ML20247G634
| ML20247G634 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/12/1989 |
| From: | Beyea J, Goble R, Thompson G MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-I-MAG-072, OL-I-MAG-72, NUDOCS 8905310029 | |
| Download: ML20247G634 (88) | |
Text
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Z-Jue - 72 ,y. Gx UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Administrative Judges: 3 3"'.
Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson Dr. Richard F. Cole
- Kenneth A. McCollum 89 11AY 23 P3 :50 0F5 m . . ,,
DOCKEDu.; . ag i;R A h c"
)
)
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos.
) 50-443-444-OL PUBLIC SEEVICE COMPANY OF ) (Off-site EP)
NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) February 21, 1989
)
)
TESTIMONY OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON, DR. ROBERT L. GOBLE, AND DR. JAN BEYEA ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON CONTENTIOtiS REGADMING THE ADEUUACY OP' THE SPMC WITH CORRECTED TABLES
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- Department of the Attorney General
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-Before Administrate./e Judges:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson j!
Dr. Richard F. Cole j Kenneth A. McCollum ~
)
)
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos.
) 50-443-444-OL f PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) (Off-site EP)
)
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) February 21, 1989
) ,
)
TESTIMONY OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON, DR. ROBERT L. GOBLE, AND DR. JAN BEYEA ON DEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR-THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON CONTENTIONS -
REGAnnING THE ADEOUACY OF THE SPMC I. IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES Q. Please state your names, positions, and business I addresses. I A. (Thompson) My name is Dr. Gordon Thompson. I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
A. (Goble) My'name is Dr. Robert Goble. I am a Research Associate Professor at Clark University in Worcester,
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A. (Beyea) My name is Dr. Jan Beyes. I am the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society in New York City.
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' ,arioflyLsummariza your experienco an~d professional
?. .qualif'ications.
'(Thompson)
I received a ph.D in applied mathematics from
. Oxford University in 1973. t Since then I have worked as a consulting 1cientist~on.a variety of energy, environment, and
.. international 1 security. issues. .My experience has included-technical ~ ' analysis'.and presentation .of expert testimony on issues related to the safety of nuclear power facilities.
In 1977, I presented testimony before the Windscale public Inquiry in. Britain, addressing safety aspects of nuclear fuel reprocessing.
During 1978 and 1979, I participated in an I international scientific review of the proposed Gorleben .
nuclear' fuel' center in West Germany, a review sponsored by the.
government'of Lower; Saxony.
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.Between 1982 and 1984, I coordinated an investigation of safety issues relevant to the proposed nuclear plant at Sizewell, England. This plant will have many similarities to the Seabrook plant.
The investigation was sponsored by a group ;
of. local governments.in Britain, under the aegis of the Town I
[ and Country planning Association. This investigation formed h
the basis.for testimony before the Sizewell Public Inquiry by myself and two other witnesses.
From 1986_to 1985, first as a staff scientist and later as !
a consultant, I was associated with the Union of Concerned
" Scientists (UCS), at their head office in Cambridge, MA. On i
behalf of UCS,
{; I presented testimony in 1983 before a licensing board of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commissi'on (NRC). concerning h m - - _m___m_-_ _ _ _ _ _ _
'tha morits of a system of filtored vonting at tho Indian Point nuclear plants. Also, I undottook an extensive review of NRC research on the reactor accident " source term" issue, and was co-author of a major' report published by UCS on this subject in 1986.. "
Since early 1987, I have been one of the principal investigators for an emergency planning study based at Clark University, Worcester, MA. The object of the study was to develop a model emergency plan for the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
Within this effort, one of my primary responsibilities has been to address the characteristics of severe reactor accidents.
My other research interests include: the efficient use of energy; the supply of energy from renewable sources; radioactive waste management; the restraint of nuclear weapons proliferation; and nuclear and conventional arms control. I have written and made public presentations in each of these areas.
At present, I.am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA. This organization is devoted to research,and public education on the efficient use of natural resources, protection of the !
environammt,,,and the furtherance of international peace and security.
A detailed resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.
A. (Goble) !
I received a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Wisconsin in 1967, specializing in high energy elementary particle physics. i Since then I have held combined i
iroscarch and tocching posts at Yalo Univorsity, tho Univorsity of Minnosota, tho Univorsity of Utah, Montana State University, and Clark University.
My present position at Clark is Research 4 Associate professor of Physics where I am a member'of the program on Environment, Technology, and Society, and part of
~ the Hazards Assessment Group of the Center for Technology, Environment, and Development (CENTED].
I have taught ;
a wide range of physics courses at both the undergraduate and graduate level and a number of courses dealing with the relationships between technologies and society.
My current research interests are: (1) emergency planning for nuclear reactor accidents (I have been one of the principal researchers in a Clark University project to write an emergency response plan for the TMI nuclear reactor); (2) risk assessment (I am conducting research on risks from radon exposures in indoor air, and am working with other CENTED group members on reviewing risk assessments for a potential radioactive waste repository in Nevada); (3) air pollution dispersal (I am f
continuing work on both short and: Long range pollutant
! dispersal, including applications to the>ecid rain problem, as well as the transpork-of radionuclides:from nuclear l accidents). A complete resume is included in the attachments 1 to this testi, mony.
l (Beyse)
I received my doctorate in nuclear physics from Columbia University in 1968.
Since then I have served ac an Assistant Professor of physics at Holy Cross College in Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research staff l
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radiation deso calculations, was tho major roason the Governor 1 'gavo for approving tha vsnting.
I participated in the international exercise on consequence modeling (Benchmark Study) coordinated by the Organization for Economic Ccbperation & Development (0.E.C.D.). Scientists and engineers from fourteen countries around the world used their own consequence moduls to calculate radiation doses following hypothetical " benchmark" releases. Other participants from the i United States included groups from Sandia Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest, and pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc.
I also served as a consultant from the environmental community to the N.R.C. in connection with their development of " Safety Goals for Nuclear Power plants."
At the request of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, I supervised a major review of radiation doses from the Three Mile Island accident. This report, "A Review of Dose !
Assessments at Three Mile Island and Recommendations for Future Research," was released in August of 1984. Subsequently, I organized a workshop on TMI Dosimetr ', the proceedings'ol'which !
were published in early 1986.
In 1986, I developed new dose models for the Epidemiology Department of Columbia University. These models are being used to assese whether or not the TMI accident is correlated with excess health effects in the local population. The new i computer models account for complex terrain, as well as time varying meteorology (including changes in wind direction).
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In addition to reports written about spccific nuclear facilitics, an artic?9 of mino on resolving conflict at the Indian Point reactor site, an article on emergency planning for teactor' accidents, L
and a joint paper with Frank von Hippel of Princeton University on failure modes of reactor containment systems have appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
I have also prepared risk studies covering sulfur emissions frcm coal-burning energy facilities, and I have menaged a project that analyzed the side effects of renewable energy
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sources. !
I regularly testify before congressional committees on energy issues and have served on several advisory boards set up by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.
I currently participate in a number of ongoing efforts aimed at promoting dialogue between environmental organizations and industry.
A complete resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.
II. OVERVIEW OF TEETIMONY Q..
To what Contentions does your testimony refer?
A.
Our testimony refers to Contentions JI 17, JI 18, JI 19.
Q. Plea 2"e summarize your testimony.
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A. IEll) Our tcstimony d:monstratos that tho SPMC does not meet applicable standards and does not take appropriate account of relevant knowledge about the characteristics of nuclear plant accidents and the potential for mitigating the effects of~Ehose accidents through emergency responses at the
- Seabrook site.
We identify deficiencies in the SPMC which are relevant to its application to all potentially affected populations.
Furthermore, we identify deficiencies which are relevant to the application of the SpMC to the beach populations. In the latter case, we illustrate the deficiencies by calculations which are specific to the Seabrook site.
In regard to the SPMC's application to all populations, we identify two major deficiencies. 1) the SPMC does not provide
-an appropriate range of emergency response strategies. 2) the decision criteria in the SPMC do not take account of all relevant information and, as a result, may fail to generate the most appropriate emergency response. The combined effect of these two deficiencies may be an unnecessary level of radiation ;
exposure to affected populations.
In regard to the SPMC's application to the beach populatiosa, we identify three major deficiencies. 3) when the i beaches are 3e'avily occupied, the SPMC will not be significantly more effective than strategies involving unplanned emergency response.
- 4) the SPMC does not have an adequate basis for rejecting sheltering as a planned emergency response measure.
5) the SPMC will be significantly less effective than emergency
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responses to accidents at generic nuclear plant accidents.
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1 Q;
-Aro tho doficicncies in th3 SpMC attributable to the
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' nature of"the Scabrook site?
iA . (All)' It is clear that the site presents a:particular i
challenge for emergency planning. The most notable part-of thatfchallenge is'the presence of'a large beach. population near
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. to the. plant during parts of each year. However, of the five 'l major deficiencies mentioned above, only one, #5, directly I arises from the presence of the beach population. The other four deficiencies represent a failure of the SpMC to adequately ;-
respond'to the site's challenge. Notwithstanding that ;
!i challenge, an emergency planning effort considerably more rigorous than~is represented by the SpMC could have been performed.
Q.
Do your criticisms of the SpMC rest upon a' comparison of the' effectiveness of emergency planning at the Seabrook site with the effectiveness of planning at a generic plant?
A. (All) In our view, it would be appropriate to make such.a comparison. ;
Nevertheless, this testimony primarily rests upon comparisons among alternative emergency response,.
strategies.at the Seabrook site.
In ruling upon,the adequacy of emergency planning in New Hampshire, this Board has accepted testimony by FEMA witness Joseph Keller.
Keller's testimony relies upon his opinion, unsupported by any site-specific analysis, that generic emergency planning lessons are applicable to the Seabrook site.
We demonstrate that generic lessons are not applicable, and to that end we compara relative effectiveness across a rangin ll 1
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'of Gmargency rcsponsoLstratsgios,oincluding'thoso with J paramators.ropresOntativa of a. generic site and others with
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parameters representative.of the Seabrook site, j While-conducting ~ calculations to assess the relative l
.effectivene3s of emergency response strategies at the Seabrook site, we were also unavoidably-driven to the conclusion that f
the SpMC will be.significantly less effective in protecting the !
' Massachusetts beach population than will a generic emergency response to a nuclear plant accident.
This is one of the five -
major deficiencies of the SpMC which we address here.
Q.
Does your testimony rely upon information about the 1 l
i potential characteristics of accidents specific to the Seabrook f plant?
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A. (All) In our view, it would be appropriate for this 1
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Board to accept testimony which relied upon such information.
Nevertheless, we have not used any Seebrook-specific information except for reactor power, about potential accident characteristics.
Where information about potential. accident characteristics
, r.u is used here, _rhat information is generally drawn from the same sources as were used in establishing the basis for the present emergency planning regulations. To a limited degree, we also draw upon other generic literature. ,
Q. Does your testimony cover the same ground as the rejected Commonwealth of Massachusetts Testimony of Sholly, at 11 , regarding the NHRERP7 A. (All) No. Our present testimony does not contain estimates of radiation doses although these would be needed for l t
'dotormining m: dical rosourco noOds, otc., and it doss not assuma any particular accident scenario. Instead, the
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testimony addresses the relative effectiveness of emergency response strategies across a range of potential accident conditionsc i The same issue has been addressed in the June 10, t 1988 FEMA Testiniony of Keller and Cumming, although in thec case without supporting analysis.
III. STRUCTURE OF THIS TESTIMONY l}.
please describe the structure of your testimony.
A. (All) The remainder of our testimony consists of eight parts.
First, we discuss appropriate objectives for emergency planning, and the translation of those objectives i
into criteria which can be used to evaluate a particular l j
Second, we examine the emergency planning issues which arise in the case of Seabrook. Third, we assess the approach taken in the SPMC in the light of our preceding discussion of objectives and criteria. Fourth, we describe an analytic approach which supplements that assessment by calculating the relative effectiveness of various emergency response strategies for the beach population. Fifth, we describe the,p,c,otective stategies used in our analysis, explaining their
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relevance to the emergency planning problems j at Seabrook. Sixth, we summarize the findings of our )
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analysis.
Seventh, we discuss implications of these findings l l
l for Massachusetts residents in the EPZ. Eighth, we summarize !
our conclusions. I l
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IV.
EMENGENCY PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND CRITERTA -!
FOR EVALUATION OF SPECIFTC PLANS j
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Q.
Why is it important to be clear about emergency planning objectives? i i
A. (Ail) Emergency response to a nuclear accident
. requires a great deal of advance planning, both in establishing the resources needed to respond in a crisis and in establishing procedures for dealing with important contingencies which, if they occur,'must be responded to very quickly. The establishment ~and use of clear planning objectives is necessary for the coherent organization of these activities. planning objectives are nat guarantees that under all circumstances the use of the plan will mean no loss of life or no doses in excess of' protective Action Guides ("pAGs"). They are a mechanism for f keeping track of what needs to be done and what are the priorities in making decisions; they also should represent reasonable aspirations for the successful use of a plan.
Q. How do you interpret the objectives set out in i NUREG-06547 "
- j A. (All) NUREG-0654 adopts the planning basis set out in f
NUREG-0396, yielding the following statement of objectives:
"The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life savies) Tbr a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of protective Action Guides (PAGs). No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree.
(NUREG-0654, page 6) l i
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This formulation is vague'as.to the relativo importance of
- "dosefsavings" and "immsdiata life saving". However, since
-NUREG-0654 rests upon NUREG-0396, further guidance can be
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obtained from Appendix-I of the'latter document, which provides the rationale for'the recommended planning basis. In
- considering " Class 9" accidents, particularly those with a large~ release of' radioactivity, that appendix states:
"These very serious severe accidents injuries.and deaths. have the potential for causing Therefore, emergency. response
~for these conditions must have as its first priority the reduction of early severe health effects. Studies have been performed which indicate that if emergency actions miles as such sheltering of'a. or evacuation _were taken within about 10:
power plant, there would be significant savings
.of early injuries and atmospheric releases."
deaths from even the most " severe" (NUREG-0396, page I-7)
It can reasonably be inferred that NUREG-0654 accepts that the highest priority'in emergency planning is to reduce the incidence of "early severe health effects",-with " dose savings"
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as a parallel but less compelling objective. As indicated below, ~
such an interpretation is consistent with the nature of the nuclear plant emergency' planning problem and with other-a literature in the field.
Q. ~How do planning objectives relate to the health effects of radiation exposure?
A. (All) A large release of radioactive material can cause radiation exposure. If the exposures are high enough, the exposed person will' suffer prompt damage to tissues, become sick, and if sufficiently damaged, die. Lower exposures, which 1
are not intense enough to cause obvious tissue damage, may L
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still affcct collular roproductivo systems and thus cause cancGrs to develop much later on.
The likelihood of cancers developing in this fashion is sometimes considered to be l
proportional to the magnitude of the exposure (the linear model).
Fct the case of acute consequences, the objective is thus to keep people's exposures well below levels at which tissue damage becomes significant. For the case of cancers, i I
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t exposure) the objective will be to minimize the total dose to the population.
A further concern is that the cancer risks !
should not be concentrated too highly in particular people.
Then the third objective is to prevent individuals from receiving high exposures, for example, PAGs. These three objectives may be considered to be embodied in the above-quoted phrase from NUREG-0654:
"The overall objectives of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for e spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides '
(pAGs)."
Two other concerns are implicit in the NUREG 0654 regulations.
A number of special populations will be particularly vulnerable because of their lack of mobility, disabilities, institutional placement, etc. Special provisions are needed te provide protection to such populations. Finally, an accident and the response to it will generate a number of secondary needs.
These considerations suggest to us the following hierarchy ,
of emergency response objectives: -
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I Avoid acuto oxposurcs loading to loss of life and injuries;
- 2) Keeg individual doses below pAGs; 3)
Reduce collective. doses as much as feasible;
- 4) protect vulnerable subpopulations; and 5)
Address ancillary problems including housing of
.anxiety, evacuees, medical treatment and screening, public etc.
Such a hierarchy is implicitly or explicitly endorsed at various places in the emergency planning literature. For example, the International Commission on Radiological '
protection has stated:
"The principles which emerge for planning intervention ir.
the event of an accident are the following:
(a)
Serious nonstochastic effects should be avoided by the introduction of countermeasures to limit i individual these dose levels below the thresholds for effects.
(b)
The risk from stochastic effects should be limited by introducing countermeasures which '
achieve involved.
a positive not benefit to the individuals This can be accomplished by comparing the reduction in individual done, and therefore individual risk, that would follow the introduction of a countermeasure with the '
increase in individual risk resulting from the
-ihtteduction of that' countermeasure. "'
(c) The"overall incidenc~e of stochastic effects j should be limited, as far as reasonably j practicable, equivalent.
by reducing the collective dose t This source-related assessment may be carried out by cost-benefit analysis techniques and would be similar to a process of optimization i in that the cost of a decrease in the health !
detriment in the affected population is balanced )
against the cost of further countermeasures."
(ICRP Publication 40, page 2) 1 I
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Accordingly, wo do not accapt.that the objective of an j
gmargency plan for tho Scabrook plant, or for any other nuclear plant, should be simply to achieve an unspecified level of
" dose savings".
Q.
.HdW should broad planning objectives be translated into criteria for evaluating specific plans? i A. (All) A plannar seeking to develop effective emergency plans needs criteria to tell how well he or she is doing.
These are " practical criteria" and are an essential component of planning. The regulatory process also contains
" legal criteria" for evaluating the adequacy of plans. These
" legal criteria" will, one hopes, be closely related to the
" practical criteria" planners are using to try to make good plans, but they cannot be exactly the same. The legal criteria will not be site-specific, but instead will be requirements intended to ensure that effective planning takes place at each ,
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site and to promote general improvement of emergency planning.
Given the diversity of nuclear power plant sites and the l<
complexity of the task of preparing for serious nuclear i I
accidents, effective planning cannot be accomplished through I generic planning' requirements alone.
The main creative effort 1
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of planning muse"co'me~^from those expecting to implement the plans, who mgst specifically address the particular i characteristics and needs of the local population and environment. Public regulatory review must assess the overall i l
quality of this effort as well as how well it meets specific regulatory requirements.
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NUREG-0654 providas much guidance for'avaluating planning afforts, in tho-context of practical planning 'and in the legal context.
The guidance encompasses four types of consideration:
- 1) Ermacted performance of the olans. How well will the plat 1 m e the, objectives across the spectrum of accident circumstances? NUREG-0654 does not define specific criteria for such assessment, but does imply that there is a distinction between adequate and inadequate performance.
- 2) Effectiveness of the olan. How does the plan ;
compare with no plan or with alternative planning possibilities for the site?
It is clear from NUREG-0654 (see pages 9 and 10) that, allowing for uncertainties and the fact that not all conditions can be anticipated in advance, emergency plans are expected to accomplish ,
something and to provide projections to the public. They are not only expected to be adequate, but should provide i i
the most effective actions to protect the public.
f NUREG-0654 does not suggest comparison between the i
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protection which plans afford at different sites. We interpret this: gap as stemming from concerns that emergency planning is necessarily site-specific, and that the use of comparisons might' encourage planners to neglect specific problems at their location. While we share these concerns, I such comparisons are warranted, in our view, by the j following considerations: i) A great deal of the research and analysis on emergency planning has been generic.
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1 Comparisons aro thoroforo ossorcial to assuring that
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generic analyses are only applied when they match !
situations appropriate to the specific site in question, t ii)' Comparisons provide a set of benchmarks showing what- ]
i can be lone, at least in some circumstances, and may encourage plan improvement through building on previous experience, and iii) The regulatory process should be self-monitoring to see that the evolution of aggregate ,
emergency plannito capability over time should be toward f j
improved rather than poorer capabilities.
- 3) Scoes of the olannino effort. Was the spectrum of accident conditions properly addressed? Were all of the important features of the particular site taken into account?
Were all of the necessary planning provisions made?
NUREG-0654 goes into considerable detail defining the planning basis and specifying needs for planning provisions.
The importance of site characteristics is obvious.
- 4) Ouality of the olannine effort. Were the major emergency planning problems for the site identified? Were all appropriate alternatives-considered? Was the needed empirical and analytical work of good quality and subjected to careftri public review?
NUREG-0654 does not specifically assert that planning should be done well, but surely that goes without saying. NUREG-0654 does demand that many planning bases be evaluated (a notable example is evaluation criterion '
"m" on page 64, which requires that the choice of recommended sheltering or evacuation strategies be justified).
Q.
Doos tho SPMC indicato that all tho abovo-stated considerations were taken into account in it's preparation?
A (All)
As will become clear, the remainder of our testimony, the SpMC is serviously defective when evaluated according t'o each of the four considerations.
V.
SEABROOK EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUES Q.
Please summarize the major emergency planning issues for the Seabrook site.
A. (All)
Despite the intense litigation surrounding these issues, the parties have reached some broad agreements, as follows:
- 1) Resident and Transient Populations. Although the specific numbers are still under litigation, the range has been narrowed for each of these categories for Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
- 2) Evacuation Time Estimates. ETEs depend on the
- population estimates together with a choice of model and a set of modeling assumptions for the roadways.
withof All the the modeling IDYNEV for this proceeding is being done model, and the range of time estimates under assorted circumstances has been narrowed.
3)
Shelterina characteristics of loemi buildinas. Beach dwellings, and most though not all of the commerical structures at the beaches are relatively light in codstrdct'lon'and provide only limited protection. i Permanent and winterized, houses manyin have the Massachusetts towns are basements. These houses generelly
,_ provide more protection than beach dwellings.
- 4) Accident snactrum to be olanned for. There is general agreement that it is appropriate to plan for the accident spectrum specified in NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0396. !
This includes at one end accidents with characteristics Studey, and as like PWR l-5 of the Reactor Safety Basis Accidents.the other end, the more serious Design
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- 5) Conmeouence modeling. Although S3abrook-sp;cific consCquOnco mod 31ing has not yot b;cn parmitted into thO I 1Ggal record; thoro is both general acceptance of i and.use of consequence Reactor Safety modeling as performed for the Study, NUREG-0396, !
and NUREG-1210. I Such modeling has been performed with the various generations the MACCS code.
of the CRAC codes and their descendent, i
Based on these agreed upon parameter ranges and analytic methods, the major planning problems at Seabrook are simply j
defined. The most acute problems occur when the summer beaches are heavily occupied. Evacuation times in this case are longer than the warning times and expected duration of major releases for the most dangerous portion of the planning basis accident spectrum.
Effective sheltering would be very difficult to arrange for the beach population.
Q. How should emergency planners respond to these challenges?
A. (All) Planners should begin with a systematic investigation of how these various problems may be alleviated.
Can warning times be lengthened for more types of accidents? Are there measures which would improve evacuation times? What can be done to provide shelter?
How can the planning for permanent residents be integrated so that they can effectively use their opportunities to find shelter?
Q. What approach is evident from NHRERP and the SPMC7
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A. (Alt) There is no evidence that a systematic investigation of the above-stated kind has been conducted.
Instead, a simple approach has been taken.
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If tha accidsnt unfolds slowly onough to dofins an
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Alort (NHRERp) or Site Area Emergency (SpMC) condition, the beaches will be closed, thus beginning the evacuation of the transient beach population. If and when the accident proceeds C
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to core me!I, (General Emergency), an evacuation of the nearby I
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- towns may also be ordered to an extent determined by the build l up of ra6;aactivity in the containment building, as measured by the " post-LOCA Monitor".
Sheltering or evacuation may be !
ordered further oub, depending on wind direction and containment radiation level.
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If a release occurs simultaneously with the declaration of General Emergency, then the decision whether to recommend sheltering or evacuation of the resident population will be i based, nominally, on.a comparison of dose projections for the two strategies, performed according to a worksheet and by the METPAC model run by the plant operators. However, from the NH litigation, there is reason to believe that evacuation would be automatically ordered if the release was large.
VI .. SPMC PLANNING APPRnACM Q.
HowdoortheSPMCcomparewiththe'[lanningobjectives my 92' and criteria described earlier in this testimony?
A. (All) The SPMC is not based on a careful analysis, s butinsteadlakesasimpleapproach,withunwarranted inferences from generic studies. These deficiencies are i
particularly evident in four instEnces. First, there has been I no evaluation of the feasibility and potential benefits of t implementing sheltering for some or all of the beach !
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populations.
Sccor.d, bassd on unsound decision criteria, residents aro systematically steered away from the potential benefits of sheltering in their houses. Third, there is no discrimination of the appropriate protective action strategies for residents in cases where large beach populations are, or
- are not, present.
Fourth, the decision criteria for protective response in a General Emergency fail to take account of available knowledge of severe accident behavior.
The first of these deficiencies is illustrated by calculations described hereafter. Similar calculations could be done to illustrate the other deficiencies, and we discuss in section IX what could be expected for the second and third issues. The absence of such calculations on the part of the applicant is indicative of their simplistic approach.
Q.
Please explain the weaknesses in the SPMC's decision criteria under a General Emergency.
A .- (All) A General Emergency refers to a situation in which substantial core degradation or melting is either actual or ;mminent.
Under such conditions, it is inappropriate to base emergency response decisions on containment radiation I levels.
The possible moder of release of radioactivity are such that this indicator is inadequate by itself.
i First, a-release may occur without a high containment radiation level. Second, containment radiation level is a poor indicator of the imminence or magnitude of containment failure
[See, for instance, the Reactor Risk Reference Documant, NUREG 1150 (1981), M. Silverberg, et al.
Reassessment of The Technical Bases for Assassina the Source Terms, NUREG 0956 l
(1986), Reviews of Modern Physics, V.37 #3; part III (1985),
and S.
- l. Sholly and G. Thompson, The Source Term Debate, Union of L
Concerned Scientists (1986)].
A particularly important point is that core melt accident sequences will proceed through a " crisis phase", which is the
- period beginning with the onset of core melting and endi'ng with the molten core resting on the containment floor. If a large release does not occur during this phase,'it is relatively unlikely for the subsequent few hours. Accordingly, if evacuation is inhibited by factors such as traffic jams, it may often be appropriate to shelter potentially exposed populations until the crisis phase is over.
Q.
How should one accommodate uncertainty in the development of a severe accident?
A. (All) The SPMC is driven by the simple idea that one should evacuate in the face of such uncertainty. Indeed, that idea was endorsed by this Board in its decision on the NHRERP.
However, this idea can be inappropriate for situations, such as may occur for Seabrook, where evacuation may be severely inhibited. The analysis which we begin in the next section shows the inadequacy of this idea since it indicates that evacuation is nah the best strategy, when averaged over a broad range of unegrtain accident conditions.
A better approach would be to observe a number of plant parameters and to correlate these observations with the results of plant-specific severe accident analysis, so as to provide an estimate of the further development of the accident sequence.
(
Tho most k important itcms of information to bo estimated are ths timas of onsGt and completion of the crisis phase. Such in-plant information should then be combined with information !
on weather conditions and anticipated evacuation times, to generate Appropriate emergency response strategies for affected
- populations. l Q. What analysis should be performed to evaluate emergency response strategies? !
A.
(All) 'The next section of this testimony illustrates 1 the kind of anlysis which emergency planners should perform.
Our analysis is specific to the beach populations.
VII.
AN ANALYTIC APPROACH TO ASSESS THE SPMC'S VALUE TO THE JEACH POPULATIONS Q ..
please explain your analytic approach.
A. (All) We follow in the footsteps of the authors of NUREG-0396, which provides the planning basis for current emergency planning.
Appendix I of NUREG-0396, which provides the rationale for that planning basis, includes a discussion of the emergency planning implications of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). Within that discussion, the results of technical analyses are presented, partly without attribution and partly with attribution to the report NUREG/CR-1131.1# Where attribution to NUREG/CR-1131 is made, the analytic results 1/ Reference (6) in Appendix I of NUREG-0396 is currently available as: D.C. Aldrich et al., Examination of Offsite Radiological F==rnanev Protective Mansuren Accidents Involvina Cora Malt, NUREG/CR-1131, forOctober Nuclear1979.
Maactor
drawn from that documant partain in part to the relative effectiveness of various emergency response strategies.
NUREG/CR-ll31 itself contains a more elaborate treatment of the relative effectiveness issue.
Our approach is similar in principle to that of
- NUREG/CR-ll31, except that we do not present estimates of actual radiation doses or the number of people suffering adverse health effects. Thus, our analysis is strictly confined to the issue of relative effectiveness. In addition, some details of our analytic approach differ from those of NUREG/CR-ll31, as explained later in this testimony.
Q.
What are the major elements of your analysis?
A. (All) First, we identify a set of emergency response strategies which collectively represent the spectrum of sheltering and evacuation actions potentially available to the beach populations.
Second, we select parameters which-represent the potential application of these strategies.
Third, we select, following NUREG/CR-1131, e. set of parameter combinations to represent the spectrum of potential accidents at the Seabrook plant. Fourth, we ls3} bate, in part using the
-ill MACCS computer prog'am, r the relative elDOt'ive'"
fic ness of each emergency response strategy.
VIII. EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRATEGIES Q. Please outline the set of emergency response strategies which you have identified.
1
A. (All) Wo hevo idOntifiGd four ovacuation stratsgies l
and four sheltering strategies. Collectively, these represent the spectrum of sheltering and evacuation actions which might in principle be available to protect the general beach population._
Of the four evacuation strategies, the first (E1) represents evacuation performed without benefit of prior planning.
The second (E2) corresponds to the evacuation currently envisioned in the SpMC. The third (E3) respresents evacuation conducted with a rapidity typical of that anticipated at a generic plant site. The fourth (E4) represents evacuation situations in which plume arrival overlaps evacuation but there is no entrapment of the population.
These strategies are hereafter referred to as
" unplanned evacuation," "SPMC evacuation," " generic evacuation" and ageneric evacuation with difficulties", respectively.
The SpMC does not contemplate the possibility of sheltering the general beach population. Thus, our first sheltering strategy (51) represents sheltering carried out without. benefit of prior planning; we hereafter refer to this as "ad hoc shelter." Our second sheltering strategy (32) represents a 1
type of sheltering which might be contemplated if the SpMC were modified to provide for implementing this kind of response.
Since much of the currently available shelter space at beach areas is in wood-frame buildings without basements, we I hereafter refer to this strategy as " shelter equivalent to wood i
L frame buildings without basements." Some of the buildings in i
l
i
]
tha b3ach arca are so insubstantial.that thsy do not mast tha specifications wo havo assumed for this strategy. Our third and fourth sheltering strategies may be considered the
" generic" sheltering strategies. The third strategy (S3) represents'the degree of sheltering which is achievable in the
- basements of typical houses in the Northeast region including much residential housing in the Massachusetts EpZ. Hereafter, we refer to this as our " shelter equivalent to wood frame buildings with basements" strategy. Our fourth strategy (S4).
represents a better quality of shelter, achievable in medium-sized office apartment or industrial buildings of masonry construction.
This strategy is hereafter referred to as the " good shelter" case.
Q. Are all these options available to the beach population?
A. (All)
Clearly, the El and E2 strategies are readily available. Also, existing structures would allow the S1 and S2 1
strategies to be available to at least a large part of the general beach population. Execution of the 52 strategy would require a substantial advance planning effort. The remaining st'ategies would only be available at the beaches if additional preparations were made.
Preparation for implementiv strategies equivalent to E3 and E4 would involve increasing the mobility of the beach population.
Increased mobility could be achieved through measures such as the building of new roads, or by limiting the number of people who are permitted to visit the beaches. It is t
___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
not out.purposo horo to proposo or to assoas tho morits of any particular m3asure for achieving faster evacuation but simply L
to. compare'the relative effectiveness of various. potential strategies.
?
The 53 and 54 strategies could be made available by the construction of-special-purpose shelters or the improvement of existing structures.
Alternatively,-access to the beach could t
be limited so that the beach population never exceeded the capacity of existing shelter space in the relevant' category.
Q.
Why did you include in your analysis protective strategies not readily.available to the beach' population?
A.:
We included these strategies partly in response to FEMA's analysis of the adequacy of the NHRERP's provisions for
!' the beach population. }
FEMA's conclusion that the NMRERP's provisions for the beach population are " adequate in concept" (FEMA. Testimony at p. 8) was based on a generic assessment of the relative' dose savings to be achieved from evacuation and sheltering in the event of a serious accident, and not on any site-specific analysis of the situatign,at the Seabrook sita.A# One ofs the purpos$s of our ,Maj:44mny is to
-demonstrate that this generic anal gis is. o snot,, applicable to the Seabrook site. By irttroducing the E3 and E4 cases,. we are able to show how generic evacuations differ from evacuations at the Seabrook site. The E4 case, although it accounts for 1/ Tr. at 14192-14193; 14230; 14233; 14250.
I
difficulties which might ba expcrianced during evacuation, nevertheless represents a faster rate of evacuation than is envisioned for the Seabrook beach population.
Similarly, the S3 strategy represents sheltering of a type which could~readily be achieved at a " generic" site in this
- Northeast region where, according to 1970 U.S.
census data, 87%
of the year-round housing units have basements.1# av contrast, thre S1 and S2 strategies, which employ shelters of a type currently available in the beach area near Seabrook, provide the sheltered population even less shielding from radiation than Aldrich R.t. d. have assumed would be provided to populations at other nuclear power plant sites even if aQ.
protective actions were recommended.A# Thus one objective was to demonstrate that generic analyses can generate erroneous conclusions for Seabrook. A second objective was to draw attention to broader possibilities for emergency planning at this site.
Given the difficulties with the Seabrook site, the emergency planners have taken too narrow an approach by not
...w evaluating the feasibility and cost effectiveness of a variety of measures for lowering risks by increasing mobility or 4 k
.ese c ac :::3 improving access to shelters.
Q.
Please describe how you have selected parameters to
~
describe the-four evacuation strategies.
l
)
1/ D.C. Aldrich at d. , Public Protection Stratacias for i
Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Shalterina Concents with Existino !
Public and Private Structures, Sandia National l Laboratory, Rt d., SAND 77-1725, February 1978 [ hereinafter "Aldrich SAND 77-1725"1 }
i 1/ D.C. Aldrich 11 d. , SAND 77-1725 at 14.
l l
l J
- A' . I (All) Tho most important paramotor hore is tho evacuation !
I tim 3.
For-thO E2 case, we use times estimated by Dr. Thomas Adler,
(
using methods' described by~him in separate testimony in this '
proceeding.
(Sam Testimony of Adler, dated February 21, 1989)
I Adler's calculations indicate that 4000 to 5000 vehicles will leave .
i
- the beach area in an initial relatively rapid movement, before traffic jams become established.
We assume that half of these vehicles belong to residents, while the remaining half belong to I i
members of the beach population.
}
The characterization of an " unplanned evacuation" (strategy El) \
{
is necessarily spec.sative.
Two considerations are noteworthy for the case of Seabrook. The first concerns the efficiency of notification.
Because the evacuation network in the beach areas freezes into traffic jams very quickly (see Adler Testir.ony in the NHRERp hearings), delays in notifying even a substantial portion of the beach population will have negligible effect on the evacuation-times.
The second consideration is planning for enhancing traffic flow.
Here the major proposal in the NHRERP is a capacity-enhancing traffic control point (TCP) at the junction of I-95 and Route 51.
(Adler, April 25 Testimony), and the major proposals in the SPMC are two traffic control positions. Salisbury and Amesbury. We have based our estimated timer on two runs by Adler (February 21 Testimony] using stipulations to contentions J1-1 and JI-2; ,one run with staffing for the TCPs; the other without.
The E3 case represents evacuation with a rapidity typical of a generic nuclear plant site.
As indicated above, such a site would have a very small population within 2-3 miles. Thus, the evacuation time will reflect only the time required to notify people, and the time required for vehicles to leave the affected area.
J In soma instancos, ovacuation timas will bo prolonged by factors such as a high population density. Our E4 case represents evacuation where such factors are operative -- hence our use of the' designation " generic evacuation with difficulties." In y
selecting in evacuation time for strategy E4, we were guided by evacuation time estimates made for several nuclear plant sites with a high density surrounding population.- For most sites, it is estimated that the population within two miles could be evacuated out to ten miles within two hours. Of these fourteen sites, the San Onofre site provides a pertinent comparison with Seabrook, in that people frequent the beach near the San Onofre plant on summer weekends.
Evacuation time estimates by Wilbur Smith and Associates indicate that the summer weekend population within 2 miles of San Onofre can be completely evacuated in 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, while the population within 5 miles can be completely evacuated in 3.50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />, assuming a balanced North-South. routing of evacuees.E' Presumably it would take less time for an evacuation just to three miles.
An important
-tv point to note about our E4 case is that it reflects an overlap of evacuation with plume passage, but l
withoutentrapmentSftheevacuatingpopulation. Such a situation could easily arise at a typical site where factors l
1/ Wilbur Smith and Associates, Analysis of Tima Raouired to Evacuate Transient and Permanent Poculation From Various Areas Within the Pluma Ernomura Pathway Emeraanev Plannina Zone: San Onofra Nuclear Ganaratina Station, November 1985.
1 I
l hindoringl evacuation aro.oporativo or whoro evacuation ordars 4 i
are delayed.
We have chosen evacuation times which illustrate the resulting. effects.
Q.
What are the conventions associated with your selection I of evacuation times?
.A. (All) First, !
we selected evacuation times both for
.the 50th percentile and for the 90th percentile members of the beach population.
In this instance, the 50th percentile member l
is that person who, when successfully evacuated, has been preceded by 50 percent of the initial beach population.
Likewise, the 90th percentile member is that person who, when successfully evacuated, has been preceded by 90 percent of the initial beach population.
Second, we have defined " successful evacuation" as
' departure from the beach area or, more precisely, as moving beyond a ?-mile radius f rom the Seabrook plant. We chose a 3-mile radius because for most accident sequences that encompasses the area wherein people are at greatest risk of receiving doses that could result in early. fatalities and severe health effects. (Esa, a g., NUREG-1210, Vol. 4, at pp.
12-14, 2. 8 , 41).
In fact, the generic protective action strategy that is advocated in NUREG-1210 (within 3 miles of the plant:
early evacuation; beyond 3 miles: . sheltering and selective expeditious evacuation after monitoring to locate hotspots) is based on their conclusion that "even for the worst possible accident, virtually all early fatalities can be
~
prevontediif tho arca near-ths plant-(2 to 3 milos) is Levacuated before-or shortly after a release . . .
" I'-
The i
three mile radius includes' roughly a third of Salisbury beach.
Adler's February 21 testimony provides time for. clearing the
' entire'Salfsbury beach area as well. These times are longer-
- for the SpMC' evacuation, though, curiously, shorter for the
" unplanned" evacuation.
Third,'our selected evacuation times begin at the time when i
plant conditions yield a-signal that a release is imminent.
This point precedes.the commencement of'the release by a time interval hereafter designated as the " warning time." With this convention,:
the term " evacuation time"'actually covers a number of sequential actions.
It includes sequential time intervals during which utility. officials notify state authorities, those
-authorities make the decision to evacuate, notification of the beach population occurs, and that population moves to its vehicles. Throughout this testimony, for both evacuation and sheltering cases, a composite notification time of 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> is assumed.
That.is; the sequence of emergency response actions
'taken by a member of the public is assumed to begin at a point O.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the release is known to be imminent.
Q. What evacuation times do you use?
A. (Al~l) For the E2 ("SPMC evacuation") case, we use evacuation times of 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> and 6.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> for the 50th percentile and 90th percentile population members, respectively.
In the El (" unplanned evacuation") case, we use evacuation' times'of4.25hoursand6.75boursforthesetwo 1/ NUREG-1210, Vol. 4, at 41.
L i
population m:mbors.
For tho E3 ("gsnsric evacuation") case wo usG svacuation timOs of 0.9 and 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, while for the E4
(" generic evacuation with difficulties") case, we use evacuation times of 1.5 and 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, based on an assumed clearance time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after notification.
Q. What assumptions do you make about radiation exposure
'during evacuation?
A. (All)
We assume that people are located inside cars with the windows open. (We assume windows are open because on.
a hot summer beach day it is highly unlikely that people could stay in their cars for any reasonable length of time with the windows closed and the use of air-conditioning systems under the evacuation conditions expected in the Seabrook beach area may cause cars to overheat.) A shielding factor of 1.0 is assumed for exposure to the radioactive cloud and 0.7 is assumed for exposure to contaminated ground. In addition, we account for deposition of radioactivity on the outer and inner surfaces of each car and on the people inside each car. This is done by increasing the effective shielding factor for exposure to contaminated ground from O.7 to 1.0. Aphenbiz provides a technical justification for thes's factors.
Q. Please describe how you have selected parameters to describe the four sheltering strategies.
A. (All) For our illustrative analysis, four parameters are important:
the time it takes people to get into shelters; the quality of the shelter; the time during which sheltering occurs; and the time required for successfu,1 subsequent evacuation.
o
)
~
As our testimony evaluating ths NHRERp's provisions for sholtoring indicates, without any plans in place for
~
implementing a shelter strategy in the beach area the task of !
getting people into shelter could be a considerable problem at L
the Seabrook site.1# Our 51 ("ad hoc shelter")
case assumes
- that people are still in the open, seeking shelter, at times when the. radioactive plume may have arrived. In our remaining three sheltering cases, it is assumed that the relevant population is sheltered prior to plume arrival. It will be noted that careful planning would be necessary to achieve that: i result, and we do not imply that such planning would necessarily be successful.
Earlier ~in this testimony we have outlined the types of
. shelter which would characterize each sheltering strategy. Our choice of specific parameters to describe those shelter types is described later.
For all four sheltering cases, we assume that a portion of the population who are instructed to shelter will instead choose to evacuate. These evacuees, who do not shelter, are assumed to account for 50 percent of the resident and employee population within the EPZ, together with 25 percent of the beach population.
We further assume that people who do shelter will be insbcucted to leave shelter only after the roads have cleared of the initial evacuees. Based on Adler's testimony, I/ See Testimony of Goble, Renn, Eckert and Evdokimoff, dated April.25, 1988.
I
wa assum2 that'ths roads will ba cleared of_the initial evacuGos within 3.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />. Allowing 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for this information to be communicated to the sheltering population, this means that everyone in shelter (from the remaining resident p6pulation in the beach area and the remaining beach
' population) is assumed to leave shelter at a point 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> after a release is known to be imminent.
We assume that post-sheltering evacuation will be
_ qualitatively similar to a direct evacuation, except that the evacuating population will be smaller (since an initial group is assumed to evacuate instead of seeking shelter). In selecting post-sheltering evacuation times, we employ Adler's 4
calculations, adjusted for the smaller population. This approach ignores any special behavis;al effects which might arise as populations evacuate areas known to be contaminated.
In introducing the 53 and S4 strategies, we pointed out thatshelteringofthisqualikyddghtbeobtainableatSeabrook if access to the beach were limited so that the beach population _ never exceeded the capacity of existing, Apace in the relevant category.- If such an approach were taken,'the post-sheltering evacuation times would be smaller than.. assumed here.
This point could be pursued through further analysis if appropriate. .
Q. What conventions do you employ in describing the sheltering strategies?
A. !
(All) As with the evacuation strategies, we selected sheltering and evacuation times for the 50th percentile and 1
)
l 90th percontilo m:mbors of ths initial boach population, as previously defined. Here also, " successful evacuation" is defined as moving beyond a 3-mile radius from the Seabrook plant.
As mentioned above, our sheltering cases assume that 25 i
- percent of the beach population will evacuate immediately, }
without seeking shelter. In some instances, people in this }
i group will accrue greater radiation doses than many in the sheltering population. The capturing of this effect would require a more elaborate analysis than we have conducted so far, and would involve ranking the beach population by dose rather than by precedence in achieving successful evacuation.
We do not expect that such an analysis would lead to change in our overall conclusions.
As for evacuation, the time at which sheltering sequences commence is defined here as the point when plant conditions signal that a release is imminent, a point which preceder commencement of the release by a time interval known as
" warning time. "' However, unlike evacuation strategies *,'
sheltering strategies involve three phases: the time interval during which shelter l~s sought; the sheltering interval;"and" the subsequent evacuation interval.
~
Q. What time intervals did you select?
A. (All),
As mentioned earlier, we assumed that. in the 52, S3 and S4 cases, people reach shelter before the plume arrives. In these cases, the pre-sheltering interval is thus effectively zero.
l
ForLths SI caso our assumptions are bastd on our analysos of the situationHat Hampton Beach.
The results will apply only qualifications to Salisbury Beach.
We assume that the 50th percentile person will enter shelters after 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, while the 90th pe~rcentile person enters shelter after 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
' These times are derived by adding a 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> notification interval to time estimates made by Ortwin Renn in testimony before this Board.E#
As mentioned above, for each sheltering strategy we assume that people begin post-sheltering evacuation at a point 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> after a release is known to be imminent. For the S2, S3, and S4 cases, we select post-sheltering evacuation times of 2.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and 4.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> for the 50th percentile and 90th percentile person, respectively. In the S1 case, we are interested in the average post-sheltering evacuation time, which we assume to be 3.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />. The 50th per :Jntile and 90th percentile persons are distinguished under the Si strategy by the difference in their i
pre-sheltering intervals.
Q.
What shielding factors did you select to represent shelter quality? 'O'"
A. (All) ~~For sheltering in the Sl'and S2 cases, we were guided by the SPNC, whose decision criteria for sheltering assume a shtsiding factor of 0.9 for cloud shielding, and 2 air j
R/
AprilSee25,Testimony 1988. of Goble, Renn, Eckert and Evdokimoff, dated At page 78, a median estimate of 2.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> is shown person. for the pre-shelter interval for the 90th percentile Under cross-examination on May 9, 1988 (see Transcript, page 11108), Renn estimated the pre-shalter interval for the 50th l
percentile person at 55-60 minutes. We assume an interval of 0.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> for this person.
l i
chanqGs por hour.
For a structur@ of this kind, an appropriate shielding factor for radionuclides deposited on the ground is 0.5.1 In the S1 case, it is also necessary to account for deposition of radioactive material on people who are exposed to
~
the plume prior to entering shelter.
We account for this by ;
- increasing the ground shielding factor'in proportion to-the fraction of the duration of plume passage during which the person is exposed prior to sheltering, up to a maximum ground shielding factor of 0.8. f Appendix A provides supporting information.
As mentioned above, the S3 strategy is equivalent to sheltering in the basements of typical New England houses. For this type of shelter, cloud and ground shielding factors of 0.5 and 0.08, respectively, are appropriate. D We assume 1 air change per hour.
The S4 strategy is equivalent to sheltering in a medium-sized office apartment or industrial building. Here, cloud and ground shielding factors,of,0.2 and 0.02, respectively, are typical.U# We assuge0.5 air changes per hour.
Q.
What assumptions do you make about radiation exposure
. prior to sheltering and during post -shelter evacuation?
i t
1/ Aldrich d d., SAND 77-1725, Tables 1 and 2.
We use values f rom the upper enti of the range reported in Table 2.
)
1D/ Aldrich d d , SAND 77-175, Tables 1 and 2. 1
{
H/ Aldrich d d , SAND 77-175, Tables 1 and 2.
I A.
,- (All)- Tho si cas@ is tho only ono in which pre-shaltaring radiation exposura must be considered. Here, we assume a cloud shielding factor of 1.0 and a ground shielding factor of 1.0.
The latter factor reflects the deposition of radioactivity on exposed people. For post-sheltering
. evacuation under case S1, we also assume a cloud shielding factor of 1.0, but assume a variable ground shielding factor.
To account for deposition both on cars and on people, we assume that the ground shielding factor ranges from 0.9 to 1.2, in-proportion to the fraction of the duration of plume passage during which the person is exposed prior to sheltering. For post-sheltering evacuation in the S2, S3 and S4 cases, we assume a shielding factor of 1.0 for exposure to the radioactive cloud. However, we employ an effective shielding factor for exposure to. contaminated ground of 0.9, instead of the factor of 1.0 used in the direct evacuation case. The difference is based on our expectation that less radioactivity will be deposited on the skin. Appendix A provides a justification for this assumption.
Q. Please summarize the parameters selected for each
.a no strategy.
I rcu A. (All) Table i shows the exposure times selected for each strategy, while Table 2 shows the shielding factors. f Tables 1-3 now completely characterize.the eight emergency response strategies.
Q.
How do you analyze the relationship between air change in buildings and inhalation exposure? !
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1 )
l l I
L l
l I
A. (Goblo)
Wa hava assum:d continuous exchango of indoor' air with air outside and have compared the average concentration indoors with the concentration outdoors assuming the outdoor concentration is constant for the duration of the release (as specified f~or each accident category in WASH-1400, Table VI
- 2-1),
The indoor average is calculated only for the period of plume passage except that, in agreement with the NHRERP, we use the 1-hour average for releases of less than an hour duration. !
We do not assume that the building provides any filtering. The-values we have used for various durations of release and air exchant;s rates are shown in Table 3. i Q.
How did you select parameters to represent a range of accident conditions?
A. (All) In the spirit of NUREG/CR-ll31, we selected the parameters estimated in WASH-1400 for the accident release categories PWR 1 through PWR 9. These release categories encompass the spectrum of potential accidents. WASH-1400, Appendix VI, Table VI 2-1 provides a complete characterization of these release categories, including their estimated probabilities of occurrence.
We actually go beyond NURM/;R-1131, in that the more limited set of release categories PWR1 through PWR5 was used in NUREG/CR-1111 as a basis for comparative analysis of the effectiveness of emergency response strategies. Through its reference to that analysis, and through presentation of results from related analyses, NUREG-0396 clearly regards these five release categories as playing an important role in defining the emorgency' planning basis. Howaver, our points'ars mads'aven ]
more forcefully by considering the entire spectrum of potential \
accidents. {
r Q.'
Do you endorse the WASH-1400 estimates of the I probability ~and other characteristics of severe core damage 1 a
accidents? i A. (All) Not necessarily. Our purpose here is to create i an analogue to the analytic procedure which underlies NUREG/CR-1131 and, through its reference to that document, NUREG-0396.. i Q.
)
Please explain the relationship between accident l release characteristics and the effectiveness of precautionary ;
emergency responses. '
A. (All) i The." warning time", as defined above, provides
\
a time interval during which emergency responses can be i
initiated.
If the warning time is long enough, it may be i
.possible to evacuate people before they are exposed to the !
radioactive plume, with an. obvious public health advantage.
Q. How nave you handled the issue of warnin'g'~Eime?
A. (All) Following the planning basis in NUREG-0396, we have analyzed the relative effectiveness of emergenc'y iesponse strategies across the range of release categories PWR1 through PWR9.
f The wDening times for these release categories are provided by NASH-1400. i 1
IX. ANALYTIC FINDINGS i
Q.
Please outline the analytic procedure you employ to assess the relative effectiveness of emergency response strategies.
i
A. (All)
W3 uso throo moasures of rGlative offcctivonass.
First, wa use tha total exposure of a relevant individual over the time interval until successful evacuation is completed, relative to the exposure of the 50th percentile individual in the " unplanned evacuation" (E1) case. Here, " exposure" is I
. physically equivalent to the collective dose to the red. bone marrow of the exposed population, which is in turn similar to ,
the collective whole body dose.
Second, we use the probability of an individual suffering early death, again relative to the 50th percentile individual in the " unplanned evacuation" (El) case. Finally, we use the probability of an individual suffering prodromal vomiting, relative to the same 50th percentile individual.
A single measure of effectiveness such as " dose savings" is 4 not adequate to characterize emergency preparedness. That is because the goals of emergency plann'ing include the avoidance of early death and injuries (see our discussin in Section IV) l as well as dose reduction, and those early health effects have t
thresholds.
A protective response strategy that is primarily directed toward reducing the aggregate dose to a large population (such as the ordering of a prompt evacuation over a large region) might be quite ineffective at preventing injuries and deaths by a population close to the plant. We, therefore, consider dose reduction, reduction in the number of deaths, and reduction in one representative early injury to be three independent measures for judging the effectiveness of a l
response. ~ 1 l
i
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - _ J
i For each of tho roloaso catsgorios pWR 1 through pWR 9, wa ostimate tha radiation exposure and-ths probabilities of early i health effects'for each emergency response strategy, both for the 50th percentile and 90th percentile individuals. We use the MACCS (omputer code for this purpose, assuming a wind-speed of 12 miles per hour (20 km/hr) and Class C (moderately unstable) stability. These meteorological conditions ar'e intended as representative fair weather conditions. They are neither favorable conditions for emergency response, nor are they " worst case" conditions. They are conditions under which the model can be expected to function reasonably well.
These results are combined over the release categories PWR 1 through PWR.9 by weighted averaging, where the weights correspond to the probabilities of occurrence of each release category, as estimated in NASH-1400. In this respect, we employ a more sophisticated procedure than NUREG/CR-ll31, which merely combines the release categories into one composite category.
Our procedure provides an analytic base for ascertaini.ng the effect of uncertainty, since accidents together with the effect of each response strategy contribute according_%q.gheir probability.
Q. Pleaseesummarize your results.
A. (Al1)
, Tables 4 through 6 and Figures 1 through 3 summarise the results of our assessment. Because of the late timing of the stipulation on ETEs, some of these numbers are interpolations from our sensitivity runs. These numbers 4
presently appearing in the Tables, should be accurate to within a few percent.
4
Our interpretation of tha summarizsd results depands on two sets of observations: one is the relative magnitude of the 1 z entries in the tables; the second is the sensitivity of these I entries to particular assumptions in the modeling.
The mag ~nitudes in the tables and figures show: 1) The "SpMC evacuation" (E2) case is only marginally more effective than is the " unplanned evacuation" (E1) case according to all three measures of effectiveness; 2) The " generic evacuation" !
(E3) and the S3 and S4 sheltering cases are substantially more I
effective than either the El or the E2 cases. Thus, protective responses which are available at,most nuclear power plant sites provide significant reduction in exposure to radiation and in early deaths and injuries as compared with emergency responses envisioned for Seabrook; 3) The E4 and S2 (shelter equivalent 1 to wood f rame buildings without basen, ants) cases appear to have some significant effectiveness, with E4 appearing generally better according to these measures; 4) The "ad hoc shelter" (S1) case is not an effective response.
The quoted results are potentially sensitive to a wide range of uncertainties in the modeling, including details of accident characteristics and meteorological conditions. Of most interest in interpreting the results are the effects of possible vaflation in warning times and duration of release.
The results for the El and E2 cases are quite insensitive to moderate changes in warning time and duration of release. The three sheltering cases, S2, S3 and S4 are insensitive to warning time, until it becomes short enough that a significant fraction of the population remains outdoors at the time of v _ _ ___ _ _ - - - - - - - - -- ~ ~~~-
- ~ ~ ~
.plumsfarrival.
Tho'offcctivonoss of'sholtoring,'ospocially-poor shaltering, dhcreases moderately with increased duration-ofrelease,-$ecause.largerinhalationexposuresmaybe anticipated.
The E4 case is most sensitive to changes in
~
Lwarning times and-duration of release (since it' represents an
. evacuation which overlaps with plume passage, but does not have L a. trapped population).- Increases in warning. time and release L
duration provide substantial increases in effectiveness, a decrease in warning time reduces the effectiveness.
These results lead directly to conclusions both about generic emergency response and about the SPMC plans for Seabrook. First of'all, our analysis confirms the generic argument presented in NUREG 1210 and'elsewhere that evacuation' is generally to be preferred in severe nuclear accidents.
Response strategy E3 is better than any of the sheltering strategies.
When evacuation is somewhat delayed, however, as in response strategy E4, the difference between evacuation and good. sheltering is not totally clear cut; however, both strategies accomplish considerable savings in doses and early deaths and injuries. One could argue that given the substantial uncertainties, it is plausible in such a situation to try to complete an" evacuation as quickly as possible. It is based on sucg analyses that planners who have not made a detailed analysis of the situation at Seabrook sometimes conclude that the best thing to do in a revere accident is get the people out of there.
_ _ - _ - - - _ _ - - = - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ __ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ - _ .
Tho situation at Saabrook undar the SpMC plan is quite
.different.
Our results show with reasonable robustness that:
- 1) As a response to the spectrum of potential accidents, including those used in the NRC planning basis, the SpMC appears to'le only marginally more effective in reducing
- exposures and early health effects for the transient beach population within 3 miles than an unplanned evacuation. The SpMC will actually increase exposures for beach visitors further out on Salisbury Beach since the beach clears more rapidly in the unplanned case than in the SpMC evacuation. The situation would be characterized by " entrapment" of the population, exposing them potentially to the major portion of the release while they are immobile and without shelter; 2) The relative effectiveness of the SpMC is much poorer for the spectrum of accidents than the effectiveness expected for.
emergency response at most nuclear power plant sites where sheltering and more rapid evacuation are provided; 3) Even with poor sheltering capability, there are clear potential benefits to be obtainedsfrom a sheltehilk'h, evacuate later strategy. ^4 These benefits derive from three factors: i) the j modest shielding the shelters provide against cloud exposure i and the somewhat larger protection provided against inhalation '
during plums passage when the individual would otherwise be essentially unprotected; ii) the avoidance of a significant i portion of skin deposition; iii) significantly reduced exposures to groundshine. Our analysis is not adequate to fully quantify the benefits of such a strategy in the absence of information about the range of sheltering available and I possibilities for dirceting traffic away from hoavily contaminated areas. However, in view of the ineffectiveness of-the SpMC response strategy, it is clear that a full evaluation of such strategies is called for, and that New Hampshire Yankee has no basis for rejecting these possibilities in the SpMC.
It is important to bear in mind that these strategies require a substantial planning effort. The bad results of the Ad Hoc sheltering example illustrate the kind of harm that can result from trying to implement such a strategy without thorough planning. Necessary to such an effort are reliable surveys of shelter availability and characteristics and a detailed analysis of problems to be anticipated in implementation, possible solutions to those problems, and t
estimates of the times required.for people to reach adequate '
she'.ter. Little or none of this analytic work has been performed.
X.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REMIDENT POPULATION Q.
What new considerations would enter into an analysis of the problems of emergency planning for the Massachusetts residents near Seabrook.
A. (All) Protecting the resident population near tha reactor. site poses a different though related set of emergency planning problems. Residents are present whether or not the I
beaches are heavily loaded so evacuation times can vary !
significantly for them. They gener11y have.immediate access to.
shelter which in many cases is substantially better than the
=shaltor availablo.to poop 10'on tho boach. The SpMC and NHRERP 3
.3ro'organizcd to mako it likoly that a protacive action recommendation for e beach closing - in effect an order to evacuate the beaches - would be made with no simultaneous protective 7 recommendation'for the resident population.
Q.
Can you draw conclusions from your analysis about the effectiveness of the SpMC in protecting Massachusetts residents near Seabrook?
A.
We have four observations:
1.
The structure of recommendations leading to beach closings needs re-examination; at the time teaches are closed, residents need to be told something, if only to be given a reason why they will be safer if they wait to evacuate at the same time that people on the beach need to evacuate.
j 2.
A detailed comparison of protective response strategies for residents alcng the linen of our analysis of the beach pooulation is needed. The analysis should take into account differing levels of beach occupancy with the corresponding differences in ers:uation times, and should attempt to develop integrated strategies, which coordinate what is recommended to the residents with what is going on with the beach populations.
The analysis should also be based on a good study of the, availability of shelters.
- 3. When a large beach pee..lation is present, our !
analysis of the three sheltering strategant and especially S3 makes it quite clear that there are large potential benefits to be derived from such a strategy for Massachusetts residents, i
1 1
1
who would othorwiso ba locksd in th3 traffic jam causGd by evacuating beach visitors. )
l 4.
Under the present SpMC decision criteria, nearby 3 j
residents are not offered these benefits. The immediate i
{
decision cr'iteria based on radiation monitors automatically !
4 recommend evacuation when large amounts of radiation are l
present.
And tRe protective action recommendation worksheet I i
(IP 2.5 attachment 3) does not use realistic shielding factors i l
for New England homes, and does not give credit for the projections against groundshine afforded by sheltering.
To summ6rize: it is likely that the conclusions from our analysis of the effectiveness of the plans for the summer beach population apply even more strongly to the nearby j resident population at times of high beach occupancy.
XI. ASSESSMENT OF THE SPMC Q.
I Please summarize your overall assessment of the SPMC.
I A. (All) In section IV of our testimony we enumerated four guidelines drawn from NUREG 0654 for evalukting emergency plans.
We summarize our observations under each of these guidelines:
IDamasind performarge of the olans. When a large beach population i's present, the plans offer very little protection to the thousands of people who would be exposed to threat of i
radiation-induced death and injury that can be anticipated from a severe nuclear accident at Seabrook.
l l
l 1
i Relative effectivanass of the SPMC clannino strateov. The protcetion offorcd by this plan to the b3ach population is very little better than that offered by an unplanned evacuation and l for portions of Salisbury B9ach it is actually worse. It is noticeably 7ess effective than the protection that could be expected from a shelter first evacuate later strategy. And it is far less effective than the protection expected at a generic reactor site. Similar conclusions probably hold even more strongly for the nearby resident population at times when there is a large beach population present.
Scoce of the olans. The plans fail to consider or to offer I a full range of response strategies, particularly strategies involving sheltering. They do not adequately cover the full spectrum of accidents in the planning basis, particularly large early accidents (the decision criteria, for example, neglect groundshine).
They do not focus on the specific emergency planning problems at the Seabrook site.
Quality of the olannina affort.
There has been no modeling or other comparative evaluation of response strategies. There !
is little reliable' data on shelter capacity and characteristics. There has been no study of the feasibility and problems of implementing sheltering and no estimates of times for implementation. The decision criteria are defective. New Hampshire Yankee has not sought a public review of the SPMC to discover problems before requesting an operating license.
l I
w -_ -- - -- -
This planning effort doos not provido roasonable assuranco that .
adequato protective measures will be taken in the. event of 1 a nuclear accident at Seabrook.
Q. Is there anything else you wish to add?
A.
(M1) Uu would like to make one final observation based on our years of work in the fields of energy policy and the management of hazards of technology. In addition to the !
i potential harm done to the people near Seabrook if these plans are approved, there may be broader consequences as well. The l
quality of emergency planning at other reactor sites may well l f
deteriorate if an "anything goes" attitude is sanctioned. And public confidence in nuclear power, already seriously eroded, will be further damaged.
l
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uf . *
- EII,; w .
R O
1
4
\
TABLE l-i POTENTIAL EYDOSURE TIMES FOR EACM .gTRATEGY i T.IME IN THE OPEN BEFORE 0IME IN TIME ON STRATEGY . SHELTER'NG SHELTER (hoursi THE ROAD (hours) Ihours)
(A) Evacuation Stratenies El. Unplanned Evacuation 0, 0 0, 0 4.25, 7.25 E2 SPMC Evacuation 0, 0 0, 0 3.75, 6.5 E3. Generic Evacuation' 0, 0 0, 0 0.9 , 1.4 E4. Generic Evacnetion with Difficulties 0, 0 0, 0 1.5 , 2.5 (8) Shelterine Stratenien
- 51. Ad Hoc Shelter 1.4, 3.1 2.95, 1.55 3.0,30 S2. Shelter Equivalent to Wood Frame 0, 0 '3.75, i
Buildings Without 3.7" 2. 0 , 4.0-Basements-
- 53. Shelter Equivalent 0, 0 3.75, 3.75 to Wood-Frame 2.0 , 4.0 Buildings With Basements
- 54. Good Shelter 0, 0 3.75, 4.25 2.0 , 4.0 HQIES: ,,
1.
The estries x, y indicate times for.the 50th percentile and 90th percentile population members, respectively. j 2.
Sequences of protective action begin when plant conditions signal that a release is imminent. The three time periods shown I
across each row are consecutive. '
.3.
" Time on the road" terminates whea people move beyond a 3-mile radius from the Seabrook Plant.
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. TABLE 3 FRACTION OF' EXTERNAL INHALATION EXPOSURE THAT WOU_LD' OCCUR INDOORS Number Of Air Chances per-Mour
[guratim Jf Release 2 1 .5
.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> .5 .35 .22 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> .65 .45 i .29 3.0 f.surs .85 .65 .45 4.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> .9 .75 .55 N
I i
TABLE 4 l
RELAT!YE EXPOSURE FOR EAC." STRATEcy
)
4 i
S7EATEGY 50th PERCENT!LE 90rnPERCE*17:;f PERSON DERSON i (A) Evacuation Strategies El. Unplanned Evacuation 1.0 1.22 E2. SPMC Evacuation 0.94 1.16
. 3. Generic Evacuation 0 0.35 E4. Generic Evacuation 0.48 0.74 With Difficulties (3) Sheltering Strategies Sl. Ad Hoc. Shelte: 1.02 1.51 S2. Shelter Equivalent to 0.69 Wood Frame Buildings 0.34 Without Sasements S3. Shelter Equivalent to 0.47 Wood F me Buildings 3, 0.63 Wits ements S4. G leer '
O.51 gg
& ~ ~wa R.36
- 1. The entry for the 50th percentile person for the " Unplanned Evacuation' strategy is arbitrarily set at unity.
- 2. Here, ' exposure" is physically equivalent to red marrow dose.
l l
L i
l
j h
Figure 1:
Relative Effectiveness of Reeponse in Reducing Expected Doses 2
- a. \
i i
4 3 5 Dose 90%:le 0
Et E2 E3 E4 St S2 S3 S4 STRATEGY (See test for description) i
______m _-___.__. _ _ _ ____._______.m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
H: .; ,
- c. >
i I
b I
. s I
TABLE 5 f l 1
RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF j EARLY DEATH FOR EACH STRATE'GY --
l l
STRATEGY 50th PERCENTILE- 90th ?ERCENT:*I .
.?(RSON PERSON (A)-Evacuation Strategies E1, Unplanned Evacuation 1.0 4.9 I 4 E2. S?MC Evacuation 0.85 L >
2.6 E3. Generic Evacuation .0 0.0006 E4. Generic Evacuation 0.005 0.32 With-Difficulties (s) Sheltering Sttategies S1. Ad Hoc Shelter 1.5 55 S:2; Shelter Equivalent to - 0.07
~ Wood Frame Buildings 0.78 Without Sasements
..S3. Shelter Equivalent to 0 Wood Frame Buildings 0.03 Wi:n Basements L,
S4. Good Shelter 0 0.006
- a
,<.,r NOTE:
n.
The entry fBr the 50th percentile person for the " Unplanned Evacuation
- strategy is arbitrarily set at unity.
4
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __w
I l
1 l
~
l Figure 2: \
Relative Effectiveness of Response in Reducing Early Deaths I
10 t" (
l 5 8 o
a 3 e l
=
a . . ,
g 4
\
2 i
= -
l 2 i l
E Et B B E4 S1 S2 S3 S4 STRATEGY (See Tant for E-- - V'=6) l L__-__ _ _ -_----- - -_- --
TASLE 6 1
' RELA;.'IVE PROBABILITY OF PRODROMAL 7OMITING FOR EACH STRATEGY STRATEGY 50th PERCENTILE 90th PERCINT:LE PERSON DERSON (A) Evacuation Strategies El.. Unplanned Evacuation 1.0 2.6 E2, SPMC Evacuation 0.77 2.2 E3. Generic Evacuation' O 0.02 E4. Generic Evacuation 0.07 0.3
.With-Difficulties (d) Sheltering Strategies S1. Ad Hoc Shelter 1.9 2.9 S2.' Shelter Equivalent to 0.73 1.63 Wood Frame Buildings Witnout Basements S3. Shelter Equivalent to 0.22 0.60 Wood Frame Buildings Wita Basements S4. Good Shelter 0.11 0.36 NOTE:
'The entry for the 50th percentile person for the " Unplanned Evacuation
- strategy is arbitrarily set at unity.
?
l Figure B:
Relative Effectiveness of Response in Reducing Prodromal Vomiting 3
i '
.j 2 3
E Vomiting 90%Ie i E vomiting so%il 5
b E1 E2 E4 S1 S2 S3 S4
, STRATEGY -
(see tw for description) i l
APPENDIX A SHIELDING FACTORS DURING n.
_ EVACUATION BY AUTOMOBILE:
i TECHNICAL DISCUSSION )
i
-l 1
Due to the relatively lightweight structure in the upper part of an automobile, and the presence of windows, the !
snielding factor for-exposure of a vehicle occupant to a radioactive cloud is effectively 1.0. That is, a person inside an automobile gains no protection against cloudshine.
For exposure to contaminated ground, neglecting deposition of radioactivity on the automobile or on the exposed person, !
the shielding factor for a vehicle occupant can be calculated to nave a range of 0.53-0.78. This range represents an updating of the 0.4-0.7 shielding factor range used in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
Cars are lighter today (and will~ce more , men
- in the futurej compared to the 1975 vehicles analyzed in One 3eactor Safety Study. Assuming that vehicles involved,in an evacuation will be 30% lighter than 1975 vehicles,1/ the' appropriate shielding factor range turns 1/. Due especially to the decrease in the amount of steel used In U.S.-built cars, the material weight of U.S. cars dropped 4 15%
by 1985. between 1975 and 1981 and was projected to drop another 15%
edition 6, (Table G. 4.3, p. 122, Transportation Energy Data Book, i Data Corporation.) Kulp, M.C. Rolcomb, ORNL-5883 (special), Noyes
E' <
L i J+ i I l
?
out to oe.0.53-0.78.1! Now, the relative contributions.of doses. fro ~m' deposited material, accounting for deposition on the ground, (
on or in the automooile, or on people, can be obtained 1
as follows:
Dose.per unit time (Relative to dose from a flat, contaminated plane):1/
A) to person road, ete:'standing on4/contaminated 1.0 x Sg beach, parking lot ,
3)
Dose Sc LI inside car from contaminated ground: 1.0 x 2/ Shield Thus(.4)gngvariesexponentiallywithmassperunit
=
0.53; (.7) 7 = 0.78. area.
3/
In the absence of detailed calculations, we assume that aosorption absorption at effects in air can be handled by neglecting all i absorption beyond 100 meters as total. distances less than 100 meters exact Thus, we replace the finite circular surface of radius 100 meters.Since problem the byofa a contamin distance, the total, dose.is insensitive to the cutoff dis chosen.
These calculations are conservative since they ignore ground scatteringLeffec.ts deposit; n close to.qhe receptor. which increase relative doses from surface regardless of the surface's orientation. Deposition is as Thus, a square centimeter of ground is assumed to receive the same contamination as a square centimeter of skin.
4/- Shieldiig factor, Sg = 0.47-0.85. i Appendix VI. See WASH-1400, 5/ Shielding factor,.Sc = 0.53-0.78.
VI. See WASH-1400, Appendix 8
C)
Dose. inside outside car from radioactivity deposited on of vehicle: .22 x Sc 1/
s*)
of vehicle with open windows: Dose inside car from radio
.0/. .2 1/
I)
.35 1/ from skin contaminated while outside vehicles:
3ose 6/
Based on numerical integration over an idealized automooile, deposition is assumed to take place on the underside of tne vehicle as well as on the top surface.
7/-
or-(2) Tnis case would occur: (1) cefore plume if evacuees passage reached their were complete. vehicles and opened windowsif w number corresponds to high wind speeds.The low number corr 8/
An estimate of the relative contribution of skin contamination to the total dose can be obtained by replacing the complex geometric shape of the human body with a set of bounding surfaces:
j
- 1) sphere: 3 the dose rate at the center of a sphere !
centimeter is 43% of the dose rate 1 meter above co circle of 100 meter radius that has also been contaminated with N curies per unit area, Although a cylindrical model would be more accurate, the results snown below. will'not differ by a large amount, as
- 2) right circulat"Bylinder: numerical integration in the-
~
i case of a that indicates cylinder with radics 1/10th of the length the average centerline dose is discussed previously.approximately 17% greater than the sphere For a cylinder witn radius 1/5tE slightly lessof the length, the average centerline dose is than the sphere case.
The results of these rough calculations suggest that direct contamination the total dose.of people must make a significant contribution to that is, We take the numerical relationship to be 35%,
from contaminated the skin contribution ground. is assumed to be 35% of the dose
(
(
?
? 'l 1
?)
Jose.from open windows:skin.17contaminated 9/ while inside vehicles wi 5
For.aur illustrative analysis, we assume'that the basic anielding factor without deposition on the car or on people --
.tnar ;s, tne factor Sc ---is 0.7 During direct-evacuation, we assume that car windows will ce open during passage of the radioactive plume. Thus, people inside cars:will be exposed to dose elements 9 , C and D from tne'aoove list.
I' This yields an effective ground shielding factor in the range 0.89-1.05.
In addition, people will ce exposed to doses from radioactive material deposited on their skin or clothes -- that is, to dose elements E or F from the above list.
Considering all these dose contributions, we assume an overall effective ground shielding factor of 1.0 for the direct evacuation case.
For post-sheltering evacuation, it is likely that many cars will have oeen left with their windows closed, and will not
. nave.oeen internally contaminated during plume passage. In
- ddition, people will have been protected from deposition of radioactive material on their b'odies, to an extent dependent on- !
tne, rate of shelter.
_ However, people will be at risk of being contaminated after leaving shelter, through brushing against 9/
We take this dose to be half of the value for a person standing in the open, area is pressed againstassuming that half of a person's surface H deposition. a seat and, therefore, not subject to 4-
,_. - - - - - - - - - - - -- -~ ~~ ~ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - -
Y{ ' ..
4, - ','.
- ,h -
1?!
t (f- . contaminated Auildings or vehicles or'from passage through;
- clouds. oft resuspended material.
'4e . account for all these considerations by assuming';a'n overal1< effective. ground- )
snield;ng factor:of'0,9 for_the post-shelter evacuation case.
j 4
A 4
s s Z-
'R
=
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5-
- - - - - - ~ - - - - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
May 1988
~
ROBERT L.GOBLE Center for Technology.
Environment,
- and Development 137 GardnerRoad and Departrnent of Physics Brookline. MA 02116 Clark University 617 566-4574
' Worcester. MA 01610 617 793 7683 Present Position Research Associate Professor of Environment, Technology, and Society, and Adjunct Associate Professorof Physics, Clark University.
Education B.A. (Honors), Physics, Swanhmore College, June 1962 Ph.D., Physics, University of Wisconsin, January 1%7 Previous Employmer i 1984 - 85 Princeton University, Center for Energy and Envimamental Studies and Deparanent of Philosophy: Hewlett Fe!!aw 1976 -
Clark University, Physics Department and Program on Science Technology, and Society: Visiting Assisunt Professor, Research Associate Pmfessor(on leave 1984 85) 1974 76 Montana State University, Physics Department: Assistant Professor, Adjunct Assistant Professor 1972 74 University of Utah, Physics Department: Researth Associme/
Associate Instuctor 1969 72 University of Mmnesota Physics Deparunent: Research Associate .
t 966 - 69 Ysis University, Physics Depamaant: Research Staff Instructor 1962 66 University of Wisconsm, Physics Depanment: NSF Cooperative Fellow, Research Assistant Current Researcir" m- ~*
e Air Quality / Acid Deposition:
Assessments and Reviews >
Tracer and Transport Studies I.ocal AirQuality i
Risk Assessment /Mazani Mangemente Comparing Hazards and Hazard Assessment Methodologies Ethical Is:,uss in Hazard !W . - _=ent Planningissues forWasse Disposal Radon Exposure and Health Effects {3 Emergency Planning for Nuclear !
Power Plants l
J
i c Recent Research Activ ties
- 1983 -
Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants (Consultant a New Hampshir Actomey General's office, hree Mile Island Public Health Fund. Massachusetts )
.- Artomey General's Office. Ontario Nuclear Safety Review Board) Reviews. 1 Testimony. Consequence Analysis. Major Planning Project at TMI. )'
1985 -
Risk Assessment and Socio Economic Impacts in Radioactive Waste Manage (Consultant to State of Mississippi. Citizens Against Nuclear Trash and State of Nevada /Mountam West Inc.) Several repons, testimony.
1977 -
E6ical Issues in Hazard Management (supponed by NSF EVIST. Hewlett Foundation. Principal Investigator and Co Principal Investigator). Book in progress; articles on ruiloactive waste, occupational and environmental hazards comparison. susceptible workers.'
1983 86
' Acid Deposition Assessment. (Consuhant. U.S. EPA). Co author. Acid Deposit and its Effecu: Critical Assessment Document.1985. Section Author,1985 Assessment section on Sulfur Mass Balance.
1982 - 83 Implementation of the Occupationallead Standard. Supported by CrTA:
fPrincipal Investigator, four researchers). Report published as anachment to OTA Report: Pmventine tilneu and Iniurv in the WaMar.
1977 82 Nuclear Power Plant Perfonnance, (supported in part by DOE. Principal Investigator, three researchers). Articles relating nuclearpowerplant performance to general plant characteristics.
1976 - 83 Demonstration of a Grid-Connected Cogeneranon System at Clark University; technical advisor and coordinator for Clark University. ne program resulted in the construcuen of a $2.5 million National Demonstration Power Plant, based on a gas fired 1.8 MW diesel engine with heat recovery from the exhaust and
. Jacket. The plant began operation in Summer 1982: it supplies approximately half Clark's thermal energy needs and enough excom electricity so that half the output will be sold to the utility. ;
Teaching and Stadent Resesrek Separvision Dissertation AdviserforM. Yersel. May 1984 Ph.D.
Atmospheric Tushmience and Difthsion in an Urban Environment.
Student Research Pmjects:
Supervision of more than 20 gradusse and undergraduate endanen in energy, air pollution, and physics: High Energy Cosauc Ray Showers: Clark Energy Una PmfDse and Models: Environmental Tradenifs in Cogeneration: Cogeneranon Road Map for Colleges a Universities: M m--- : en of Worcemer Weather: Pollutant Dispersal in Urban Areas:
Effects of Buildings on Pollutant Dispersal: Cogenerauon Symem Monitoring: Radon in Indoor Air: Radon-Induced Health Effects: AIDS and Health Care Pr,s in Zaire:
2
~
Environment. Technology, and Society:
Introductory Case Studies on Population and Food: Special Topics in Altema Cogenerauon:
Eann. Science Altemative Energy Systems Laboratory. Graduate Core Course: Limits of de
(
Writing Seminar.
{
Physics for Non Science Student: 4 Ejinstein's Ideas: Cultural Astmnomy:
with laboratory): Urban Meteorology College Physics: Panicle Physics (an honors cours Undergraduate Physics:
Electncity and Magneusm: Classical Physics Graduate Physics:
Quantum Mechanics: Advanced Quantum Mechanics: Mathematical Metho Professional Societies Amencan Association for the Advancement of Science !
Amencan Physical Society: Forum on Science and Society: Division of Panicles and Fields Sigma Xi Society for Risk Analysis Air Polludon Contml Association Service 1976 - 83 City of Worcester Energy Task Force 1977 -
1978 - 80 Clark Science. Technolony, and Society, Program Committee Altemate. Clark Graduate Board 1978 - Clark Energy Task Force 1981 84 Faculty Lounge Comminee (installation and operation of new faculty dining room) 1981L CENTED Sjeenng Committee
~
BMsc G'w.
e , ann m.u w,o
'4 *5.th D.4d1s. A o m . - - ;..
Recent Individual Awards and Honors ,
National Science FoundanaaWational Endowment for the Humanities:
Individual 1ncentive Award (Jan.1984-Jan.1986)
Priw Universiry: Hewlett Fellow (Sept.1984-June 1985)
Amences Association for the Advacement of Science: Summer Fellowship in Environmental Science (Summer 1982)
Othec Activities Consulting Agnements:
1986 - 88 Massachusetts Attomey General's Office, Sheltering in thc 5mergency Plana for the Seabrook Nuclear Reactor.
3
N J
1986 ; 37 Rhode Is!'and Dept. of Environmental Management. Risk Assessm for Toxic Substances in Seafood.
1036 88 State of Disposei. Nevada / Mountain West Inc., Risk Analysis for Radioacdve Waste
'986 5
C:tizens Disposal. Against NuclearTrash Socio Economic Impacts of Radioactive Waste 1935
' Mississippi Health and Safety Office -Radioactive Waste Risk Analysis.-
1983 New Hampshire Attorney GenerJ Nuclear Emerger.cy Planning.
'l982 86 = U.S. ESA: Acid Deposition Assessment.
1986 Lecturer.
and Harvard Occupational Health. School of Public Health. Short Course on Risk Asse 1981 Lecturer. Department of Engineenng and Applied Science. University of .
. Wisconsin-Extension Program on Industrial Facility Cogeneradon.
- GRANTS AND AWARDS -
University Grants
~ Demonstration of a Grid Connected Integrated Community Energy System DATE TITLE AMOUNT 1982 84 . Mass Electric Company) Colt Industries /
E 20,000' Mass Electric Consuuction. Grants -
for Cogeneration Monitonns m 3innerev 1981~ 83.
Mass Energy Office / DOE Energy Conser-104,000 vanon Measwas in Schools and Hospitals.~
2 masches grants for cogeneration heat FA;ej equipment co authored with J.
C"ollins and B. Kimball)
- DE PG4181R 113973
- DE PG4182R 143391 13,750
~ 1980 82 HUD: Loan for Plant Construccon 1,200,000 (co-authored with J. Collins. B. Kimball) 1980 82 DOE Pham III: Consmcuon: grid connec. 330,000 tion and construction tcanagement costs (co authored with J. Colib) 4
_i__ __ o--- : - - - - - --
1 1 n
1977' 73
.e ' 'DdE Phase II: Detailed Feasibility and
- 4. Preliminary Design (co autored with - 206.000 C. Hohenemser L
" ' 1977-BOE Phase If Preliminary Feasibility -
Study (co ausored wid C. Hohenemser) .149.000 Other Grants and Grant Support Received L
s DATE TITLE AMOUNT 1987 88 Ontario Nuclear Safety Review Board - Modelling Consequences of Reactor Accidents 12.160 (Principal Investigator) c 1987 '88 Rhode Island / EPA
" Risk Assessment Methodology for Contaminated Seafood (Co-Pnncipal 10.000 Investigator with H. Bmwn) 1984 86 NSF/NEH-Interdisciplinary Incentive Award Ethical Issues in Huard Management (Princi- 45.800 pallnvestigator Individual Award) 1983 85 NSF - Sensitive Workers. Ethical Issues and 170.500 Differential Sensitivity to Workplace Hazard (Co Pnncipal Investigator with R. Kasperson)
- RI! 8217297 1983 84 Clark University-Elemental Analysis of Par-1.500 ticulates (Joindy with C. Hohenemser Facuity Development Award) ' " ' .
1982 - 83 OTA -Implementation of Occupational Lead S tandard (Principal Invenisator) Contract 29.000 s233-7040.0
'1982-DOE - Nuclear Power Plant Performance 9.000
($ncipal Investigator) Purchase Order
- DE' APOl 82 El19625 ;
1 1982 AAAS -Summer Fellowship in Environmental 5,800 Sciences (for work on Acid Rain in EPA's I Office of Strategy Asassament and Long Range Planmng) 5
0
~
1980 82 NSF- Labor / Laity: Comparison of Worker
& Public Protection from Technological 240.000 Hazartis (Co. Principal Investigator with R. Kasperson) 1 0SS 79-24516 1979 - 80 Association of Physical Plant Administration -
Preparation of a Cogeneration 4.000 Reference Manual for Colleges and Universities
&nncipal Investigator) 1979 Argonne Laboratories - Testing Computer Models for Cogeneration System Design 5.30 (Principal Investigator)
Univ. e98456-01 1977 80 NSF - Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste Management #oss 77-16564 190.000 (Co.pnncipal Investigator with Roger Kasperson)
PLTLICATIONS Articles (Energy / Hazards / Air Quality) 1988 "The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework"(with R.E. Kasperr n O.
Renn.
published).P. Slovic, H.S. B rown, J.E. Emel, J.X. Kasperson, and S. Ratick) Ria Analysis (to I
" Methodology for Assessing Hazards of Contaminants in Seafood"(with H S Smwn and L, Teitelbaum> Rw'!2 tory Torieninev and PWrolerv. 8:76 - 101 (1988). .. .
l 1986
" Turbulence Parameters in an Urtran Envirecment* (with M. Yersel), Boundary Laver 1 Metenmlonv V. 37, #3 p.27111986). !
" Methods for Analyzing.and Comparing Technological Hazards: Definiti ons and Factor Structures (with C. Hohenemser, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson, R. Kates, P. Collins, P. Slov B. Fischoff. S. I h=4a andT. Layman.) In Rik Evaluarians and Mane:a.rt- i V. Covello, J. Menkes and Y. Mumpower, eds. Plenum Press, New York.1986. {
1985
" Protecting Workers, Protecting Publics: The Ethics of Differential Protection"(with P.
Derr, R. Kaspenon, R. Kates) in V.T. Covello (ed.) Rid Analysis in the Psvare Sectnr.
Plenum PresA New York,1985.
6
, l c
l
1983
- Time Scales in the Radioacdve Waste Problun* Eauiry Ismes te in kadinactive Was Manneement.
139-171 .
R. Kasperson Ed. Oelgeschlager Gunn.. Ham. .
p.
Cambridge 1 A*tneschenc Envimnment, V 17, No. 2. 275 (1983)."Short Dista ,.
" Responding to the Double Standard of Worker /Public Protecti Kasperson R. Kates), Envimnment V. 25. No. 6. 6 (1983 on (witho P. Dem R.
1982 "Airbome Lead: A Clear-cut Case of Differential Protecuen." (with D Ashford), Environment V,24. No.1,14 (1982).
" Technological Risk Perception and Nuclear Power Costs:
The Quandfication of Uncenainty
185 (l982). (with D. Shakow) Technnlor3 cal Formenerina and Social channe
~
198.1 Environment. V. 23. No. 7, 6 (1981)." Worker /Public Protecdon: The D , . ,
1979
" Nuclear No. Power 8,32 (1979). Plant Performance: An Update,"(with C. Hohenemser) Environ 1978
" Power Plant Performance" (with C. He= .%), Envimament V. 20. No.3,25. (197 Technical Moneysphe, 1988 Porential Retrieval of Radioactive Wam at Wor-and Yuces Mountaisi Rrca Review of Riele feeu** (with D. Golding, R. Kasperson)(1988) 17 p.
Porrefneure Riele at the N< -
ind Technical I .=2 Yueen Mountain Rr -.harv? A Review of Methndninaieni ten-* (with J. Emel, R.E. Kasperson, and O Renn) (1987)p.53 7 !
-_m_. _ . _ _ __ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _
1987-Methndnlorv for A_u.eeine H.,neds of Conimminante in Seafood. (with H. Brown, and L Teitelbaum) for the Naragansen Bay Project. U.S. EPA and Rhode Island Departmen Environmental Management. 47 p.
P-. closure Ritkt 'st the NocM Yucca Mountain Renceitorv. (with R.E.Kasperson J Eme J.X. Kasperson, and O. Renn). (1987) :0 p. . . .
Nue!ese Waste Svtrem Riskt at he Noosed Yucen Mountain Renosienry. (with J Em L
Kasperson. R.E. Kasperson, anc O. Renn). (1987) 116 p. . , .
1986 Evaluation Clark Uruversity. of the Rsderan IIT MMel Utefulnese and Practiemhility. (with 0.Renn) CEN .
Site.Charneterivation Emel. R. Kaspenon. O. Renn), Ricke CENTEDat theUnivemry.
Clark Yucca Mountain Site
- A Pmliminne The cronoted Sebarn T ska nucharwaste mnesitney aren* A oteliminary seeeeement of selected risk and social imnact ernsideratione. (with J. Emet. J. Kagemon, and R.
Kasperson.) Worcester. MA:
Hazard Assessment Group. CENTED, Clark University.
1985 Risk Issuet Aunciated with a SMt.dnme Renneitary at Richenn. Mineieeinni. (with H Bro .
J. Emel, J. Kasperson, and R. K2spenon.) New York: Social Impact Aue.amment Netwo .
1983 .
,Ma' hods for Analvrine and Comnarine Techaninarieni Matsrds Definitions and Fsetne 6:ms.1wim CJdpapaper. J. Kaspenon. R. Kasperson. R. Kates. P. Collins. A.-
Gcidman. P.'Slovi,c,,B,.f
- 3. Oc:ober 198I. ---- sbff. S. Lichtensacin, and M. Layman).
CENTED Research Report
- Lrie anter b( ~
- *erw-1982 Atmnedr;c S-- -
So r=minne far . ._ Af"- ' --n-.:nr Acid Chmaition* Aer::!nn the A===mentt and AAAS. Fall 1982.
1980 Comenemntm* A C2mmie rW = (with W. Goble) Association of Physical Plant Administrators. Washington.1980). -
8
1978 Sciennsts Insutute for Public Information. New York Government Papers 1985 ImHementation CENTED Working Paper of the RAGOccuestinnal
/WP 83 1. October I_rsd 1983.Standard.(wid in Pmventine illnessD.
. Hattis and inrur e Workelsee. Vol. 2. NTIS. Office of Technology Assessment. Washmgton. Spnng ,
Th n
D. Bennett, R. Linthurst) U.S. EPA EPA /60018-851001. Augus 1977 78
" Grid Connected Integrated Community Energy System. Clark University-
Phase I. Preliminary Feasibility Study.
v.1: Executive Summary DOE Report #C004211-1/1 (NTIS.1977) v.2: Final Repon. DOE Report #C004211 1/2 (NTIS.1977).
Phase II. Detailed Feasibility and Preliminary Design Preliminary Report. DOE Repon #C00-4211 2 (NTIS.1978).
v.1: Final Report. DOE Report #C00-4211-3/1 (NTIS.1978).
v.2: Appendices. DOE Report #C004211-3/2 (NTIS.1978).
(These reports were produced by the Clark Demonstration Team and consultants I wm the main text and edi:ed each volume.)
. _ .. t Conference Proceedings Energy. Hazards. Air Quality).N# "" * '" ' '
w carej univ =rw 2 $' '
1987 Estimation of Fenamnt Consequences of a Severe Accident at the Pickering Nuclear P Station.
Rcview Board. (with S. IAAgr$E1.
Sepeamber 24-26.1987. C. Corcoraton). Bnef Presented to Ontano Nuclear Safet Radioactive Wastes and the Social Amplification of Risk. (with R.E. Kasperson, J. Emel C.
Hohenemser. J.X. Kasperson, and O. Renn). In R.O. Post (ed.) Wa='a Maaa=* ment '27.
Tucson. AZ:
Anzona Board of Regents (1987).
m 9
l I
o j
i Can Risk Assessment $: l Transplanted to Developing Countries? (with H. Brown) Invited paper for de Fourth Tallories Seminar on Intemational Development Enutled Environmental Risk in the Economic Development of Newly Industrializing C May 12 14,1987. Tufts University Tallories European Center. France.
"Potencal use of 21h as a Biological Marker of Exposure to Radon "Firs S,ymposium on Environmental Health." Pittsburgh, PA, June 1987, 1985
{
High Risk Workers. Society for Risk Analysis, October 1985."The 1984 Isse in Hydrology, May 31,1984"i cid Rain." invited ta!k , uturepresented at Americ 1983 "Short Range Dispersion from a Point Source in an Urban Area.* (with M. Yersel).
. Society. Boston (1983). Proceedings of the 6th Symposium on Turbulence an 1981 "A Participatory Approach to Undergraduate Energy Education: the Case of Clark Education. Providence, Rhode Island,1981.Universiy" (with D. Ducsik)
-er t ; P <-
" Clark University's Grid-Connected Cogeneration Plant." (with J. Rodousakis. J Cook Distnct Heaung, V. 67. No.1,4 (1981). . ,
1979
.w RA4
- A Micrometeorological Study in the Worcester Area" (with A. Molod, M. Yersel),
Proceedings of the Conference on the Meteorology of Northern New England and the Mantime "rr,- Gorham, ME(1979).
1978
' Grid-Connected Cogeneranon at Clark University: 7he Effect of Terms of Utility Interconnecuon: (with S.E. Nydick), Proceedings of the Intemational Conference on Energy Use Management. Tucson (197p). .
1977 10
" Energy Pmfiles at Clark University:
Gottlieb) P:oceedings to the First National Conference on Tec Conservauen. Washington, D.C. (1977).
Testimony 1988 the New Hampshire Radiological Emerges:y Coricord. N.H. May 1988. eactor -
gn Response 1986 Before Department of Energy. Office of Civilian Radioactive Social Wastes Manageme and Economic Consequences of a Pmpose: Sebago Lake Repository -N 1986.
Articles (Particle Physics) 1975 0
" Determination (1973). of de 6**. 4 Mass Dif:rence (with J.S. Ball) Phys Rev D 11 197 1973 3
"Two Pion intermediate ..
.mw Stiths in Decay K ) . 27 ." PhysYe .E47931 (1973).
, n ar N =-
-a g i i g= s e p -t-w avaryw. 1972
' Soft 2345 Pion (1972). PMW in Electron-P6sitron Collisions"(wid J.L. Rosner) Phys Rev D 5 1971
" Current Algebra and Analyucity: Bootstrappmg se p and awith the Pian Decay en Setting me Scale * (with (LS. Bmwn), Phys. Rev. D 4 723 (1971).
I1 ;
I j
1968 L.S. Brown). Phys, Rev. Lett. 20 346 (1968)." en wt Pion Pion Scatteri
" Soft Photons and the Classical Limit * (with L.S. Brown)
Phys. Rev.
173,1505 (1968).
1965
' Cross
' Ebel) Phys. Section for l1965).
Rev. B 1401675 the Production of a Possible Bound m "(wt Cascade Nucleon Syst ihME . .
Conference Proceedings (Particle 'tysics) 1988 Intemational Workshop on Photon Photon Collisions (Israe !
1973
" Pion Form Factor and Inelastic n n Scattering," Proceedings of the Intemational Conference on n - n Scattering (Tallahassee,1973).
eso 12
1 i
Resume for Gordon Thompson j August 1988 -
professional Excertise Consulting scientist on energy, environment,'and international security issues.
Education
- phD in Applied Mathematics, Oxford University,1973.
- BE in Mechanical Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia,1%7.
- 85 in Mathematics and physics, University of New South Wales,1966.
Current Accointments s
- Executive Director, institute for Resource & Security Studies ( IRSS ),
Cambridge, MA.
- Coordinator, Proliferation ReforTn Project ( an IRSS project ).
- Principal Investigator (I of 3), Three Mlle Island Emergency Planning Study, Center for Technology, Environment and Development, Clark University, Worcester, MA.
r
- c inctoal mv estigator(1 of 3), NAT0 0ptions Study (a joint project of IRSS and the 1.9st ate for Peace and International Security).
- Treast.rer, Ceter for Atomic Radiation Studies, Arlington, MA.
- Member, Board of Directors, Polltleal Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.
- Member, Advisory Board, Gruppe Okologie, Hannover, FRG.
Consultina F-fence ( selected )
- Ontario Nuclear Safety Review, Toronto, Ontario,1987: review of safety aspects of CANDU reactors.
- Washington Department of Ecology, Olymple, WA,1987:. analysis of risk aspects of a proposed radioactive waste repository at Hanford.
- Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 1986-1987 : preparation of testimony on hazards of the Savannah River Plant.
- Lakes Environmental Association, Bridgton, ME,1986 : analysis of federal regulations for disposal of radioactive waste.
2
. i
- Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG,1986. participation in an international stud the hazards of nuclear power plants.
- Three Mlle Island Public Health Fund, Philadelphia, PA,1983-present .
studies relatid to the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
- Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, MA,1984-present . analyses of the safety of the Seabrook nuclear plant.
- Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA 1980-1985 : studies on energy demand and supply, nuclear arms control, and the safety of nuclear installations. i
- Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Boston, MA,1985 :
preparation of testimony on cogeneration potential at the Maine facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.
- Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK, 1982-1984 : coordination and conduct of a study on safety and radioactive waste implications of the !
proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- US Environmental protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1980-1981 assessment of the cleanup of Three Mlle Island Unit 2 nuclear plant.
- Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Princeto NJ,1979-1980.
sources.
studies on the potentials of various renewable energy
- Government of Lower Saxony, Hanriover, FRG, 1978-1979 : coordination and conduct of studies on safety aspects of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel center.
~
.w wn .
~
Other Excertence (*siidcted ) '" 2
.C; tM mr_t g . 4t? r"Ic;
- Co-leadership 094thPaul'wsiker-) of a stucy group on nucteep: weapons-3
~
proliferation, InsfiRiff6f P6fitics, Harvarc Universtty;T4dl. U
- Foundation ( with others ) of an ecological political movement in Oxford, UK which contested the 1979 Parliamentary election.
- Conduct of cross-examination and presentation of evidence, on behalf of the Political Ecology Research Group, at the 1977 Public inquiry into proposed expansion of the reprocessing plant at Windscale UK
- Conduct of research on plasma theory ( while a PhD candidate ), as an associate staff member, Culham t.aboratory, UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1 % 9-1973.
- Service as a design engineer on coal plants, New South Wales Electricity Commission, Sydney, Australia,1%8.
o 3
Publications ( selectW
- ~ Verifying a Halt to the Nuclear Arms Race', in F. Barnaby (ed), verification Handbook. MacMillan Press, UK (in press).
- " Verification of a Cutof f in the Production of Fissile Material *, in F. Bar, a (ed), Verification Handbook. MacMillan Press, UK (in press).
- " Severe Accident Potential of CANDU Reactors , Consultant's Report in The
' Saietv of Ontario's Nuclear Power Reactors. Ontario Nuclear Safety Review, Toronto, February 1988.
- Nuclear-Free Zones ( edited with David Pitt ), Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, UK,1987.
- Risk Assessment Review For the Socioeconomic Imoact Assessment Procosed Hloh-Level Nuclear Waste Recository at Hanford Site. Washincton (edited; written with five other authors), prepared for the Washington Department of Ecology, December 1987-
- The Nuclear Freeze Revisited ( written with Andrew Haines ),
Nuclear Freen and Arms Control Research Project, Bristol, UK, November 1986. Variants of the same paper have appeared as Working Paper No.18, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, February 1987, and in ADIU Reoort. Jan/Feb 1987, pp 6-9, University of Sussex, L Brighton, UK.
- international Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ( written with fif teen other authors ), Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRGI.2 y.qlumes ), Septemoer:1.986 F E
- 'What nappened at Reactor Four' ( the Ch~rnobyl e reactor accident f,' Bulletin of the Atemic Scientists. August / September 1986, pp 26-31.
- The Source Term Debate: A Reoort by the Union of Concerned Scientists
( written with Steven Sholly ), Union of Concerned Scientists, - ' ~ "
Cambridge, MA, Jmunry 1986.
- ' Checks on tM Wiiar ( a review of three books on nuclear proliferation ),
Nature.14 November 1985, pp 127-128.
- Editing of Perspectives on Proliferation. Volume I, August 1985, published by the Proliferation Ref0rm Project, institute for Resource and Security l 5tudtes, Cambridge, f4A.
- "A Turning Point for the NPT ?", ADIU Reoort. Nov/Dec 1984, pp I-4, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.'
- " Energy Economics , in J Dennis (ed), The Nuclear Almanac. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,1984.
- *The Genesis of Nuclear Power", in J Tirman (ed), The Militarization of Hich Technoloav. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA,1984.
4
- A Second Chance New Hamoshire's Electricity Future as a Model for the -
Nation ( written with Linzee Weld ), Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA,1983.
- Safety and Caste Manaaement Implications of the Sizewell PWR ( prepared
, with the help of 6 consultants ), a report to the Town & Country Planning l Association, London, UK,1983.
- Utility-Scale Electrical Storaae in the USA The Prosoects of Pumoed Hydro.
Comoressed Air. and Batteries. Princeton University report PU/ CEES *120, 1981.
- The Prosoects for Wind and Wave Power in North America. Princeton University report PU/ CEES
- 117,1981.
)
- Hydroelectric Power in the USA Evolvina to Meet New Needs. Princeton' !
University report PU/ CEES
- I 15,1981.
- Editing and part authorship of " Potential Accidents & Their Ef fects", Chapter ill of Recort of the Gorleben international Review. Dublished in German by the Government of Lower Saxony, FRG,1979 -- Chapter 111 available in English from the Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.
- A Study of the Consequences to the Public of a Severe Accident ALA j
Commercial FBR located at Kalkar. West Germany. Political Ecology Research Group report RR-1,1978.
I Exoert Testimony (Jelected )
- International Physicians for the Preventico of Nuclear War,6th and 7th Annual Congresses, Koln, FRG,1986 and Mescow, USSR,1987: Relat"i nships
] '
between nuclear power and the threat of nuc' ear war.
l
- County Council, Richland County, SC,1987 : coilcations of Severe Reactor l Accidents at the Savannah River Plant.
- Maine Land Use Regulation Commission,1985 : Cogeneration potentil at f acilities of Great Northern Paper Company.
- Interf aith Herings on Nuclear issues, Toronto, Ontario,1984 : Options for Canada's nuclear trade and Canada's involvement in nuclear arms control.
- Sizewell Public inquiry, UK,1984 : Safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.
- New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission,1983 : Electricity demand and l supply options for New Hampshire. l
- Atomic Safety & Licensing Board, Dockets 50-247-SP & 50-286-SP, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1983 : Use of filtered venting at the Indian Point nuclear plants.
- US National Advisory Committee on oceans and Atmosphere,1982 : '
implications of ocean disposal of radioactive waste.
i l
5 I
- Environmental & Energy Study Conference, US Congress,1982 : Implications of radioactive waste management. '
t Miscellaneous
- Australian citizen.
Married, two children.
- I Resident of USA,1979 to present; of UK, 1969-1979.
Extensive experience of public speaking before professional and lay audiences.
Author of numerous newspaper, newsletter, and magazine articles and book reviews.
Has received many interviews from print and electronic media.
- mw*mm****
== w- some op..
m
,e O
1 O
i Restae for Jan Beyea July 1986 EDUCATIQ4:
s Ph.D., Celtatia Ohiversity,1968 (Physics).
3.A . , Amherst college,1962. k i
EWIntM2ft HISIQtY:
1980 to date, Senior Staff Scientist and, as of 1985, i
Director of the Environmental Policy Analysis Departnent, National Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, NY, NY 10022.
1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Stud Princeton University.
1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College.
l 1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Colurtia University Physics Deporti .
CCNSULTING WGtK:
Consultant on nuclear energy to the Office of Technclogy Assessrent, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; the Offices of the A General in New York State and the Commonwealth of Massadiusetts; the St -
lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish Diergy Consnission; the 'Ihree M Island MIblic Health Fund; and various citizens' groups in the United States .
PUBLICATIONS CCNCERNING INENTf CONSEPVATICN, ENENTI PCLICY, Articles:
" Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: Wilderness and Wildlife Pefuges," Steoe and Beyes, Annual Review of Enerey (to be published, October 1986).
No. 28, June 1985.][An earlier version appeared as National Audubon Society Re ll, p. 425 (1905)."U.S. Appliance Efficiency Standards," Pollin and Peyes, En "Computee itseling for Energy Pelicy Analysis," Pedsker, Peyes, and Pittsburgh, put,15, part J, p.Lyons, Pren ^^ 1 of the 15th Annual Mod 1111 (1984). ~
the Atornie Scientists, J8,, p. 52 (August / September 1982)." C "Second Thoughts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Powr: Both Sides, W. W. Norton and Co. (New York,1982). l "Indoct Air Pollution," Pull. At. Scienosts, 37, p. 63 (Feb.1981)
g Articles (con't)
Scientists, "Erergency 36,, p. 40Planning for Reactor (December 1980). Accidents," Pulletin of the Atoric (An earlier version of the article Vahrenholt, editors, Keipenheuer & Witsch, Colcgne, 1950.
" Dispute at Indian Point," Bull. At. Scientists, 3_6, p. 63, (May 1980) .
Housing," Hartje, Dutt, and Beyes, ASHRAE Transa (Winner of ASHRAE outstanding paper award.J ,_ , .
Technology and Society Division Paper 78-TS-5,ASFE Housto
" Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Energy Balance of 4
Twin261.
Page Pivers Townhouses," Beyes et al., Energy and Buildings, Vol. I (1977),
Also Chapter 3 of Saving Energy in the Home, Ballinger, 1978.
"The Two-Resistance Podel for Attic Heat Flow: Implications for Con-servation Policy," Woteki, Dutt, Reyea, Energy--Se Intl. Journal, 2,657(1978) ,
Published Debates:
Island Put11e Health Fund,1622 Locusc Street, Phila., Pa. i
" Land Use Issues and the Pedia," Ctr. for Cessunication, NYC, Oct.1984.
Nuclear Peactors:
Academy Forum c How Safe Are Wey?, panel discussion sponsored by the taa National Acadery et Sciences, Wash., :.C., May 5,1980.
c Line, P.R.S. Television.The Crisis of Nuclear. Energy, Subject No. 367 on Wil Transcript printed by Southern Education Ceppuni-cations Assoc., 928 WoodroWJtreet, P. O. Box 5Si&, t Columbia, S.C.,1979.
Reports:
We ' ' '
(See also, Intze, to Special Issue en Legal Isaues Arising From Energy Plan 1984, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, jl, p.251, (1986)]
A Review of Dose Assessments at %ree Mile Island and PecoNWenda Future 1954. Research, Report to the %ree Mile Island Public Realth Fund, August
[See alsc, " Author Challenges Review,' Health Physice Newsletter, March,1985, and "TMI-Six Years Later," Nuclear Medicine,16, p.1345 (1985).]
_ ~3-I Reports (Con't) ,
"Irnplications for Mortality of Weakening the clean Air Act," (with G.
Steve Jordan), National Audubon Society, EPAD Report No.18, May 1982.
"Some Len9-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Majer Peleases of Radioactivity to the Atomosphere from Wree Mile Island," Peport to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Decereer 1980.
" Decontamination of Krypton 85 frorr Wree Mile Islard Nuclear Plant,"
(with Kendall, et al.), Report of the Union cf Concerned Scientists to the Gevernor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.
"Some Coments on Consequences of Hypothetical Peactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (with Gordon hompson), National Auduben Society, EPAD Feport Nc. 3, April 1980.
" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Centainnnt," (with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.
"The Effects of Peleases to the Atssphere of Radioactivity frete Synthetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Government of Icwer Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as grt of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.
" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Pf.sk Specteur," presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reacter Safety Research in the ,
Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1,1978.
A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical Peacter Accidents at Barseback, report to the Swedish Energy Com., StockhcJa, CS I 1978:5, 1978.
Testimony:
.= *
- e t.re e
" Responses to the C7-.dyl Accident," before the Senate Comittee on <
Energy and Natural Resources, U. S. Senate, June 19, 1986.
" Dealing with. Uncertainties in Projections of Electricity Consumption,"
befcre the Camup. on Energy and Natural Pescurces, U. S. Senate, July 25, 1965.
"Sorre Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their i
Implications for Energency Planning," testimony and cross-examination before the Nuclear Pegulatory Coeurission's Atovic Safety and Licensing Board, on {
behalf of the New York State Attorney General and otherr, July 1982.
l l
j
.c 0
Testimony (Con't)_
"In the Matter of Application of Orange and Rockland Counties, Cortversion to coal of Iovett Units 4 and 5," . for Inc Mstistmy and cross-examination on the health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conver to coal; Department of Environmental Resources, State of N.Y.,. 5, Nov 1981.
" Future Prospects for Commercial Nuclear Power in the United States " ,
U..Insular and S. HouseAffairs, of Representatives, Octoberbefore 23, 1981.
the Sub "Coments on Energy Forecasting," material submitted for the record at Comittee en Science and 'ItchnologyHearings before the Subcom '
Comittee Print No.14, June 1-2,1981.
for Restart of TV1 Unit No.1," testimony and crossMrz '
Atenic Safety Representing andApril York, Licensing 1981. Board on behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group
" Advice and Recommendations Concerning Ganges in Reactor Design and Safety Analysis which should be Required in Light of the Accident at tree Mile Island," statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Cosmission concerning th propcsed ruleraking hearing on degraded cores, December 29, 1980.
Environmental 1979. Protection Comittee of the New Ycrk Ci ,
Accidents Also at before the Committee, "'Ihe Impact on New York City cf Reactor Indian Point, June 11, 1979. Also " Consequences of a Catastrophic Reactor Accident,"
Health, August 12, 1976 (with Frank von Hippel).staterent to the New York City Boa{
)
"Energency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," testineny before the California Energy Resources and Development comission, Emergen Response and Evacuation Plans Hearings, Novereer 4,1978, Page 171.
Advertising of 1hersel Insulacion," Beyes and Dutt, before .
" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Jacerpert," teetimony before the N.Y. State Peard on Electric Generation Sitino and the Envirerre Vatter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nucleas Pcwer Station), May 1977 .
the Sundesert Nuclear Installation," testirony before the )C Resources and Development Comission, December 3,1976.
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