 I 9 I_

l Reactivity Balance SURVEILLANCE RE0L'; AEMENTS SURVEILtANCE FREQUENCY

<4

I' g

g' A SR 3.1. 1 ----------NOTM-----

h---The predicted reactivity values may be h[b ~

adjugted (nonsalized) to correspond to the speasured core reactivity prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of. .

60 effective full power days;(ESP &}y after each fuel loading.

[2. Thi urveillance not require [$ ~ff f,4 l performed pri . to entry -in =

k r 2. ;

Verify overall core reactivity balance is Prior to within i 1% Ak/k of predicted values. entering NODE I after fuel loading M

a.aasu to - / __, ort _

Q Only required after 60 3 P-CEOG STS 3.1-4 Rev 1, 04/07/95 6

CEA Alignment "- M) h' (CTh TS TF 134 ACTIONS (continued)

~

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET10N TIME .

2*f, y' ,

/kb 5.\

Required Action and-associated Completion 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months h -'

Time met.

] g g --- .

-~

g,1,g, j \, One or more CEAs '

untrippable.

Ac4 a */,-

3.l. 3. i

/kbi a e[b 15 nches [T9FJu) M pid;n 1 how 4""

any CEA psne d SUh/E!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,/ ) g

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY /acA4 AHO 4l,'3,),)

SR 3.19.d i .1 Verify the indi ated position of each CEA to be within

, / nches}%f all other CEAs (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

$7poG in its group.

\ 5.2 Verif that, for ch CEA, the PERABLE CEA/ 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

. di D'\/ i g

posi ion indica r channels, ed switch an plant comp er CEA post on indicat n 1 icate with [S inches) f each ot r..

Verify the CEA motion inhibit is OPERABLE. 31 days

,( .3.1.3) SR 3.1. '

(continued)

CEOG STS 3.1-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95 W

Shutdown CEA Insertion Limits '^- 5 ;' -

3.1

TS TF-134 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS __

3. I '. Shutdewn Control Element Assembly (CLA) Insertion Limits (Analet) g LCO 3.1. All shutdown CEAt shall be withdrawn to 2 12 ncher.

L MODEE2w 1, ith any regulating CEA not fully inserte h p f .. .. ........ _ .. NOTE - . . - - . . . . . T Thi

..3---_

not app?icable while performing SR 3.1. . .

h R 3 *a t! R CTieAt If ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

p. r more shutdown R.I.1 Verify 5 our CEAs not within limit. -

-2 [4.5 Ak/k.

, e Tsrw t '

C L'd 4 k.l.2 nitiate borati to I hour

#21.5 i= cJ e /4, I restore SbM t ithin inel~~Qs M~~

y ,;.,, ,, ,
o ~ ur er ~ ~by,a e > , y ,!, j q.4, na ,, /, Lis.u eta s.n w .aa I Restore shutdown Q to within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months h
< ;2,s..r LeAes.
~
2!.
. Required Action and associated Completion 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months @
Time not met.
CE0G STS- 3.1 13 Rev 1, 04/07/95
L INSERT ACTION A
.D$ Ll3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION- COMPLETION TIME
- A. One shutdown CEA ' A.1 Verify the accumulated Once within 4 hourt withdrawn 2121.5 times the'/hutdown CEAs inches and < 129 g @ inches bwithdrawn 2121.5 and < 129 inches.
m 5 g inches. >
24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months thereaAer d
4
.I h-1 -y..
1 1
a i
e 5
6 I
t
--.., ..m_- ,. y g- - -m--, . . . ~ . - rw,.e . . .v: y.-- .- .. ,,, . _ . . . . c. -,---e, - -- - - ,-- ,
Regulating CEA Insertion Limits '* j' ;; h
. TSTF-t 34 .
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETIONTI!il A. (continued) @2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than or equal 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 5 to the fraction of
. RTP allowed by the CEA group position and insertien limits specified in the COLR.
B. Regulating C 3 groups ~ B.1 Verify short^-term 15 minutes n 3*I'3'l inserted between the long-term steady state steady state insertion limits are O Sit AA g inse9 tion limit and not exceeded.
the transient insertion limit for QR
> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months per 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 
-interval. 8.2 Restrict increases in 15 minutes
, THERMAL POWER to s 5s RTP per hour.
C. ' Regulating CEA groups C.1 Restore regulating 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 3,l,3 ( inserted between the CEA groups to within Ach.w c long-term steady state inseEtionlimitand limits. hl b the transient insertion limit for intervals > 5 effective full power ,
days (EFPO) per-30 EFPD interval or
. > 14 EFPD per 365 EFPD.
grap k.*wwun D. -PlHealarm circuit D.1 Perform SR 3.1. .l. I hour !
d .b3. inoperable. fgp /34 g
(continued.'
,CEOG STS 3.1-16 Rev 1, 04/07/95 9
-. . = - ... . . . . . . - . .. ... . .. .- -
+
Regulating CEA In:ertion Limits:(Analog 3.1 -
7y, p t 3&
ACTIONS
~
CONDITION . REQUIRED ACTION- COMPLETION TINE D. (continued) Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months thereafter 3.1 ?,. (, . .
yr.d C,2. E. Required Action and E.1 Be in N00E 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Complation gfjg _
Time not met.
. A4mi 4 af =
bc .1.1,9 d ,' Z .
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
(),$ ( LSR 3.1. 1 '- --
' - - d----------- ---
T/sSury are /
l 4erfo p
____p______
not re ited to entry MOD ] cF- 134
%. ___________f.
l
-Ve.ify each regulating CEA group position 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months is within its. insertion limits.
\
SR 3.1/.2 Verify the accumulated times during which 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ~\
'I '1 m UJ the regulating CU groups are inscrted beyond the steady state insertion limits hlgg A E butwithinthetransientinsertionlimit$.
preter Je t inee<bbn limit f[2.l. li.4 SR 3.1 a
.3 Verify M alarm circuit is OPERABLE. 31 days hlh CEOG STS 3.1-17 Rev 1, 04/07/95 4
_, , . , . . ,,,y , , . . , . .
._ - - _ .- -- =-. _.
(cy.s> STE.50M'"*i.i 3.1 CTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS TS Tf-(36 3.1. Special Test Exceptinn (STE)-SHUTDOWN MARGIN (50M)i'- N)- g b !
(J, jo.l LC0 3.1. ' "*
irementsofLC03.1.1.'SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SD]M nr.d the re ulating --
767I'I CAT in m . limits o LCO3.1.7,'Re TS II'#3 #
~
esent Assemb (CEA) Insertion Lleits.gulating .may be suspended Control, .
for wasuraent of CEA worth 0-f 'M E-- provided shutdown T3 TE-67 reactivity equi alent to at least ",he highest estimated CEA worth (of those EAsactually.yJtbdrayn),1LavalJab]tt trip insertion. % s M J W c....p. F ab -
. u s ss t 3 te va) o'au &om l*% eh ef L't e 3.l.$ , Ad J,e C.**b'I E l**
~~Asse sl3 (cca) g u,h Lt 4/~~
APPLICABILITY: MODES 2 and 3 during PHYSIC - - -
W
...........................N0TE--..----- . ...-......-..-.
Operation in MODE 3 shall be limited to 6 consecutive hours.
ACTIONS CON 0! TION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Any CEA not fully A.! Initiate boration to di,4tnu i 3'g inserted and less than restore required ---
the above shutdown shutcown reactivity, b 7f'd a reactivity equivalent 1*m,,//. /ch available for trip /
insertion.
QB All CEAs inserted and the reactor subcritical by it.ss than the above shutdown reactivity equivalent.
-e
~
CEA STS
~~3.1-18 Rev 1, 04/07/95~~
+ - - . , - . . e - , c - ., ,, - - - . - . - .
Pcge Replacernent Instructions VOLUME 6 Section 3.2 ;
Note: Uruierlined titles imlicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are nferenced by esting the unit l number as wil as the specylcation number located in the upper right hand corner ofthe CTSpage.
Key:
DOC = Discussion ofChanges DOD = Discu.<sion Qf TechnicalSpecVication Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation NEMOVE INSERT [
Q1tp.ity of Chaastes No pages changed.
II!i i
-3.2.22 3.2.2-2 3.2.3 2 3.2.3 2 1.
11!! Bases No pages changed.
Cl3)larkun & Discussion of Channes No pages changed.
NSHC Findinas No pages changed.
ISTS Markup & Justification 3.25 3.25 3.2-7 3.2 7 ,
ISTS Bases Markun & Justification No pages changed.
i i !
~~N<we: Italici:cd entries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefsdly.~~
F,',
3.2.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN15 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.2.1 -------------------NOTE-------------------
f7,', shall be determined by using the incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map with all full length control element u assemblies at or above the long-term steady state insertion limit, as specified in the COLR. This determination shall be limited to core planes between 15% and 85% of full core height inclusive and shall exclude regions influenced by grid effects.
Verify the value of f7,r, . Once prior to operation above 70% RTP after each fuel loading AND Each 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1 CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.2.2-2 Revision Af(g
. . . - - _. =-- . . .. _
Fi 3.2.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.3.1 -------------------NOTE-------------------
/( shall be determined by using the incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map with all full length control element n assemblies at or above the long-term steady state insertion limit as specified in the COLR.
Prior to Verity the value of [',.
, operation
> 70% RTP after each fuel loading AND Each 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.2.3-2 Revision /l1
_ ~. _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ .
Fly .ti;5 3.2.
$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _
$URVE!LLANCE FREQUENCY
~~2. 2. l.2 $R 3.2.2.1 ----------------- NOT ---------------~~
e m . m e r o w ,e,u o @ sem .
Fly shall be detemined by using theyirn ccm, +rcJ ele *ed detectors to obtain a p map with all full length stffbution insertion limit,
/
at or above t 55* *bbee
. k
\/2'f*I'3) i 4 the long tors steady staasspecifiedintheCOLR.
Verify the value of Fly. Once prior to operation above 705 RTP after Tk 4 do4namkehoa g,1I4s Ided 'h ve each fue1
/ ~<s 44,<o pj u n gr/. ,/ /:.'//
/ loading Cvo heyd Iml.a,n aa,) sk.Il rulb )>W gg
'VLoul by ..J offaeli, Each 31 days of -
accumulated operation in MODE 1 l
(. SR 3.2.2.2 Veri the value of F,y. In accordance with the Frequency requirements of
.. $R 3.2.2.1 SR 3.2 .3 Verify the value of T,. In accordance j with the Frequency requirement of SR 3.2.2.1 CE0G ST$ 3.2-5 Rev 1. 04/07/95 4
1 s-= se w , y
. m' t F
ACTIONS (continued) _
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3,73 8. RequiredAction[and 8.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Ach,sm associated Completion TimeeP not met.
$URVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY (4.7.,1,"l) $R 3.2.3.1 .------------------NOTE---.----------------
5R-3p.2
_ tadand ameh-SRg191.3 44 shall berendri /rati, 1 4e 1
) C5 I r-ilshallbedeterminedbyusingthe1~
~
~~al al****+ g (44,1,3,3 detectors to obtain a po rAfstr map with all full lengt s at or above pw hl < *kp~~
........................................( p_,g,g,,,p the long; term steady st e insertion limi __,w Aw g yw<
Verify the value of F!. Prior to operation
> 70% RTP after each fuel loading AND Each 31 days of accumulated operation in MODE 1 SR 3.2 .2 Verify the value of F, [nacco nce w'ith t freg cy re rements o .
% 3.2.3.1 (cor.tinued)
CEOG STS 3.2-7 Rev1,04/07/f5
. - . , , , ~ - . .
-. . .- . . ~ - - - - _ _ - _ - . -- . - . - . . -
P ge Replacement I..structio:s VOLUME 7 Section 3.3 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit l number as utli as the spec @ cation trumber locatedin the upper right-handcorner ofthe CISpage.
Key:
DOC = Discussion ofChanges '
DOD = Qiscussion Qf Technical Spec $ cation Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation REMOVE INSERT Overview of Channes ;
No pages changed.
gji ;
33.1 1 and 33.12 33.1 1 and 3.3.12
33.14 3 3.1 4 l 3.3.16 33.1 6' 3.3.21 through 3.3.2 4 - 3J.2.I through 33.2 4 3J.3 2 333 2 3.3.41 _ _
33.4 1 33.4 5 through 3.3.4 7 33.4 5 through 33.4 7 33.5.I and 3J.5 2 3.3.5.I and 3.3.5-2 33.5 5 33.5 5 3.3.7 I 3 J.7 1 33.7 3 33.7 3 3.3.81 through 3.3.8 3 33.81 through 33.8-3 33.9 3 3.3.93 .
3.3.11 3 ,
33.11 3 ITS Deses .
B 33.133 B 33.133 8 33312 through B 333-15 B 33.3 12 through B 333 15--
B 3J.517 B 33.5-17
- B 33.7 7 and B 33.7 8 B 33.7 7 and B 3J.7-8
. B 3.3.5 3 and B 33.8-4 B 3J.8 3 and B 33.8-4 B 33,9-9 B 33.9 9 B 33,10-1I through 1133.10-20 B 33.10-11 through B 33.10 ,
RT'S Markun & Discussion of Channes Specification 3.3,1, Unit i _ Specification 33.1, Unit i PageIof14- Page1of14 Page 10 of14 Page 10 of 14
- Specification 3J.1, Unit 2 Specification 3J.1, Unit 2 ,
- PageIof14 Page1of14 Page 10 0f14 Page 10 cf 14 ,
DOC 3J.13 through 33.17 DOC 33.13 through 33.1-7 t
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- Note: Italici:ed entries indicate uneven eschanges. Phwefollowpage replacement instructiom carefully._ -
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i Pai li pl: cement I:structio:s VOLUME 7 i Section 3,3 t Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumTo *garding CTS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit ;
number as wellas the spectfication number lo ates in the upper right-handcorner ofthe CTSpage.
Key:
DOC = Qiscussion OfChanges DOD = Discussion Of TechnicalSpect1icatios. Dev, tion or Discussion OfBases Onlation REMOVE INSERT CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes. Co#>.tinuca Specification 3.3.2, Unit i Specification 33.2 Unit I- 7 Page 4 of 7 and Page 5 of 7 _
Page 4 of 7 and Page 5 of 7 Specification 3J.2, Unit 2 Specification 33.2, Unit 2 Page 4 of 7 and Page 5 of 7 Page 4 of 7 and Page 5 of 7 DOC 3.3.2 2 through 3.3.2 4 DOC 3J.2 2 through 3.3.2 4 '
Specification 3JJ, Unit 1 Specification 3.3J, Unit 1 i Page 7 of 10 .
Page 7 of 10 Specification 3JJ, Unit 2 Specification 3JJ, Unit 2 Page 7 of 10 Page 7 of 10 ,
l Specification 3.3.7, Unit i Specification 33.7, Unit 1 Page 1 of 10 Page 1 of 10 Specification 3J.7, Unit 2 Specification 3.3.7, Unit 2 Page 1 of 10 Page 1 of 10 DOC 3J.7 5 DOC 3J.7 5 Specification 3J.8, Unit 1 Specification 3J.8, Unit i .
CRRS, Page 2 of 4 through 4 of 4 ' CRRS, Page 2 of 4 through 4 of 4 Specification 3J.8, Unit 2 Specification 33.8, Unit 2 >
CRRS, Page 2 of 4 through 4 of 4 CRRS, Page 2 of 4 through 4 of 4 ,
MSHC Findians No pages changed.
ISTS Markun & Justification i
33 1 through 33-4 33-1 through 33-4 3311 through 3314 33-11 through 33-14 3317 and 3.318 33-17 and 3318 33 22 through 33 24 33-22 through 33-24 33 26 3.3 26 ,
33 30 3 3-30 ,
33 32 through 33 34 33-32 through 33 34
^ 33 36. 33 36 i
'33 38- 3 3-38 ?
33 40- 33 40
~ 33 42 and 33-43-.. 33-42 and 33-43 ii ,
~
Note:Italici:edentrics indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollov wge replacement instructions car-fuly, r y = sa r--- 6 *tE_ rt v, m p- +,- p w m w. -v- w- y sr --
t Page Replacement I:structions i VOLUME 7 Section 3.3 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit l number as wellas the spec $ cation number locatedin the upper right handcorner ofthe CISpage.
Key:
DOC = Discussion OfChanges DOD = Qiscussion Of TechnicalSpec$ cation Deviation or Discussion OfBases Deviation
' REMOVE INSERT ISTS Markun & Justification. Continued DOD 3.3-2 and 3.3 3 DOD 3.3 2 and 3.3 3 DOD 3.3 6 and 3.3 7 DOD 3.3 6 and 3.3 7, ISTS Baws Markun & Justincation B 3.3 39 B 3.3 39 83.358 B 3.3-58 83.3115 8 3.3.I !$
B 3.3 120 and B 3.3 12 i B 3.3 120 and B 3.312i Page titled " Insert 3.3.9.4"(found after page B 3.3 132) Page titled " Insert 3.3.9.4" ,
B 3.3144 B 3.3144 ;
B 3.3 146 B 3.3 146 o
l' lil
. Note: Italici:edhntries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.
t:
t
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RPS Instrumentation. Operating 3.3.1 4
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation.0perating LCO 3.3.1 Four RPS bistable trip units, associated measurement !H :
channels, and applicable automatic bypass removal features for each Function in Tabla 3.3.1 1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
ACTIONS
..............................-------NOTE----------------------------- ..-----
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each RPS Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Place affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one-RPS bistable bistable trip unit in trip unit or bypass or trip.
associated measurement channel AND inoperable except for .
Condition'C (excore A.2.1 Restore affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months channel not bistable trip unit .
calibrated with and associated incoredetectors). measurement channel to OPERABLE status.
M CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 3.3.1-1 Revision Et;
.g_,.y,y .
,-wyv - -p. My s . . _ . ,,4,, =--- - , .e.w wc--,,tw m-tv-ce e.-ry , w y e-wee. . . .-. - .-,e r - - - -
t RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1
^
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (Continued) A.2.2 Place affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months blstable trip unit in trip.
B. One or more functions - - - - - - - - - - - NOT E - - - - - - - - - - - -
with two RPS bistable LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
trip units or ----------------------------
associated measurement channels B.1 Place one affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 
. inoperable except for bistable trip unit in Condition C (excore bypass and place the
,. channel not other affected calibrated with bistable trip unit in incoredetectors), trip.
AND 8.2 Restore one affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bistable trip unit and associated measurement channel to OPERABLE status.
C. One or more Functions C.1 Perform SR 3.3.1.3. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with one or more power range excore 08 channels not calibrated with the C.2 Restrict THERMAL 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months incore detectors. POWER to < 90% RTP.
i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1-2 Revision 0
-- . . , - . - _ - _ - ._ .~ .- _ - .
P RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One or more Functions - - - - - - - - - - - N OT E - - - - - - - - - - - -
with two automatic LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. ;
bypass removal ----------------------------
feature channels it inoperable. E.1 Disable bypass I hour channels.
QB E.2.1 Place one affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months bistable trip unit in bypass and place the other in trip for each affected trip Function.
AND E.2.2 Restore one automatic 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bypass removal feature and the affected bistable trip unit to OPERABLE status for each affected trip Function.
F. Required Action and F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion to < 15% RTP.
~~Time not met for Axial Power Distribution-High and Loss of Load Trip -~~
Functions.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1-4 Revision 1("
,mh. -~---~~w,- .e < -' ~,-,.,-v-
RPS Instrumentation-Operating 3.3.1
i 50RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) j SURVEILLANCE _ FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2 ------------------NOTES-----------------
1. Not required to be performed until i 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is 2 15% RTP. ,
~~2. The daily calibration may be suspended during PHYSICS TESTS, provided the~~
~~calibration is performed upon reaching each major test power plateau, and !~~
prior to proceeding to the next major- i test power plateau. ,
i Ferfonn a calibration (heat balance only) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and adjust the excore power range and AT power channels to agree with calorimetric calculation if the absolute difference is 2 1.5%. 1 SR 3.3.1.3 -- ----------------NOTE-------------------
Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is 2 20% RTP and I required to be performed prior to operation g i above 90% RTP.
Calibrate the power range excore channels 31 days using the incore detectors, g CALVERT CLIFFS _- UNITS 1 &_2 3.3.1-6 Revision y y
.-~- , * -<--,:- - --n.. , . . - n-_-.- -,--,,ws ,+, 4 v ~ , - - - - , - , , , - - , , ,
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 3.3.2 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION i 3.3.2 ReactorProtectiveSystem(RPS) Instrumentation-Shutdown i LCO 3.3.2 Four Rete of Change of Power-High RPS bistable trip units, associated neasurement channels, and automatic bypass renoval l11 features shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5, with any reactor trip circuit breakers closet and any control element assembly ct.pable of being withdrawn.
...........................-N0TE---------.-----------------
Bistable t'ip units may be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is
< 1E-4% RTo. Bypass shall be automatically removed when THERMAL PO4ER is 2 IE-4% RTP.
ACTIONS ,
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Rate of Change of A.1 Place affected I hour Power-High bistable bistable trip unit in trip unit or bypass or trip.
associated measurement channel AND inoperable.
A.2.1 Restore affected -W Sours bistable trip unit and associated measurement channel to OPERABLE status.
og CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2-1 Revisionptg
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (Continued) A.2.2 Place affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bistable trip unit in trip.
B. Two Rate of Change of - - - - - - - - - - - N OT E - - - - - - - - - - - -
Power-High bistable LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
trip units or ----------------------------
associated measurement channels B.1 Place one bistable I hour inoperable, trip unit in bypass and place the other bistable trip unit in trip.
AND B.2 Restore one bistable 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months trip unit to OPERABLE status.
C. One automatic bypass C.1 Disable bypass I hour il removal feature channel.
inoperable.
E C.2.1 Place affected I hour bistable trip unit in bypass or trip.
AND CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2-2 Revision F ti
l I
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown I 3.3.2 ]
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (Continued) C.2.2.1 Restore automatic 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bypass removal ,
~
feature and affected bistable trip unit to OPERABLE status, t
QB-C.2.2.2 Place affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bistable trip unit in trip.
D. Two automatic bypass - - - - - - - - - - - N OT E - - - - - - - - - - - -
removal. features LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable, inoperable. ----------------------------
D.1 Disable bypass I hour 11 '
channels.
QB D.2.1 Place one affected bistable trip unit in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months bypass and place the other in trip.
AND D.2.2 Restore one automatic bypass removal 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months feature and the .
affected bistable trip unit to OPERABLE status.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2-3 Revision
< w ,.w.- -
, , , - . . . .-,. - - . - - . , , , . , . . . . ~ , , - - - - - ,--,.+._--,_m..
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION. TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Open all reactor trip 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion circuit breakers.
Time not net.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMEllTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
.SR 3.3.2.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK of each Wide Range 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor.
SR 3.3.2.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the Once within Rate of Change of Power trip instrument 7 days prior to channel. The allowable value shall be each reactor s 2.6 dpm. startup i SR 3.3.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 24 months automatic bypass removal feature.
SR 3.3.2.4 -------------------NOTE-------------------
Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Perform a CHANNEL CAllBRATION, including 24 months automatic Dypass removal features. g 4
i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 -3.3.2-4 Revision,9'
I RPS Logic and Trip Initiation 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Two channels of RTCBs D.1 Open the affected Imediately 3 or Trip Path Logic RTCBs.
affecting the same trip leg inoperable.
E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND B, or D not met.
E.2 Open all RTCBs. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months QE One or more Functions h with two or more Manual Trip, Matrix Logic Trip Path Logic, or RTCS channels inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or D.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 31 days RTCB channel.
SR 3.3.3.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days RPS Logic channel. g it CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.3.3-2 Revisionf
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation LCO 3.1.4 Four ESFAS sensor modules, associated measurement channels, llt and applicab~ie automatic block removal features for each Function in Table 3.3.4 1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS
..............................-......N0TE---.- .-.----------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each ESFAS Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Place affected sensor 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months with one ESFAS sensor module in bypass or module or' associated trip.
measurement channel inoperable. AND A.2.1 Restore affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months sensor module and associated measurement channel to OPERABLE status.
98 A.2.2 Place affected sensor 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months module in trip. ,
1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.4-1 Revision)Ty
-. .,-. . .. -- ._ ..- - - - .~ .
i ESFAS Instrumentation ,
3.3.4 j Table 3.3.4-1(page1of3) :'
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation i
FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~1. Safety Injection Actuation Signal !"~~
~~a. Containment Pressure-High SR 3.3.4.1 s 4.75 psig SR 3.3.4.2 SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.5 I 2 1725 psia~~
~~b. Pressurizer Pressure-Low 'I SR 3.3.4.1 SR 3.3.4.2 SR 3.3.4.3 SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.5~~
~~2. Containment Spray Actuation Signal~~
~~a. Containment Pressure-High SR 3.3.4.1 s 4.75 psig SR 3.3.4.2 SR 3.3.4.4 1 SR 3.3.4.5~~
~~3. Containment Isolation Signal~~
a. Containment Pressure-High SR 3.3.4.1 s 4.75 psig SR 3.3.4.2 SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.5 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.4-5 Revision g'ig
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.4 Table 3.3.4-1(page2of3)
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation FUNCTION SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~4. Steam Generator Isolation Signalk) d SR 3.3.4.1 2 685 psia~~
~~a. Steam Generator Pressure-Low )~~
~~SR 3.3.4.2 SR 3.3.4.3 SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.5~~
~~5. Containment Sump Recirculation~~
~~a. Refueling Water Tank Level-Low SR 3.3.4.2 2 24 inches above SR 3.3.4.4 tank bottom SR 3.3.4.5~~
~~6. Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System lL~~
~~a. Steam Generator 1 Level-Low SR 3.3.4.1 s -149 inches and SR 3.3.4.2 2 -194 inches SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.5~~
~~b. Steam Generator 2 Level-Low SR 3.3.4.1 s -149 inches and SR 3.3.4.2 2 -194 inches SR 3.3.4.4 SR 3.3.4.5 -~~
c. Steam Generator Pressure SR 3.3.4.1 s 135.0 psid for Difference-High SR 3.S.4.2 Unit 1 (1 > 2) or (2 > 1) SR 3.3.4.4 5 130.0 psid for U SR 3.3.4.5 Unit 2 l
l- I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS'1 & 2 3.3.4-6 Revision [l P
ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.4 Table 3.3.4-1 (page 3 of 3)
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Id Pressurizer Pressure-Low may be manually bypassed when pressurizer pressure is < 1800 psia. The bypass shall be automatically removed whenever pressurizer pressure is 21800 psia.
IN Safety Injection Actuation Signal is required to start the containment l" spray pumps.
I'I Only the Steam Generator Isolation Signal function and the Steam C?nerator Pressure-Low signal are not required to be OPERABLE when all l"7 associated valves isolated by the Steam Generator Isolation Signal lh function are closed and de-activated.
IU Steam Generator Pressure-Low may be manually bypassed when steam generator pressure is < 785 psia. The bypass shall be automatically removed whenever steam generator pressure is 2 785 psia.
1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.4-7 Revisiongu I
ESFAS Logic and Manual Actuation 3.3.5 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5 EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFAS)LogicandManual '
Actuation LC0 3.3.5 Two ESFAS Manual Actuation or Start channels and two ESFAS Actuation Logic channels shall be OPERABLE for each ESFAS Function specified in Table 3.3.5-1.
APPLICABILITY: According to. Table 3.3.5 1.
ACTIONS
...........................--------- NOTE-------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each ESFAS Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Auxiliary A.1 Restore affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months Feedwater Actuation Auxiliary Feedwater y System Manual Start Actuation System channel or Actuation Manual Start channel Logic channel and Actuation Logic inoperable. channel to OPERABLE status.
8 B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.
B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l-CAlVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.5-1 Revision gli o
ESFAS Logic and Manual Actuation 3.3.5 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more Functions- C.1 Restore affected 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months with one Manual Manual Actuation Actuation channel or channel and Actuation Actuation Logic Logic channel to channel inoperable OPERABLE status.
except Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation ll System.
3 D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition C AND not met for one Manual Actuation D.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months channel.
E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition C AND not met for one Actuation Logic E.2 Be in Mode 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months channel.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS-1 & 2 3.3.5-2 Revisionffll
ESFAS Logic and Manual Actuation 1 3.3.5 Table 3.3.5-1 (page 2 of 2) )
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System E Actuation Logic and Manual Actuation Applicability I') High Pressure Safety Injection pumps are only required to start l automatically on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal when Reactor h
Coolant System temperature is 2 385'F for Unit 1, 2 325'F for Unit 2. l l
Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.5-5 Revision /
CRS 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7 Containment Radiation Signal (CRS)
LCO 3.3.7 Four CRS containment radiation monitor sensor modules, associated measurement channels, one CRS Actuation Logic g channel, and one Manual- Actuation channel shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS, with containment purge valves open, lt During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment with containment purge valves open. lt ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One radiation monitor A.1 Place the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months sensor module or sensor module in associated trip.
measurement channel inoperable. OJ A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATION 3.
AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
-CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7-1 Revision $ll
CRS 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.2 -------------------NOTE------------------- i Testing of Actuation Logic shall include verification of the proper relay driver output signal.
Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days CRS Actuation Logic channel. ;
SR 3.3.7.3 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days containment radiation monitor sensor.
Verify CRS high radiation setpoint is less than or equal to the Allowable Value of g g 220mR/hr.
SR 3.3.7.4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each 24 months containment radiation monitor instrument channel.
SR 3.3.7.5 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 24 months CRS Manual Actuation channel.
SR 3.3.7.6 Verify CRS response time is within limits. 24 months on a ~ lIl STAGGERED TEST BASIS 11 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7-3. Revision)/
CRRS 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION -
3.3.8 Control. Room Recirculation Signal (CRRS)
LCO 3.3.8 One CRRS trin circuit and measurement channel shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:. MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, 9l0 During movenent of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. .CRRS trip circuit or A.1 Place one Cc7 trol I hour measurement e.hannel Room Emergency g
.1 operable in 3E 1 Ventilation System 2, 3, or 4. train in recirculation mode with the post-loss- g g of-coolant incident filter fan in service.
B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND g not met.
B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 
\l CALVERTLCLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-1 l Revisionf 1
CRRS 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. CRRS trip circuit or C.1 Place one Control Immediately meaaurentnt channel Room Emergency inoperable during Ventilation System g movement of train in irradiated fuel recirculation mode assemblies, with post-loss-of- p coolant incident 3 filter fan in service.
J 9E C.2 Suspend movement of Immediately ,
irradiated fuel assemblies.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the control room 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l' 3
radiation monitor channel.
11 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-2 Revisiong
CRRS ,
3.3.8-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)-
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY .
SR 3.3.8.2 Perform a' CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the 92 days 9 CRRS radiation monitor trip circuit and measurement channel.
Verify CRRS high radiation setpoint is less %
than or equal to the Allowable Value :-f 11 6E4 cpm above normal background.
SR 3.3.8.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the CRRS 24 months radiation monitor trip circuit and 8 measurement channel.
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2' 3.3.8-3 RevisionJ/
CVCS Isolation Signal ;
3.3.9
. SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.2' ----------------NOTES------------------
~~1. Testing of Actuation Logic shall include the verification of the proper relay driver output signal.~~
~~2. Relays associated with plant equipment-that cannot be operated during plant .~~
operation are only required to be tested once per 24 months.
Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 92 days CVCS sensor channel with setpoints in accordance with the following Allowable Values:
West Penetration Room Pressure-High s 0.5 psig Letdown Heat Exchanger Room Pressure-High 5 0.5 psig SR 3.3.9.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each CVCS 24 months sensor channel.
SR 3.3.9.4 Verify CVCS Isolation Signal response time 24 months on a l 11 is within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS
- it CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.9-3 Revision /
Remote Shutdown Instrumentation-3.3.11 4
Table 3.3.11-1 (page 1 of 1)
Remote Shutdown System Instrumentation FUNCTION / INDICATION REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS 1.. Reactivity Monitoring '
~~a. Wide Range Neutron Flux 1~~
~~b. Reactor Trip Breaker Indication 1 per trip breaker~~
~~2. Reactor Coolant System Pressure Monitoring~~
~~a. Pressurizer Pressure 1~~
~~3. Monitoring Decay Heat Removal via Steam Generators Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature 1 per loop "~~
a.
~~b. Steam Generator Pressure 1 per steam generator~~
~~c. Steam Generator Level (Wide Range) 1 per steam generator a S~~
~~4. Reactor Coolant System Inventory Monitoring~~
a. Pressurizer Level 1 ll CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 &-2 3,t.11-3 Revisionjd g % = -m_- .__
RPS Instrumentation-Operating B 3.3.1 .
BASES changes in power distribution and RCS temperature may render the calibration inaccurate.
SR 3.3.1.3 It is necessary to calibrate the excore power range channel upper and lower subchannel amplifiers such that the internal ASI used in'the TM/LP and APD-High trip Functions reflects the true core power distribution as determined by the incore detectors. A Note indicates the Surveillance is required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is 3 20% RTP, and prior I to operation above 90% RTP. Uncertainties in the excore and incore measurement process make it impractical to calibrate when THERMAL POWER is < 20% RTP. The Completion Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allows time for plant stabilization, data taking,
. and instrument calibration. The Frequency requires the I
Surveillance be performed every 31 days after the initial performance prior to operation above 90% RTP. Requiring the Surveillance prior to operations above 90% RTP is because of l tt the increased uncertainties associated with using uncalibrated excore detectors. If the excore channels are not properly calibrated to agree with the incore detectors, power is restricted during subsequent operations because of
- increased uncertainty associated with using uncalibrated excore channels. The 31 day Frequency is adequate, based on operating experience of the excore linear amplifiers and the slow burnup of the detectors. The excore readings are a strong function of the power produced in the peripheral fuel bundles and do not represent an integrated reading across the core. Slow changes in neutron flux during the fuel cycle can also be detected at this Frequency.
SR 3.3.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each RPS instrument channel, except Loss of Load and Rate of Change CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.1-33 Revisionp[g
RPS Logic and. Trip Initiation B 3.3.3 BASES the two affected channels of RTCBs. This Condition allows for loss of a single vital instrument bus or matrix power .
supply, which will de-energize both Trip Path Logic channels in the same trip leg. This will open both sets of RTCBs in the affected trip leg, satisfying the Required Action of opening the affected channels of RTCBs.
Of greater concern is the failure of the trip path circuit-in a nontrip condition (e.g., due to two trip path K-relay failures). With only one Trip Path Logic channel failed in a nontrip condition, there is still the redundant set of RTCBs in the trip leg. With both-failed in a nontrip condition, the reactor will not trip automatically when
. required. In either case, the affected RTCBs must be opened immediately by using the appropriate Manual Trip push buttons, since each of the four push buttons opens one set of RTCBs, independent of the triip path circuitry. Caution must be exercised, since depressing the wrong push buttons may result in a reactor trip. 1 If the affected RTCB(s) cannot be opened, Condition E is entered. This would only occur if there is a failure in the Manual Trip channel or the RTCB(s).
E.1 and E.2 Condition E is entered if Required Actions associated with Condition A, B, or D 3re not met within the required Completion Time or if one or more Functions with more than it one Manual Trip, Matrix Logic, Trip Path Logic, or RTCB channel is inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or D.
If the RTCBs associated with the inoperable channel cannot be_ opened, the reactor must be shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and all the RTCBs opened. A Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE.from full power conditions in an orderly CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3-12 Revision ff h
. -- -.- _ . . -- -= - . . . . . -
RPS Logic and Trip'Initiotion B 3.3.3 ->
BASES manner and without challenging plant systems and to open - 1 RTCBs. All RTCBs should'then be opened. placing the plant in a MODE where'the LC0 does not. apply and ensuring no CEA-withdrawal occurs.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.3.1
' REQUIREMENTS
< A CHA1NEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each RTCB channel.
every 31 days. This verifies' proper operation of each RTCB.
The RTCB must.then-be closed prior to testing the other RTCBs. or a reactor trip may result. The frequency of 31 days is' based on the reliability analysis presented in ,
topicalreportCEN-327,"RPS/ESFASExtendedTestInterval
~~Evaluetion" (Ref. 4).~~
! SR 3.': d,1 A CHAhNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each RPS Logic channel is perforned every 92 days to ensure the entire channel will l perfonn its intended function when needed.
In addltion to reference voltage tests, the RPS CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST consists of three overlapping tests as described in Reference 3. 'These tests verify that the RPS is capable of performing its intended function, from bistable input through the RTCBs. The first test, the instrunent channel test, is addressed by SR 3.3.1.4 in LC0 3.3.1.
This SR addresses the two tests associated with the RPS Logic: Matrix Logic and-Trip Path Logic.
Matrix locic Tests l These tests are performed one matrix at a time. They verify
.that a coincidence in the two instrument channels for each Function removes power from the matrix relays. During i l
CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2. B 3.3.3 Revision ,l l
V -
RPS L.gic and Trip Initiation B 3.3.3 BASES testing, power is applied to the matria relay test coils and prevents the matrix relay contacts from assuming their
.de-energized state. The Matrix Logic tests will detect any short circuits around the bistable cont,tets in the coincidence-logic such as may be caused by faulty bistable relay or trip bypass contacts.
Trio Path Tests These tests are similar to the Matrix Loric tests, except that test power is withheld from one matrix relay at a time, allowing the trip path circuit to de-energize, opening the affected set of RTCBs.. The RTCBs must then be closed prior to testing the other three trip path circuits, or a reactor trip may result.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis presented in topical report CEN-32V, "RPS/ESFAS ExtendedTestIntervalEvaluation"(Ref.4).
SR 3.3.3.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the Manual Trip channels is performed prior to a reactor startup to ensure the entire channel will prform its intended function if cequired.- The Manual Trip Function can be tested either at pt wer or shutdown. However, the simplicity of this circ'Jitry and the absence of drift concern makes this Frequency alequate.
Additionally, operating experience has shown thtt these components usually pass the Surveillance when pe-formed once within 7' days prior to each reactor startuo.
s 4
- REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 14 2.- 10 CFR Part 100
-3. UFSAR, Section 7.2 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3-14 Revtsion 0
l RPS Logic and Trip Initiation- ~
B 3.3.3 i BASES
~~4. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March:3, 1989 i~~
~
CALVERT CLIFFS UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.3-15 Revision 0
~
ESFAS Logic and Manual Actuation-B 3.3.5
. BASES-The Frequency of 92 days is based on operating experience <l U that has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at this Frequency.
SR 3.3.5.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the manual ESFAS
- actuation circuitry, de-energizing relays and providing
~1 Manual Actuation of the Function.
This Surveillance verifies that the actuation push buttons-are capable of opening contacts in the Actuation Logic as designed, de-energizing the actuation relays and providing Manual Trip of the Function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating -
experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 24 months.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, St.ction 7.3
~~2. Letter from R. E. Denton (BGE) to NRC, dated June 5, 1995 Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.5-17 Revision /~~
CRS B 3.3.7 BASES SR 3.3.7.2 Proper operation of the actuation relays is verified by verification of the relay driver output signal.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on plant operating experience with regard to actuation channel OPERABILITY, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 92 day interval is a rare event.
SR 3.3.7.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each containment radiation sensor channel to ensure the entire channel, except for sensor and initiating relays will perform its intended function.
The Frequency of 92 days is based on plant operating experience with regard to sensor channel OPERABILITY and drif t, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 92 day interval is a rare event.
SR 3.3.7.4 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a check of the sensor channel including the sensor. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for sensor channel drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive tests. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis.
The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an 24 month calibration interval based on the refueling interval and the l It h
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 B 3.3.7-7 Revision /
CRS B 3.3.7 BASES instruments not being inservice during power operations, but part of preparation for being placed in service is a' CHANNEL ll CALIBRATION.
SR 3.3.7.5 Every 24 months, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the manual CRS actuation circuitry.
This Surveillance verifies that the actuation push buttons are capable of opening contacts in the Actuation Logic as designed, de-energizing the actuation relays and providing Manual Actuation of the Function. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance
-were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every 24 months.
SR 3.3.7.6 This Surveillance ensures that the train actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum times assumed in the analyses. Response times are defined in the same manner N-4 as ESF RESPONSE TIME. The 24 month Frequency is based upon plant operating experience, which shows random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Testing of the final actuating devices, which make up the bulk of the response time, is-included. Testing of the final actuating device is one channel is included in the testing of each actuation logic channel.
REFERENCES 1. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.3 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.7-8 Revision 1 +- P== dr + w* -
re
CRRS B 3.3.8 BASES APPLICABILITY The CRRS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES'1, 2, 3, and 4, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies to ensure ig n a habitable environment' for the control room operators.
ACTIONS A CRRS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. -The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure er drift of the trip circuit or measurement channel sufficient to exceed the nominal trip. setpoint. Typically, the drift is not large which at worst would result in a' delay of actuation rather than a total loss of function. This determination is generally made during the performance of a -
CliANNEL CALIBRATION when the process instrument is set up for adjustment to bring it to within specification. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS identify trip circuit arift. If the trip setpoint is not within the Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable and the appropriate Conditions must be entered.
A.1. B.I. B.2. C.1. C.2.1. and C.2.2
Conditions A, B, and C are applicable to the CRRS trip circuit and measurement channel. Condition A applies to the failure of the CRRS trip circuit or measurement channel in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Entry into this Condition requires action to either restore the failed channel or manually
, perform the CREVS function (Required Action A.1). The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is sufficient to complete the Required Actions. If the channel cannot be restored to 3 OPERABLE status, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this' status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6_ hours and to MODE _5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The Completion Times of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months for reaching MODES 3 and 5 from MODE 1 are-reasonable, based on operating experience and normal
'cooldown rates, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner'and without challenging plant safety systems or operators.
4 II
~~CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.8-3 Revisiong~~
i q
CRRS B 3.3.8 BASES Condition C applies to the failure of the CRRS trip _ circuit or measurement channel when moving irradiated assemblies. .lu The Required Actions are ininediately taken to pla'ce one j OPERABLE CREVS train in the recirculation mode with post- 3 !
LOCA-fans in service or to suspend movement of irradiated h ,
fuel assemblies. The Completion Time recognizes the fact that the radiation signal is the only Function available to initiate control room isolation in the event of a fuel handling accident. I SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred, CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Acceptance criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the i transmitter or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
The Frequency, about once every shift, is based on operating experience that demonstrates the rarity of channel failure.
The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel OPERABILITY during normal operational use of the displays associated with the LCO required channels. In addition, a downscale alarm and upscale alarm immediately. alert operations to loss of the channel.
Il CALVERT_' CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.8-4 Revision /
CVCS Isolation Signal B 3.3.9 BASES ,
The Frequency is based upon the assumptions of an'24 month calibration interval for the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis and includes operating experience as well as consistency with an 24 month fuel cycle.
-SR 3.3.9.4 This Surveillance ensures that the train actuation response times are less than or equal .to the maximum times assumed in the analyses. Response times are defined in the same manner g as ESF RESPONSE TIME. The 24 month Frequency is based upon plant operating experience, which shows random failures of-instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Testing of the final actuating devices, which make up the. bulk of the response time, is included. Testing
, of the final actuating device in one channel is included in the testing of each actuation logic channel. l REFERENCES 1. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 7.3
~~2. Plant setpoint analyses~~
~~3. Letter from R. E. Denton (BGE) to NRC, dated June 6,~~
~~, 1995~~
~~4. EN-4-104, " Surveillance Testing" tl CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.9-9 Revision /~~
~~PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES raise and control the f. team generator level to establish boiler condenser heat transfer. Feedwater flow it increased until indication is in range.~~
15. Condensate Storace Tank Level Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Level is provided to ensure water supply for auxiliary feedwater (AFW). The CSTprovidestheensuredsafetygradewatersupplyforlLI the AFW System. Inventory is monitored by a 0 to 144 inch level indicatien for each tank. Condensate Storage Tank Level is displayed on a control room indicator and plant computer. In addition, a control l il room annunciator alarms on low level.
Condensate Storage Tank Level is considered a Type A variable because the control room meter and annunicator are considered the primary indication used by the Operator. The DBAs that require AFW are the steam line break and loss of main feedwater. The CST is the initial source of water for the AFW System. However, as the CST is depleted, manual operator action is necessary to replenish the CST or align suction to the AFW pumps from the hotwell.
16, l'/, 18, 19. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling.
An evaluation was made of the minimum number of valid core exit thermocouples necessary for inadequate core cooling detection. The evaluation determined the reduced complement of core exit thermocouples necessary to detect initial core uncovery and trend the ensuing core heatcp. The evaluations account for core nonuniformities including incore effects of the radial ll, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-11 kevision ))
4 +r .
Jesc'a u. .J , . e m
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10
. BASES-decay power distribution and excore effects of condensate runback in the. hot legs and nonuniform inlet temperatures. Based on these evaluations, adequate or inadequate core cooling detection is ensured with-two valid core exit thermocouples per quadrant. >
, The design.of the Incore. Instrumentation System includes a Type K (chromel alumel) thermocouple within each of the 45 incore instrument detector assemblies.
The junction of each thermocouple is located more than a foot above the fuel assembly, inside a structure that supports and shields the incore instrument detector assembly string from flow forces in the outlet plenum-region. These core exit thermocouples monitor the temperature of the-reactor coolant as it exits the fuel assemblies.
The core exit thermocouples have a usable temperature-range from 40*F to 2300*F, although accuracy is reduced at temperatures above 1800*F.
~~20. Pressurizer Pressure (low g M Pressurizer low range pressure is a Category I variable provided for verification of core cooling and RCS integrity long-term surveillance.~~
Low-Range Pressurizer pressure is measured by two pressure transmitters with a span of 0 psia to l 1600 psia. The pressure transmitters are located inside the containment. Redundant monitoring capability is provided by two indication channels.
Control Room indications are provided.
Pressurizer pressure is a Type I variable because the operator uses this indication to monitor the cooldown of the RCS following a LOCA and other design basis events. Operator actions to maintain a controlled CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-12 Revisiongi
.= - _-
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES cooldown, such as adjusting steam generator pressure or level, would use this indication. Furthermore, ;
Pressurizer pressure is one factor that may be used in
-decisions to termir. ate reactor coola'nt pump operations.
Two indication channels are required to be OPERABLE for all but two functions. Two OPERABLE channels ensure that no single failure, within either the PAM instrumentation or its auxiliary supporting features or power sources (concurrent with the failures that are a condition of or result from a specific accident), prevents the operators from being presented the information necessary for them to determine the safety status of the plant and to bring the plant to and maintain it in a safe condition following that accident.
In Table 3.3.10-1 the exceptions to the two channel requirement are CIV Position and the SMMs.
l II Two OPERABLE channels of core exit thermocouples are required for each channel in each quadrant to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant temperature rise across representative regions of the core. Power distribution symmetry was considered in determining the specific number and locations provioed for diagnosis of local core problems. Therefore, two randomly selected thermocouples may not be sufficient to meet the two thermocouples per channel requirement in any quadrant. The two thermocouples in each channel must meet the additional requirement that one be located near the center of the core and the other near the core perimeter, such that the pair of core exit thermocouples indicate the radial temperature gradient across their core quadrant. Plant specific evaluations in response to Item II.F.2 of NUREG-0737 should have identified the thermocouple pairings that satisfy these requirements. Two sets of two thermocouples in each
, quadrant ensure a single failure will not disable the ability to determine the radial temperature gradient.
It CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS'l & 2 'B 3.3.10-13 RevisionJI w-
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES For loop and steam generator related variables, the required information is individual loop temperature and individual steam generator level. In these cases two channels are required to be OPERABLE for each loop of steam generator to redundantly provide the necessary information.
In the case of CIV Position, the important information is the status of the containment penetrations. The LC0 requires one position indicator for each active containment isolation valve. This is sufficient to redundantly verify the isolation status of each isolable penetration either via indicated status of the active valve and prior knowledge of the passive valve or via system boundary status. If a normally active CIV is known to be closed and deactivated, position indication is not needed to determine status.
Therefore, the position indication for valves ir, this state is not required to be OPERABLE.
The SMM monitors, Core Exit Thermocouples, and the Reactor Vessel Water Level Monitoring System comprise the Inadequate l 11 Core Cooling (ICC) instrumentation. The function of the ICC instrumentation is to enhance the ability of the plant I operator to diagnose the approach to, and recovery from, ICC.
APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LC0 is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. These variables are related to the diagnosis and preplanned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.
In MODES 4, 5, and 6, plant conditions are such that the likelihood of an event occurring that would require PAM instrumentation is low; therefore, PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.
ACTIONS Note 1 has been added in the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS, il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-14 Revisionf
. .. -- ~ . -
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10-BASES even though the ACTIONS may eventually require plant shutdown. This exception is acceptable due to the passive
. function of the indication channels, the operator's ability to monitor an accident using alternate instruments and methods, and _the low probability of an event requiring these indication channels.
Note 2 has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. .The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each -
Function listed in Table 3.3.10-1. The Completion Time (s) of the inoperable channel (s) of a Function will' be tracked separately for each Function, starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.
A.1 When one or more Functions have one required indication channel that is inoperable, the required inoperable channel must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel (or in the case of a Function that has oniv one required channel, other non-Regulatory Guide 1.97 indication channels to monitor the Function), the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.
B.1 This Required Action specifies initiation of' actions in accordance with Specification 5.6.7, which requires a written report to be submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. .This report discusses the results of the root cause ' evaluation of the inoperability and: identifies proposed restorttive Required Actions. This Required Action CALVERT CLIFFS'- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-15 Revision 0
PAM Irstrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES-is appropriate in lieu.of a shutdown requirement, given the-
. likelihood of plant conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation. -Also, alternative Required Actions such as grab sampling or diverse indications are identified before a loss of 8 functional capability condition occurs.
.C.d a When one or more Functions have two required indication channels inoperable (i.e., two channels inoperable in tre same Function), one channel in the Function should be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two-required ;
channels inoperable 'in a Function is not acceptable because the-alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur. !
Dd When two required hydrogen monitor channels are inoperable, Required Action D.1 requires one channel to be restored to OPERABLE status, This Required Action restores the monitoring capability of the hydrogen monitor. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring hydrogen monitoring and the i availability of alternative means to obtain the. required. i
-. information. Continuous operation with two-required channels inoperable is not acceptable because alternate I indications are not available.
- i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-16 Revision /S
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10
.DASES.
f_d This Required Action directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.10-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent.
Each time Required Action C.1 or D,1 is not met, and:the associated Completion Tine has. expired, Condition E is entered for-that channel and provides for transfer.to the appropriate subsequent Condition.
F.1 and F.2 If the Required Action and associatec Completion Tine of Condition C'are not met, and Table 3.3.10-1 directs entry into Condition F, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the requirements of this LC0 do not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .
The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
G.1 1
Alternate means of monitoring Containment Area Radiation have been developed and tested.. These alternate means may be temporarily installed if the-normal PAM channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allotted time. -The Reactor Vessel. Water Level Monitoring System is one of three >
components of the Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation.
The SMMs and-Core Exit Thermocouples could be used to monitor Inadequate Core Cooling. If these alternate means are used, the Required Action is not to shut down the plant, but rather to follow the directions of Specification 5.6.7..
.The report provided to the NRC should discuss the alternate
/ ,
l f .
=
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-17 Revision 0
_q_
a.__ i---g .m _ .- .-
1 i
PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10
-BASES means used, describe the degree to which-the alternate means are equivalent to the installed PAM channels, justify the areas in which they are not equivalent, and provide a
- schedule for restoring the normal PAM channels.
1 SURVEILLANCE A Note at the beginning of the Surveillance Requirements 1 REQUIREMENTS specifies that the following SRs apply to each PAM instrumentation' Function in Table 3.3.10-1.
SR 3.3.10,1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHJNNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter ind.cated on one indication channel to a similar parameter i on other channels. It is based on the assumption that indication channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations-between the two indication channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each
, CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
, Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a qualitative assessment of the indication channel which considers indication channel uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may' be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit.
If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE. If the channels are normally off scale during times when surveillance is required, the CHANNEL CHECK will only verify that they are off scale in the same direction. Off scale low current loop
_CALVERT CLIFFS _-' UNITS'l-& 2 B.3.3.10-18 Revision 0
_ - - -~ .- - . .
PAM Instrumentation >
B 3.3.10 BASES channels. are verified to be reading- at the bottom of the range and not failed downscale.-
For the Hydrogen Monitors, a CHANNEL' CHECK is performed by drawing a sample from the Waste Gas System through the 9-monitor.
The Frequency of 31 days is based upon' plant operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one indication channel of a given Function in any 31 day interval is a rare event. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, cnecks of channel during normal operational use of the displays associated with this LCO's required channels.
SR 3.3.10.7, A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 46 days on a staggered test basis for the Containment Hydrogen Analyzers.
The CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed using sample gases-in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. 3 SR 3.3.10.3 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 24 months or approximately every refueling. CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a-check of the indication channel including the sensor. The Surveillance . verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. A Note allows exclusion of neutron detectors and Reactor Vessel Level. Monitor System from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
The Frequency is based upon operating experience 'and consistency with the typical industry refueling _ cycle and is
~
' CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-19 Revisicn p S f
m ,s, ,= .,
l PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.10 BASES justified by an 24 month calibration interval for the '
determination of the magnitude of equipment drift.
- REFERENCES- 1. Letter from R. E. Denton (BGE) to NRC, dated June 6, 1995
~~2. August 9,- 1988, J. Tiernan memo to NRC, Regulatory Guide 1.97 Update~~
~~3. Regulatory Guide 1.97~~
~~4. NilREG-0737, Supplement 1~~
~~5. . Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, L'apier 7~~
~
tU CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.3.10-20 Revision 0
$peciC. .A.x ~5.7.I g
-ar44 2NsTRUMENTATIM (4h4 M g' T.'5 l f
< ~5.~5. ( 3/4dri REACTORPROTECTIVE1NSTRUMENTAT10[N 55}
LIMITING CONDITI M FM OPERATI r , RPs 6 s. w, 4. .p , ,T,4 . a . .'. . - . 4 g
'2.'.7,,.'_'.' ~ 'Y. , Yl " F,,% *_'I*f
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,3 g 3.34,1 ^= = M r ete ;;;'.;;tive ..t ;;.t;ti;r. dar.r.;;; ; Tid P 1 IT .:
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ACTION: ** " t 'I . 3.3 ^ . - - - -
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,'7 Q' h/,P - -h %r A e c...n + m <~^<y . . " w*.!
6 .p i 4 .
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$URVETLLANCE REQUIREMElff5
.'. 4.0. .1.1 Each reactor protective EmetfGnenteten entpaeyNbe Y tiemonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the ciuunitL CHECK, dANNEL M '3*I'g CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST ;:rtir: t-i ;; th: C ;;.4 .I th: " :;:r:!= rhr ' -Teble-4r34.
s g, ~f4$3.J4.Z Ine togle f the bypasses s bedemonstrydOPERABLE or 3, 3, g ,3 (ts4ach reactor ST sg h ,*-=
unless perfo during the puceding 92 day ,
'i=r ~ hall be demonstratec ortliARE at least once per ie (.3 '
REFT'ELING INTERVAL dur g CNANNEL CAJIRRATJ0 Uteng of each channel l - -
qu+ .b + ;. byp.,, c , ,,,,,a "p1 affacted by bypass opera ,g
... ~ - .
SU 3J.% STEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor tFir- A, g
~~@ function The shall REACTOR TR be demonstrated to be within its limit at least-once per_g~~
= REEUILTNC INTERVAL I Eacn test shall in ude at least one che el per at all channels are ted at least once ev lfunctionsuch INTERVALS wh ,a N is the total n of redundant chann N REFUELIN-in a specific reactor tr function as :hown the ' Total No. of Ch
~
~~ ell" colunm ofy;
. I . .- - - -
Qable 3 _
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Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testin;.
CALVERT CL!fFS - LINIT I 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 208 pn3e (.G 14
$ pec Er,+ m '% , 5 , L 3/4.3 INSTMMENTATIM
<, .... + .r e d.. t
,.3 TABLE 4.31(Continued)
,, $p ,4,r. 4... T. I ~5,, '" R1PS TABLENOTATIE '-~.
L,.pi .-J Te:p l 4 . 4 ..., ' '
with reactor trip breakers in the closes position and the CEA drive) sq system e=a=hle of CEA wi+Wawal. , .~pm - -_- jy},,5
(*(7 N If not perfo in previous 7 days. *
.D. [*
E Nt balance en1Fa;.esrEA of RATER u--- Faur") adjust -
(A.
L $,s.3 a Z ' _ . . .. . - c r r n - _ers A ---- sne asse . , - - _ . signals lagree with ca' orimetric calculation if absolute difference is > 1.54. e4 core eDuring PNV5ICS TESTS, these daily calibrations of nuclear pow =r and i g.w e r = '. 9 W*S._ AY power may be suspended ided these calibrations are perfomed ,
'. s, . . . I g 1 upon reaching each major t st r plateau and prior to proceeding or test power p steau. - A*I
.to the i bg,5 N -
/Above f BATO TREN Poller. recalibrate the excore detectors which monitor the AKIAL 35 APE UdDEX by using thejncore detectors or 0
m strict TNE M L Poltta during sunseg tions to < 90% of the 1 C ** d ' ' '*
~~existing Reactor Ugolant M ' T'~~
{(q. maximum allowedTTME" a h e paura level 1
C*2 uep_combinatioA U DOT adjustjs? M =r:M -
. - .m . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . . . .T im .7DrtngFW5ICS
- $ - *t'2 m snese sally canorations of nuclear power and AT power may be wets sus rovided these calibrations are performed upon reaching r' P... ,
" '~
2H eac major power plateau and pr or ta near M ine ta 'ha r +- 4,t
( major test pose
~~u. Nest et Ne,4 4 4a *f. -.d~~
.1.3,t.S
' M Neutron detectors may be excluded fr Y EL CALI TION. d4 b Ha* N cle 12, the s llance sha due b March 6,after ich time this ame nt will be perseded kne No. 208.
r w
\ _- - __ . - .
~ 5 51 5 'T.I.'3 KleT E : _/ _Jot 7 regor,A f c. be p,4.< <a viti l t hoso on,-
THERMAL %d, '\ 328 */. RT P o.4 rego;yj ;
% ,+. 3 - -
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NSN W*A y4% g9g paefi 1
3 CALVERT CLIFFS . UN!Y 3 3/4 3 8 Amendment No. 209 p,$, t0 # I&
$pe Eica+ ion 33.I M
_w "f, ~$ $/t.t INSTRUMENTATION kp+,d (R _
g ,; , ; ais.a.4 REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTR' J MENTATION p *+ ___ _
A, p;,,, ges 6.Wu, + p -.e< - a ~~'* Ad -
LIMITIIIG CONDITION FOR OPERATION
'"M ~"'_I'f
~~'[, P('D,'f, ~Yc p.,s. .,~~
~~s. s. 4 4.3."." ,~~
^
.--L ww.i.ur en viedire inn - 6uiun ; m ^.
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.nd
~~n. s. t- s. s. n. s A'I APPI ICA8iLITY: ."; ;.; .. ,,,Qable A et**d s_4o) -~~
~~A.l ACTION: A+~~
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SURVEILLAha REQUIREMENTS TO^Er7- __
]nQ.,'M
'l}'
e.
-4.4rMd Each reactor protective lmenhedettira reansJshall be CaA demonstrated OPERABLE by the perforinance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL d"
};Q[c] CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST ' -'"~
-the fr.;;:::k: th - *= T^1= 1 1 1
'- + M " "_' ;;d .t 4.3.1.I.
~~s R~~
'L'e l 7 t to e logic for the
. reactor STARTUP u sses shall be demongeted CPERABLE>rior e nerformed during Yprecedino 92 dafr ~T e PG' Ltt: ';;;f n sha'M be demonstrated 0FDABLE at least ~once pe[r b3 s~
k REFUELING INTERVA during CNAlplEL CALIBRATI0li_ testing of each channel affee w by bypas ope 4g g 4 ,,,_,,4;, g y p,,,
,,,,,,,f; , p,,4,,g l
Q]..
g h,3,l ,g i4.3<!~I?3 ThaREACTOR'Tzii GTINE of eacfFreactor trIF -
functiori shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per' i ktTUELING INTERVAb c.ach test snais incause at seast one cnannes per func i IN n such that all channels ara tested at least once every N FUELING
~'
VALS where H is the total specific actor trip function as shoyn'yumber of redundant channels in in tha " Total No. of Channel " olumn of j able 3.3 1f _ ~ - _= _ - -
M{~- _ - . - - -.
i g g ,,. T fe 'T.'5.1 - 1 4a </r 4"' ~ ;- c wt.,f'4, *"
A $& a p , Co e .~
~~d G'.> r l~~
~~p. , k iv'S 3~~~ < f . . ,~~
% s ~"
I on STAME40 y L.s.
> t.se + . . e i.,- a , ~~ ~ ~ 4 ST M515 "'**"I a
~~d "PP 'i '~~
~~L* ! ' * ~~~
~
Q e e no v e. s P * ~+ v r c .
heutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. ' '
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 .3/4 3 1 Amendment No. 186 Q [
q p,. f. . 4. .s 3. 3 I 3/4.3 Ill5TEl#IElrTATIM s ,. e J . . . . . . I C'a -c.
TABLE 4.31(Continued) p, g,, , , p, , ,, 4 . , , ~L 3 . "T.,
TABLE NOTATIM "RP5 L4e aJTin ' a. * *
C a -s ag g, With reactor trip presters in the closed position and the CEA drive] A 3.3. i, 6 e_ system canable of cra withdeamal. g; __
__ d.C) g If not performed in previout 7 days._ 'T * ', , "[. .
I '3.1,'2 k -
'llaat balanes only Emam 4 of safth Tur=- paur% adjust T 'ee Qto make the nuclear power si "wr o c.
Jgree wit ca orisetr c ce cu ,stion if absolute difference is > 1.R. t.*~* 9' During PIITSICS TESTS. these daily calibrations r nuclear power and _y "~ ' [ *. '. -
~
NoUt. AT power may be suspended vided these calibrations are performed -
T upon reaching each na or t st r plateau and prior to proceeding tc the n? or tez power p steau. g 31.1.3 M F 4bove h
"'~'
RAftDTHElBELPOWER.recalibratetheexcoredetectors A,(6 which monitor the AXIAL SNAPE IllDEX by using the incore detectors or c o J.'4.6 ' restrict TWEMAL PDWER dur subseg pt coerstions to < 90% of the A ~f c . *2. aus allowed THE tr . th th: --' e t ' t; " "-- 0:: h ;. ,
~~N ;" -~~
._ M*Q_ y),f,
[ deve IR of RATED TWEIBE. POWER) adjusf.^.77--Ofir:te
h,, g --.. - ->ser .. ... . ... - oi e. # 0uring pilYSICS E$ these daily calibrations of nuclear power and AT power may be a r pow-r w vic, ' suspe provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching r_3,, . . i .,
~~7. - each majo st power plateau a +^ nearaadina +^ *ka -r~~
~~major test steau.im a ir iref h w p.,r... ,i) A.~~
$.T85 Neutron detectors may be exclud[d r i5 M.
T.T . -
tJ 07 i.
---- -~
<; R '9, , t ,3 N oTE
~~Mat cegv ,4 % bcp,e(,c.<J vd,1 M 12 hovr5 d *rTHE4aL Powg 4 hh*4 ATP~~
'1 f#9Jtrb % be fcr.Qve.t<I * '
I per or ( operab, abew' 'lo'bflTP.
w_
A CALVERT CLIFFS . UNIT 2 3/4 3-8 Amendment No. 161 l
-i g a
DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 3.3.1 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - OPERATING minimum channels Operable is no longer used. His change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
A.12 Current Technical Specification 3 3.1 Table 3.31 Endnotes (d) and (c) do not require the bypass to be automatically removed. Ilowever, consistent with the current Calvert Cliffs ,
design, the bypasses are automatically removed, ne total bypass function discussed in CTS 4.3.1.1.2 is considered to include the automatie bypass removal feature. improved Technical Specifications Footnotes (a) and (b) will require the bypass to be automatically removed. Moving requirements within a Technical Specification is an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
A.13 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 4.31, Endnote (1) requires that above 15%
RTP the excore channels be recalibrated using the incore detectors. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.3 will require the excore channels to be calibrated using the incore detectors prior to reaching 90% RTP. Current Technical Specifications and ITS Actions require the plant to not exceed 90% RTP if this calibration is not performed. The CTS does not specify when above 15% RTP the calibration must be parformed, but it is required to be performed prior to increasing power 2 90%. Therefore, the proposed change is administrative power 2 90% RTP. because both the CTS and ITS require the calibration pr 2.21, Table Notauon
A.14 Curren'. Technical Specification Table , references Specification 3.2.5, "DNB Parameters" for the design reactor coolant flow. The referral to Specification 3.2.5 is being deleted. Improved Technical Specifications do not reference other Specifications. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.1, RCS DNB Parameters, establishes the minimum required RCS design flow. No technical requirements are removed as a result of this change and the requirement to maintain RCS flow greater than design flow is not affected. Therefore, the removal of cross references to other specifications is an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
A.15 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1, Table 4.3-1, Note (6) is a one-time requirement regarding a Surveillance that was due March 31,1996. This Note is no 'nger required and will be removed. Removing a requirement that is no longer requireo is considered an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
A.16 Current Technical Specification a.3.1, Table 2.2-1, Footnote (3), and Table 3.31, Footnote (c) indicate that the APD liigh trip may be bypassed when RTP is < 15% and must be automatically reinstated 215% RTP. Current Technical Specification Table 3.31, Footnote (c), also applies to the Loss of Load trip function. This note is retained in ITS Table 3.3.1 1 as footnote (d) for the Axial Power D!aribution-liigh and Loss of Load trip functions. Additionally, the Applicability of these functions has been modified by ITS Table 3.3.1-1 Note e to indicate that the functions are only required to be operable when 2 15% RTP. This Note is necessary to clarify the applicability for meeting the associated surveilluce requirements and the MODES in which the functions must be OPERABLE.
This Note is consistent with CTS Table 3.31 Footnote (c), since if the function is permitted to be bypassed, it is not required to be OPERABLE md surveillances would not have to be
. met. This change is administrative since the Note only clarifies what the Current Tachnical Specifications already allow. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.3.1-3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES I SECTION 3.3.1 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - OPERATING A.17 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1, Table 4.31, requires a Channel Check for the Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitor, improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 1 includes the Logarithmic Neutron Flux ! bnitor in the Rate of Change of Power liigh i Function. Ilowever, the Channel Check only applies to the monitors. Hus, a Footnote (f) l was added to the iTS which clarifies this. This change is administrative since the CTS already depicts this.
A.18 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action 2.a requires that an inoperable channel be placed in trip or bypass within one hour. Action 2.b requires that within one hour all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped or bypass Condition, improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition A requires one or more '
functions with one RPS bistable trip unit or associated measurement channel inoperable be placed in trip or bypass in one hour. The ITS Conditior. A captures the technical intent of CTS Action 2.a and 2.b by requiring that all affected functions take the specified actions, therefore, the change is administrative. His change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
TECilNICAL CIIANGES - MORE HNTRICTIVE M.I Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action 2.c does not specify a time for the additional inoperable channel to be placed in bypass. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 Action B will require one channel to be placed in trip and one channel to be placed in bypass in one hour. This change essentially places a one-hour time limit, where none previously existed, to perform the Actions. This change is, therefore, a more restrictive change. The change will not adversely affect plant safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
M.2 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 requires the Actions for the functional units be followed when a bypass removal channel is inoperable. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 established Actions specifically for when one or two bypass removal channels are inoperable (ITS Actions D and E). The Actions are essentially the same as when one- or two trip units are inoperable, except that the bypass channel is required to be disabled within one hour. The addition of this new requirement is considered more restrictive. The addition of this requirement will not adversely affect plant safety, because the action to disable the bypass channel when the automatic bypass removal is inoperable ensures the trip is in effect. This change is con 6 tent with NUREG 1432.
M.3 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Joes not have any requirements if an Action cannot be completed within the required Completion Time. Thus, CTS 3.0.3 would have to be entered. Current Technical Specification 3.0.3 allows 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months to reach Mode 3, or Mode 2 for those ftmetions which are only applicable in Mode 1. Improved Techn! cal Specification 3.3.1 added two Actions (Action F and G), when the Required Action and Associated Completion rimes cennot be met. Action (F) allows 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Hermal Power to be reduced to < 15% RTP, and Action (G) allows 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to place the plant in Mode 3.
Two actions are nuessary since the associated functions have different modes of applicability. This change essentially allows one less hour to be outside the Mode of Applicability, however, adequate time is still allowed to reach the required plant condition.
Therefore, this change will not adversely affect plant safety.
i
' CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS- 1 & 2 3.3.1-4 Revision 11 l
4
.~.
DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 3.3.1 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - OPERATING M4 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 4.3 1 Note (3) requires the excore channels be calibrated using the incore detectors after power is above 15% RTP. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.3 requires the calibration be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after exceeding 20% RTP. This change is more restrictive since the CTS did not limit the time required to perform the surveillance. This change is acceptable since the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months time limit provides sufficient time to complete the surveillance without a substantial burden on the operating staff. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
M.5 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 4.31 Notes (2) and (4) require the heat balance to be performed when power is > 15% RTP. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 will add a Note to SR 3.3.1.2 (heat balance) which requires the Surveillance be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months aller power is > 15% RTP, This change is more restrictive since the CTS did not limit the time required to perform the surveillance. This change is acceptable since the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months time limit provides sufficient time to complete the surveillance without a substantial burden on the operating staff. This change is consistent with NUREG-1434 M.6 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 4.3-1 Endnote (3) requires power be limited to 90% RTP if the excore channels are not calibrated using the incore detectors. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 Action C requires power be limited to 90% RTP within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when the excore channels are not calibrated using the incore detectors. This change is more restrictive since the CTS did not limit the time within which to reduce power to 90%
RTP. The change adds a time limit of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to reduce power to 90% RTP when no time limit existed. This change is acceptable since the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months limit allows time to complete the Surveillance while minimizing the time in a condition where the excore channels may not be calibrated. This is consistent with the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months delay allowed for a missed SR. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
P M7 Current Technial Specification 3.3.1.1, Table 4.3 1, requires the Surveillance Requirements for the delta T power function be applicable in Mode 1. ITS Table 3.3.1 combines the nuclear power and delta T power functions into a single function identified as Power Level.
Iligh. The ITS Power Level-liigh function is required fn Modes I and 2 consistent with the CTS Table 4.31 requirement for nuclear power. The Power Level-High trip function is based on the higher of either nuclear power or delta T power, therefore the two are combined in th- ITS. The Surveillances for this function are a combination of the existing Surveillances applicable to nuclear power and delta T power. The CTS requires a daily adjustment (calibration) based on the heat balance, a quarterly channel functional test, and a channel calibration on a refueling basis for the delta T power function. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432. The addition of Mode 2 for this function does not affect the daily adjustment based on the heat balance since the CTS and ITS do not require this adjustment until > 15% RTP. The requirement to perform the quarterly channel functional test and the refueling channel calibration prior to MODE 2 is a more restrictive requirement.
This change does not impact safety since from a practical standpoint, these surveillances would already be performed, and the unit does not routinely operate for extended periods in MODE 2, This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1 5 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.3.1 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - OPERATING TECilNICAL CHANGES - MOVEMENT OF DETAILS TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS LA.1 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 3.31 contains a " Channels to Trip" column.
Improved Technicci Specification Table 3.3.1 1 will not contain this column. This is an informational column which is more appropriate for the Bases. He number of channels to trip will not be changed. He information is being moved to the Bases intact. Any changes to these requirements in the Bases will require change in compliance with the Bases Change Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. Ilowever, any hardware change to the number of channels to trip will require a design change. He Bases Change Control Program will ensure that changes receive appropriate review This change is a less restrictive movement of details change with no impact on safety, nis change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
LA.2 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1 Endnote f requires at least two decades of overla,) between the Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitoring channels and the Power Range Neutron Flux Monitoring channels. This is a design detail regarding operation of two types of equipment that is more appropriately maintained in the Bases. This requirement is being moved to the Bases for ITS 3.3.1. The requirement for operability of these functions is not being changed. Any changes to this requirement in the Bases will be controlled in accordance with ITS Section 5.0 Bases Control Program. This Program ensures any changes to these requirements will be adequately reviewed. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
LA.3 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 4.31 Notes (2) and (4) specifically requires the adjustment of the Nuclear Power Calibrate Potentiometers and AT Power Calibrated Potentiometers improved Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.2 requires that the power range and AT power channels be adjusted. References to the method of adjustment, i.e., the potentiometer, is moved to the Bases ofITS SR 3.3.1.2. Detailed descriptions of calibration equipment is more appropriate in the Bases. The change does not alter the requirement to adjust the two ftmetions based on calirometric results. This change only moves details out of Technical Specifications and does not affect plant safety. The Bases are controlled in accordance with the Bases Control Program in ITS 5.0. These controls ensure that changes to the Bases are adequately reviewed. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
LA.4 Not used.
lA.5 Not used.
LA.6 Not used.
LA.7 Current Technical Specification Table 2.2-1 requires the allowable value for Thermal Margin / Low Pressure (TM/LP) trip function to be adjusted to be not less than the larger of 1875 psia, or the limits provided in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR). Ilow the allowabic value is derived will now be contained in the COLR, and the COLR will be referenced by the ITS. Thus, details regarding how allowable values are determined are more appropriately determined outside the Technical Specifications. This requirement is -
being moved to the COLR where it can be adequately controlled.
L LA.8 Not used.
i
~
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.1-6 Revision 1i
DISCUSSION OF CilANGES SECTION 3.3.1 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - OPERATING IECIINICAL CIIANGES 1 FRS NFSTRICTIVE L.1 Not used.
L.2 Not used.
LJ Current Ttchnical Speci0 cation 3.3.1.1, SR 4.3.1.1.2 requires that the lo gic for the bypasses be demonstrated Operable prior to each reactor startup, unless performed during the precaxling 92 days and requires the total bypass function be verified once per refueling interval (24 months). Manually or automatically inserted bypasses all)w plant operation under conditions that do not require the respective RPS functions, but would result in an
. unnecessary RPS trip if they were not bypassed. The total bypass functions remove these bypasses when the plant conditions no longer support allowing the bypasses. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.3.1.8 requires the total bypass function be verified every 24 months. This is consistent with safety analysis assumptions that the automatic bypass removal function operates. The capability to bypass a function when it li not needed is not assumed in safety analyses since it performs no mitigative function. Therefore, this requirement is deleted from the Technical Specincations. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
L.4 Current Technical SpeciGcation a..s.f ' Action 2.c permits a second channel to be placed in bypass for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months foi maintenance or testing when one channel is inoperable and placed in the trip condition. Improved Technical SpeciDeation 3.3.1 Action B will permit one channel to be placed in trip and one channel to be placed in bypass in one hour and require one channel be restored in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . This is equivalent to the CTS, however, the ITS does not restrict the condition to testing and maintenance. This change is acceptable since the cause of the inoperability, either planned or unplanned, has no different impact to the overall safety. This change would avoid an unplanned shutdown and associated transient due to an unforeseen channel inoperability. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 33.1-7 Revision 11
/
Se4 e.kA a 3 ' 3' L 3/4.3 Ilt$TRUMENTATION IABLE 3.31 (Continued) , jg "1 ACTION $TATDIENTS
, , j4 g w r_
tj,..ad fr ., 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months from time of itf al loss of OPERABILITY: however, the inoperable chantsel shall then be etther restored to OPE 8ABLE status or placed in the trfpped condition. I
~~b. Withi one hour, aII ru tional units receiving an put f he inoperable ch nel are also placed in t same A.9 A c ition (either b ssed or tripped, as appl able) as~~
_at reaut red by a above for the inonerable hannel. A,l h one d55tfonk e be b p 5 or t ;f i 48_ hourshimiejerTogymg Jefts aan matmenn ,*y W* *g chaemeMproviceo sne other Inoperable channel s in the trfppe _t n
,, f, ;
,,g , ,g , S -
,, 4 With the nunper 6i 6n.nnuis vrsanoi.s one seus taan requirea' h(M10N3- by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, vertfy compliance with the 5NUTDOWil MARGIN requirements of m M .f l.
Specification ?.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2 as appif cable, within
_ hour and at litst once,per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter
' ACTIO11 4 - W1th the number of channels OPERA 8LE one less than requir%
t' -
_ by the Minimus Channels OPERA 8LE requirement, be in ll0T STANDSY within 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months st however, one channel may be bypassed for up to I hour for surveillance testing per Spectficatfog 4.3.1.1.
Ses Ocsussen 4f shonys S**"
fp.%.% 1.1. sQVtas (ew w ~..,.~. ,a c.,. ~ . ~ ,,. n .. . u .. m f
i *cefuM m 3 3 3,N P.1 L % 't. GI" Teip Ts A,'shs.s "
Nay AanM G
. ?.
[Nra r e **
SAttar e. snoot f,3 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 169 pp A oV 2
Sp u,Geeon 3.3.2 INSERT ACTIONS C, D, E '
C. One automatic bypass removal C.I Disable affecwd operating Ihour feature inoperable. bypass channel.
C.2.1 Place affected bistable Ihour trip units in bypass or trip.
E 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months ,
C.2.2.1 Restore automatic bypass removal feature and affected bistable trip units to OPERABLE sta*.is.
48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months C.2.2.2 Place affected bistable trip unit in trip.
D. Two automatic bypass removal ------------ N OTE------------
features inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
D.1 Disable affected operating Ihour bypass channels.
~
D.2.1 Place one affected bistable Ihour trip unit in bypass and place the other in trip.
M D.2.2 Restore one automatic- 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bypass removal feature and the affected bistable trip unit i- to OPERABLE status.
j-E. : Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, E.1 _ Open all reactor trip circuit breakers.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months d
l, l- ,
pp 5 4 '7 -
l
$ p, re . C . , ,. %, , "<,. ~v, . 2 3/4.3 tusTagNENTATION g, ;,,, ;
TABLE 3.5-1 (Continued) Q ,.,3 ;,._ y46 gig
.,<...,y -
44 hours5.092593e-4 days 0.0122 hours 7.275132e-5 weeks 1.6742e-5 months free time o inldal loss of ILITY: however, the i rable channel shall then be either restored to status or placed in the tripped condition.
p k within one hour. all functional units receiving an input I tree the inoperable channel are also placed in tne same h condition (either bypassed or tripped, as applicable) as i that required by a. above for the inoperable channel. ) I ose erwe MCIWN B J,/ The-Minfom-Channote ****?"'l .ai t d a =t a r cbas dA hoeuve, one additional channel may be bypasdsed 48_ hours news r s.r- na -tm m m mas- ---
4s*ff8+'$,j '
u *',,;,a 64 3 ,,,.A A g provises the ethir 'noperable cf.:nnel s p ac "T.,.,.<.w, g 9
Q , 4 . ,g3f _. p ,}
(Eliian3 with Ine number of ChMAElf one less snan requi 7' ' ' " "
by the Minimus Channels OptRABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SNUT90lEl NARGIN requirements of . b' % ,
hpecification 3.1.1.1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and at least once orper3.1.1.2 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months sas apb11 cable, within t reafter. \
(Esu4- wNn we . _. vi m... is wr-?=l one less than required '
by the Minimum Channels OptRABLE **
STAfW8Y within 5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months s: howeve,J channel o*quirement.
may be be by pinsse NOT for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months for surveilien testing per $pecification)d 4.3.1.1. p-Tu J. , . . . . ... . r , L --/ N' b* d 'b'"l #"
$ d .f w 1.1.0.,* W r k 9,. y
.<- Ap. . . r, .. < ,.- 7 3 *3, "(M Lnaraur. %%.% 1%d.c d. als '
e L... .s 1, ; o ', . s . a . . .- _ __
{I'*" h 4,'g -
weW & ".. % )9Y G
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. 149
1 i
, PC (. I CrM ors 3.3.2 l I
INSERT ACTIONS C, D, E l
l i
C. One automatic bypass removal C.l Disable afTected operating Ihour feature inoperable, bypass channel.
l
@ i l
C.2.1 Place affected bistable Ihour I trip units ia bypass or trip.
AN_0 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months C.2.2.1 Restore automatic bypass removal feature and affected bistable trip units to OPERA 13LE status.
E 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months C.2.2.2 Place affected bistable trip unit in trip.
D. Two automatic bypass removal ..----------- .--N OTE--------------
features inoperable. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable.
D.! Disable affected operating ihour bypass channels.
O._S D.2.1 Place one affected bistable Ihour trip unit in bypass and place the other in trip.
AND D.2.2 Restore one automatic 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months bypass removal feature and the affected bistable trip unit to OPERAI3LE status.
E. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.
E.1 Open all reactor trip circuit breakers.
6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months d
pp 5d7
DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 3.3.2 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - SHUTDOWN automatically when power is IE-4% and above. This change adds additional detail, consistent with the Calvert Cliffs design, to the Note to clarify the bypass function. The addition of clarifying detail constitutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
A.7 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action 2.a allows the channel to be in bypass for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to perform maintenance or testing. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.2 Action A requires 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months to restore the channel to Operable status. The ITS wording requires the inoperable channel to be restored to Operable status, which would include rnaintenance, testing, or whatever may be required to restore the channel to Operable status.
This chanke is considered administrative because the channel has to be restored to Operable status or the channel must be placed in the tripped condition, which is consistent with the CTS. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
A.8 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1-1 contains a " Minimum Channels Operable' column. Improved Technical Specifications delete this column because the Actions in the ITS are based on the number of channels inoperable, from the total number of channels, which is specified in the LCO. This change is administrative in nature because the minimum channels Operable is no longer used. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
A.9 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action 2.a requires that an inoperable channel be placed in trip or bypass within one hour. Action 2.b requires that within one hour all functional units receiving an input from the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped or bypass Condition. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition A requires one or more functions with one RPS bistable trip unit or associated measurement channel inoperable be placed in trip or bypass in one hour. The ITS Condition A captures the technical intent of CTS Action 2.a and 2.b by requiring that all affected functions take the specified actions, therefore, the change is administrative. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
TECIINICAL CIIANGES- MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Action 2.c does not specify a time for the additional inoperable channel to be placed in bypass. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.2 Action B will require one channel to be placed in trip and one channel to be placed in bypus in one hour. This change essentially places a one-hour time limit, where none previously existed, to perform the Actions. His change is, therefore, a more restrictive change. The change will not adversely affect plant safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
M.2 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1,1 requires the Actions for the functional units be followed when an automatic bypass removal feature is inoperable. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.2 established Actions specifically for when one or two automatic bypass removal features are inoperable (ITS Actions C and D). He Actions are essentially the same as they would be when one or two trip units are inoperable, except that the affected operating bypass channel is required to be disabled within one hour. He addition of this new requirement is considered more restrictive. The addition of this requirement will not adversely affect plant safety, because the action to disable the bypass channel when the CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2-2 Revision 11
j DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES l SECTION 3.3.2 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - SHUTDOWN )
automatic bypass removal is inoperable ensures the trip is in effect. His change is I consistent widiNUREG 1432.
M.3 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 does not contain any requirements if an Action cannot be completed within the required Completion Time. Rus, CTS 3.0.3 would have to be entered. Current Technical Specification 3.0.3 allows 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months to reach Mode 4.
Improved Technical Specification 3.3.2 added an Action (Action E), when the Required
' Action and Associated Completion Times cannot be met, to open all reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCDs) in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . This change essentially requires all the control element assemblies (CEAs) to be inserted in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . His change is more restrictive and will not adversely affect plant safety, because it places the plant outside the Mode of Applicability.
This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
TECIINICAL CilANGES - MOVEMENT OF DETAILS TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED-DOCUMENTS LA.1 Not used.
LA.2 Current Techn! cal Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 3.31 contains a " Channels to Trip" column.
Improved Technical Speci6 cation 3.2.2 will not conta.in this infcrmation. This is an informational column which is more appropriate for the Bases. The number of channels to trip will not be changed. The informa:lon is being raoved to the Bases intact. Any changes to these requirements in the Bases will require change in compliance with the Bases Change Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. Ilowever, any hardware change to the number of channels to trip will require a design change. The Bases Change Control Program will ensure that change receives appropriate review. This change is a less restrictive movement of details change with no impact on plant safety, nis change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
LA.3 Not used.
IECllNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L1 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Applict.bility requires the Rate of Change of Power-liigh functional unit to be Operable when any RTCB is closed and any CEA is capable of being withdrawn. Improved Technical Specificatico c.3.2 will change the Modes of Applicability to be Modes 3,4, and 5, with any RTCBs closed and any CEA capable of being withdrawn. This change is reasonable because the CEA withdrawal events are not postulated in Mode 6 and cannot occur when the reactor is defueled, and Boron Dilution in Mode 6 is not terminated by a reactor trip. These events are not postulated in Mode 6 or cannot occur when the reactor is defueled. Relaxing the Modes of Applicability constitutes a less restive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
L.2 _ Current Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, SR 4.3.1.1.2 requires that the logic for the bypasses be demonstrated Operable prior to each reactor startup, unless performed during the
, preceding 92 days and requires the total bypass function be verified once per refueling interval (24 months). Manually or automatically inserted bypasses allow plant operation under condition- that do not require the respective RPS functions, but would result in an CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.2-3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 3.3.2 - RPS INSTRUMENTATION - SifUTDOWN unnecessary RPS trip if they were not bypassed. The total bypass functions remove these bypasses when the plant conditions no longer support allowing the bypasses. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.3.2.4 requires the total bypass function be verified every 24 months. This is consistent with safety analysis assumptions that the automatic bypass removal function operates. The capability to bypass a function when it is not needed is not assumed in safety analyses since it performs no mitigative function. Herefore, this requirement is deleted from the Technical Specifications. His change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
L.3 Current Technical Specification 3.3.1 1 Action 2.c pennits a second channel to be placed in bypass for up to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months for maintenance or testing when one channel is inoperable and placed in the trip condition. Improved Technical Specification 3.3.2 Action B will permit one channel to be placed in trip and one channel to be placed in bypass in one hour and require one channel be restored in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months . This is equivalent to the CTS, however, the ITS does not restrict the condition to testing and maintenance. This change is acceptable since the cause of the inoperability, either planned or unplanned, has no different impact to the overall safety. This change would avoid an unplanned shutdown and associated transient due to an unforeseen channel inoperability. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432, CALVERT CLilTS - UNITS &2 3.3.2-4 Revision 11
. . . = .. . .- ._. . - - _ _ - _ _ . . . - _ - - _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . - - . .
i h4.M4uitap 3.t.3 INSERT ACTIONS A, B, C, D, E (page 2 of 2)
E. Requird Action and associated E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Completion Time of Condition A, B, or D not met. AHp .
E.2 Open all RTCBs. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OE .One,,c,JEf,%w,Q h Matrix Logic, more Manual Trip, Trip Path Logic, or RTCB channels inoperable forreasons other than Condition A or D.
~~l. .~~
pay7,fio .
- I Spdn sku T.3,3 INSERT ACTIONS A, B, C, D, E ! '
(page 2 of 2) l E. Required Action and as=<ein'arl E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 houn Completion Time of Condition A, B, or D rd met. 3. ,
Open all RTCBs. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months E o.,,emo[kbn,a(@ E.2 b ;
Mwo or more ManualTrip, ;
Matrix @, Trip Path Igic, or '
RTCB channels inoperable forreasons other than Condition A ,
or D. :
I W
9 P
b i
9 i
p*y 7.4tO
$p 8.. 4.o. ~5.~5.7
~3. 3
,s.s.7
'3fC3- INSTRUMENTATION ,] q,{ p, } } Q
-:i: .3.2-
:=
(,g =Tme=re=v:wWe L W. <.<. =e _.._,mn. v
.A r n. n, .< a r
,)
~.a... , ~ . - s . . . . . ..L w.-. m . ,, .t ., A LIMITING CONDIT FOR OPERATIO ._,*a .s , . e t. Ac u .. L w , . .I . u. M....,i L c, o ~-
3.2.1 he' Engineered $afet fe A,4s 4.% ,.v...,j
$*$*7 Actuation $ stes ( A$
[ inst ntation channels and y sses shown in Tab e 3. sha?l1 be
,, w . g 5.,
., p . ., g-OP LE with their trip set nts set consistent wi the values shown i L e Trip 5etpoint column o able 3.3 4. Q*
APPLICABillII: As-shown-in-Teble 3rbe- Owe. ) c ORE ALTtmATiog l ACTION: [.,) N:, S 4
(
.~~llith an EsFA$ instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Yalues column i N Vdoo o of Table 3.3 4 declare the channel inoperable and apply the '
l' applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3 3 until the channel is '
restored to OPERABLE status with the tri -s m consistent with the Trip 5etpoint value.pfsetpoint adjusted
~~4. WilDTT5FA5 Instrumentation channel inoperable, take the ACTIOy~~
]showninTable3.3-3. f- ---
$URVE!LLANCE REQUIRENEWT5 3 3 .*7. l 4,;,;,; 3 Each.ESFAS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated
~~4. 3 . 7. '2. OPERABLE by the perfor1 nance of the CllANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL CALIBRATION and * '~~
g. . $.,'-)3
~5 , p.ANNEL CN m.. ; . w. ,.3.a FUNCTIONAL TEST opere44= 1.rins C,e =:: end ;;
U., i,6sencies-A.3.2.1 . lesic fur 6ne oy ses shall be demons atedOPERA5LLcuring) ,-
fthe power CHANNEL FUNCTI TEST of channels af cted by bypass o atton. The total bype function shall be d nstrated OPERAB at er REFUELIN ERVAL during CHAN CALIBRATIonf tatt a of l kastonce -channe affected- . bypass operation 7 (4d#.1.) The(INGINEERE 5A
=
FEATURES R[59N5E JE U each ESF em A~~JCD ~
g M.11.b shall be demonst o be w1Ihtn t)e 11m19 at least once per RV Lac'i test shall inc1 e at least one channeleper ~'
. unctl6Tsu 'all channels are tes J at least onct every REFUELING INTERVALS wher is the total number f redundant channels a specific '
EsFAs functi as shown in the 'TotJ No. of Channels' Col' n of j able 3.3. f _
on n > nG6CMb "I 6'ei .BA} i',
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT I 3/4 3-9 Amendment he. 208 e ( 8 10
5p c.r,e 4. , 1. 7. ~7 i
~3 3 s/*+-la5TmnErgTIM .) 7. .,
Q i 3.1. '7 4/+Aa :===rm nAfDE~[CfuATSNN 9HP?Smet --- -
r.en,...~........,..--....-.-.-....,--s LInITIns Co mITI M FoR ortRATI nfwlA m: ~~: r ,. a. f, g Q , e n.:..,.. ,
'm -
.. ,.n , .s e 3.3.2.I _ Engineered ty Feature Actuati tem (E5FA$1 - ----
3 .~C . '7 inst ntation ch&nne and bypasses shown i ab e 3.3 3 shah r :
, LE with their p setpoints set con tent with the y -es shown 1,r> ' 'i
he Trip 5etpoint lumn of Table 3.3-4 y APPLICABILITY: + 9 ia TeMe-4,5-3, o AM gliggs V- cu,. $
[cok
...-.-4 pyg ,
M.r.....
P'ardfW 4.. ~>M iIMada.'g j _%" dl
~
(a7With an E5FA5 Instrumentatica channel trip setpoint less .
% conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-4.
applicable ACTIM declare the channel requiremett rable and a of Table inoN3-3 until tkply grestored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted j the echannelli (C'.'
A. $j ,
consistent with the Trip Stepoint value.f With shown aninESFAS Table 3.3 instrumentation
~~3. p channel Inoperable, take the ACTIO]N h ()~~
G SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS ed trirl- Each 13mS* Instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated
(f*' .7, g ,,OPERABLE q by the performance of the CNAMEL CNECK. CNANNEL CALIBRATIM and
,l 3,'3 * .7, 3 CNANNEL FUNCTIMAL TEST :;:nM=; Mt ; t "E! nd et t': 'r;2endes g, .7,6 t- ia Tahia 1.? 3.--
I *b
[4.3.2.I.2 he logic for the asses sMTT De comons rated UrtuAsLE cu Ing' the at er CNANNEL FMCT TEST of channels af cted by bypass i oper 1e on. The total b ss function shall be d nstrated OPERAB at once per Refile INTERVAL during CNANN by bypass operatjon.- t CALIRRATIM test g of )l k-
{ Q channel affee g 75 <to..in h__e 3
~
'I n R 3.5'7'(, C4.L2'O The dits!httato ummTUREs RESPON5E TI)tE4f each~ESFAD ~
(fancfionl shall be demonstrated to be withfr the limit at least once per REFUELING INTERVALS issn zes hall include at least on cnannei per (Tunction such that all chan s are tested at least o every N REFUELIN
{ INTERVAL 5 where N is the tp 1 number of redundant annels in a speci '
\ESFAS function as shownJ6 the ' Total No. of Chan s' Column of Ta le 3.3 3 on
~~STAhEnte 7EST 6Asl CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 3 9 Amendment No. 186 I~~
p e. S e i E 10
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.3.7 - CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SIGNAL (Technical Specification 3.9.3 Actions). This is a less restrictive change because instead of requiring the valves to be closed, an option is added to suspend Core Alterations and the movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Prohibiting the coatinuation of Core Alterations and movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies prevents the initiator of a fuel handling accident from occurring. Action B.2 removes the plant from the Mode of Applicability, as does Action B.l. Action B.2 accomplishes this by entering applicable Conditions and Required Actions of ITS 3.9.3. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
L.4 Current Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Table 3.3 6, states that the Mode of Applicability for the Containment Area Purge and Exhaust isolation Monitors is Mode 6, and Table 3.4-3 states that the Mode in which the surveillance is required is Mode 6. Improved Technical Specification applicability will be during Core Alterations with containment purge valves open, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the containment with containment purge valves open. This change makes the applicability for the monitors consistent with the safety analysis. The Containment Area Purge and Exhaust isolation Monitors are required to close the Containment Purge and Isolation Valves upon an increase in containment area radiation following a fuel handling accident. This function is not required if the purge valves are already closed or if Core Alterations or movement of fuel in containment, which could result in a fue! handling accident, are not anderway. As the required Mode of applicability is narrower in the ITS, this change is less restrictive. The change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.7-5 Revision 11
'I (ACW 3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Control Room Recirculation Signal (CRRS)
LCO 3.3.8 One CRRS trip circuit and measurement channel shall be '
OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:' H0 DES 1, 2, 3, and 4, .
lg During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION -COMPLETION TIME A. CRRS trip circuit or A.1 Place one Control I hour measurement channel Room Emergency inoperable in MODE 1, Ventilation System 2, 3, or 4. train in recirculation mode with the post-loss-of-coolant incident A filter fan in service.
B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met, B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 5
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-1 Revisionf
3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. CRRS trip circuit or C.1 Place one Control Imediately measurement channel Ronm Emergency ..-
inoperable durir.g Ventilation System g movement of train in irradiated fuel recirculation mode assemblies. with post-loss-of- p coolant incident 3 filter fan in service.
E C.2 Suspend movement of Imediately ,
irradiated fuel assemblies.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the control room 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months l l' 3
radiation monitor channel.
@ge 3 of 4 ,,
il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-2 Revisiong
h*' 3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the 92 days 9 CRRS radiation monitor trip circuit and _
meast went channel.
Verify CRRS high radiation setpoint is less 3 than or equal to the Allowable Value of 11 6E4 cpm above normal background.
SR 3.3.8.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the CRR$ 24 months radiation monitor trip circuit and 8 measurement channel.
J page 'l of 4 ,,
u CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.3.8-3 Revision [
33 (0
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Control Room Recirculation Signal (CRRS)
LCO 3.3.8 One CRRS trip circuit and measurement channel shall be
~~OPERABLE.~~
i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. Q ACf!ONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CRRS trip circuit or A.1 Place one Control _1 hour measurement channel Room Emergency inoperable in MODE 1 Ventilation System 2, 3, or 4. train in recirculation mode with the post-loss-of-coolant incident A filter fan in service.
B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. G hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met.
B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months i
It CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-1 Revision [
l p, zow
b 3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. CRRS trip circuit or C.1 Place one Control Imediately measurement channel Room Emergency -
inoperable during Ventilation System g movement of train in irradiated fuel recirculation mode assemblies. with post-loss-of- p coolant incident 3 filter fan in service.
E C.2 Suspend movement of Imediately ,
irradiated fuel assemblies.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the control room 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 0 3
radiation monitor channel.
%e 3 f9 ,.
ll CALVERT CLIFFS ~- UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-2 Revisiong
("
3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ;
SR'3.3.8.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the 92 days 9 ;
CRRS- radiation monitor trip circuit and _ i measurement channel.
Verify CRRS high radiation _ setpoint is less %
than or equal to the Allowable Value of- II.
6E4 cpm above norma 1' background. ,
SR 3.3.8.3 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the CRRS 24 months-radiation monitor trip circuit and 8 measurement channel.-
e C
it CALVERT CLIFFS ' UNITS 1 & 2 3.3.8-3: Revision [
. _ __ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ . _
d RPS Instrumentatlon-Operating M .
4 3.3.1 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1 -Reactor Protective stem (RPS) Instrumentation -Operating 'f;N "-
g LC0 3.3.1 f units M ssoci (3 3.1. Four RPS removal a for each--Function in 3.1- !he be ~'"~
EE I
~
OPERABLE. - , '
jeadore e J APPLICA81LITY: C"ghd - A k T.Lic ACTION'
.-,..............................N0TE------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each RF$dr_te,yr byppi rese'v_ap function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
. One or ao nctions A.! Place affectedkrip I hour
(. . (
with one RPS trip unit unit in bypass or 9 or associated trip. CaMeded bis 4dk drip"'+
in for "Nk'"#
3,g ,
Ta h t,g.t e
Condition C (excore channel not calibrated alg}
A.2.1 Restore channel to P , = -- - f *
^
A mw ,2.4 with incore 'f48Dours OPERABLE status.
detectors).
g
_g 4.g-9 __st.
'.2.2 A Place affecte rip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months unit in trip.
(continued)
CEOG $15 3.3 1 Rev 1. 04/07/95
.y
,+,m . . - , . - . , _y-- ,.,--,y
/
O RPS Instrumentatton-Operating M h (Cff) ,
ACTIONS (continued) [
C0WITION[ REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET!0N TIME dhe N3</ ~
/
taJu* # B.
Oneormorehtlons with two RPS trip D---~~ NOTE------- h LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
.its or associated aUe<4'd Geo.nt7sh%fpat ".$. .D. channelsin.
h'N"h f>]*
l'3l'I c.pt for s.i - 5 riac. on. 6 , nit :>our Condition C (excore in bypass and place mi, p I channel not calibrated the other trip unit Ach- 2 6 with incere in trip.
detectors).
B B.2 Restore one rip unit k48750urs en nornantr status. - -
ond a s sdcded Nasortmhd c$ars &
C. One or more Functions C.1 Perfom SR 3.3.1.3. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with one or more power .
range encore channels QB
/NFW not calibrated 6 tith the incore detectors. C.2 Restrict T'iE 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months A j \us^7se P0tlER to 5 9 hl4
T e 1._)
U _
D. One or more Functio #s I 9.1 Disable bypass
~~with one automa ic I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ~~
~
l' ' ' '
channel.
bypass removal n
inoperable.
fW" QB _
gj4Q D.2.1 Place affected p I hour units in bypass or trip.
M (continued)
CEOG STS 3.3-2 Rev 1. 04/07/95 4
- -. . - - - =.-. . . . - .. . .
RPS Instrumentation-Operating h
ACTIONS peQD ,_ as,a CON 01T10N REmi!REDhTION COMPLETION TIME (
D.-(continued) 0.t.2.1 Restore se e removal ke4[ hours and affected a units j to OPERAsLE status.
D.2.2.2 ac unthaffected in trip.
48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months h
E. One or more Functions --------- NO T E------------
with two automatic LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.
bypens removal ---------------------- +
hannels Inoperable.
S.ca E.1 Disable b I hour ust .. channe1s.ypass "
14 s 08 O'
~~g, '~~
ht.gl e'T- -M E.2.1 Place one affected trip un1t in bypass I hour b and place the other
.A- - in trip for each fun o. * ~'
~
t< move ' ~'
W& '$.?.
E.2.2 9 k48[ hours Na gass edd rip unit '
g to OPERA 81E status , k3, ,
for each affected trip function.
~~equired Action and Be in M00E.7. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months ~~
.J.*t. l ,a,ssectated Completion
.y .e n.t .e\.
f
~~' % uAU Pew bide,%%.pipa~~
* *f L.sd rey M res @
~~CE0G STS 3.3-3 Rev 1, 04/07/95 N~~
~~f. R,p;,a p a .4 .. A ** s uw4< .0 F.1 pe&ne THrad G h~"~~
' d..,Lkes Y,~ na+ mi -
t04R 4e ' h ,
i Ar.i/ be Orde.w-04 4 4.is%f,TP ,
of Lo.) f,:, f&c.
- - - - - - - , , ~ , - . e--+-- , w w - , -
RPS Instrumentation-0peratleg @
SURVE!LLANCE REQUIRDIENTS .
NOTE Refer to Table 3.3.1-1 to determine whichMa11 be performed for each RPS l b Function.
SURVEILLKE FREQUDCY 4 MI'I SR 3.3.1.1 Perfore a CHANNEL CHECK of each RPS 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months TW ASL instrument channel except Loss of Load.
SR 3.3.1.2 - - ----- - -----NOTES--- --------
~~1. Kat required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is 4.11.l l 4'3 ^~~
~~2 y RTP. g g~~
~~2. The daily calibration may be susnanded during PHYSICS TESTS, provided the calibration is performed upon reaching A sach major test power platesitand~~
''''''''''""'""' I4 l On test power plateau C-DT Perfo alibration (heat balance only) and f .-
L adjust the excore power range and AT power 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months eAhl channels to agree with calorimetric calculation if the absolute difference is k}l.Sf.
SR 3.3.1.3 ------------- NOT E---------------
H3t' required to be perfpraedi ntil 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ' -
4ti,i,i RTP.
after THERMAL POWER is N l T.W 4.3-i ,
{
Calibrate the power range excore channels 31 days using the incore detectors.
L
-/_
/ _-.
(continued)
.Y __ M Erb / $,g , ,
'Pobos) ague 10% ggp )
- - ), ,
CEOG STS 3'.3-4 Rev 1, 04/07/95 in#4 '
}
W RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown Q
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.2 Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation-Shutdown , 6)
(3.3.t.1 LCO 3.3.2 rg te je Chg at h isnr GilWof 5 P'.*J d und av k ahte,byfo+ '
(5TF_-S7.-)
\
remove \ Eradet l K!CAE TY: MODES 3, 4 and 5, with any reactor trip circuit breakers (RTC8s) closed .nd any control element assembly capable of being withdre n.
. ...... .....--. -. -..N0TE.--- ----.. ----- .--
(25"gpfri may be bypassed when THERMAL POWER is < IE-4
~
Bypass shall be automatically removed when TH RMAL POWER is t IE-4 RTP.
RTP.
h ACTIONS f CON 0! TION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME
- L i
A.
7 'J !)
One Powee Ra ;e of A.1 Placeaffe:tedt{ rip I hour Chansg--High trip unit unit in bypass or
( *, * ~ or asrociated trip.
I true(nBchannel nopefable.
AS dd kdah
" * "
~~N' # b 4r:p s,, % 1 A.2.1 Restore hannel to 'k48bours a sso,2,y e,1~~
/ 3 .3././
~
OPERABLE status. m u,mg A c.no et 2.A gg A.2.2 Place affectedItrip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months unit in trip.
(continued) 4 CEOG STS 3.3 11 Rev 1. 04/07/95
)
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown ((Wis@ h)
(g;r.g u#
9:
(crJ)
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION [ QUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME .-
~~8. Two Power Ra of NOTE @~~
of Chang-H1 trip LCO3.0.4htapplicable.
j
= t re or associat -
narrnanBchanne inoperable.
^-
B.li Place trip unit I hour in bypas and place
$ 3'5f'03N the other trip unit 3,3,g. ) in trip.
TMd O' g E '
B.2 Restore on trip unit 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months 
~
to OPERABLE status.
C. One automa removal pass C.1 Disable bypass Iho25 @.
channel.
I inoperab e. t '
Qil O* #D/
C.231 Place affecte unit in bypass or
' trip.. ,.
1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months H<
.64 'h h J.J.l.1 0
~~e. M .7. gg C.2)2.1 Restor ypa~~
' k48 hours removal and affect r p unit to p,, g, @ -
OPERABLE statu,.
E '
,3- -
C.2.2.2 Place affectedarip 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months unttt in trip.
- ,5=
(continued)
CEOG STS 3.3-12 Rev 1, 04/07/95 b
RPS Instrumentation-Shutdown M 3.3.2 h
cys) ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME '
O. Two automatic bypass -NOTE removal 6 8=. LCO 3.0,4 is not app 11:able.
taoperable, ,
D.1 f, Disable bypass *'
I hour ' eb' ' +
~~h d channels, Qp.7, ,g c.c. M. 2. 98 -~~
D. 2.'1 Place one affected 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 4 trip unit in bypass' and plas:e the other in trip. --
M Q_4.~+Q
__ _ h.ve. Il '
I 32.2 E* * ' ' see a E o)b ass ip unit 48hurs h g -
o OPERABLE status.
g E. Required Action'and -
associated Completion E.1 4 ~.0
. pen 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 9,3,g, ,
,,, g Time not met.
CEOG STS 3,3 13 Rev 1. 04/07/95 ee ,
-)
RPS Logic and Trip Initiation h
[41"$) ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME .
E. Required Action and E.1 Be in NODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A, AlEl WEW * *Y U ** ** *
,,, E.2 Open all RTCBs. 6 heir s Do c M.1. * '
One or sore Functions I with two or more n Manual Tri), Natrix Logic, Logic, ordRTcs M -- TP h channels inoperable pm for reasons other than Condition A or D.
~~p. SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 1~~
SR 3.3.3 ' D2 days Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each RPS Logic channelWNtB chanfle).
S .,"
SR 3.3.3I[ Perform a CHANNEL FIMCTIONAL TEST
~ on each once within 47ag) RPS Nanual Trip channel. 7 days prior to @
each reactor startup SR 3.3.3.3 Perform a CHANNEL F
/ -}
10NAL TEST.
including separate rificatirn of the 418] montns / -
Lundervoltage'and RTCB.
unt trips, on each /
u- / -
(tid,l.1,() I3 3*I Nederm CHANNit. FONc TioAL 7 Ild=y5
, CEOG STS
~
c .~f ne a...a 3.3-17 ^ ;
. Rev 1, 04/07/95 I
I l.
\
M ESTAS Instrumentation
[ctQ @
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 ed safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation
~
se e mods! ea5uNe@ agkak g
/N '1'2.h 3 /
LC0 3.3.4 Four ESFAS M sociated nd n and a
~~4 removal e OPERA 8L .~~
or each Function in Table 3.3.4-1 s a he gr APPLICA81LITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS <
. . . . . . . . _ . - ... .N0TE------------- ---- - --- - -- '
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each ESFAS(trifor byfEss respMfal)
Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME (7
',)
One to ainment Spray Actu on Signal A.1 P1 e affecsed trip it in bypass.
I hour '
' (C a ociated instrument
) trip unit or operable, j
.'f M. One or more Functions 1 Flace I hour
. ~ . . - oo si, in bypass or @
wit'sorone associa ESFAS@rac .
L p romesp channel Qnge modk
(~311.I ::;;Mie
, ,,0.
yconewe 3-h J.2.lbesare anne to N48 hours OPERABLE status, @
w.~
t) q <
%$0rm )b A.2.2 PJace affected ) 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months ' #
Gn in trip.
(continued)
CEOG STS 3.3-18 Rev 1, 04/07/95
M rsa s in3tn .gnt.u on g g
,e.ie u.4.,<, e ,
gg Egtnmere. Safety Festum kt.stian syst. leottwentatie, T~e Me 3,3 2 '
MascTim amiiuma sta.as semes i etelHasesis WAug , -
(i) i. ..t. in,-ti. t.ti. . .n r '
(g, ,,- @l A
~~e. ',,d ein nt, _ ....~~
a u.4.,
at 3.3.4.2 .c+ @
at 3.3.4.4
~~b. Prenewiser Prenewe = Leute, 1,2.3 SR 3.3.4.3 at 3.3.4.1~~
{}
at 3.3.4.2 a( paie
}
C) n. c.t.in nt.,, ,=t ti. .i in:
'/ at 3.3.4.3 sa 3.3.4.4 at 3.3.4.3 Qg h
~~e. Centefrement prenews-sish ,2,3 88 3.3.4.1 5 (19AQ e en 3.3.4.2 et 3.3.4.4~~
~~3. Centelement teeiette%gstensi~~
, 4. CenteInannt Preeewe.eigh I.2,3 m 3.3.4.1 s([1 pes) pib se 3.3.4.2 at 3.3.4.4 38 3.3.4.*e .)
talrunent te.f.ti afgh
~~1. , l t 4.1 . (2a em 6en.grMor. en 3.3.~~
se 3.3(4.5 4 se 8 3 feeietten ti ,
g .
~~e. Steen Generator Prenewe = Lew idIII. 3 In 3.3.4.1 t 9t 3.3.4.2 Sa 3.3.4.3 m U/~~
st 3.3.
v
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- u.4.4.3 t.t, i ,
rg;g;;) e
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Q qSeg3.3.4.4
, g e* Estte.
i c) st 3.3.4.3 Iabo.e ter J
sfe,f +Ac (centir es) 4.) Prenewlaer Prenewe- .e-amermaiiy den prenewfse presewe 1. e 1 t v.sved pele. The (bas.e
, Sal sf.IN Se sue <c.
e 'o r Ma taer pre..ee 6 4 1 p.la.
(th) ho v. ire kW6 del ad @et eentaisuunt sprisy
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) pe JRainici!.Wr2.
. y r awe - 2 . .i.n.-ie E.t re., ire.n i .setiv tio an. t,,e ite. 4.er...ter to .e mone en en . iete sei.ee i
,re we t., e.ei.te.
'A*~ %ndo, r.wtaMors Se,yaJ CE0G sTS
~~3. 347""""~~ Rey 1, 04/07/95~~
ESFAS Instru.entation g
/ 1sMe 3J.41 (pass 2 of 23 taelmored sefety feetwee Astmeten prete sentraentatten
%e$e sa.sb - 09
/
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n w
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SR 3.3.4.4 na 3.3.4.5
~~b. Steam senereter swt - tas 1,2,3 se 3J.4'1~~
"!iid
. a 3 h
~~88 3J ' 8~~
~~s. Steam 6mereter Pressure 1 5,0 r0en'4L~~
~~,3 se 3J.4.1 s O I f f erence - aigh se 3.3.4.2 D D ,Y) * 'flll si,0.0p44arOrik%~~
~~CEOG STS 3,3 23 Rev 1, 04/07/95 wp~~
4-ESFAS Logic and Manual hAna)dg)3 3.3.5 U/
(a0 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5 Enaineered saf :
(r,k) (Ap(1og)) gy_Reatures Actuation System (ESFAS) Logic and g Manual
_,___~3,s
&" litdE2"
.d V 3,7,/th LCO 3.3.5 Two ESFAS' jal and cSFAS Actuation Lo ic channels shall be C ABLE r eacn 6SFAS Function specif ed in Table 3.3.b,..
APPLitABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5-1.
ACTIONS
..................................... NOTE--- C=-----------...--.------- G Separate Condition entry 1s allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET!ON T1HE UL .1 bro ^ % r morgFunett6n)
A. A.1 Restorefchanneltol 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months h)
( onf Aux 111ery OPERABLE status.
g4 'ee Eifer Actuation '
g[g p,4g,c or c at n - S kcl g)
d N" D* h Logic channel M*"'*I 6Iad inoperable. cn* M fl *^d hil..h., L oj 3 M'l B. Required Action and E.1 Be in HODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months awe
b associated Completion Time of Condition A AMD not met. L B.2 Be in MODE 4. 112 hours0.0013 days 0.0311 hours 1.851852e-4 weeks 4.2616e-5 months 3,y,; \ C. One or more Functigns C.1 RestoreE channel to 48 iurs Aciw Lf
/ with one Manual or Actuation Log c y Lg s. h channel inoptrable g> .ffm+d 01.W Addm A exc R AfA W,. .
~~c,h oul na Ac%d.% + g /__u\~~
J :his.hm <.kes.,r) z Log:<. ,, .
MI*ryMcJwM (continued) Y Attw hon Sjs+ee CEOG $15 3.3-24 Rev 1, 04/07/95 551$ =
.. ..___ _ . _ . _ _ . . . ~ . . . . _ _ _ _
ESFAS Logic and Manual kV(Ar,siogh 3.3.5 agineeres s.v.ty twr actustid'sh'id"dt.T tee e s' ers' nemmi en aspine.htitty wu y - - -- -.
<o is"Mfk'Fi@.$,.... .i,#
'1,. .. . )
_(2) 2. cent.im ent sp .y act . tion sis i , 14 oy . 2. c... i-, i ..i . .n .. i. .ini . .3.4 .
- ( y) i.ii.n sis i 1. . ,'

p)
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e
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a '
1,7,yg s . ua,,, t . . , ,,, s
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l, '4,3, i k
k b. Aci, iton Logec.
'~
- ~ ~
i,2., .s lh bl Saf.A Lytbn AcMo" Sg
. () - fpveps are onl y 9 W,3 b d,r1 ad.7.wf.'u$
~ ~~y~
4 ,o a ' W . s6 *
.t NA_b._e eb is 33 ss f (l!d D or > 37_5'F(Wijt
/
C GSS 3.3 ~~4 ev_l. 04/07/95 be+WCoolawY 6ystein
- . , , . . . m -
GMD 3.3.7 D
3.3 INSTRUNENTATION Sfo or modolf5 An6 3.3.7 Containment h e Isol,ation) Signal ( ) ((pi)dg9 W LC0 3.3.7
@G g r . containment radiation monitor hannals Mne uu ib Actuation L l be OPERABLE. y, qand one Manual (Trk, tpsis]
J ff @
l N"*k* *_a %
APPLICA8ILITY: During CORE ALTERATION During movement of irr lated fuel assemblies withi t su ' '
containment 4~ ~ N ~ ,
^ y'; cen$ytnmh P uq ** ** LOP)
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One raotation monitor A.) cm the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months channel inoperable. nneDintrip.
y av'm ob gene rnef e o r-
'"'""'+ '""' ' "' '"''''
CvJ' ALTERATIONS.
8@
A.2.2 Suspend movement of Irmediately'i irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
h.'ha foi"aad B. One required Manual B.1 Place and maintain lamediately or diitaliiUTb Actuation Logic ra inoperable.
containment purge and exhaust valves in h closed position.
(continued)
CEOG STS 3.3-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 4
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVE!LLANCE FREQUENCY '
~ " '
jS'R"~3'.T.7 C;CCLMONOTEC' .F Testing of Actuation Logic shall include -
verification of the properdhafatiovof) Nlmy demr es put gach )httiattpa' e @ fu - -
Q $caI PerformaCHANNELFUNCT]hNALTESToneach days (URC %-o@
Actuation Logic channel. _
f ,
h SR 3.3.7s4 Perform a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each months containment radiation monit channel.
._E,J,,c'.[.O 't SR 3.3.7.5 Perform a C EL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each i months S Manual channel _.
Ac+L*ViQ _
_g4 SR 3.3.7.6 Verify
. i .
.ps_gj
+iss s ..-)
r Q
M) months on 4
h
, contun- 1 raaimunn r==a s within W AGGERED limits. .- --
TEST BASIS i
e CEOG STS 3.3-32 Rev 1, 04/07/95 un
C {An1he:)
3.3.0 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION g,.,gn l 3.3.8' Control Ro .a Signal (C )@__
$jt circvd animensore meh LCO 3.3.8 0.m C channel shall 6i OPERABLE.
(4)
APPLICABILITY: knnrs t- 9- 1 K,,;,74_'d .
Giurific CD# ALTERAMWl5)
DuHng movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. I Q @f ACTIONS CON 0!TillN REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. :R # MankaTif ip, 3 A.1 /~CC---NOTE ---- A K uation Lf /PlaceContr Room I 08
[one or su qic, or required Emergency fr Cleanup channels .f partic ateflodine or h --itortfisoperable gaseo ]rgjiation System toxic EACS) M s protecti a h
(. ; mode automatic in tra for to toxi gasf
\. ' . M00E 3, 2, 3, or 4. p ection i perable.
'} Stol
'enblegn syEm ge C A AS ing c,b.-f a- ----- - \
~~"8"5%" b Place one I hour tr roto ch-~~
_ ubost--Qfiher % is service.] -
B. Required.4ction and 8.1 Be in M00E 3.
MPhl 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months @ fh associated Completion Times of f ondition A '- MQ q not met.
B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months f
(continued)
CEOC STS 3.3 33 Rev 1, 04/07/g5 t ,
y l
l I
)
C ((A(aS3D @
3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION AEQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME '
C. Is4tf5 Man Actu or no Trip, Logi or qulr C.I.
' NOTE--
P1 e CREACS s protec O
toxicj mode h
@. annel I s f aut c transf par ate / ne I to tax gas eoush lati prr tion mode monit#Ilinoperable i i erable.
urMme < '
0 2 M c s;;rr # E h Ab T or during Place one - '
Et" h e "d"'" #".elo"saH%bSireaa a g e
um ,,,i.. e_u. w 0 Rki ITip circu ! gf[ 4M" [ '" *i"'
or meAsarentat C.th Suspend movement of Innediately g gg trradiated fuel assemblies.
@ c2 g,a,M;;,/ t-ft@
s
@ ~
C.2.$ $ pend CORE
/Innedtate TERATIONJ.
{$
b[A) .
= , -
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform a CHANNEL CHECK on the (radim(d) 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months control room radiation monitor channel.
(continued)
CEOG STS 3.3-34 Rev 1, 04/07/95 g : 7, '
CVCS Isolation SignalM 3.3.9 .b 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Isolation $lgnal h '
g LC0 3.3.9 Four clianne's of West Penetration Room / Letdown Heat Exchanger Room pressure s B)and two Actuation Logic channels shall be OPERA 8 .
APPLICA81LITY: MODES 1, 2. 3, and 4.
Sensor mobks,sehNssodbd me4wam,o-t e, hap.ejs h
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLET!0N TIME A. One Actuation Logic A.1 (A<< EA.j L.Q Ra'. tore theAchannel 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months h
channel inoperable. to OPERABLE status.
_m__
Qffesitk2msav red
~~B. One CVCS isolation B.1 Place the t in I hour Q f nMrumshD channel b s or trip.~~
p inoperable. o(p,g,f mgo,. 4 68"50C Sk$ cat **4 - .W. - p..
B.2.1 Restore th channel 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months rnoM)e or- to OPERABLE status.
M$oc.?akt$
mugQ E Neded woor mea >l B.2.2 Place the ck trip.
el in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months h 1 C. YCS isolation C.1 Place one I hour Detru charnels bypass an e the @
inoperabl_,e other in 5ensor trip. rnedde A!fD (continued)
- - - N E. _ , _
LCO 3,0,4 g, y
~~er%U t. -~~
CEOG STS 3.3-36 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1.
. dl4n
~
(
CVCS Isolation signal h
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY '
SR 3.3.9.1 Of each unsor- u.
PerformaCHANNELCHECM 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months T channtI SR 3.3.9.2 ------NOTES- -
~~1. Testing of Actuation Logic shall inc1 the verification of the proper relo7 4 r. + perWon or ears inittaucomlay.)~~
~~f od gh s.' n\~~
~~2. Relays associated with plant equipment that cannot be operated during plant ,~~
operation are only reautred to be . .c.* p ar 7 fduring ch MODE entry g m..As xc ing 2 urs un tested _
i n the vlous 6 nths.
a CMEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each ays CYCS OEelatMn7 channel with setpoints in accordance with the following Allowable Values:
West Penetration Room Pressure-High 50.5 psig I Letdown Heat Exchanger Room Pressure-High 50.5 psig Ik SR 3.3.9.3 form a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each CVCS nths laticti cress #e indicating) channel. ! ;
f e~'s- ., ._
GEE 3 _
, M R 5. M . 9 Y Cr.- ( C VC4 7 u t., 6y Q ,, l / p ' _Z al ro A c :., 9 Mhc ,:s sw , I, .'i 3, .
MO
._, Tf 47 (Asi,5 CEOG STS , 3.3 38 ~ Rev 1, 04/07/95
.~
i I
PAM Instrumentation g lC.T h '.
3.3. INSTRUNENTATION
.3. I PoshcidentMonitoring(PAM) Instrumentation .
u l/2.(,.s. C0 3.3. The PAMffnsif ---tatfoDfor each Function in Table 3.3
=
shall be OPERA 8LE.
APPLICA81LITY: N00ES 1 . and 3.
ACTIONS
. _ _ . . . - . . - . _ . ..- NOT E S-------------------------
~~1. LC0 3.0.4 is not appitcable.~~
2 Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUlkED ACTION CONPLETION TINE 3.3.24 ) 3.g t,: A. One or more Functions A.1 Restore required 30 days
~~e. 6s - g,~~
%5t,6f 4- .with one required- channel to OPERA 8LE-2 channel inoperable.
~
i .
_ status.-
(TMje.44.A ' @ sed.% j, 172L 34'I fyy wa B. fequired Action and 8.1 Initiate action in Immediately g 3,'g ..t associated Completion accordance with l- Time of Condition A ' Specification 5.6 not met. SIf
&d&&
1114 AcNa C. ------NOTE-----.
Not applicable to C.1 Restore r,nevchannel to OPERABLE status.
7 days h
3g 3g hydrogen monitor char,nels.
One or more Functions with two required h_p.ey+ ay schannels inoperable, h (continued)
,1
-CEOG STSj 3.3-40 Rev 1, 04/07/95 m#p ~
e e .t = = ' + + -** * *- -e i.,+- .i.m%.6, , . , ,
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ .---2.______m__:__._____.__-___
J l
}:
PAM Instrumentation [(kr614)
I.34 D '
SURVEILLAN R E S S
5" -.8
. ... -F f_ .. . ....... NOTE------ --------------- --------
A
!$! ...'!!'.!*.!"..^"J."'!.'""'"t*!M.M'!$.!".M.' ...h.. ... I& '
SURy!LLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3. .1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days answumentat6fDchannel that is normally
- {q'7'g ,
energized, h.
. SR 3.3. --------------------NOTE-------------------
4.3,3.6) Neutron detectors re excluded from CHANNEL CAllBRATION. - - -
................. ..... .......k ... .
Perform CHANNEL CAllBRA hmonths h
~~, . - - - - - - _ -x -._~~
J' on tath indic.fron obwl o.4' b d d e wlle g )7 eftefk Con +a?.~,A : LO 4 -
Hy b y n A n.) ,,,,
gg& $ ,
7_ l a - _ - -
- - _ _ ~ ~ _-
SR 13.10 &
ferform a C.HAAML CAtioMTeoM oa
-(%.S.l?t). ba5"Ia ^^+
4d 1
' hb n yAna)yaees jd5'?ST@EEED -
k TE$T)-
4 4
CEOG bih 3.3-42 Rev 1, 04/07/95 MMQ .
R
f
-,r- - - _ _ _ , -
PAM Instrinnentation M d) 3.3 40 tkRvy i.ie s.s. i <,e.e i e< u post Accident seen tertig inettwentotten
~,
. l "cic ca"' "'"' -
CTS REFittu'tt0 FSGI 'f atault Cmoutts TM 3310 FUNC110u kleutete ACTIO$t 1.f(Leserithmic(moutron Fim g 2 F
~~2. Reacter Cootent dystgomt 6ey fesperature 2 L F~~
~~3. Reactor Cootent6ystm L_eptemperature 2 pee esp , F hf) hh Qegier Cee41pH trat pressure tv e )~~
ee ssorace 2
Ncr F
y (itj s. neector v.eset Water tevet 2
~~6. 2 F l gp CentelementhWater Level (ulde reece)~~
~~(t) 7. Centalraent pressure f~~
~~8. Centelement lootetten vatn Peeltlen 2~~
2 per penegg flow 7
F
9. Centeirament Aree medtetten (high renee) 2 G (3,h,(g ' 10. Centeinuent tydrogenQ 2 F
Q i pressurtaer tevet ,2 F 2 per steenpeter F Steam Generator Weter tevel (vide rence) h i
-@ 2gp (rsw.ig sie ite,s.e va,* tevei ,
@ @ Cen
. Core tatt Temperature-euedrent (1) I I"I F M " Core tatt temperature-tundrent (21, 2M ,
f Core tatt Temperature-eundrent D3 2(83 F Core talt temperature-eundrent (41 2(83 F
/Z f C8. - Aunit terveeduster'itou _
te) m.et reestred for tsetetten vetves whose associated penetretten te leotated by et teest one elesed and
.eettveted outemette volve, etened menuet vetve, bitnd fienge, se check valve with flow through the valve secured.
(b) (Mty one poeltten ltdicotten chamet la recpdred for penetration flew paths with enty one Instelled sentret room truttention channel.
m . .h._e,ee ..tt e. t.o er _ e eere e.,t t.e,_ - es.
gte, , s.
to eon ,.2..4ete,y
, , . ,,<.. ._.ed oui.. ... .,pe ,er . . , as _eef; to i,.t.
. .t-ts/en, m m i m -e .. te,wieiery ('T/
q y.teewisiery t.u. Se,e Cu,,i tveiustion i.n, cei.esery e,ert. n, un;me a i-tr ents sp cieied en the ./
12 te am 6 Are.ier Pec,5s.c _ __
~~2. persic ,ven4oc ] @~~
g
<9 + m ss,..g preu.nn ,
j g S#i4# Prf ASTre (i ow e co ge L
(. LOG 5h - 3.3-4T ) Rev 1, 04/07/95
-. v -
+
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.3- INSTRUMENTATION System (RCS) temperature is > 385'F for Unit 1, and > 325'F for Unit 2. This change is consistent with the requirements of the Calvert Cliffs Low Pressure Overpressure Protection Specification, which requires only manual operation of the high pressure safety injection pumps when RCS temperature is s 385'F for Unit 1, and s 325"F for Unit 2. This change is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.
9. Table 3.3.4-1 contains a Modes column which requires all the ESFAS functions to be Operable in Modes 1,2, and 3. This is the same Applicability as required by the Applicability section of Specification 3.3.4, and the CTS. This change deletes the Modes column from the Table and moves Footnote (d) from the Modes column to the function column. Footnote (d) allows the Main Steam Line Isolation Signal to not be Operable when all Main Steam Line Isolation valves, which are isolated by a Main Steam Line Isolation Signal, are closed.
10. Table 3.3.4-1 Function 1.b Footnote (b) states that SIAS is required as permissive to initiate Containment Spray. This Footnote will be changed to state that SIAS is required to start the Containment Spray Pumps. This change is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs design.
11. Surveillance Requirement 3.3.5.1 (Channel Functional Test) is modified by a Note which allows relays associated with plant equipment that cannot be operated during plant operation to only be tested during each Mode 5 entry exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , unless tested during the previous 6 months.
~~This change will revise the Frequency m the Note to require the valves to be tested once per 24 months. This change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.~~
12. Table 3.3.5-1 lists each individual function and the applicable Modes associated with each function. This change will add line items for the Manual Trip and Automatic Actuation Logic channels for each function. This was necessary because the Modes of Applicability for the Manual Trip and Actuation Logic channels are not the same. The Modes of Applicability for Manual Trip are Modes 1,2,3, and 4, and the Modes of Applicability for Actuation Logic channels are Modes 1,2, and 3. This change is a result of the Calvert Cliffs design.
13. Surveillance Requirements 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.2.3 require a Channel Functional Test on the Rate of Change of Power and on the automatic bypass removal feature every 92 days, respectively. This change will revise the Frequency for these Surveillance to once within 7 days prior to each reactor startup for SR 3.3.2.2, and every 24 months for SR 3.3.2.3. This change is consistent with the current Calvert Cliffs licensing basis.
~~14. All Reviewers Notes will be deleted. These Notes are for the NRC reviewers and are not intended to be included in the specifk plant's Improved Technical Specifications.~~
15. Calvert Cliffs does not currently have a Technical Specification for the Control Room Isolation Signal. Specification 3.3.8 will be added to Calvert Cliffs ITS. The Specification is named Control Room Recirculation Signal. The NUREG-1432 version of this Specification will be revised to be consistent with the Calvert Cliffs design and the current testing performed on the components. No credit is taken in the accident analysis for manual initiation of the control room isolation, therefore, the NUREG-1432 Actions and Surveillance Requirements associated with manual operation are not adopted. In addition, no credit for filtration is assumed in the accident analysis for the gas decay tank rupture, therefore, the MODE 5 and 6 Applicability and associated Actions have been deleted. Control Room isolation is also credited during a fuel l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-2 Revision 11 ,
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.3- INSTRUMENTATION handling accident, so applicability during movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies is retained, but during Core alterations removed. NUREG-1432 Required Action C.2.2 has not been adopted since it is not required by the Applicability; once NUREG-1432 Required Actions C.2.1 is completed, the LCO is no longe required to be met (and thus Required Action C.2.2 and C.2.3 are not required to be completed). The Notes in Actions A and C have been deleted since the Calvert Cliffs design does not include a toxic gas mode.
26. Specification 3.3.10 will not be included in the improved Technical Specifications because Calvert Cliffs does not have a Shield Building Filtration Actuation Signal. This change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs design.
17. Specification 3.3.12, which requires that the Remote Shutdown System be Operable, has been changed to require the Remote Shutdown Instrumentation to be Operable; the control circuits and transfer switches are not included in this Specification. As noted in the Safety Evaluation Report for License Amendments 120 (Unit 1) and 102 (Unit 2), dated August 6,1986, the remote
hutdown instrumentation is provided for monitoring purposes only. This is consistent with the position stated in previous Safety Evaluations for other License Amendments, such as Amendment 88 for Unit I (dated November 17, 1983). That Safety Evaluation stated that the instrumentation was used to monitor key safete parameters and that no automatic features were actuated from the remote shutdown instrumentation. Therefore, the Technical Specification only requires the instrumentation to be Operable, not the control circuits and transfer switches. Due to this change, SR 3.3.12.2, which verifies the contro! circuits and transfer switches are capable of performing their intended function, has been deleted.
18. The Note in Specification 3.3.12 SR 3.3.12.3 which excludes the Reactor Trip Breaker Indication from the channel calibration is being modified to also exclude the Reactor Trip Breaker Indication. The Reactor Trip Breaker Indication channels indicate whether the Reactor Trip Breakers are open or closed, which does not require a channel calibration. This change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.
19. This change removes part of the Applicability for LCO 3.3.6. "When associated DG is required to be Operable by LCO 3.8.2, 'AC Sources - Shutdown'" is removed because the Diesel Generator-Loss of Voltage Start (DG-LOVS) is required for ESFAS systems to function in any accident with a loss of offsite power, and ESFAS Applicability is Modes 1,2, and 3. As noted in the Safety Evaluation Report for License Amendments 198 (Unit 1) and 175 (Unit 2), dated September 27,1994, the undervoltage instrumentation is only required in Modes I through 3.
This is consistent with the discussion provided in our application for a license amendment dated November 2,1993. That letter states that an EDG is required during shutdown and refueling to ensure adequate AC electrical power is available to mitigate events such as a fuel handling incident or a loss of shutdown cooling. Due to the reduced pressure and temperature conditions of the reactor coolant system during shutdown conditions, these events develop more slowly and the results are less severe than the events which occur at full power. Thus, additional time is available for the operator to evaluate plant conditions and respond by manually operating engineered safety feature components as required to successfully mitigate the consequences of the event. These discussions support not including Modes 4 through 6 and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. However, to be cc:., tent with the AC Sources-Operating requirements (CTS 3.8.1.1, ITS 3.8.1), wh:ch repres that the DG auto start and sequence loads following a loss of offsite power, the Mode 4 requirements will be added.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 ?.3-3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.3- INSTRUMENTATION demonstrated operable and CTS Table 3.3-1 footnote d indicates that this function has an associated bypass feature. The NUREG provides actions for an inoperable bypass feature and also provides surveillance requirements for demonstrating the function Operable. This change maintains consistency within the ITS and is consistent with the current Technical Specification requirements.
35. NUREG-1432 Surveillance Requirement 3.3.3.1 requires quarterly testing of the RTCBs. CTS Table 4.3-1 requires the RTCBs be tested on a monthly basis. Calvert Cliffs has retained the existing more frequent testing of the RTCBs consistent with the licensing basis and CEN 327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Internal Evaluation," June 2,1986, including Supplement 1, dated March 3, !939.
~~36. Not used. l~~
~~37. NUREG 1432 Condition B of LCO 3.3.7 requires placing the purge valves in the closed position and entering the applicable conditions of LCO 3.6.3 for the inoperable purge valves which result -~~
from an inoperable manual actuation or automatic actuation channel. These actions are in error end have been corrected in ITS 3.3.7 to require either the valves be closed, or the actions of LCO 3.9.3 be entered for inoperable valves. The STS reference to LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, is inappropriate since that LCO applies in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 whereas, LCO 3.3.7 is applicable during core alterations and movement of fuel. LCO 3.9.3, however, has the same applicability of LCO 3.3.7 and is the approprirae reference. The STS is also in error to ,
require both actions be accomplished since the actions are somewhat redundant. Closure of the purge valves performs the safety function of the automatic and manual functions covered by the LCO. The actions of LCO 3.9.3 would require that core alterations and fuel movement be suspended which removes the unit from the mode of applicability. Therefore, ITS 3.3.7 Condition B replaces the "and" requirement in the STS with an "or" to indicate that these actions accomplish the same desired result. Thi., change is also consistent with the requirements of the STS for each of the other PWR owners groups.
38. The Applicability of NUREG LCO 3.3.1 is MODES I and 2. The ITS Applicability references Table 3.3.1-1, and Table 3.3.1-1 has a colamn specifying the Applicability for each Function in the Table. This method is necessary since each Function does not have the same Applicability; two of the Functions are only required in MODE 1215% RTP. This change is also consistent with the Calvert Cliffs CTS Table 3.3-1.
39. NUREG-1432 SR 3.3.9.2, Note 2, requires testing of relays after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of Mode 5 operation for relays that carinot be tested during operation. These relays would cause a closure of the letdown line which is undesirable during unit operation. The CVCS actuation logic is currently not requiced by the Technical Specitications. The 24 month test frequency proposed in ITS SR 3.3.9.2 is consistent with the CTS Table 4.3 2 footnotes 2-6 for other ESFAS functions actuation logic which cannot be tested entine. The requirements of the STS would impose an unnecessary more restrictive change on plart operations and are not adopted.
40. The ESFAS Functions listed in Table 3.3.4-1 include trip and bypass removal features as appropriate. Referring to trip and bypass removal features as separate Functions is incorrect and confusing. Removing the words " trip or bypass removal" satisfies the intent of the Note and eliminees the error.
. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-6 Revision i1
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 33- INSTRUMENTATION
41. NUREG-1432 SR 33.13 Note states the Surveillance Requirement is not required to be performed until after THERMAL POWER is 2 20% RTP. This change adds the phrase "and required to be performed prior to operation above 90% RTP," from CTS 4.3.1.1.1, Table 43-1, Notation (3). This is added to account for increased uncertainties associated with using uncalibrated excore detectors.
cal' 'ERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.3-7 Revision 11
4 "F 4 RPS Instrumentation-Operating h'
BASES t
SURVEILLANCE 1R
3.3.1.2'(continued) g g i.f REQUIREMENTS g this Surveillance must performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER is 2 RTP. The secondary calorimetric is i rate at lower power levels. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allows time a for plant stabi zation, data taking, and E instrumentcaltpration. 3 A second Note indicates daily calibration may be suspended during PHYS! TESTS. This ensures that calibration is prope receding and following physics
@?O testing at each plateau, recognizi that durin testing,
'u"aSe#5 On%n*" '"' g$ '"""*"g" "" ""d'" g ,,,g
- s ew SR 3.3.1.3 * 'M lt is necessary to callorate the' excor power range channel
- ~
upper and lower subchannel amplifiers uch that the internal ASI used in the TM/LP and APD-High tr reflects the true 4,d ge,%4o opedt'% core power distribu11on as determined by the incore otgog 90ej* g detectors A Note t.o/the Frecuene-> indicates _the._ C,, '
l/
Su ill e is required.wlthin 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months s:after THERNAL POWER \L i is O"q 6 RTRQyncertaintiesinthaexcoreandincere '
seasurement iFroce mak t'figiFa~cTic~arto calibrate when'
- THERMAL POWER is RTP f12 EoGr's'Jallows-t'i orila&Jhe Completion data-takingd nt stabilization. Time;of ~ ,
%" fgeq.p,eptp and .tnstrument-ca13bration.itnWin5retaecectoriaan not properly calibrated to agree with the incore detecto s
% Swb4 k ' 3 power is restricted during subsequent operations because of od GM increased uncertairtty associated with using uncalibrated --
u yM !
pxcore siculetbrA 1The 31 day Frequency is adequate, based 3 cp y on operat ng experi'ence of the excore linear amplifiers and M}
M.. h,[PWbMWCE
.AI t
the slow burnup cf t!s detectors. The excore readings are a strong function of the power produced in the peripheral fuel p
h W*NU bundlesanddonotrepresentanintefuxdurin the core. Slow changes in neutron f rated reading across '
I i %vt. 9 d% 47p cycle can also be detected at ti.is Frequency.g the fuel fA M rt
~~S4er* (-~~
~~Rep,qN5ehnye/f '~~
SR 3314' pr..d. o p e.4,,o d. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each RPS instrument channel, except Loss of Load and@ Rate of 2 is be ..,s, . 0 ma .
% leM.uA on tedwisirr> h (continued)
~~a. h oc/=4#JCEOG STS 44h vsin3 B 3.3-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 mealrbr*4td enore Medar),~~
e kkx ,
l T
^
RPS Logic and Trip Initiation h
l i
8ASES '
ACTIONS (L1 (continued) gg
~~two channels of RTC8s, this it19n is'also applicable to -~~
/" _
the two affecteLATC8s.
single vital instrument Thi Condition allows for less of a Mb@ '
Q* *c*' 'Fh will de-energize both r matrix power supply,'which a on Logic channels in the same '
trip le;' This will open both sets of RTC8s in the affected trip I affectg;RTC8s. satisfying the Required h
p Action of opening the g
Of greater concern is the failure of . n tistion circuit in a nontrip condition (e us to two initiation K-relay failures). With only one DeLogicchannelfailedin a nontrip condition, there il the redundant set of 2-RTC8s in the trip 1c0 With both failed in a nontrip condition, the reactor will not trip automatically when required. in either case, the affected RTCBs must be opened immediately by using the appropriate Manual Trip push t,uttons, since each of the fourJush buttons opens one set of RTC8s, independent of the nTt circuitry. Caution must be exercised, since depress . the wrong push buttons may result in a reactor trip.
4- gg If the affected RTC8(s) cannot be opened, Condition E is entered. This would only occur if there is a failure in the
-(0_ ,
Manual Trip ci ortheRTC8(s). '5 CLowerj __ _ __ .
' TJp %+Q L1 and L2
~
Condition E is entcod if Required tions associated with Condition A, 8. or D are not met wi hin the required 04 Completion Time or if for one or unctions more than i
one Marual Trip. Matrix Logic, QIIttiaytohlogic, or RTC8 i channel is inoperable for reasons other7 han Condition A or D.
If the RTCOs associated with the inoperable channel cannot be opened, the reactor must be shut down within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and all the RTCBr opened. A Completion Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and wf thout challenging plant systems and to open RTCBs. All RTC8s should then be opened, placing the plant in a MODE where the LCO does not apply and ensuring no CEA withdrawal occurs.
(continued)
CEOG STS 8 3.3-58 , Rev1,04/07/95 W
d m- _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ --___m.__.___m -
CRS b f
AdMiiD s a.J.7 @
BASES I -
SURVE!LLANCE
~~SR 3.1.7d~~
~
~
e REQUIRE) D T- , "ser (continued) CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a channel including the sensor.
t check of the Surveillance ve'rifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within t hh 4"**"
t.
necessary range and accuracy. CHANN TION leaves A. "I the channel adjusted to account fo st Yt Ba successive calibrations to ensure tnat sne channel remains -
operational between sucesssive tests. CHANNEL CALIBRATION $
must be performed consistent with the plant specific L,g .. m ,4:l.g ;Amt setpoint analysis. ~
[. 4,6A % A dr M ) not The Frequency is based unon t.2 snumation.cf an call tion i month h
(',,_ .betag.r ta irrgq .4 do,6ug ,.3 f
g i
d edrad'a f*h ploeA wa< a +-
SR 3.3.7.5 g c. R 5 g
\ ppt, cou88ATeN. Every a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the sa na ctuation circuitry.
. [ This Surveillance verifles that the push buttons are
( .
capable of opening contacts in the Ac ation Logic as
/O, c
c4va*^A
-~ , assignea, co-energizing thedETMs iserelays and providing nanual f tne Function. The month frequency is based on t need to perform this urveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed With the reactor at power. Operating expertence ha: shown these components usually pass the elliance when performed at a Frequency of once every 4
months. ,
h
-- SR 3.3.7.6 2M '
f .s This Survelilance eqsures that the train ac*uation response times are less tha r equal to the maximum times assumed in f the analysesJ The month Frequency is based upon plant operaung expericace, which shows random failures of t .
598W Yw,sr<
instrumentation components causing serious response time gg,Q g' g , ** l degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent @ - -
occurrences. Testing of the final actuatin devices, which manner as Esf ' *ake up the bulk of the response time, is i ciuded. Testing AC5t'0M5C TlM6.
(continued)
CEOG STS B3.3-11) Rev 1, 04/07/95 to g l
@@gg o@
BASES (continued) Q
~~APPLICABILITY Tha bFenet'ons must be opranne r in NODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, (a'nd JMX)E 5 og thi_r.Mn rnRF ALTIRAMNGand during I /\~~
/ tovement of irradiated fuel assemblies to ensure a habitable environment for the control room operators, i
[For thess plarttrt that credit gas decay tank ruptureN (accidents, JYe CRIS must also be OPER8 SCI in H0 DES 5 and 6J (0 -
m . =
ACTIONS A N8.A0 & M es k c &
channel is inoperable whe*n i does not satisfy the go ;n tre se oA- OP ILITY criteria for the channel' function. The most common cause o h nnel inoperability s outright failure or
, drift of th b orforocen asuunnasufficient to excee 9 6?"*Y b thgJtoferanc nT1Dwea Etne planJ4pecmgaretooint) ,W,,,,,,,
TanalwisT Typ' cally, the orirt is not large agTwould CMtMt MugA4Tios A result in a dalay of actuation rather than a (total loss of it, p e *s a4%.at ,i wi function. This d performance of ahtermination TtMCTJUNAL is cenerally ILsl made durino lthe when tycess vp 44dpM.I io krt4it. 7tastrumerkis set un fnv =Mffitment to brino it within J lscecifR'ationf If the trip setpoint is not within the 4 N Jped 4 d"M. Allowable Value, the channel is inoperable and the CI AMc fwotovu1EFS appropriate Conditions must be entered.
m, ,n.m A. I . "B[i. B.2.' C'.1. C .7.1 C . 2.2A Ar M To~ridtti and C hav een modi by a Note ich spec s that CREA be place .ually in oxic gas a p ection mode the autom transfer he toxic g Pi/ rotection so is inoperakkp (At thi it, the ba fcr m this Note as follows 4 gg Q Conditions A, B, and C are applicable toKawral mn ' Murn=*ne met en of m m auenv iKJ condition A Me M *Yt v^ed ) applies to the failure of the a na pres a r/p, ayunio N%et [ ~
, an& tequipea oarm cu intWi manWortchannel@ in N0DE 1, 2, 3, or 4 e/tode and4eouYed a ous Entry inte this Condition requires action to ett store the ~4Lecims t 4w@.fuction / channel fe',ed or ma u ally perform the (Requ@ ired Action A.1). j ihe Comp rety g
mt cwd ch n Tise of 1 hour is sufficient to complete the Required Ae' ions cn' att r > on N 1 L-nd if th~e channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE
~
u,a us 'the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO s (continued) CEOG STS B 3.3-120 Rev 1, 04/07/95
l-M5 g CA @ BASES ACTIONS A .1'. B .1. B . 2.' C .1. C . f .1 M C.2.2 , V
~~,(continued) h does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours (Required Action B.1) and to MODE 5 within 36 hours (Required -~~
Action B.2). The Completion Times of 6 hours and 36 hours for reaching MODES 3 and 5 from MODE 1 c.re reasonable, based on operating experience and normal ecoldown rates, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without chal1,engipg plant safety systems or operators. O Ik Condition _C applies to the failure offR Manua rip 7 q d_ gas b nn nM Mteve*^mg/ or , uNng CBRE TEMTlQNSLM or when moving irradiated as es. The Required Act'loiIs are immediately taken to tg. chu e,y\ / place one_0PERABLE(EEHC5/trai the dusro==rv ram atwo) wetect En1 mod or r%my tv anu>uons sus end movement of~irra antwei h el- lh hew, eddN assemb1'es. The compleiiton Time recognizes the f act that the radiation donalFUih the only Functions available to initiate control room isolation in the event of a fuel d handling ar.:1 dent. hg g gugygg ; SURVEILLANCE 1R'3.3.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours ensurel that a cross failure of instrumentation has not occurred._]A'
~~'CHANN CHECK is rmally a compa. son of the parameter~~
' indi ted on one hannel to a si lar parameter on_other ch nels. It based on the sumption that astrumente nnels mont ring the same arameter shwu read pproximatel the same valu . - ( Signific t deviations ween the two strument annels an indicatto of excessive i trument dr ft in one M Icould b of the. channels or somethina ===_ -= - in 1 CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to , verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly 'I between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 1 (continued) CEOG STS B 3.3-121 Rev 1, 04/07/95
f ' 4 m M h.k .N cvcs Iw4
- SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.7.4 REQUIREMENT (continued) CHANNEL CALIBR/. TION is a complete check of the i w 2nt channel including the sensor. The Surveillanc erifles that the channel responds to a measured par er within the -
necessary range and accuracy. ' CHANNEL CAL TION leavas the channel adjusted to account for inst nt drift between successive calibrations to ensure tha he channel remains operational between successive test . CHAN:;EL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent wit the plant specific f setpoint analysis. , The Frequency is based upon the assumption of an (18] month calibration interval for'the determination of the mar stude i of equipment drift r 'the setpoint analysis. SR 3.3.7.5 } Every [1 months, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on the ma a CPIS actuation circuitry. M T Surveillance verifies that the trip push buttons are
~~'+.' pable of opening contacts in the Actuation Logic as i~~
designed, de-energizing the initiation-relays and providing Manual Trip of the Function. The (18] month Frequency is. based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions.that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the. , Surveillance when performed at a Frequency of once every / 18 mon % _ _ _ ., _ _ _ .' SR 3.3g i.. This Surveillance e sures that the train actuation response equuimes et times are less than equal to the maximum times assumed'in i _ the analys_es. PThe .onth Frequency is based upon plant Ord hed h h S u nt operaung experten , which shows random failures of T instrumentation components causing serious response time M uar % ESF degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Testing of the final actuating devices, which Pd7(WE Time., make up the bulk of the response time, is included. Testing (continued) CE0G STS , Raw 1,.04/07/95 (
~~. - . . . - - - . .-. . . _ _ - - ~- -~~
~~Part Instrumentation b~~
~~. qG 6ASES .~~
~~LC0 condensate storane Tank (CST) level if-(continued)~~
~~, C$T Level is provided to ensure water supply for pl *W}f The CST ptvvfdes the ensured safatv nrads wtter supply for the [AFW] System.) Th Si consi _s~~
{ @ inkt asnartad'hv r"'I ou t g , gi n f d_Cnyfntory is monitored by a 0 to 144 incn . v Teindication for each tank. . CST Level is dis ed on a centrol room indicator 6trW chefD
~~. nd plant computer. In addTI on, a c.ontrol h. h I room annunciator alarms on low level.~~
Qt i stischantCST Level is considered a Type A varia51e because the control room meter and h v annunciator are considered the primary indgation used 6N M,,% . nnerator T6s DBAs that requirdAFWi*ars the 'y s,alf-elecJrypowB steam line break ($Lsh and bdMV sma6 Water or th jne CST is the initial sour'Ee of FW1 System. However, as the CST is depleted, manua operator action is necessary to replenish the CST or align suction to tneJAFWL pumps from the hotwell. & 1 q 14;15pW,1G) Core trit Temnerature thi,lSij Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long ters surveillance of core cooltag. An evaluation was made of the minimum number of valid core exit thermocouples necessary for inadequate core cooling detection. The evaluation determined the y e*4
~~+4duced complement of core exit thermocouples c .ta ,,<.~~
necessary to detect initial coreCEgovery and trend , the ensuing core heatup. The evaluations account for ' core nonuniformities including incore effects of the. radial decay power distribution and excore effects of condensate runt.ack in the hot legs and nonuniform inlet temperatures. Based on these evaluations, adequate or inadequate core cooling detection is ensured with two valid core exit thermocouples per quadrant. The design of the Incore Instrumentation System includes a K (chrome 1 alumel) therracouole within each t.f the incore instrunent detector assemblies. h % (continued)
^
~~CE0G STS B 3.)-144 Rev1,04/n7/95~~
~~. 5 . . - , , . - , . . ,..-..e~~
~~.- - - , . - =~ - . _ . . . - _ - . . _ - - - . . - - - _ -~~
~~i r PAM Instrumontatlon M @ BASES 7@~~
f LCO with the failures that are a condition of or result from a (continued) specific accident), prevents the operators from being presented the infomation necessary for them to determine the .
safety status of the plant and to bring the plant to and g maintain it safe conditio followug that accident. I'i Table 3.3 i the exceptio to the two channel requiremen Containment Isolation Valve Positio 4gQ 3
'Two OPERABLE channels of core exit thermocouples are requ re Marp for each channel in each quadrant 40 provide indf 9 tion of p),;,-3,c radial distribution of the coolant temperatura tl's across representative regions of tha core. Power distripution symmetry was considered in enormining the specific number and locations provided for diagnosis of local core problems.
Therefore, two randomly selected thermocouples may not be sufficient to meet the tc thermocouples per channel requirement in any quadrant. The two thermococples in each channel must meet its additional requirement thet one be located near the center of the core and the other near the core perimeter, such that the pair of core exit 3emocouples indicate the radial temperature gradient across thdr core quadrant. Plant specific evaluations in response to
. Item II.F.2 of WREG-0737 should have identified the thermocouple pairings that satisfy these requirements. Two sets of two th6rmocouples in each quadrant ensure a single ,
failure will not disable the ability to deterstne the radial temperature gradient. for loop and steam genarator rebted variables, the required information is individual loop temperature and indivital steam generator level. In these cases two channels are re utred to be OPERABLE for e;.ch loop of steam generator to r undantly provide the necessary information. , In the case of Containment Isolation Yalve Position, the . important information is the status of the containment penetrations. The LC0 requires one position indicator for each active containment isolation valve. This is stifficient ' to redundantly verify the isolation status of each isolable penetration either via indicated status of the active valve and prior knowledge of the passive valve or via system boundary status. If a normally active containment isolation valve is known to be closed and deactivated, position i (continued) CEOG STS B 3.3-146 Rev 1. 04/07/95
Page Replacensent I:structions VOLUME 8 Section 3.4 Note: Underlinedtitles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing Ihe unit number as uvilas the spec @ cation number locatedin the upper right hand corner ofthe C15page. Ksy: DOC = Qiscussion OfChanges DOD
~~Qiscussion [?f TechnicalSpec$ cation &viation or Discussion QfBases Deviation REMOVE INSERT Overview of Channes No pages changed.~~
~~- jn -~~
3.4.5 1 _ . 3.4.51 3.4.9.I and 3.4.9-2 3.4.91 and 3.4.9 2 3.4.11 1- 3.4.11 1 3.4.121 through 3.4.12 5 3.4.12-1 through 3.4.12 5 - 3.4.13 2 3.4.13 2 3.4.15 4 3.4.15-4 3.4.161 and 3.4.16-2 3.4.161 and 3.4.16 2 3.4.17 1 3.4.17 1 IIkBam B 3.4.5 2 B 3.4.5 2 B 3.4.9 3 through B 3.4.9-6 B 3.4.9 3 through B 3.4.9-6 B 3.4.114 B 3.4.11 4 CTS Markun A Discussion of Channes Speci6 cation 3.4.3, Unit 1 Page 2 of 5 Page 2 of 5 Specincation 3.4.3, Unit 2 Page 2 of 5 Page 2 of 5 Specl0 cation 3.4.4, Unit 1 Page1ofI PageIofI Specification 3.4.4, Unit 2
~~' Pagt; I of I PageIofI Specincation 3.4.9, Unit i .Page1ofI .~~
~~PageiofI Specincation 3.4.9, Unit 2 Pageiof1 Page1of1~~
~~' DOC 3.4.9 2 DOC 3.4.9-2 i~~
~~i l Note: Italickedentries indicate uneven exchanges. Piemefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.__ r E~~
~~. - -. ~ - . ._ -. . _ _ _ . _ -_ . . _ . _~~~
Pcge Replacessent I:structions - VOLUMEN Section 3,4 - t Note: Underlinedtitles trulicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as ucIl as the specfication number located in the upper right-handcorner ofthe CISpage. Key: DOC = Dhcussion OfChanges D00 = Discussion {}f Technical. Specification Deviation or Discussion (UBases Deviation , REMOVE INSERT CTS Merkun & Uggjg,1.t2of Channes, Continued. Specification 3.4.10, Unit 1 - , Page 2 of 2 Page 2 of 2 i SpeciGcation 3.4.10, Unit 2 Page 2 of 2 Page 2 of 2 Specincation 3.4.11. Unit i Page 1 of 2 Page I of 2 Specincation 3.4.11. Unit 2 Page i of 2 Page I of 2 IX)C 3.4.11 1 through J.4.1l 4 , Specification 3.4.12 Unit i Page 3 of 4 Pa4e " f 4 Specincation 3Al2, Unit 2 Page 3 of 4 Page 3 of 4 Specification 3.4.13 Unit i Page 2 0f 3 Page 2 0f 3 Specification 3.4.13, Unit 2 . Page 2 of 3 Page 2 of 3 DOC 3.4.15 I and 3.4.15 2 DOC 3.4.151 and 3.4.15 2 NSHC Findinas No pages changed. ISTS Markup & Justification 3.4 5 and 3.4 6 3.4 5 and 3.4-6 3.4 7 (found aller several figure inserts) 3.4 7 Page titled " Insert 3.4.5 LCO Note 2"(found after Page 3.4-8) Tage titled " Insert 3.4.5 LCO Note 2" 3.410 and 3.411 3.410 and 3,4 11 3ct 13 3.4 13 :
., 3.4 18 3.4 18 '3.4 20 3.4 20 3.4 22 3.4 22 3.4 26 3.4 26 Page titled " Insert 3.4.12"(found after Page 3.4 26) Page titled " Insert 3.4,12" 3.4 27 3.4 27 ii , - Note: halici:edentries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement irutructions carefully. - . , - - . . , . , . ~ . ~ . . , ,
~~t Page Replacenient Instructbra ,~~
~~. VOLUME 8 Section 3.4 ;~~
Note: Underlinedtitles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit l number as wellas the spect/ication number located in the upper right-handcorner ofthe CTSpage. ? l Key: DOC = Discussion OfChanges i IX)D = Dir ussion Of TechnicalSpecification Deviation or Discusston QfBases Deviation i REMOVE INSERT t JSTS Markun & Justification, Continued. 3.4 30 and 3.4 31 3.4 30 and 3.4 31
- 3.4 44 3.4 44-Page titled " Insert 3.4.17," Page 1 of 2 (found after 3.4-44) Page titled " Insert 3.4.17" DOD 3.4 5 through 3.412 DOD 3.4-5 through 3.411 JSTS Bases Markun & Justi0catlos B 3.4 40 B3.440 B 3.4 51 B 3.4 51 i
~~i 6 m i i t r~~
~
lii - Note:Italict:edbntries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully. ;
RCS Loops - MODE 3 3.4.5 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 1 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 J 4 LCO 3.4.5 Two RCS loops shall be OPERABLE and one RCS loop shall be in : operation. ,
--------------------------- NOTES---------------------------- ' , 1. All reactor coolant pumps may be not in operation for flH s I hour per 8 hour period and s 2 hours per 8 hour period for low flow testing, provided:
a. No operat'.ons are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and -

b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10'F 5' below saturation temperature.

2. No reactor coolant pump shall be started with any RCS cold leg temperature s 365'F (Unit 1), s 301 F (Unit 2)' !
~~unless:~~
a. The pressurizer water-level is s 170 inches;

b. The pressurizer pressure is s 300 psia (Unit 1),
~~s320 psia (Unit 2);and i~~
~~c. The secondary water temperature of each steam generator is s 30'F above the RCS temperature. '~~
~~S APPLICABILITY: MODE 3. l(~~
!CALVERT CLIFFS UNITS 1 & 2- 3.4.5 Revisiong' t - w ~
~~Pressurizer 3.4.9 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizer LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:~~
a. Pressurizer water level 2133 inches and s 225-inches; 6nd

b. Two banks of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with the capacity of each bank 2150 kW and capable of being N
powered from an emergency power supply. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizir water A.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours icvel not within reactor trip breakers limit, open. AND , 11 A.2 Be in Mode 4. 12 hours B. One required bank of B.1 Restore required bank 72 he.rs pressurizer heaters of pressurizer inoperable, heaters to OPERABLE status.
~~'ll CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.9-1 Revision,/ , s~~
~~- _ - - ..=~~
Pressurizer 3.4.9 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITIO't REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition B AND C.2 Be in Mode 4. 12 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.9.1 Verif.v pressurizer water level is 12 hours 2 133 enches and 5 225 inches. SR 3.4.9.2 Verify capacity of each required bank of 24 months pressurizer heaters 2150 kW. It CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.9-2 Revision / i
Pressurizer PORVs 3.4.11 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power-0perated Relief Valves (PORVs) LCO 3.4.11 Two PORVs and associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.
~~-APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, MODE 3 with all RCS cold leg temperatures > 365'F (Unit 1), > 301*F (Unit 2).~~
~~ACTIONS~~
~~..............................-.---.N0TES------------------------------------~~
1. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each PORV. It

2. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable, fi CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME SI A. One or two PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hour inoperable ar.d power to associated capable of being block valve.
~~manually cycled. 1 T~~
~~)\ ~ CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS 1-& 2 3.4.11-1 Revisionj (~~
~~LTOP System 3.4.12 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System LCO 3.4.12 An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with:~~
a. 1. A maximum of one high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump only capable of manually injecting into il the RCS, and

2. When HPSI suction is aligned to the refueling water tank, the HPSI pump shall be in manual control and either:
~~e a) HPSI flow limited to s 210 gpm, or b) An RCS vent of 2 2.6 square inches established; AND~~
~~b. HPSI loop motor. operated valves (MOVs) only capable of manually aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS; g~~
~~-.----------------------. NOTE--------------------------~~
~~HPSI loop MOVs may be capable of automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS for the purposes of testing. AND~~
~~c. 1. Two OPERABLE power-operated relief valves (PORVs),~~
and associated block valves open, with PORV lift settings on or below the curve in Figure 3.4.12-1 when the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System is not in operation and PORV lift settings s 492 psia (Unit 1), s 443 psia (Unit 2), when the SDC is in operation, or
~~2. One OPERABLE PORV, and asser.iated block valve open, with PORV lift setting on or below the curve in~~
;\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.12-1 Revision / i -- - , c ,- , Y --
f LTOP System 3.4.12 Figure 3.4.12-1 when the SDC System is not in operation and PORV lift setting s 429 psia (Unit 1), s 443 psia (Unit 2), when the SDC is in operation; and an RCS vent of 2 1.3 square inches fi established; or
~~3. An RCS vent of 2 2.6 square inches established.~~
~~APPLICABILITY: MODE 3 with any RCS cold leg temperature s 365'F (Unit 1), 6 s 301*F (Unit 2), MODES 4, 5, and 6.~~
~~-..------------------------NOTE-----.----------.-----------~~
~~This Specification is not applicable when the RCS is vented to 2 8 square inches. ACTIONS~~
~~.............................--------NOTE-------------------------------------~~
While the requirements of this Limiting Condition for Opar . tion are not met, entry into a MODE, or other specified condition in the Applicability is not permitted. 1 CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.12-2 Revision 43' l t
LTOP System 3.4.12 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more HPSI A.1 Initiate action to Immediately pumps capable of verify a maximum of automatically one HPSI pump only injecting into the capable of manually RCS. injecting into the RCS and no HPSI pumps f l 98 capable of automatically Two or more HPSI injecting into the pumps capable of RCS. manually injecting into the RCS. B. HPSI flow > 210 gpm B.1 Initiate action to Immediately and suction aligned reduce flow to to refueling water s 210 gpm. U tank. MQ 5 RCS vent < 2.6 square inches established. C. One or more HPSI loop C.1 Initiate action to Immediately MOVs capable of verify HPSI loop MOVs automatically are only capable of f aligning HPSI pump manually aligning flow to the RCS, HPSI pump flow to the RCS. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.12-3 Revision g y
~~,ys.. - . . - ,~~
9
l LTOP System 3.4,12 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION- REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One of two required D.1 Restore required PORY 5 days g , PORVs inoperable in to OPERABLE status. MODE 3 with any RCS
~~-cold. leg. temperature .s 365"F (Unit 1),~~
~~s- 301*F (Unit 2), or MODE 4.~~
~~-M RCS vent < 1.3 square inches established.-~~
E. One of two required E.1 Restore required PORV 24 hours lI PORVs inoperable in to OPERABLE status. MODE 5 or 6. M S RCS vent < 1.3 square inches established. F. Required Action and F.1 Depressurize RCS and 48 hours ! associated Completion establish RCS vent Time of Condition D 2 1.3 square inchet. or E not met. f 1 G. . All- required PORVs G.1 Depressurize RCS and 48 hours inoperable.' establish RCS vent of 2 2.6 square inches.
~~.l s - CALVERT~ CLIFFS -UNITS 1 & 2- 3.4.12-4 Revisionpf l~~
et __ - s,-- e - - - <- , . . . - ..m. . . - - - - .- - . _ . - , . -w , = * - . < . ,
LTOP System 3.4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.12.1 Verify a maximum of one HPSI pump is only 12 hours capable of marually injecting into the RCS. l5 SR 3.4.12.2 Verify HPSI loop MOVs are nnly capable of 12 hours manually aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS. I SR 3.4.12.3 Verify required RCS vent is open. 12 hours for unlocked open vent valve (s) C 31 days for locked open ventvalve(s) SR 3.4.12.4 Verify PORV block valve is open for each 72 hours lf j required PORV. ; l l SR 3.4.12.5 -.---.-----..----.N0TE------------------- lf l Not required to be performed until 12 hours ) after decreasing any RCS cold leg lf temperature to s 365'F (Unit 1), s 301*F ; (Unit 2). Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 31 days required PORV, excluding actuation. . I SR 3.4.12.6 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION on each required 24 months lS I PORV actuation channel. j i CALVERT-CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.12-5 Revisiongr
RCS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours M Pressure boundary LEAKAGE exists. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.13.1 Verify RCS Operational LEAKAGE is within 72 hours f H limits by performance of RCS water inventory balance. SR 3.4.13.2 Verify steam generator tube integrity is in In accordance accordance with the Steam Generator Tube with the Steam Surveillance Program. Generator Tube Surveillance Program it CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.13-2 RevisionJf
RCS Specific Activity 3.4.15
~~~f~- _._~~
~~g _. bbbb bb h hbbbh kbbbb bbbbh~~
~~~ !" 200 N--- -~~
~~k .~~
I _. ____._ _. ___ _ ::T- __._ ._ _._._ _.. UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION j _ E 330 _
~~Q T:~~
~~g _._ bL~~
: ::: : :::: i-: :
$bbb3 :::: ___
q_ . y 1oo _ r. s i i t i t kt II g I I ___. _._ _ e : ACCEPTABLE :1, :: y _._ OPERATION __- -
~~- .___. ::___.-__--_ --._ ... - --- _I .- - _ - --~~
~~I i i i ii~~
< so - -t 1iii i i ii q__.__ q_ _ _--__
o Illi Ilhil iIlli illii lil i- 111'~ I-20 so ao so so 70 so 90 100 PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER U FIGURE 3.4.15-1 (page 1 of 1) Reactor Coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Specific Activity Limit Versus Percent of RATED THERMAL POWER With Reactor Coolant il Specific Activity 3, 1.0 nCi/am DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.15-4 Revisiong
l STE-RCS Loops - MODE 2 l 3.4.16 j 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.16 Special Test Exception (STE) RCS Loops - HODE 2 ! I l LC0 3.4.16 The requirements of LC0 3.4.4, "RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 " and 1 the listed requirements of LCO 3.3.1, " Reactor Protective l System (RPS) Instrumentation-Operating," for the Reactor i Coolant Flow-Low, Thermal Margin / Low Pressure, and Asymmetric 11 Steam Generator Transient Functions may be suspended provided:
a. THERMAL POWER s 5% RTP; and

b. The reactor trip setpoints of the OPERABLE Power Level- y High channels are set s 15% RTP.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 2, during startup and PHYSICS TESTS. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. THERMAL POWER not A.1 Open reactor trip Immediately within limit, breakers, l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify THERMAL POWER s 5% RTP. I hour
~~\\ 'CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.16-1 RevisionJ/~~
~~STE-RCS Loops - MODE 2 3.4.16 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued) SURVEILLANCE . FREQUENCY~~
.SR 3.4.16.2 Perform a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 12 hours prior logarithmic and power level neutron flux to initiating monitoring channel. startup or PHYSICS TESTS i
U
'I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1:& 2 3.4.16-2 Revision 0 1 . . . a,_ . . - . . . - - _ 4.,. . . . . . , . - . . , . . . - . _ . . . . - , , . . . . . . _ . . . . . . _ , _ . . . . , _ . - ~ , . _ . .
STE RCS Loops - MODES 4 and 5 3.4.17 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 3.4.17 Special Test Exception (STE) RCS Loops - MODES 4 and 5 LC0 3.4.17 The reactor coolant circulation requirements of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4 " LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled'- may be suspended during the time intervals required: 1) for local leak rate testing of containment penetration number 41 6 pursuant to the requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program; and 2) to permit maintenance on valves located in the conrnon shutdown cooling suction line or on the shutdown cooling flow control valve (CV-306) provided:
a. Xenon reactivity is s 0.1% Ak/k and is approaching g stability;

b. No operations are permitted which could cause reduction of the RCS boron concentration;

c. The charging pumps are deenergized and the charging flow paths are closed; and

d. The SDM requirement of LC0 3.1.1 is verified every 8 hours.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Suspend activities Immediately g requirements of the being performed under Limiting Condition this Special Test for Operation not Exception. met.
~~'l CALVERT-CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.17-1 Revision /~~
RCS Loops - MODE 3 8 3.4.5 BASES RCS Loops - MODE 3 satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3. LCO The purpose of this LCO is to require two RCS loops to be available for heat removal, thus providing redundancy. The LCO requires the two loops to be OPERABLE with the intent of requiring both SGs to be capable (> -50 inches water level) of transferring heat from the reactor coolant at a controlled rate. Forced reactor coolant flow is the , required way.to transport heat, although natural circulation . flow provides adequate removal. A minimum of one running RCP meets the LCO requirement for one loop in operation. Note 1 permits a limited period of operation without RCPs. All RCPs may be not in operation for s I hour per 8 hour 6 period and s 2 hours per 8 hour period for low flow testing. This means that natural circulation has been established. When in natural circulation, a reduction in boron concentration is prohibited because an even concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured. Core outlet temperature is to be mafatained at least 10*F below the saturatiJn temperature so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction. In MODE 3, it is sometimes necessary to stop all RCPs or il shutdown cooling (SDC) pump forced circulation (e.g., to change operation from one SDC train to the other, to perform surveillance or startup testing, to perform the transition to and from SDC System cooling, or to avoid operation below the RCP minimum net positive suction head limit). The time-period is acceptable because natural circulation is adequate for heat removal and the reactor coolant temperature can be maintained subcooled, u
~~-CALVERT CLIFFSL- UNITS 1 &-2 B 3.4.5-2 Revision 4~~
~~- . ~ . _ __ _- _ . _- , _ __ _~~
~~=_ -. . .- ,_- _ _ -. _ - . _ -~~
Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES during. loss of offsite power, as indicated in NUREG-0737 . (Ref.1), is the reason for their inclusion. The requirement for emergency power supplies is based on NUREG-0737(Ref.1). The intent is to keep the reactor coolant in a subcooled condition with natural circulation at hot, high pressure conditions for an undefined, but extended, time period after a loss of offsite power. While loss of offsite power is a coincident occurrence assumed in the accident analyses, maintaining hot, high pressure conditions over an extended time period is not evaluated in the accident analyses.. 4 The pressurizer satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criteria 2 and 3. LCO The LCO requirement for the pressurizer to be OPERABLE with water level 2133 inches and s 225 inches ensures that a < steam bubble exists. Limiting the maximum operating water level preserves the steam space for pressure control. The LCO has been established to minimize the consequences of potential overpressure transients. Requiring the presence of a steam bubble is also consistent with analytical assumptions. The LC0 requires two banks of OPERABLE pressurizer heaters, each with a capacity 2 150 kW and capable of being powered p from an emargency power supply. The minimum heater capacity y required is sufficient to maintain the RCS near normal operating pressure. By maintaining the pressure near the ' operating conditions, a wide subcooling margin to saturation can be obtained in the loops. The generic value of 150 kW is derived from the use of 12 heaters rated at 12.5 kW each. The amount needed to maintain pressure is dependent on the ambient heat losses. n
~~.CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2~ B 3.4.9-3 Revisionf . + , _ .,- - - - + ,m.,.~~
~~Pressurizer i B 3.4.9~~
. BASES APPLICABILITY The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatest effect on RCS temperature-resulting in the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus, Applicability has been ,
designated for MODES 1 and 2. The Applicability is also 1 previded for MODE 3. The purpose _is to prevent solid water RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoit rapid pressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, such as reactor coolant pump startup. The LC0 does not apply to MODE 5 (Loops Filled) because LCO 3.4.12, " Low Temperatere Overpressure frotection (LTOP) System," applies. The LC0 does not apply to MODES 5 and 6 with partial loop operation. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is the need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters capsble of being powered - from an emergency power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditioni, of these MODES gives the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended period. For MODE 4, 5 or 6, it is not necessary to control pressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat t transfer. When the Shutdown Cooling System.is in service, this LC0 is not applicable. - ACTIONS A.i and A.2 With pressurizer water level not within the limit, action must be taken to restore the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 3, with the reactor trip breakers open. within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. This takes the plant out of the applicable MODES and restores the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses. Six hours is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. Further pressure and temperature reduction to MODE 4 brings CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.9-4 Revision 0
Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES _ _ _ i the plant to'a MODE where the LCO is not applicable. The - 12 hour time to reach the nonapplicaule MODE is reasonahle : based on operating experience for that evolution.. M i If one required bank of pressurizer heaters is inoperable, restoration is required within 72 hours. The Completion-Time' of 72 hours is reasonable considering that a demand caused by loss of offsite power would be.unlikely in this period. Pressure control may be maintained during this time using normal station powered heaters. , C.1 and C.2 4 If one required bank of pressurizer heaters is inoperable and cannot be restored within the allowed Completion Time of . Required Aci. ion B.1, the plant must be brought-to a MODE in I which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve ~this status, the plant must be brought to MODE.3 within 6 hours and to MODE 4 within 12 hours. The Completion Time of 6 hours .: reasonable, based on operating. experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging safety systems. Similarly, the Completion Time of 12 hours is reasonable, based on operating experience to reach MODE 4 i from full power to an orderly manner and without challenging l plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance _ ensures that during steady state operation, pressurizer water level is maintained below the , nominal upper limit to provide a minimum space for a steam bubble. The Surveillance is performed by observing the-indicated -level. ' The 12 hour interval has been shown by operating practice to be sufficient to' regularly assess the . CALVERT' CLIFFS - UNITS l'& 2 B 3.4.9-5 Revision 0 p V
Pressurinr , B 3.4.9 l BASES . level for any deviation and verify that cper!. tion is within . safety analyses assumptions. Alarms are also available for early detection of abnormal level indications. ' SR 3.4. M The Surveillance is satisfied when the power supplies are demonstrated to be capable of producing the minimum power and the associated pressurizer heaters are verified to be at . their design rating. (This may be done by testing the power supply output and by performing an electrical check on heater element continuity and resistance.) The Frequency of 24 months is considered adequate to detect heater degradation and has been shown by operating experience to be
~~-acceptable.~~
REFERENCES 1. NUREG-0737. II.E.3.1, November 1980 CAU *RT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.9-6 Revision 0 1 [ -
1 Pressurizer PORVs B 3.4.11 BASES Therefore, this LCO is applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and NODE 3 with all RCS cold leg temperatures > 365'F (Unit 1), k ] _ > 301'F (Unit 2). The LCO is not applicable in MODE 3 with. all RCS cold leg temperatures s 305'T (Unit 1), s 301*F (Unit 2),whenbothpressureandcoreenergyaredecreased and the pressure surges become much less significant. The PORV setpoint is reduced for LTOP in MODE 3 with T.,, s 365'F (Unit 1), s-301'F (Unit 2) and in MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place. LCO 3.4.12 addresses the PORV regt.irements in these MODES. ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by two Notes. Note 1 clarifies that the pressurizer PORVs are treated as separate entities, 4 each with separate Completion Times (i.e., the Completion 5' Timeisonacomponentbasis). Note 2 is an exception to LCO 3.0.4. The exception to LC0 3.0.4 permits entry into MODES I, 2, and 3 to perform cycling of the PORY or block valve to verify their OPERABLE status. resting is typically not performed in lower MODES. 4 b_d With one or two PORVs inoperable and capable of being manually cycled, either the inoperable PORV(s) must be restored or the flow path isolated within 1 hour. The block valve should be closed but power must be maintained to the associated block valve, since removal of power would render the block valve inoperabic. Although the PORV may be designated inoperable, it may be able to be manually opened and closed and in this n:anner can be used to perform its function. Power operated relief valve inoperability may be due to seat leakage, instrumentation problems, automatic control problems, or other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a possibility for a small break LOCA. For these reasons, the block valve may be closed but the Action requires power be maintained to the valve. This Condition is only intended to pc f t aperation of the plant l (.'
~
~~ll CALVERT.CLIFFSJ- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.4.11-4 Revision / 1 f~~
~~. 6.-.. .- -#.... e . .~ r ~_.u_ _ . ' , . , - - __,_.,m., _y . _ , , , . - - . . - - . - _ _~~
Spotub 343 : INSERT ACTION C C. NOTE C.! Initiate action to restore immediately Required Action C.2 shall be Parameter (s) to within completed whenever this limits. conditionis entered. -.
?m Require acots met . C.2 Determine RCS is Prior to entering MODE 4 any time in other MODE acceptable for continued I, 2, 3, or 4. operation.
k (,7,4 3.,(,4S fo-Ogg $ p.y z J S
S p e c [F '. , % 4 .'. - 7. 4 . 3 INSERT ACTION C 4 C. NOTE C.1 Initiate action to restore immediately Required Action C.2 shall be Parameter (s) to within completed whenever this limits. condition is entered. AMD Requirements o not met C.2 Determine RCS is Prior to entering MODE 4 any time in othe nMODE acceptable for continued 1, 2, 3, or 4. operation. L M.3caa~,r_q,,,,.o. e W' i 9 1 g y 2 oF 3
Spu:. G Ao- Lh4 3.4 #4,4 REACTOR COOLANT SY5TEK cs RC5 Lmps - MobE5 1 anj A.I
~~,14. : . :- caat r u= = rtr ~~ -: = ==~ - =~~
~~3,q NON~~
~~~~ r n~~
LC o / 4 ' !.E (Txo'---Yeactor coolant loops sM " -~+^- oooladtws-in-each 7,q loop shall beg in operation. gy 4 .'2.
~~
~~APPLICA81LITYi MODES 1 and C Acri.o g7, .o.. . . m...<..,....m_......m_.~~
~~. .,. . . .. . . 6.f..r+ -.,__2 _~~
~~5 ~d. *..$ [. ,~~
^* d n,i A *Per4 % be in at least NOT STANDBY within hourCE) 'h $URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ER W The abve required reactor coolant loops shall be verified to be 34Al in operation : ' e' rh:; nr^- ::: Mat at least once per 12 hours.
~~g_ _i ( ba* db h S: !; :td S:t 5::;;ti:n 2.10.2. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. 169 b M~~
~~$p ec. J .+* *<o , 3. 4 . t 3,4 .-4/+r+ REACTOR C00 LAM SYSTDI (kC Y) u-= -~ _~~
_ _ _ . . _ _ _ -wutani cIMcuuu run a 3 4.k M < LC.O D 3g4 -1 A .1.k k ? actor coolant I ps : d h t' ::stoe-eeelert m . in-eash g b.
I
~~%grshall beg operatier..~~
APPLICABILITY: McLES 1 and Q ~ V - - = M~TIOh! a ,, . m.6 ,_. 6.. . u. . m _1..,__m ____ __ ___, 47 A l'Esi=, E iiit fiassiersiimiriiti;inE '"',_ - -_ _ ,_"5:3"'= ~ 6 -
*'" "*d5 oI O +s -m r +f .
~~SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDIENTS~~
~~,L I SR 3,4 *4~~
~~g i.0.1.1- The above required reactor coolant loop; shall be verified to be in operation rd :'--mt; -^r*- :::!=t at least once per 12 hours.~~
bui% (oad4re n forO p d SW 0;n':1 i n t C ;.,^i = 3.10.3.- A,] C/.LVERT CLIFFS . UNIT 2 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. 149 O pose I.C 1
l l Spu@t.ab 3.i.9 f
'34 9fe4 R ECTOR COOLANT SYSTE 0/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER __ -c_= 'O & [Ju of h.% .g LIMITING CONDITI0li FOR OPERATION S4k b N
[Sv4,4 The Pressurizer shall be OPERABLE C'- - "- ' --' : '1with a. b. 1 least 150 kw of pressurizer heater capacity capable of being sr plies by rgency power. .The pressurizer level shall De maintained within an 1 h operating band between 133_and 225_ inches pucept n.n 6nrew un ,y v v v. irc vy. iny .no ic6uwwn inow u ses en 25 GPH. If three c ing d - pump e operating and letdown flow less than 25 GPM pres rizer level shal e limited to betweea 133 an 10 inches, c
~~44. 3 3PPLICABILITY: MODES 1 f Ng j----. m . c;, pe y ,,,--3,Twithin 72 hours or be in at~~
~~}gj' '~~
~~C least NOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in *!0T-SHUTD0'5 . within the followir.g 12 hours.~~
/k b '% With the pressurizer )the~f te 'acae iMe. be in at least NOT A STANDBY with the reai: tor trip breakers open within 6 hours r.d in N0T SHUTDOWN-within he fellowing.6. hours _. _
~~ml [k d' ^ l '~~
~~$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS N 4,4,4 The pressurizer water level shall be detemined to be within the 3.49,) above band at least once per 12 hours.~~
M-5 ft 34.9{ Me r'. c ,es k sf <*.h a y'.es k 6,A & PN'iW L-li e.: >, gp W, ( M *OS . CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4 9 Amendment No. 188 l
- -.- _ - - ~ -. - - . . _ - . . . . - - _ . - _ - - . . . .
~~h t'c t I tce ti uo 14.S a O 3/4,4 REACTOR C001AEI SYSTDI C-~~
~~3. 4 _~~
~~-3/4,4,4 PRES $1NtIZER =- =-~~
3*4 ' 3 h.Lh . F L *=A *'s Leo LIMITIM C0WITI0Il FOR SPERATION --I ~'_ Ou . M' The pressurizar shall be OPERABLEY2 c'r- T-'"2 and with least 150 kw of pressurizer heater capact'iy capsoie or peinghupplied by -- I
~~a. -.~~
~~smeroency m er. The pressurizer level shall be maintained within an~~
b. -' operating and between 133 and 213 inchesg 6.p6 . . .;;, tr, charging-re ope Ing and letoown isow n ~ . inen 25 GPM. I roe chargi N
~~pups operating and letdown is less than 25 pressurizer vel . . .~~
~~.shall limited ta ha+i.===a H3 -naf 210 inctiesa g X~~
~~APPLICABILITY: IIDDES 1p2 _~~
~~- /\c oy sum, o r;..w.,m ca y~~
~~s.g=q _~~
~~, v.- w -e - - - " 8 pressurizer noperable i: '3 #4*"** * *h x ;;;;t'; - . ,,,,,,~~
~~Ac noW Q"'EE'I.5...b p...r.. l a au-~~
~~. 'S.,E , .b5'..,I5"t'hn Y witfiin the next 6 hours and-4a 80ZJIHRDelAl i 72 hours or be in at heast IIOT ustiu ST 19u-, _~~
~~ACd %, With theBYpressurize otheawis:~~
~~' .:ke:r;ih, be within in at least 110T~~
~~6 5 TAW with the rea 110T SWTD0lel within tor trip brea following o hours.~~
~~rs open 6 hours and in~~
~~= g_- _;_, _~~
SURVEILLANCE REQllIRDIEllTS D 4-4 t The pressurizer water level shall be detemined to be within the 349I above band at least once per 12 hours. _~ _ _ , = _ - _ d r. P.y c poes4 y =I * .c4 cegu,) e 4 Q ,p
~~"""~~~~
3.g , 9,7 pr% o,.2.,c ( ,,, 4 ,,, , ,,: ggg , v m 24$. e L, M.'"2. l l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 165 l l
~~. , , , , . . , , , , , c~~
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.4.9 - PRESSURIZER , TECIINICAL CHANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS LA.1 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.4.9 requires the pressurizer to be Operable with a steam bubble. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.8 LCO will require the pressurizer to be Operable, but not require the pressurizer to have a steam bubble. This requirement will be moved to the Bases of Section 3.4.9. Throughout the ITS, the Bases usually describes the contents of the system and the requiremena for Operability. This requirement can be adequately cot. trolled in the Bases which require change in accordance with the Bases Control Prograr.i in ITS Section 5.0. This approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and provides for a more appropriate change control process. The level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the requirement a steam bubble to exist in the pressurizer. Furthermore, NRC and Calvert Cliffs resomces associated with processing license amendments to these requirements will be reduced. This change is a less restrictive movement ofinformation change with no impact on safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. LA.2 Not used. l TECIINICAL CIIANGES LESS RESTRICTIVI L.1 Current Technical Specification 3.4.4 Action a allows a 72-hour Completion Time to restore an emergency power source that supplies the required pressurizer heaters. If the heaters are inoperable for any other reason, CTS Action B requires the unit to sh. uown. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.9 allows a Completion Time of 72 hours for the pressurizer heaters regardless of the cause for the inoperability. Therefore, this change essentially increases the Completion Time from a shutdown track to 72 hours when the pressurizer heaters are inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable emergency power source. This time is reasonable considering that a demand caused by a loss of offsite power would be unlikely in this period. Also, pressure control can be maintained during this period with the norma! station powered heaters and the one train still capable of being powered by an emergency power source. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.2 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.4.4 requires pressurizer water level to be between 133 inches and 225 inches, except when three charging pumps are running and letdown flow is less than 25 gpm. In this case, pressurizer level is limited to between 133 inches and 210 inches, improved Technical Specifications 3.4.9 will not include the requirement limiting pressurizer level to between 133 inches and 210 inches when three charging pumps are running and letdown flow is less than 25 gpm. Calvert Cliffs can never be in this shuation during normal operations. If Calvert Cliffs had three charging pumps running with less than 29 gpm letdown flow, the plant would be in an accident condition per the accident analyses. Tims, there are operating restrictions and plant alarms which prevent the plant from purposely entering this condition. Therefore, this statement is not needed in the Technical Specifications since it allows operation which is beyond the L.CO. Deleting an Operating rcatriction from Technical Specificaticas constitutes a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.4.9-2 Revisior. I1
= 5pn4c a.~ 3i4.IO' j .i INSERT APPLICABILITY NOTE i
NOTE-. . 1 The lift settings are not required to be within Limiting Condition'for Operation limits during I . MODE 3 >365 F for the purpose of =inng the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot) j conditions.- This exception is allowed for 36 hours following entry into MODE 3 >365 Fi ~
~
~~provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup. t I~~
~~.-.l I~~
J t i L t i E-yy - mm . - . .. .r . , .e -.r. . = . . + - . . ~,.. .4..w - y. .., ,
fpebCeihas S Al. I o
~~-INSERT APPLICABILITY NOTE ~~~
4 - NOTE--- -- The lift settings are not required to be within Limiting Condition for Operation limits during ] d-0 MODE 3 >365 F for the purpose of setting the pressurizer safety valves under ambient (hot)' conditions.LThis exception is allowed for 36 hours following entry into MODE 3 >365 F
~~. provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup, i~~
~~s t g :~~
.~
~~l Spc,b4w 3 . 4 . 11~~
~~'I 4/4,4 REACTM C00UlHT SYSTDI.~~
34 -_ s g l't.0.0 RELIEF VALVES ]Jg g r LDEITING C01 BITIN POR OPERATION
# 4.4.3. Two r thet 34 M valves shal be brated LE. relief valves,(PORVs g; gg ygg APPLICABILITY: IISBES 1 2. and 3 . 7* --- .b _
~~l TWi+9s~4 sd~~
~~=T =~~
A rtus A C .H' or both P0,1V(s)# h as excessive nt Ix'_;_. within 1 hour (Q c1 the associated block valvejs) and maintain power to the block valve (s). gg j ,j j ,; ,g , j g , p[Qj
%'_With one PORY ino rable i : ^ :..n. :t r f i n::::t. R J Acrum B 2rt ':l:;;. wit in 1 hour ther restore the PORY to OPERABLE status or close the associa d block valve and remove power " rom ghe block valve: restore t PORY to OPERABLE status within@
Acou F i ._!!: 0 , 5 days or be in T STAND 8Y within the next hours , M Land at or below 365'F mithi n the following hours.. E With both PORVs fnoperable k- '- " - "-- - --'-- 4 "'* *# 0 ~
."""" nt 1 ":;:. within 1 hour either restore one PORY to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove r from the block valve restore one PORV to OPERABLE status ithin@evfp1MruMP 72 hours or be in NOT stale 8Y within the Acreen p xt hours and at or below 365'F within the following i
~~d. fWith one or both block valve (s) inoperable, within 1 hour restore PA , . .~~
b'*# 5 the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV( in override el Restore at least one block valve to 444 0F E status within 2D72 hours if both block valves are inoperable restore anyJema ning inoperable block valve to SPERABLE status within(Die 4Mwm 5 days; othentise, be in at
A y,,g least 110T STAIIDtY within the next rs and at or below 365'F A-p within the following urs. Ask
~~% The provisions of Spec ation 3.0.4 are not applicable. l m, - _.~~
~~A.& h (DO II~~
~~. [Ns a Marri ' gAboveus3 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 e.. = =.: a =e= r:.:.: mum 3/4 4-7 g~~
Amend.aent No.188
i Tp *e s6 I 3.4. t I z.4 w m m c00 = m m c g 3,4,i[ =:l0.0.: RELIEF VALVES IMit'- (d*f_i_Wyf] Ge (foAvs[) y unnu c0mma = *Euna - t_c o
~~,2*4~~
~~Il 4:ct Two valves shal rb. rated relief valves 4 j.( s)hnd s A mi-J dJ: ===ne4=+s G p M@a>A~~
~~a. Ifous e A Y,. (W \~~
APPLICABILITY: MDE5 y, ACTION: [ Q~,}.;j j ((k,((, 2 9 L- \ M ' or both PORV s Mash net 'nNd;i within 1 hour A g.* g[the cl associate [ lock valve (s) and _ maintain power to the_ _ _ block valve (s). f, j g ; j AcT tohl . ith one PORY t rtble ... t: : 90: ttr tr.; :=ne;; . i - - -- G ===l i ^ - . wit in I hour eith restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated ock valve and remove power AcitF oM h the" block valve; restore the to OPERABLE status within
~~. ;.., 5 days or be in NT ANDBY within the next hours A, and at or below 301*F within he following hours. j .~~
h ith both PORVs inoperable ... G ....n nnwr so.n mn.;m Ac6og m --? '--"- . within 1 hour either restore the PORVs to GPEllABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove r from the block valve: restore one PORY to OPERABLE stetus g sou ithi -- O 6L72 hours or be in NOT STANDBY within the p t nd at or below 301*F within the following l
d. its one or both block valve (s) inoperable, within 1 hour restore 'A Act toms the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated c, 4 E PORV(s) in override closed. Restore at least one block valve *.o OPERABLE status within@ltARHO 72 hours if both block valves are .
noperables restore a ining inoperable block valve to fag PERABLE status within 5 days; othentise, be in at ' p least NOT STANDBY within the next hours and at or below 301'F l within the following rs. @ Acw w$ % The provisions of Spectf cation 3.0.4 are not applicable. e NoTtt Way o.\J Jc5 c lJ f y 4<-py_-#,,] Mo.n ed to Q d
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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-7 Amendment No. 178 p o, y I oF 2
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES j SECTION 3.4.11 - PRESSURIZER PORVs ADMINISTRATIVE CIIANGES A.1 The proposed change will refonaat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Speci0 cations, with no change of intent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, the Technical Specifications should be more easily readable and, therefore, understandable by plant operators, as well as other users. During the Calvert Cliffs ITS development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional information may also have been added to more fully describe each LCO and to be consistent with NUREG-1432. However, the additional information does not change the intent of the current Technical Specifications. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process involves no technical changes to existing Specifications. A.2 Current Technical Specification 3.4.3 Applicability footnote
contains a reference that below 365'F (30l*F for Unit 2) the LTOP Technical Specification applies. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.11 deletes this reference. In general, the ITS does not reference other Specifications. In this case, the Applicability for this Specification and the LTOP Specification are precise enough so that no confusion should exist as to which Technical Specification applies. Deletion of this unwarranted reference cons'itutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
A.3 Not used. A.4 Current Technical Specification 3.4.3 requires the Specification to be applicable in Modes 1 and 2, and Mode 3 above 365 F (above 301*F for Unit 2). Improved Technical Specification 3.e.11 specifies that in Mode 3 the Specification be apolicable with all RCS cold leg temperatures > 365'F (> 301 F for Unit 2). This change is administrative because this is consistent with current Calvert Cliffs practice. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. A.5 Current Technical Specification SR 4.4.3.1.a requires each PORV to be demonstrated Operable by performance of a Channel Functional Test in accordance with Table 4.3-1, item 4. Table 4.3-1, item 4 provides the Surveillance Requirements for Pressurizer Pressure
- High reactor trip. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.4.11.1 requires a Channel Functional Test of each PORV. Cmrent Technical Specification SR 4.4.3.1.a has been revised to be consistent with ITS SR 3.4.11.l; the reference to Table 4.3-1, item 4 has been deleted. This proposed change is an administrative change, because a Channel Functional Test of each PORV will be required to be performed in accordance with ITS SR. 3.4.11.1, and the Channel Functional Test for the pressurizer pressure - high reactor trip will be required to be performed in accordance with ITS SR 3.3.1.4 for item 4 of Table 3.3.1-1. In addition to the justification provided above, this proposed change is consistent with NUREG 1432.
A.6 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.4.3 does not specify a method for tracking allowable out of service times. Note I for the Actions of JTS LCO 3.4.11 states that separate condition entry is allowed for each PORV. This note provides a trethodology for tracking Completion l Times. It allows the Conditions and Completion Times te be entered and tracked separately for each inoperable PORV. In the ITS, once a Condition has been entered, the subsequent l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.11-1 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.4.11 - PRESSURIZER PORVs discovery of another inoperable component expressed in the Condita 'oes not result in separate entry into the Conditia, unless specifically stated. The Reque I Actions would continue to apply to each additional failure, with Completion Times base on initial entry into the Condition. In the case of an inoperable PORV, the initial actiom for ITS 3.4.11 l Actions A, B, and C are required to be completed within one hour. If during this time, the second PORV becomes inoperabic, very little time (less than one hour) would be permitted to take the initial action for the second inoperable PORV in the event separate condition entry was not explicitly allowed. Also, this time would be more limiting than: a) the initial Completion Time permitted by ITS Action A (i.e., one hour) in the event both PORVs were concurrently discovered to be inoperable, but capable of being manually cycled; and b) the initial Completion Times permitted by ITS Actions D and E (i.e., one hour) in the event both PORVs are discovered to be inoperable. Thus, a note permitting separate condition entry for each PORV has been added to CTS LCO 3.4.3. This clarification is necessary due to the reformatting of the requirements contained in the ITS. This change is perceived as the intent of the Actions of CTS 3.4.3. Thus, this proposed change is considered be an administrative change, because it does not involve a technical change to the CTS. TECIINICAL CIIANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Current Technical Specification 3.4.3 Actions b and d require the one inoperable PORV and block valve, respectively, to be restored to Operable status within 121 hours; and Actions e and d require one of two inoperable PORVs and block valves, respectively, to be restored to Operable status within 73 hours. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.11 Actions B, C, D, and E will reduce the time allowed to restore the PORVs and block valves to Operable status by one hour. Reducing the allowed outage time constitutes a more restrictive change. The change does not adversely affect plant safety. The change is consistent with NUREG-1432. M.2 Current Technical Specification 3.4.3 Actions b, c, and d shutdown requirements require the unit to be in Mode 3 within 12 hours and temperature to be below 365 F (Unit 1), and 301'F (Unit 2) within 36 hours. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.11 Action F requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and temperature to be below 365 F (Unit 1), and 301'F (Unit 2) wi'hin 12 hours. This change reduces the time allowed to be in Mode 3, and Mode 3 with temperature below 365 F (Unit 1) and 301 F (Unit 2). Reducing the shutdown times constitutes a more restrictive change. The change does not adve sely affect plant safety because the plant is still capable of shutting down in a safe and orderly manner. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. M.3 Improved Technical Specification SR 3.4.11.3 was added to CTS 3.4.3. The added SR will require the PORVs to be cycled once per 24 months. This SR is required to demonstrate that the PORVs ftmetion. The addition of new requirements to Technical Specifications constitutes a more restrictive change. This change will not detrimentally affect safety because it proves the PORV can perform its function. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. [ TECIINICAL CIIANGES - RELOCATIONS None CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.11-2 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.4.11 - PRESSURIZER PORVs TECilNICAL CIIANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS LA.1 Not used. TECHNICAL CHANGES - 1 FRS RESTRICTIVE L.1 Actions a, b, and c of CTS 3.43 provide the required actions in the event one or two PORVs are inoperable. Action a provides the actions for one or two inoperable PORVs due to excessive seat leakage, and Actions b and c address one or two inoperable PORVs for causes other than excessive seat leakage, respectively. Actions A, B, and D ofITS 3.4.11 provide the required actions in the event one or two PORVs are inoperable. Action A provides the actions for one or two inoperable PORVs that are capable of being manually cycled. Actions B and D provide'the actions for one or two inoperable PORVs that are incapable of being manually cycled, respectively, ne CTS have been revised to reflect the ITS methodology for addressing PORV inoperability. These proposed changes are considered to be a less restrictive change, because they appear to broaden the applicability for Action a of CTS 3.4.3 and narrow the range of appi;eability for Actions b and e of CTS 3.4.3 Actually, excessive seat leakage is an example of an inoperable PORV which does not prevent the PORV from being manually cycled, the excessive seat leakage results in a PORV being inoperable,just as other conditions result in the PORVs being inoperable. Thus, this change could be interpreted as meeting the intent of the CTS. Action a of CTS 3.4.3 has been revised to be applicable when one or both PORVs are . inoperable and the applicable PORVs are capable of being manually cycled. In the event this occurs, the inoperable PORV can be manually opened and closed to perform its function. Thus, the PORV should remain available so that the operators could manually utilize the relief pathway. For this con-lition, the prudent course of action is to close the block valve and maintain power to the block valve. This methodology permits the operators to have relatively quick access to the PORV for pressure control. If the power were removed from the block valve, additional operator actions would be required to manually utilize the pathway. Therefore, the proposed change to Action a of CTS 3.4.3 is acceptable. Actions b and c of CTS 3.4.3 have been revised to be applicable when the PORVs are inoperable end the valve is not capable of being manually cycled. In this case, the PORV cannot be used manually for pressure control, and t'ie condition of the PORV may be uncertain. Thus, the prudent course of action is to secure the PORV by closing the block valve, and r, vide additional assurance that the PORV is isolated by removing power from the valves. AAons b and c of CTS 3.4.3 require these actions, and they also require the PORVs to be restored w an Operable status. Thus, the proposed changes to Actions b and c of CTS 3.4.3 are acceptable. In addition,-at Cn! vert Cliffs, the PORVs are not credited in the accident analyses for overpressure protection during Modes 1,2, and 3 with the RCS cold leg temperature greater than the enable temperature for the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System. In these Modes and specified conditions, the pressurizer safety valves are the mechanism credited for overpressure mitigation. Rese proposed changes are consistent with NUREO-1432. m
~~.CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.11-3 Revision 1I~~
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.4.11 - PRESSURIZER PORVs L.2 Current Technical Specifications require the TORV CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST (CFT) to be performed every 31 days, in sccordance with CTS Table 4.3-1, Item 4. Improved Technical Specifications will decrease the Surveillance Frequency to 92 days. The PORV actuation-instrumentation is the same, as that used for the RPS High Pressurizer Pressure Function, described in CTS Table (3-1. Item 4. The RPS High Pressurizer Pressure Function CFT Surveillance frequency was decreased from 31 days to 92 days in the RPS and ESFAS "me Aly to quarterly" Technical Specification change (approved in an NRC Safety Evaluation neport for Amendments 193 and 170 for Units 1 and 2, respectively, dated August 24,199< . In this report, the NRC stated that Calvert Cliffs had to satisfy three requirements necessary to extend the CFT Frequency. These requirements were: a) the licensee must confirm that they have reviewed instrument drift information for each channel involved; b) have to determine that drift occurring in that channel over the period of extended surveillance test interval would not cause the setpoint value to exceed the Allowable Value as calculated for that channel by the licensee's methodology; and c) should have onsite records of the as-found and u-left values showing actual calculations and . supporting data for planned future NRC audits. The NRC further stated that Calvert Cliffs met these three requirements and could extend the CFR Frequency from 31 days to 92 dayt for certain instruments, including the High Pressurizer Pressure Function. Calvert Cliffs has evaluated this instrumentation as it relates to the PORV opening setpoint ensured that it meets the three requirements listed above. Since the PORV actuation and the High Pressurizer Pressure High Trip Setpoint share the same instrumentation and the signal that actuates the PORV is pnerated from the same portion of the instrument that actuates the RPS, this change is acceptable. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.11-4 Revision 11
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~~,LIMITI M CO SITI M FOR OPERATI M (Continued) 1~~
2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure l-, 5 above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4.9-1 or Figure 3.4.9-2. d ,

3. If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in accordance p, with. Specification 3.4.9.1.
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4.4.9.3.1 Each PORY shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by: L.3 SR a. Perfomance of a CNamtL FMCTIONAL TEST,,on the PORV actuation
% 4, r2, 6- chann.1. but excludina valve coeratjongwlthinji days prier'to (fnterp(~4 conditiopfffwhich the rung is p qlitred OPE ** W mad b. 3 at ... 6 vns per n days theresTrer m .. tne runs is required OPERABLE.
g 3 A 2. 6 b. Performance of a CNAMEL CALIBRATIM on the PORY actuation channel at least once per REFUELIM INTERVAL. l
N c. Verifying the PORY block valve is open at least once per 72 hours 'T . 4 . I'1. 4-l when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.
Testi p Tn accordance ure'Jant to Specif htheinservice/(s'treqairene ion 4.0.57 , - A ,4 The RCS vent (s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 4.4.9.3.l 12 hours hen w the vent (s) is being used for overpressure protection. 3 4.12 ,3 4.4.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at leasi once per 12 hours. gv ying rical 6 snu m er sunoly 7vrcuits a rcu . . . no n verifyina
~~. nue,vec Tras ir discharge cir ves are ~ ~ p i~~
t The automatfE~opentifg feature of the high pressum amish - 5 6 L'l. I l* k , njection oop MOVs shall be verified disabl.ed at least once ner 12 hours. k b* g' g ,q,)L, g . The above OPERABLE pump shall be verifiedyve its hydswitch ingj (t" := nMeast once per 12 hours. __ V* * . C y ~ . ~ ~ r en @n ! Os~ ,o . 6 c. p. t.: e .y . y. &, $ e n 4 s. + 4 c. Q c,3 . . . , p., r2 Ly,, , ., gQ. - %. m
. Exce t when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise securef h 4. I'2.3 in t e open position, then verify these vent pathways open at least once per 31 days, a 3 , a E , 3 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-35 [ Ame ho ~ ,
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~~3/4.4 REACTOR C00LAllT SYSTEM g LIMITIl1G C01SITIO11 FOR OPERATIO11 (Contissed)~~
2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure- L.5" above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4.9-1 or Figure 3.4.9-2.
\ 3. If a pressure limit was exceeded, take action in acctrdance with Specification 3.4.9.1. - -kr-The-provisions - Srif!cet!= 3.0.' := =t :;;"::Q. _ _ i ~ ~ ~-- -
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~~a. formance of a CHAllllEL FUNCTICIIAL TEST on the snow metuation 14~~
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(6tega condittsfrin which tWV_ is rgetfired OPERABLE l.. et sus >6 anse per .n usia 6-. uer unen sne nmv is required OPERABLE.
~~, g)' 4 b. Performance of a CHANilEL CALIBRATION on the PORY actuation .M""'~~
~~channel at least once per REFUELillG IIITERVAL. l SR~~
3. 4. Q * 'l c. Verifying the PORY block valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORY is being used for overpressure protection.

d. ~T ng in accord ith the ins ursuant to Spe cation 4.0.5 2
.ypef6 test reqS$febeng /, - \,, #4 g,4'q*3 The RCS vent shall be veriffeo to be open at least once per 4.4.9.3.)
12 hours w hen the ventis being used for overpressure protection. 4.4'.9.3.3 All high pressure safety injection pumps, except the above OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperabic at least once per 12 hours by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power tr_euitLor_)y.JeI1fying_theirdischargevalvesare lo A g' 3,gg,1 .me+ no su Tc open Vs shall be v
~~' feature of the high pressuT51fE ed disabledA1 least encoefer_1? hou C~~
q The above OPERABLE pump shall be verified to have its handswitch inliuT1-SM, 4. l t . I to-lock at least once per 12 hours. Var. C f = . . ~ w f on, u pg , P*~p h e-e tale. .r ,. ),. m 9q %e EC51 % e. ,, s '2 c, , , , /J 3,q,iy,- Exce t when the vent pathway is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in t e o position, then verify these vent pathways open at least G *d nce per days. #"WD') P .b CALVERT C'.!FFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-3 % Jme nt B M g Pbop@MD Va@c
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'24 hou'rs when required by ACTION 3.4.6.1.b. except when operating gg .in,the shutdown cooling mode, and "h"* 'd r vesitT~heau cio seal Leakage Dete mniwring tne re[ac Syst'em at least o per 24 hours.
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CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-20 Amendment No. 188 l g y. 2.3 3
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~~b. Mor.1 oring the cont nt sump rpe fre uency a east once hours, ontat ump Level Alarm em is /~~
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L g A CALVERT, CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4 20 Amendment No. 165 l poy 2 00 3
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.4.I5 - RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.1 The proposed change will reformat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Specifications, with no change of intent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, the Technical Specifications should be more easily readable and, therefore, understandable by plant operators, as well as other users. During *he Calvert Cliffs ITS development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional information may also have been added to more fully describe each LCO and to be consistent with NUREG-1432. However, the additional infmation does not change the intent of the current Technical Specifications. 'lle reformattug, renumbering, and rewording process involves no technical changes to existing Specifications. IECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE None TECHNICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS None TECHNICAL CHANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS LA.1 Not used. l TECHNICAL CHANGU - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.1 Current Technical Specification 3.4.8 (RCS Specific Activity) Modes of Applicability are Modes 1,2,3,4, and 5. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.15 Modes of Applicability are Modes I and 2, and Mode 3 with T,y,2 500 F. This change is acceptable because when operating in Mode 3 with RCS T,y, < 500 F and in Modes 4 and 5, the release of radioactivity during a SG tube rupture is unlikely since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure settings of the main steam safety valves. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.2 Current Technical Specification 3.4.8 SR Table 4.4-4 Item I requires a gross activity determination at least once per 72 hours. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.15 SR 3.4.15.1 will decrease the Frequency from 72 hours to 7 days. This change is acceptable because the results of previous analyses are trended, which allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching @e LCO limit. Therefore, based on this trending program, it is very unlikely that a gross 4ailure could occur during this time without prior indication. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.3 Current Technical Specification 3.4.8 SR Table 4.4-4 Item 4.b requires the Dose
' EquivalentI-131 specific activity be verified in Modes 1,2, and 3. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.15 SR 3.4.15.2 adds a Note which only requires the SR to be performed in Mode 1. This change will delete the Modes 2 and 3 requirements for this Surveillance. This CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.15-1 Revision i1
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.4.15 - RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY j is acceptable because the level of fission products gererated in Modes 2 and 3 are much less, and fuel failures associated with fast power changes are more apt to occur in Mode 1. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. I L.4 Current Technical Specification 3.4.8 SR Table 4.4 4 Item 3 requires E-Bar to be determined from a sample taken in Mode I after a minimum of 2 Effective Fuel Power Days and 20 days of Mode 1 operation have elapsed since the reactor was last suberitical for 2 48 hours. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.15 SR 3.4.15.3 allows the Surveillance to be delayed for 31 days after a minimum of 2 Effective Full Power Days and 20 days of Mode 1 operation have elapsed since the reactor was last suberitical for 2 48 hours. The 31 days ensure the radioactive materials are at equilibrium so the analysis for E-Bar is representative and not skewed by a crud burst or other similar abnormal event. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.5 Current Technical Specification 3.4.8 Action a contains a clause stating that plant operation may continue for up to 100 hours when specific activity of the primary coolant is
> l.0 pCi/ gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4.8-1, provided that operation under these circumstances shall not exceed 10 percent of the units total yearly operating time. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.15 will not contain this clause regarding 10 percent of the units total yearly operating time.
Generic Letter 85-19, Reporting Requirements on Primary Coolant Iodine Spikes, states that requirements to shutdown a plant if coolant iodine activity limits are exceeded for 800 hours in a 12-month period can be eliminated. The quality of nuclear fuel in the decade preceding the generic letter had greatly improved with the result that normal coolant iodine activity (i.e., in the absence of iodine spiking) is well below the timit. Appropriate actions would be initiated long before accumulating 800 hours above the iodine activity limit. In addition,10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requires the NRC to be immediately notified of fuel cladding failures that exceed expected valves or that are caused by unexpected factors. Therefore, this limit is no longer necessary based on proper fuel management and existing reporting requirements < precluding ever approaching the limit. This change is consisten: with NUREG 1432. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.4.15-2 Revision i1 w
RCS P/T Limits 3.4.3 (crs> 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperatc*e (P/T) Limits (3.49 l) LCO3.4.3 RCS pressure RCS temperature', and RCS l etup and cooldown rates shall h sal etained within ne limits gni't: ' 'A: *
~~'I PYtR. . Qp.~~
2- ;. _ _ - - _ . - mm APPLICABILITY: At all times. ; _ p,.r u - - - - - - ,,
~~- De g y.,% 34.y .6 .A ans.y e<a ns" @~~
p 4e m.b. cL.y ,Ln b i s* r i. - .q .* L.* P*I' ACTIONS ~SOM ~^ O-~^ ^ - CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET10N TIME 34.3.1 A. ---------h0T E -------- A.1 Restoreparameter(s) 30 minutes
~~' by Requ' red Action A.2 to within limits. - shall be completed whenever this Condition i M~~
~~t .~~
- -- -------- -- - A.2 Determine RCS is 72 hours 6*!N Pd'h*"
~~accept'hle for 3ll of CO# contir .d operation, not met in MODE 1, 2,~~
~~3. or 4.~~
3,4,e3 g\ B. . Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion . #/ Time of Condition A E not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5 with 36 hours RCS pressure (continued) 5 J CEOG STS 3.4-5 Rev 1, 04/07/95
RCS P/Y Limits 3.4.3 ACTIONS (continued) CONDIT10N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION' TIME C. ------NOT E ------- C.1 Initiate action to immediately Required Action C.2 restore parameter (s) 34'9I shall be completed to within limits. . Acnw whenever this C AllD
~~'"I'h5h of C.2 Determine RCS 1: Prior to A Re . acceptable for entering MODE 4 hl$~~
not met any time in continued operation. other than NX)E 1, t, s 3, or 4. 7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
~~- ------------ NOT E------- ----~~
(4.4.9.l,jh/ SR 3.4.3.1 Only required to be performed during RCS heatup and cooldown operations and RCS inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. Verify RCS pressure, RCS temperature, and 30 minutes RCS heatu;'and coo'idown rate within limits' specified - th "!' F.. in 6 pecs 3.4. 5-\ .a.1 3 4.g- 2. _ h CEOG STS 3.4-6 Rev 1, 04/07/95 J
i RCS Loops-MODES I and 2 (CT.5) 3.4.4
~~. , . . a 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)-~~
~~3.4.4 RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2 3.4.4 Two RCS loops shall be OPERABLE and in operation.~~
~~3.4.l.1)LC0~~
~~-APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.~~
~~ACTIONS ' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME~~
~~'L % cona hon A. Re A.1 Pe in MODE 3. 6 hours l~~
~~SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY~~
~~,4,g, SR 3.4.4.1 Verify each RCS loop is in operation. 12 hours CEOG STS 3.4-7 Rev 1, 04/07/95 i~~
~~INSERT 3.4.5 LCO NOTE 2 renL4ar coolan pum~~
2. No shall be started with any RCS cold leg temperature s 365 F (Unit 1), s g 301 F (Unit 2) unless:

a. the pressurizer water level is s 170 inches, b,
~~the pressurizer pressure is s 300 psia (Unit 1), s 320 psia (Unit h \b~~
~~c. the secondary wa$ter temperature of each steam generator is s 30*F above the RCS temperature.~~
( O O
RCS Loops-MODE 4
'*5 < cts) 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.6 RCS Loops-MODE 4 le o .3 (3. 4.l.h LC0 3.4.6 Two loops e6 consisting of an combination of RCS shall be OPERABLE * ,h .
loops and at and leastshutdown one loop er cooling tr9 (SDC) hall be in operation, c L nd us ..._ . . _ . NOTES - g oN,4 1. All reactor coolant pumps Mnd SDC pumps may@ cewhersize@ for s I hour per 8 hour period, provided: 7'STF'/33( h
a. Nofoperationsarepermittedthatwouldcause

3. 4.1. 3 reduction of the RCS boron concentration; and Ape n w43W A G1

b. Core outlet t erature is maintained at least 10*F ltnrTa atto emperature.
~~mW calz dp 34S 6 0~~
~~2. ed with any RCS cold leg isol 6.A O temperature s f4ag}*F unless:~~
a
~~'g l g 9f[,(; a. Pressurizer water level is 4-{y}s;.# @~~
~~h#, Secondary side ater temperature in each steam generator cold leg temperatures. s *F above each of the RCS 13o lk (. _ _~~
~~- ..._P-~_."^~ acor m ( 4 I g~~
~~APPLICABILITY: MODE 4. N M' AWN)~~
~~~ - -~~
ACTIONS-CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE 34.1.g A. One required RCS loop A.1 Initiate action to Immediately A*4 ^ ^ inoperable, restor a second loop c- t..l.. to OPERABLE NiQ status. Two SDC inoperable. (continued) CEOG STS 3.4 10 Rev 1, 04/07/95
.\
~~RCS Loops-MODE 4 3.4.6 AC110NS (continued) CON 0! TION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME g. (14.1.3~~
~~8. One required 50C inoperable.~~
B.1 Be'in MODE 5. 24 hours h AllD Two required RCS loops inoperable. h C. Required RCS hop or C.1 Suspend all Ismediately - SDC inoperable, operatier.s involvi~- > 3.4.13 loop reduction of RCS M. b 03 boron concentration. No RCS hop or SOC 8tiQ in operation, 1o. c.2 Initiate action to Ismediately e-restore one loop or-M to OPERAELE status and operation. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVE!LLANCE * -
*~ FREQUENCY' (4,4,g,1,p SR 3.4.6.1 Verify one RCS leep-or SDC is in 12 hours operation.
4.44 3,hSR 3.4.6.2 Verifyskcondarysidewaterlevelin 12 hours required Cts) is 4- 2HJ _ E sib 7 Eur (continued) w CEOG STS 3.4-11 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1
~~. RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled 3.4.7 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)- >~~
3.4.7 RCS Loops-MODE 5. Loops Filled (3,4.13) LCO 3.4.7 One shutdown cooling (SOC) shall be OPERABLE and in operation, and either: N 4Ih a. One addittsnal SDC shall be OPERABLE; or Q NEw b. The secondary side v ter_1aval or each steam generator d se. 1A .1 '(SG) rhall betz f28f.# T E_- fo n M _ _ _ S o*c L \
- ~~ ------- S----------NOTES----Gr~. pot m o& +---g--- -
~~h 1S 7/~- / S 3~~
~~1. The SdC pump of the 4eefe in operation say(8e ste_->cervee@ for s I hour per 8 hour period provi : , ,~~
~~(3 4.1.3 b h a. No operations are permitted that would cause reduction of the RCS boron .oncentration; and~~
~~b. Core outlet temperature is maintained.at least 10*F below saturati aperature.~~
~~NEv/ 2. One required SDC may be inoperable for up to~~
m. 3 y1 2 hours for surveillance testing provided that the other o c c. c. 2., SDC i EERABLE and in operation. g g %, 7

3. No reactor c ant pump hall b2 started with siW l
' RCS cold og t res '
~~1A.O unless: 35 h +o AwN wM s~~
~~- w s.+ o~~
~~a. The pressurizer water. level Ts y s;f er The secondary side water temperature in eac~~
~~( no% #~ 03~~
"""'"T above each of the RCS cold 1 e tures. [ *N 4. may C -- a mm operation during 6t** L4 ~1 planned heatup te MODE 4 when at least one RCS loop is o*t t. t- in operation. = - .- x . : . h. If* &s=*its. (ftss.eg is f si APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops filled.
CEOG STS 3.4-13 Rev1,04/07/95
Pressurizer - CTS) 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.9 Pressurizar kg3 3 g,b __
~~,,3~~
~~[3 4. LC0 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:~~
a. Pres ter water level ; and.

b. Two fp capacity of each zer heaters PERA8tE with the^
21150}?kW and capable of be.ingj h powered from ah r.f power supply M k APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Pressurizer water A.1 Be irt MODE 3 with 6 hours level not within reactor trip breakers 3g limit. open. AcA.a b g
~~..2' k in t10CE'4.' ours 3,4A B. One required pressurizar heaters inoperable.~~
of B.1 Restore required scent of pressurizer 72 hours h Ab"A heaters to OPERABLE status.. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion 3'4' 4 Time of condition 8 G Acbo a not met. C.2 Bo in ICOE 4. ur: CEOG STS '3.4-18 Rev 1, 04/07/95 h
~~._ . _ . .. . _ ~.~~
~~Pressurizer Safety Valves 3.4.10~~
/cTh 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves *
(3A2.))LCO 3.4.10 82fT.w.o$_ __essu..riz.er. _sa.fety valve..s.s.ha,ll b.e OPERA 8tE.dth '"t g 4 APPLICA8!LITY: MODES , 2, 3, nm gg (New/ 64 '- MODE with a RCS cold leg tempera 3. t..s. m
~~g. fbc~~
~~,be i - NOTE ?^ - .--~~
The 1ift settings are not required to be withlaMalts g hl during M00Ef 3 for the purpose of setting the pressurizer sa ty valves under ambient 9 This exception s allowed for* intoMODE3proidedaprelimin[367 hours (hot) conditions. following entry ary cold setting was made prior to he up. gg----------- - - - - ACTIONS ~ hS
CON 0! TION REQUIREDACTION COMPLUION TIME 4l2. ) A .~ 'One pressurizer safety A.1 Restore valve to i> .a valve tr. operable. 15 minutes OPERA 8LE status.
~~' m' B. Required Actton and B.1 Be in MODE 3.~~
associated Completion 6 hours Ab Time not met. 8NQ Oft ul / B.2 all- 112dours Two -[e- - e L -- RCScoldleg@ temperatures # pressurizer s:afety s valves inoperable, 9 sc/ Job CEOG STS 3.4-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95 2 s 5
rressurizer PORVs 3.4.11
<ao 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power;0perated Rallef Valves (PORVs) hlk - LC0 3.4.11 POR$nd associated bhck valvghall be OPERABLE.
APPLICA8ILITY: MODES If f g pA ACTIONS pl 4,y fe-punh~ > 3el *f &#'# $ (QO( A.61.... __. _ ___ _.-NOTES ----. Separate Condit4n entry is allowed for each PORY. l J,4,7 Ac{.,,,, e 2. LCO 3.0,4 ?< not appitcable. . l CONDITION REQUIREDACTION COMPLETION' TIME
~~.74.3 A. One or PORVs A.1 Close and maintain 1 hour krua inoperable and capable power to associated of being manually block valve.~~
cycled. B. B.! Close associated 34'I I hour OnePORYinoberable and not capa le of block valve. Ahenb being manually cycled. M B.2 Rewave power from I hour associated block valve.
=
B.3 Restore PORY to OPERABLE status. ff5D JC.Aadr) e!& (continued) CEOG STS 3.4-22 Rev1,04/07/95 .
i LTOP Systes , 3.4.12 (CT3h , 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) Systes ' LC0 3.4.12 An LT Systna sh 11 be OPERA 8LE with a maximum of one high pre vre safety 1 jection (HP$l) pump and.oneichatting pump M "' 6 t_c o % Ll, I'l. M esp ble of fnje ing into the'RC3 cad-the s fety inj 14en t ks ($1T4 1 lated, and'
~~'t h . Two OP LE power rated relle' alves ( .Vs)with~~
~~' DOC g,Q Ilft ttingt G{ prig; or r -~~
~~b. Th RCS depres rized and_ $ vent o~~
~~. . . . FoT E t (1.3] squa inches. C.sn -~~
ob
~~A itk h I_~~
s([ I&p PPLICA81LITY: "M00 y;RCS cold leg temperature ses W i^ b A i J. r oM. 3peu ,0 8 e r s --- - ----- - ut W(.a* D 39 i/4O Dt;; o w.< sa l Xad i m,
. b j n 4,kt rsop .-- --- --NOTE-- ----.
g.1 @ I' lag. ') lg /TI, inn, u en u ensi quires ..... aa preTsuru u = ANi pe/""pd*llL * - than equal to the {RC old leg tempe ure allowed laus RCS re for the ex he P/T limit ng vidad in the p n, ves J ,,
. m % Spoc.feslne b a. F n y p ac l d 4 sJ)wo, f Ons at 'not*
P ACTIONS - N$ JJ. Me Acd _ d' h 8 't S uM}*t. WP.stg,f,'me' of CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME o.v fema.fip Jg --)'Two A. or sure HPSI pumps A.) Initiate action to ! ately
~~^J EM'$ '"/)~~
ig c,5 pf capable of injecting verify a maximum of , _y- into the RC one HPSI pump apable 3,y,9,3 monvull Ns,**D
~~Acbn e _d f_*.^15 .):.. '~~
~~cm J Ao HNr esme s coedalt C Icw~~
~~S's $$) (continued 3 in3 3 9 w nk I~~
^
~~CEOG STS 3.4-26 Rev 1. 04/07/95 s~~
~~.T n3wc4 1. 4.12.~~
~~An LTOP System shall be OPERABLE with:~~
~~e. 4 M . 1. A maximum of one high pressure safety injection (liPSI) pump only capable of~~
~~' d 'i'i'h.~~
manua: injecting into the RCS, and When SI suction is aligned to the Refueling Water Tank the HPSI pump l h ' ' q' 3 J 2. shall be in manual control and either: . a) I! PSI flowlirnited to s 210 gpm,or b) An RCS vent of 2 2.6 square incbes establisM.!; AND .
~~4.e.3.e) b. IIPSIloop moto perated valves (MOVs) only capable of manually aligning HPSI pump lA flow to the RCS 6,4.9. 3.c)~~
~~---- N OTE ------------- -~~
~~liPF' loop MOVs may be capable of automatically aligning IIPSI pump flow to the RCS~~
~~\ d Nok for the purposes of testing.~~
~~AND~~
'g'9 c .Two OPERABLE powQperated relief valves (PORVs), and associated block ib 4 M ;) 1. valves open, with PORVIin settings on or below the curve in Figure 3.4.12-1 when ,
the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System is not in operation and PORV lin settings 4 s 429 psia (Unit 1), s 443 psia (Unit 2), when the'SDC is in operation, or One OPERABLE PORV, and associated block valve open, with PORV lin setting on
~~<3,M.3.a.E)2.~~
A IOr or below the curve in Figure 3.4.12-1 when the SDC System is not in operation and PORV lin utting s 429 psia (Unit 1), s 443 psia (Unit 2 f, when the SDC is in operation; and an RCS vent of t 1.3 square inches established; or f,4,q.3.u,D3. An RCS vent of 2 2.6 square inches established. O b
~~?!,~~
~~e m.f- , }.L_ . .. [ - _ ,- ; ; .. ^ ,3~~
}% .guktto ky mn C .1 xn . n , pI'
~~k. d s ur bHPAt 5 ow ys.1o3 -l,' na 5 h,w k m t~~
6,*/,9. 3 ) ta %H3 wcJu' #$l ' (W 9 I
~~&;,,6p { <La Gl; 2.L :~~
~~5. vw Jr \~~
t, , Os, . or une e 4 Pat Q C., j T n ,' {.,'n(N n e iEas 40 v 't E [' u.4+ o. I I en on e d s'a ] e (y ) A_,4, A_ j f ee p 953 op A>Vs f ( r4 Va wu <* ea *
~ k^+"s"9 c 36 4 o tr.cn vul LTOP Sys.*stes .st g ,$c,,,, , e m e m !~%
(crs q1re ACTIONf'(eniriU64)k xb .' . A s ^ - ' ^ ~1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTICN COMPLETION TIME 1 f~8 ". Two 'or more charging -- -----NOTE----- pumps capable of T charg ne pumps may be injecting into the able o Injecting into the RCS. $ during pump swap
~~..peration for 5 15 minutes.~~
B.! Initiate action to Ismediately verify a maximum one charging p capable of inj ting into the RCS C. A Si not isolated C.! Isolat affected SIT. I hour who SIT ressure is gr ater t an or equal the maximus RCS
~~f. pressure for existing cold leg temperature allowed in the PTLR.~~
D. Required Action and 0.1 Increase PCS cold leg 12 ho s associated Completion temperature to Time of Condition C >(175}'F. not met. ' D.2 Depressurize affecte 12 hours SIT to less shan t maximus RCS press e for existing col leg temperature all in the PTLR. 5 ' uq
~~. One requ red PORY ')~~
~~l Restore required PORY 7 days~~
~~? S,') Q g,, inopertble la MODE 4. to OPERABLE status, p ">~~
~~{ he'& J idik 34 5(s 90 g (continied)~~
~~) Of 3 61 (a. ! n f /~~
~~C.E0G STS 3.4-27 Rev1,04/07/95~~
~~~. .-.~~~
g/
'\
I &a v. 3 < l. 3 c -- (1v-i ,Ju e161 -d. l 1.,_. s. _ .- t
RCS Operational LEAKAGE (CTS) 3.4.13 3.4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ,. (3,4,y,q LC0 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be lleited tos , (3.4.41D8. No Pressure boundary LEAKAGE; (7.46.7,6)b. I gpk unidentified L"AKAGE; Q ,[G .7,<)4 c. 10 gpa identiffed LEAKAGE; k'tt! [ e !. ' # (3. 4,(,.7.hh allons per day primary to secondary 4 AGE ug any on C
}
jpg Mew 9e m kW APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. AC'i!ONS CONDITION REQUIREDACTION COMPLETION TIME G*2 A. RCS LEAKAGE not within A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to 4 hours Af h*a b Ilmits for reasons within Itaits. ether than pressure boundary LEAKAGE. 3.4g,g 8. ReqJired Action and B.1 3 associated Completion Be in MODE 3. 6 hours A' ' A ***" 4 ilme of Condition A NfD not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. QE X nours Pressure teundary LLAKAGE exists. CEOG 515 3.4 30 Rev1,04/07/95 l '
s ACS Operational LEAKAGE 3.4.13 SURVEItLANCE REQUIREMENT $ SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.13.1 ,' ' 4 A4.'2.C ( . _ ___,,.______-_-m dur ng ste y st e ope tion
/%e,ty Ac5 op 6M irAK4 die. gyp, g f s i 6 9 e4LI* jM4 ! )j Pl I*'^" ~
~~A ( A~~
~~ %j 'f%.URCS water inventory balance. 72 hours em SR 3.4.13.2 Ver egrity is in accordance NM with the Steam Generator Tube Survel11ance in accordance with the Steam ld S ue 3 A.t3 Program. Generator Tube Ox, A.3 Surveillance Program CEOC STS 3.4-31 Rev 1, 04/07/95
(
l 1 1 ! l I l j c;t s) STE-RCSLooph 3.4.l b, 3.4 REACTOR C00LMi SYSTEM (RCS) - @6f 1 2 r --- 3.4.V Special Test Exception (STE) RCS Loops * ,d 3 prJ, {Up9 , l (3.m ' LC0 3.4. The requirena a C0 4.
Leos- 51 2,*
~~and the 11stal requirem ets f 3.3. . .~~
~~act gd w,ta.g ,,,J' PretacHwdgee !ns ntation -~~
~~r_at) , ' for the A !~~
"'?n k ,c - 'RPS)(he Dv, 1 rgin d ssure, and L5) l . Y _ry nera}eg _ansient ( '_ ^ x ,tM ; ,0 .w. . .ww, cv .:;r; .-- - r F:O W / S eMone{ aay be sus h [p ed:
a. THOUML POWER i 55 RTP; and >

b. The reactor trip setpoints [f thh OPERA 8LE channels are set s TP. r 4 vel h h s'
~~APPLICA81LITY: MODE 2, during startup and PHYSICS TESTS. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TIME~~
~~. 3 ioa A. THERMAL POWER not A.! Open reactor t;fp Immediately within limit, breakers.~~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY (4.goa.)) SR 3.4. 1 Yorify THERMAL POWER 5 51 RTP. I hour SR 3.4.1 .2 Perfeft a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each 12 hou-s prior fogarithmic r--- ?n:' and-Hasee power to initiating hMas'2.) level neutrois flux monitoring channel, startup or PHYSICS TESTS CEOG STS 1444 Rev 1. 04/07/95
- - . . - - . - - -- .-_._l._--- _- -- e ,- , . , , .-,-,r.m., n. . . - - . . . ,- ,,
~&
~~TrJ.5EeT 3. 4 ID STE RCS Loops - MODES 4 and 5 3.4.17~~
~~<m>~~
~~M REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3,4.17 Special Test Exception. (STE) RCS Ioops - MQpES 4 and 5 (Fe~dtktcEfa!fe.1cvTJuj~~~
~~'Ihc requirements of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Imps-MODE 4, LCO 3.4.7, $.104) LCO 3.4.17 "RCS Imps MODE 5, Imps Filled" and LCO 3.4.8, *RCS Loops.~~
MODE 5, Loops Not Filled," may be sus @rovided: ggfN Xenon reactivity fygo.1*f, approaching stability;@ (3.w r>.b) a. k No operations are permitted which cc dd cause reduction of the
~~.(3.10.5.*)b. RCS b ron concentration~~
~~C.,lo. 6.cd c . T L C.y# ji m; I m e ,.J e[a o~ LeJ i]vod -]e };~~
~~e5pwp4 e Ar4~J'( '4f"- (3./0.:7.c 7 cl . APPLICABILITY: e L ,',w .s r Th st>M MODES 4 and 5 Lc0 t J.I e < v u b,'I a-v u 3 6 hour~~
~~I 9 uitte d ' o ! Ih '~~
ACTIONS g CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. $c'non reactivity not wM A.1 Immediately llimitt Suspend perfon activitics being# under this S g fi. ass og W d #m Q\g ( Acm. 4f \ Operations urring - wh ch could ca c redu ion of RC ' boron
~~\ concentration __ *%, f s e.- w ,J 4.~~
jejl ) t-
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 1)EVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
15. Specification 3.4.12 (LTOP System) Applicability was changed from Mode 4 when any RCS cold leg temperature is s 285'F, Mode 5, and Mode 6 when the reactor vessel head is on, to Mode 3 with any RCS cold leg temperature is s 365'F (s 30l'F for Unit 2) and Modes 4,5, and 6. His change is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs requirement to have the Pressurizer Safety Valves and PORVs Operable in Modes I and 2, and Mode 3 with any RCS cold leg temperatures > 365'F (> 301*F for Unit 2). The addition of the Note which exempts the LCO when the RCS is vented to 2 8 square inches allows the equipment for the LCO to not be applicable when the reactor vessel head is off. Also, changer were made to na Actions consistent with the changes made to the Applicability.

16. NUREG-1432 Specification 3.4.14 provides requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves.
The Calvert Cliffs' ITS do not contain the requirements of this Specincation, except for the SR which tests the interlock that prevents the shutdown cooling system suction isolation valves from opening at a specific pressure. This SR is c' rrently addressed as CTS SR 4.5.2.c.1, and it has been retained as ITS SR 3.5.2.9. Calvert Cliffs Unit Nos. I and 2 were licensed prior to 1979. Neither unit has any specific requirements to individually leak test any pressure isolation valve, as conGrmed by NRC letter dated August 15, 1980.. Additionally, Calvert Cliffs was not identified by the NRC Event V crder, dated April 20,1981, as an older plant that was required to add a requirement for leak testing pressure isolation valves. As described in the Calvert Cliffs' response to Generic Letter 87-06, "Feriodie Verification of Leak Tight Integrity of Pressure Isolation Valves," dated July 7,1987, the pressure isolation valves are either: a) periodically tested in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI; b) periodically tested in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J; or c) the pressure upstream of the valves (i.e., St. 217,227,237, and 247) is continuously monitored by remote indication in the control room. These activities ensure the valves are meeting thdr pressure isolation function. Therefore, Calvert Cliffs does not need to add additional requirements to the ITS to ensure these valves are leak tested.
17. Specification 3.4.15 (RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation) SR 3.4.15.2 Frequency is being changed from 92 to 31 days. This change is consistent with the current Calvert Clifts Surveillance Frequency for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor Channel Functional Test.

18. Specification 3.4.16 (RCS Specific Activity) Required Action A.2 Completion Time to restore the Dose Equivalent 1-131 to within limits is being increased from 48 hours to 100 hours. This change is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.

19. A new Specification [ Specification 3.4.17, "Special Test Exception (STE) RCS Loopa - Modes 4 and $"] was added to Section 3.4. This new Sp:cification is a Special Test Exception which allows LCOs 3.4.6, 3.4.7, and 3.4.8 to be suspended while performing special tests or maintenance (i.e., local leak rate testing on containment penetration 41, maintenance on valves located in the common shutdown cooling line, or maintenance on the shutdown cooling flow control valve). This Specification is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.
~~This change also resulted in changing the title of Specification 3.4.16 to include Mode 2.~~
~~20. Not used.~~
CALVERT CLIFFS- UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-5 Revision 11 1
1 1 DISCUSSION OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 1 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
~~21. NUREG 1432 SR 3.4.9.3 requires the verification that the pressurizer heaters are capable of being powered by an emergency power supply. This surveillance does not exist in CTS 3/4.4.4.~~
Improved Technical Specification 3.4.9 will not contain a surveillance to verify that the pressurizer heaters are capable of being powered by an emergency power supply. This is appropriate, became the pressurizer heaters are permanently powered by Class IE power supplies. Class IE power sources are backed-up by the emergency diesel generators. The transfer from the normal power supply to the emergency power supply for these buses occurs on an under voltage condition. The transfer from the normal power supply to the emergency diesel generators is currently ensured by testing in accordance with CTS SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.3; this SR has been maintained in ITS 3.8.1. Additionally, the specifications for other systems that are supplied by a Class lE power source (e.g., the safety injection systems) do not contain SRs to verify the systems are capable of being supplied by emergency power. Thus, the climination of SR 3.4.9.3 from the ITS is ransistent with other specifications. Furthennore, the climination of this SR is consistent with the Bases of NUREG-1432 SR 3.4.9.3 which states: "This SR [SR 3.4.9.3) is not applicable if the heaters are permanently powered by lE power supplies."
22. Reference to "specified in the COLR"in SR 3.4.1.4 was deleted because the limit in the LCO is the limit tested for in the SR. Therefore, placing the value in the Core Operating I hnits Report is not necessary. His change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.

23. ne containment sump monitor in Specification 3.4.15 was changed to containment sump level alarm. Calvert Cliffs has a containment sump level alarm system. This change is consistent with the current Calvert Cliffs licensing basis.

24. Not used.

25. Not used.

26. Not used. l

27. NUREG 1432 SR 3.4.9.2 requires the verification of the pressurizer heater capacity once per 92 days. Calvert Cliffs ITS will require verification of the pressurizer heater capacity once per 24 months. Calvert Cliffs Current Technical Specification does not contain this SR, thus this is a new SF. for Calvert Cliffs. Ilowever, the test the SR will require is currently being performed every refueling interval (i.e., every 24 months). An historical review of maintenarce history has detemiined that no failures of the test have occurred in the past 5 years. Therefore, the Calvert Cliffs ITS will continue to require the test every 24 months consistent with current practice. In addition, the 24 month interval is consistent with NUREG-1432, Generic Change TSTF-93.

28. The Mode of Applicability for NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4 2 is Mode I with T,v,in one or more RCS loops < [535'F) and Mode 2 with T.,, in one or more RCS loops < [535 F] and Km 21.0, NUREG SR 3.4.2.1 requires verifying RCS T,y,in each loop to be 2 [520'F) every 30 minutes thereafler. NUREG 1432 SR 3.0.4 requires surveillances to be met prior to entering the Mode of Applicability for an LCO. The requirements regarding RCS minimum temperature for criticality should be applicable whenever the reactor is critical and not just below a certain temperature.
The following changes were made.to NUREG-1432 Specification 3.4.2: a) the Applicability of ITS 3.4.2 was revised to be Mode 1 and Mode 2 with Km 21.0; by an additional frequency was added to ITS SR 3.4.2.1 to require the verification of T.v, prior to reeching criticality; and c) the CALVERT CLIFFS- UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-6 Revision i1
DISCUSSION OF TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM current frequency was modified by a note which addresses the temperature requirements provided in the Applicability of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.? thus, aner achieving criticality, the SR will only be required to be performed when RCS T.,, is less than 525'F. The revised Applicability of ITS LCO 3.4.2 is the same as the Applicability of CTS LCO 3.1.1.5. It is broader than the Applicability provided in NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.2. With the revised Applicability, ITS 3.4.2 will require each RCS loop average temperature to be 2 515'F in Modes 1 and 2 with IQ 21.0. The revised frequency ofITS SR 3.4.2.1 requires verification of RCS Tevs to be performed: a) once within 30 minutes prior to reaching criticality; and b) at once per 30 minutes thereafter whenever RCS T.,,is less than 525'F. These frequencies are consistent with the intent of NUREG-1432 SR 3.4.2.1 and CTS 4.1.1.5.a and 4.1.1.5.b.
29. NUREG 1432 SR 3.4.1.4 requires the RCS total Dow rate to be verified within limits by precision heat balance. Calvert Cliffs ITS will require the RCS total flow rate to be determi -d by mr tsurement. The Calvert Cliffs ITS will not specify the method by which to verify the RCS total Dow rate. Calvert Cliffs does not use the precision heat balance method of verifying RCS total flow rate. Calvert Cliffs current Technical Specification requires the measurement of the total now rate. Thus, this deviation from NUREG 1432 is also consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.

30. !mproved Technical Specification SR 3.4.1.3, which verifies RCS total flow rate, contains a Note which states, " Required to be met in MODE 1 with all RCPs running." TSTF-62 revised the Note to read "Only required to be met in MODE 1" with the justification that all RCPs are required to be running in MODE 1. Ilowever, the Applicability of LCO 3.4.1 is Mode 1.
Derefore, a Note which states, "Only required to be met in MODE 1" is superfluous. The NOTE has been deleted. TSTF-62 was approved by the NRC on September 18, 1996. A new generic change will be proposed to delete the Note from NUREG-1432.
31. The Actions for NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.1 were modified to reflect the Action requirements of CTS 3.1.5 for RCS cold leg temperature not bung within limits. The Action for CTS 3.1.5 requires the restoration of RCS cold leg temperature to within limits, or Thermal Power be reduced to less than 5% of Rated Thermal Power (i.e., Mode 2). The Action for CTS 3.1.5 is the same regardless of which parameter (i.e., pressurizer pressure, RCS flow rate, or RCS cold leg temperature) is out of limits. Thus, Action A of ITS 3.4.1 provides the requirements for restoration of the parameter, and Action B ofITS 3.4.1 provides the requirements for exiting the mode of applicability in the event the parameter cannot be restored to within limits within two hours, 32, in NUREG-1432 LCOs 3.4.1.a and 3.4.1.b, the limits for pressurizer pressure and RCS cold leg temperature are expressed in ranges. In ITS LCO 3.4.1.a, only a rninimum limit is established for pressurizer pressure. This limit is consistent with the initial assumption regarding pressurizer pressure in the Calvert Cliffs accident analysis. This limit was approved by the NRC in License Amendment No. 88 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 for Unit No.1, and License Amendment No. 61 to Facility Operating Liccase No. DPR 69 for Unit No. 2. In ITS LCO 3.4.1.b, only a maximum limit is established for RCS cold leg temperature. This limit is consistent with the initial assumptions regarding RCS cold leg temperature in the Calvert ClitTs accident analysis. His limit was approved by the NRC in License A:nendment No. 39 to CALVERT CLIFFS- UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-7 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-14.'2 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 for Unit No.1, and License Amendment No. 9 sa Facility Operating License No. DPR 69 for Unit No. 2. Thus, these deviations are consistent with the current licensing basis for Calvert ClilTs.
~~33. NUREG 1432 SRs 3.4.6.3,3.4.7.3, and 3.4.8.2 require the verification of the correct breaker alignment and indicated power available to the required pump that is nnt in operation.~~
NUREG 1432 SR 3.4.6.3 applies to the RCS and SDC pumps, while NUREG 1432 SRs 3.4.7.3 and 3.4.8.2 only apnly to the SDC pumps. Current Technical Speci0 cation SR 4.4.1.3.1 requires the verification of the correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability for the required shutdown cooling pumps and valves that are not in operation. NUREG 1432 SRs 3.4.6.3, 3.4.7.3, and 3.4.8.2 have been modined to reflect the additional requirement to verify the correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability for the required shutdown cooling valves, which is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis. These SRs were modined by replacing the word " pump" with the words " loop components." He components required to be checked by the SRs will be denoted in the Bases. For the RCS loop, the required component is the RCS pump. For thc SDC loop, the required components are the pump and the valves.
34. NUREG 1432 SR 3.4.11.4 requires the verification that the PORVs and block valves are capable of being powered by an emergency power supply. This surveillance does not exist in CTS 3/J.4.3. Improved Technical Specification 3.4.11 will not contain a surveillance to verify that the PORVs and block valves are capable of being powered by an emergency power supply.
This is appropriate, because the PORVs and block valves are permanently powered by Class IE power supplies. Class IE power sources are backed-up by the emergency diesel generators. The transfer from the normal power supply to the emergency power supply for these buns occurs on an under voltage condition. He transfer from the normal power supply to the emergency diesel generators is currently ensured by testing in accordam with CTS SR 4.8.1.1.2.d.3; this SR has been maintained in ITS 3.8.1. Additionally, the specifications for other systems that are supplied by a Class lE power source (e.g., the safety injection systems) do not contain SRs to /erify the systems are capab!c of being supplied by emergency power. Thus, the elimination of NUREG-1432 SR 3.4.11.4 from the ITS is consistent with other specifications. Furthermore, the eliminat:on of this SR is consistent with the Bases of NUREG-1432 SR 3.4.11.4 which states:
~~"This Surveillance [SR 3.4.11.4] is not required for plants with permanent IE power supplies to the valves."~~
35. In the event two PORVs are inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled, Action E of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 requires the closure of and removal of power from the associated block valves within one hour, and it requires the plant to be placed in Mode 3 within six hours and Mode 4 within 12 hours . Mode 4 is a Mode for which the NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 does not apply. Action c of CTS 3.4.3 provides actions to take when two PORVs are inoperable due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage. It requires: a) closure of the associated block ialves; b) removal of power from the associated block valves; and c) restoration of one PORV to an operable status within the following 72 hours. If any of these actions are not met, the CTS requires the plant to be placed in a Mode and condition for v hich the LCO does not apply.
Actions D, E, F, and G for NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 have been modified in ITS 3.4.11 to incorporate the current licensing basis provided in Action c of CTS 3.4.3. The proposed deviations include: a) adding an action to Action E of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 (i.e., Action D CALVERT CLIFFS- UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-8 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ofITS 3.4.11) that would permit restoration of one PORV to an Operable status in the event two PORW are inoperable and are not capable of being manually cycled; b) eliminating Actions E.3 , and E.4 of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 from Action D ofITS 3.4.11; c) eliminating Action D of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11 from ITS 3.4.11; d) revising Action G of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 (i.e., Action F ofITS 3.4.11) to apply to all the previous actiora: and c) labeling Actions E, F, and G of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11 as Actions D, E, and F ofITS 3.4.11. Action E of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11 provides the actions for two inoperable PORVs that are not capable of being manually cycled. This Action is being revised to include a Requ ed Action that would provide 72 hours to restore one of the PORVs to an Operable status. The .w action p.:vides a series of actions which lead to exiting the action. Thus, the shutdown , iirements provided in Required Actions E.3 and E.4 of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11 have been enMnated from ITS 3.4.11. In the event the Required Actions and the associated Completion Times of the revised Action E are not met, an action is needed that requires the plant to be placed in a Mode and condition for which the LCO does not apply. This type of action is consistent with the philosophy of NUREG 1432. Alsa, Action c of CTS 3.4.3 contains an action which requires the plant to be placed in a Mode and condition for which the LCO is not applicable in the event one of its required actions are not met within the specified completion time. Actions A, B C and E of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 also require this type of Action. Actions D and G of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.1I contain actions to place the plant in a Mode and Condition for which the LCO does not apply. Action D cf NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 addresses the event where a Required Action and associated Completion Time nf Condition A, B, or C was not met, while Action G of NUREG -1432 ' CO 3.4.11 addresses the event where a Required Action and associated Completion Time 3f Co.,dition E is not met. In ITS 3.4.11, Action D of NUREG l?32 LCO 3.4.11 was consolidated into Action G of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11, and Action G of NUREG-1432 LCO : 4.11 was also revised to address the event where a Required Action and associated Completion Time of the revised Action E was not met. Due to the consolidation of Action D into Action G in ITS 3.4.11, Actions E, F, and G of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.ll were labeled as Actions D, E, and F in the ITS. These proposed deviations from NUREG 1432 were necessary to incorporate the current licensing basis provided in CTS 3.4.3, as approved by the NRC in License Amendments Nos.188 and 165 (for Units 1 and 2, respectively) with a Safety Evaluation Report dated Ap'.il 20, 1994. la License Amendment Nos.188 and 165, the NRC accepted the 72 hour allowed outage time for restoring a PORV to an Operable status in the event both PORVs were inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage. This allowed outage time pr,vides a more realistic opportunity to make repairs to the inoperable PORV. Thus, the plant would avoid unnecessary shutdowns, and would avoid entering the region when the PORVs are required to be operable for low temperature overpressure purposes. It h safer to attempt repairs of the PORVs in Modes I,2, ar.d 3 with the temperature above the LTOP enable temperature, because the PORV . are not credited in the accident analyses in Modes 1,2, and 3 with temperatures above the LTOP enable temperature. During operations in Modes 1,2, and 3 with the temperature above the LTOP enable temperature, the pressurizer safety valves are the credited means for overpressure protection in the accident analyses. Thus, the proposed a:ldition of the 72-hour allowed outage time to restore a PORV to an operable status to Action D ofITS 3.4.11 end the CALVERT CLIFFS-UNITS 1 & 3.4-9 Revision 11 i
DISCUSSION OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM deletion of the shutdown requirements (Actions E.1 and E.2 of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11) from Action D ofITS 3.4.11 are acceptable. To support this change, Actions D and G of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11 had to be revised in ITS 3.4.11. These requirements ensure that the plant is placed in a Mode and condition for which the LCO does not apply in the event a Required Action and associated Completion Time are not met. Action D of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.11 was incorporated into Action F ofITS 3.4.11, and Action F of ITS 3.4.11 was revised to apply to Condition D of ITS 3.4.11. The proposed deviations regarding Actions D and G of NUREG 1432 LCO 3.4.11 are considered to be acceptable, because the ITS continue to require the plant be placed in a Mode and Condition for which the LCO does not apply in the event a Required Action and its associated Completion Time are not met.
36. Not used. l

37. TSTF 153 revised the Notes for the RCS loops, which provide exceptions to the requirements for required pumps to be in operation. In revising the Notes, TSTF-153 created the possibility for misinterpretation. As a result of TSTF 153, the Notes were revised as follows:
Note to NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.5 "All reactor coolant pumps may not be in operation for s I hour per 8 hour period, provided . . .". Note 1 of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.6 "All reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) and SDC pump may not be in operation for s I hour per 8 , hour period, provided. . . ". Note I of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.7 "The SDC pump of the train in operation may not be in operation s I hour per 8 hour period, provided . . .". Note 4 of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.7 "All SDC trains may not be in operation during planned heatup to MODE 4 when at least one RCS loop is in operation." Note 1 of NUREG-1432 LCO 3.4.8 "All SDC pumps may not be in operation for s 15 minutes when switching from one train to another provided . . .". The justification for TSTF-153 describes that this change is necessary to eliminate ambiguity that could lead to errors or improper enforcement. Ilowever, this change can now lead to a misinterpretation of the allowance of the Notes. Specifically, the Notes can now be interpreted as trquiring the required loop or train to not be in operation for the specified periods; i.e., it must CALVERT CLIFFS- UNITS l & 2 3.4-10 Revision 11 l l
DISCUSSION OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.4 - REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM be taken out of operation. He intent of the Notes (as described in the associated Bases) is to allow (but not reauire) the required loop to not be in operation for the speciGed periods. Herefore, for consistency with the original intent and to avoid improper enforcement, the Notes have been revised by replacing the phrase "not be in operation" with the phrase "be not in operation." These revidons make the Notes consistent with the ACTIONS, which use the phrase "not in operation" to describe when the loop is not operating. A generic change has been proposed with this correction to TSTF-153,
38. NUREG 1432 SR 3.4.13.1 provides the requirements for verifying RCS operational leakage is within limits, it contains the following note in the surveillance column: "Not required to be performeu in Mode 3 or 4 until 12 hours of steady state operation." This Note was deleted from ITS SR 3.4.13.1 in order to maintain consistency with the current licensing basis. Cntrent ,
Technical Speci0 cation SR 4.4.6.2.c requires RC5 leakage to be determined at least once per 72 hours during steady state operation . . ." This proposed deviation will require the initial performance of the surveillance to be performed 72 hours prior to achieving steady state operation in order to comply with ITS SR 3.0.4. His is more restrictive than NUREG 1432, which permits the initial SR to be performed 12 hours after establishment of steady state operation in Mode 3 or 4. This additional restriction is consistent with the current licensing bases. It is acceptable, because it only affects the initial performance of the SR. Subsequent performances of the surveillance will be required to be performed at the same frequency (i.e.,72 hours during steady state operation).
~~39. Calvert Cliffs ITS LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable during shutdowns and during MODES 5 and 6.~~
Therefore, entry into LTOP conditions would be allowed without LTOP requirements being met. Ilowever, it is inappropriate to entry conditions most susceptible to an LTOP event when the necessary overpressure protection is not available. Therefore, the ACTIONS of NUREG-1432 Specification 3.4.12, " Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System," (ITS 3,4.12) are modined by a Note which states that while the requirements of the LCO aie not met, entry into a MODE or other speci0ed condition is the Applicability is not permitted. CALVERT CLIFFS- UNITS 1 & 2 3.4-11 Revision 11
Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES APPLICABLE The pressuriznr satisfies Criterion 2 and Criterion 3 of the
~~SAFETY ANALYSES NRC Policy Statement.~~
~~(continued) g: : y Ql33 iaQaatj 2t$ W h LCO The LC0 requi nt for Env pressuruer to be urtnA3LE with~~
~~. water level ensures that.a steam bubble entsts.~~
Lietting the max num operating water level preserves the steam space for pressure control. The LCO Ms been established to minialze the consequences of po'ential overpressure transients. Requiring the presence of a steam bubble is also consis ithanalyticalassumptions. The LC0 requires two of ERABLE pressurizer heaters, each with a capacity 24 l50 k and capable of being powered from an emergenc{y w po}*er supplyP. The minimum heater A capacity required is sufficient to maintai 81 normal operating pressurejsnen>ccouanne "n the RCS arneat near losses) unro ,the_pressumer iniulatiod. By sa ntaining the-
~
prTasure near the operating conditions, a wide subcooling na aturation can be obtained in the loops. The Mr _t de value ofM150}4kW is derived from the use of II heaters rated at 12.5 kW each. The amount needed to @ maintain pressure is dependent on the ambient heat losses. APPLICABILITY The need for pressure cotstrol is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatest effect on RCS tsaperature resuleng in the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus, Appitcability has been designated for MODES 1 and 2. Th: 14plicability is also. provided Tov MODC 3. the purpose is to prevent solid water RCS operation'during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises caused by nors#1 operational perturbation, such as reactor coolant pump sttrtup. The LCO does iot . apply to MODE $ (Loops Filled) because LC0 3.4.12, ' Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP The LC0 does not apply to MODES 5 and 6 w)ith partial loopSyst n ,' applies. operation. In MODES 1,'t, and 3 availability of press. uriter thereheaters is the need capable to maintain the of being powered from an emergency power s.hpply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES gives
~~. (continued)~~
CEOG STS B 3.4-43 Rev 1, 04/07/g5 N
i l l T
~~-Pressurizer PORVs~~
~~_ , _ _ 8 3.4.11 __kt>DG3,,%h5 t BASES 9 3tM ,,,,,g __~~
;. j APPLICABILITY $MODES 4, 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place. .
(continued) I LC0 3.4.12 addresses the PORY requirements in these MODES.
]
ACTIONS AJ " TAfflWi$ are modified bj 4pe Notes. Note-) clarifles ' A
, - that all pressuriser PORWs, are treated as separate entities, g i each with separate Complett m Times (i.e., the Completion j . . S )
Time is en a component best ). ~ Note A is an exception to LC0 3.0.4. The exception djp LC0 3,0.4. permits entry into ' edh*J l' '*" I ; MODES 1, 2, and 3 to perfore cycling of' the PORY or block i valve to verify their OPERA 8LE_stalgr a _fasHaa h tyelcally) wLeerformed in la- mru AA spr M ta$ WiththePORginope 1 ano capsore of being manually cycled, either the'F isolated within I hour. yeust be restored or the flow path < The block valve should be closed l but power must be maintalped to the associated block valve, i since removal of power would render the block valve . inoperable. Although the PORI may be designated inoperabl., it may be able to be manually opened and closed a J in this ' manner can be used to perfors its function. PORV ino rability may be due to seat leakage instrumentation p i n ,' automatic control problems, or,'other causes that do not prevent manual use and do not create a pessibility , for a small break L'JCA. For these reasons the block valve spy be closed but the Action requires power, be maintained to the valve. This Condition is ecly intended to permit ' operation of the plant for a 11:4ted period of time not to exceed the next refueling outage (MODE 6) so that maintenance can be performed on the PORVs to eliminate the probles condition. The PORVs should normally be available for automatic mitigation of overpressure events and should a be returned to OPERABLE status prior to entering startup (MODE 2). Quick access to the PORY for pressure control can be made when power remains on the clostd block valve. The completion Time of I hour is based on plant operatino . experience that einer problems can be corrected or closure
~~.can be accompitshed in this time period,~~
. (continued) , CEOC. STS ,_ ~B 3.4251 Rev 1, 04/07/95 , , u s.
~
e-1 s. m_m. s--m - _ s,-16 4 e-c.-- e>,,-..c- m. w -- ,, cm . .N a , - +~e.,,im w-* =w, p --e-t. ,qy + q., s..
5 Pgg) Replacement IIstructions - , VOLUME 9 [ Sectian 3.5 . Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CTS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit , number as wil as the specification number located in the upper right-hand corner ofthe CTSpage. Key: . DOC = Qiscussion OfChanges DOD = Qiscussion Qf TechnicalxxclDeation Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation t REMOVE INSERT l Overview of Chanaq No pages changed.. i
.p: - LT.S 3.5.23 3.5.2 3 --- 3.5.3.2 3.5.3.2 - 3.5.5 2 3.5.5-2 ITS Bases ! -f No pages changed.
~~CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes . Specification 3.5.2, Unit 1~~
~~- Page 3 of 6 and Page 4 of 6 Page 3 of 6 and Page 4 of 6 .~~
Specification 3.5.2. Unit 2 Page 3 of 6 and Page 4 of 6 Page 3 of 6 and Page 4 of 6 , Specification 3.5.3, Unit i PageIof1 Page1ofI Specification 3.5.3, Unit 2 + Page1of1 Page1ofI DOC 3.5.3 I through 3.5.3-3 DOC 3.5.31 through 3.5.3 3 DOC 3.5.4 I DOC 3.5.4-1
~~- NSHC Fludians-No pages changed.~~
ISTS Markun & JustificaQgn .4 3.5 5 through 3.5-8 3.5 5 through 3.5-8 3.5-11 3.5 11 .
~~. ISTS Bases Markun & Justi.Qcation l i No pages changed.~~
~~1 spjy it~~
]
~~Note + ltalicbed entries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.~~
~~-. - - . .. . - . .. - .- .- . .. . ._ - - - - . .. -. .. .=. . - . _ - . - - -~~
ECCS - Operating ' 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) l SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.6 Verify each ECCS pump starts automatically 24 months i on an actual or simulated actuation signal. 1 SR 3.5.2.7 l Verify each low pressure safety injection 24 months pump stops on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3.5.2.8 Verify, by visual inspection, each ECCS 24 months train containment sump suction inlet is not , restricted by debris and the suction inlet trash racks and screens show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion. 7 , SR 3.5.2.9 Verify the 3hutdown Cooling System opo 24 months permissive interlock prevents the Shutdown Cooling System suction isolation valves from y being opened with a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal of gg 2 309 psia. h L
' CALVERT CLI'FFS'- UNITS 1 & 2 3.5.2-3 . Revisionfiq ,n .,,, . - . . , t ., ..,,.m.. . , , , __,,,-,.m_,y,,.,.,,.,,,,y_ ., , .,_.,%._,,..w ,w Ie , _, ., h m,q.rh,,..
l 1 ECCS - Shutdown ) 3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 The HPSI train related portions of the In accordance it i following Surveillance Requirements are with applicable . applicable: Surveillance Requirements ; SR 3.5.2.1 SR 3.5.2.5 SR 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2.6 SR 3.5.2.3 SR 3.5.2.8
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5.3-2 Revision / 1-
9 TSP 3.5.5 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY
-SR 3.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the TSP baskets 24 months provides adequate pH adjustment of water borated to be representative of a post-loss- !
~~N of-coolant accident sump condition. CALVERT CL?FFS . UNITS 1 & 2_- 3.5.5-2 Revision g it~~
~~.__.u_. ._ _ _ ._ _ _ ,_-., _ .= _ _.~~
Spec [.ubri .3 . E 2-3/4.5 ItERGENcV CORE C00 LING SYSTDi$ (ECCS) SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Continued) . At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL by: 1.' Verifying the Shutchwn Cooling Systr
~~eoen-permissive -~~
~~SR't.s.29 isolation interlock prevents the shutdo- Cooltre,_, stem suction valves from bein d with a simulated or actual RCS pressure signal of17g ,.4.~~
$ A visual inspection of the c. tainment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction in 's are not restricted by M3 5 4 debris and that the sump compt ,nts trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural (distress or corros'on..
~~(3. _ vernying that a minimum total of 259.3 cubic feet of soy Q granular trisodium phos hate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage skets.~~
~~4. Verifying that a sample from the TSP baskets provides i adequate pH adjustment of water borated to be representative 4~~
( of the post-LOCA sump condition. m At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by: 58'45 1 5 @ Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on & Safety injection Actuation test
- signal. j YM %f@h, Verifying that each of the following pups start ' .M 3.g,2,/,, automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injectinn Actuation Test StenA1:
a. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump.

b. Low Pressure Safety injection Pump.
~~.Cea. buamw of ch7 & Ssukke 3 6. G, n~~
~~r1P" p_ -~~
M J4 7htc *dn . ( 5C. '1.5.20 g,q ,,,,( g_p 54,fi on1 M m.,rkks g an. ecM ., twJ,4ea Achw stysl. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 207 pop 3 of 6
j ,(wh oo 3 5* L E f 3/4.5 IMEMENCY CORE C09 LIM $YSTDi$ (ICC5) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMDITS (Continued) By perforz1Wg a flow Dalance test during shutdown follow 1 --7 . - completto of HPSI System modiff ations that alter syst flow '
~~; charact latics and verjfying e following ilow rates or a g*g c single PSI Pump System :~~
he ( 1. A7A,Jun of the three 1 est f.ow legs shall b greater than J I 3'I 2 3 'f'ec r !t nf u a ak n e 3;Mf4-W m pursuantto{n-Qim<~,a .h> A , p<y nn g, vu. Q4~e F'n a7~1 p w a u + 3
~~a. .~~
~~.s . a ,,, +c d f/.a p :,4 u y ,c,.L J L a .,p J lo di op.n d cbsah J hal i~~
j i f, A H?SI P System is a HPSI pump a one of two safety inj tion h imits contain allowan for instrument erro drift or uctuation. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1- 3/4 S-6 Amendment No. 169 h -
spec.F, a4.o, 3. 5. 2 m 3/4.5 OfERGENCY Cati COOLING $YSTE45 (ECC51 SURVEILLANCE REQttitDWITS (CoettencJ) t least once per REFUELING MERVAL by: SR. 3. Verifying the Shutdown Cooling System open-permissive . 3 5.l.9 interlock prevents the Shutdown Cooling System suctice isolation valves from being opened with a simulated or actual RCS pressure signal of a 309 psia. _, sR w A visuai insp.ction of the contain=nt su, and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by 3.5.2.N debris and that the sump components trash racks, screen;. etc.) she.v no evidence of strwetural(distress or corroston.
3. Veri ing that a minimum total of 2H.3 cubic feet of solid l granu ar trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

4. Verifying that a sample from the TSP baskets provides adequate pH adjustment of water berated to be representative of the post-LOCA sump condition, GR @ At ieast once per REmuMG mt Vat, during shutdown by:

4. Verifying that each autenatic valve in the flow th actuates to its correct position on a Safety Inj tion Actuation test sigs 1. j 3.y;1g Y. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety injection Actuation Test Signals

a. High-Pressure Safety injection Pump. . g, ,f

b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
~~4Q,,cfev If c' ("b 3,3~, j N~~
~~'fW%M $N spc ft GOD SR 35.2.7 *"S #- ^ '~~
~~e - p~~
~~cs - a e ld -)~~
5 - l led a e 4 -* -f i,m I i u7 2g..-+t,y CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 185 1 e.
l Spec 8t *. 2 5,L I 3/4.s EntastucV coat cooLIns snies ftccs)
~~, SURVEILLAbet htqttatMDITS (Centlemed)~~
By perfo ng a flow dance est during shutd following comple of HPSI Syl tem ifications that ter system flow-char eristics and verj ng the followi ow rates for a l L,g
~~, si e NPSI Iump Syst .~~
~~roe lowest flow 1~~
~~shall be grea r than Sq~~
~~k. The, pun 470 8*- of the_y ,~~
~~3* 5 f ow he we a k e~~
~~, pursuant to(5peMff catidn 4.5 5J ~ r (e inters.ke fed $ f&m&~~
~~W Tr;r*3dy1gA7' ge ,,ly em t , janys devely]',nj . ' .~~
, '@S 4"" *' A' g' g.i.]k, p u n y r A m ,c7u;a)IcA,0/kl - ?fucl 4O .'
~~b .I i~~
~~'HPSI Pump System is a HPSI pump and de of two safety injection headers.- -~~
These limi contain allowances or instrument error drift or fluctuat . ye CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 Amendment No. 149 l pe ge k of [
~~. __ - - ..~~~
~~$(ftfic4lt00 3e[e3 i~~
l
-i 3,f 4/4 4- "NY tett M M SYSTDtB (Etts) g,/ .j 3,L3 3/44r3 Ects *"a*?!? "_ 7 ? Is _t_hmeni'fr:
~~4 LIMITI M COW ITION FOR OPERATION Lc0 3.5.3 ^- : +fr. nne ECC: xt:nt- - e % fe; shall be~~
~~nG3 _~~
fa. One# OPERAS high-pressu safetyinj tion pump, and I b. An OPE flow path c able of tak g suction rom th ~ refuell water tank o a safety In etion At ation 5 nal and automa cally transfe ing suction o the co ainment sump on a Recir lation Actuat on signal. # APPLICABILITY: MODES I3 and 4. , ACTION: g g, [ . h4,m- f/With no E__ -"aret_- 6PERABLE restore at least oneb e%to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD $NUTDelet
.M,4 within the next }b. In t event the C5 is actus';es and injects Rea or Coolan ystem, a 5 er into th al Report sha be prepa and s itted to e Consissio ursuant to 10 FR 50.4 wit n l ! 4,2 days de ibing the c1 unstances of e actuat16n nd the L tafel are i1stad actua nn evelas to ta_ $URVEILLANCE REQU IIPs tedn ecl.(d poMas af h , ppi u eau 3 3.d -
7heMNeiy .$k AAc. AglIO: g.} 54.s.r.2., dE 3. f.2 1 ses. r,2.c ' rumb 5(3 C s Z. (. M k A M ica d . 3523 g3 , s t. % , S&'5
~~' Between 385'F nd 365* /a tran ion on exis Isheret OPE 4~~
M.O " HPSI pump l automati 1 be p tatus . a heat ed in p -to-1 on a At 3 F and 1 . the Idown a resto tred to LE l A' b gQ , R $1 At 3 F a'i shal s in pdi-to-lo and wil not st au+ cally _ j w111 nouct 6 ce with [- pressurizer pressure < 1750 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 216
~~'toVtksMobC3 p p neM.%~~
~~Id I ' pc,9 c~~
~~. , . - - . . . . _ u..a ;-~~
~~- . . . - -- ..-.- - - -..-. . - --- . ~ . - . - - . - - .~~
~~[ (A oA 353 3.I 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE C00LI N SYSTEMS (ECCS) g,[~~
~~g. 5.3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTDtS .JdDOE54-fe-1MO MM ^." t LIMITIN Co W! TION FOR OPERATION lCD JJd 3.5.3 As444*4aum, one 4GC5 ;d;i;ts n-OPERABLE:~~
~~d[ f ' 9 < hall be a. One' OPE LE HPSI pump, and ,~~
b. An OPE LE flow path apable of t ingsuctionfredthe refuelt water tank n a Safety ection Actuat n Signal nd 8' automa cally transf rring sucti to the contai nt sump on a Recir lation Actua on Signal. _ _ _ .
~~( APPLICA81LITYi MODES 3k and 4 s; With no CCC" ;.hy:...... OPERABLE, restore at least one EGGE.~~
~~//t /oh g - - / w?'^~~
~~ithin .the 9 to next OPERABLE~~
# Qstatus within 1 hour or be in COLD $WTDOW - /fc forv 8 ~ b. In the event the ECCS is act ated and inject water into th CS,
a Spect Repo shall be pared and su ted to the Commi ton pu ant to 1 FR 50.4 withi days descr ng tl , ! l. , 2 cir tanc of the a ation and th otal accumul d a atto ycles to te. j
~~$URVEILLANCE RE IRDENTS -~~
~~ira.k reldt p 'Nen 8 h 1 u t n~~
~~' ' 3'l 1&chfoIIQuittvec $N AQC' AA. .'I A C A b fo -~~
rd' Acccal4uc $,2 SR 3 5,z./ SR.3.C.z.s - g s,s.z.2 se . 3. c. 2.L W'xjsPPyed y 3R 3,g.2 3 SR 3, r.24 '
~~# Between 'F an 301'F. a ransition ton exists wh the N~~
~~OPERAB PSI will placed in 1-to-lock on cooldown[n[}' I g,~~
~~.gg _~~
~~rest red _ to tomatic LE H stus on a h p_ hilt up. At 301' and less, tb( in pull-to- kandwillfot ____ f/ h~~
u
~
~~ance with nica 5 e ation ..~~
~~- [Tli t hJres surfiiFires - - . _ _ . sur'e75iSOM-. >~~
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 193 c Id I v - -, + sp y- --,-r- vy - - - -
~~,,,-w , - - g ,~~
DISCUSSION OF CilANGES l SECTION 3.5.3 - ECCS-SHUTDOWN l ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES i A.I The proposed change will reformat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Specifications, with no change ofintent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, ! the Technical Specideations should be more easily readable and, therefore, understandable by plant operators, as well as other users. I During the Calvert Clifr sITS development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional information may also have been added to more fully describe each LCO and to be corsistent with NUREG-1432. However, the additionai information does not change the inter . of the current Technical Specifications. The reformattirg, renumbermg, and rewMag process involves no technical changes to existing Specifications. A.2 Current Technical Specification 3.5.3 SR 4.5.3.1 requires the applicable Surveillances from CTS 3.5.2 to be performed. Improved Technical Specification 3.5.3 SR 3.5.3.1 will list the applicable Surveillance numbers which are required to be performed for the HPSI train related portions of the SRs. The addition of details by specifically listing the required Surveillance numbers constitutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. A.3 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.5.3.a footnote # requires, at 365'F and less, that ilPSI pump use be conducted consistent with the LTOP Specification. Improved Technical Specification 3.5.3 deletes this requirement because referencing other Spcifications is not necessary because those LCOs are required to be met per LCO 3.0.1. Therefore, deleting references to other Technical Specifications constitutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432. TECilNICAL CIIANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE None TECIINICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS None TECHNICAL CHANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENhe.E-CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS LA.1 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.5.3 lists each subsystem which comprises an Operable ECCS train in Modes 3 and 4. Improved Techr.ical Specification LCO 3.5.3 will not list each subsystem which comprises an Operable ECCS train; it only requires two ECCS trains to be Operable. The composition of each ECCS train is being moved to the Bases of Specification 3.5.3. His is acceptable because moving the composition of each ECCS subsystem to the Bases will not affect the requirement for two ECCS trains to be Operable. Throughout NUREG-1432, the- compm. tion of systems, subsystems, or trains are consistently being moved to the Bases. This requirement can be adequately controlled in the Bees, which require change control in accordance with the Bases Change Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. His approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5.3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CIIANGES SECTION 3.5.3 - ECCS-SIIUTDOWN provides for a more appropriate change control process. The level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the requirement to have two ECCS trains Operable. Furthermore, NRC and Calvert Cliffs resources associated with prwessing license amendments to these requiremed will be reduced. This change is a less restrictive movement of information change with no impact on safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. LA.2 The # footnote to Current Technical Specification 3.5.3.a allows the llPSI pump, at temperaturcs between 385'F and 365 F (for Unit 1) and between 325*F and 30l*F (for Unit 2), to be put in pull-to-lock on cooldown and restored to automatic status on heatup. This footnote also allows the llPSI pump, at temperatures of 365'F and less (for Unit 1) and 301'F and less (for Unit 2), to be put in pull-to-lock to prevent the pump from starting automatically. Improved Technical Specidcation 3.5.3 does not contain these requiremcats, improved Technical Specification LCO 3.5.3 is modified by a Note which allows the llPSI train to not be capable of automatically starting on an actuation signal when RCS cold leg temperature is < 385'F (Unit 1), < 325'F (Unit 2), during heatup and cooldown and when
< 365'F (Unit 1), < 30l*F (Unit 2), during other conditions. This ITS Note is consistent with the intent of the CTS # footnote, which allows the required IIPSI pump (and as a result the 11 PSI train) to not be capable of automatic actuation and still be considered OPERABLE in order to allow a transition inio and out of the low temperature overprev ure protection conditions. The ITS LCO on LTOP (LCO 3.4.12) requires the liPSI pump to be in manual control under these conditions. Therefore, the details of the implementation of the LTOP requirements in the # footnote are to be moved to the ITS Bases. This is acceptable because moving these details to the ITS Bases will not affect the requirements to comply with the LTOP Specification or to use the allowance provided in the Note to ITS LCO 3.5.3.
Changes to the Bases will be controlled by the Bases Cont ol Program in ITS Chapter 5.0. This approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and provides for a more appropriate change control process. The level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the LTOP requirements. This change is a less restrictive movement ofinformation change with nc impact on plant safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. TECIINICAL CIMNGES - LESS MESTRICTIVE L1 Current Technical Specificatio'. ' 9.3 Action a requires the plant to be in Mode 5 in 20 hours if the required llPSI train cannot be restored to Operabie status within the required Completion Time. Improved Technical Specification 3.5.3 Action B will extend the Completion Time to be in Mede 5 from 20 hours to 24 hoyrs. This change is reasonable based on operating experience to reach Mode 5 in an order!y manner, and without challenging plant systems. It is also consistent with similar CTS Actions, such as Action 3.4.6.b. Increasing the Completion Time constitutes a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-143.9. L.2 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.5.3 Action b requires a special report to be submitted to the NRC in the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the RCS. This requirement is bemg deleted from the Technical Specifications. If an event occurred in which the ECCS was actuated and injected water into RCS, an LER would be required. Therefore, the CTS requirement to submit a special report to the NRC is unnecessary, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5.32 Revision 11
~~- _ _ _ ~ _ _~~
l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.5.3 - ECCS-SIIUTDOWN because other requirements (LER requirements) will ensure that a repon is provided to the a NRC. This change is consistent.with NUREG-1432. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5.3-3 Revision Ii
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.5.4 - REFUELING WATER TANK ADMINISTRATIVE CHANLF$ A.1 The proposed change will reformat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Specifications, with no change of intent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, the Technical Specifications should be more easily readable and, therefore, understandable by plant opnators, as well as other users. During the Calvert Cliffs ITS development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional information may also have been added to more fully describe each LCO and to be consistent with NUREG-1432. Hoivever, the additional information does not change the intent of the current Technical Specifications. The reformatting, renumbering, and cewording process involves no technical changes to existing Specificatior.s. A.2 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 lists the specific parameters that make the RWT Operable. Improved Technical Specification 3.5.4 transfers this information to the SRs. The transfer of requirements within the Technical Specifications (in this case, from the LCO to the SRs) constitutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4.d limits the maximum solution temperature in the RWT to 100 F in Mode 1. This requirement, however, was not verified per a Technical Specification Surveillance. Improved Technical Specifications will add a Surveillance (SR 3.5.4.2) which tequires the verification that RWT borated water temperature is s 100 F. The SR is also modified by two notes (consistent with the CTS LCO requirement) that requires the SR to be met only when in Mode I and only performed when the ambient air temperature is > 100 F. This change will not have an adverse impact on plant safety. l TECHNICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS None TECHNICAL CIIANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE-CONTROLLED ILQCUMENTS None TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.1 Current Technical Specification 3.5.4 Action requires the RWT to be restored to Operable statu; within one hour regardless of the reason for the inoperability. Improved Technical Specification 3.5.4 Action A will extend the completion time from one hour to eight hours when the RWT is inoperable due to boron concentration or temperature not within limits. This change is acceptable based on the time it takes to change boron concentration or temperature in the RWT, aad that the contents are still available for injection. Increasing the AOT is considered a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.5.4-1 Revision 1i
~~+ ..~~~
s
)
~~ECCS-Operating ! 3.5.2~~
$URVEILLANCE Rf00!RfMENTS SURVE!LtMcE FREQUENCY Verify the followl <4.fs2dSk3.5.2.1 /p 11sted position w bvalves r toare theinvalve the 12 hours . Operatorremoved(JAMlscliedda7 (P W )T9 6 - 9 Valve Number Petition Function M0V 617,9 '
~~OPA ,~~
~~' I' Le4by&~~
~~x.V. u.o o~ .~~
~~. CD dV-30(. .~~
ppn . I[P I" b h g.2.h.2,, SR 3.5.2.2 Yorify each ECCS manual, poweryoperated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked sealed, or otherwise secured 31 days hlk in position, 3s in the correct position. 3.i.:.: Yr; r""! ;t;E; h f utz 5'.' ;* i; ={ @ 4 4 5.2,h SR 3.5.2 N the fell ing ECC5 pumps deve p the In accordance requifeddif ential pressure on with the rscirculat flow: Inservice Differential ' Egg Pretture. etid HP '*8 2{}400] %g,, A,'y ' I LPSI'*) 1[300 l' h l_ CrsTi~iE)
~~. . , , ..., ,.b VvJ jcontinued) f?Y N '.~~
h ee.d d 3 e ~ 'l h e 4" I * *" P *0 "3 " a . , 5m i-/s 4he re &"' d c' /"' ""4 A o 73 Tf- 78) , CEOG STS 3.5 5 Rev1,04/07/95 _ _ _ _ _ . ..._m_______ .__ __ .__
d i ECCS-Operating - 3.5.2 Crs)g . SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SUMEILLANCE FREQUENCY .' mk e SR 3.5.2. '
~~. ' Verify e ch rging pueo develops a flow In 4./.7. A> . of 1 (k [asvurps)gt-gps m s pisc e 7e spes.3 M accordanca 4~~
p -- " with the - inservice i Testing p Progras SR 3.5.2 Verify each ECCS automatic valve that is.- aciths not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, in the f ow path actuates tc the
~~. f. 2 . f. correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.~~
~~R 3.5.2 Verify each ECCS p starts automatica11 4 52E onanactualorstauatedactuationsignaY. months M SR 3.5.2~~
~~;+yt months simulateda:tuationsigna$.onanactualor~~
~~f. _ ,~~
~~SR 3.5.2.9 Verify, or each ECCS throttle valve isted i below ach position stop is la th correct (18]aonths post on, j ve Number~~
~~/ O 3~~
~~(-- ___~~
-)
~~(continued) CEOC STS 3.5-6 Rev 1, 04/07/95 g Y~~
~~.c , _ - - ,~~
ECCS-Operati 3.5. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (contirued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY F-g w SR 3.5.2 Verify, by visual inspection, each ECCS months L' > train containment sump suction inlet is not restricted by debris and the suction inlet
~~<45. 2.d .2, trash racks and screens show no evidince of structural distress or abnora.a1 corrosion.~~
~~6R 3 6 2. 9 VuiC y & ShoYoe Coc'I'$ q,g, 7 , Z~~
~~="l562 Sysb~ open < "' *N A 3~~
~~in4triocl preve Js kg cochm t 3 gg~~
~~$y shm for bos noteac n va\ves ,. >\ L. or a A ,~~
L9 c<d of 2_ 3 0 9 p, , n. I i CEOG STS 3,$.7 Rev1,04/07/95
T k). hee - - Nort - -
. Eto d.c Coold hbhm Cold it3 h.r*pmbet.t. ort, C 3ES'b (U6 4 th L 3 7g#F (und Q due..$ map oc cooldu W wb^ t 3GfY fHu.PS2 M +E) $*6 2 0 'F ( u r d d 3 durq oMu u'ad'b% 4b CCS-Shutdown 73 \ in is not req uiruA 4 Lt cae*h d 'Aa4cto) 3.5.3
-\ / tgr 4, e.s or, as e t . 3.5 EMERGENCY CORI COOLING YSTEMS(ECCS) 3.5.3 ECCS-Shutdown . <j, g, LC0 3.5.3 One high pressure safety injection (HPSI) train shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 3 with pre surizer pressure < MODE 4. psia, h ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3#3 A. Required HPS! train M'*
~~Inoper-ble.~~
A.1 Restore required HPS! I hour train to OPERABLE status. 3.3 3 B. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 5. 24 hours Ahu $ associated Completion Time not met. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEN 3 i 'l b n tilded por h h SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY n r n [5 m i b % <e e ts
)
5, s,,f SR 3.5.3.1 The 4o11owing % re a cable: In accordance bwithapplicable l-MSP 3.5.2.1/ SR 3.5.2 J eA 3 SR 3.5.2.2 SR 3.5.2 CEOG STS 3.5-8 Rev 1, 04/07/h5
4
~
~~9 3. 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.5 Trisodium Phosphate (TSP)~~
- ra n a ,3g 3.5.5 The TSP baskets shall contain 2 3 (35.2).LCO ft of active TSP.
APPLICA81LITY: MODES 1, 2, @ 3 g ACTIONS ' CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME y/k A. TSP not within ifatts. A.1 Restore TSP to within 72 hours
~~- 5, rj-/ Ilmits.~~
ItEtl ._ NI(( # B. Required Action and associated Completion B.1 Se in MODE 3. 6 hours Time not met. AM) 4y,g,1,b____
~~- B.2 Be in MODE mes h~~
SURVE!'. LANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLMCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.5.1 Verify the TSP baskets contain 2 2'9S t 3 24 ar.nths 0 of granular tr4sedhmt phosphetA SP
'f* 2.e'h- / dodecahydrate. h SR 3.5.5.2 Verify that a sample from the TSP baskets months provide. adequate pH adjustment of @
f.f.7.e. water e% - horded M h represenMcA. cf a 9 8 4+ + M 9 Cenelbin l M j CEOG STS 3.5-11 Rev 1. 04/07/95
)
~~- Page Itplacem=t I:structio:s .. VOLUME 10 Section 3.6 ,,.,~~
Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding C75 markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as well a the specification number located in the upper right-hand corner of the C75page. Key: DOC = Qiscussion Of. Changes DOD = Qiscussion Qf Technical Specification Deviation or Discussion WBmes Deviation REMOVE INSERT
~~- Overview of Channes No pages changed.~~
~~llfi 3.6.6-3 3.6.6-3 ,~~
~~' ITS Bases -~~
B 3.6.1-4 and B 3.6.15 B 3.6.1-4 and B 3.6.1-5 B 3.6.2 9 B 3.6.2-9 B 3.6.3-1 through 3.6.312 B 3.6.3-I through 3.6.3 12 B 3.6.8-2 B 3.6.8-2 B 3.6.8-4 and D 3.6.8-5 B 3.6.8-4 and B 3.6.8-5 ' CTS Markup & Discussion of Channes Specification 3.6.1, Unit 1 Pages 4 of10 and 5 of 10 f ages 4 of10 and 5 of10 Specification 3.6.3, Unit 1 Pages 3 of 6 and 5 of 6 Pages 3 of 6 and 5 of 6 . Specification 3.6.3, Unit 2 Pages 3 of 6 and 5 of 6 Pages 3 of 6 and 5 af 6 DOC 3.6.6-4 DOC 3.6.6-4
~~'NSHC Findings No pages changed -~~
~~4 ISTS Markun & Justification 3.6 3.6-8~~
~~~ 3.6-13 ; 3.6-13 ' 3.6-17 and 3.6-18 3.6-17 and 3.6 ' '~~
~~3.6-31 3.6 31 DOD 3.6-2 DOD 3.6-2 i~~
~~. Note: Italici:edentries I.xficate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.~~
~~; Pcge Replaccert I:structions VOLUME 10 Section 3.6 -~~
Note: Underlinedtides indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit - number as well as the specification number located in the upper right-handcorner ofthe CTSpage. Key: V DOC = Discussion OfChanges DOD = Discussion QfTechnical Specification Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation
' REMOVE: INSERT ISTS Bases Markun & Justineation -B3.6-4'. B 3.6-4 i
~~B 3.6 - B 3.6-12~~
. Page titled " Insert B 3.6.2 SR 3.6.2.2" (located after page 3.6-18) Page titled " Insert B 3.6.2 SR 3.6.2.2 B 3.6-19 B 3.6-19 B 3.6 B 3.6-22 B 3.6 29 B 3.6-29 B 3.6-3 i B3.6-3i B 3.6-82 B 3.6-82 B 3.6-84 B 3.6-84 ^
~~DOD 3.6-3 . DOD 3.6-3 i i ta m~~
~~-c li J $ote: Italici:ed entries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully. \~~
Containment Spray and Cooling Systems 3.6.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE.. FREQUENCY-SR 3.6.6.1 Verify each containment spray manual, power- 31 days operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position. SR 3.6.6.2- Operate each containment cooling train fan 31 days unit for 2 15 minutes. SR 3.6.6.3 Verify each containment cooling train 31 days cooling water flow rate i: 2 2000 gpm to each fan cooler. SR 3.6.6.4 Verify each containment spray pump's In accordance l11 developed head at the flow test point is with the greater than or equal to the required Inservice developed head. Testing-Program SR 3.6.6.5 Verify each automatic containment spray 24 months valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation' signal.
~~-SR 3.6.6.6 Verify each containment spray pump starts 24 months automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.~~
SR 3.6.6.7 Verify each coi tainment cooling train starts 24 months automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS . & 2 3.6.6-3 Revision
~~.e '~~
Containment B 3.6.1' 1 l BASES-ACTIONS A,d In the event containment is inoperable, containment must be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour. The 1 hour-Completion Time provides a period'of time to correct the . problem conenensurate with 'the importance of maintaining containment during MODES 1,: 2, 3, and 4. This time period also ensures'that the probability of an accident (requiring containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 and B.2
-If containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the, required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36~ hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions f.om full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.1 REQUIREMENTS Maintaining the containment OPERABLE requires compliance - with the visual examinations and leakage rate test 7 requirements of the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. Failure to meet leakage limits specified in LC0 3.6.2 and LC0 3.6.3 does not invalidate the acceptability of these overall leakage determinations unless their contribution to overall Type. A,.B, and C leakage
.causes that to exceed limits. As left leakage prior to the first startup after.perfonning a required Containment ~ Leakage Rate Testing Program, leakage test is required to be-s 0.6 L. (207,600 SCCM) for combi'ned Type B and C leakage 7 and 's 0.75 L. (259,500 SCCH) for overall Type A leakage. At it y
~~^ 11 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.6.1-4 Revision [ u~~
^
A
l Containment B 3.6.1 BASES all other times between required leakage rate tests, the acceptance criteria is based on an overall Type A leakage limit of s 1.0 L . At s 1.0 L, the offsite dose consequences are bounded by the assumptions of the safety analysis. Surveillance Requirement Frequencies are as required by Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. These periodic testing requirements verify that the containment leakage rate does not exceed the leakage rate assumed in the safety analysis. Additionally, the requirements regarding the Unit 1 ' containment purge isolation valves must be met. I SR 3.6.1.2 For ungrouted, post tersioned tendons, this SR ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Concrete Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Testing and Frequency are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 4). 7 REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J Option B
2. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 14

3. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 5

4. Regulatory Guide 1.35. Revision 2 January 1976 7 w r CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.1-5 RevisionJ/7
~~~ Containment Air Locks.~~
B 3.6.2 BASES- , required to be performed _every 24. months.__The 24 month-Frequencyisbased'onthe;needto'performthis-SurveillanceLlU urder the conditions. that applyLduring a plant' outage and the potential 1for _ loss. of containment OPERABILITY'if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor.at. power. _The 24- month Frequency. for the interlock is justified. based on - > generic _ operating experience.- The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is' considered adequate given that the interlock is not challenged during use off the air lock. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part.50, Appendix J Option B
2. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 14

3. Updated Final' Safety Analysis Report,-Chapter 5
~~+ 4~~
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.2-9 Revisionff
l Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves BASES BACKGROUND The containment isolation valves form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for fluid penetrations not serving accident consequence limiting systems to be provided with two isolation barriers that are closed on an automatic isolation signal. These isolation devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their closed position (including check valves witn flow through ; the valve secured), blind flanges, and closed systems are considered passive devices. Check valves, or other i automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accident, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analysis. One of these barriers may be a closed system, i la Containment isolation occurs upon receipt of a high containment pressure signal. The containment isolation signal (CIS) closes automatic containment isolation valves in fluid penetrations not required for operation of Engineered Safety Feature systems in order to prevent leakage of radioactive material. Upon actuation of safety injection, automatic containment isolation valves also isolate systems not required for containment or Reactor Coolant System (RCS) heat removal. Other penetrations are isolated by the use of valves in the closed position or blind flanges. As a result, the containment isolation 7 valves (and blind flanges) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will. be isolated in the event of a release of radioactive material to containment atmosphere from the RCS following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). a
~~'CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-1 Revisionfy~~
Containment Isolation Velves B 3.6.3 BASES The OPERABILITY requirements for containment isolation valves help ensure that containment is isolated within the time limits assumed in the safety analysis. Therefore, the OPERABILITY requirements provide assurance that the containment function assumed in the accident analysis will be maintained. 7 APPLICABLE- The containment isolation valve LC0 was derived from the SAFETY ANALYSES assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the containment-boundary, containment isolation valve OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of the containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of containment is applicable to this LCO. The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material within containment are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break, and a control element assembly ejection accident. In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that containment isolation valves are either closed or function to close within the required isolation time following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through containment isolation valves (including containment purge valves) are minimized. The safety analysis assumes that the purge valves are closed at event initiation. The DBA analysis assumes that, within 60 seconds after the accident, isolation of the containment is complete and leakage terminated except for the design leakage rate, La. The containment isolation total respcase time of 60 seconds includes signal delay, diesel generator startup (for loss of offsite power), and containment isolation valve stroke times. 7 CALVERT CLIFFS ' UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-2 Revision 9' l l 1
Containment Isolation Valvos-B 3.6.3:
~~' BASES 'The containment isolation valves satisfy' -~~
10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion -3. j LC0 Containment isolation valves form a part of the containment' boundary. The containment isolation valve safety function' is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establishing the containment boundary during a DBA. The automatic power operated isolation valves are required-to have isolation times within limits and to actuate on an automatic isolation signal. The valves covered by this LCO are listed with their associated stroke times in the Updated ) Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) (Ref. 1). 1 The_normally closed isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind '? flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These 11 p'assive isolation valves or devices are those listed in Reference 1. This LC0 provides assurance that the containment isolation valves will perform their designed safety functions to e minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and establish the containment boundary during accidents. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and.6, the. probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containment isolation valves are not required < to be OPERABLE in MODE 5. The requirements for containment h CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-3 Revision [
~~g. -%~~
l J
, Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES isolation valves during MODE 6 are addressed in LC0 3.9.3,
~~" Containment Penetrations."~~
ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow paths to be unisolated inter.r.ittently under administrative controls. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who i < is in continuous comunication with the control room. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for containment isolation is indicated. A second Note has been added to provide clarification that, for this LCO, separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable containment isolation valve. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable containment isolation valves are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. The ACTIONS are further modified by a third Note, which ensures that appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected systems are rendered inoperable by an inoperable containment isolation valve. 7 The fourth Note has been added that requires entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1 when h leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage limi t. The fifth Note allows the shutdown cooling (SDC) isolation valves to be opened when RCS temperature is < 300*F to establish SDC flow. This Note is required for Operation in MODE 4 to allow SDC to be established. {i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-4 Revision [
1: Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES A.1 and A.2 In the event one containment isolation valve in one or more penetration flow paths is inoperable, the affected penetation flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de activated automatic containment isolation valve, a closed manual valve, a blind flange, and a check ;, valve with flow through the valve secured. For penetrations 7 isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device ' used to isolate the penetration should be the closest , available one to containment. Required Action A.1 inust be completed within the 4 hour Completion Time. -The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. For affected penetration flow paths that cannot be restored to OPERABLE statu:, within the 4 hour Completion Time and that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the affected penetration flow paths must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation. Rether, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those isolation devices outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate considering the fact that the devices are operated under admini:,trative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low. For the isolation devices inside containment, the time period specified as
" prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed ~l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-5 Revision /
I Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 1 BASES l within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the isolation devices and other l administrative controls that will ensure that isolation ! device misalignment is an unlikely possibility. Condition A has been modified by a Note indicating that this Condition is only applicable to those penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves and not a closed system. For penetration flow paths with one or more g containment isolation valves and a closed system, Condition C provides appropriate actions. Required Action A.2 is modified by a Note that applies to isolation devices located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these devices, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small, t B.1 With two containment isolation valves in one or more penetration flow paths inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated within 1 hour. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activcted automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. The 1 hour Completion Time is 7 consistent with the ACTIONS of LC0 3.6.1. In the event the affected penetration is isolated in accordance with Required Action B.1, the affected penetration mtist be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis per Required Action A.2, which remains in effect. This periodic verification is necessary to assure leak tightness of coitainment and that CALYERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-6 Revision 97
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES-penetrations requiring isolation following an accident ~are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying each affected penetration flow path is isolated is appropriate considering the ' fact that the valves 'are operated under administrative controls and the probability
~~.I of.their misalignment is low.~~
Condition B is modified by a Note indicating this~ Condition is only applicable to penetration flow paths with two containment isolation valves. Condition A of this LC0 addresses the condition of one containment isolation valve inoperable in this type of penetration flow path. C.1 and C.2 With one or more penetration flow paths with one or more containment isolation valves inoperable, the inoperable valves must be restored to OPERABLE status or the affected penetration flow path mJst be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic valve, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. A check valve may not be used to 7 isolate the affected penetration. Required Action C.1 must-be completed within the 72. hour Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable, considering the relative stability of the closed system-(hence, reliability) to act as a-penetration isolation boundary and the relative importance of supporting containment OPERABILITY during
. MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. In the event the affected penetration -is isolated in accordance with Required Action C.1, the affected penetration flow path must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to assure leak tightness of containment and that containment penetrations requiring. isolation following an accident are isolated. The Completion Time of once per 31 days for verifying-that each affected penetration flow path is -CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 -B 3.6.3-7 Revisionf.1
R Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES-isolated is appropriate considering the valves are operated , under administrr tve controls and the probability of-their' ' misalignment is low. Condition C is modified by a Note indicating that-this
-Condition is only applicable to those_ penetration' flow paths with one or more containment isolation valves and a closed' system. This Note is necessary since this Condition is I written to specifically address those penetration flow paths in a closed system. Containment Isolation Valves and their associated penetration numbers are given.in Table 5.3 of the l UFSAR(Ref.1). The penetrations on closed systems are-listed below.
Penetration No. Function IB Containment Vent Header to Waste Gas 16 Component Cooling Water Inlet 10 Component Cooling Water Outlet 19A Instrument Air 20A Nitrogen Supply 20B Nitrogen Supply I 20C Nitrogen Supply 23 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Drains 24 0xygen Sample Line 38 Demineralized Water 44 Fire t rotectio- i Required Action C.2 is modified by a Note that applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means 's considered acceptable, since access to these areas.is typically restricted. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of thue valves', once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small.
~~'CALVERT-CLIEFS - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.6.3-8 Revision ff I - __ _m-- _s_.___.m_ _ . . - - . . . _~~
i { Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES 0.1 and 0.2 If the RL; aired Actions and associated Completion Times are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be becught to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditicns from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVE1LLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the containment vent valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable reason. If a containment vent valve is open in violation of this SR, the valve is considered inoperable. If the inoperable valve is not otherwise known to have excessive leakage when closed, it is not considered to have leakage outside of limits. The v SR is not required to be met when the containment vent 4 valves are open for pressure control, as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or for Surveillances that require the valves to be open. The containment vent valves are capable of closing in the environment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited periods of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.6.3.2. SR 3.6.3.2 This SR requires verification that each containment 7 isolation manus' valve and blind flange located outside containaent and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. l g The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-9 RevisionffU l
Containment Isolation Valves B 3.6.3 BASES I radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any ' testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those containment isolation valves outside containment and capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. Since verification of valve position for containment isolation valves outside containment is relatively easy, the 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and was chosen to provide added assurance of the correct positions. Containment isolation valves that are open under administrative controls are~not required to meet the SR during the time the valves are open. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the I correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing. l, The Note applies to valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas and allows these devices to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, 3, 4 and for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment 1 solation valves, once they have been verified to be in the proper position, is small. SR 3.6.3.3 This SR requires verification that cach containment 1 isolation manual valve and blind flange located inside containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the containment boundary is within design limits. For containment isolation valves inside containment, the Frequency of " prior to entering MODE 4 from HODE 5 if not performed within the previous a CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-10 Revision)I
I Containment Isolation Valves- ,
~
B 3.6.3 BASES 92 days" is appropriate, since these containment isolation valves are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is' low. Containment' isolation valves that are open under administrative _ controls are not required to meet the SR during the time.that they. are open. This SR does nt,c apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since 7 4 these were verified to be in'the correct position upon ' locking, sealinC,-or securing. 7 The Note allows valves and blind flanges located in high radiation areas to be verified closed by use of administrative means. Allowing verification by administrative means is considered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, 2, and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probability of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified.to be in their proper position, is small. SR 3.6.3.4 Verifying that the isolation time of each automatic power operated containment isolation valve is within limits is required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis. The isolation time and Frequency of this SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. l0 SR 3.6.3.5
' Automatic containment isolation valves close on an isolation signal (CIS Channels A or.B, or safety injection actuation signal Channels- A or B) to prevent leakage of radioactive material from containment following a DBA. This SR ensures each automatic containment isolation valve will actuate to CALVERT' CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.3-11 Revision [ll
V
~
~~Containment. Iso 1ationiValves-B 3.6.3 -~~
~~' BASES ~~~
~~~ 7.i , its isolation position on a containment isolation ' actuation~~
~
~~signal.- This Surveillance is not required for valves that'~~
-are locked. sealed,- or. otherwise secured-in the required 3 - position under' adrainistrative controls. The 24 month Frequency,wasLdeveloped considering it is prudent that this : ,
~~SR be performed only during a unit outage, since isolation of penetrations would' eliminate cooling water flow and.~~
~~. disrupt ' normal operation of many critical' components.~~
Operating experience has shown that-these components usually' pass this SR when-performed on the 24~ month Frequency.- Therefore, the Frequency was' concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 5 I (
~~/ 'CALVERTCdIFFS-UNITS 1&2 B 3.6.3 Revi sion,0' I +~~
IRS B 3.6.8 BASES APPLICABLE The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive iodine SAFF.TY ANALYSES within containment are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB), or a control element assembly (CEA) ejection accident. In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that adequate containment leak tightness is intact at event initiation to limit potential leakage to the environment. Additionally, it is assumed that the amount of radioactive iodine release is limited by reducing the iodine concentration in the containment atmosphere. The IRS design basis is established by the consequences of the limiting DBA, which is a LOCA. The accident analysis l0 (Ref. 3) assumes that only two trains of the IRS are functional due to a single failure that disables the other train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne radioactive iodine provided by the remaining two trains of this filtration system. The IRS satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3. LC0 Three separate, independent (except for power), and redundant trains of the IRS are required to ensure that at least two are available, assuming a single failure coincident with a loss of offsite power. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, iodine is a fission product that can be released from the fuel to the reactor coolant as a result of a DBA. The DBAs that can cause a failure of the fuel cladding are a LOCA, MSLB, and CEA ejection accident, i Because these accidents are considered credible accidents in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the IRS must be operable in these MODES to ensure the reduction in iodine concentration assumed in the accident analysis. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are low due to the pressure and temperature limitations of l\ CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3,6.8-2 Revision [
. IRS-B 3.6.8 g BASES i brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least : <
MODE 3 within G hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The e.llowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experier e, to reach the required plant conditions from full power Onditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Initiattag each IRS train from the Control Room and operating it for it 15 minutes ensures that all trains are OPERABLE and that t associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that motor failure can be h 7 detected for corrective action. The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of fan motors and controls, the two train redundancy ava'.lable, and the iodine removal capability of the Containt.ient Spray System independent of the IRS. SR 3.6.8.2 This SR verifies that the required IRS filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. _SR 3.6.8.3 The automatic startup test verifies that both trains of equipment start upon receipt of an actual or simulated test signal (ESFAS). The 24 month Frequency is based on the need l( CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.6.8-4 Revision [
~~e. _~~
b
~~-IRS--~~
~~B:3.6.8~~
~~-- BASES to perform this' Surveillance underL the conditions that apply R during a plant outage and the potential for,an unplanned _.~~
Ltransient if the; Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. ~ Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at ' the 24 month Frequency; .Therefora, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. '
~~- Furthermore, the Frequency was developed considering that -~~
~~the system equipment OPERABILITY is demonstrated on a 31 day-~~
~~-Frequency by SR 3.6.8.1.~~
~~REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Appendix 1C~~
2. UFSAR, Section 6.7 ,

3. UFSAR, Section'14.21 i
~~N CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS.1 & 2.- B'3.6.8-5 Revision 0 y _____.____m_.__.______-__ _ . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _~~
~~- . .. - . - . . - . - . _ _ . . - - . _ . _ _ . . - . - . . .. - . . . _ . . . . . - . . ~ . . - . . . . . . -~~
~~TC Gh khil i I i~~
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3/4.6 CMTAIREur SYSTBS , _ssavt Lumet asquismuurs (continued) Contatuent purge f seletion valves shan De demonst
~~/ $ > $~~
SPttABLt1 ' - time upon entering NOpt 5 from power operett . unless ,u,, the survelliance test has been perfo in the past stx enn a v time after beine opened prior to entering b
Nett 4 from modes by verify 1 t when the mes:ured Zl leakase rete is a to the leak rates detemined pursuant to Technical Specificatt .6.1. or aII other Type B er C penetrations, the combi {. i kage rate is less than or equal to '
~~i 0.60 L~~
, valves. The leakage r for ontainment purge isolation - 4-shall also empared to rate to detect ssive valve de,theM.usly gradltion measured leakage -
.I
c. The con t purge isolation valve seals shall aced 4, with seals at a frequency to ensure no individual see ns in service greater than 2 consecutive fuel reload cy '
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CALVERT CLIFft - UNIT 1 3/4 6-3 Amendnett No. 219 ' h
Spu.f.ce4 an 3.6.1 3.(, 4/4,6 CONTAINMENT SYSTDi$, A'I y,g 4/4,44 (PRIMARMu#iAlf9m N Contain lnetruct r_ 7 Inteority a
~~.o LIMITING CON 0! TION ?0lt OPERATION w gg 3.5.1.5 The t'rir? ' 't **" e' th: containmer.2 sha11 be(6t:b;f :t chJ w..;;;tst r'th t" erte-M te e-'S6 '- Sp;ift;;ti;;, t.t.t.s.~~
~~___---}4{gg~~
~~, APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4. ,~~
~~g4 / ACTION: sg .afi .i. (.y, [a~. Vith the contal nt structure exhibt ng evidence of possibW~~
~~) abnomal degr atton per Specif; cati 4.6.1.6.1. perfom an engineerin valuation demonstrati the ability of the 4,A,[~~
contal t structure to continu to perfom its design f tion If co nued containment inte ty cannot be assured by one eerina evaluatN 'i*u on aava af +ha = = **ita fbe in COLD SNUTDOWN within 36 hours. etoeg Am* B . . requirements g qifirm - Li. ru not anonceDIt j;iAeol3}i{$ 3f_YaN
. With the st tural integrity of t containment not confo ng Y at a level nsistent with the ac ptance criteria of Specifica on 4.6.1.6.2 or 4.6. .3. restore struct1ral 4 ' ".-"
integri' or complete an engin ring evaluation that as res , struct al integrity A'3 U) [g\ amp stureabove200griort F, f increasing Rcactor Cool tSystem) y k e.cu eL.s. ^
~~swJ* A~~
~~,,% w..m t.~..n., ,3, ., u a.~~
3
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~~4.6.1.6.1 Contair.rierit Tendons. Thecontainmenttendons'strubur integrity shall be demonstrated at five year intervals. The tendons' structural integrity shall be der,nstrated by:~~
a. Detemining that for a representative sample of at least 9 tendons (3 dome, 3 vertical, and 3 hoop). each tendon has a normalized lift-off force equalling or exceeding its lower Ilmit expected range for the tiene of the test (see Figures 3.6.1-1, 3.6.1-2.and3.6.13). If the nomalized lift-off force of any one tendon in a group lies between the lower limit expected range 1 and the lower bound individual, an adjacent tendon on each side l shall be checked for lift-off force. If both of these tendons are found acceptable, the surycillance program may proceed considering the s'ngle deficiency as unique and acceptable. If her of the CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 fs-8 Amendment No. 212 l hm Dowss% -C d.ny 4 4.RA, r.o -
~~% % ara. c,.4rA^~~
P*ygQ10
1 SpeeSu4. 7.f. 3 - l d INSERT 3.6.3 ACTION NOTES 2. 3. & 4 NOTES A
2. Separate Condition catry is allowed for each penetration flow path. g 3, Enter applicabic Conditions and Required Actions for system (s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves.
i
~~4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1,"Containme4"when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance 4.;riteria.~~
7 3 f, henekttellem ot0 pctks Mg bd. MwisokAked inferMNM . (Adot o.d min istrad iv e, ?rntrol3. $
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~~/4.6 CONTAtletENT SYSTEMS }~~
3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAIMENT 6et h ea n g ..f'c}* a p A CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY S P"'# '\ / *
~~C. A m' m W LIN! TING C0WITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 'Priar.ry CONTAI MENT INTEGRITY shall ce maintained.' '~~
~~l S r 11,.3.2? APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4. s Wf thout primary CONTAllplENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAIMElli~~
~~= ,~~
~~A.t. 4 f Z TY within one hour or be in at least 110T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLS $NUTDOM within the following 30 hours. gaf~~
~~/.eL t SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS I[c~~
~~l Q.6.1.1 Primary CONTAllelENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated~~
~~@IL16.3.33~~
~~1. t % "At least once pe ~~~
esys by ver fying A st 3'b .3.3f not capable o ing closed by 0/ ERA 8u_that all pen'etratton " l containment automatic [ isolation y ves and required :.o be closed during accident cendition re closed by valves blind 'hneese or gescuvat A
~~g. b Lautomatic valves secured Tii"[ heir posf T onsfuxcep". for va' vi 4) @~~
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4 S. }f f'c. pfet requirements of Specification 3 613vertfying that each containment air lect is in j { ' aw j; /c. Bytoverifying enteringthat C8'the equipment 4 following hatch is closed and sepled, prior a shutdown i o ne by conducting a Type B test hatch utme
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Hyd en purge container.nt vent isolation valves $ for e hcon$nment pressure control, airborne radioactivity controbano
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surveillance testing purposes only were q The shv.tdown cooling isolation valves may be opened iilies, the RCS g s /\ Q# 4'M
~~~ temperature is below 300*F to establish shutdown cooling fl n~~
M lb l are located inside the contaIn(ment and are or' locked. l sealedExcept v ( Re(wit *d Asuva 4.7. otherwise secured in the closed position. ThesepenetratIrnsshall be vertfled closed during each COLD $N exceptthatsuch k verificetion need not be performed more te hen once per 92 days. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 6-1 ' Amendment No. 187 owie - -- -- ~ _ ,
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~~S r.en& des 3.4.3 ; i INSERT 3.6.3 ACTION NOTES 1. 3. & 4~~
~~% NOTES .~~
2. Sepense Condition erwry is allowed for each penetration kv path. .

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for system (s) made inoperable by containment isolation valves.

4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.(.1, " Containment," whenj'j leckage results in excueding the overall containment leakage n te acceptance critene j e
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5p.c.Ab 34'3 l i ' f ! 3/4.6 CONTA1:Beff SYSTDtl g,, h,ge,,,,,w ,f ca,,g , 3/4.6.1 PAlleART coiffAllftENT fri spec.G s M
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9 EMTAINENT INTERRITY % d**'d ' I Lilt!TIIIS COWITIM 798 eptRATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTA!IBIENT INTt4RITY shall be maintained.' ' t ; At2L3911II: IIODES 1, 2.' 3 and 4. ' NEh : Without primary CONTAtagitNT Illitet!TY, restore CONTAllpitNT-4 teplee<4 within one hour or be in at least 110T STANDIT within the next !
-A p s 6 hours and in Cet8 SINfftelal within the following 30 hours.-- a ~
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, t 4.6.1.1 primary CollTam"r maami shall be demonstrated j %3 1 58 L (..S.2 g rat 1 cast once not capable sy ny verir 1 ing closed by that ali penetration containment automati 4 .NR 3.6
E 3 isolation ves and required to be closed durins accident 1 4 g Minion are closed bs valves, blind "lanaear or deactivated) i autcait'c valves securel ' n sna' r nonit' onsJexcept for valvesj .
~~--Ghat are open unser aan n' strat' ve contro12mr. .,muum '~~
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veriffrements requ of Specification 3.6.1.3.ing that eacn contalis i. air locit is in comp 11 { c. ing that the equipment hatch is closed and sealed, rior ' By to enter veriffng IIDDE 4 following a shutdown where the tediament atch ,
, .{ by conducting a Type B test ;g "_n; v.-eeg l ^
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SR '!!L(..L l regen purge containment vent isolation valves ecl.AsJev. for' "# d# h ,6 i l g containneht pressure control, airborne radioactivitt cent surveillance testing purposes on1 y .gnd
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s'Ntemperature The shutdown is below 300'F cooling to isolation establishvalves shutdown maycoolinabe opened f1= dthe Resj p h M'3d tacept valves blind flanges. and deactivat=>i au+-tic vahtaa)which f(k A A.1) f-A Repleid are located inside the containient and a ocked. sealed, or . A otherwise secured in the closed sition. hese penetrations shall R A M. N be verified closed during each SNUTD( except that such @ verification need not be perfonned more o' ten then once per 92 days. CA ftRT C[ty y J U J m m /4 3 6 1_ Amendment No.164
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DISCUSSION OF CilANGES SECTION 3.6.6 - CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS TECIINICAL CIIANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE CONTROLLED _. DOCUMENTS A LA.1 Current Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 LCO states that the Containment Spray System shall be Operable with each spray system capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank or a Containment Spray Actuation Signal and Safety injection Actuation Signal, and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS), and that the flow path from the containment sump shall be via an Operable shutdown cooling heat exchanger. Improved Technical Specification 3.6.6 requires the Containment Spray System to be Operable, but does not contain the details that are in the h CTS. These details are being moved to Section B 3.6.6 of the ITS Bases. This is acceptable because these details do not impact the requirement to verify that the Containment Spray System is Operable. Sese details can be adequately controlled in the Bases which require change control in accordance with Bases Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. This apptcach provides an effective level of regulatory contrW and provides for a more appropriate change
~~control process. The level of safety of facility operations is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the requirement for the Containment Spray System to be k~~
Operable. Furthemo e,NRC and Calvert Cliffs resources associated with processing license amendments to these requirements will be reduced. This is a less restrictive movement of information change with no impact on srfety. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432. LA.2 Current Technicel Specification 4.6.2.2.a.1 requires that the containment air recirculation i and cooling units be started from the Control Room. Improved Technical Specification i SR 3.6.6.2 will not contain this requirement. This requirement will be moved to Bases Section SR 3.6.6.2 of the ITS Bases. This is acceptable because this requirement does not impact the requirement to verify that the containment air recirculation and cooling units will remove heat from containment. His detail can be adequately controlled in the Bases which require change control in accordance with Bases Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. This approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and provides for a more appropriate change control process. The level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the requirement to verify the containment air recirculation and cooling units are Operable. Furthermore, NRC and Calvert Cliffs resources associated with processing license amendments to these requirements will be reduced. This is a less restrictive movement of information change with no impact on safety. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. LA.3 Current Technical Specification 4.6.2.2.a.3 requires verifying cooling water flow when the l flow service water outlet valves are fully open. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.6.6.3
. will not contain this requi ement. This requirement will be moved to the Bases. This is acceptable because Technical Specifications should only contain specific requirements (i.e., to verify flow is a certain gpm). As long as the flow requirements are met, Technical Specifications should not specify valve position. The Bases of ITS SR 3.6.6.3 will include the requirement to conduct the SR when the full flow service water outlet valves are fully open. He Bases vil be maintained in accordance with the Bases Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. This approach provides an effective level of control and a more appropriate change control process. The level of safety of facility operations is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the requirement to verify that the flow to each cooling unit meets ihe acceptance criteria. Furthermore, NRC anj Calvert ClifYs resources associated with processing license amendments to these requirements will be reduced. This is a less o
b cal. VERT CLIFF 3 - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6.6-4 Revision 11
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Q i gys) Containment Isolation Valves (f/. :f:-!: 3.6.d !="5 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves (.^t:.%... % d EC @ (3.6.f.l) L' CO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE. t APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. i ACTIONS
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16.1 t4 t.n 1. ation flow paths ([ewegCier.1(21 in>90fge valvwnetra".tca;4w hll may be unisolatedTntermittently under aaministrative con'.rais. 3,6.E nch. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.
<2 ' '* * 'j . Enterabebycontainmentisolationvalves.licable inopera Conditions and Required Actions for system (s) m 3 t,,l.) \4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.6.1, ' Containment," when leakage results in exceeding the overall containment 'A /\
~~F..t is W/ leakage rate acceptance criteria. /J_\/jll~~
CONDITION REQUIREDACTION COMPLET!0N TIME A. ..--- -NOT E-..---- A.1 Isolate the affected 4 hours only applicable to penetration flow path pet.atration flow paths by use of at least one closed and with two valves containmenp..J. D. 4.
~~iih isolation de-activated~~
. b g g' t. 4 1 -gMMp,elautomaticvalve closed manual valve, One or c,re , blind flange, or A"d ' p e,,
penetratter. flow paths check valve with flow with one containment through the valve isolation valve secured.' inoperable _f[e opt f 7 rplirg va ve akage AND i and shield utidi t$ f (continued) CEOG STS 3.6-8 Rev 1, 04/07/95 '
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~~Containment Isolation Valves -(":::;S:-k w.; b.W 3.6.3 h SURVIILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ($$1~~
---~~ --NOTE-------- &I %.tl.a \SR 3.6.3/. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation F..%.*e M/ areas may be perified by use of n
[4,(,.1. l . c-administrative means. g cel ch l.A.p' Verify each containment isolation manual Prior to valve and blind flange that is located entering MODE 4 8 '*/* S 6' d"** Inside containJeeacd required to be free MODE 5 if A ra d closed curing accident conditions is not performed r3'TF- 4f i closed, except for ontainment isolation within the u o .3,6.3 valves that are open under administrative previous A <F,,.h.+c# controls. 92 days lu
$9 3.6.%.y Q4 Verify the isolation time of taart noWe.9 In 'y'4 /'3\ oserataV.aB@ each automatic 'ontainment accordance ",with the ~p ' 75ff- O / isolation valve is within mits. ]
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y SR 3.6.3. Perform leakage rate tes ng for 184 days containment purge valve with resilient seals. AlfQ l With 92 days af r opening i valve SR 3.6.3 Verify each automatic containment isolation months valve that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to 4,4,),2,/g\ the isslation position on an actual or simulated actuation signai. (continued)
~~- CEOG STS 3.7 ,~~
Rev 1. 04/07/95 s
I Containment spray and Cooling systems ennospheric and thdip l 3.5.15 (m> i l 3.6 CONTAINMChi $YSTEMS 3.6.$ Containment $sray and Cooling systems (f)ttospfic andJ0ali) ((0p5011 Isren fpf' Iscinc removaypy the borngr.- ,1 3Dra.r M g l A'b' M .2' LEO 3.6 4 Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE. orb APPLICABILITY: MODEsJg,2,%94f)(y.4i.64Q _ E A etc, f iedered sgq is rd t,egviced b be. lb ACTIONS 0*6EA8 I 8db'" 94 "U'ILEf M'""'8 d # l7to psin. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION CONPLETION TINE A. One containment spray A.! Restore containment 72 hours train inoperable. spray train to
~~'d +, 2.1 OPERABLF. status. AdQ Acynes 10 days from discovery of fa11ere to meet the M mailm9 t/c No"n~~
8. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associatGd Completion -- --m 3'4*8 8 Time of Condition A AtlQ - L A ru"^ w P*ndt Atr.ws nnt met. R'i' E 8.2 Be in W,JE 8 hours lk C. One contaisement C.1 Restore containment 7 days cooling train cooling train to gg inoperable. OPERABLE status. AliD A* **
~~10 days from discovery of failure to meet the w LCO'Lb'.t.%~~
d.'on (c, cte <ah e 1 I (continued) CEOG ST$ 3.6-17 Rev 1, 04/07/95
0 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (AtmesJ..i - im^ ^ 3.6.[ ACTIONS (continued) CON 0lT10N REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME .. D. Two containment - D.1 Restore one 72 hours
~~/ M .2. coolin9 trains containment cooling g,.s inoperable.~~
train to OPERABLE status. E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours + 3'"'1't associated Completion A*f'? de 's f Tie of Condition C or 0 not met. Alg) n, (41 E.t Be in MODE E. hours F. Two containment spray F.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Ismediately trains inoperable. 3.44 bet 4.4 DE Any combination of three or more trains inoperable. , SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.d1 Verify each containment sp ay manual, owe hldays I f, ,2, l, g ,l operated, and automatic valve in the f ow path that is not locked, sealed, or h h otherwise secured in position is in the I correct position. (continued) CEOG STS 3.6-18 Rev 1, 04/07/95
/
s ICS,'."....,"...'...."..'-'- (crs) 3.6 CONTA!WtENT 3.6 lodine System (1 )((Moospb6 rte and DupfD h63.fLC0 3.5 @ trains shall be OPERABLE. @@ APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2sj 3 , and 4. ACT40NS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLET!ON TIME 3I' A. One train A.! Restore I train to 7 days Aen.J/ inoperable. OPERABLE status. E
~~,4,g,g Required Actson and 1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours -~~
associated Completion Acr>." Time not met. 2 Se in MODE 5. 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6. I Operat_e each I o wun ne trainforJ[2 s operau n. conti Ifor u 31 days @ (< 4.1. I. ens with heaters)/2 15 minutes} A SR 3.6. .2 Perform requi d I S filter testin in accordance with the Ventilation Fifter in accordance with the & @ Testing Program (WY. ve. blab RW j Te,Ev; 'Prcgre 1 (continued) CEOG STS 3.6-31 Rev 1 C4/07/95 m' j B, AArt om tu he /Aw @ s.,.:.a.&*ZH-bum l2,1 & --a am . w M' t
DISCUSSION OF TECt'.ilCAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.6 - CONTATNMENT SYSTEMS apply. It is consistent with the philosophy provided throughout NUREG-1432. The Ba es for NUREG-1432 LCO 3.0.2 states: "He fin:t type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met . If this tyr; of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a tdown my be required to place 15e unit in a MODE or condition in which the ips , is not applicable." Additionally, the Completion Time for Required Action B.2 w45 clumged from "84 hours" to "12 hours". His time is consistent with the Completion Time of Required Action B.2 ofITS LCO 3.5.2, which also requires the plant to be placed in Mode 3 with pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia.
7. The shutdown track in Required Action E.2 was changed from a requirement to be in Mode 5 in 36 hours, to Mode 4 in 12 hours. This change was made bccause the Calvert Cliffs Containment Spray and Cooling Specification is only applicable in Mo'ss 1,2, and 3. This change is consistent with other 7 :hnical Specifications (when not modified and justified in the Bases) when shutting down to..fode 4,

8. A Surveillance (ITS 3.7.6.2) was added to NUREG 1432 Specification 3.6.8 (Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.6.7) which requires the performance of a Cnannel Celibration of all hydrogen recombiner instrumentation and control circuits every 24 months. His test is consistent with Calvert Cliffs' current licensing basis.

9. The change adds an Action to NUREG-1432 Specification 3.6.10 (ITS 3.6.8) which incorporates an Action when two lodine Removal System trains are inoperable. Calvert Cliffs deviates from the standard Combustion Engineering plant in that it has three trains of todine Rernoval System. Two trains are required during a design basis accident. One of the three trains is a swing train and has to be powered from the correct bus to maintain separate and independent trains. In order to perform this alignment without entering Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 Chere is no Action for two trains), Action B wlas added.
Action H a!!ows one hour to restore one lodine Removal System train to Operable status. This change will not increase the total time allowed to be in Mode 5 (Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 allows 37 hours, and Actions B and C combined would also allow 37
~~nurs).~~
10. NUREG-1432 Condition C is for one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable and is only applicable to penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve and a closed system. Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.6.3 wili retain the same requirement as the NUREG cxcept the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant ITS will also apply to those closed systems _with more than one containment isolation valve. Calvert Cliffs is a non-General Design Criteria plant with closed systems that contain one or more containment isolation valves. In conjunction with this change, a phrase was added to Conditions A and B Conditions Notes which specify that these Conditions only apply to penetration flow paths not in a closed system. This change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs design.

11. In ITS 3.6, changes have been made to reflect the implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B. This is consistent with Calvert Cliffs' current licensing basis as approved in License Amendment Nos. 219 and 196 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69, respectively. These License Amendments were issued on February 11,1997.

12. Not used. l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.6-2 Revision 11
1 Containment (Atmospheric) B 3.6.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) . MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experienc6, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. l SURVE!LLANCE $R 3.6.1.1 , REQUIREMENTS ' Maintain 1 the c neent OPERABLE requires compliance l with the y sua examinations and : eakage rate test !
~~-m reauirerants_cfl0C 50. Aan==n x a r usv r'. as = w n ew !~~
CedaQ.{. Dy A1)orovec Axumpti Failure to meet (pirisfkEd pp'ge} ! y lvFfith entitantAnal) leakage limits spec' fled in Mt 'T<' thi ' m 3.6.2 and LCO 3.6. Fdoes not invalidate the _6 acceptabilit of these overall leakage deteminations unless d their contri tion to overall Type A, B and C leakage ' causes that to exceed limits. As luft sakage prior to the M8"'"g I first startu after performing a re utred u mpeenark J.) eskage test is requir lo be r l
~~' '" 3 ,~~
8 t combined T e B and C leakage, and 30.75 L; dor overais Type A les age. At all cther times between required leansge rate tests ~the acceptance criteria is based on an overall 459.5o0 At s 1.0 L the offsite see
, dose Type:ensequences A les age limit of $ 1.0b L'y.the assumpti*ons of the are bounded safety analysis. SR Frequencies are as required by iA)penpx o, as =vdii^ f u^ cy approvec ex tions. Inus, /
~~JSt 2Af fuhich allats Freauenev exte ions) does noticoly.~~
; TTiese periodic testing re utrements.verif that the x / containment leakage rate oes not exceed he leakage rate .. / a_ssumed in the safety analysis.
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85 ""Si k "Et- \ gf [ SR 3.6.1.2 A L /% rm For ungrouted. post tensioned tendons, this SR ensures that the structural integrity of the ccatainment will be SL p mainteined in accordance with the provis13ns of the Containment Tendon Surveillance Program. Tecting and frequency are consistent with the recommendations of _ Re?ulatory Guide 1.35 (Ref. 4). _ (continued) CEOG STS B 3.6-4 Rev1,04/07/95
=
~~Containment Air Locks i^tr .r. . n .nu yo.F G 83.6.h BASES (continued) g~~
~
APPLICABLE lbgM conta.tadenQ ~ SAFETY ANALYSES reeaseofradioactivemateri,theDBAsthatresultina tI within containment are a loss o coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (ftSLB) and a control element assembly (CEA) ejection r 'ru s /,. k. p r.Je. is accid nt (Ref. 2). In the analysis of each of these
<d/hd f, fo me fo* acci ots, it is assumed that containment is OPERA 8LE such that release of fission products to the environment is pM A ' T od, , 8e con olled by the rate of containment leakage. The M 4 b m.,;e m con ainment was designed with an allowable Isakage ra all 4 @ J [ % of containment air weight per day (Ref. 3). i -
~~l 14 #'4'~~
~~4 4 TWytype r is certned in to cr 9, app nu m o gne 1),~~
[ 4g"{<f p.k m as L.: e maxi. mum a110wable ntainment leakage the ca ulated maximum ceak ontainment pressur . P.) of e at g p 1 cshmd (Awd psto which result
<[55.'an harle, ram'tha limitina- which is a Ide Eta (Ref. ).f This allowable leakape rate h - r<< u ,c , fd43.f f si&)' forms the basis for the acceptance criterli, imp' . 4 the -A \' 6% ,Lu.h A ~ - SRt assrelated with the air lock, lo ^ fordualcontainment, radioactive material hinDBAsthatresultinareleas[MSLB, containment are a !.0CA, and a CEA ejection a ident (Ref. 2 .
each of these acci ats, it is assum)ed that contalIn the nt isanaly s of OPERA 8LE such tha release of fission products t the environment is atrolled by the rate of conta nt leakage. The ontainment was designed with a allowable leakage rate f [0.50]% of containment air ight per day (Ref. 3). is leakage rate is defined 1 '1D CPR 50, @ Appendix (Ref.1), as L.: the maximum lowable contal nt leakage rate at the calcul ed maximum peak contal nt pressure (P.) of g, which results fron ' the altingD8A,whichisa[75%R42.3) MSLB (Ref. 2). This able leakage rate fones the sis for the acceptance g'al' teri. 4-m a - e k. u. ... eos a te w inck ) _ i The containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. fve.t.r re lu Jar n - Aj LCO Each containment air lock form part of th containment pressure boundary. As part of containment the air lock safety function is related to control of the containment leakage rate resulting from a D8A. Thus, each air lock's structural integrity and leak tightness are essential to tN successful mitigation of such an event. (continued) CEOG STS S 3.6-12 Rev 1. 04/07/95 s e t
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Oh ! every 24 mor:. s he 24 month Frequency is bas,M the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for loss oicantainment OPERABILITY if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power, & 24 month T3rr G Frequency for the interlock is justified based on gene-ic operatmg experunce. 4 0
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Containment Isolation Valves ( i B 3.6 C0WTA!8 MENT $VSTEMS 8 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Yalves 444moophe" =d "nQ , SA$ES I - BACKGROUND The conta; ment isolation valves form part of the ' containsect pressure boundary and provide a seans for (Icid penetrations not serving accident consequence limiting ( systems to be provided witt. two isolation barriers that are I closed on an automatic-isolation signai. These isolation 49 devices are either passive or active (automatic). Manual valves, de-activated automatic valves secured in their es with flow through - closed the valve position (including secured),. blind flecheck,valv.d ei an closed systems are considered passive devices. C ocE valves, or other g automatic valves designed to close without operator action following an accid 6nt, are considered active devices. Two barriers in series are provided for each penetration so that , no single credible failure or malfunction of an active component can result in a loss of isolation or leakage that exceeds limits assumed in the safety analysis.. One of these barriers may be a closed system.
.,. Containment isolation occurs _upon receipt of s h'igh l containment pressure signalto . r iow naaetor Lou ent ascos
' ' (RrJr m e num umum1 The containment isolation signai closes automatic containment isolation valves in fluid penetrations not required for operation of Engineered $6fety
~~. Feature systems in order to prevent leakage of radioactive matarla1. Upon actuation of safety injection, automatic~~
e containment isolation valves also isolate systems not required for containaent.cr RCS heat removal. Other penetrations are isolated b position.or blind flanges. y As theauseresult, of valves the containment in the closed ,
~~isolation valves (and $11nd flanges) help ensure that the containment atmosphere will be isolated in the event of a~~
~~' release of radioactive material to containment atmosphere from the RCS following a Design Basis Accident (08A).~~
The OPERA 8ILITY requirements for containment isolation valves help ensure that containment is isolated within the time limits assumed in the safety analysis. Therefort, the OPERABILITY requirements 7.mvide assurance that the containment function assesed in the accident analysis will be maintained. (continued) [ CEOG STS B 3.6-19 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l t
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Containment Isolation Valves (" :;*4^ xf 50 B 3.6.3 g BASES (continued) LC0 Containment isolation valves form a part of the containment boundary. is reisted 'to minimizing the loss of reactor coolantThe containment isolation va inventur.y and establishing the containment boundary during a DBA. The automatic power operated iso'lation valves are required to have isolation times wittn limits and to actuate on an automatic. isolation sig ul. The p va,ves must - maintal sealed c1 p r have eks installed prey ull open _ Blocks urge valves al gtuatt, on .1[1 The valves covered d automatic / this LC0 b are th their associated stroke times in t e h The nonna11y closed isolation valves are considered OPERABLE when manual valves are closed, automatic valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, blind I flanges are in place, and closed systems are intact. These passive isolation valves or devices are those listed in j, i Reference Q
'rurge valves with resilient sea -(and secondary contal nt hypass val si must meet addi onal leakage rate requirem sr The other cc inment isolation t'alve eskage mates e addressed by LC .6.1, " Containment,"
Ig:t a3 ype C ~ /k A LL) This LCO providfs assurance that the containmet t isclation (}) I valves ops w ee va We) will perfore their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory and estabitsh the containment boundary during accidents. i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to containment. In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, the containment isolation valves are not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 5. The requirements for contair. ment isolation valves during MODE 6 are addressed in LCO 3.9.3,
~~" Containment Penetrations."~~
~~a (continued) CEOG STS~~
~~B 35-22 Rev 1. 04/07/95 A~~
~~t Containment Isolation Valves ("~~
~~f:t nf B59)-3.6.~~
~~O BASES SURVE!LLANCE SR 3.6.3.1 (con nued)~~
*~
REQUIREMENTS opening of a co afnment purge valva. tailed analysis of the purge valv failed to conclusivel demonstrate their ability to c1 e during a LOCA in ti to limit offsite doses, The ore, these valves *are equired to be in the sealed clo d position during MODES ,2 3, and 4. A contaiwe purge valve that is se ed c,losed must have
, motive p r to the valve operato remo'ved. This can be accomp1 hed by de-energizing th source of electric p or by ving the air supply t the valve operator. I this plication, the term 'se ed' has no connotatio of leak l htness. The Frequene is a result of an NRC intistyve,GenericIssue8 (Ref.(D related to
_p - Fyp,*'n c tainment purge valve use during unTt operations This SR i not required to be met 11e in Condition E of his LCO. his is reasonable since e penetration flow p h would be isolated. _ SR 3.6.3 ,; .f This SR ensures that he g w p pge) valves re closed as re ired or, if open,1 open vor en allowab reason. If a @ valve is open i violation of this R, ths valve is coda'. ' ' Vd cons dered inoperable. If the inopera e valve is not aS"" otherwise known to hav excessive lea ge when closed, it is not considered to have eskage outsi of limits. The SR is not required to be met uhen the valves are open for pressure control, ALARA or air 4 y considerations for pers)nnel entry, or forJurveillancetsthatrequirethe valves to be open. The wri-- valves are capable of closing in the eavironment following a LOCA. Therefore, these valves are allowed to be open for limited perfoos of time. The 31 day Frequency is consistent with other containment isolation valve requirements discussed in SR 3.C.3Q SR 3.6.3 i This SR requires verification that each containment a
~~'"*I"b "' *be a~~
isolation manual valve and blind flange located outside containmentaand required to be closed during accident [d 2'ftJ Ig,.4f
~~. ~concitionsl s closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside the (continued)~~
CEOG STS B 3.6-29 Rev 1, 04/07/95 6e .
Containment Isolation Valves m""-"'" 83.6.5 @ BASES SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.6.3 (continued) h administrative means is cohsidered acceptable, since access to these areas is typically restricted during MODES 1, t and 3 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the probabilit misalignment of these containment isolation oncevalves,y of , they have been verfiled to be in their proper position, is small. . SR 3.6.3. e r ,psetle O ,. ,o
~~< Verifying at t e isolation time of eachmme ooerswd ani) 7 sped automati containment isolation valve is within limits is~~~
required to demon.trate OPERABILITY. The isolation time test ensures the valve will isolate in a time period less A than or equal to that assumed in the safety analysis.s*{The l'/ isolation time and Frequency of f.his SR are in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program (6p@ytlaf9.) .
~~, y -~~
3.6.3.6 ' {SR f For containment purge alves wit r 111ent seals, i additional leakage r e testing eyond the test quirements of 10 CFR 50, Appe Ix Ji(Ref. , is required ensure OPERABILITY. Oper ting experience has demonst ted that M~3D this type of seal as the potential to degra in a shorter time period than do other seal types. Base on this observation and he importance of maintain this penetration 1 light containment dtheenv(duetothedirectpathbetween ironment). a:Fre ency of 184 days was establi ed as part of the NRC res ution of Generic Issue J-20 ' Containment Leakage Due o Seal Deterioration" (Ref.({p. - Additi ally, this SR must be per reed within 92 days after opent the valve. The 92 day F quency was chosen roc zing that cycling the va ve could introduce add lonal seal degradation ( yond that occurring to a va e that has not '>een open ). Thus, decreasing the terval as been o(pened.from 184 days) I a prudent measurejafter a valve (continued) CEOG STS B 3 6-31 Rev 1. 04/07/95
~~-e -,c~-,. ,. , _ y n -~~
~~/ ~. - _~~
~~be lTise ek hat.1R.S ate. powered ,sc para e 8gineert)~~
$dc43Eec.bres huses. Ne b' irk 'Cll5 frAM Is a . swing 4rdin M (c*w ha o\iped to itdyt, pesoer he.e R @ *-'U" CD 'ihev fasiae' red Sedeh Myre4 bus . 73 BASES ___
j McKGROUND (escert fee poiar)) trair.s a Y provided to meet the reautrement far (continued) paration, independenc and reduMancy. f .h IC rain s' w _ d ol el. J e e is uiree to supply o ne waivr w APPLICA8LE The DBAs th.t result in a release of radioactive iodine SAFETY A*MLYSES within containment saa a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line bre,i MSLB), or a control eleesnt assembly (CEJ.) ejection accicant. In the analy.i: for each of these accidents, it is assumed that adequate containment leak tightness is intact at event initiation to limit potential leakage to the environment. Additionally, it is assveed that the amount cf radioactive iodine release is limited by reducing the iodine ccacentration in the containment at. The
~~.r..~~
dasign basis is tstablished the con ces of gg he accid t alys the limiting DBAt wh ;h is a LOCA. l /N Q Ref. 4) assumes that onl_ y g tral of the I $ f(unctional due to a single failure that disable he L'J train. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne radioactive iodine provided by the remaining
~~@_ train;of this filtration system.~~
The sctisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 g [(eptopt(seesdeQ s'op2 rate. independent ( anti rardun Qins of the are required *o ensure thst at least available, asluming a sing e failure coincident loss of offsite fober. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, iodine is a fission product that can be released from the fuel to the reactor coolant as a result of a DBA. The D8As that can cause a failure of the fuel cladding are a LOCA, MSLB, and CEA ejection accident. Because these accidents are considered credible accidents in MODES 1,2,3,and4, theft must be operable in these W @ (continued) CEOG STS B 3.6-82 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
~~. _ _ . _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _ _ _ _ _~~
~~g&A e BASES (continued)~~
~~$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS hR 3.8.~~
1 LMj k b GDecitJheTeach train'for 2 13 minutes ensures that all LE and that all associated ea=+ als are
~
trains are OPE functioning praa- 1v. It also ensures thatGToeir85e fan d / motor failureFortscesMet vibMr;ioscan be detectW rar korrective action. fror systems w 4h heaters, opera'; with] pne neaters n (automatic heater ycling to' maintain j temperatur for 1 10 continuo hours eliminates no ture m the orbers and HEPA fil rs. Experience fr filter testi at operating units I icates that the 10 ur period is att far anfature el instine an 4ka =Ana == ==d , htEP litersJ The 31 day frequency was developed considering the known reliability of fan motors and controls, the two . rain redundancy available, and the iodine removal capability of the Containment Spray System independent of the . sR 3 6. 2 This SR verifies that t e required . filter testing is performed in acc anc with the Ventilation Filter Teatino f
~~/$'~~
Program (VFTP?. $ n ny t-mi= - in =rra-i witre tueguia - , su ce 52 (R_of. A).1 The VFTP includes sessing - 4 m.rn ruter perforwance, enarcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (gerieral use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. sR 3.6. 3 - W The automatic st rtup est verifies that both trains of equipment start upon receipt of an actual or simulated test f[FAIe\/ stenal. The month Frequency is based on the need to perfets this urveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned trustent if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these come is usually pass the Surveillence when performed at f M-conc ! month Frequency. Therefore the Frequency was tobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint. @ Furthermore, the Frequency was developed considering that (continued) CE04 STS ,. B 5.6-W4 Rev 1, 04/07/95 4 4
+
a - . _ + --%, r - wi e--- a-e-e- *- - e?
DISCUSSION OF BASES DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.6 - CONTAl.NMENT SYSTEM 5s is entered . . ." The Bases for ITS SR 3.6.2.2 have been revised to incorporate the changes discussed abou, as well as several editorial enhancements.
17. Typographical / grammatical error corrected.

18. This change incorporates correct terminology from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. Option B, for defining the term P, as the calculated peak containment internal pressure related to the design basis loss-of-coolant accident.

19. NUREG 1432 B SR 3.6.8.1 states that operating each Iodine Removal System train for 215 minutes " . . also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action." Improved Technical Specifications will not include the alarms for blockage or excessive vibration because this equipment is inside Containment, and the only way to make the determination is by going inside Containment. Containment entries while operating at power will not be made for this surveillance.
~~l l l CALVER1 CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.6-3 Revision 11~~
~~--w. ,~~
~~. - . - .. . _ _ . = ... - -- . -. . . . .~~
P:ge Replaccinent 3nstructirs VOLUME 11 Section 3.7 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as wil as the spect/lcation number located in Ihe upper right-hand corner ofthe C15page. 7 Key: . DOC = Discussion OfChanges DOD = Discussion Of TechnicalSpecification Deviation or Discussion QfBases Deviation REMOVE- INSERT Overview of Chammes No pages changed. Illi 3.7.42 3.7.4-2 3.7.51 3.7.51
- 3.7.61 3.7.6-1 3.7.71 3.7.7 1 3.7.11 1 and 3.7.112 3.7.11 1 and 3.7.112 3.7.13 1. 3.7.13 i 3.7.152 3.7.15 2 ITS Bases B 3.7.1 I through B 3.7.16 B 3.7.1 I through B 3.7.1-6 B 3.7.3 1 B 3.7.3-1 B 3.7.3 8 and B 3.7.19 B 3.7.3 8 and B 3.7.19 B 3.7.31J B 3.7.3-1I and B 3.7.3.I2 - B 3.7.4 1 through B 3.7.1 5 B 3.7.41 through B 3.7.15 B3.7.8.8 B 3.7.8.8 B 3.7.11-2 through B 3.7.11-4 8 3.7.112 through B 3.7.11-3 - B 3.7.12 4 B 3.7.12 4 B 3.7.15-2 through B 3.7.1-4 B 3.7.15 2 through B 3.7.1-4 CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes DOC 3.7.13 and DOC 3.7.14 DOC 3.7.I 3 and DOC 3.7.14 DOC 3.7.2-2 through DOC 3.7.1-4 DOC 3.7.2 2 through DOC 3.71-4 Specification 3.7.4, Unit i .
~~Page1of1 . PageIofI Specification 3.7.4, Unit 2 -~~
~~-Page1of1 PageIofI DOC 3.7.4 1 - DOC 3.7.4-1 4~~
~~4 i J Note: Italact:ed entries indicate uneven exchanges. ' pleasefollowpage replacement instructiom carefu!!y.~~
-i
E l= Pcg) Replacement I:structio:s VOLUME 11 Section 3.7 Note: Underlined titles trulicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CTS mur'kups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as urli as the spectfication number located in the upper right-hand corner ofthe CTSpage. Key: dot 'scussIon OfChanges 2 DOD= scussion Qf TechnicalSpecification Deviation or Discussion OfBases Deviation
)
REMOVE INSERT CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes. Continued. SpeelGcdon 3.7.8, Unit i Page 3 of 6 Page 3 of 6 Specification 3.7.8, Unit 2 Page 3 of 6 Page 3 of 6 Specificatica 3.7.10, Unit I - Page 1 of 3 Page1of3
. Specification 3.7.10, Unit 2 Page 1 of 3 Page1of3 Specification 3.7.11, Unit 1 Page 1 of 3 Page 1 of 3 Specification 3.7.11 Unit 2 ,
P1geIof4- Page1of4 DOC 3.7.11 I through 3.7.113 Specification 3.7.12, Unit 1 PageIof3 Page 1 of 3 Specification 3.7.12, Unit 2 Page 1 of 3 Page 1 of 3 NSHC Findines No pages changed. ISTS Markun & Justification 3.71 3.7 1 3.7-5 3.7 5 Page titled " Insert 3.7.3 Actions A,B,C"(afler page 3.7-11) Page titled
~~Insert 3.7.3 Actions A,B,C 3.713 and 3.714 3.7-13 and 3.714~~
. 3.7-16 3.7-16 3.7 3.7 18 3.7 3.7-20 ^ '~"~ . Page titled "12"(found two pagei after 3.7-20)\ 1 . f ' iPage titled"12"' ' ~ ~
Lm ,. ,j(Note: Carfully match the text of these pages. Disregard recurring page numbers.)] 3.7-26 3.7 26 3.7-30 3.7-30 . 3.7 31' 3.7 31 1
~~- Page titled " Insert 3.7.11 Action A" after 3.7-31 ~~~
~~il m4'~~
/
~~i Note: Italict:cdentries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully.~~
e-
~~Page Replacernent 1:structions~~
1. , VOLUME 11 Section 3.7 Note: Underlinedtitles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CIS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as uvil as the specipcation number .'ocated in the upper right-hand corner ofthe CTSpage.
Key: DOC = Discusston OfChanges . . DOD = Qiscusslon Qf TechnicalSpectpcation Deviation or Discussion OfBases Deviation REMOVE INSERT ISTS Markun & Justification. Continued. 3.7-32 3.7 32 3.7 34 3.7 34 DOD 3.7 2 and 3.7 3 DOD 3.7 2 and 3.7 3 DOD 3.7 5 and 3.7 6 IX)D .~.7 5 and 3.7 6 ISTS Bases Markun & Justification B 3.71 through B 3.7-3 B 3.71 through B 3.7 3 1 B 3.7 5 B3.7-5. B 3.7 9 B3.7-9 B 3.714 and B 3.715 B 3.714 and B 3.7-15 B 3.717 B 3.7.I7 B 3.7 22 B 3.7 22 B 3.7 27 B 3.7 27
~ Page titled " Insert B 3.7.3 SR 3.7.3.2"(afler page 3.7 28) Page titled " Insert B 3.7.3 SR 3.7.3.2" B 3.7 30 B 3.7-30 B 3.7 32 B 3.7 32 B 3.7 59 and B 3.7-60 B 3.7 59 and B 3.7-60 B 3.7 72 B 3.7 72 h 3.7-74 B 3.7 74 " insert 3.7.1 Bases A 1 and A-2"(insert after 3.7-74)
B 3.7 80 B 3.7-80 B 3.7-83 B 3.7 83 B 3.7 92 B 3.7-92 DOD 3.71 through 3.7 4 DOD 3.71 through 3.7-4 lii Note: Italicted entries indicate uneven exchanges.' Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully, i,Q
~
~~h i_z_______. ..____._- 1._._~~
CST 3.7.4 , SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Verify CST usable volume is 12 hours 2: 150,000 gallons per Unit, b 11 ll ' CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.4-2 Revision /
1 CC System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Component Cooling (CC) System 1 LCO 3.7.5 Two CC loops shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQVIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CC loop A.1 --------NOTE ------- inoperable.
~~-Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.4.6, "RCS Loops--MODE 4," for shutdown cooling made inoperable by CC.~~
Restore CC loop to 72 hours il OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AND not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours x
. . ,3 \\ ..CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.5-1 Revisiong
i-SRW 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Service Water (SRW) System LCO 3.7.6 Two SRW subsystems shall be OPERABLE. h APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. i M IONS s CONDITION REQUIRED ACTI0N COMPLETION TIME ' A. One SRW subsystem A.1 --------NOTE ------- inoperable. Enter app icable Conditiens and , Required Actions of i.C0 3.8.1 "AC , Sou.ces--Operating," for diesel genarator made inoperable by SRW. Restore SRW subsystem 72 hours l! to OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A AN9 not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.6-1 Revision F ti
SW-3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS.:
~~^ - 3.7.7 - Saltwater (SW) System LCO 3.7.7 Two SW subsystems shall be OPERABLE. -APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,.3, and 4.~~
ACTIONS . , CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SW subsystem A.1 ------- NOTES ------- inoperable.- 1. Enter. applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.1, "AC-Sources-Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SU System.
~~2. Enter applicatior '~~
Cnnditions and r Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," for shutdown cooling made inoperable by SW System. Restore.SW subsystem 72 hours l4 to OPERABLE status. ; q
~
9
~~.CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.7-I Revisionf-~~
SFPEVS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Spent-Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System (SFPEVS) LCO 3.7.11 The SFPEVS shall be OPERABLE and in operation. APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Auxiliary Building. ACTIONS-03NDITION COMPLE710NTIME - REQUIRED ACTION A. One SFPEVS charcoal A.1 Verify OPERABLE SFPEVS Imediately adsorber' bank train is in operation. ! inoperable. M M A.? Suspend movement of Imediately
;* One SFPEVS exhaust irradiated fuel fan inoperable, b i
assemblies in the Auxiliary Building. M One SFPEVS charcoal N adsorber bank and l one SFPEVS exhaust fan inoperable. B. No ( "_RABLE SFPEVS B.1 Suspend movem;nt of Immediately train. irradiated fuel , assemblies in the M Auxiliary Building. No OPERABLE SFPEVS train in operation. 1
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.11-1 Revision J/ _.___.___m___.__
SFPEVS i 3.7.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify an OPERABLE SFPEVS train'is in 12 hours 6 u operation, SR 3.7.11.2 Perform required SFPEVS filter testing in . In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the Testing Program. Ventilation Filter Testing Program SR 3.7.11.3 Verify each SFPEVS fan can maintain a 24 months tt measurable negative pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure.
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2_ 3.7.31-? Revision [ f
i SFP Water Lev'el 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS f' 3.7.13- Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Water Level LC0 3.7.13 The SFP water level shall be 2 21.5 ft over the top of g irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks. APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the SFP. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. SFP water level not A.1 - -- ---NOTE ------- within limit. LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. 7 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in SFP. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Verify the SFP water level is 2 21.5 ft 7 days above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies l 11 seated in the storage racks. s t
*: it CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.13-1 Revision /
MFIVs 3.7.15 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY. SR 3.7.15.1 Verify the closure time of each MFIV is in In accordance accordance with the Inservice Testing with the Program. Inservice Testing Program i 11 o.
~~# CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.15-2 Revision y li~~
^
MSSVs B 3.7.1 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.l.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) 4 BASES-BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for the secondarf system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) by providing a heat sink for the removal of energy from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water Systeni, is not available. Eight MSSVs are located on each main steam header, outside containment, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 10(Ref.1). The MSSV rated capacity passes the full steam flow at 102% RTP (100% + 2% for instrument error) with the valves full open. This meets the requirements of the American Sc-iety of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, Section III (Ref. 2). The MSSV design includes staggered setpoints, according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the lo ti accompanying LCO, so that only the number of valves needed will actuate. Staggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve thattering because of insufficient steam pressure to fully open all valves following a turbine reactor trip. The MSSVs have "R" size orifices. 11 APPLICABLE The design basis for the MSSVs comes from Reference 2; their SAFE 1Y ANALYSES purpose is to limit second? y system pressure to s 110% of design pressure when passing 100% of desiga steam flow. This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or accident considered in the , Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transier,t analysis. The events that challenge the MSSV relieving capacity, and thus RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat removal events, and are presented in the UFSAR, Section 14.5 l( CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.1-1 RevisionJ/ l
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES (Ref. 3). Of these, the full power loss of load event is the limiting A00. A loss of load isolates the turbine and condenser, and terminates ncmal fEedwater flow to the steam generators. Before delivery of auxiliary feedwater to the steam generators, RCS pressure reaches s 2647 psia. This peak pressure is < 110% of the design pressure of 2500 psig, , but high enough to actuate the pressurizer safety valves. The MSSVs satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3. LC0 This LC0 requires all MSSVs to be OPERABLE in compliance with Reference 2, even though this is not a requireinent of the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less than the full number of MSSVs requires limitations on allowable THERiiAL POWER (to meet Reference 2 requirements), and adjustment to the Reactor Protective System trip setpoints to meet the transient analysis limits. These limitations are according to those shown in Table 3.7.1-1, Required Action A.2, and Required Action A.3 in the accompanying LCO. An MSSV is considered inoperable if it fails to open upon g dennd. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure has been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the Inservice iesting Program. The lift settings, according to Tatle 3.71-2 in the accompanying LCO, correspond io ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure. A note is added to Table 3.7.1-2, stating that lift settings for a given steam line are also acceptable if any two valves lift between 935 and 995 psig, any two other valves lift " between 935 and 1035 psig, and the four remaining valves it CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.1-2 Revision)I i-
s 'Vs B 3.7.1 BASES' lift.between 935 and 1065_ psig. Thus. .the MSSVs still: y perform that design basis function properly. This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will parform their designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCPB. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a minimum of five MSSVs per steam generator are required to be OPERABLE, according to Table 3.7.1-1 in the accompanying LCO, which is l!miting and bounds all lower MODES. In MODES 4 and 5, there are no credible transients requiring the MSSVs. The steam generators are not norma!!.y used for heat removal in MODES 5 and 6, and thus cannot be overpressurized; .there is r.o requirement for the MSSVs to be OPERABLE in these MODES. ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that - 4 separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. A.1 and A.2 An alternative to restoring the inoperable MSSV(s) to OPERABLE status is to reduce power so that the available MSSV relieving capacity meets Code requirements for the power level. The number of inoperable MSSVs will determine the necessary level of reduction in secondary system steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced reactor trip
~~'i it CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS l'& 2 B 3.7.1-3 RevisionJf~~
~~i MSSVs B 3.7.1. BASES settings of the power level-high channels. The reactor trip setpoint reductions are derived on the following basis:~~
~(
SP= x 106.5 X where: SP = reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of RTP V = maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line 106.5 = Power Level-High Trip Setpoint X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steamlinein1bs/ hour Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in1bs/ hour NRC Information Notice 94-60 states that the linear relationship is not always valid; however, the setpoints in le Table 3.7 have been verified by transient analyses. , The operator should limit the maximum steady state power level to some value slightly below this setpoint to avoid an inadvertent overpower trip. The 4 hour Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is consistent with A.1. An additiona' 8 hours is allowed to R- reduce the setpoints in recognition of the difficulty of resetting all channels of this trip function within a period of 8 hours. The Completion Time of 12 hours for Required Action A.3 is based on operating experience in resetting all channels of a protective function and on the low probability of the occurrence of a transient that could result in steam generator overpressure during this period. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.1-4 Revision g to
MSSVs B 3.7.1 BASES-B.1 and B.2 If the MSSVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the associated Completion Time, or if one or more steam gerierators have less than five MSSVs OPERABLE, the unit must , be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this stu.us, the unit must be placed in at-least - l MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The- , allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full ; power conditions in an orderly ranner and without challenging unit systems.
-SURVElltANCE SR 3.7.1.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies the OPERABILITY of the MSSVs by the verification'of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. 'The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 4), requires that safety and relief valve tests be performed in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/ASMEOM-1-1987(Ref.5). According to Reference 5, the following tests are required for MSSVs:
a. Visual examiriation;

b. Seat tightness determination;

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting);

d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria; and

e. Verification of the balancing device integrity on balanced valves.
~~TheANSI/ASMEStandardrequiresthatallvalvesbetested every 5 years, and a minimum of 20% of the valves be tested~~
~~-every 24 months. The ASME Code specifies the activities, as N_~~
~~found lift acceptance range, and frequencies necessary to e . CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNITS 1-& 2- B 3.7.1-5 Revision [~~
~~-- - - - - - _ - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ . - _ - _ _ - - - . - - - _ . - __.w. .-- .--.-~~
MSSVs' B 3.7.1 BASES satisfy the requirements. Table 3.7.1-2 defines the lift f setting range for each MSSV for OPERABILITY; however, the 6 valves are reset to i 1% during the Surveillance to allow g for drift. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. Thi. is to allow testing of the MSSVs at hot conditions. The MSSVs may-be either bench tested or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure. If the-MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lif t setting pressure shall be corrected to ambient cor.ditions of the i valve at operating temperature and pressure. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Chapter 10
2. ASME. Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Article NC-7000, Class 2 Components

3. UFSAR, Section 14.5
~~!' 4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Article IWV-3500~~
~~5. ANSI /ASMEOM-1-1987 4~~
4 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.7.1-6 Revisiong _x_-_-__-_-_______-____ ._ Y
i JAFW-System B 3.7.3 B 3.7- PLANT. SYSTEMS-B 3.7.3 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System BASES BACKGROUND The AFW System automatically supplies fe3dwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) upon the loss of ' normal feedwater supply. The AFW pumps take suction through a common suction line from the condensate storage tank (CST) (LCO 3.7.4, " Condensate Storage Tank (CST)") and pumo to the steam generator
- secondary side via separate and independent connections to the AFW header outside Containment. The steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing-steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the main steam safety valves (MSSVs)
(LC0 3.7.1, " Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)") or atrospheric dump vr.lves (ADVs). If the main condenser is available, steam may be released.via the steam bypass valves and the resulting excess water inventory in the hotwell is l0 moved to thL backup water supply. The AFW System consists of one motor driven AFW pump and two steam turbine driven pumps configured into two trains. The motor driven pump provides 100% of AFW flow capacity; turbine driven pump can provide 100% of the required
- capacity to the steam generators as assumed in the accident t analysis, but only one turbine driven pump 4 lined up to auto start. The other turbine driven pump is placed in standby and requires a manual start when it is needed. The - pumps are equipped with a common recirculation line to prevent pump operation against a losed system. The motor-driven AFW pump is- powered from an independent Class 1E po.er supply, and feeds both steam generators.
Orso pump at full flow is sufficient to remove-decay heat and cool the unit to Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System entry conditions. CAi. VERT: CLIF"S --UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.7.3-1 Revision 9h S
AFW System B 3.7.3 i i BASES F.1 Required Action F.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended , until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. With two AFW trains inoperable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, the unit may be in a seriously degreded condition with only non- G safety related means for e.onducting a cooldown. In such a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. However, a power change is not precluded if it is determined l !! , to be the most prudent action. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status. While other plant conditions may require entry into LC0 3.0.3, the Actions required by LC0 3.0.3 do not have to be completed because they could force the unit into a less safe condition. , SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Verifyfr.g the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the AFW water and steam supply flow patiis provides assurance the the proper flow paths exist for AFW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, scaled, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealiag, or securing. This SR i as not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulations; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the r.orrect position. The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. It CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.3-8 Revision [
AFW System B 3.7.3 - BASES SR 3.7.3.2 Cycling each testable, remote-operated valve that is not in its operating position provides assurance that the valves will perform as requi: 4 Operating position is the g position +. hat the valve is in during normal plant operation. This is accomplished by cycling each valve at least one cycle. This Surveillance ensures that valves required to function during certain scenarios, will be capable of being properly positioned. The Frequency is based on engineering judgment that when cycled in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program, these valves can be placed in the desired position when required. SR 3.7.3.3 Verifying that each AFW pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head (2 2800 ft for the steam driven pump and 2 3100 ft for the motor driven pump) ensures that AFW pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential head are normal tests of pump performance required by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code (Ref. 2). Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this testing is nerformed on recirculation flow. This test confirms one ;,uint on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. Performance of inservice testing, discussed in the ASME Code, Section XI (Rci;. 2), at 3 month intervals satisfies this requirement. This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. This deferral is required because there is an insufficient steam pressure to perform the test. 4 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.3-9 Revision /
AFW System B 3.7.3 1 - BASES 1R_).7.3.6 This SR ensures that the AFW system is capable of'providing a minimum nominal flow to each flow leg. This ensures that the minimum required flow is capable of feeding each flow , leg. The test may be performed on one flow leg at a time. The SR is modified by a Note which states the SR is not required to be performed.for the AFW train with'the turbine-driven AFW pump until 24 hours after reaching 800 psig in the steam generators. The note ensures that proper test conditions exist prior to performing the test using the turbine-driven AFW pumps. The 24 month Frequency coincides with performing the test during refueling outages. SR 3.7.3.7 This SR ensures that the AFW System is properly aligned by verifying the flow path to each steam generator prior to entering MODE 2 operation, after 30 days in MODE 5 or 6. OPERABILITY of AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the opcration of the AFW System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgnent, and other administrative controls to ensure that flow paths remain OPF.RABLE. To further ensure AFW System alignment, the OPERABILITY of the flow paths is verified following 4 extended outages to determine that no misa',ignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow path from the CST to the steam generators is properly aligned. Minimum nominal flow to each flow leg is ensured by performance of .9 SR 3.7.3.6. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.3 i Il
~~'CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.7.3-11 Revision,pf r + - -~~
~~. ..-. . , . . . . - . .- .. . . ~ , . - - - . . . . . .. - - . . . -~~
1
-I
AFW System B 3.7.3-BASES 2.. 'ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,.Section XI, I Inservice Inspcction, Article IWV-3400 =l 1
~~i 2 'I s~~
~~- CALVERT'. CLIFFS --UNITS 1-& 2 B 3.7.3 Revision 0 ,).~~
w _ , . . ., ,- ., .
CST B 3.7A-B 3.7.. PLANT. SYSTEMS-B 3.7.4 Condensate Storage Tank.(CST) BASES-BACKGROUND - The' CST provides a safety grade source of water to the steam generators for removing decay and sensible heat from the~ ReactorCoolant_ System (RCS). . The CST provides a passive-
~~-flow of ' water, by gravity,- to the Auxiliary Feedwater. (AFW)-~~
System (LCO 3.7.4, " Auxiliary Feedwater-(AFW). System"). - The steam produced is released to the atmosphere by the main .l 6 - steam safety valves- (MSSVs) or the at.nospheric.. dump valves. The AFW pumps operate with a continuous recirculation to the CST. i The component required by this ' Specification is CST 12. When the main steam isolation valves are open, the preferred means of heat removal is to discharge steam to the condenser by the nonsafety grade path of the turbine bypass valves. The condensed steam is returned to the backup water supply 4
~~'(CST 11 and CST 21) by the condensate pump. This has the advantage of conserving condensate while minimizing releases to the environment.~~
Because the CST is a principal component in removing residual heat from the RCS, it is designed to withstand ' earthquakes and other natural phenomena. The- CST is designed to Seismic Category I requirements to ensure availability of the feedwater supply. Feedwater is also , available from an alternate source. 1 '
~~- There is one CST (CST 12) shared by Units 1 and 2. A description of the CST is found in the Updated Final Safety y -13~~
{I s . CALVERT (1TFFSL- UNITS 1 &'2' 8 3.7.4-1 Revision [ q ~.. ,r y y ..w--
CST-B 3.7.4 BASES-i Analysis Report (UFSAR), Sections 6.3.5.1 and 10.3.2 (Refs.1and2,respectively). APPLICABLE The CST provides cooling water to remove _ decay heat and to SAFETY-ANALYSES cool down the unit following all events in the accident analysis, discussed in the UFSAR, Chapter 14 (Ref. 3). For anticipated cperational occurrences and accidents which do not affect the OPERABILITY of the steam generators, the analysis assuraption is generally 6 hours at MODE 3, steaming , through the MSSVs followed by a cooldown to shutdown cooling y (SDC) entry conditions at the design cooldown rate. H The limiting event for the condensate votim is the large feedwater line break with a coincident loss of offsite ^ power. Single failures that also affect this event include the following:
a. The failure of the diesel generator powering the motor driven AFW pump to the unaffected steam generator (requiring additional steam to drive the remaining AFW pumpturbine);and

b. The failure of the steam driven train (requiring a longer time for cooldown using only one motcr driven AFW purnp).
These are not usually the limiting failures in terms of consequences for these events. The CST satisfies 10 CFR 50.35(c)(2)(ii), Criteria 2 and 3. LCO To satisfy accident analysis assumptMns, the CST (i.e., CST 12) must contain sufficient cooling water for bcth units to ensure that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at Mode 3 for 6 hours following a reactor trip from 102% RTP, assuming a coincident loss of offsite power and the ost adverse single failure. In doing this it CALVERT CLIFFS-- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.4-2 Revision 0
CST B 3.7.4 BASES must retain rufficient water to ensure adequate net positive suction head for the AFW pumps during the cooldown while in Mode 3, as well as to account for any losses from the steam driven AFW nump 'urbine, or before isolating AFW to a broken line. The CST usaPe volume required is 2 150,000 gallons per unit in the MODE of Applicability, which is equal to 300,000 gallons. The 300,000 gallons of water is enough to provide for decay heat removal and cooldown ci both units. By adjusting the feedwater flod to thc permissib'.a cooldown . rate, decay heat removal and cooldown of both units can be accomplished in 6 hours. The 300,000 gallons are also adequate to maintain the RCS in MODE 3 for 6 hours with steam discharge to atmosphere with concurrent and total loss of offsite power, or to remove decay heat from both units for more than 10 hours after initiation of cooldown and still maintain normal no-load water level in the steam generators. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge lir.e location or other physical characteristics. w OPERABILIT'. of the CS1 is detemined by maintaining the tank volume at or above the minimum required volume. APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CST is required to be OPERABLE. In MODES 4, 5 and 6, the CST is not required because the AFW System is not required. ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CST is not OPERABl.E, the OPERABILITY of the backup I water supply (CST 11 for Unit 1 and CST 21 for Unit 2) must be verified by administrative means within 4 hours and once b every 12 hours thereafter.
~~'CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 S 2 B 3.7.4-3 F;visiongk - -_ I~~
CST B 3.7.4-I BA3ES OPERABILITY of the backup feedwater supply must include, verification that the manual valves in the flow paths from 9 the backup supply to the AFW pumps are open, and availability of the required volume of water
-(150,000 gallons) in the backup supply. The CST must be g returned to OPERABLE status within 7 days, as the backup supply may be performing this function in addition to its normal functions. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the backup water supply. Additionally, verifying the backup water supply every 12 hours is adequate to ensure the backup ,
water supply continues to be available. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE backup water supply being_ available, and the low probability of an event requiring the use of the water from the CST occurring during this perica If the CST voice i; less than 300,000 gallons and greater than 150,000 gcH ans and both units are in the MODE of Applicability, only one unit must enter this condition u provided the unit aligns to the OPERABLE backup water supply (CST 11 or CST 21). B.1 and B.2 If the CST cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the affected unit (s) must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit (s) must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full ! power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. CALVERT-CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.7.4-4 Revisiong6 o
CST-B 3.7.4 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.4.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the CST contains the required usable l6 volume of cooling water. (Thisvolume 2 150,000 gallons per unit in the MODE of Applicability.) The 12 hour Frequency is based on operating experience, and the need for operator awareness'of unit evolutions that may affect the CST inventory between checks. The 12 hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to abnormal CST volume deviations. i Although the volume in the CST for each unit is required to be 150,000 gallons, the total combined volume for both units is 300,000 gallons. l 6. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.5.1
2. UFSAR, Section 10.3.2

3. UFSAR, Chapter 14 CALVERT CLIFFS UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.4-5 RevisionJf(#
^~
L CREVS-h 'B'3.7.8- , BASES SR 3.7.8.2 This SR verifies that the required CREVS-testing is-performed in'accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing. Program (VFTP). The VFTP- includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum ~ system- i flow rat *, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are w discussed in detail in the VFTP. 1R 3.7.8.3 This SR verifies each CREVS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal (CRRS). This tesi. is' conducted on a 24 month Frequency. This frequency is adequate to ensure the CREVS is capable of starting and 11 operating on an actual or simulated CRRS. This SR is modified by a NOTE which indicates that it is only required during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. - Automatic j actuation is not required if neither unit is in one of these b
'(
~~MODES since sufficient time is available for manual actuation of the system following a fuel handling accident.~~
~~i '~~
~~= REFERENCES 1. UFSAR. Section 9.8.2.3~~
~~2. UFSAR, Chapter 14 l li j~~
f
~~-p ;~~
t? CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITSL1.& 2 B 3.7.8-8 Revision [ w = _ _ _ - _ .___
SFPEVS B 3.7.11 BASES ' assumes that the SFPEVS is functional. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne radioactive material provided by this filtration system. The amount of fission products available for release from the auxiliary building is determined for a fuel handling accident. These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 3). The SFPEVS satisfies 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3.
~~-LCO The HEPA filter bank, two charcoal adsorber banks, two b "~~
exhau;t fans, and other equipment listed in the Background i Section are required to be OPERABLE and in operation. l6 The SFPEVS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control exposure in the auxiliary building are OPERABLE. The SFPEVS is considered OPERABLE (, when its associated:
a. Fans are OPERABLE; 6

b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber banks are not G h excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air c.irculation can be maintained.
The SFPEVS is considered in operation when an OPERABLE exhaust fan is in operation, discharging through the OPERABLE HEPA Filter and one OPERABLE charcoal adsorber 6 bank. Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.11-2 Revision [ =_ .
~~+ &+ o b~~
99'# IMAGE EVALUATION ///gf k////t %@? gI// TEST TARGET (MT-3) 6,[+4#4 W '%,, 4 1.0 E2 E y 'j EE I.I [" Ele 1.8 l ~ I.25 1.4 1.6
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~~4 150mm >~~
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4
#% <$<$4 4 'Stkp'*p,,, Aih '44.e #. mssJo;= m5e0 (716) 265 1600
~~l so-4* 9 ki+4r IMAGE EVALUATION ((j/j// g$ '#4 xx k/ ,,[TE# / TEST TARGET (MT-3) l.0 'd in Ela 5 $ ILE I.1 ['E U1~~
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~~IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)~~
~~/////~~
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~~+ .~~
~~l.0 5milu u 9 BE 11 1.1 g~~
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~~# %,, d'b<$ 4% +$(p$ff A 4, - ,, = ,, - -~~
~~e= -~~
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~~SFPEVS B 3.7.11 BASES~~
- APPLICABILITY .During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building, the SFPEVS is required to be OPERABLE and in operation to mitigate the consequences of a fuel 6 handling accident.
ACTIONS A.1 r~l A.2 G When one SFPEVS charcoal adsorber bank or one SFPEVS exhaust fan, or both, are inor: able, action must be taken to verify an OPERABLE SFPEVS train is in operation, or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building be suspended. Or.e OPERABLE SFPEVS train consists of one OPERABLE exhaust fan able to discharge through the OPERABLE HEPA filter and one OPERTBLE charcoal adsorber bank. This ensures the proper equipment is operating for the Applicable Safety Analysis. Il B.1 When there is no OPERABLE SFPEVS train or there is no OPERABLE SFPEVS train in operation during movement of , irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building, action must be taken to place the unit in a condition in which the LC0 does not apply. This Action involves immediately suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position. 9URVEILLANCE SR 3.7.11.1 REQUIREMENTS The SR requires verification every 12 hours that the SFPEVS is in operation. Verification includes verifying that one exhaust fan is operating and discharging through the HEPA filter bank and one charcoal adsorber bank. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient considering that the operators G will be focused on the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the auxiliary building. Thus, if anything
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.11-3 Revision /l
I , SFPEVS B 3.7.11. 8 BASES were to occur to tause cessation of operation of the SFPEVS, 9 it would be quickly identified. SR 3.7.11.2 This SR verifies the performance of SFPEVS filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).. The VFTr includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general' use and following specific operations). Speci fic. test frequencies and additional information are discussed in ' detail in~the VFTP. . SR 3.7.11.3, This SR verifies the integrity of-the spent fuel storage pool area. The ability of the spent fuel storage pool area to maintain negative pressure with respect to potentially uncontaminated adjacent areas is periodically tested to verify proper function of the SFPEVS. During operation, the spent fuel storage pool area is designed to maintain a slight negative pressure in the spent fuel storage pool area, with respect to adjacent areas, to prevent unfiltered LEAKAGE. This test is conducted on a 24 month Frequency. This Frequency.is adequate to ensure the SFPEVS is capable of maintaining a. negative pressure.
~~~ REFERENCES- 1. UFSAR, Section 9.8.2.3~~
2. UFSAR, Section 14.18

3. Regulatory Guide 1.25 CALVERT CLIFFS -JJNITS 1-&'2 B 3.7.11-4 RevisionffG
~~SFPEVS -) B 3.7.11-V~~
~~.. BASES-4; ~ 10 CFR:100.11-e i~~
5
~~,ai b~~
~~f T CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.11-5 Revision 0~~
~~-"c --+-# , . , . , ,_ ,_ _ ,~~
PREVS B 3.7.12 BASES for 2 15 minutes. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two train lo redundancy available. SR 3.7.12.2 This SR verifies the performance of PREVS filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VTTP). The VFTP includes te: ting the performance of the HEPA filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP. SR 3.7.12.3 This SR verifies that each PREVS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal (Containment 4 1 solation Signal). This test is conducted on a 24 month i Frequency. This Frequency is adequate to ensure the PREVS H is capable of starting and operating on an actual or simulated Containment Isolation Signal. REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.6.2
2. UFSAR, Chapter 14

3. UFSAR, Section 14.24
~~= !"~~
If CALVERT-CLIFFS UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.12-4 Revisienf
MFIVs B 3.7.15 BASES s A description of the MFIVs operation on receipt of an SGIS ' N. is found in the UFSAR Section 14.4.2 (Ref.1). ; APPLICABLE' .The design basis of= tha MFIVs is established by the analysis SAFETY ANALYSES for.the large SLB. It is also influenced.by the accident- . analysis for the large FWLB. Closure of the MFIVs and tneir bypass valves is also relied on to terminate a steam break for core response analysis and an excess load event upon receipt of a MSIS on high steam generator level. Failure of an MFIV to close following an SLB or FWLB can result in additional mass and energy to the steam-generator's contributing to cooldown. This failure also results in additional mass and energy releases following an SLB or FWLB event. The MFIVs satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3. d LC0 This LC0 ensures that the MFIVs will isolate MFW flow to the (a C steam generators. Following an FWLB or SLB, th'ese valves will also isolate the nonsafety related portions from the b safety related portions of the system. This LC0 requires that one MFIV in each feedwater line be OPERABLE. The MFIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits,-and are closed on an isolation actuation signal. i-l Failure to meet the LC0 requirements can result in additional mass and energy being released to containment following an SLB or FWLB inside containment. Failure to I. meet the LCO:can also add additional mass and energy to the steam-generators contributing to cooldown. APPLICABILITY The;MFIVs must be OPERABLE whenever there is significant mass and energy.in the Reactor Coolant System and steam l generators. I " b
.CALVERT. CLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.15-2 Revisiony , . . - , , ~ . . -~_--7_ .c .
~~MFIVs B 3.7.15~~
BASES, In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the MFIVs are required to be OPERABLE ll in order to limit the amount of available fluid that could be added to containment in tha case of a secandary system pipe break inside containment. O In MODES 4, 5, and 6, steam generator energy is low.
ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve. A.1 With one MFIV inoperable, action must be taken to restore the valve.to OPERABLE status within 72 hours. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the isolation 6 capability afforded by the MFW regulatory valves, and tripping of the MFW pumps, and the 'ow probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. B,1 and B.2 If the MFIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status in the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.15-3 Revisionp'
MFIVs B 3.7.15 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.15.1 REQUIREMENTS ' This SR ensures the closure time for each MFIV is s 80 seconds by manual isolation. The MFIV closure time is l 11 assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Prt, gram. The MFIVs are tested during each refueling outage in accordance with Reference 1, and sometimes during other cold shutdown periods. The Frequency d;monstrates the valve (, closure time at least once per refueling cycle. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed. il REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 14.4.2 U
2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 1989, and ASME Operation and Maintenance Code Part 10, 1.987, with 1988 Addenda Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.7.15-4 Revision /
I
DISCUSSION OF CHANCES SECTION 3.7cl - MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES ____ has been voluntarily complying with this requirement. This change is more restrictive on plant operations and is consistent with NUREG-1432.' TECHNICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS None - TECHNICAL CHANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE CONTROI.IID DOCUMENTS LA.1 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 Table 4.71 lists the MSSV orifice sizes. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.1 will not contain this information. nese details will be moved to Section B 3.7.1 of the ITS Bases. This acceptable because these details do not impact the requirement far the MSSVs to be Operable. These details can be adequately controlled in the Bases which require change control in accordance with the Bases Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. This approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and provides for a more appropriate change control process. The level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the iequirement to verify the lift settings for the MSSVs. This change is a less restrictive movement ofinformation change with no impact on safety. This change is consistent wit!.NUREG-1432. TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.1 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 Action a requires the inoperable MSSV(s) to be restored to Operable status within 4 hours, or reduce the Power Level- High trip setpoint per the Technical Specification table. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.1 Action requires power to be reduced per the Technical Specification Table within 4 hours, and allows 12 hours to reduce the Power Level - High trip setpoint. This change extends the time to reduce the Power Level - High trip setpoint from 4 hours to 12 hours. The time to reduce reactor power remains the same (even though not diactly required by the CTS, a power reduction would be required when the Power Level - High trip setpoint is reduced). The 12-hour Completion Time is based on operating experience in resetting all channels cf a protective function, the low likelihood of the occurrence of a transient that could result in SG overpressure during this period, and the fact that power is still reduced within four hours, as before. Allowing an additional eight hours to Comn'ete a Required Action constitutes a less restrictive char.ge. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.2 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 Footnote
requires at least two MSSVs to be Operable during the time entry into Mode 3 is permitted to determine Operability of the MSSVs. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.1 will not contain this requirement. This footnote requires either scheduling maintenance on the MSSVs at two different times during an outage (and also testing), or requiring bench testing in order to meet this requirement.
Also, operating experience has shown that the MSSVs usually pass the SRs. The likelihood of an event occurring which would require the MSSVs in Mode 3 while they are being tested is remote. Therefore, allowing Mode 3 to be entered prior to performing the SRs is acceptable. Deleting a requirement which requires the MSSVs to be Operable is a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3,7.1-3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES
SECTION 3.7.1 - MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES L.3 In the event one or more MSSVs associated with the cperating steam generator are inoperable, Action b of CTS 3.7.1.1 permits continued operation in Mode 3 provided at least 2 MSSVs on the non-operating steam generator are operable and that the inoperable MSSVs are restored to an operable status within 4 hours. Otherwise, the Action requires the plant to be in at least Mode 3 within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours, improved Technical Specification 3.7.1 does not contain this action. The ITS will not permit operation in Mode 3 until at least 5 MSSVs are operable on each steam generator.
In the case one, two, or three MSSVs associated with the operating steam generator are inoperable, and at least five of the MSSVs are operable on the non-operating steam l generator, the ITS would permit indefinite operation in Mode 3. This is less restrictive than Action b of CTS LCO 3.7.1.1 which would permit operation in Mode 3 to continue for only 4 hours. In the event there are less than five MSSVs operable on either steam generator, the ITS would require the plant to be placed in Mode 4 within 12 hours. This is more restrictive than Action b of CTS LCO 3.7.1.1 which permits continued operation in Mode 3 for four hours, and, in the event the valves are not restored to an ograble status within the 4-hour time period, requires the plant to be placed in Mode :s within 36 nours. Deletion of Action b of CTS LCO 3.7.1.1 is acceptable, because: a) overpressure protection of the secondary system is ensured when at least 5 MSSVs for each steam generator are operable; and b) in most cases, all MSSVs will be declared operable prior to entry into Mode 3, because the plan will be to operate the unit at 100% rated thermal power. In general, the plant would not be brought to Mode 3 with the intent of operating in Mode I with an inoperable MSSV, because the plant would be restricted to the power level specified in the CTS. i I l I l L i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3,7,g.4 Revision i1 l l
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3,7.2 - MAIN STEAM ISOIATION VALVES A.6 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 contains an action which is applicable in Modes 2 and 3. This action states: "With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, subsequent operation in MODES 1,2, or 3 may proceed provided . . ." Action C ofITS 3.7.2 addresses the condition of one or more MSIVs inoperable in Modes 2 or 3; it permits continued operation in Modes 2 or 3 as long as the inoperable MSIVs are closed. The reference to Mode 1 in the CTS Action for Modes 2 and 3 is being deleted. The reference to Mode 1 is inappropriate, because this action is only applicaHe in Modes 2 and 3. Once an MSIV is shut, the plant is in Mode 3, because the plant would trip. Therefore, this change is considered administrative.
. TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 Actions, when the plant is in Mode 1, requires the plant be in Mode 4 in 12 hours when the Required Actions and associated Coopletion Times cannot be met. Since the Mode of Applicability for this Action is Mode 1, the plant is required to be in Mode 2 in 12 hours. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.2 Action B will require the plant to be in Mode 2 in o hours when the Required Action ard associated Completion Time cannot be met. This change decreases the amount of time allowed to be in Mode 2 from 12 hours to 6 hours. The 6-hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach Mode 2 in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems. Decreasing Completion Times is a more restrictive change. This change does not adversely affect safety because the change ensures that the plant is in a degraded condition for a limited amount of time while ensuring a safe and controlled power decrease. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
M.2 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 requires the MSIV to be closed when MSIVs are inoperable in Modes 2 or 3. Improved Technical Specifications will add a requirement to verify the MSIV is closed once per seven days. This change adds an additional Required Action when MSIVs are inoperable in Modes 2 and 3. This verification was added to ensure 1 that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The seven-day Completion Time was chosen based on engineeringjudgment, MSIV status indications available in the Control Room, and other administrative controls to ensure the valves are in the closed position. The addition of a required action is a more restrictive change. This change does not adversely affect safety because it ensures the safety analysis assumptions remain valid. This change is consistent .vith NUREG-1432. M.3 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 Actions, when the plant is in Mode 2 or 3, require the plant be in Mode 4 in 12 hours when the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met. Ic proved Technical Specification 3.7.2 Action D will require the plant to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours, and Mode 4 in 12 hours, when the Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met. This change adds an intermediate step to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours. The intermediate step to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours ensures that the unit is cooled down in an orderly manner without challenging plant systems. Adding an intermediate step while cooling down to Mode 4 is a more restrictive change. This change does not adversely affect safety because the change ensures that the plant is operated in a manner such that plant systems are not challenged. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.2-2 Revision li'
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.7c2 - MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES M.4 In the event one main steam line isolation valve is inoperable in Mode 1, the Action for CTS 3.7.1.5 permits power operation to continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to an operable status or closed within the specified completion time. Action A for ITS 3.7.2 requires the MSIV to be returned to an operable status within a specified completion time, in the event one MSIV is inoperable in Mode 1; it does not include the option to close the MSIV. This ontion has been deleted from the CTS._ This change is acceptable, because the plant cannot operate with an MSIV closed. In the event an MSIV is closed, a reactor trip would occur. Thus, while the CTS permit the unit to continue to operate with an inoperable MSIV that has been closed, the unit could not actually operate in this manner. Deleting the option from the Action for CTS 3.7.1.5 to close an inoperable MSIV does not impact public health and safety, and does not impose any hardship on the operation of the unit. TECHNICAL CHANGES - RELOCATIONS LA.1 Not used. TECHNICAL CHANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS None IECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.1 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 Actions, when one MSIV is inoperable in Mode 1, require the valve to be either restored to Operable status or closed within four hours. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.2 Action requires the inoperable MSIV to be restored to Operable status within eight hours. This change exter.ds the time to restore the MSIV to Operable status from four hoars to eight hours. The eight-hour Completion Time is reasonable because some repairs on the MSIVs can be performed with the plant hot, and the likelihood of an accident occurring during this time p :riod that would require the closure of the MSIVs is remote. Allowing an additional four hours to complete a Required Action constitutes a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.2 Current Technical Specifictition 3.7.1.5 Actions, when the plant is in Modes 2 and 3, do not allow for more than one MSIV to be inoperable in Modes 2 and 3. Therefore, if more than one MSIV were inoperable, the plant would be required to enter LCO 3.0.3. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.2 Action C allows for more than one MSIV inoperable. The ITS will allow eight hours to close any MSIV, regardless of how many are inoperable. This change increases the allowed outage tim 2 when more than one MSIV is inoperable from no time to eight hours. The eight hours would allow some repairs to be performed on the MSIVs with the plant hot. The likelihood of an accident occurring in this time period that would require the closure of the MSIVs while in Modes 2 and 3 is small. More than one MSIV is allowed to be inoperable, because when closed, the MSIVs are performing their safety ftmetion. increasing the allowed outage time when two MSIVs are inoperable in - Modes 2 and 3 constitutes a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432. a 'i p CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.7.2-3 Revision i1
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 307.2 - MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES L.3 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.5, " Main Steam Line Isolation Valves," is applicable in Modes 1,2, and 3. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.2 is applicable in Mode 1, and Modes 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.2-adds an exception to the Applicability which allows this Specification to not be applicable if
= all the MSIVs are closed. '.'his is acceptable because when the MSIVs are closed, they are performing their safety function. Adding an exception to the Applicability is a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432.
L.4 Not used. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.2-4 ' Revision 11
_ _ ______ _ ____ - _ _ -. _ - .. .- . ~ r ,
~~, y hb . 3.?. 4 J~~
~~3.7 4/44 PLMT SY1 TEM.~~
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Centensete Stornoe Tank LIMITI M CONDITION F3R OPERATI M Q; LCo 3.*?4 Ainimum 4drev8 The gaMT) condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE @ f\ . containeenaser voiume of 13v,99u nai sonn e unit-i SR 3.7,4d/ ~" APPLICABILITY , MODES 1. 2 and 3. " /^A-j (2 g: With'thehondensate storage tank inoperable, witt.in 4 hours t C uABLE statfor be in NOT yM wi hDnj
~~., 4.TW L[DemonstratetheOPERABILITY condensate storage tank~~
~~[& [* 4,/~~
~~.Ay An.., As1.~~
~~psa _)the p supply to the auxiliary e ater pumps and restore condensate storage tank to OPERABLE statut within~~
~~? days r be i ROT 58UTDOWN within the next 12 hours.~~
~~Actual O > r In006 2 at 6 4, an).~~
~~+= _ _~~
~~A.I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - g 9*9'$'I 69PERABLE~~
~~'The at less~~
o. 12 ondensate storage tank shall be demonstrated e per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary P. feedwater pumps.
~~6 The con e storage tank shall be demonstrated~~
~~. 4 h*I M'* A'l DPERAPLE at least once per 12 hoursf of veruying 6n 6 sne tenn wns ina a ,~~
~~2*dN%. " Inimum of 150.000 gallons of water and by verifying that the flow path for' / A. 2~~
~~% '. aking suction from this tan c is OPERABLE with the manual valves in this 1= math anaa4thenever theq condensate storage tanz is une supply "~~
source for the auxfitary fee ater pumps. 3 l -- , 5 ( CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/47-8 Amendment No. 186 l w m-l . r? I fI s i
SfeSeb)3 74 3,7 W PLANT SYSTDt3 1,-), <( -3/3.7.1 / TURANE_f#tLEl , Condensate Storace Tank LIMITING C0mITION FOR 9MRATION I V:01.7.'f - 3. I_.1.-3 The M condensate storage tank _(CS shall be OPERABLE @ mininun msamco water volume or 1su.uuu gal _ ons per unit. g IR J,7.'/. I APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2 and 3.
~*
~~ACTION: With thehcondensate storage tank inoperable, within 4 hours either:~~
~~a. Re 6re the CS o OPERABLE s)dtus or be ip'Il0T S W wi th next 12 h s, orf I e b^%m 'D .~~
~~Il#. a ,j - o~~
~~Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the as a u supply to the ruxiliary con nsate storage tank.~~
ater pumps and restore E ,* ' 1,.. the o ondensate storage tank to OPERABLE status within R 7 days o be i UTDOWN within the next 12 hours. eDE 3 ;.) i L.* s & A foO SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDIENT5[ . 5 2. 1. 7, 't, / 6 TheQio.12Iondensate storage tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at leasNo ce r 12 hours by verifying the contained water voliane is within its limits n feedwater pumps. g. gis the supply source for the auxiliary M.
~~.gj 4.7.1.3.2 The o, con otase_ tank shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE at least once per 12 hour $by verifying that the tank com nw .~~
~~k ' I A,2~~
~~# ;cj) [~~
~~Intilum of 150.000 gaisons of warer and by verifying that the flow path fo -~~
takini, suction from this tank is OPERABLE with the manual valves in thi Idg [ t laar nath ooervimenever the source for Tne auxillary fe oncensate swrevu 6.at-TT"The supply umps. f)M L keGp -LA.I i
~~h. -~~
1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 7-8 Amendnent No.163 l P4p /J/
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.7c4 - CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.1 The proposed change will reformat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Specifications, with no change of intent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, the Technical Specifications should be more easily readable and, therefcre, understandable by plant operators, as well as other users. During the Calvert Cliffs ITS development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional information may also have been added to more fully describe each LCO, Applicability, Action, or SR and to be consistent with NUREG-1432. However, the additional information does not change the intent of the current Technical Specifications. The reforma' ting, renumbering, and rewording process involves no technical changes to existing Specitications. A.2 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.3 Action a requires the CST to be restored to Operable status within four hours, or to verify the Operability of the backup water supply within four hours, and restore the CST level within seven days. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.4 will not contain the Action to restore the CST level within four hours. The ITS will only contain the requirement to verify the backup water supply within four hours and to restore the level in the CST within seven days. De'eting the requirement to restore the CST level within four hours is not needed because the option to restore always exists. Deleting an Action that always exists as an option constitutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. A.3 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.3 requires the CTS to have a minimum contained water volume of 2150,000 gallons per unit, improved Technical Specification SR 3.7.4.1 will require the CST to have a usable volume of 2150,000 per unit. The CTS for each unit l is on a per unit basis, that is, Unit 1 CTS requires 150,000 gallons and Unit 2 CTS requires 150,000 gallons. The CTS LCOs for each unit are clarifying that the 150,000 gallon requirement tor the given unit is in addition to the 150,000 gallon requirement for the other unit. Each LCO is not requiring 150,000 gallons for each unit at all times (e.g., Unit i CTS is not requiring a total of 300,000 gallons when Unit 2 is not in MODE 1,2, or 3. Unit 1 is requiring 150,000 gallons, ami the 150,000 gallons must be different from the 150,000 gallons required by Unit 2 when Unit 2 is in MODE 1,2, or 3). This is consistent with UFSAR Section 10.3.5, which describes the total volume of water needed in the CST when one or both units are operating. Therefore, to avoid the impression that a total of 300,000 gallons are required in the CST when any unit is in MODE 1,2, or 3, ITS SR 3.7.4.1 will use the words " usable volume" in addition to "per unit." Since this does not affect the current l requirements, the change is considered administrative. TECENICAL CHANGES - MORE HrMTRICTIVE M.1 Current Technical Specification 3.7.1.3 Actions require the plant be in Mode 4 in 12 hours when the Required Actions and associated Completion Times cannot be met. Improved Technical">pecification 3.7.4 Action B will require the plant to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours, and Mode 4 in 12 hours, when the Required Action and asociated Completion Time cannot be met. This change adds an intermediate step to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours. The intermediate step to be in Mode 3 in 6 hours ensures that the unit is cooled down in an orderly manner CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.4-1 Revision 11
s & % 2.28 e 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTDi$ LDEITIM CORITIM FM GPERATIM (Castinued) A c ry.,/ (_, % ' kith one cosmor, exhaust to atmosphere duct isolation valv6 '
, ino*erable, reatore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status pitkin 7 days t,r be in at least NT STAW8Y within the next A AM6 g6 hours and in COLS Sal,*ftelal within the following 30 hoes. M Aer,4 A With the toilet area exhaust duct isolation valve inoptrable, trestore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours f f,y, f AcW 1(br be inrithin 5WT301A1 at least NOT30STAND the following hour.1 8Y within the next 6 hours and in m=
~~un a~ g g ~ a.., . g SMVEILLANCE REQUI' 4 SF b'M I+4 9,~~
~~C f FM CI ' i~~
~~1) The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:~~
Sa. At least once per 62 days, on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, by deenergizing the backup Control Room air conditioner and i verifying that the emergency Control Room air conditioners L maintain the air temperature 5104'F for at least 12 hours who (in the recimulation mode. , . rw mred ,A
~~% At least once per 31 da:/s by initiation flow through'each -~~
~~ftIter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that eac tra n 06 MDL1 oprates for at least 15 minutes.~~
c. At least once per 15 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housing, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1. Verifying ths.i the charcoal adsorbers remove 199% of a
+ halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.5.a and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2 March 1978, while operating the ventilation systm at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10%. 2.' Verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove 199% of the DOP when they are tested-in-place in accordance with Regulatory , Positions C.S.a and C.5.c of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2. March 1978, while operating the ventilation j N system at a flow rate of 2000 cfc 110%. J[- a b Q tsosss w E C) v y ric s,p. bb r.o "p.,4,. 6. GJrA,, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 Amendment No. 202 l e r A .' M tes.9.2. P.. Gem r.y,rea cwS R Ate -hg in ' *g*g(- mm m.m.7xc g
~~' n ag- s~~
~~fd CA on) 3< 7.8~~
~~
~~3/4.7 PLANT SYSTDi$~~
*~ ~
LDtITING COMITI6X FOR OPERATION (Continued) _ With the toilet area exhaust duct isolation valve inoperable. M< #y g ~ ~ store the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least NOT STAMDBY within the next 6 hours and in {
~~& (G, _/~~
~~( Room Emergency Ventilation System shall be fa~~
~~a. At least once per 62 days, on a STAGGERER TEST BASIS.~~
deenergizing the backup contrS1 Room air conditioner and / verifying that the emergency Control Room air conditioners maintain the air temperature s 104'F for at least 12 hours when in the recirculation mode. ' r dN ;
.$R h7.$.1 h At least once per 31 days by initiation flow through each HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that eat ra n operates for at least 15 minutes. "c. At least once per 28 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housing, or (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any.
~~ventilation zone cosaunicating with the system by:~~
1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove > 99% of a halogenated h3drocarbon refrigerant test gas hen they are tested in-place in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.S.a and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2.
~~March 1978, while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i 10%.~~
2. Verifying that the HEPA filter banks remove > 99% of the DOP I when they are tested in-place in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.S.a and C.5.c of Regulatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2. March 1978, while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 2000 cfm i10%.

3. Verifying within 31 days hfter removal that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained frora an adsorber tray or from an adsorber test tray in accedance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Reg.nlatory Guide 1.52 Revision 2. March 1978, demonstrates a removal efficiency of 2 90% for radioactive methyl iodine when the sample is tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 (30*C. 95% R.H.).j 3ec iMtcus toa R NNJ d 1 her toth A IdM C0 flL%
Yin Ca <" CALVERT CLIFFS - tJNIT 2 3/4 7-17 Anendment No. 187 l uwpedu <es ul_ ~MG b % b 9,L M
~~, t - t sndis c i n wJ -c <e n .w..n w 4 : &.f '*Q(~9<*3rl- A 4 Pe n 24 6~~
$poSc.M 3 7./o j M 9/+:f PLANT SYSTEMS l 4/4,0 cf ECCS PUMP ROOM EXHAUST ILTRAT!0N SYSTEM g,g ,,
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION h M ,4 The ECCS Pump Room Exhaust Ventilatican System shall be OP LE Lco 3. i.io (wipr_ane nPA futer anwarcoal ansorcererain and tmrexha APPLICABILIII: MODESf.2,3and4. ). ACTION: f, fa. With one ECCS pump room exhaust fan inoperable, restore the I'
~~b. b ~2 inoperable fan to CPERABLE status within 7 days or be ipat least ,~~
~~J M0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDmN within the following 30 hours,~~
~~- Mr.. C - ( g4 , y.g g ,~~
b.gWith the ECCS exorust initer muvinoperable( restore zwfMteD A./ ACTl*N b - LE status within 24 hours or be in at least NOT Atrp 4 ( STANDBY 6 to OPE within he next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the (following 30 hou . ME/3 ,, l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4#i9,4 The ECCS Pump Koom Exhaust Ventilation System shall ba demonstrated OPERABLE: At leact once 1er 31 day ~ y inm paing. Trom Ene i.on3roi Moorg y 3'D'I 's, (p ow prougr.TTE" REP r and21arcoal__adsorberMain and j { d vertrying tnatteac xhaustfagerates/foretleast15 minutes.
'b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural O' I maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or ,A 6 (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any LTb g ventilation zone communicsting with the system by:
~~1- 1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove t 99% of a j~~
~~-p halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are '~~
1 tested in-place in accordance with Regulatory S45 48$e Positions C.S.a and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, 7 Revision 2. March 1978,~ while operating the filter train st a flos rate of 3000 cfm 10h V - A3 _ SR 3.7. Jo.Z P..Rm r.pc.a. s.c cs rg rs gm, u n m .,1.m
~~k < ecer..Is& & 44. vealdo,.%y p yj N-CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 7-20 Amendment No. 186 l pp I . F 3~~
@d .' h eA 48) "3,7, / O j l ~$ ,7 4/+rF PLANT SYSTENS ~3,-), j a 3/4 4 ,7 p ECCSPUMPROOMEXHAUSThFILTRATIONSYSTEM- . , '
LIMITING CO M ITION FDA CPERATI0ll L/ 0 1. N -4 The ECCS Pump Room h haust Ventilation System ak=11 he OPERABLE uvune earn n uer J m;... . . ; a .. mrain and td ark * '===n. L4-l APPLICADILITY: MODES 1, 2. 3 and 4. ACTION:
a. With one ECCS pump roce exhaust fan inoperable, restore the kb A -- inoperable fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least NOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in
~~~ ~~~
~~UTB9tAlwithin 44%y ,the following 30 hours. .m M r.,.~~
~~b. di h the ECCS ENutte l terAra t ro inoperabl restor _ f /,/~~
bJ o OPER JLE status within c4 hours or be in at least NOT Y withi the next 6 hours and in COLD $NUTD0601 within the h;,3)C Nfo11owing 30 PREFS SURVEILUWICE REQUIRENENTS 1 7.7.& The ECCS Pump Room f.xhaust Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
~~\. At least one. - 't1 davs_Iby initiating from the Control Room.~~
~~g,-))l), l glow Inrouch the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying tMt teach exhaust fanAperates for at least a minutes. . ggg~~
~~% \~~
~~b. ~ At least once per in months or i aTter any structural w maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or REFI'[3~~
~~e (2) following painting, fire or chemical release in any~~
*l D.h. 2- ventilation zone cotununicating with the system by:
h 1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 99% of a O h '- h&iogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are gP i - tested in-place in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.S.a and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. {
~~,a Revistor. 2. March 1978, wh*1e operating the filter train at du3- =~~
~~[4 O a flow rate of 3000 cfm i 10%. J~~
~kh .. ,-~ y y, , > 7~' ~ ~ ~ y '2g' f 3.7IO. *x Q, e M WW hN L wlb 1 , g ueka.A ,mw ,><ei sM q L h41Ah r.w rs w.a.m r.w 1A , . .,. r , %** M CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 3/4 7-20 Amendment No. 1F1 l f
W ' S 3.1.Il 3/7 W429 j)31UllG OPERATIOks fy154 hf44,47- SPENT FUEL P0OL YENTILATI0ff SYSTEM 3&Il - f l LIMIT *J1G C0181TI0ll FOR OPERAT!001 M .
~~-4,84 The Spent Fuel Pool Ven / kka ystem shall be OPERA 8LEhith:~~
~~LCO 3311~~
~'
~~On/ hEPA filter bank. b 'Tino charcoal adsorber banks an1 Two exhaust far.s. APPLICABILITY: ~ SW ver rradTated f e D.sroh m.prse si st~~
~~, f irre,<lde A f.oe. ann sje$on p~~
~~4141 is, l h Glim .,W h~~
' k d ,'on : th'one harcoa[adsorberbankand/or~oneexhaust A tr. operable, fuel it within the storand aan rMn f4 (g')ewoon wit vei the sto i i
~~ar. OPERABLE exhaust fan is inratfon ope _rayeMF proceed e.nd discharging provided thrsugh~~
~~'n 0PERA8LE train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.~~
i
% With the HEPA filter bank inoperable, or with two charcoal adsorber banks inoperable, or with two exhaust ie fans g, inoperable.w$[ , ,,, 1 -(-
~~suspend all operations involving movement of fuel wit iin the g,;y)~~
~~, storas poolcer orsne operauon witNoaas oveMhe n-tornee pool [ -~~
~~until t leaat one charcoal Adsorber cant. at'Teast one exnaust fan, and the HEPA filter bank are restored to OPERABLE status.~~
~~. The stons of spe fications 3.0.3 and[0.4 are not I l~~
l
$URVEILLAllLL stEQUIREMENTS 4d.-te The above required Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: 1 ~
~~At least o e per 31 days by in l'ating flow througf HEPA SR 311t l ' ' tilter b and both charcos' sorbe- banks and we fying that~~
~~. cal adsorber bank .d eacn exhaust fan t leas' 5 minutes. ratesforaj-(eachch v~~
Ad $l SAll*L P<rhem repsra 1 srMVS f lJer h h y in <<ca<r % ut ' W e c<as )< ~o u AA 4. WJ.iden Alb re,gr. dbdfmer y, w e s e p ., 4 ,s.1 ~- g g CALVERT CL S- IT 1 3/4 9-15 Amencrxnt No.169 j pop If 3
5pce1(iebid 3.1.ll I
\
~~l l I~~
..c 3,7 -8/W REFUELIM OPERATIONS Sf7 g ~j ,-), f / -3/?. .12- SPENT FUEL P00L NTILAT10NStiTEM p-e %o rbroe h1*
~~LIMITIM CD'1DITION FOR OPERATION Nk MN A ',1~~
~~? / ,~~
~~LM 3M fl t. tnt 'The Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Systes shall be OPERABLE)with: i D One HEPA filter bank. ,~~
~~' Tw'o. charcoal adsorber banks, and J Two exhaust fans g APPLICABitig readiated fue1 A) in the dorsoe as61d M4 4 . her&~~
~~fed he l etneo.sbl,eh i~~
~~1.h ACTION:~~
~~,o a ,(j h mon gy; /af . ;4g . _~~
g hdr% h With one charcoal adsorber bank and/or one exhaust fan - A k @ eration inoperable, an OPD AM w fuelover
~~; toads uovament the staraaewithin noo}Autythe procstorag@Vra provided aust~ran is in operationThd discharging through M~~
an OPERABLE train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. _ d I@yN k. With the HEPA filter bank inoperable, or with two charcoal adsorber banks inoperable, or with two exhaust fans inoperable, sr
~~, . , g,,,,~~
~~bt suspend all coerations involving movement of fuel within the --~~
*6 storage poolw. crane operad on ;;. . ~ . m .. w. nurage poo [,4-until at least one enarcoat adsorber cank. .i ;. i un. exnam -
~~fan, and the HEPA filter bank are restored to OPERABLE status. ons of Sppfications 3.0.3p 3.0.4 are no SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS~~
~~.O.10 Th'e above required Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:~~
At least o per 31 days by initiat .3 flow through the H pg3,j,jf,l I filter b and both charcoal adso er banks and verify 1 that 'b each c rLoal adsorber bank and ch exhaust fan oper s for at leas 5 minutes. A.3 Y m e n w >w w m " s g 1,7, H . 2.
~~.J g c. a,, y,byXy f*Q w~~
~~_ .Pfer r-g y j[p[ w w ,.,, w g wA w w' /~~
~~.<s.-L M CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/49-15 haendment No. 149 , - - e _~~
i f' N opedre , 42. Adi,g M.) Pm e Ib Y
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.7.11 - SPENr FUEL POOL EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES A.1 The proposed change will reformat, renumber, and reword the existing Technical Specifications, with no change of intent, to be consistent with NUREG-1432. As a result, i the Technical Specifications should be more easily readable and, therefore, understandable by plant operators, as well as other users. During the Calvert Cliffs ITS development, certain wording preferences or conventions were adopted which resulted in no technical changes to the Technical Specifications. Additional information may also have been added to more fully describe each LCO, Applicability, Action, or SR and to be consistent with NUREG-1432. However, the additional information does not change the intent of the current Technical Specifications. The reformatting, renumbering, and rewording process involves no technical changes to existing Specifications. A.2 Current Technical Specification 3.9.12, Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System (SFPEVS). Action c exempts the provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4. Specification 3.0.3 requires th'e plant to shut down when a condition exists that is not covered by the LCO, or one in which an Action is not provided. Specification 3.0.4 exempts Mode changes if the LCO is not met unless continued operation is allowed by the Actions. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.11 will not contain this exemption. The provision to exempt Specificatica 3.0.3 is not required because there is no condition of inoperability that is not encompassed by the Action, therefore 1 CO 3.0.3 would never be entered. The provisions to exempt Specification 3.0.4 are not required because upon completion of the Required Action, the plant will be outside the Mode of Applicability for the LCO. The delWon of requirements that do not apply is considered an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. A.3 Improved Technical Specification SR 3.7.11.2 requires the performance of the required SFPEVS filter testing in accordance with the VFfP. The requirements for VFTP are otr lined in ITS Section 5.0. Current Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 contains the actual testing requirements. This change moves these testing requirements from Section 3.7 to Section 5.0. The movement of requireme "s with the Technical Specifications constitutes an administrative change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. TECIINICAL CIIANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 Current Technical Snecification LCO 3.9.12 requires the spent fuel pool ventilation system to be operable with one llEPA filter bank, two charcoal adsorber banks, and two exhaust fans. When one adsorber bank and/or one exhaust fan is inoperable, CTS 3.9.12 Action a requires the Operable exhaust fan to be placed in operation discharging thro; gh an Operable train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. If this action is taken, fuel movement can continue for an indefinite period of time. No requirements exist to restore the inoperable exhaust fan or charcoal adsorber bank. Improved Technical Specification LCO 3.7.1I will require the spent fuel pool exhaust ventilation system to be operable and in operation. Operation will be required during the Mode of Applicability, even if both exhaust fans and charcoal adsorber banks are Operable. The Bases will also define "in operation" to be one l exhaust fan in operation discharging through an Operable train of HEPA filters and one Operable charcoal adsorber bank. This proposed change is essentially more restrictive, since CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.7.11-1 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3.7.11 - SPENT FUEL POOL EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM it will reo 're the SFPEVS to be in operation during the Mode of Applicability even if both
- exhaust fans and charcoal adsorber banks are in fact Operable, it is appropriate, because the l spent fuel pool ventilation system is a system w'.ich is manually initiated. Thus, in the event of a fuel handling accident occurring during thc movement of
radiated fuel assernblies in l the auxiliary building, the system would only be initiated some time after the e' ent. The delay in initiating the system could permit a radioactive release to the outside avironment.
Bus, anytime irradiated fuel assemblies are being' moved within the auxiliary building, the spent fuel pool ventilation system should be operable and in operation. This change is consistent with current practice, which requires the SFPEVS to be in operation when moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building. This requirement will provided additional assurance of public health and safety. To support this change, it was necessary to revise CTS SR 4.9.12.a. Currently, this SR-requires the spent fuel pool ventilation system to be verified operable at least once per 31 days by initiating flow threugh the HEPA filter bank and both charcoal adsorber banks and verifying ' hat each charcoal adsorber bank and each exhaust fan operates for at least 15 minutes. He revised LCO requires the spent fuel pool ventilation system to be in operation at all times during the condition of Applicability. Thus, operability of the system will continuously be confirmed. Instead of the performance check, an SR which verifies the spent fuel pool ventilation system is in operation is required. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.7.11,1 will require the spent fuel pool ventilation system to be verified to be in operation at least once per 12 hours. This SR provides additional assurance of public health and safety by ensuring that system operation is verified on a periodic basis. The Frequency of 12 hours is appropriate, because plant personnel w a l be focused on the fuel handling activities occurring in the auxiliary building. Thus, if anything were to occur which would result in the cessation of the operation of the epent fuel pool ventilation system, it would be quickly identified. TECIINICAL CIIANGES - RELOCATIONS None TECIINICAL CIIANGES - MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION TO LICENSEE CONTROLI ED DOCUMENIS LA.1 Current Technical Specification LCO 3.9.12 lists the components which make up the SFPEVS and CTS 3.9.12 Actions describes the components needed to place the SFPEVS ."in operation." improved Technical Specification LCO 3.7.1I will only require the SFPEVS to be Operable and in operation. The specific components which comprise the SFPEVS will no longer be specified in the LCO and the description of "in operation" will no longer be described in the Action (the words "in operation "have been added to the LCO as described in the Discussion of Change M.1 above). The specific components and description of "in operation" will be moved to Section B 3 7.11 of the ITS Bases. This is acceptable because these details do not impact the requirement for the SFPEVS to be Operable and in operation. These details can be adequately controlled in the Bases which require change control in accordance with Bases Control Program in ITS Section 5.0. This approrch provides an effective level of regulatory control and provides for a more appropriate change contral process. The level of safety of facility operation is unaffected by the change because there is no change in the requirement for the SFPEVS to be Operable and in operation. Furthermore, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.7.11-2 Revision 11
l DISCUSSION OF CHANGES SECTION 3,7.11 - SPENT FUEL POOL EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM l NRC and Calvert Cliffs resources associated with processing license amendments to these requirements will be reduced. This change is a less restrictive movement of information ; change with no impact on safety. This change is consistent with NUREG 1432. LA.2 Action a and b of CTS 3.9.12 require the suspension of all operations involving crane operation with loads over the storage pool. Since crane operation over the storage pool is not I necessarily affected by the loss of the SFPEVS or its components, the requirements associated with the suspension of crane operation with loads over the storage pool are to be l r: located to the UFSAR. The bounding design basis fuel handling accident assumes an ; I irradiated fuel assembly is dropped and damaged. The movement ofloads (loads other than fuel assemblies) is administratively controlled based on heavy loads antlyses. The heavy loads analysis methodology and crane operation which dictate the controls are described in the UFSAR. Therefore, the Actions associated with crane operations involving loads are not required to be in the ITS to ensure adequate control ofloads and are to be relocated to the UFSAR. Changes to the UFSAR will be adequately controlled by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. LA.3 Not used. I TECHNICAL CIIANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE L.1 Not used. L.2 Current Technical Specification 3.9.12 Applicability for the SFPEVS, is whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool. Improved Technical Specification 3.7.11 Applicability is during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the Auxiliary Building. This change reduces the 1 Modes of Applicability from whenever irradiated fuel is in the storage pool to whenever irradiated fuel is being moved in the spent fuel pool. This change is acceptable because the fuel handling accident assumes an irradiated fuel assembly is being moved in the spent fuel pool. The reduction of the Mode of Applicability is considered a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432. L.3 Current Technical Specification Surveillance 4.9.12.d.2 requires that SFPEVS maintain a measurable negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere once per 18 months. Improved Technical SpecificaDn SR 3.7.11.3 requires that SFPEVS maintain a measurable negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere once per 24 months. This change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 months to 24 months. The 24-month Surveillance Frequency is sufficient to ensure that the SFPEVS can maintain a measurable negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area of the Auxiliary Building. After reviewing the previous ten years of Surveillance history, the SFPEVS has never failed to maintain e measurable negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area of the Auxiliary Building. The SFPEVS contains redundant electrical and mechanical components and is operated once per
.,1 days to verify operability. Therefore, per Generic Letter 91-04, the effect of this change on plant safety is small. Also, instrument drift will have no af"ct on the test. There is no instrumentation associated with this Technical Specification requirement. Decreasing Surveillance Frequencies constitutes a less restrictive change. This change is consistent with NUREG-1432 and the guidance in Generic Letter 91-04.
~~l l L l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7.11-3 Revision 11~~
~
~~f. . b 3.7. 4 g 37 WM MAMM SY$m$ (~~
S/hh6 PENETRATIONR0OMEXHAUSTNAFRFILTRATIONSYSTEF '! LIMITIM CoWITION FOR OPERATION . -- y y'7,fp 4 4 r4r! Two independent containment penetration roce exhaust air filter trains shall be OPEulLE. APf11CABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and I.
~
~~ACTION: 4C"*d 4 [Uno>erable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE W statusWith a 7 da one containment pe for w in at least noT RT=*v within the next 6 hours and~~
~~/ fen.4 h dil11pthe f 31Mwing 30 houy OLD ,/~~
l[
~
OCB Tyfn 12 h SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 44rM Each containment penetration room exhaust air filter train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: . 7, )l
~
58 .$.7,l'r* f A At least once ner 31 days (6n\$ tar.dsarn TkBA3Sby init gi ing) Lp?, / rom e control room, rivthrough tne HUIA_ filter and CMarcoal) er_trai_n and veciffng that the traf3roperates for et least 15 minutes. I b. At least or.ce per 18 months or (1) afser any structural 1 maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings or (2) following painting. fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone comunicating with the system by:
, 1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 199% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they are tested in-place in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.S.a and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. March 1978, 1 while operating the filter train at a flow rate of 2000 cfm 1 10%,
i k _ ? See Disc,sso.s . f c}~p 4 Spy &,h., g,o ! " AbWdrdiw Gh eb A 2,
~~/M]' SR 3113,2 Va.,f b .an j } MEV.S PRj'h~~
~~jur a;# d i*st ?r 3% d' ~~~
~~pr 3h l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1~~
~~" A gg 3/4 6-26 , .WW.$e Amendment No. 212 l 1~~
\ / i ll\ l ey 193 l l
jpegjhiFA Idod ~3, 7, /L um
~~~ ~f f ) [_.~~
j -ih5+:fr CONTAIMMENT $YSTEMS g -), /2 -4/4.e.o - PENETRATION R')%I EXHAlfSTCAl# FItfRA}f0MSiSTEM g y" LIMITING CONDITION FOR rPEP* TION L40.T.7.11 i.e.o.A in independe.it containment penetration room exhaust air filter trains shall be OPERASLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3. g;g " ; With one containment penetration roorc exhaust air filter train nopera:ble, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 7 days j be in at. least NOT STANDBY within the nt.xt 6 hours and 1.rucuts
~~- /. ##3g _~~
~~IThin g followi y su nours. - ' OI {~~
$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.0.0.7 Each containment penetration room exhaust air filter train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: l ~
SR3 7.R./ (. At imi one, per 31 days <9hSTAGGERE0hSTY Sby inipating A .l rom the Antrol sw. flsit thTough the PA T ' ter anrcha adsorbar trait and vert (ying that th perates for at ast n minutes. 5 ~ At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter ur cliarcoal adsor'er housings. or (2) following painting, fire or chemir.al release in any j ventilation zone coneunicoting with *he system by:
1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 199% of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when tiey are tested in-ploce in accordance with Regulatory Positions C.S.a and C.S.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Revision 2. March 1978, while operating the fliter train st a flow rate of 2000 cfm j
~~_/ (ce own,a & drme %~~
~~% Spee;b lios Ti % \' Adwsuid we 0whsls " .~~
~~_ - - - ~ - f he' ft 3 A # c h, R 2,10. 2 $; & - >* ysew va r.mr ra+ %- g/.4 //i %) lo ' y,my . -~~
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~~w"-- - CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 6 22 Amendment No. 189 l ti I . j)yjglo 5~~
~~m. , ,~~
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MSSVs 3.7.1 l- 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS- -~,. 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)_ 3.7,Ll) LCO 3.7.1 The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as.specified in Table 3.7.11 ? and Table 3.7.1-2. < (,\ - - t LP-APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2, and 3.
~~' ACTIONS . _ .. . -N0TE- - --: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~~
~~Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV. 4~~
' CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-A. One or more required A.1 Reduce power to less 4 hours MSSVs inoperable. than or equal to the applicable 5 RTP listed in ~ .'3 Table 3.7.1-1.
~~c. - kro,7A 4a) g ase Lese A.2 - Reduce the I urs~~
- tWamsawara ' )- gh A '37 setpoint (fp Tinbli)n T lN l accordance w'th
~~. Table 3.7.1. l.~~
1 i. i B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion i 34),i Time not met. E
~~/tme A j_ DB B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12dours @~~
~~l One or more. steam generators with less than [ M ] MSSys~~
~~. OPERABLE.\'~~
~~7). l CEOG STS 3.7-1 Rev 1, 04/07/95~~
~~', s I'~~
~~I 3g f , (5~~
~~-r .p ') %..~~
. - . . - .. . - . . . . . . . _ - . - - . ~ . - - ~ . . . ~ . ,, + x l Q - ~
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~~~ ;/_~~
~~-;5- . .~~
~~MSIVs;~~
,1 3.7.2 -- \ ---. __ "3.7. PLANT SYSTEMS: . l 3.7.2 .hain Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)'
~~1 [3.7.t.sp LCO 3.7.2 _ Two IVs shall_be OPERABLE. ~ l 9 APPLICA81LITY: MODE 1, l~~
~~;6 MODES 2 and 3 except when all MSIVs are closed @~~
~~QMctlyMed) g ' , ACTIONS t~~
- CONDITION - REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3.*n s- A. One MStV. inoperable in A.1 Restore MSIV to- 8 ours AnW MODE 1. .
~~OPERABLE status.-~~
~~' km y~~
,- 8. Required Action and 8.1- 8e in MODE 2. 6 hours- - psociatedCompletion-Time of Condition A 1 I k- ~ not met. . t 33 g,g-N - C. --- ---NOTE-- - C.1 Close MSIV.' 8 hours g Separate Condition
~~%"','*p entry is allowed for 8llQ il each MSIV.~~
. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - C.2 Verify MSIV is Once per 7 days 4 closed. ~ One or more MSIVs
~~inoperable in MODE 2~~
~~' ,y or 3. e s.- - D.' Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 3 hours~~
~~-associated Completion-Time of Condition C Algt:'~~
~~not met.- - D.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours~~
.)
~~CEOG STS' 3.7-5 Rev 1. 04/07/95 l~~
~~'). ; 5 W~~
p.
~~.b :~~
~~INSERT 3.7.3 ACTIONS A. B. C i NOTE A.1 Align remaining OPERABLE 72 hours LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. steam-driven pump to~~
~~- automatic initiating statuk. ,~~
A. One steam driven AFW pump R inoperable. A.2 Restore steam-driven pump to 7 days > g OPERABLE status. AcW d' , 10 days from discovery of E [$ Ib NOTE D.1 Align standby steam-driven pump 72 hours LCO 3.0 4 a x, applicable. to automatic initiating status. ANI2 B. One motor-driven AIM pump inoperable. D.2 Restore motor-driven pump to 7 days OPERAULE status. 1747 kW'" '*\ 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO. C. Two AIM pumps inoperable. C.) Align remaining OPERABLE 1 hour [ pump to automatic initiating status. 3.'7. l .1 i E A6.s b.\ . b C.2 Verify the other units motor- Ihour driven AFW pump is OPERABLE. AND 3 C Restore one AIM pump to 72 hours OPERABLE status. 6 3 f euf y a),w d j e ? ~ ~ f
~~,w~ n i a_, '~~
ho & , , - nkqxo% S is _ ___ - - - _ y_ s ' 1
AFW System 3.7.h @ SURVEllLANCE REQUIREMINTS
~~$URVEllt.ANCE g FREQUENCY h~~
~~SR 3.7 .1 Verify each AFW manual automatic valve in eacb we e afewpathand rated, and 31 days hl in both ste upply flow aths to the (401.2**A/~~
~~\ steam turbin locked, seal that is not rivenkerw,sesecuredin or oi i Oz i '~~
position, is in the correct position. SR 3.7 -~.--.------~~ NOTE--------------- red to be performed for the b Not rec , A turbint riven AFW pump unttF{t47 hours r _ fg after I ching*{S00}Tsig in the steam p ,j, j,.// / ( generators. QA.1.ll2 4,l $2 .L kw ou %d') Verify the developed head of each AFW pump ays o a d " "' at the flow test point is greater than or ,f;l31; RED ST ffT l '8, equal to the required developed head. IS SR 3.7 . NOTES-: --- - Not re red to be performed for the m tu tven AFW pump until L1/ lI j /-{24 safterreachingM800},ppsig d.7.l ?. ( .) in he steam generators. ,
2. Not plicable in E 4 when stfam' g rator is re eduponforhyt 2.0 val. J i Verify each AFW automatic valve that is not locked, sealed, or othentise secured in months h position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
_ _ - (contir.ued) 3 ' ' E C3 th e <L -)t gA A b. , ( me n -o(a , A < A l M 8 (' *
~~V *ht 4 k d U. M w 4s s p, e 4 7,3/ ;.7~~
@.u.. p -m . ,,,,,.. CEOG STS 3.7-13 Rev 1, 04/07/95 t
AFW System 3.7.h h
~~$URVEllt.ANCE REQUIREMENTS (contijuod) _~~
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7 ---- --NOT ES----------- h--Not red to be performed for the turbi hours riven AFW pump unti1 Agggfa ter reaching 8tS001"psig in the Ql
~~,1, l,7,, c , j steam generators.~~
f2. No applicabl n MODE 4 when steam 20 b l nerator i lied upon f est ( removal . Ver f e om months an an actual or simulated actuation sign 1 ' (wherp'in pt y, 2/ or/33 SR 3.7. Verify the p AFW flow pathper ali neent by ver$fying flowof the fromrequired the Prior to entering MOPT 2 h condensate storage tank to each steam whenever unic
.. generater, has been in '11'2.l.) MODE 5 or 6 for > 30 days. . -- - - - Neff .
~~SfL 3 1,%,Q 10 M*f regas set ./, G y G,~.D Gr 44 AV A~~
+ra te n*,}l .//a f.Ah Jea n AfJ twp lf ya bi .2 4 f y,, , f) ,- re*c b l y 8 0 0 f.s ty -fh s dr e n, p~* A!J e ~
~~2i NA (4.1.1.2. c. 2. v e,.(3 % prw y ,_ u c.c.ut e r ,ag e~~
~~' ms~ ~ ~ 3t o prm es,.,..J (ha -h .a c) b /~~
fl> ,'1' CEOG $15. 3.7-14 Rev 1, 04/07/95 s-w-v-, , - . . , - -----,v s -- ~- - , e,- n~w m , - - --w w-- -
~~,y --e em~~
~~. . ._.. .. -. -- . ... . _ - . . . -. _ . _ - . ..- ~._ . - .. .- -- . - .~~
~~( l l~~
~~3. -~~
~~4Ts> ._ yr #~~
,S_URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS / ' $URV[lLLANC[ FREQUENCY 4,1,\,1l $R 3.7.).1
~~Verify C$ Wis 1#{","jegallon , 12 hours~~
@@lA @f53 @b i pse Uni 4 CEOG STS 3.7-16 Rev 1, 04/07/95
,.k' y.,_.,w y -,%- - -- - * - --- - - - -
CCW System 3.7 4 h
~~$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMElfi$ ,~~
~~SURVEILLMCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7 1 -----~ ~---- NOT E----~~---~~ Isolation of C$ flow S.o individual~~
~~/ components does not render the C S System 4.~1,% \ , g inoperable.*)~~
Verify aut each ic C09 valve manual, in the flow paowerikservicingrated, and 31 days @lb safet lated equipment, that is not g lg lock ealed. or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position. t Verify each CSautomatic valve in the flow
$R 3.7 2 path that is not locked, sealed, or months .Q / , '98 $ !'b/ \ otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
c Ad SR 3.7 l 3- Verify each C W p en an actual or s starts automatica11 lated actuation sign 1. months @ CEOG STS 3.7-1B Rev 1, 04/07/95
~
vm.v, +-w, -- w
l
$WS <D (cr.G SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY $R 3.7 1 Isolation of ---------- h~~fl ow to -NOTE n
~~dual~~
'h components dges not rende W inoperable. '1' 4 ' ' 9. V r fy aut h man r p c va ve in the f ow path servicing e nd 31 days L d
safet lock elated sealed,equipment,ise or otherw that is not secured in z(d position, is in the correct position. SR 3.7 . 2 Verify each tomatic valve in the flow months path that is et locked, seal.d. or ctherwise secured in position, actuates to 4'7'4'l'g the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. m - NEA) SC44 1R 3.7 & 3 - Verify each ump starts automatica11 on an actual or simulated actuation sign 1. months @@ CEOG STS 3.7-20 Rtv 1, 04/07/95 e
- . w ,, - -y,--- -,,,y y - - - ,w---c,- y
~~l l t 3.~~
~~$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMEl(TS SURVE!LLANCE FREQUENCY .~~
~~0'7 SR 3.7 71 ----- - ------ ----NOTE--- Isolation of $ flow to in~~
~~..- e----------~~
~~dual hIh components does not render 5 inoperable. A~~
.... b . -............-...... lg Verify each 5 manual, powen-operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety-related that is not locked, sealed,equipment,ise or otherw secured in position, is in the correct position.
SR 3.7 2 eachS[a valve in the flow sealed, or i months bI Veriffhat path otherwise secured is not locked,i in pos t on, actuates tc the correct position on an actual or steulated actuation signal. E SR 3.7 3 b Verify each $[ pump starts autoestically months h on an actual er stuulated actuation sigr.al. 4 CEOG STS 3, o Rev 1, 04/07/95
~~- _- ~ - . .~~
SURVillLANCE REQUIREMENTS (conttaued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY ugw ca, SR 3.7 2 Perform accordance Program (VR p) V required with , StRCS ationfilter Filtertestin! T sting in In accordance n
~~'um!5 wEnfr rm hlb~~
_ Y (A//r/ M Pr d .*7. b . I c . 3.7 3 Ver tra actuates on an actuafk or simulated actuation signal. nths hh SR 3.7.11. Verify one CREACS train an maintain a [18]mont on' positive pressure of 2 0.125)incheswater a STAGGE D gauge, relative to t adjacent [ area] TEST S during the emergent radiation state of the emer ency mode of erstion at a emergency vent lation flow ate of $ [3000) cfs.
~~\\\6Y[- - -~~
~~Dnly Peguired in fiobE.51.2,3, a d 4. l CEOG STS 3.7-26 Rev 1, 04/07/95 L~~
~~< .---.a~~
~~__ . . . . .. . . ~ . _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ r [CCS PRE 3.7. O _ Q~~
~~$URVEILLANCE RIOUIRENENTS (continued)~~
~~SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY~~
Ntv SR 3.7.@p.2Perform required ECCS PRidf5 filter testing in accordance h (pg g in accordance with tho TestingProgram("'TP)g' .
~~tilation Filter with the M~~
~~, M o o ife f-7 g A~~
y W93' ( [ $R 3 .13.3 Verify each ECCSMREACS train actuates o [18] mon s 3 J an actual or plated actuation signa . L J r5R 3.7.13 Verify one ECC$ PREACS train maintain a [18 months inc water gauge a5;'AGGERE . negative relative topressure atmosphert [ic] pr sure during the TEST BAS 3 [postaccident]modeof oration at a flow L rateofg[20.0]00 cf . _) SR 3 .13.5 Verify each ECCS C5 filter bypass [18] nths / j- d aper can be . t CEOG STS 3.7 30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l l l l f e l l - , f -
p . - - M w e v.a.G @ (cr.s} - w<m(:reuv,
~~-w . .Q 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS '~~
3.7. Pa! " ! & ; ^'- Ci n x; !;;.;; U ^ 4;) ' (J.9,l2. LC0 3. shall be OPERABLE
~~& $bI m ._ .~~
b h APPLTCABILITY: , dh0DE51,#, 3t andf()iated fuel assemblies in the ACfl0N5 puring of trnd b)@h j CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One FBACS train A.1 Restore F%CS tr n 74 inoperable. to OPERACLE sta s. h
\,. f ERelutredAc'ed an associ on B.1 Be in M00 . 6 hours h Completio Time Alg) =of Condi on A not .
set in 1, 2 B.2 Be in E 5. 36 hours 3, or DK T .FBACS trains i perable in MODE 1, f, 3 or 4. '- f - . Required Action and 1 Place OPER&BLE FBAC lamediately AssociatedComplet)A on train in operation Time (ofCondition
not met during DS rovement of irradi ed fuel assemblies i the f.2 Suspend movene of Issmediately fuel building. trradiated fu
~
~~assemblies i the uel buy . (continued) i CEOG STS 3.7-31 Rev 1. 04/07/95 6Ak L'hll #1C/TioV~~
~~~- '~~
I
)
E 2
l t INSERT 3.7.11 ACTION A A. One SFPEVS charcoal adsorber A.1 Verify OPERABLE SFPEVS i= M -*-ly bankinoperable train is in operation , OR DE , i One SFPEVS exhaust fan A.2 Suspend movement of - Immediately inoperable
~
~~irradiated fuelassemblics in~~
.u the auxiliary building DE .. +
~~One SFPEVS charcoal adsorber .~~
~~~ bank and one SFPEVS exhaust fan inoperable ,,~~
~~i i O 4 f~~
+
~~9 b t 7 Ii 9 i. a _ f_ __~-~~
~~,f}f"'~~
l: Y . . . - . . - - - .-.. - . . . . - . . . .
j l SFfy
~~3. ' ll 0 ACTIONS (continuedL COMPLETION TIME~~
_ CONDITION [ REQUIRED ACTION UOOfUh . I Suspand movement of lamediately T" . fue E ope i e $ r1 ss t'irradi les i the'_ irradiated fuel lies in the building. kun '"9-g, ,. g , & f E /-).1 G5%4V.5 a. ~~ TRAL #[dV.-v> e.,-).
~~/No@g/fou I g~~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE [ ] FREQUENCY SR '3.7 a @ 3 gyt e IF continuous nours t)r h tne neaWrn_ onefatino or her systess without Waters 7. //ovgs boc.,d,>]
~
UllFW90M/) e v6J SR 3.7 2 Perfom required 11ter testi in accordance with th ; Ventilation F1 er In accordance with b cfVRP]J p.<, A.3 Testing Program FTT T ." bh % FHW k Teshy Paq u,~ l 4 r - Verify each FBACS train a
~~-m a SR 3.7.14.3 ates [18] months Q) on an actual or simulat actuation signal.~~
~~m SR 3.7. .~~
~~& WFNVSS' &~~
Verify swin=n tr-i car. maintain a @l_ month g negative pressure (1Mincnerwater naegD La FMGL aJeebI, C with respect to atmospheric pressure p - II E T S hpaN =!! h1 e Yopfe) (continued) CEOG STS 3.7-32 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l. l l
0 I l PR 7 g@ ; 473) "' 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS r CWnuS$ystem (PR 3.7. Penetration Room Exhaust ) a
~~,(,..(,,1)LC0 3. Two PR($S trains shall be OPERABLE GJ \~~
APPLICABILITY: M00!$ 1, 2, @ ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TINE. M'41\A. One PR train A.1 Restore PRC train 7 days ACT4/ inopera le. to OPERABLE status.
~~/ s. Required Action and B.1 Se in MODE 3. 6 hours~~
[3g h *d associated Completion - T Time not met. Algt B.2 Be in MODE hours S'URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS __
$URVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7. 1 Ope _r_ateesch_PRd train for 31 days em:;rx=e:m:ua 4.s.u,, 215 minutes).
~~e I h gfg SR 3.7. Verify required PRidC6 filter testing in~~
~~<gg .2 accordancewiththe9VentilationFilter Testing Program 1VFft) .~~
~~in accordance with Ve414&n the ,{Y""lter Fi~~
~~'# 2 g~~
TeShy Pnvyram (continued) CEOG STS- 3.7-34 Rev 1, 04/07/95 4
DISCUSSION OF TECliNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS ne MFW regulating valves are also automatically closed and MFW bypass valves autom:tically opened on a turbine trip, reducing MFW flow. Although this additional isolation capability is not safety related, this capability is nufficiently reliable to permit a reasonable time for restoration ofinoperable MFIVs. The change to NUREG-1432 SR 3.7.3.1 requires valve stroke time testing to be performed and requires that the closure be initiated by an actual or simulated actuation signal. This SR is revised to omit the actual required closure time and the phrase "on an actual or simulated actuation signal." Improved Technical Specification SR 3.7.15.1 will read, " Verify the closure time of each MFIV is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program" with a Frequency of "In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program." These requirements are not included in the CTS, except in the ESFAS Response Time Testing requirements, which are addressed in ITS 3.3.4. Herefore, there is no need to duplicate the actuation testing in ITS 3.7. Additionally, such actuation testing is not included in the Inservice Testir.: Progren with the stroke time testing, although the required stroke time is included in the Inservice Testing Program. Therefore, this change is consistent with the current licensing basis. As indicated above, the actuation testing is included in ITS 3.3.4. This Specification is added to the end of Section 3.7 to minimize the volume of documentation changes since it was not included in the original ITS submittal.
~~8. NUREG-1432 Specification 3.7.4 contains requirements regarding :he atmospheric dump valves.~~
The Calvert Cliffs ITS will not contain these requirements. In the steam generator tube rupture and loss of AC power analyses, the atmospheric dump valves are utilized in order to maximize the radioactive release associated with the event from an analysis standpoint. This provides l assurance that the results are within the acceptance criteria for 10 CFR Part 100. The atmospheric dump valves are not required for depressurizttion or cooldown of the plant ir. response to Design Basis Events. The MSSVs are used to mitigate these events. l
9. Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.7.3, "AFW System," adds a Limiting Condition for Operation Note that is not currently in NUREG-1432 Specification 3.7.5,"AFW System." He Limiting Condition for Operation Note states that the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) trains required for Operability may be taken out-of service under administrative control for performance of periodic testing. This Note is consistent with Calvert Cliffs CTS 3.7.1.2 Action c. This Note is required to allow certain tests to be performed (e.g., manual discharge valve closed for pump Total Dynamic Ilead Test or Logic Testing) because of the Calvert Cliffs unique Ai W design. This change is consistent with Calvert Clifts' current licensing basis, as approved in a Safety Evaluation Report, dated November 17,1983, for Amendment 88 (Unit 1), and in a Safety Evaluation Report, dated February 16,1983, for Amendment 62 (Unit 2).

10. Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.7.3, "AFW System," deleted Actions A and E, added new Actions A, B, and C, and renumbered the remaining Actions from N" REG-1432 Specificatien 3.7.5, "AFW Syrtem." The NUREG 1432 Specification is for plants' d one turbine-driven AFW pump and two motor driven AFW pumps. The above changes 4 result of the unique design of the Calvert Clifts AFW System which contabs two turf = driven AFW pumps and one motor-driven AFW pump, and has the capability to cross-con.act Units 1 and 2 motor-driven AFW pumps. This design requires unique Actions, which are contained in the Calvert Cliffs CTS, and which have been adopted in the ITS. However, Calvert ClitTs' ITS also adopted the NUREG-1432 Actions which require trains to be Operable. He summation of these changes resulted in the Calvert Cliffs ITS. Improved Standard Technical Specification Action A is not applicable to Calvert ClitTs because the loss of steam supply results in both steam driven pumps becoming inoperable. This condition is addressed in ITS Action C for two inoperable pumps.
CALVERT CLif FS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-2 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG 1432 SECTION 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS nese changes are consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis. In conjunction with the above changes, two new Surveillances were added. The added SRs are SR 3.7.3.2, wh!ch requires the cycling of each testable, remote-operated valve that is not in its operating position every 31 days, and SR 3.7.3.6, which requires the verification that the AFW System is capable of providing a minimum of 300 gpm nominal Dow to each flow leg every 24 months. These tests are a direct result of the Calvert Cliffs AFW design.
11. NUREG-1432 Specification 3.7.8, " Service Water System," contains a Note (Note 2) which requires the applicable Condition and Required Action of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.6 to be entered for shutdown cooling made inoperable by Service Water (SRW). Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.7.6," Service Water System," will not contain this Note. Calvert Cliffs' SRW System does not supply cooling water to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers. His change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs design.

12. Calvert Cliffs contains a Saltwater (SW) System. NUREG 1432 does not contain a Specification for the SW System. The NUREG 1432 Specification 3.7.8 for SRW was utilized as a template for the Calvert Cliffs ITS SW System Specification (ITS 3.7.7).

13. NUREG 1432 Specification 3.7.9 contains the requirements for an ultimate heat sink. The Calvert Cliffs ITS will not contain this requirement. The Chesapeake Bay utilizing the SW System is the ultimate heat sink at Calvert Cliffs; however, the SW System is a " train'ed" system and is similar to the Component Cooling and SRW Systems. The Specifications for SRW were used as a template for the SW System. The atmospheric damp valves are not credited in the Calvert Cliffs safety analysis. Therefore, this Specification was deleted since it does not resemble the current Calurt Cliffs SW System. This change is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current design.

14. NUREG-1432 Table 3.7.12 requires the main steam safety valve lift settings to have a tolerance ofi 3%. Calvert Cliffs ITS Table 3.7.1-2 will define the range oflift settings that are permitted for each MSSV, however, the 13% tolerance does not apply to each MSSV at Calven Cliffs.
~~Calvert Cliffs' allowable value range is from 13% to approximately i 6%, depending on the valve. This change is consistent with Calvert Cliffs' current licensing basis.~~
15. NUREG-1432 SR 3.7.2.1 and SR 3.7.3.1 require valve stroke time testing to be performed and the closure be initiated by an actual or simulated actuation signal. These SRs are revised to omit the phrase "on an actual or simulated actuation signal." He requirement is not included in the CTS, except in the ESFAS Response Time Testing requirements which are addressed in ITS 3.3.4. Therefore, there is not need to duplicate the actuation testing in ITS 3.7.
Additionally, such actuation testing is not included in the Inservice Testing Program with the stroke time testing. Therefore, this change is consistent with the current licensing basis. As indicated above, the actuation testing is included in ITS 3.3.4.
16. NUREG 1432 SR 3.7.14.4 requires one Fuel Building Air Cleanup System train to be capable of maintaining a specific negative pressure during the post-accident mode of operation, at a specific flow rate. Calvert Cliffs ITS SR 3.7.11.3 will only require each Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System fan to maintain a measurable negative pressure. His is consistent with the current Calvert Cliffs licensing basis, which only requires that a negative pressure be established.
This change also deleted the NUREG-1432 requirement to perform the test on a Staggered Test Basis. Current Licensing Basis requires each fan be tested every 18 months. l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7 3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.7 o PLANT SYSTEMS 350*F. Here is a relatively short period of time after the transition to MODE 4 after which the shutdown cooling system is placed in service. The AFW system at Calvert Cliffs is not used for normal startups and shutdowns and is only requirco for design basis events in the safety analysis. Steam generator levels during normal startup and shutdown are maintained using pumps in the conden ate and feedwater system as needed based on secondary side pressure and SG level.
21. NUREG 1432 Specification 3.7.14 provides requirements for a fuel building air cleanup system that consists of two redundant trains, and which is automatically actuated. He Calvert Cliffs spent fuel ventilation system is essentially a single train with two redundant fans and charcoal adsorber banks, which is manually initiated. The CTS allows one fan and/or charcoal adsorber bank to be inoperable indefinitely, provided the spent fuel ventilation system is placed in operation. Improved Technical Specification LCO 3.7.11 will require the spent fuel pool exhaust ventilation / stem to be Operable, and in operation at all times, even when both fans and adsorbers are actually Operable. This proposed change is more restrictive than the requirements contained within the NUREG. If the LCO requirements of NUREG-1432 Specification 3.7.14 were retained, the system would only be required to be operable. Thus, in the event of a fuel handling accident occurring during the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building, the system would only be initiated some time after the event. The delay in initiating the system would permit a radioactive release to the outside environment. Thus, anytime irradiated fuel assemblies are being muved within the auxiliary building, the spent fuel pool ventilation system should be operable and in operation. This requirement will provide additional assurance of public health and safety.
The revised LCO requires the spent fuel pool ventilation system to be in operation at all times during the condition of Applicability. Thus, operability of the system will continuously be confirmed. Instead of the 31 day performance check provided by NUREG-1432 SR 3.7.11.1, an SR which verifies the spent fuel pool ventilation system is in operation is required. Improved Technical Specification SR 3.7.11.1 will require the spent fuel pool ventilation system to be verified to be in operation at least once per 12 hours. This SR provides additional assurance of public health and safety by ensuring that system operation is verified on a periodic basis. The Frequency of 12 hours is appropriate, because plant personnel will be focused on the fuel handling activities occurring in the auxiliary building. Thus, if anything were to occur which would result in the cessation of the operation of the spent fuel pool ventilation system, it would be quickly identified.
22. The Note in NUREG SR 3.7.2.1 stating that the surveillance is only required to be performed in Modes 1 and 2 is deleted. Current Technical Specification SR 4.3.2.1.3 tests operability of the MSIVs as part of ESFAS response time testing for the Steam Generator Pressure-Low Function.
The Modes of Applicability in CTS for this Function are Modes 1,2 and 3. Conducting this test in Modes 1 and 2 would cause an Asymmetric Steam Generator RPS trip and place the plant in Mode 3. Testing the MSIVs in Mode 5 is in accordance with cold shutdown testing as described in ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI,1989, and ASME Operation and Maintenance Code Part 10,1987,with 1988 Addenda.
23. NUREG-3.7.14 Actions are written for a two train FDACS system. Current Technical Specification 3.9.12 only requires one IIEPA filter bank, two charcoal adsorber banks, and two exhaust fans, which does not constitute two complete trains. Current Technical Specification 3.9.12 Action a allows indefinite operation with one operable exhaust fan in operation, one operable llEPA filter and one operable adsorber bank Condition A and R quired CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-5 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 , SECTION 3,7 o PLANT SYSTEMS Actions A.1 and A.2 are structured to reflect the current licensing basis requirement. This is necessary based on existing plant configuration. l. i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-6 Revision i1
1 I i y q c,g Mt 30 M b *. % # , p c s-A ED ,3( ( cy 2 ken MS$Vs B 3.7.1 < l B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS i 5 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MS$Ys) . BASES BACKGROUND The primary purpost of the MSSVs is to provide overpressure protection for the secondary system. The MSSVs also provide protection against overpressurizing the reactor coolant by providing a heat sink for the pressure removal of boundary energy from(RCP8)he t Reactor Coolant System (RCS) if the preferred heat sink, provided by the Condenser and Circulating Water Systes, is allable. ,o ch., e ! Eight MSSVs are located o e n eam header, outside containment, upstream of he na
~cescnoea in the'FSAR, as (Ref.isolation 1). The MSSV valves, as @ h rated capacity passes the full flow at 102% RTP (100% + 2% for instrument error meets the requirements of)the ASME Code, Section IIIwith the valves full open. Th $Alg (Ref. 2). The MS$V dest;n includes staggered setpoints, ,
~~Acprding to Teole 3.7.1-4. in x ihe eccompanying LC0, so that~~
~~) L.~~
only the number of valves neeoed will actuate. Steggered setpoints reduce the potential for valve chatter'ng because The m%h L.4 of insufficient steam pressure to fully open all valves (d,, ,MttM _ following a turbine reactor tripg
- h APPLICABLE The design. basis for the MSSVs comes from Reference 2; d,'y,, ,j SAFE 1Y ANALYSES purpose is to limit secondary system pressure to 5 1105 o design pressure when passing 2005 of design stem flow.
This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipated operational occurrence (A00) or accident considered in the Design Basis Accident (D8A) and transient anal sis. The events that challenge the MSSV relievi u pacity, and @ thus RCS pressure, are those character 1r as decreased heat ra==al m s, and are presented in the SAR, @ 34- " Sectian115 (Ref. 31 Of these, the full power loss (condenserA@en (IBCY) event is the limiting A00. h @ 1solates tne turvine and condenser, and tenninetes norma t .Q t feedwater flow to the steam generators. Before delivery of auxiliarv feedwater to the steam generators, RCS pressure W~ reaches s Weso psane This peak pressure is < 1105 of the @ design pressure ~or 2500 psig, but high enough to actuate the pressurizer safety valves, unr=wi-u= 1 ii-vi- -t ea @ (continued) CECG STS 8.3.7 1 Rev 1, 04/07/95 9 _ y.w,% -eq_ , r-um--
----wgm- _--- MS-*
i k 1-4 I i a MS$Vs l 53.7.1- t { BASES
~~4 i~~
APPLICA8LE /durtChe(Lgy)e%t is 2.5 f5 lb/Aour, which is lessAhan T SAFETY ANALY&E5 (the#ated casactsy of tut _MS$Vs. / / J h (continued)
"The Iteiting acci t for peak RCS pressure the full. 1 power feedwater ne break (FWL8), inside c tainment, with 5
! the failure of backflow check valve i he feedwater , i line free t;ic fected steam generator, ater free the : affected ste generator is assumed to lost through the l l' break with nimal additional heat tr sfer free the RCS. rA With heat val limited to the una octed steam generator. W
4 the red heat transfer causes a increase in RCS l temper re, and the resulting RC fluit expansion causes an in:re e in pressure. The RCS p sereinceeases to
~~vM with the pressurir safety valves providing t~~
~~'4f capacity. The maximum lieving rate of the MSSVs ofogtheFWLseventiss2 E6 lb/ hour, which 's less l_tpan the rated capacity of MS$Vs.~~
conserva fWullysit ~ assumption a small ran f f i TUsifsiresI FWL s than a full double e guillotine k + produce an $ pressure of 2765 ps for a period o n to second exceeding 11 M (2750 s g) of design ssure. GI t 4-This is sidered acceptable $ pressure i still well below M of design pressu where deformati may occur.
~~The p. 111ty of this event is in the re of 4 E-6/ year, The MS$Vs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.~~
i LC0 This LC0 requires all MSSVs to be OPERA 8LE in comp 11ance with Reference 2 even though this is not a requirement of ' , the DBA analysis. This is because operation with less than
the full number of MS$Vs requires limitations on allowable l THEMAL p0WER (to meet Reference 2 requirements), and {
I r- ad h + - t to the anneter Protection System trip setpointry A meet- - -- -fju m ' These liettations are according to those shown in 3 Table 3.7.1-1, Required Action A.2 and Re trod Action A.3
**' 5 " M "I# in the accompanying LCO. ' An MSSV Is consi$ red inoperable '

. 14 if it fails to open upon demand. I i
The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to , open within the setpoint tolerances, relieve steam generator i 1 overpressure, and resent when pressure has been reduced. ; The OPERASILITY of the MSSVs is determined by periodic ' (continued) 1
CE04 STS-b 3.7-2 Rev 1, 04/07/g5 L +
6 i f j i l i l -{_ F
<+---vm+ms-,w+ ps y, . q- <s ew.- t ,.w- ,~y~.v.+m .' van,+-ae----,+v4 ' - --sw< e--r-~es r---- -'.mc---w m se e v --a ~ - - - - - - - - -
~~7 1~~
~ \ /{ %4 e .) .hd 4.Takte ~3.7.l-Z 3 shig dat Whe% s be 3Nn titen he .,e slo m,phM4 $say b v Les 144 Wben if f ad MS <>'s; t 4
any wo .NeuWs 144 L>elweerg 9594n41035 ps( sad & Ove i rmati .%0 va bel64 'me b as 8115and 10659 3. TA MSSVs 5>
~~'De #1MWs Soli yderu % ele- th$rg n lem sar Ons.4'efprpe4 8 3.7.1 ,~~
~~i LC0 survet11ance testing in accordance with the Inservice (continued) lasting Program.~~
TheIfftsettingsiaccordingtoTable3.7.1-2inthe l accear,anying LC0 corrcspond to ambient conditions of the l palveatnominal,operatingte.4eratureandpressure.
eT f This LC0 provides assurance that the MS$Vs will perfom , their designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in a challenge to the RCP8.- M_ AP3'LICAdiMN / In a minimum of MS$Vs per steam e/ requ t to be OPEnA8Lf, ccordinghTableberatorare . 1-1 in the ( g eors /jg j ,.J y accompany 1po LCO, which is limiting .ad bounds all lower ! y M003. > z ana J, Do%n A3RL Code and Ene " , accise nalysis require oni MS$Vpersteamgen[ tor 3 in a de awareressure pro inn 1 j
~~/ i In MODES 4 and 5, tbsre are no credible transients requiring the MS$Vs.~~
The steam geleerators are not normally used ( ? heat removal in MODES 5 and 5. and thus cannot be overpressurized; there is no requirement for the MS$Vs to be OPERAsLE in these MODES. ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each M35V. 7As maler a[ kej*stabIs A.1 and A.2 MisVs pull rlde'm*s h' r/w nece ss.,I /,n) e4 An alternative to restoring the inoperable MSSV(s) to l' g,g *^ '. a f'8+AjePI ' OPERA 8LE status is to reduce power so that the available 4 sy sirra s/cem - //'d *",p MSSV relievin0 CanaritV meets Code Peauirements far the newer level. Aseration may contin rovided the allowab ' rnrdmet reac4 rep.;re .I THtRFUU. POWE 'is equal to the prod t of: 1) the ratio g 4 ,,,j,, ,p I'**y the number f MSSVs available pe steam generator to t 3 total n r of MSSVs per ste enerator, and 2) t ratio lf// IM,t # /Aa /oder (**s h p 4 c,k . u t.lW la/e / - /i of the vallable relieving c Luult ied by 100%L c ty to total sie low,
~~-j 4ry sdpd .~~
~~trelup y r. e44 / = A.~~
~~/;'// 6.s.s : (continued)~~
CE06 $ $ B 3.7-3 Rev 1, 04/07/95 ' t - . 4' , n . - , ,
~~..e , , . . . .......w .e.m._---, r-.--.--e, - - , . . - . - . . .. -,.+e r e ..n _ . - -m-~~
~~. _ _ = . _ _ . - _ _ _ -~~
MSSVs B 3.7.1 SASES M A ' ACTIONS (continued) B.1 and k.2 h 1 1 If the MSSYs cannot be resto ed to OPERABLE status in the associated Completion Time r if one or more steam generators have less than MS$Ys OPERA 8tE, the unit must be pieced in'a MODE in whic the LC0 does not a.ppiy. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within. [' ] hours. The allowed Com experience,pletion to reach Times are reasonable, the required based unit conditions fromonfulloperating power conditions in an orderly manner,and without challenging unit systems. *
~~SURVElLLANCE SR 3 . 7.1.1_~~
REQUIREMENTS This SR verifles the OPERABILITY of the MSSYs by the verification of each MSSV lift setpoints in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. The ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 4 , requires that safety and relief valve tests be performe)d in accordance with ANSI /ASME OM-1-1987 (Ref. 5). According to Reference 5, the following tests are required for MSSVs : g e( , A J,# ,, surp hence
a. Visual examination; ai

b. Seat tightness determination;

c. Setpoint pressure determination (lift setting); '
L
d. Compliance with owner's seat tightness criteria; anc .fg

e. Verification of the balancing device integrity on t h5 Nor-balanced valves.
be The ANS!/ASME Standard requires that all valves every 5 years, and a minimum of 20% of the valves tested every 24 months. The ASME Code specifies the activities nd tes ed i h frequencies necettary en utterv th. reautre nte. .. Table 3.7.1-2@wsd+93ff midoint t'ala"a OPERA 81LITV fa theSurveill'ancetoallowfordrift.however, the valfes are reset to i is during h This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This is to (continued) CEOG STS 8 3.7-5 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l
~~. ~ig I-~~
i i MSIVs ' B 3.7.2 , BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES EatnAeam inMet loan. headerpstream of thgesed M51V iphe} @ (continued)
b. A break outside of containment and upstream from the MSIVs. This scenario is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled itCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the MSIVs -
anamses tar ernan. -limits the blowdown to a > sing' e steam generator. .,. ,
c. A break downstream of the M51Vs. This type of break will L isolated by the closure of the MSIVs. Events such as increased steam flow through the turbine or '
the steam bypass valves will also terminate on closure (f..g.) excess load. of the M51Vs. ) 3 4 GVth - d. A steam generator tLbe pture. For this scenario, closure of the MS!WD1 olates the affected a+a= generator from the in et steam generator minimi radiological relea$a.9sesgtEBf _h e operator 4 o maintain the pressure of the - steam ge retor with the ruptured tube below the MSSV setpoints, a necessaiy st isol i ng the flow through the rupture.! j, 4 ,,, g ,
~~e. The MS!Vs ars also utilized du$ng other events such as a feedwater line break. These events are less limiting so far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned.~~
The MSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 This LC0 requires that the MSIV in each of the [two) steam 11aes be OPERA 8LE. The MSIVs are considered OPERA 8LE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal. This LC0 provides assurance that the MSIVs will perforn j their design safety function to mitigate the consequence _s_of l' accidents as wv i a ruu n i n v i i . if ...,... .. . I! is tne i FR 100 (Ref/ 4) limitt nr the Mac staff aEo_r...iqoved 1 l t
@ E'Md W Re kn 'l licensi bas 1a P b \
L l; , (continued) I CE0G STS 8 3.7-g Rev1,04/07/95 l l , t rs 7-- y4p3 gr-T-} ^WTf' T'tr WPy TT4* "'"rr'-1wW-t-'r*-1n-"- Pz8 ='**-p - g w 4+w-"T F-M 4ew'v- *#--'- " * ** - " - - - - - -
I 1 MFIVs [a+1= nji7 pass _v 1F
~~,- % ^~~
~~ggggs [fr.b.a mi f,(m. 5 +IO e f Av> gli l~~
~~' A descric11pn of the MFIYsks found in the'F5,~~~
{ BACKGROUND (, y A (continued) Section 610,Pfb(Ref.1). , - WD ' 1 APPLICABLE The design basis of the MFIVs.is estab?lshed by the SAFETY ANALYSES analysis for the irrge SLB. It is also influericed by the. accident ant'ysis for the large FWLB. Fuosure f the MFIVs n W Q ypass vasves may 1so es relied on o terminate steam break for core resp te analysis and excess b feed er flow event upe receipt of a MSI on high sie tor level,j . an LB su additional mass and energy to the steam generato*s contributing to cooldown. This failure also results in additional mass and energy releases following an SLB or FWLB event. , The MFIVs satisfy triterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. LC0 This LC0 ensures that the MFIVs (snas., w- m an will O' isolate MFW flow to the steam generators. Following an FWLB or SLB, these valves will also isolate the r..insafety related portions from the safat sted portions of the sys__ tem. Ints n u tequires that )MFIVs [ino-m moas 0 @ alAltas3)in each feedwa ne be OPERABLE. The ,iFlys /IED Etrtmerrr7BMDare considered OPERABLE when the isolation @ times are within limits, and are closed on an isolation actuation signal.
Failure to meet the LC0 requirements can result in g "E additional mass and energy being released to containment Q*
g y" p"u'b. following an SLB or FWLB inside enntainment. IIf an M515 ' Enign sie L a# .tJhl excess generator sev is re- Jed on to erminate an edwater flow a nt, failure to t the LC0 $
~~, QQ ***D resul in t he intrait - nn af water int the main ste ,p . s. M Aj- .line .F g c y,.~~
APPLICABILITY The MFIVs ana we ovum univO must be OPERACLE whenever there is significant mass and energy in the Reactor Coolant @ (continued) CEOG STS B.3.7-14 Rev 1. 04/07/g5 w n v - 2' , , _ ~
t
~
MFIVs([and,4W!vi awrass valvasL @ 5 3./. BASES APPLICA81LITY System and steam generators. lThis ures that 1 thel (continued) jovent or an NLLB a yIngle Tallu annot b lblowddlen of more,tMn one steam 1 rator. the L In M00ES 1, 2, and 3, the MFIV usr g ri am>= --- 1 are reautred to be OPERA 8LE,CokeepFunen snarare stes li'
%ur 1.us1.a ny a c.cossa _,__. v % in order to co, ' " amount of available fluia snat could be added .. ant in the case of a secofvfary systes pipe break insidt . tainment. When the valves are closed and deactiv. A G- M ind W - A o -..- ^ --=1 they are already performing their safety function. @
In , and 6. steam generator enerny is low. the RFIs 3sgr tne Dypass {hiFeto ince MFW is40t recuirep ,wettes are norgaMh - g ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indicatir that separate Condition entry is allowed for each val e. AA With one MFIV Erv------ f*o& mai tnoperabie,Qction must be taken to m == -- vi=1- - _ _ - - - v=F within. R 72}chours. en t se valves areposed or isointeg sne WLisol ( e the t ir required s4(ety function (e.g/,to for unit with % v e nely per eawater 11n 8] ho Completion ime is reas able to cl ts ass valve, ich inclyd performing contro11 the MFIV d) i s..utdown to DE tJ --
----e Th 72# our h M Q roabbdh M Mpaj 4G Selab Completion Time takeslinto account the N P** %Ih m fforded a by the deaamTno umABtB valves and I ~
the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the NFW flow paths. b g. l If morf than one MFIV orAMFIVJ Dypass vej== in sne s f ClowAath cannot be regor~ed to OPERABLVstatus, then here CEOG STS-B 3.7-15 Rev 1, 04/07/95 mm ,
~~, - y .I,w y two -~~
~~r 4-MFIVr QaruVIMFlWI,sypess v4Jfe7) s J.7Jg g aAsts b~~
; ,ii SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7. 1 (continued) y maad IM9N REQUIREMENTS C 3 (setal'Itar s a The MFIV closure time is assum.d in the accident anc containment analysesil is ryelTjance (horse ly perf reac on r urnipg t un toopfaratio fell ing i efuel g, ou age. /The FIVs houl not D tes ed at r s .ce e en a art trok exe se i reases h t risk t, va e el sure ith he u t go ratin power' these valves aie n tes ed a p th are xeept res t ASME ode, ectio XL(Ref. f) re treme s dur ng topera on in ES } and .f . .c 'The Frequen The mFlVs are htkJ amWrT/'smoninN accordance kb The 18):. month Frequency with forthek va ve @ !nservice Testinf de^3 adap ta uch ftGh5 Atwedawn. e sure~,tmi is based on the efueling cycle. Operating / uA kth 1, W experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed OTTi,ri ~^ ~"
~~WW dee.3 e4u M f T V "'O REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Section~~
'; geW1hd!J"s&%"*""-
~~litct, ufA5mE 'OptisAm u rN w% & Dar4 to ,19E'), .__ _.~~
~~.w+L.19 87 v Added.~~
~~i -~~
~~%g...a.=we h **-=cem%e no,.sm.a- -~~
~~whw a*-o* e --+~t*- +v**+= e Na -m" *= CEOG STS B 3.7-17 Rev 1, 04/07/95 h s- ah .~~
~~mekaesse, m - * - w e == -+,----==a -~~
* * - = ' =
~~4--** * * = ~ * '~~
I
I l i AFW Syste B 3.7 v'd" I 8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS / B 3.7 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System -Ils rrwHla3 >wP/n ILt t U I w n a ..+..w g _ FASES has%r assv nrt \r, _= BACKGROUND The AFW System automatically supplies feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat from the Reactor Coolant QgQ System upon the loss of nonnal iesdwat. (supply. The AFW pumps take suction through a=== rate -o ==nfi suction i linee from the condensate stcrage tank (CST) (LCO 3.7. e $ @g
~~' Condensate Storage Tank (CST)') and pump to the steam~~
[LoAI;r1 N,.lJer generator seconderv r de via separate and inde ndent ' LL [AFuO huJ4r e # connections to theQud< n feed-star carvi ~ cutside containment. The steam g uerstors function as a heat sink
~~@ j for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by !~~
releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators I via the main steam safety valves (MS$Vs) (LCO 3.7.1, ' Main Steam Safetv Valvet fuitVai') or atmoenharie. Ives the ma{rFcondenser is avaname,(ADYs) ases= may {LCOX7.4. the steam bypass valves andeecueuiateo xe ine c It os ruiva>6d via h lg s)'). 'Atees')heric)) amp Valves _~ The AFW System consists f M ao rdrivcaAFWpump$and steam turbine driven lump 3 configured int @ trains. Og i - mutur ariven pump provices suus of Mw flow capacity; Y turbine driven pumpj provides 100% of the required capacuy 6e sne utvem generators as assumed in the accident 3
> * *^t b re tion 1 et r pump er C i n C l.&.1-l M motor driven AFW pump is p predfromanindepend t nu ,A ,.h.,L,;g d'i++a m a plau.0 C ass 1E power supply, and feeds @ steam generator, ._ ;
~~h 'A'-a% %.\ ret, sets I~~
. -. . \ +. ,+ u ro$$o'omTb" heNeNe neraN h 4 is ,,, .4 , & . One pump at full flow is sufficient to remove decay heat and cool the unit to Shutdown Cooling (SOC) System entry conditions.
l The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives > steam from either h main steam header upstream of the main steam isolation valve (MSIV). Each of the steam feed lines will supply 100% of e- c - the requirements of the turbine driven AFW pump. The
.I nic epr A J w hes J turbine driven AFV pump supplies a common header capable of a */ e p ve,e,i 11 "I * *
~~9 '"" '** '"~~
l k (continued) i CEOG STS B 3.7-22 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l l
8 h ACTIONS ,) and .2 (continued), The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on h operating expertance, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without l challenging unit systems. _ f p u ,,eq q lii N0DE I with (two FW trains and3) operation i allowed operablo MODES 1.) i .
~~ ontirjue cause only e p motor driven AFW is req ed in ac rdance with e{
fo,c r d'*^P /J - No that modif s the LCO Although is not re red, ( ' prec/u/c/ ,'/ - -/ern.4,ed s i the unit may c tinue to 01 down and start the S . j k Le & mosf e 74 ,+ ac h, QW f Required Action .1 is modified by a Note indicating that a'.) required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended untti one AFW train is restored ERABLE status. I h Wsth kAhy4e]) ATW trains inopera in MODES 1, 2 anJ 3 I the unit i m a serious 1 degraded condition with related means for conaucung a cooldownf g= am e r r = " " = coni only noites) a ety cw - ' t h
~~-nn - afatv grade / J tenuttimentl. In such a condition, the unit shoitId not be- =~~
~~riurbed by any action, including a power change, that S might result in a trl .V The seriousness of this condition requires that action started immediately to restore ont~~
~~' N INC O W /a,,F M ,*],*e f Mey @AFW train to OPERABLE status. LCO 3.0.3 o mrt app 1mbiel '~~
~~could force the uait i oalesssafecondition.f j f(qco'M C* I O 3'd3 Ol ' .#jRequired Acti~~
/ ;y $ Iu" 416) n E.1 is modified by a te indicating t g/p/QS (6/d' all require E changes or power r uctions are susp ded j untti one W train is restored to ERABLE status. '
With on AFW train inoperable, tion must be ta to isoedt ely restore the inope le train to OPE BLE status or to tunedtately verify, b administrative ns, the OPERABILITY of a second tr n. LCO 3.0.3 i not applicable as it could force the un into a less safe condition. L __ _ _
~
(continued) I CEOG STS , B 3'.7-27 Rey }, o4foyfg5 I l
INSERT B 3.7.3 SR 3.7.3.2 Cycling each testable, runote-operated valve that is not in its operating position provides assurance that the valves will perform as requi nis is accomplished by cycling each valve at least one cycle. *1his Surveillance ensures that ves required to function during certam scamrios, will be capable of being properly positioned. Frequency i2 based on engmocring j%e that when cycled in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program, these valves can be placed in the desired position when required. 1 Opedig gosik ,% '% ( *> ik h4 1 lls va\n n's in aoe,Q n.cni plad ope % C
/
G e 9 e T re . + * ,
AFW System > B 3.7 h BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7 '" ntinutJ) REQUIREMENTS potenuti for an unpainnea transtantAf the CG were4erformed wim the reactor at 4maar) The @ month @ Frequency is acceptable, based on the design ret ability and operating experbnce of the equipment. This SR is modified byia[ Not ote indicates that the SR be deferred unt ' uttab es conditions are tab 11shed. TThTi oererrai . -c. i n- oecause re is ,s nsuffici nt steam pressure o perform the tes W Note. [2 states that the ,is not. required i [The][In 4. MODE 4 the required p is altsady operat' and the autos rt function is required. In E 4, the heat r al requirements uld be less p]ro[ving more time fo op ator action to ually start the utred nFW pump. eviewer's Note: Some plants may routinely use AFW for heat remova in MODE 4. The sond justificati is (i) provided for plants that use a startup feedwater pump rather W than AFW for startup and shutdown.
"J' s m n su C 6 sa t'@h h This SR ensures that the AFW System is properly aligned by verifying the flow path to each steam generator prior to entering MODE 2 operation, after 30 days in MODE 5 or 6.
OPERABILITY of AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the AFW System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering jud0ment, and other administrative controls to ensure that flow paths remain OPERABLE. To further ensure AFW System alignment, the OPERABILITY of the flow paths is verified folli, wing extended outages to determine that no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow pat s from tha - CST to tfie. steam generators is proper 1 aligned.>y requiri a vertf thtton of minimum T capacity pm at I 1270 pt . (This SR is no required by those n ts th use AFW for normal startup dshutdown.) J b'm'Mm he tn sh klow $s task ${ev lt3 75 gh;aref k p#rdormous d 9S 5.').'3.b, (continued) CEOG STS B 3,7-30 Rev 1, 04/07/95 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - - - _ _ - _ . - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ^ - - - - ' ' - '~
I i B 3. B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) h I BASES BACKGROUND The CST provides a safety grad 9 source of water to the steam tat co y-wM generators Reactor Coolant for System removing (decay and sensible heat from theThe CST provides a passive RCS). flow of water, by gravity, to the Auxiliary Feedwater jg System (LC0 3.7.4 " Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Systes")(AFW) The rep.lo / 6 7 steam produced is released to the atmosphere by the main 4ucekAM steam safety valves (MSSVs) or the atmospheric dump valves. 4.'r i.i csr a- The f.FW pumps operate with ~ a continuous recirculation to the
~
e
)
~~lh c.SE~~
;. @ lch When the main steam isolation val *es are pen, t e preferred means of heat removal is to disetarge eam to the condenser by the nonsafety grade path of the condensed steam is returned to the bypats valves. The by the condensate @ A 60 (t/hDif#D pump. This has the advanta f conserving 2 Hindensate while minimizing release to h e vjrg _ 'Thi.rt is on C.W(cWI Because the CST !s a principal c ao wt tr. remov srdEIQ~ l) -
f Jharej g7 W j# residual heat from the RCS, it is designed to withstand h3
.f yJ 2., earthquakes and other natural phenomena. The CST is ' -- - designed to Seismic Category I requirements to ensure availability of the feedwater supply. Feedwater is also available from an alternats source. _ @ EM r<sSD 3 cri onofthpCS is uno in the g LJ .Sa o a io.3 2 v w= -
APPLICABLE The CST provides cooling wa r to remove dect . heat and to z SAFETY ANALYSES cool down the unit followin all events in the acci agsis,discussedinth ( SAR, Chaptep ameh
~~. i - 1 =soeu uwi n) . For anticipated ope M~~
tonal h RJ. 3 occJrrences and accidents which do not affect the OPERABILITY of the steam generators, the analysis assumption is generally 9f30}%inutes at NODE 3, steaming through the MSSVs followed by a cooldown to shutdown cooling (SDC) entry conditions at the design cooldown rate. The limiting event for the condensate volume is the large feedwater line break with a coincident loss of offsite (continued)
^
CEOG STS B 3.7-32 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1
CRI B 3.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7 ' 1 (continue uited C M R c) @ testing each Itrain once every month provides an adequate check on this system. hl fkonthly eater operation dry out any no ture accumul ed in the harcohl from h dity in the ent air. stems - with aters must be o rated for 2 10 ontinuous h[ rs with the eaters energir . Systems with t heaters ne only be o ated for 115 minutes to demonst ate the funct on of the) tea. he 31 day frequency is based on the known hs available. ty of the equipment, and'the'two train redundancy
@ d ker SR 3.7. H.2 (MS This SR verifles that the require h' testin is performed in accordance with the%entilation F1 ter Testing Program (VFTP)P. IT LutALs fl ater/ tests ama in accordMed iwi6r n ouintory 6 e 1.52 (Ref. MT The7VFTPrincludes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical pro erties of the activated charcoal eneral use and foi owin specificoperations). Spec ic test frequencies and addl ional infomation are discussed in detail in the m *s+cccQM (VFTih b84 frf %t .7Thb SR 3.7 3_ _
ggi) t48'7 'S **dogydde This SR verifies each train starts and anarates on an I engt g tyyg c, 'tclual or simulated ac n sient. Frequen- o l cy/h of dtM3 ad 3. I i epb % 3 an cL.I 5
@ ,k bwMcaes, ~ [SR 3.7. H .4 i , This SR verifle the integrity of acontrolroomenchsure and the ass inleakage rates o potentially conta ated l air. The c rol room positive ressure, with resp t to potentia contaminated adja nt areas, is pari cally - tested verify proper func on of the CREACS. uring the rg cy radiation state the emergency mod of l
(continued) l ' CEOG STS B 3.7-59 Rev 1, 04/07/95 l TUs sh s mobAej G g a. Nde wldek dedei +Id IHs wl y required dd$ r4 obr 5 1, Z ,3, a4 4. Aub+ic Wh is ' , not required if neHker thiv is in owe of nese riobES rined. suMeiewt %c. is Av4\ade. 4n mAwAl cetuoth of 4kc s'yste% fedewing c. he\ kdlig a.ccident .
~~-. .. - _ _. _-. - . . - = . - .~~
83 h BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS bR 3.7.11.4 (continued) f operation, th vCREACS is desig o pressurize the contro room 2 [0.12 , Inches water gi positive pressure with respect to d;acent areas in er to prevent unfilter l s inlaakag The CREACS is de gned to maintain this p itive pressur with one train at n emergency ventilation ow rate [3000)cfm. The equency of [18] months a STAG ED TEST BASIS is onsistent with the guid ce pro ded in NUREG-080 Section 6.4 (Ref. 4). REFERENCES 1.hSAR,Section 2.hSAR, Chapter M9 @@ h.dgulage6 Guide Idev. 2D ' [/NUREG-0800, %ction 6.4, f.dv. 2 July lpl) CE0G STS B 3:7-60
~~, Rev 1. 04/07/95~~
.. /
SFfENS B 3. . h BASES (continued) h APPLICABLE The is dest ned to mitt the consequ ces of a SAFETY ANALYSES fuel handling acc! dent in whibt all rods in the fuel assembly are assumed to be damaged. The anal tsis of the fuel handling accident is given in Reference P. The Design. Basis Accident analysjs of the fug'l handling ccident assumes that eiG, vs. L..vri the FBACS is functional, Q psinale rutinrs TEt-diru$terthe other,tr'UD. The accident analysis accounts for the reduction in airborne
@h radioactive material provided by q,jp-4 im LM this flitration system. The amogn of fiss: on cenducts f' *- ". 'I'."r available for release from the(fueManoLetHabutiding is determined for a fuel handling accident. These assumptions and the analysis follow the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. ).
~~The (LACS satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. h so Mdan*Maat landr'ted J u rajat of the M ( 7/w O g C0 e, ,~~
'rcouired ta be CPERABLEiKo enlurs 5 as isass ont is -- )g _h / avail le, assuming y single fa that disab1m Ctha r coincident totth a loss o ffsite Dower Jgot I sJ . .3 '
~~l W ( tr ebud ANS hh g jfal e couso sw 16 in sne a apnwr i6 iwis fr the I~~
~~~,1 Iw6 0 g g b'e / Ad fu building e eding the [CFR 100 limits (R . 5) in j event of a uel handling / accident. 'c %eq q uo N OAcw y t~~
~~arrego~~
~~c. '~~
Ledd ent lyv.homJ5"Q* The h 'js considered OPERABLE when the individ 1 c onents necessary to contro11xposure in the h a 3 building are OPERABLEGnath Arti_q). its co idered OPERABLE when its associated: ____J g ys h /* too a. Fans p OPERABLE;
~~b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbe t excessively b b restricting flow, and are capable of performing their '~~
~~filtration functions; and l~~
~~c. Fasef. des HTeD fuctwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air'tirculation can be maintained. h~~
*2 APPLICABILIT [InMODES1,2 , and 4, the FBACS is requ d tc,be N i
~~FOPERABLE to vide fission product re ECCS leaks ue to a LOCA (refer to LC associated with~~
~~.7.13 "Emergencyj i~~
~~h 1 (continued) { C E STS~~
~~B'3.7-72 Rev 1, 04/07/95~~
~~,. - - - - . ~ . ~~~
s wm h wa+ e+ 6 au opue 03 eu %isin y n,&& Q Lp& L. ; oeemLL //tPA filha obe peewLt clataal dd& Luk. - ~ ~ ~ - i l
_ - _ _ _ - . . . - . - . . . . . . . . . - . . _ _ . . . . _ . ~ _ - - - - _ . _ . - - . - _ _ . _ _ - . . _ . - _ ~ t 8 hh BASES ru.a.m c, e -_ a , Il
, ACTIONS- ; f.1 and f.2 (conti ) 7 If the system not placed in operation, this tion j b 'C64* 0 Pig M 5fetW5 requires sus sion of fuel movement, which ludes a fuel i . handling dent.-- This does not prec1 he movement of f l qN^38F iy'C h ao pPERAst. fu.i to a afe position. ;
~~M YS^ [ *Y } a When diiP) tamilia of thdL TS Ar** F TanW.lduring movement 5~~
~~~ '~~
~~thequgThu11 ding, action of irradiated must be taken fuel assemplies to place the t in,in a cor.dition in which the~~
. LC0 does not apply. This Ives immediately s nding movement of irr fuel assemblies in the i .- building. This does no lude the movement of fuel A n;egy ; to a safe position 2 ]/. $URVEILLANCE st 3.7. '
1 REQUIREMENTS - [Standbysystemssh Id be checked iodically to ensu I that they functio .prope.rly. As t environment and real operating _condi ons on this syst are not severe, sting %> l each trainsonc every month prowl s an adequate c k on this satsism moisture acc pthly' heater op stidii' dries out a lated in the ch oal from humidit in the M (f/ T N S N i~ ~ y
ambient _ sir !-(systems with ters must be r ed.for g 3' l,$-E k 16 cent vous hours with t heaters one z . Systems

wit t aters need only operated fo 15 idutosto
** **~the function the system.l. The 1~ day .Fra cy is based on th known reliability f the equipment L 'and' two train redu ncy available. l SR 3.7. f h.
This SR verifles the performance of.StAtt> filter testing in , -accordance with thet[ Ventilation Filtiir "astino Prearam VFTp 2r The tu m p iter tes p are l s (accordance urth the] q f- GuideM2 (Ref EE r TheN vr rbincludes testing
o mrn n nur i-rrormance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, L minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific l .
l (continued) l: CEOG STS . B*3.7-74 Rev 1, 04/07/95 t l. emy- --t er - yr- + r,+t w- +- - rs -y<.e w - w us s'm++ -, , , =---i- es.- et ----.--an-+
d: A J ,L---A<,, .-1 Ju-l, - --, nk-, sam- at, . , -S., b re- A .r.2+a4 W & - A - KL Js -A
- Insert 3.7.11 Bases A.1 and A.2 : 'A.1 and A.2; When one SFPEVS charcoal adsorber bank or one SFPEVS exhaust fan, or both, are inoperable, action must be taken to verify an OPERABLE SFPEVS train is in operation, - or movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the auxiliary building be suspended. Onec OPERABLE SFPEVS train consists of one OPERABLE exhaust fan able to discharge -
through the OPERABLE HEPA filter and one OPERABLE charcoal adsorber b'a nk. This ensures the proper equipment is operating for the Applicable Safety Analyses. 4 6 4 g . i e 9 4 e 1 Q 6
~~--~.- ,--,,,,y , ,4 -.-- ._, y -e,m - -~~
y y,- ,
BASES B h 3.7. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR (continued) b Month 1 ester operati dries out any soi ure that have cumulated in charcoal as a r it of hun M y$ the lent air, stems with heat must be ty in Q) In/ 4 li 2 0 continuous urs,Nith the hea rated fo p Withuut heatersf5e only. operat senercize.ISysjdesf f l' Q 7emonstraty the for 2 lY minutes to ; the s ee M The 31 day
~~/NM &~~
~~tio Trequency is based on the known reliabiltty of the equipment and the two train redundancy available. Sy&al 74>M O c c d fTDOM) SR 3.7.Q2 15.2~~
~~##% n# This SR verifies the performance of PR filter testing in @~~
~~4 ( & grpg accordance with the Ventilation Filte stino Program 3 febAMc (VFTP h [it- atts5 Miter~~
^1nestyrir} sests inc udes artthe testing in accordancWini ggI AIM) 1 Ine HEPA~ filter, charcoal adsorber efficiency,performan~ce system flow rate and the physical properties of the minimum of /W),gm hf% activated charcoa,l (general use and following specific bsM operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in theA(VFTP Op }ot, _
(Cov7MINN50YI $ Z)[hilhhk6 ^ JL' This SR verifles that each r train tarts _and aneratar ' # h an actual or simulated act ion siana I18 th W kit td it, een&,c ncyAs conMenW ha@c y] _ g
~~M mee betyfey.IkB 3.7.15.4 ' ~~~
l F, eye. yrs 4,pdedf[~5R This SR verifles e integrity of the penetration < ( enclosure. The 111ty of the penetration room i
' %T h PRE 6 is negative press e, with respect to potentially intain uncontaminat adjacent areas, is periodically ested to Ca(Ole of dark ad l Verify pro r function of the PREACS. Duri the post i
~~accident e of operation PREACS is dest cyerang on an a&d to maintain a~~
," slight 1 negative pressure,at a flow rate f s (3000) cfm in the 80 etration room with respect to ad cent areas to S$4ddtd Con $a?nerM pr.ev t unfiltered LEAXAGE. The Freq cy of (18] months is L og*4'm g(p a , to 1 stent with the guidance provid in NUREG-0800,
~~_5 tion 6.5.1 (Ref. 6). (continued) CE0C STS , B T.7-80 Rev 1, 04/07/g5~~
~~>-w~~
\M
~~N & bra foi k '* FP .~~
FP 3 (Tyr stpregeJeich Water Level 4W 8 3.7.HI B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS _ 8 3.7. k (53E'QE) Pool Level h BASES BACKGROUIO The minimum water level in the' fuel storage pool meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident. The specified water level shields - and minimizes the general area dose when the storage racks are filled to their maximum capacity. The water also provides shielding during the movement,of spent fuel. A general description.of he' fuel storage pool design is " en in the FSAR, Section ,.) pont Fuel Pool ing and T ~eanup, Reference System is given1,inand the the SAR. Section(I .
~
(Ref. 2). The assumptions of the fuel ; handling ~ accident are given in the FSAR, Section( lyZl4D (Raf. 3). APPLICABLE The minimum water level in the' fuel 2torage pool meets the . SAFETY ANALYSES assumptions of the fuel handling accident described in ,4 Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 4). The resultant 2 hour wNd .mg6 thyroid dose to a person at the exclusion area boundary is/D Mpe; g je., fAmaii iracuorv oi sne iu s Fn 100 tabf. El limitr. Toortnne troReference 4 17 h t of water between the top of the damaged fuel bundle and he: fuel pool surface
~~'t I l~~
~~for a fuel handling accident. With it ga m level, Ine d'5 @ assumptions of Reference 4 can be used tractly ' l~~
~~" pracuce th s d 6 preserve snis a>>umpuon ror th bulkofl Q *'*] \~~
Pf**1t N n lfs the fue in the stcrage ra s. In the case of a si gle -tka (bw, 4 g'ff a'3 . bundle, dropped and lying orizontally on top of t e spent 34A ggh l ! fuel r eks, however, ther may be < 23 ft of wate above the N AtI
~~M **fe.11 top o the bundle and th surface, by the width %,~~
~~} "Da'b R, y a) bundl . To offset this mall nonconservatism, e analysis the fC b t~~
b tiqu y ass s that all fuel r s fall, although anal is shows l g, the only the first f rods fall from a hypo etical (max num drop.J l The fuel storage pool water level satisfies (Cr14Dtelb 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. rihroe L a JL ggf 139 l (continued) CEOG STS . B 3.'7-83 Rev 1, 04/07/95 1 G
Secondary Specific Activt 8 3.7. BASES (continued) 0;> \lh APPLICABLE The accident analys of the main : line (MSLB), SAFETY ANALYSES as discussed in the SAR, Chapter (Ref. , assumes the initial secondary coolant specific as vity,$o have a radioactiveisotopeconcentrationof90.10TpC1/gmDOSE h EQUIVALENT l-131. This assumption is used in the analysis for determining the radiological consequences of the postulated accident. The accident analysis based on this and other assumptions, shows that the radiological l consecuences of an inst a do not exceedra 11 traction of T l A
~~- the neceph.<e he unitAAB limits (Rd.1) for whole yandthyroidpose) 15 [.D 'rderk Queuia stes l~~
Ot UDAR(ed, th b Withthelossofoffsitepower,th$redainingsteam generator is available for core decay heat dissipation by venting steam to the atmosphere through MSSVs and atmospheric dump valves (ACVs). Tne Auxiliary Feedwater System supplies the necessary makeup to the steam generator. Venting continues t:r.ttl the reactor coolant temperature and pressure have decreased sufficiently for the Shutdown Cooling System to complete the cooldown. In the evaluation of the radiological consequences of this accident, the activity released from the steam generator connected to the failed steam line is assumed to be released directly to the environment. The unaffected steam generator is assumed to discharge steam and any entrained activity through MSSVs and ADVs during the event. Secondary specific activity limits satisfy Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement. LCO As indicated in the Applicable Safety Analyses, the specific activity init in the secondary coolant system of M 0.10 1/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 to limit the K4act+r**ee radiol ical, consequences of a Design Basis Accident (D8A) \ 4 ,4 to sani r n m.-im, n tne pequiregnialD (Ref.1). g } eV % e u f>AA. Monitoring the specific activity of the secondary coolant ensures that when secondary specific activity limits are ' exceeded, appropriate actions are taken in a timely manner to place the unit in an operational MODE that would minimize the radiological consequences of a DBA. (continued)
~~.CEOG STS ,~~
B 3.7-92 Rev1,04/07/95 t 4
DISCUSSION OF DASES DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS PLANT-SPECIFIC CIIANGES
1. These changes incorporate Calvert Cliffs-specific information into brackets. Bracketed information located throughout NUREG-1432 will be replaced with the specific Calvert Cliffs requirements. This change also includes deleting bracketed items when it is not consistent with the Calvert Cliffs design.

2. The change to the non-bracketed system name, number of systems / components, terminology, or value was changed to be consistent with Calvert Cliffs specific system name, number of systems / components, terminology, or values. This change also includes any numbering changes due to the addition or deletion of Specifications, Actions, or Surveillance Requirements (SRs).

3. This change either adds information to or deletes information from the Bases to make it more understandable, or to conform to Calvert Cliffs' design or safety analyses.

4. This addition, deletion, or modification to references, or the changing of reference numbers, was performed to ensure that the references are applicable to Calvert Cliffs, and to ensure consistency between references in the text and the reference section.

5. NUREG-1432 Section 3.7.19 Bases (Secondary Specific Activity) in the Background section contains a paragraph which contains a thyroid dose for a person at the exclusion area boundary, should the main steam safety valves open for two hours following a trip from full power, if the secondary activity level were at the Technical Specification limit. The Calvert Cliffs Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) Bases for 3.7.14 (Secondary Specific Activity) will not contain this requirement because this number is not analyzed for Calvert Cliffs. This change is consistent with the current Calvert Cliffs accident analysis.

6. Calvert Cliffs has an Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; therefore,"FSAR" will be changed to "UFSAR" throughout the ITS Bases.

7. This change to the Bases was made to conform with changes made to the Specification.

8. NUREG-1432 Section 3.7.7 Bases (Component Cooling System) in the Applicable Safety Analyses section contains a statement that the analysis assumes that a maximum saltwater
'emperature of 76*F occurs simultaneously with the maximum heat loads on the system. The Calvert Cliffs ITS will contain the statement that the analysis assumes that a maximum Chesapeake Bay water temperature occurs simultaneonsly with the maximum heat loads on the ;ystem. This change was made consistent with the Calvert Cliffs analysis, which assumes various temperatures depending on the time of year. These numbers can also be found in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
9. NUREG-1432 B 3.7.2 SR 3.7.2.1 contains verbiage that the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) should not be tested at power. This verbiage has been deleted in Calvert Cliffs ITS B 3.7.2 SR 3.7.2.1 because Calvert Cliffs performs a quarterly partial stroke test on the l
MSIVs at power. This is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current operating practice to perform i a partial stroke test on the MSIVs at power. I l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.7-1 Revision 11 l
DISCUSSION OF DASES DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS
10. These additions or changes to NUREG-1432 are based on details moved out of the Current Technical Specifications . These details were moved into the Bases to capNre the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.

11. At Calvert Cliffs, the MSIVs are not containment isolation valves. Thus, they are not local leakage rate tested in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. He containment is a barrier which limits the leakage of radioactive materials to the environment so that acceptable radiation-limits are not exceeded in the event of an accident. For the secondary side of the steam generators, the barriers which provide protection against leakage of containment atmosphere to the environment following a loss of coolant accident will be the inside of the steam generator tubes and the outside of all lines connected to the steam generator shell side. These barriers serve the same function as the containment liner, and, as such, they are part of the containment following the accident. He lines which emanate from the steam generator shell side will not be damaged during a LOCA, as the design is at least equivalent to or better than, the containment liner with regard to quality assurance, pressure, temperature, testing, and missile protection.
Also, in the event an accident were to occur when the plant was operating with steam generatcr tube leaks, an effective barrier would still be maintained. Following a LOCA, the RCS is depressurized and the higher shell side pressure prevents leakage of fission products through the steam generator tubes. Additionally, as the accident progresses, additional assurance that the barrier will be maintained is provided by a head of water above the tube bundle. The total plant release associated with a LOCA, including steam side leakage, is within the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100,
12. NUREG-1432 Bases Section SRs 3.7.3 and 3.7.8.3 state that the 24-month Surveillance interval is based on the need to perform the Surveillance under conditions that apply during a unit outage, and the potential for transients if the Surveillance is performed at power. Calvert Cliffs ITS Bases Section SRs 3.7.3.5 and 3.7.6.3 will not contain the statement because Calvert Cliffs currently satisfies these SRs during the performance of the quarterly Instrumentation Channel Functional Tests.

13. The Bases for NUREG-1432 SRs 3.7.11.2, 3.7.13.2, 3.7.14.2, and 3.7.15.2 state that the filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52. This statement has been deleted from the Bases of ITS SRs 3.7.8.2, 3.7.10.2, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.12.2. Currently, the filter testing requirements for the various ventilation systems are contained in the applicable CTS SRs. These SRs denote that Calvert Clifts complies only with portions of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.52, Revision 2; Calvert Clifts does not comply with all the positions established in RG 1.52, Revision 2. Thus the statements contained in NUREG-1432 SRs 3.7.11.2,3.7.13.2,3.7.14.2, and 3.7.15.2 do not apply to Calvert Cliffs. The provisions of RG 1.52, Revision 2 to which Calvert Cliffs complies are defined in the Ventilation Filter Testing Program provided in ITS 5.0. The Bases for ITS SRs 3.7.8.2,3.7.10.2,3.7.11.2, and 3.7.12.2 refer to the Ventilation Filte. Testing Program; thus, the Bases for these SRs do not need to define the provisions of RG 1.52, Revision 2 to which we comply or reference RG 1.52.

14. Calvert Chffs ITS 3.7.3 Bases, Action F.1, revised NUEG-1432 3.7.5 Bases, Action D.1, to make the Action match the Action Note, and to not preclude a plant shutdown if deemed appropriate.
The NUREG specifies actions to be taken when there are no Operable auxiliary feedwater trains. The Note to Action D suspends all Technical Specification-required shutdowns. The Bases for the Note states that not only are Technical Specification-required shutdowns suspended, but no power changes or shutdown should be made. This is inconsistent with the Note, and may CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-2 Revision 11
l DISCUSSION OF BASES DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 SECTION 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS preclude the plant being put in a safe condition if equipment is functional but not Operable. The added words clarify that a plant shutdown or power change may be made ifit is the most prudent action. This change is necessary to ensure that it is clear to an operator that plant power changes or a shutdown may be made ifit is the most safe course of action.
15. Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.7.3 Bases, Action F.1, revised NUREG-1432 3.7.5 Bases, Action D.1, to make it clear that if other Actions or plant conditions require entry into LCO 3.0.3, that an LCO 3.0.3 entry is made, but the required Actions do not have to be taken. The NUREG specifies actions to be taken when there are no Operable auxiliary feedwater trains. The Note to Action D suspends all Technical Specification-required shutdowns, including LCO 3.0.3. The Note states that LCO 3.0.3 is suspended, but the Bases state that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.
~~This is incorrect. The differences are significant in terms oflogging, reportability, and actions to be taken should Conditien D be exited. This change corrects the error.~~
16. NUREG-1432 3.7.1 Bases, SR 3.7.1.1 Section, states that Table 3.7.1-2 (Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings) allows a i 3% setpoint tolerance for Operability; however, the valves are reset to i 1% during the Surveillance to allow for drift. Calvert Cliffs ITS 3.7.1. Bases, SR 3.7.1.1 Section, states that Table 3.7.1-2 defines the lift setting range for each MSSV for OPERABILITY; however, the valves are reset to i 1% during the Surveillance to allow for drift.
This change was made to be consistent with changes made to Table 3.7.1-2 which will not contain the i 3% setpoint tolerance because Calvert Cliffs' current licensing basis allows setpoint tolerances from 3% to 6%. A phrase is added to the Bases stating that the ASME Code specifies the as found lift acceptance range. This change is consistent with the Calvert Cliffs current licensing basis.
17. Not used. l

18. Bases statements which refer to the Code of Federal Regulations or the Standard Review Plan as the source of offsite dose or other accident analysis acceptance criteria are changed to reference the Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Plant-specific acceptance criteria for Calvert Cliffs are approved by the NRC and stated in the UFSAR. The Code of Federal Regulations contains the maximum allowable limits, not the plant-specific limits which are typically more conservative. Calvert Cliffs is not committed to the Standard Review Plan and, therefore, the current licensing basis may not be the Standard Review Plan values.

19. Typographical / grammatical error corrected.

20. A clarification is added to the Bases of LCO 3.7.3 that clarifies the apolication of a CTS allowance. The CTS allows AFW trains required for operability to be taken out of service under administrative control for the performance of periodic testing. This allowance is retained in ITS 3.7.3 as an LCO note. While periodic tests clearly include surveillance tests, the Bases also clarifies that this allowance may be used for post-maintenance tests and other required testing that is similar to periodic surveillance tests. This clarification is consistent with current plant application of this allowance, the original license amendment which implemented the allowance, and plant design which makes the allowance necessary.

21. ' The requirement in the NUREG Bases for SR 3.7.5.5 to demonstrate a flow and pressure to verify the CST to AFW flow path is deleted. Current Technical Specification 4.7.1.2.b does noi require a specific flow and pressure to be demonstrated as part of this surveillance (retained as CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS I & 2 3.7-3 Revision 11
DISCUSSION OF CASES DEVIATIONS FROM NUREG-1432 l SECTION 3.7 - PLANT SYSTEMS ITS SR 3.7.3.7). A separate surveillance ITS SR 3.7.3.6 demonstrates the flow performance of the AFW pumps, consistent with CTS 4.7.1.2.c.2. PU SR is only required to demonstrate that the flow path is operable and any amount of flow would demonstrate this requirement. The addition of specific flow requirements to this SR would be an unnecessary more restrictive change to plant operations.
22. NUREG Bases for SR 3.7.11.3 explain that the surveillance verifies each CREACS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal, and that the Frequency of[18] months is consistent with Reference 3 (Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2)). Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2) does not specify a frequency for testing involving operation of systems. The Frequency for tests in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2) is for liEPA filter and carbon adsorber testing. A plant specific description is substituted for the Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2) justification.
~~CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.7-4 Revision 11~~
~~.- .. ~_ . - . - , . ... - --~~
~~Paga ReplacGment instructionsi _~~
;j
~~< VOLUME 12~~
- Section 3.8 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CTS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as wellas the specification number locatedin the upper right hand corner of the CTSpage. ?
Key: . . DOC = Discussion OfChanges . 7 DOD = Discussion Qf TechnicalSpecification Deviation or Discussion Of Bases Deviation REMOVE ~ INSERT ;
~~- Overview of Channes +~~
No pages changed . t gg , 3.8.1 2 3.8.1-2 { 3.8.15 3.8.1 5 3.8. l-8 3.8.1-8 3.8.1 11 3.8.1-11 3.81 13 and 3.8.1 14 3.8.1 13 and 3.8. !-13 3.8.21 through 3.8.2-4 312-1 through 3.8.2-4 3.&S-1 and 3.&$.2 3.8.5-1 through 3.85 3
'3.8.6-6 3.8.6-6 3.8.91 3.8.9-1 3 3.&10 I and 3.8.10-2 3.810-1 through 3.8.10-3 l ITS Bases 3.&l 1 through 3.8 l-33 3.&l-1 through 3.8.1-34 3.8.2 5 through 3.8.2-7 3.8.2-5 through 3.8.2-7 3.8.3-7 3.8.3-7 3.8.4-9 through 3.8.4 11 3.8.4-9 through 3.8.4-11 3.8.5-3 and 3.8.5-4 3.8.5-3 and 3.8.5-4 3.8.6-5 3.845 3.8.8-3 3.8.8-3 3.8.10-3 through 3.8.10-5 3.8.10-3 through 3.8.10-5 CTS Markun & Discussion of Channes Specification 3.8.1, Unit i Specification 3.8.1, Unit 1 page 9 of 12 and page 10 of 12 page 9 of 12 and page 10 of 12 page 12 of 12 .
~~page 12 of 12~~
~~. Specification 3.8.1, Unit 2 - Specification 3.8.1, Unit 2 - page 9 of 12 and page 10 of 12 ~~~
page 9 of 12 and page 10 of 12. page 12 0f 12 - . page 12 0f 12 - Specification 3.8.2, Unit 1 Specification 3.8.2, Unit I_ . page I of 4 and page 4 of 4 page 1 of 4 and page 4 of 4 page 4a of 4 , : page 4a of 4 Specification 3.8.2. Unit 2 Specification 3.8.2 Unit 2 ' page I of 4 and page 4 of 4 page 1 of 4 and page 4 of 4 page 4a of 4 . page 4a of 4 DOC 3.8.2-2 through DOC 3.8.2 4 DOC 3.8.2-2 through DOC 3.8.2-4 i I Note: Italici:ed entries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefolldw page replacement instructions carefully.
3 Page Replacenent Instructions
~~- VOLUME 12 - '~~
Section 3.8 Note: Underlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CTS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the un:t number as well as the specification number located in the upper right hand corner of the CTS page; ! < Key: , DOC = Discussion ofChanges . DOD = Discussion Of Technical Specification Deviation or Discussion Qf Bases Deviation REMOVE INSERT
^
CTS Markun & Discunden of Channes (continued) Specification 3.8.3, Unit i Specification 3.8.3, Unit 1 - page 7 of 11 page 7 of 1i
._ Specification 3.8.2, Unit 2 Specification 3.8.2, Unit 2 page 6 of i1 page 6 of 11 DOC 3.8.3-4 through DOC 3.8.3-9 DOC 3.8.3-4 through DOC 3.8.3 9 Specification 3.8.4, Unit i Specification 3.8.4, Unit ! . page 3 of 5 . page 3 of 5 Specification 3.8.4, Unit 2 'ification 3.8.4, Unit 2 page 3 of 5_ page 3 of 5 DOC 3.8.4 3 through DOC 3.8.4-5 DOC 3.8.4 3 through DOC 3.8.4-5 Specification 3.8.5, Unit 1 Specification 3.8.5, Unit I page1ofI page1ofI Specification 3.8.5, Unit 2 Specification 3.8.5, Unit 2 page1of1 .page1ofI
DOC 3.8.5 2 through DOC 3.8.5-4 DOC 3.8.5-2 through DOC 3.8.5-4 Specification 3.8.6, Unit i Specification 3.8.6, Unit I page 2 of II page 2 of 1I
. page 5 of 1I page 5 of 11 page 7 of 11 page 7 of 11 page 10 of 1l page 10 of 11 Specification 3.8.6, Unit 2 Specification 3.8.6, Unit 2 page 2 of 11 page 2 of i1 page 5 of I1 page 5 of 1I page 7 of i1 page 7 of 11 page 10 cf II page 10 of II Specification 3.8.9, Unit 1 Specification 3.8.9 Unit i ..
_ page 1 of 6 through page 3 of 6 page 1 of 6 through page 3 of 6 Specification 3.8.9, Unit 2 Specification 3.8.9, Unit 2 page 1 of 6 through page 3 of 6 page I of 6 through page 3 of 6 Specification 3.8.10, Unit i Specification 3.8.10, Unit I page 1 of 3 page1of3
. Specification 3.8.10, Unit 2 Specification 3.8.10, Unit 2 page 1 of 3 page 1 of 3 . DOC 3.8.10-3 and DOC 3.8.10-4 DOC 3.8.10-3 and DOC 3.8.10-4 NSHC Findinas '3.8-28 through 3.838 3.8-28 through 3.8.38 ii l Note: Italici:ed entries imlicate uneven exchanges. : Pleasefollowpage replacement instructions carefully,
l. Page Replacement Instructions l VOLUME 12 Section 3.8 Note: Uvierlined titles indicate tabs in volumes. Regarding CTS markups: Pages are referenced by citing the unit number as well as the specification number located in the upper right hand corner of the CTS page.
Key: DOC = Discussion Of. Changes DOD = Discussion Of Technical Specification Deviation or Discussion Of Bases Deviation REMOVE INSERT ISTS Markun & Justification 3.8-2 3.8-2 page titled: " INSERT ACTION D" page titled: " INSERT ACTION D" 3.8 5 through 3.8-7 3.8 5 through 3.8 7 3.8-9 3.8-9 3.8 12 3.8-12 Page titled: " Insert SR 3.8.1.11"(After 3.8-13) Page titled: " Insert SR 3.8.1.1I" (After 3 S-i3) 3.8-14 3&i .e 3.8-16 and 3.817 3.a-16 and 3.8-17 3.8 19 3.8-19 Page titled: " INSERT LCO 3.8.2" Page titled: " INSERT LCO 3.8.2" 3.8-21 3.8-21 Page titled: "INSERY 3.8.3"(After pg. 3.8-22) Page titled: " INSERT 3.8.3" page 1 of 2 and page 2 of 2 page 1 of 2 and page 2 of 2 3.8-24 3.8-24 3.8-27 3.8-27 3.5-29 through 3.8-31 3.8-29 through 3.8-31 3.8-34 3.8-34 3.8-39 3.8-39 3.8-41 3.841 DOD 3.8-3 DOD 3.8-3
~~' DOD 3.8-6 through DOD 3.8-10 DOD 3.8-6 through DOD 3.8-10 ISTS Bases Markup & Justification Page titled:" INSERT B 3.~~
~~8.1 BACKGROUND~~
~~"(After page B 3.8-1) Page titled: " INSERT B 3.~~
~~8.1 BACKGROUND~~
"(After page B 3.8-1) Page titled:" INSERT LCO 1"(After page B 3.8-3) Page titled:" INSERT LCO 1"(After page B 3.8-3) B 3.8-15 and B 3.816 B 3.8-15, ami Page titled " Insert B SR 3.8.1" and B 3.816 Page titled:" Insert B SR 3.8.l.9"(After page B 3.817) Page titled:" Insert B SR 3.8.l.9"(After page B 3.817) B 3.8-29 B 3.8-29 Page titled:" INSERT B 3.8.1 SR 3.8.16"(After page B 3.8-32) Page titled;" INSERT B 3.8.1 SR 3.8.16"(After page B 3.8-32) Page titled: " INSERT B 3.8.2 ACTIONS"(After page LCO 3.8.2) Page titled: " INSERT B 3.8.2 ACTIONS"(Afler page LCO 3.8.2)
. B 3.8-40 B 3.8-40 B 3.8-56 B 3&56 B 3.8 66 B 3.8-66 DOD 3.8-1 through DOD 3.8-6 DOD 3.8 1 through DOD 3.8-6 iii Note: Italicized entries indicate uneven exchanges. Pleasefollow page replacement instructions carefully.
AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION = COMPLETION TIME A. One required A.1 Perfonn SR 3.8.1.1 or 1 hour 9 LCO 3.8.1.a offsite SR 3.8.1.2 for circuit inoperable. required OPERABLE AND 9 offsite circuits. Once per 8 hours thereafter AND A.2 Declare required 24 hours from feature (s) with no discovery of no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one train when its redundant concurrent with required feature (s) inoperability of ' is inoperable. redundant required feature (s) AND A.3 Restore required 72 hours offsite circuit to OPERABLE status. AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or 9 LC0 3.8.1.b l9 CALVERT CLIrFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.1-2 Revision g 11
~~'AC Scurces-Operating 3.8.1 ACTIONS (Continued)~~
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-C. (continued) C.2 Declare, CREVS - 24 hours from_ CRETS, or Hz Analyzer discovery _of no with no offsite power offsite power to available inoperable one train when.the redundant concurrent with CREVS, CRETS, or H2 inoperability of Analyzer is redundant inoperable. required feature (s) AND C3 Declare CREVS, CRETS, 72 hours and H2 Analyzer supported by the 9 inoperable offsite
~~circuit inoperable.~~
D. LC0 3.8.1.c DG - - - - - - - - - - - NOT E - - - - - - - - - - - - inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LC0 3.8.9, " Distribution U Systems-Operating," when Condition D is entered with no AC power source to a train. D.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 or 1 hour SR 3.8.1.2 for the OPERABLE required AND offsite circuit (s). One per 8 hours AND thereafter y
~~\\ -CALVERT-CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.1-5 Revision /~~
u _ _ _ -
l AC Sources-Operating
! 3.8.1 ACTIONS (Continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G. Two LC0 3.8.1.b DGs G.1 Restore one DG to 2 hours g inoperable. OPERABLE status. 08 LCO 3.8.1.b OG that provides power to the 9 CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer inoperable and LC0 3.8.1.c DG inoperable. H. Required Action and H.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A, AND g B D, E. F, or G not met. H.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours 9 I. Three or more I.1 Enter LC0 3.0.3. Imediately 9 required LCO 3.8.1.a and LCO 3.8.1.b AC sources inoperable, il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.1-8 Revision /
l AC Sources-Operating t 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - N O T E S - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. DG loadings may include gradual loading as recommended by the manufacturer.

2. Momentary transients below the load i limit do not invalidate this test.
9
3. This Surveillance shall be conducted on only one DG at a time.

4. This Surveillance Requirement shall be preceded by and immediately follow without shutdown a successful performance of SR 3.8.1.3 or SR 3 8.1.9.
Verify each DG is synchronized and loaded, 31 days and operates for 2 60 minutes at a load 2 4000 kW for DG 1A, 2 2250 kW for DG 1B, and 2 2700 kW for DGs 2A and 2B. SR 3.8.1.5 Verify each day tank contains 2 325 gallons 31 days of fuel oil for DG 1A and 2 275 gallons of fuel oil for DGs IB, 2A, and 28. SR 3.8.1.6 Check for and remove accumulated water from 31 days each day tank. SR 3.8.1.7 Verify the fuel oil transfer system operates 31 days q to automatically transfer fuel oil from storage tank [s] to the day tank. l gg
\\
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.1-11 Revision / _a
AC Sources-Operating.
~~3. 8.1 -~~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.13 Verify that automatically bypassed DG trips 24 months are automatically bypassed on an actual or i simulateo required actuation signal. 9 SR 3.8.1.14 Verify each DG: 24 months
~~a. Synchronizes with offsite power source while loaded _ upon a simulated restoration of offsite power;-~~
it
b. Manually transfers loads to offsite power source; and

c. Returns to ready-to-load operation.
~~l. l u l\ CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2' 3.8.1-13 Revision /~~
'r
~~- .~_ . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ _ ._._ . . . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ - __ . _ . _ ._ _~~
~~AC Sources-Operating~~
~~-3.8.1~~
~~SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)'~~
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY , SR 3.8.1.15 -------------------NOTE------------------- All.DG starts may be preceded by an engine . prelube periou. Verify on an actual or. simulated loss of 24 months-offsite power signal in conjunction with. an . actual or simulated Engineered Safety - ,
~~. Feature actuation signal:~~
a. De-energization of emergency. buses; #

b.- Load shedding from emergency buses;

c. DG auto-starts from standby condition and:

1. energizes. permanently connected loads in s 10 seconds,

2. energizes auto-connected emergency loads through load sequencer,
. 3. maintains steady state voltage 2 3740 V and s 4580 V, q l 4. maintains steady state frequency of 2 58.8 Hz and s 61.2 Hz, and
~~5. supplies permanently connected and auto-connected emergency loads for 2 5 minutes.~~
~~t 1 CALVERT CLIFFS ~- UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.1-14 Revisiong.9~~
~~,. .. . . _ _ . . . _ . . , . - . . - , x. a..--. . . .- . _ - . . - - - - . . - . . . -~~
_ ~ - - - - . 4 AC Sources-Operating 3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE- FREQUENCY SR 3.8.1.16 For the LCO 3.8.1.c AC electrical sources, In accordance- 3 ll
~~~SR 3.8.1.1, SR 3.8.1.2, SR 3.3.1.3, with applicable SR 3.8.1.5, SR 3.8.1.6, and SR 3.8.1.7 are_ Surveillance required to be performed. Requirements I '~~
~~I l l:~~
\\
~~CALVERT~ CLIFFS - UNITS-1 & 2 3.8.1-15 Revisionfd 1~~
- ' ~ ~ ~ ^ ~^ " ' - ' - ^ - - ~ ' / , - l- ,
~~LAC 1 Sources-Shutdswn~~
~~3.8.2~~
~ /3'8hELECTRICAL: . - POWER. SYSTEMS 1 = , ; L3;8;2.'ACESources-Shutdown' j ~ ?LC0;3.8.2; iThe following AC. electrical power sources shall be:0PERABLE:
~~c ch One; qualified circuit between the offsite transmission. network and the onsiteLClass 1E; AC electrical power~~
~
~~distribution subsystem (s)' required by LCO 3.8.10,: o j~~
~~"Di stri buti on . Systems-Shutdown;" -~~
i
b. Onediesel~ generator (DG)

capableofsupplyingone; train- ;
~~of:the onsite Class:1E AC electrical power distribution q,~~
~~' subsystem (s) required by LC0?3.8.10;- ^~~
1 . One' qualified circuit between:the offsite transmission-
~~. c.:~~
~~network and the other unit's;'onsite Class 1E AC~~
~~/ - electrical- power distribution . subs'ystems that supply ,~~
~~power-to the required Control R.oom Emergency Ventilation ', System-and the Control Room Emergency Temperature n System;'and 9~~
~~-d. One DG from the.other unit capable of supplying the .~~
., other unit's onsite. Class.1E AC. electrical 1 power distribution- subsystems that supply power to the reauired Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 'and ~
~
~~l Control Room Emergency Temperature System, if the DG lh required by LCO 3.8.2.b is not capable of supplying~~
~~power. to the onsite Class 1E AC electrical-power ~,~~
. . distribution subsystems that supply power to the- -required Control Room Emergency Ventilation System and Control Room Emergency. Temperature System. 11
~~. .. APPLICABILITY:- -MODES 5..and 6,-~~
~~. - During= movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. 9 T +~~
~~I ~ b.~~
~~-l(~~
~~g ' '~~
^
~~[ - JCALVERT: CLIFFS ~-. UNITS 1&2- .3.8.2-1 Revision [ M a~~
~~/ I'~~
~~M: 'AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS~~
~~--------------------__--------------NOTES------------------------------------ l In~~
1. LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. 9 3-

2. Performance of Required Actions shall not preclude completion of actions - ,,
to establish a safe conservative position; . CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION -COMPLETION TIME A. One reouired oftsite - - - - - - - - - - - N OT E - - - - - - - - - - - - circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions-and Required Actions of-LC0 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A. A.1- Declare affected Immediately required feature (s) with no offsite power available inoperable. 0_R A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies. AND l l
\(
CALVERT. CLIFFS. UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.2-2 Revision /
AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 4 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION. REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (Continued) A.2.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions. AND A.2.4 Initiate action to Imediately _ restore required offsite power circuit to OPERABLE status. , B. One required DG B.1 Suspend CORE Imediately inoperable. ALTERATIONS. AND B.2 Suspend movement of Imediately irradiated fuel assemblies. AND B.3 Initiate action to Imediately suspend operations involving positive reactivity additions. AND B.4 Initiate action to Imediately restore required DG to OPERABLE status. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.2-3 Revision 0
AC Sources-Shutdtwn 3.8.2-SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1 -------------------NOTE-------_------------ The following Surveillance Requirements ! (SRs) are not required to be performed: p SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, and SR 3.8.1.14.
----..........____-____..-__.-............ R For the LCO 3.8.2.a and LC0 3.8.2.b AC In accordance g sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs of with applicable Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," SRs except SR 3.8.1.4, SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.13, 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.16, are applicable. 'I SR 3.8.2.2 For the LCO 3.8.2.c and LC0 3.8.2.d AC In accordance sourc^s required to be OPERABLE, the SRs with applicable required by SR 3.8.1.16, are applicable. SRs !
n 4 It CALVfRT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.8.2-4 RevisionJ/
DC Sources-0perating 3.8.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY P SR 3.8.4.7 -------------------NOTE------------------- The modified performance discharge test in SR 3.8.4.8 may be performed in lieu of the service test in SR 3.8.4.7. 3 ll4 Verify battery capacity is adequate to 24 months supply, and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a abattery service test. n CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.4-3 Revision /
l DC Sources. Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources. Shutdown i LCO 3.8.5 The required channels of DC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem (s) required by LCO 3.8.10. " Distribution Systems-t Shutdown." APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6 3 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. ACTIONS
~~.................................... NOTES---------------------.--------------~~
1. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. 3

2. Performance of Required Actions shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position, CONDITION REQUIREDACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC channels requiredfeature(s) inoperable, inoperable.
~~QR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND II CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.5-1 Revision Rf.~~
~~!.l .~~
DC Ssurces-Shutdown r 3.8.5 ! ACTIONS (continued) [ CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME , r A. (continued) A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies. , M t A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations j involving positive ; reactivity additions. 3 E A.2.4 Initiate action to Immediately ' restore required DC electrical power , subsystems to OPERABLE status. , i 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 4 2 y 3.8.5-2 Revision 0 L! . .. g 1
~~, - . . . . , - , . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . , _ . - ~ . _ . , - - . . . . - . . - - - - . - . - = . . , ,, - . - . - --~~
~~- --. .. _. -_ .- . . _ = - . . -. _ _ _ - _ _ _ -~~
DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1 ------------------. NOTE------------------- The following Surveillance Requirements are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.6, SR 3.8.4.7, and SR 3.8.4.8. For DC sources required to be OPEP.ABLE, the In accordance 3 following Surveillance Requirements are with applicable applicable: Surveillance Requirements SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8 SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.5-3 Revision g3
Battery Cell Parameters 3.8.6 Table 3.8.6-1(page2of2) Battery Surveillance Requirements (*) A battery charging current of < 1 amp when on float charge is acceptable y for meeting specific gravity limits following a battery recharge, for a maximum of 7 days. When charging current is used to satisfy specific gravity requirements, specific gravity of each connected cell shall be measured prior to expiration of the 7 day allowance. l Il l l l l I l\ CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.6-6 _ Revision [ m
Distribution Systems-Operating 3.8.9 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.9 Distribution Systems-Operating LCO 3.8.9 The AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more AC A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hours electrical power power distribution distribution subsystems to AND lD subsysten:s OPERABLE status. inoperable. 16 hours from discovery of failure to meet Limiting Condition for Operation B. One or more AC vital B.1 Restore AC vital bus 2 hours bussubsystem(s) subsystems to l Il inoperable. OPERABLE status. AND 16 hours from discovery of-failure to meet Limiting Condition for Operation CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.9-1 Revision /ll L; i.-
Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 The.necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support equipment required to be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. 9 ACTIONS
~~...................................-NOTES------------------------------------ ,~~
1. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. 9

2. Performance of Required Actions shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position. H CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or nere required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or AC vital supported required bus electrical power feature (s) distribution inoperable.
subsystems inoperable. OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS. AND b CALVERT' CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 3.8.10-1 Revision)( _ _. -- , ,,_.m- .._ ,._- ,- , _ . . . , . . _ _ . ,
Distribution Systems-Shutdown ! 3.8.10 t ACTIONS (continued) l CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately
~~-irradiated fuel assemblies.~~
~~Als A.2.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend operations involving positive~~
~
reactivity additions. . t g '! A.2.4 Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC, i DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status. AND A.2.5 Declare associated Immediately-required shutdown . coolingsubsystem(s) . inoperable and not in , operation. i .. L l-o l L. ! CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS.1 & 2- 3.8.10-2' -Revisiongi
~~._fs .r .~~
w- .. . .. . . - - .--- _ _ . . . . _ - -. .. . . .
Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FRE0';ENCY SR 3.8.10.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and 7 days voltage to required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- 3.8.10-3 Revision 0
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS B 3.8.1 AC Sources-Operating BASES BACKGROUND The Class 1E Electrical h,wer Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources starting at the 4.16 kV engineered safety feature (ESF) buses and the onsite diesel generators (DGs). As required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 (Ref.1), the design of the AC electrical power system has sufficient independence and redundancy to ensure a source to the ESFs assuming a single failure. The Class IE AC Distribution System is divided into two redundant load groups so that the loss of one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each load group has connections to two offsite sources and one IE DG at its 4.16 kV 1E bus. Offsite power is supplied to the 500 kV Switchyard from the transmission network by three 500 kV transmission lines. Two electrically and physically separated circuits supply electric power from the 500 kV Switchyard to two 13 kV buses and then to the two 4.16 kV ESF buses. Athird69kV/ 13.8 kV offsite power source that may be manually connected to either 13 kV bus is available from the Southern Maryland 9" Electric Cooperative (SMECO), When appropriate, the ESFAS LOCI and shutdown sequencer for the 4.16 kV bus will sequence loads on the bus after the 69 kV/13.8 kV SMECO line has been manually placed in service. The SMECO offsite power source will not be used to carry loads for an operating unit. A detailed description of the offsite power network and the circuits to the Class IE ESF buses is found in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). 11 .CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS _1 & 2 B 3.8.1-1 Revision / _v -a- ,
t AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 . BASES The required offsite power circuits are the two 13 kV buses 9 (11 and 21) which can be powered by:
a. Two 500 kV lines, two 500 kV buses each of which have connections to a 500 kV line that does not pass through the other 500 kV bus and both P-13000 g (500kV/14kV) transformers;or

b. One 500 kV line, one 500 kV bus, and one associated P-13000(500kV/14kV) transformer,andthe69kV/
13.8 kV SMECO line. When the SMEC0 line is credited as one of the qualified offsite circuits, the l disconnect from the SMEC0 line to Warehouse No. 1 must be open. 11 In addition, each offsite circuit includes the cabling to and from a 13.8/13.8 voltage regulator, the voltage regulator, 13.8/4.16 kV unit service transformer, the unit service transformer, and one of the two breakers , to one 4.16 kV ESF bus. Transfer capability between the two required offsite circuits is by manual means i only. The required circuit breaker to each 4.16 kV ESF bus must be from different 13.8/4.16 unit service transformers for the two required offsite circuits. Thus, each unit is able to align one 4.16 kV bus to one required offsite circuit, and the other 4.16 kV bus to the other required offsite circuit. In some cases, inoperable components in the electrical circuit' place both units in Conditions. Examples of these are 13.8 kV bus 11 or 21, to 500 kV transmission j lines, one P-13000 service transformer, or one 500 kV bus. In other cases, inoperable components only place one unit in a Condition, such as an inoperable U-4000 and/or13.8kVregulatorthatfeedsarequired4.16kV bus. l l The onsite standby power source to each 4.16 kV ESF bus is a L dedicated DG. A DG starts automatically on an safety 11 CALVERT_ CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-2 Revision [ L 1, _
_, . - - . =- . . . AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES ! injection actuation signal or on a 4.16 kV degraded or [ undervoltage signal. If both 4.16 kV offsite source breakers are open, the DG, after reaching rated voltage and frequency, will automatically close onto the 4.16 kV bus. In the event of a loss of offsite power to a 4.16 kV 1E bus, if required, the ESF electrical loads will be automatically sequenced onto the DG ia sufficient time to provide for safe shutdown for an anticipated operational occurrence (A00) and ensure that the containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a design bases accident. Ratings for the 1A DG satisfies the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and ratings for the 18, 2A, and 28 DG satisfy the requirements of Safety Guide 9 (Ref.4). The continuous service rating for the 1A DG is 5400 kW, for the IB DG is 2500 kW, and for the 2A and 2B DGr. are 3000 kW. APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and SAFETY ANALYSES transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 5) and , Chapter 14(Ref.6),assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6 Containment Systems. The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is
. consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least one train of the CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1-& 2 B 3.8.1-3' Revision 0 ,
I t
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:
a. An assumed loss of all offsite power; and

b. A single failure.
The AC sources satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), Criterion 3. LCO Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE Electrical Power Distribution System and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an ADO or a postulated DBA. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses. Loads are immediately connected to the ESF buses when the buses are q powered from the 500 kV offsite circuits and, when powered fromthe69/13.8kVSMECOoffsitecircuitafterbeing n manually connected, the loads are sequenced onto the ESF bus utilizing the came sequencer used to sequence the loads onto the DG. The SMECO offsite circuit will not be used to carry h loads for an operating unit. The LC0 requires the plant to be supplied by two of three offsite Class 1E electrical power distribution system circuits. These circuits consist of two 500 kV circuits via 500kV/14kVand13.8kV/4.16kVtransformersandthe69kV SMECO dedicated source (described in Ref. 7) via 69 kV/13.8 kVand13.8kV/4.16kVtransformers. In addition, each 9 offsite circuit includes one of the two breakers to one 4.16 kV ESF bus. Since transfer capability between the two il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.8.1-4 Revision [
_-- . ~. -- - .- - _ _ - - . . _ . - - . - .-
)
1 AC Sources-Operating l B 3.8.1 ) l I BASES ' required offsite circuits is by manual means only, the . requ' ired circuit breaker to the 4.16 kV ESF bus must be to different 4.15 kV ESF buses for the two required circuits. Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished g ; within 10 seconds. Each DG must also be cappble of , accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are : required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such ! as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required 9 : Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to reject a load 2 500 hp without tripping. Proper sequencing of loads, including shedding of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent (to the ?xtent possible) of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation SpMm (CREVS) Control Room Emergency Temperature System i grTS), and H Analyzer are shared systems with one train of each system connected to an onsite Class 1E AC electrical power , distribution subsystem from each unit. LC0 3.8.1.c requires
' one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission g network and the other unit's onsite C-lass 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to supply power to the a CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer to be OPERABLE and one DG from the other unit capable of supplying power to the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer to be OPERABLE. The qualified ,
~~circuit in LC0 3.8.1.c must be. separate and independent (to o t lL i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-5 Revision g9 1-9~~
~~~ .. = -, . - - . ~ _~~
AC_ Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 -BASES the extent possible) of the qualified circuit in LC0 3.8.1.c > must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of the qualified circuit which provides power to the other train of the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer. These requirements, in conjunction with the requirements for the 9 unit AC electrical power sources in LCO 3.8.1.a and LCO 3.8.1.b, ensure that power is available to two trains of the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer. APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, > and 4 to ensure that:
a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of A00s or abnormal transients; and E

b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.
The AC power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are covered in LC0 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown." ACTIONS 6.d To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the g one required LC0 3.8.1.a offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since. the Required Action only specifies " perform," a failure of ; SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, the second offsite circuitis-inoperable,andConditionCand/ ore,as 9 applicable, for the two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-6 Revision)T9 1
~~. , _ , _ - - , . ~ . . _ _ _ - _ ,-- _ __ _ _~~
t AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES b.s1 t Required Action A.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide ; assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features. These features are powered from the redundant AC electrical q pcwertrain(s). Single train systems may not be included. The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any . discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
a. The train has no offsite power supplying its loads; and

b. A_ required feature on another train is inoperable, q If at any time during the existence of Condition A (one required LC0 3.8.1.a offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant A required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or Luth, that are associated with the other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdoivn. The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to Train A and Train B of the
~
~~CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2'_ B 3.8.1-7 Revision 97 q _~~
~~.. , _ _ _ , , - , - _ _ _ ~ _ . . . - ._. - . . , . , . - _ __~~
~~AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1~~
' BASES onsite Class IE Distribution System. The 24 hour Completion i Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the '
redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account t the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a : reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a ~ DBA occurring during this period. U . Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 8), operation 1 r may continue in Conditior. A for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the-low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. l-The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 l establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet .. LC0 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b. If Condition A is entered _while. l9 l for instance, an LCO 3.8.1.b DG is inoperable, and that DG is _ subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This could lead to a total of 144 hours, since initial failure to meet LC0 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a g LCO 3.8.1.b DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total , L of 9 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS'l & 2- B 3.8.1-8 RevisionJ/9 q
AC Sources-0perating , B 3.8.1 BASES _ LCO 3.8.1.a and 3.8.1.b. The 6 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after 9 discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which 9 Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AM" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Time means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and , the more restrictive Completion Time must be met. As in Required Action A.2, the Completion Time allows for an 1 exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the , allowed outage time " clock." This will result in i establishing the " time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b was initially not met, instead of at the time '1 Condition A was entered. B.1 To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with an inoperable LC0 3.8.1.b DG, it is necessary to verify the ' availability of the offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies " perform " a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered. l ILE , Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a LCO 3.8.1.b DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are-designed with redundant safety related trains. Single train systems are not included. Redundant required feature CALVERT CLIFFS < UNITS.1'& 2 B 3.8.1-9 Revisiong4 L : y' p
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES failures consist of inoperable features with a train, redundant to the train that has an inoperable LC0 3.8.1.b DG. The Completion Time for Required Action B.2 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Action, the Completicn Time only begins on discovery that both:
a. An inoperable LCO 3.8.1.b DG exists; and !O

b. A required feature on another train is inoperable. 9 If at any time during the existence of this Condition (one q LCO 3.8.1.b DG inoperable) a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.
Discovering one required LCO 3.8.1.b DG inoperable 9 coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE dss. results in starting the Completion Time for 9 the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently, is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown. In thi.- Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite l9 circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the CALVERT CLIFFF - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-10 Revision /7
~~. - . . . . . - . . . - - . . - = . .-.- -~~
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during ~this period. i B.3.1 and B.3.2 Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s)..SR 3.8.1.3 dues not have to be 9 performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), the other DG(s) would be declared incperable upon - discovery and Condition D and/or G of LC0 3.8.1, as 9 applicable, would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause fa11uce no longer exhts and Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remainingDG(s),performanceofSR3.8.1.3sufficesto provideassuranceofcontinuedOPEP.ABILITYoftheDG(s). 9 In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B. Consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 9), 24 hours is 9 reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) is not c affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG. M Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 8) operation may continue in Condition B for a period that should not exceed i 72 hours.- CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNITS.1 & 2 B 3.8.1-11 Revision /7
~~. wr i % e,- ei_,..,, , , , . . -e,e. --...% ,y_,,-s-,- . , ---,.,m- ,e, , . . - -~~
AC Sources-Operating , B 3.8.1- i BASES In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DG and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class.1E Distribution System. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the _' remaining AC sources, a. reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. The second Completion Tinie for Required Action B.4 i establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power !,ources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet : LCO 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b. If Condition B is entered while, T [ for instance, a LC0 3.8.1.a offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LC0 . may already have been not met for up to 72 hours. This could lead to a total of 144 hours, since initial failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.6, to restore the DG. At this 9 time, a LCO 3.8.1.a offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG. restored OPERABLE, and an additional 72 hours (for a total of 9 days) allowed prior to complete , restoration of LCO 3.8.1.a and 3.8.1.b. The 6 day T Completion Time provides a limit on tine allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure t, meet LCO 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b. This limit is considered reasonable 9 for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 72 hour and 6 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the mere restrictive Completion Time must be met. As in Required Action B.2, the Completion Time allows for an exception to the normel tine zero" for beginning the allowed time " clock." This will result in establishing the
~~" time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a or 3.8.1.b was _q initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was-entered.~~
~~CALVERT CLIFFS UNITS 1 & 2 .B 3.8.1-12 Revisionp'y I 4^.~~
~~. - _, ., ,- . __ . . _ . . . ~ . _ - _ , - __ _ . _ _ . - - - - - . -~~
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 . I BASES L1 Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6 the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition C is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9,
~~" Distribution Systems-Operating," must be innediately entered. This allows Condition C to provide requirements for the loss of the LCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit and DG .~~
without regard to whether a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train. To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the one required LC0 3.8.1.c offsite circuit inoperable, it-is necessary to verify the OPERABILITY of the remaining ' required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies " perform," a failure of 9 SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, the second offsite circuitisinoperable,andConditionAand/ ore,as applicable, for the two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered. G1 Required Action C.2, which only applies if the train cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event coincident with a single failure of the associated DG will not result in a complete loss of safety function for the CREVS, CRETS, or the Hz Analyzers. The Completion Time for Required Action C.2 is intended to I allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any l: discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also l allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for l
~~.CALVERT CLIFFS'- UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-13 Revision f 9 gi: m,- v- * ** "~~
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 ; BASES , beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required ; Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that ; both:
a. The train has no offsite power supplying its loads; and

b. A train of CREVS, CRETS, or Hz Analyzer on the other train is inoperable.
If at~ any time during the existence of Condition C (one required LCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit inoperable) a train of CREVS, CRETS, or Hz Analyzer becomes inoperable, this Completion Time Begins to be tracked. Discovering no offsite power to one train of the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System coincident with one train of CREVS, CRETS or Hz Analyzer that is associated with the other train that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Times for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it 9 minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown. The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to Train A and Train B of the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 24 hcur Completion . Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable CREVS, CRETS, or H2 Analyzer. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. S.d Consistent with the time provided in ACTION A, operation may L continue in Condition C for.a period that should not exceed l 72 hours. With.one required LC0 3.8.1.c offsite circuit
'CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 -B 3.8.1-14 Revision-/7 r + ,. ---w- ,+e-, - .-,r- --
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the unit safety systems. In this Condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuits and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System. If the LC0 3.8.1.c required offsite circuit cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer associated with the offsite circuit must be declared inoperable. The ACTIONS associated with the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer will ensure the appropriate actions are taken. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. 9 D.1 Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to any train, the Cor.ditions and Required Actions for LC0 3.8.9 must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of the LCO 3.8.1.c offsite circuit and DG without regard to whether a train is de-energized. LC0 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train. To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with the une required LCO 3.8.1.c DG inoperable, it is necessary to verity the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequency basis. Since the Required Action only specifies " perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 or SR ? 8.1.2 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-15 Revision /9
~~- . ._ ~ - . . .- -~~
~~AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 ) t~~
' BASES met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1 or SR 3.8.1.2, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit g inoperability additional Conditions and Required Actions must then be entered.
r Erl 9 Required Action D.2 is intended to provide-assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period the LC0 3.8.1.c DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function- for the CREVS, CRETS, or the 2H Analyzers. The Completion Time is intended to allow t e operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an ' exception to the normal
~~" time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock."~~
~~In this Required Action, The Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:~~
a. An inoperable LC0 3.8.1.c DG exists; and

b. A train of CREVS, CRETS, or Hz Analyzers on the other train is inoperable.
If at any time during the existence of this Condition (the , LCO 3.8.1.c GG inoperable) a train of CREVS, CRETS, or H2 Analyzer becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked. Discovering the LC0 3.8.1.c DG inoprable coincident with one train of CREVS, CRETS, or2H Analyzer that is associated with the one LCO 3.8.1.b DG results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently, is acceptable because it minimizes _ risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.
~
~~CALVERT-CLIFFS -_ UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-16 Revisiong9 I~~
~~u - e-- e'&.4 A 2 -~~
~~s 4,: -- - 4-<. e Je a -'M e- a + 's+~~
AC Sources-Operating i B 3.8.1 BASES In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class IE Distribution System. Thus, on a component ' basis, single failure protection for the CREVS, CRETS, or H2 9 Analyzer may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time also takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining CREVS, CRETS, and'Hz Analyzer train, a reasonable. time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. D.3.1 and 0.3.2 Required Action D.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.3 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s),theotherDG(s)wouldbedeclaredinoperableupon discoveryandConditionBand/orFofLC03.8.1,as dpplicable, would be entered. Once the failure is repaired, the common cause failure no longer exists and Required c) Action D.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.3 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of the DG(s). In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either D.3.1 or D.3.2, the corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition D. Consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 8), 24 hours is
~~- reasonable to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) is not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.~~
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-17 Revision g9 Ry . . . . - _ = -., ,
AC Jources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES D.4 Consistent with the time provided in ACTION B, operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 72 hours. In Condition D, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and 3 offsite power circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the Class 1E Distribution System. If the LCO 3.8.1.c DG cannot be restored to OPERABLE status-within 72 hours the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer associat'd with this DG must be declared inoperable. The Actions associated with the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer will 3 ensure the appropriate Actions are taken. The 72 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring g during this period. E.1 and E.2 i Condition E is entered when both offsite circuits required by LCO 3.8.1.a are inoperable, or n, hen the offsite circuit required by LCO 3.8.1.c and one offsite circuit required by 9 LCO 3.8.1.a are concurrently inoperable, if the LC0 3.8.1.a offsite circuit is credited with providing power to the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer. Required Action E.1 is intended to provide assurance that an 9 event with a coincident single failure will not result in a complete loss of redundant required safety functions. The Completion Time for this failure of redundant required features is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed for one train without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 8) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for 9 two required offcite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption'that two complete safety trains are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-18 Revision /9
l AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are powered from redundant AC safety trains. Single train features are not included in the list. 3 The Completion Time for Reqv n Action E.1 is intended to l '[ allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal " time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time " clock." In this Required Actien, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:
a. Two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and T

b. A required feature is inoperable.
I' 't any time during the existence of Condition E q (e.t.,tworequiredLCO3.8.1.aoffsitecircuitsinoperable) and a required feature becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked. Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 8), operation may continue in Condition E for a period that should not 9 exceed 24 hours. This level of degradation means that the offsite electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a sa^. shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation could correspond to a i total inss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources. Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperaMe
~~- that-involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two L~~
~~c lCALVERT' CLIFFS-UNITS 1& B 3.8.1-19 Revision [9 m ;~~
~~. L_. :- -,_~~
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES factors tend to decrease the severity of this level of degradation: h p a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power c system that remains available is not susce M ile to a
~~!. single bus or switching failure; and~~
~~b. The ime required to stect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally iruch less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source, q~~
With two of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of , the offsite circuits comensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria. Consistent M th Reference 8, with the available offsite AC 9 sources two les than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If onh "a 7ffsite source is required within 24 hours, power optrativ mntinues in accordance with Condition A or C, as appi N ole. 9 F.1 and F.2 9 Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note to indicate q CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-20 Revision p' 9 m m-m-i-in
~~.-. - = - - . - _ - - .~~
AC Sources-Cperating B 3.8.-1 BASES that when Condition F is entered with no AC source to any train, the Conditions and Required Ac: ions for LC0 3.8.9, 9 must be immediately. entered. Yhit clicws Condition F to. provide requirements for the lov o# one equired LC0 3.8.1.a offsite circuit and ore LC0 3.8'1 b DG without g . regard to whether a train is de-eaergized. LC0 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrici:1ons for a de-enargized train.
~~' Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 8), operatlen' i may continue in Condition F for a period that should not exceed 12 hours.~~
9 In Condition F,' individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power-system. Since power system redur.dancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition F (loss of two required offsite circuits). A This difference in reliability is offset by the' susceptibility of this power system config; ration to a single bus or switchir,9 failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time fcr repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. G.1 9 With two LC0 3.8.1.b DGs inoperable, there are no remaining standby AC sources to provide power to most of the ESF systems. With one LC0 3.8.1.c DG inoperable and the LC0 3.8.1.b'DG that provides power to the CREVS, CRETS, and H2 9 Analyzer inoperable, there are no remaining standby AC sources to the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzers. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power
, system is the only source of AC power for this level of CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-21 Revision g 9 w - , ___m______.-_______m_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ .-
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES degradation, the risk associated with Nntinued operation i for a short time could be less thai that associated with an inrnediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation. Consistent with Regulatory 1.93 (Ref. 8), with both < LC0 3.8.1.b DGs inoperable, or with the LC0 3.8.1.b DG that provides power to the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer and the LCO 3.8.1.c DG inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. H.1 and H.2 l9 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of 9 Condition A, B, E, F, or G not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LC0 does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. 1.1 9 Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which l7 all redundancy in the LC0 3.8.1.a and LC0 3.8.1.b AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-22 Revisionfl9
~~, - - .- - - -__ - - - ..- - - - . - - . - ~ - - . .. .-~~
AC Sources-Operate;g B 3.o.1 BASES unit is required by LC0 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown. SURVEILLANCE The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and REQUIREMENTS testing of all important areas and features . especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref._10). Periodic l3 component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of , the DGs are consistent with the recommendations of Re;ulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), or Safety Guide 9 (Ref. 4), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 11).. l3 When the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances the following is applicable. The minimum transient output voltare of 3740 V is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90% or 3600 V. The specified maximum output voltage of 4400 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures g that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are enual to +- 2% of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are the recommendations given in Regulatorv Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The SRs are modified by a Note which states that SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.15 are applicable to LCO 3.8.:.a and g I.C0 3.8.1.b AC Sources. The Note also states that SR 3.8.1.16 is applicable to LCO 3.8.1.c AC sources. This l1 Note clarifies that not all of the SRs are appliable to all
~~-the components described in the LCO.~~
11
~~.CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS.1 & 2 B 3.8.1-23 Revision /~~
e
~~- y 9,. . - . - . . - -,-5.- , - . .~~
, AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SR 3,8.1.1 and SR 3.8.1.2 These SRs assure proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The Frequency of once within I hour after substitution for a 500 kV circuit and every 8 hours thereafter for SR 3.8.1.1 was established to ensure that the breaker alignment for the SMECO circuit (which does not have control room indication) is in its correct position although breaker position is-unlikely to change. The 7 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is adequate since the 500 kV circuit breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room. SR 3.8.1.1 is modified by a Note which states that this SR is only required when SMECO is being credited for an offsite source. This SR will prevent unnecessary testing on an uncredited circuit. SR 3.8.1.3 and SR 3.8.1.9 These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition. To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note (Note 2 for SR 3.8.1.3) to indicate that all DG starts for these Surve111ances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading by an engine prelube period. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-24 Revision 0
7-AC Sources-Operating ) R 3.8.1 BASES for the purposes of SR 3.8.1.9 testing, the DGs are required i to start from standby conditions only for SR 3.8.1.9. Standby conditions for a DG mean the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recomendations. In order to reduce stress and mechanical wear on diesel 9 engines, the DG manufacturers recommend a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. This is ! the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recomended by the manufacturer. SR 3.8.1.9 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds. The minimum voltage and frequency stated in the SR are those necessary to ensure the 9 DG can accept DBA loading while maintaining acceptable voltage and frequency levels. The 10 second start li requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis LOCA analysis in the UFSAR, Chapter 14 (Ref. 6). Since SR 3.8.1.9 requires a 10 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.3, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.3. The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.3 is consistent with Safety Guide 9 (Ref. 4) and Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). 9 The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.9 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 9). This 9 Frequency provides adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing. Il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-25 Revisionfl
AC Sources-Operating
B 3.8.1 BASES SR 3.8.1.4 This Sarveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads greater than or equal to 4000 kW for DG 1A and greater than or equal to 90% of the continuous duty rating for the remaining DGs. The 90% minimum load limit is 9 consistent with Ref. 3 and is acceptable because testing of '
these DGs at pest Kridcat load values is performed by SR 3.8.1.11. A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source. Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0. The 0.8 value is the design rating of the machine, while 1.0 is an operational limitation. The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). This SR is modified by four Notes. Note 1 indicates that , diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that 9 mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to prevent routinely paralleling multiple DGs and to minimize the potential for effects from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance. , SR 3.8.1.5 This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-26 Revisiong4
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES automatically added. The level required by the SR is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of I hour of DG operation at full load plus 10'<. The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period. SR 3.8.1.6 Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, out all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 11). This SR is for g preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this Surveillance. SR 3.8.1.7 This Surveillance demonstrates that one fuel oil transfer q pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 8 3.8.1-27 Revisiong9
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 ' BASES
~~-storage tank to its associated day tank. This is required to support continuous operation of standby power scarces.~~
This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE. The Frequency for this SR is 31 days. The 31 day Frequency _ corresponds to the design of the fuel transfer system. The design of fuel transfer systems is such that pumps will operate automatically or must be started manually in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tanks during or following DG testing. In such a case, a 31 day Frequency is appropriate. SR 3.8.1.8 Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer (this SR verifies steps 1 through 5). The sequencing logic controls the permissive and closing signals to breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 10% load sequence time interval tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. The UFSAR provides a sumary of the automatic loading of ESF buses. The Frequency of 31 days is consistent with DG monthly testing and is sufficient to ensure the load sequencer operation as required. SR 3.8.1.9 __ See SR 3.8.1.3.. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-28 Revision 0
AC Ssurces-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES SR 3.8.1.10 Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. SR 3.8.1.11 This SR provides verification that the DG can be operated at a load greater than predicted accident loads for at least 60 minutes once per 24 months. Operation at the greater than calculated accident loads will clearly demonstrate the ability of the DGs to perform their safety function. In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed using a DG load greater than or equal to calculated accident load and using a power factor s 0.85. This power factor is chosen to be representative of the actual design basis inductive loading that the DG could experience. In addition, the post accident load for DG 1A is significantly lower than the continuous rating of DG 1A. 9 To ensure DG 1A performance is not degraded, routine monitoring of engine parameters should be performed during the performance of this SR for DG 1A (Ref. 12) , This Surveillance is modified by a Note which states that i momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not l invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit will not invalidate the test. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-29 Revisiongg
AC Sources-0perating B 3.8.1 BASES The 24 month Frequency is adequate to ensure DG OPERABILITY and it is consistent with the refueling interval. 9 SR 3.8.1.12 Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics. This Surveillance is accomplished by tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associeted single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power. Consistent with IEEE-308 (Ref. 13), Regulatory Guide 1.9 9 I (Ref. 3), and Safety Guide 9 (Ref. 4), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2). SR 3.8.1.13 9 This Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions are bypassed on a required actuation signal. The non-critical protective functions are consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) and Safety I Guide 9 (Ref. 4) and IEEE-387 and are listed in UFSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2) Verifying the non-critical trips are bypassed will ensure DG operation during a required actuation. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react l l< CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-30 Revisiong4
AC Sources-Operating. B 3.8.1 BASES appropriately. -The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is . more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately; detrimental to emergency operation of the DG. The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance,.and is intended to'be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when
~~. performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the .,:~~
Frequency was. concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint. This Frequency is consistent with UFSAR, I Chapter 8(Ref.2). SR 3.8.1,14 9 This Surveillance ensures that the. manual synchronization-and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and gi voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset. The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance. SR 3.8.1.15 cl , In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded. 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-31 Revision /H ] 1 o.-.
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES This Surveillance demonstrates the D3 operation during a loss of cffsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF (i.e., safety. injection) actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of q loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DC system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified. It is not necessary to energize loads which are dependent on temperature to load (i.e., heat tracing, switchgear HVAC compressor, computer room HVAC compressor). Also, it is acceptable to transfer the Instrument-AC Bus to the non tested train to maintain safe operation of the plant during testing. Loads (both permanent and auto connect) < 15 kW do not require loading onto the diesel rince these are insignificant loads for the DG. The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 24 months. This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize mechanical wear and stress on the DGs during g testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. SR 3.8.1.16 q This SR lists the SRs that are applicable to the LCO 3.8.1.c AC electrical sources (SR 3.8.1.1, SR 3.8.1.2, SR 3.8.1.3, il SR3.8.1.5,SR3.8.1.6,andSR3.8.1.7). Performance of any SR for the LC0 3.8.1.c AC electrical sources will satisfy l ll CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-32 Revision
AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES both Unit 1 and Unit 2 requirements for those SRs. Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.4, SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.9, 11 SR 3.8.1.10. SR 3.8.1.11 SR 3.8.1.12, SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.14, and SR 3.8.1.15', are not required to be N performed for the LCO 3.8.1.c AC electrical sources. Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.10 is not required because $ u this SR verifies manual transfer of AC power sources from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit, but only one qualified offsite circuit is necessary for the LC0 3.8.1.c AC electrical sources. Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.4, SR 3.8.1.11, and SR 3.1.8.12 are not required because they are tests that deal with loads. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.8 verifies the interval between sequenced loads. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.14 9 verifies the proper sequencing with offsite power. Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.9 verifies that the DG starts within 10 seconds. These SRs are not required because'they do not support the function of the LC0 3.8.1.c AC electrical H sources to provide power to the CREVS, CRETS, and Hz Analyzer. Surveillance Requirements 3.8.1.13 and 3.8.1.15 9 are not required to be performed because these SRs verify the emergency loads are actuated on an Engineered Safety Feature Action System (ESFAS) signal for the Unit in which the test is being performed. The LC0 3.8.1.c DG will not i start on an ESFAS signal for this Unit. REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17
2. UFSAR, Chapter 8

3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Rev. 3, July 1993 9

4. Safety Guide 9 J

5. UFSAR, Chapter 6

6. UFSAR, Chapter 14' II, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.1-33 Revisionf
~~AC Sources-Operating B 3.8.1 BASES~~
7. NRC Safety Evaluation for Amendment Nos.19 and 5 for cg Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. I and 2, dated January 14, 1977

8. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Rev. O, December 1974 l

9. Generic Letter 84-15

10. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. GDC 18 !

11. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev.1, October 1979 l9

12. Letter from D. G. Mcdonald, Jr. (NRC) to C. H. Cruse (8GE), dated April 2,1996, Issuance of Amendments for q Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Ur 1 (TAC No.
~~M94030) ar.d Unit 2 (TAC No. M94031)~~
~~13. IEEE Standard 308-1991 h 1 8.~~
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS l'& 2 B 3.8.1-34 Revision g .9 1 I .. . . _ _ _ _______________________________________.________________.____________________________________a
AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES ACTIONS LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 5 or 6. However, > since irradieted fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 5 or 6 LCO 3.0.3 would not specify 9 , any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. The ACTIONS have been madified by a second hote stating that performance of REQUIRED ACTIONS shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position. This clarification is provided to avoid stopping ll movement of irradiated fuel assemblies while in a non-conservative position based on compliance with the REQUIRED ACTIONS. A.1 An offsite circuit would be considered incperable if it were not available to one required ESF train. Although two trains may be required by LC0 3.8.10, the remaining train with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient require.d features to allow Continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS and fuel movement. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable, with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions will be implemented in accordance with the affected required features LC0's ACTIONS. A.2.1. A.2.2. A.2.3. A.2.4. B.1. B.2. B.3. and B.4 With the offsite circuit not available to all required trains, the option would still exist to declare all required features inoperable. Since this opticn may involve il CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.2-5 Revision [
, AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES i undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, and operations involving positive reactivity g additions. The Required Action to suspend positive reactivity additions does not preclude actions to maintain j or increase reactor vessel inventory provided the required SDM is maintained. Suspension of these activities does not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability or the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the unit safety systems. The Completion Time of immedf aly is consistent with the required times for actions re? o ring prompt attention. The restoration of the required At *ical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the unit safety systems may be without sufficient power. Pursuant to LC0 3.0.6, the Distribution System's ACTIONS are not entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, the ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.10 must be immediately entere.1. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit, whether or not a train is de-energized. LC0 3.8.10 provides CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.2-6 Revision /9
AC Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.2 BASES the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized trcin. SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 and SR 3.8.2.2 q REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 and SR 3.8.2.2 require the SRs from LC0 3.8.1 g that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. SR 3.8.1.10 is not required to be met since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.4, SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.13, and SR 3.8.1.15 are related to automatic starting of the DGs for an operating unit, which is not y applicable for a shutdown unit. SR 3.8.1.16 is related to the LC0 3.8.2.c and 3.8.2.d AC sources, and is addressed by SR 3.8.2.2. SR 3.8.2.1 is modified by a Note. The Note lists SRs not ' required to be performed in order to preclude deenergizing a n required 4.16 kV ESF bus or disconnecting a required offsite i circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC Sources availtele, a single event could compromise both the required circuie and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still bt capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are requireti to be OPERABLE. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR. REFERENCES None h CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.2-7 Revision /
Diesel Fuel Oil 9 B 3.8.3 BASES acceptability. Poor sample procedures (bottom sampling), contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, and particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and
. proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated DG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DG fuel oil.
E.1 l0 With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.2 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil-properties to within the new fuel oil limits. This period u provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or restore the stored fuel oil properties to within the new fuel oil limits. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combinations of these procedures. Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is a high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function. F.1 to With a Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, or one or more DGs with diesel fuel oil not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Conditions A ! through E, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be inmediately declared CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.3-7 Revisionglo
DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES This SR is modified by a Note. The Note allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test. Thissubstitutionisacceptablebecausel h a modified performance discharge test represents a more i severe test of battery capacity than SR 3.8.4.7. 3 SR 3.8.4.8 g A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery after having been in service, to detect-any change in-the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage. A battery modified performance discharge test is a simulated - duty cycle consisting of just two rates; the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance discharge test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of tne performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance 3 discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery performance discharge test for the duration of time equal to that of the performance discharge test. A modified performance discharge test is a test of the , battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test. V f
DC S@urces-Operating i B 3.8.4' BASES Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.8; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.8-while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.7 at the same 3 time. 1 The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance are consistent withIEEE-450(Ref.9)andIEEE-485(Ref.5). These references reconenend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer rating. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements. The Surveillance Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is
< 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity 2100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, according to IEEE-450 (Ref. 9), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is 210% below-the manufacturer's rating. These Frequencies are consistent with the reconinendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 9).
~~REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Appendix IC~~
2. Safety Guide 6 3.- IEEE-308-1978'

4. UFSAR, Chapter 8 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNITS 1 & 2- B 3.8.4-10 Revisiong3 L
~~DC Sources-Operating B 3.8.4 BASES~~
~~5. IEEE-485-1983, June 1983~~
~
6. 'UFSAR, Chapter 6

7. UFSAR, Chapter 14

8. . Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974

9. IEEE-450-1995

10. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977
~~-CALVERT CLIFFS . UNITS 1 & 2 B 3.8.4-11 Revision 0 s ;^?.~~
DC' Sources-Shutdown B 3.8.5 BASES any action.. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in-MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, the 3 inability to. suspend movement of-irradiated fuel assemblies would not be sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. The ACTIONS have been modified by a second Note = stating that}}

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