ML20247G480

Intervenor Exhibit I-MAG-62,consisting of Memo,Dtd 880615, Forwarding Revised Suppl 1 to CRGR Review of Final Evaluation Criteria for Review of Offsite Emergency Plans Prepared by Utils,Per NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,Rev 1,Suppl 1

ML20247G480
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/10/1989
From:	Sniezek J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Jordan E Committee To Review Generic Requirements
References
RTR-NUREG-0654 OL-I-MAG-062, NUDOCS 8905300412
Download: ML20247G480 (132)

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MEMCRANDUM FORT' Edward L. Jordan, Chairman Committee to Review Generic Requirements i

FROM: James H..Sniezek, Deputy Director l Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j

SUBJECT:

CRGR REVIEW OF FINAL EVALUATION CRITERIA FCR~ REVIEW OF 0FFSITE ENERGENCY PLANS PREPARED BY UTILITIES l (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, REY.1, SUPPLEMENT 1)

The subject review was rescheduled from May'19, 1988 to June 22, 1988. Enclosec is a revised submittal of Supplement 1 and the response to public comments. The revision incorporates FEMA comments and includes a new section ir, the introduction to Supplement 1 that cescribes how the " realism" rule will be applivo. All of.

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'the changes to the original Supplement i e ' indicated in comparative text. For ease. of review, only those changes since the May 11, 1966 version of the respons6 te public comment have been indicated in comparative text; i.e., primarily those changes prompted by FEMA comments.

- .. Original s: pud or James H. Sniezek James H. Sniezek, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Supplement 1 Package DISTRIBUTION:

TEMurley, NRR WDTravers, NRR E5Beckjord, RES VStello, NRR JHSniezek, NRR CRVan Niel, NRR HRDenton, GPA Central Files CHBerlinger, NRR FKantor, NRR MTJamgochian, RES PEPB R/F TTMartin, NRR EDPodolak, hRR WJ01mstead. 0GC FJCongel, NRR WGParler, OGC JPMurray, 0GC CONTACT:

> Eoward M. Podolak, NRR 492-3167 ij I' f

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P.P5 iRh SC/PEFB/NRR C/ / RR D/OSEP PR 00EA/GCB ADT/NRR DC/NRR ERPodolak:sc CRVa.n Niel WD rs FJCongel CHBerlinger TTMartin Jh5niezek 5/S)/88 5/pt/SS 5 8 5/L6/88 5/ /88 5/ /S8 5/ /88 O

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.  :,u:i E -C. wE :.ua Eu:3. ;u CRITERIA FOR UTILITY Off5ITE PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

!. INTRODUCTION A. Purpose The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) have added a supplement to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1 that provides guidance for the development, review and evaluation of utility offsite radiological emergency response planning and preparedness for those situations in which State and/or local governments 1 decline to participate in emergency planning. As indicated below under " Authorities" this guidance can be used for resolving deficiencies in emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear power plant licensing and for operating nuclear power plants.

B. Use of Document #

This document has been developed for use in reviewing and evaluat-Ing utility prepared offsite emergency plans and preparedness. This document is intended to be used with Section 1 and Appendices 1-5 of the existing NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. A notice has been provided in the Federal Register to announce the availability of this document Except where specir1cally modified, the existing licensee-only evaluation criteria of the current Section II are not affected by this document. For those situa-tions in which State and/or local governments are participating in the emergency planning process, the existing NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. I evaluation criteria will apply.

C. Authorities This document is intended to facilitate the implementation of the changes to 10 CFR Part 50.47(c)(1) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.Section IV.F of the NRC regulations, effective December 3,1987 (52FR42078) dealing with the following: " Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off - Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Participate in Off-Site Emergency Planning." The rule does not specifically spply to plants that already (

have operating licenses. However, as state &by the Cossaission in the )

preamble to the rule (52 FA 42084);

As described above,10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) of the Cosesi 's regulations already provides a mechanism (the "120-day la - 4.ieCA l for addressing situations in which deficiencies are ide ed i in emergency planning at operating plants. To the autant that l thir, rule provides criteria by which a utility plan would be i judged by State and local withdrawal from participation in IThis refers to State and local governments identified as having an emergency preparedness and response role in the offsite plan. It is not restricted to the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) but may include governments that are identified as having roles, such as, providing reception and congregate care  ;

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,0 emergency planning, thase criteria would presumably be of assistance to decisionmakers in determining under 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii), whether renedial setton should be taken, and if so, what kindjand where deficiencies in emergency planning remain uncorrected after 120 days.

It is consistent with the provisions of the FEMA /NRC Nwnerandum of Understatoding dated April 18, 1985, wherein the parties agreed to evaluate offsite plans prepared by utilities and provided to FEMA by the NRC..

D. Assumptions.

The following NRC assumptions are used for the development, review and )

evaluation of utility offsite plans and preparedness. 1 m, . .

4

1. In an actual radioloofcal emergency. State and local officials that  :

have declined to participate in emergency planning will: l l

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the' health and safety of- ]

the public; J

b. Cooperate with the utility and follow the utilitiy offsite plan; and j i

c. Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary .  ;

Although it is assumed that non-participating State and local organizations f will respond and follow the utility's offsite plan, it is not assumed that 1 these organizations will be as familiar with the plan as if they had par-ticipated in the planning process and exercised with the utility. There-fore, the utility's offsite response plan and the offsite response organt-zation will provide compensating actions through the use of Ifaisons to deal with the coordination of information and resources with State and local governments and to provide advice and assistance to responding  ;

State and local governments in implementing their assigned roles and func-tions undar the utility's offsite response plan.

c E. 5,c228 In developing this document, the planning standards of NUREG-0654/fENA-REP-1, Rev. I have not been changed and they a pply to the offsite response organization defined below. This complies wit) the NRC rule change cited in C. above. The guidance will be used for the development, review and evaluation of offstte emergency plans and preparedness in which State and/or local governments decline to participate in emergene,y planning and preparedness. The planning standards are the same as tnose used to eval-unte licensee, State and local plans and preparedness. The evaluation criteria have been modified with due allowance for the non-participation of State and local governments and for the compensatory measures that  !

l Under 10 CFR must be p(rop (osed, developed and implemented by the utility.50.47(c) (

effort to secure and retain the participation of the pertinent State and/ l or local governments. The degree of participation that the utility is able j I

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& 11 is ' s5 .F; -G, .r.gE :s,m gu:3, cca A:

Q' to gain from State'and local organizations during the planning process 9 h should be reflected in the utility's offsitt plans and preparedness; and -

1the resources to implement the offsite plan saast'be identified and com ari,tted by the utility and by State and local governments participating in h

the~ planning process.f The appropriate FEMA-guidance memoranda, policy

~

memoranda and REP 1ocuments (e.g. , FEMA REP-2,10,12) will be applied to define the' condittor:t of adequacy and inadequacy of emergency plans and preparedness for specific evaluation criteria. The numbering pattern for

.the evaluation criteria tr. Gds document is the same as that used in the existing-Section 11 of MUREG-0654/ FEMA-FEP-1, Rev. 1. Therefore, numbers that apply to licensee-only evaluation criteria are missing and additicnal-criteria have been assigned new numbers.

F. Ocfinitions The following definitions apply to the use of this document.

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1. Offs 1te Resoonse Organfzat1on (0R0): The utf11ty offsite emergency response organization along witn other participating voluntary and private organizations, and local, state and Federal governments engaging in the development of offstte emergency plans and prepared-ness.for.a nuclear power plant. >

2. Nonparticipating Organization: State and local governments that decline to partfcipat.e in emergency planning and preparedness for a nuclear power plant.-

G. Summary of Chanjes_

The following is a sussnary of the changes to the evaluation criteria of MUREG 0654/FlHA REP-1, Rev.1.

1. The concept of "offsite response organization" is adopted and defined.

Throughout the revised evaluation criteria "offsite response organiza-tion

• replaces references to " State and loca) governments" as that phrase was used in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Aev.1.

-2. In addition, evaluation criteria were modified or added to compensate for lack of participation by State and local governments in the planning process, for these functions:

i

a. Identification of the functions which require State and local authorization before fsplementfag (A.2.a.).

b. Identification of additional liaison personnel to ads tse and assist State and local officials in an energency (C.5.).

c. Provisfon for adyising State and local officials on emergency actions to be taken (D.4., J.10.f.).

d. Provision for coordinating emergency messages with State and local governments (E.8.)

e. artici Provision local emergency for cosumunications with non-p(F operations facilities ...

1 ) pating State and I

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f. Provision for pubite information describing the role of the offsite response organization vs. the State and local organiza-tions during the emergency (G.1.e.).

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g. Establishment of an omgrgency operations center for use in directing and controlling offsite response functions (H.3.).

h. Offsite response organization shall have the administrative and physical means (even though they might not have the responst-bility) for activating the alert and notification system (E.6.

andJ.9.).

1. Recomunendation on the use of potassium fodide (KI) for the gen-eralpublic(J.10.f.)

j. Provision for encouraging participation in exercises and drills by State and lorp) governments but not requiring it (N.2.a. and N.6.).

k. Provision of training to persons in the utility's offsite response organization who will be responders (0.4.k.).

1. Provision for offering training to non-participating State and local governments and other organizations (0.6.).

m. Provision for providing copies of the offsite plan and its revisions to non-participating State and local government entities with which the offsite response organization identifies interfacesinitsoffsiteplan(P.11).

H. Application of the " Realism" Rule The Consission amended its rules in 10 CFR 50.47c(1) to provide criteria for the evaluation at the operating license review stage of utilf ty-prepared emer-gency plans in situations in which state and/or local governments decifne to participate further in emergency planning (52 FR 42079). The revised rule reads as follows (emphasis added):

i (c)(1) Failure to meet the applicable standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this section may result in the Commission dec11ning to issue an operating license; however,'the applicant will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Cose1ssion that deficiencies in the plans are not significant for the plant in question, that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operations. Where an applicant for an operating license asserts that its inability to demonstrate compliance with requirements of paragraph (b) of thf s section results wholly or substantially from the decision of state and/or local governments not to participate further in omargency planning, an operating license may be issued if the applicant demonstrates to the Commission's satisfaction that:

(1) The a paragraph b) (pplicant's of this inat:111ty section is to comply wholly or with the requirements substantially of of the result the non-participation of state and/or local governments.

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[ Os 12 33 3: :- 4: -C. - : E r_: e g_:3. Oce (if) The applicant has made a sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain participation of the pertinent State and/or local governmental authorities, including the furnishing of copies of its emergency plan.

(111) The app 1tcant's emergency plan provides reasonable assurance

' that public health safety is not endangered by operation of the facf11ty concerned.. To make that finding, the applicant must demonstrate that, as outlined below, adequate protective measure can and will be taken in the event of an emergeny. A utility plan will be evaluated egainst the. same planning standards applicabia to a state or local plan, as listed in paragraph (b) of this section, with due ~ allowance made both for--

(A) Those elements for which state and/or local non-participatica makes compliance infeasible and (B) The utility's measures designed to compensate for any deficiencies resulting from state and/or local non participation.

In making its determinatioIon the adequacy of a utility plan. the NRC will reccentze tne reality that in an actual emergency, state ana local government officials wtII exercise their best errorts to _ protect tne health and s4Tety of t M public. The NRC will ottermine the toequacy of that expected response, in concination with the utility's compensation measures, on a case-by-case basis, subject to the following guidance.g In addressing the circumstance where applicant's inability to comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section is wholly or substan-tially the result of non-participation of state and/or local governments, it may be presteed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials would generally follow the utility plan. However, this presumption may be rebutted by, for example, a good faith and timely proffer of an adequate and feasible state and/or local radiological emer-gency plan that would in fact be re11ed upon in a radiological emergency.

At the same time the Cosunf ssion added a new Paragraph 6 Section !Y.F. of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, which reads as follows:

5. The participation of state and local governments in an emergency exercise is not required to the extent that the applicant has fdentif fed those governments as refusing to participate further in emergency planning activities pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1). In such cases, an exercise shall be held.with the applicant or licensee and such governmental entities as elect to participate in the emergency planning process.

The emphasized portion above is the kernel of the so called " realism rule'.

In its " realism rule", the Comunission provides the details of how a utility-sponsored offsite utility plan would be evaluated. While asserting that State and local participation in emergency planning is essential to the maximum effectiveness of a plan, the Goeskission has provided that, in the case of non-participation of State and local governments in the planning process, a Itcense can be issued even if emergency planning falls short of the ideal, but is still adequate to protect the public health and safety. Specifically l ifcense can be issued under 10 CFR 50.47c(1)(f fi) if the Cosmutssion finds, athat i the applicants emergent,y plan provides reasonable assurance that the pubile health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility (provided "

that the non-participation tests are met). As stated in the preamble to the final rule (52 FR 42084):

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N 22 13 s :20 :sc -c. #: E v E _: 3. r The rule recognizes - as did Congress when it enacted and re-enacted the provisions of Section 109 of the KRC Authorization Act of 1980 - that no utilit;y plan is likely to be able provide the same degree i.e.,of a public state or protection that would obtain under ideal conditions, UATE,(emphasis local added) .

participation, By- THAT

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NEVERTHELESS A vsde/>A

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BE AD The new rule prcvides that the utfitty plan will be evaluated against the same

[16] planning standaros applicable to a state and local plan with due allowance r,ade both for elements for which non-participation makes compliance infeasible and the utility's measures desigr.ed to compensate for deficiencies resulting from non-participation, Here, in determining adequacy, the

" realism" provisions of the "best efforts response" and the " generally follow the utility plan" are considered in combination with the utility's compensating mea sures. '

However, the full nature of 10'UR 50.47(c)(1) can be realized by recognizing that, over and above the realism provisions, it remains a mechanism for dealing with deficiencies in emergency planning. It provides that the applicant can seek and the Commission can issue a license in sub-optimum cases where the [16]

planning standards are not met, if the applicant has demonstrated that:

1 the deffriencies are not significant,

2. adequate interim compensating measures have or wf11 be taken promptly, or 3, there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operatfor,s.

Finally, in the preamble to the final " realism rule" (52 FR 42080) in referring to its " Realism Remand" (CLI-86-13), the Cosnission explained that the:

measure et significance under (1) and adequacy underthat (2) is"nothe operating fundamental emergency planning standard of 550.47[a] C that adequate license will be issued unless a finding is made by NR protective" measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.

Thus, ultimately, the Commission will have to determine the adequacy of utility prepared offsite plans In and preparedness doing so, all of these4 with theare parties aidbound of the)yLicensin't the ru Boards FEMA and the NRC staff.

to recognize the reality that in an actual emergency, State and local government '

officials the public.

will exercise their best efforts to protect the health an ,

case (LBP-88 13, May 9, 1988, Docket No. 50-322-01-3):

2The " realism" concept can be applied to resolve deficiencies in emergency plans and exercises.

For example Jf towing cars is not identified as a State or local responsibility in a ug,i lity prepared offsite plan or if more cars need to be " towed" during an exercise than the utility can accomodate, the " realism" concept could be applied to resolve what otherwise might be a planning deficie

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a:

The Board gives no credence to the possibility that Nassau County Police ]

will not provide assistance to the public in an actL61 emergency because the "best efforts" assumption of the Consnission and the regulations pro-hibit such consideration.

II. PLANNING STANDARD $ AND EVALUATION CRITERTA A. Assignment of Responsibility (organization control)

' Planning Standard Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee, and by State and local organizations within the Eirergency Plan-ning Zones have been assigned, the emerge cy responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and f

, each principal response organization has staff u r%ppnd and to augesent i l

its initial response on a continuous basis.

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Evaluation Criteria

1. -a. The offsite plan shall identify the elements of the offsite response organ 12:ation for Emergency Planning Zones (see Appendix

$ of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rey. 1).3

b. The offsite response organization shall specify its concept of operations, and its relationship to the total effort. The con-cept of operation will explain how the offsite response organi-zation will function with non-participating State and !ccal '

governments, and will specify the various modes of operation.

c. The offrite plan shall illustrate these interrelationshfas in a Mcck diagram. This diagram will define the roles for the off-site response organization and non-par;icipating State and local gs er,sents, and identify the lead interfaces,

d. The offsite response organization shall identify a specific individual by title who shall be in charge of the emergency response.

e. fh offsite rssponse nrpanization shall provide for 24-hour per j

day enriency response, including 24-hour per day staffing of CGatWnk*tions links.

2. a. The offstte response organization shall specify the funettons anc responsibilities for major elements and key individuals by title, of emerpency response, including the following: Connand and Control, A erting and Notification, Communications, Public Informetton, Accident Assessment, Public Health and Sanitation, 30rtsste response organization is defined as the utility offsite emergency response organization along with other participating voluntary and private -

organizations, and local, State and Federal governments engaging in the development of offsite energency plans for a nuclear power plant.

7 e _ _ _ _ .-- ,

. NUREG-06E4 FEMA-REP-1 Rev.1 Supp.1 Criteria for Preparation anc Evaluation of Racio ogical. Emergency Response P ans and 2 preparedness.in Support o:

Nuc ear 3ower P ants.

Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and Preparedness C.ef:-Report fc. 'nte.t Ux cr.d Commert

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$ .1uscript Como!ated: .L....a ^.E -

Date Puolisnec: NovemeeHGS:t U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Federal Emergency Management Agency ;

Washington D.C. 20555 -

Washington D.C.f20472 l e

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un Y TABLE OF C0hTEf4TS Page u.

1. Introduction E A. Purpose 1 y "

.B. Use.of Document 1-

.C.. Authorities 1 D.- . Assumptions 2 E. Scope 2-F. Definitions 3 G.. Summary of Changes '3 H... Application of the " Realism" Rule 4 II.

Planning Stanoards and Evaluation Criteria A. AssignmentofRespens16Tity(OrganizationControl) 7 B., Onsite Emergency Organization 9 C. Emergency Response Support and Resources 9  :

D. Emergency Classification System 11 E. Notification Methods and Procedures 12 F. Emergency Communications 15 G.- Public. Education and Information 16 H;. Emergency facility and Equipment 18 ,

I. _ Accident Assessment- 19 (

J.- Protective Response ~ 20 :j K. Radiological Exposure Control 23 4 L. - tiedical and Public Health Support 24 M. Recovery and keentry Planning and Post-accicent 0perations 25 N. Exercises anc Drills 26 0.- Radiological. Emergency Response Training 29 P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans 31 i

i i

1 i,

ChITERIA FOR UTILITY OFFSITE PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS

1. INTRODUCTION A. Purpose The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) have aeded a supplement to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1 that provides guidance for the development, review and evaluation of utility offsite radiological emergency response planning and preparedness for those situations in which State and/or local governments 1 decline to participate in emergency planning.

B. [ inter 4m] Use of Document Thisdocumenthasbeendevelopedfor[4pter4m]useinreviewinganoevaluat-ing util1ty-preparec offs 1te emergency plans and preparedness. This

[4mter4m-wse] document is iyytendec to be used with Section I and Appendices 1-5 of the existing NUREG-t/654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. A notice has been pro-viced in the Federal Register to announce the avail 6bility of this docu-ment [ana-te-4mv4te-pubne-rev4ew-and-eemment]. [Subsequest-te-the-rece4pt e6-eemments,-this-seewment-w&44-be-4sswed-4n-fina4]. Except where specifically modified, the existing licensee-only evaluation criteria of the current Section II are not affected by this document. For those situatiens in which State and/or local governments are participating in the emergency planning process, the existing NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 evalu,ation criteria will apply.

C. Authorities This cocument is intended to facilitate the implementation of the changes to 10 CFR Part 50.47(c)(1) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E Section IV.F cf theNRCregulations.[ dated-Geneber-29,-19873) effective December 0, 1987 (52FR42078) cehling with the following: " Evaluation or tne Acequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operatirg License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to Par-ticipate in Off-Site Emergency Planning." It is consistent with the provision!. of the FEMA /NRC Memorancum of Understanding dateo April 18, 1985, wherein the parties agreed to evaluate offsite plans prepared by utilities

[en-behalf-ef-State-aas-leea4-governments; and provided to FEMA by the NRC.

1[ T he -e eme n t -pe r 4 ee- e m p i re s -e n -a be w t - Feb ew a ry -it 95 - 1988,-- G emme n t s -m ay - be- s e n t te-Savid-Meyer,-Gh4ef,-Program-pweeedures-Braneh,-Ma44-Step---4999-MNB, Wash 4nsten,-9,G,--29555,--Gemments-may-be-sent-threwgh-the-ma44-er-hand-earr4ed te-th4s-aedress-between-the-hewes-ef-7+39-arm,-and-4+45-prm,]

This refers to State and local governments identified as having an emergency preparedness and response roie in the offsite plan. It is not restricteo to the Emercency Planning Zones (EPZs) but may include governments that are acentitled as naving roies, sucn as, provicing reception ano congreghte care centers and assistance in traffic control.

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'D. Assumptio4 5 ~ The following NRC [ FEMA] assuirptions are' insed for the development, review 1 <

and. evaluation of utility offsite plans and preparedness .

1.: .In an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that lhave declined to participate in emergency planning will:

a. Exercise'their best efforts to protect the health and safety of-g the public; i(

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b'. Cooperate with the utility and follow the utility cffsite plan;

'and f '

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c. Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State ano local response is necessary.-

g -y b . Although it' is assumed tha Micn-participating State and local' organizatiers will respond and follow the utility's offsite plan, it is not assumed that these organizations will' be as f amiliar with the plan as if they had par-

'ticipated in the planning process 'and exercised with the utility. There-fore, the utility's offsite response plan'and the offsite response organi-zation will provide compensating actions through the use of liaisons to coal with ~the coordination of information and resources witit State ano local governments and.to provide advice and assistance to responding State and . local governments-in implerrenting their assigned roles and func-tions under t' he utility's offsite response plan. I E. ' Scope In developing this document, the planning standarcs of NUREG-0654/FDtA-REP-1, Rev.. I have not been changed and they apply to the offsite response organi:ation defined below.- This complies with the NRC rule change citec Lin C. above. The gu1 dance will be'used for the development, review and

, evaluation of offsite emergency plans and preparedness in which State and/or local governments cecline to participate in emergency planning ar.c

. preparedness. The planning standards are the same as those used to eval-uate licensee, State and local plans and preparedness. The evaluaticn criteria.have been modified with due allowance for the non-participation of State and local governments and for the compensatory measures that l must be proposed, developed and itnplemented by the utility. Under 10 CFR s 50.47(c)(1)(ii) the utility is expected to make a sustaineo ocod faith j' effort to secure and retain the participation of the pertinent State crd/

or local oevernments. Lhe-et4Hty-eHsite-p4ans-and-prepapeeness-w+44-se empesees-to-aseevnt-for-the-vary 4ne-degrees-ef)Thedecreeofparticipaticn

- that the utility is able to gain from State and local organizations during

- the planning process should be reflected in the utility's offsite plans and preparedness; and the resources to implement the offsite plan must be icen-tirleo and ccmmitted by the utility ard by State ano local governments participating in the planning prccess. The appropriate FEMA guicance memorands, policy memor m ia and REP documents (e.g., FEMA REP-2, 10, 12) will be applied to defina the conditions of acequacy and inadequacy of i emergency plans and preparedness fer specific evaluation criteria. The l numbering pattern for the evaluation criteria in this document is the same 1 as that used in the existing Section II of MUREG-0654/ FEMA-FEP-1, key. 1. "

Therefore, numbers that apply tu licensee-only evaluation criteria are missing and adoitional criteria have been assigned new numbers. I

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F. Definition The following cefinitiens apply to the use of this document.

1. Offsite Response Organization (ORO)h Tht utility 'fsite emergency j' response organization along with other participating voluntary and

. private organizations, and local ., State and Federal governments engaging in the development of off site emergency plans and propered-ness for a nuclear power plant'.

2. Nonparticipating Organization: [Dese-organizations-4mehd4mg] State and local governments that decline to partic1pate in emergency plan-ning and preparedness for a nuclear pcwer plant.

G. Summary'of Changes The following is a summary of the changes to the evaluation criteria of MUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.,1. ,,

1. The concept of "offsite response organization" is' adopted and defined.

Throughout the revised evcluation criteria "effsite response organiza-ticn" replaces references to State and local governments.

2. In addition,' evaluation criteria were modified or added to compensate for lack of participation by State and local governments in the planning process, for these functions:

'c. Identification of the functions which require State and local authorization before implementing (A.2.a.).

b. [ prev 4s4en] Identification of additional liaisen personnel tc aavise and assist State and local officials in an emergency (C.5.).

c. Provision for advising State and local officials on emergency actions to be taken (0.4. , J.10. f. ) .

-d. Provision for coordinating emergency messages with State ano local governments (E.8.).

e.: Provision for communications with non-participating State ano local emergency operations facilities (F.1 '.

f. Provision for public information cescribing the role of the offsite response organization vs. the State and local organiza-tions during the emergency (G.1.e.).

g. Establishment of an emergency operations center for use in  :

cirecting and controlling offsite response functions (P.3.). '

h. Offsite response organization shall hive the administrative and

. physical means (even though they might not have the respcnsi-f- bility) for activating the alert ard notification system (E.6.

I and J.9.).

E__ _ _ _ . - . -  !

i. Recommendation on the use of potassium iodide (KI) for the gen-eral public (J.10.f.)

j. Provision for encouraging participation in exercises and drills by State and local governments but not requiring it (N.2.a. and N.6.).

k. Provision of training to persons in the utility's offsite response organization who wf11 be responders (0.4.k.).

1. Provision for offering training to non-participating State and local governments and other organizations (0.6.).

m. Provision for provioing copies of the offsite plan and its revisions to non-participator.g State anc local government entities with which the offsite response organization identifies interf aces in its offsite plan (P.11).

)*

H. Application of the " Realism'I Rule The Commission amended its rules in 10 CFR 50.47c(1) to provide criteria for tne evaluation at the operating license review stage of utility-preparea emer .

gency plans in situations in wnien state anc/or local governments cecline to participate further in emergency planning (52FR42079). The revised rule reads as follows (empnasis acced) ,

(c)(1) Failure to meet the apolicable standards set forth in paragraph Ib) of this section f_ result in the Commission declining to issue an operating license: however. the applicant will have an opportunity ;o_ demonstrate to the satisfaction nf the Commission that defic 1encies in the plans are not signif1 cant for the plant in questice.

t.nat acecuate inter 1m ccreensating actions have been or wiil te taken promotly, or tnat there are other-compelline reasons to permit plant operstions. Where an applicant for an operating license asserts that its Inability to demonstrate comoltance with requirements of paragracn (b) _

cf this section results wholly or substantially from the decision oi state ana/or local governments not to participate turtner in emergency planning, n an coerating i1 cense may be issueo 17 the applicant demonstrates to the Commission's- satisfaction tnat:

li) The appl 1 cant's inacility to comply with the requirements of paragrapn (b) of this section is wholly or substantially the resuTt of tne non-participation of state anc/or local governments.

(ii) The applicant nas mace a sustained, gooo faith effort to secure and retain participation of tne pertinent State and/or local governmental authorities, incT'cing u tne furnisning of cepies of its, crercency plan. ,

(ii1) The apolicant's emergency plan provides reasonable assurance that public healtn safety is not encangereo by cperation of the f ucility concerned. To make tnat fancino, tne appl 1, cant must demonstrate tnat. as outlinec celow, acecuate protective measure can are w1il be taken in tne event of en emergency. A utility plan will be evaluated  !

against tne same planning standarcs applicaole to a state cr loCai plan, cs 11stec in caragraph () of tnis section, witn cue allowance made corn for--

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(A) Those elements for which state and/or lucal non-participation makes Complidnce infefsible and (B) The utility's measures designed to conipensate for any deficiencies  !

resulting from state and/or locai non-partic1pation.

l l 1 l IN MAKING ITS DETERMINATION ON THE ADEQUACY OF A UTILITY PLAN, THE NPC WILL RECOGNIZE THE REALITY THAT IN Ah ALTUAL '.MERGEhC), STATE AND LOCAL GOVERhs1ENT OFFICIAL 5 WILL E/.ERCI5E THEIR BEST EFF0 Kid TG FROTECT THE HEALTH AND 5AFtiT OF THE FU5LIC. The NRC will determine the acecuecy of that excected response, in combination with the utility's compensating .

l measures, en d case-cy-case basis, subject to the following gu1cance. In acoressing the circumstance where acclicant's inability to cimoly with the requirements of odragrapn (b) of this section is wnolly _r substan l I1 ally the result of non-participation of state and/or local governments, it may oe presumed that in the event of an actual raclologicai emercency, State and local officials would generally follow tne utiilty plan. Fewever, tnis presumption may be rebutted by, for example, a gooc fdith and timely proffer of an acecuate ana feasible state anc/or local radiological emer gency pian tnat would in Va,'et te reliec upon in a radiological emergency.

At the same time the Commission added a new Paragraph 6 Section IV.F. of 10 CFR Part 50, Appencix E, wh1cn reacs as follows

6. The participation of state and local governments in an emergency exercise is not recuired to the extent that the applicant has ident1 flea tnose governments as refusing to partic1pate further in emergency planning activities cursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1). In such cases., an exercise snall be neld with the apolicant or licensee ano sucn governmental entities es elect to participate in the emergency planning process.

The emob23irec cort 1un above is the kernel of the so called " realism rule".

'n 1ts~ realism rule", the Commiss1cn provices the details of now a utility-sconsorea offsite utility plan would be evaluateo. While asserting t.ne.t State and local participation in emergency planning is essential to tne maximum effectiveness of a plan, the Canmission nas provicea tnat, in the case  ;

cf non-carticip4 tion of State and local governnients in the planning process, a j iicense can ce issued even if emergency planning falls shcrt of the iceal, but l 15 still adecuate to protect the public health anc safety. Specifically, a license can be issued uncer 10 CFk E0.47c(1)(iii) if the Commission f1ncs that tne applicants emergency plan prov1 des reasor,6Dle assurance that the public healtn and safety is not encancered by coeration of the facility (prov10ec tnat the non-participation tests are met). As stated in the creamble to the final rule (52FR42084):

The rule recognizes - as cid Conaress when it enacted and re-enacted the provisions cf Section 109 uf the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 - that no I utility clan is 11kely to be aDie provice tne same cegree of puclic  !

orotection tndt woulo obtain under iceal conc 1tions, i.e., a state or iocal particloation, BUT TkAT IT HAY NEVERTHELESS BE ADEOLATE (emonasis accea).

The new rule provides that the utility plan will be evaluated against the sare )

(16] olar.ninc standarcs acolicable to a state and local plan with due

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{dlluwance~ mad both for elements for which non-participation makes compliance

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infeasible and the utility's amasures designed to compensate, fer ceticiencies

,'" T resulting from non-participation. Here, in determining adecuacy, the

'" realism" provisions of the "best efforts respcnse" and the " generally follow tne utility plan" are consicered in combination with tne utility's compensating

, measures.

However, the fuli nature of 10'CFR 50.47(c)(1) can be realized by recognizing that, over ano above the realism provisiur.5, it remains a mechanism for dealing with deficiencies in emergency plannir.g. It provices that tne applicant can see>: and the Commission can issue a license in sub-optimum cases where the [16]

planning standarcs are not met, if the applicant nas comonstrated that:

1. the deficiencies are not significant,

2. adequate interim' compensating measures have er will be taken promptly.

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3. there are other compelling reasons to permit plant operations.

Finally, in the preamble to-the final " realism rule" (52FR42080) ir. referring to its' "Rcelism Romanc" (CLI-86-13), the Commission explained that the:

mea'sure of significance under (1)' and adequacy under (2) is the fundamental emergency planning standarc of 650.47ta] that "no operating license will be issuec unless a finding is mace by NRC that adeouate protective measures can anc will be taken in the event of a radiological

. emergency."

Thus, ultimately, the Commission will have to determine the adecuacy of utility prepared offsite r,lans with the aid of the Licensing Boards FEMA ano Ine NRC 4

staff. In doing to, all of tnese parties are bouno by the rule to recognize the i reality tnat in an actual emergency, 5 tate and local governn.ent officials will l exercise Ine1r best efforts to protect the health and safety of tne public. As Estated oy tne Atemic Safety and Licensino Boaro in tne Shorenam case (LBF-58-13.

May 9, 1988, Docket No. 50-322-01-3):

.The Boaro gives no credence to' the possibility that Nassau County Police  ;

will not provice assistance to the public in an actual emergency Decause the "best efforts" assumption of the Commission anc tne regulations pro n1 bit such cons 1ceration.

4 II. PLANNING STANDARDS AND EVALUATIch CRITERIA  !

A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)

Plarning Standard Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee, anc by State anc local organizations within the Emergency Pian-ning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a ecntinuous basis.

Evaluation Criteria

1. a. The offsite plan shall identify the elements of the offsite response organization for Emergency Planning Zer,es (see Appendix 5 of NUREG-0654/fiMA-REP-1, P.ev.1).1

b. The offsite. response organization shall specify its concept of operations, and its relationship to the total effort. The con-cept of operation will explain how the offsite response organi-zation will function with non-participating State and lccal governments, and will specify the various modes of operation,

c. The offsite plan shall. illustrate these interrelationships in a

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block diagram. This diagram will define the roles.for the off-site response organization and non-participating State and local governments, and identify the lead interfaces.

d. The offsite response organization shall identify a specific indivioual by title who shall be in charge of the emergency response,

e. The offsite response organization shall provide for 24-hour per cay emergency response, including 2a-hour per oay staffing of communications links.

2. a. The offsite response organization shall specify the functions and responsibilities for major elements and key individuals by title, of emergency response, including the following: Commeno anc Control, Alerting anc Notification, Ccmmunicaticns, Public Information, Accicent Assessment, Public health and Sanitation, Social Services, Fire and Rescue, Traffic Control Emergency Medical Services, Law Enforcement, Tr6nsportation, Protective Response (including author 1ty to request Feceral assistance and to initiate other protective actions), anc Radiological Exposure l- 1Gffs1te response organization is defined as the utility offsite emergency response organization along with other participating voluntary and private organizations, and local, State end Federal governments engaging in the development of offsite emergency plans for a nuclear power plant.

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Control'. The descr'iption of.these functions shall incluce a clear and concise summary such as a table of primary anc support

' responsibilities using the: agency as one axis, and the function as the other. This description shall specify those functions which my require State [ame] or local authorization before implementing, such as:

1. Directing traffic; ii. Blocking roadways, erecting barriers in reacways and channeling traffic; iii. Posting traffic signs on roadways; iv. . Removing obstructions frem public roadways, including tow-ing vehicles;

v. Activating sirens and directing the broadcasting of EBS messages; vi. Making decisions and recommendations to the public concern-

'ing protective acticos for the plume exposure pathway; vii. Making decis'.' ens and recommendations to the public concern-ing protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway; viii. haking decisions and recommendations to the public concern-

. ing recovery and reentry; ix. Dispensing fuel from tank trucks to automobiles along roadsides;

x. Performing access control at an EOC, relocation centers and the EPZ perimeters; and The offsite plan shall also identify similar functions and re'sponsib111 ties and interfaces for an anticipated State and local response to an emergency.

b. The offsite plan shall centain where applicable (by reference to specific acts, codes or statutes) the legal basis for such authorities inclucing those that reserve functions to State anc local governments.

3. The offsite plan shall include written agreements referring tc the concept of operations developed between Federal agencies, the offsite response organization, and other support ceganizations having an emergency response role tithin the EmergeN y Planning Zones. The agreem=nts shall identify the emergency measures to be provideo and the mutually acceptabic criteria for their implementation, and spe-  ;

cify the arrangements for exchange of information. These agreertents  !

may be provided in an appendix to the offsite plan or the offsite i plan itself may contain descriptions of these matters and a signature  !

page in the offsite plan may serve to verify the agreements. The signature page format is appropriate for organizations where response functions are covered by laws, regulations or executive orders where separate written agreements art not necessary.

4 The offsite response organization shall be capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted period. The individual in the offsite response organization who will bu responsible for assuring continuity of resources (technical, administrative, and materioi) shall be specified by title.

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4 B. Cnsite Emergency Organization (Hot Applicable)

C. Emercency Response Suoport and Resources Planning Standard Arrangements for recuesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and Iccal staff at the licensee's.near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and  ;

other organizations capable of augmenting the planned respense have been 1dentified.

Evaluation Criteria

1. The Federal government mainteins in-depth capability tc assist li-censees, States and local governments through the Federal Radiolog-ical Emergency Response Plan. Each offsite response organization and licensee shall make FAisions for incorporator.; the Feoeral response capability into its operation plan, including the following:

a. specific persons by title authorized to request Federal' assist-ance; see A.1.d., A.2.a.;

b. specific Federal resources expected, including expected times of arrival at specific nuclear facility sites; and

c. specific licensee and offsite response organization resources au11able to support the Fsderal respense, e.g., air fields, comand posts, telephone lines, radio frequencies and teie-communications centers.

2. [ar] The offsite response organization may dispatch representatives to the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility.

(Technical analysis representatives at the near-site EOF are preferred.)

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3. The offsite response organization shall ioentify radiological labora-tories and their general capabilities ano expectec availability to I provide radiological monitoring and analyses services which can be used in an emergency.

L. The offsite response organization shall identify nuclear and other '

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tifieo and supported by appropriate letters of agreement.

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5. The offsite response organization shall prev 4de icentify liaison

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4 L- D. Emergency Classification System Plannino Standard A standard emergency classification ar.c action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, ic in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State anc local response, plus call for reliance on information previoed by f acility licensees for determinatices -

of minimum initial offsite response measures.

Evaluation Criteria

3. The offsite resso.v,e organization snall establish'ar. emergency classi-fication and e egency action level scheme consistent with that established by (Pc facility licensee.

4. The offsite response organization should have procedures in place that provide for impleinenting emergency actions and that provide for advising State and local officials on emerger.cy actions to be taken which are consistent with the emergency actions reconsnended by the nuclear facil1ty licensee, taking into account local offsite condi-tions that exist at the time of the emergency.

E. Notification' Methods and Procedures Planning Standard Procedures have been established for notification by the licensee cf State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency per-sonnel by all response organizations; the contant of initial and followup messages to response organizations and the public has been established; anc means to provide earTy notification anc clear inservetton to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have oeen established.

Evaluation Criteria

1. The offsite response organization shall establish procecures which describe the bases for notification of all response organizations consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme set forth in Appendix'*I of liUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. These ,

procedures shall include means for verification of inessages. The specific details of verification need not be incluoed in the offsite plan.

2. The offsite response organization shall establish procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing its own emergency response perscor.ei and for alerting ano notifying ncn-participating State anc local governments.

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5. The offsite response organization shall establish a system for ois-seminating tu the public appropriate information contained in initial and followup messages receivea from the licersee (See Evaluatiun Criteria E.3 and E.4 in NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1) including the appropriate notification to appropriate troadcast mecia, e.g., the Emergency Breaccast System (EBS).

6. The of' site response organization shall establish administrative and physical means, and the time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Ione (see Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. [and-FEMA-rep-iG)] It shall be the licensee's responsibility to demonstrate that such means exist, regardless of who implements this requirement. The offsite response organization shall have the administrative and physical means to activate the system.

7. The offsite response organization shall provide written messages intended for the public, consistent with the licensee's classifica-tion scheme. In particular, draft messages to the public giving instructions with regard to specific protective actions to be taken by occupants of affected areas shall be prepared and included as part of the offsite plans. The prescripted messages should address the various conditions such as the delegation of authority by the State and local governments to the offsite response organization to issue prompt instructions. Such messages should include the appropriate aspects of sheltering, ad hoc respiratory crotection e.g., handkerchief over mouth, thyroid blocking or evacuation. The role of the licensee "

is to provice supporting infonnation for the messages. Fer ad hoc respiratory protection see " Respiratory Protective Levices Manual" American Inoustrial Hygiene Association,1963 pp.123-126.

i B. Ther[shallbeprovisionsforcoordinatingemergencymessageswith f participating and non-participating State and local governnier.ts. ,

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' F. ' ' Emercency Communications 4 Planning Standard-n .. . .

' Provisions' exist for' prompt communications among' principal. response crganiza-i- tions to emergency personnel and to the public.

H Evaluation' Criteria ~

1. The communication plans for emergencies shall include organizational titles and alternates for both ends of the communication links. Reliable 3' . primary and backup means of communication for the utility and the offsite response organization shall be established. The utility and the offsite respense organization shall establish the capability to communicate with non-participating State and local governn.ents via normal emergency telephere number (s) (e.g., 911) and via one other backup mode such as'the ability to transmit via existir.g emerp3ncy radio frequencies. Each offsite plan

'shall include:

a. provision for 24-hcur per day notification to and activation of the uffsite response organization'.s emergency response network; and at a minimum, a telephone link and alternate, -including 24-hour per day manning of communication links that initiate emergency respense actions;

,b.

provisiun' for communications with contigucus States 6no local govern-

_ments within the Emergency Planning Zones;

c. provision for communications as needed with Federal emergency response organizations;

d. provision for communications between the nuclear facility ano the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility, ett' site resporte organization's emergency operations centers, and radiological moniter-ing teams;

e. provision for alerting or activating emergency persennel in each response organization;

2. The.offsite response organization shall ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile meoical support f acilities exists.

3. 'The offsite response organization shall conduct periodic testing of the entire emergency communications system (see evaluation criteria H.10, N.2.a and Appendix 3 cf NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1).

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G. Public Education ar.d Information Flanning Standard

'Intermation is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified anc what their-initial actions shall be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broa,dcut station' and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of informa-tion during an emergency (inclucing the physical location ~ or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of intor-l:

mation to the public are established.

Evaluation Criteria

1. The offsite response organization shall provide a coordinated periodic (at-lea:t annually) dissemination of information to the public regarding how they will be notified and what their actions shoulo be in an emer-gency. This information sn'all include, but not necessarily be limited to:

a. educational information on. radiation;

b. centact for additional information;

c. protective measures, e.g., evacuation rcutes and relocation centers, sheltering, respiratory protect 1cn, radioprotective orugs;

d. 'special'neecs of the handicapped; ano

e. special steps to be taken to describe the role of the offsite re-sponse organization vs. the State and local organizations curing the emergency.

Means for accomplishing this dissemination may include, but are not necessarily limiteo to: information in the telephone book; postir.g in public areas; anc publications distributed on an annual basis.

2. The public information program shall provide the permanent and transient adult population within the plume exposure EPI an adecuate opportunity to become aware of the information annually. The programs should incluc&

provision for written material that is likely to be available in a re,i-cence during an emergency. Updated information shall be disseminated at l 1 east annually. Signs or other measures (e.g., decals, pestec notices.

or other means, placed in hotels, motels, gasoline stations and phone booths) shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EP2 appropriate information that will t'e helpful if an emergency or accident occurs. Such notices should refer the transient to the telephone directory or other source of local emergency infor1r.ation anc guide the vis1 tor to appropriate radio and television frequencies.

3. The offsite response organization shall desigrate the points of contact and physical locations for use by news media during an emergency. This should include provis4nns for acccmodating State and lecal government pt.blic information perscr.rel assigned a role under the of tsite plan.

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.r, 4 'a. . The cffsite response orgar.ization shall designate a spokesperson

.who shall have access to all riecessary information.

b. The offsite response crganizatien shall establish arrangements for timely exchange of information mong designateo spokespersons.

- c. The offsite. response orgacitation shhll establish coordinated arrangements for dealing with rumors.

5. The offsite response organization hall conduct coordinated programs at least annually to acquaint news sedia with the offsite energency plans.

information concerning radiatd.,n. r ano points of contact (see G.1.e) for release of public information in an emergency.

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I_ H. Emergency Facilities and Ecuipment plannino Standard Acequate emergency fhcilities and equipment to support the emerger.cy response are provided and maintained.

Evaluation Criteria

3. 'The offsite response organization shall establish an emergency opera-tiens center for use in directing and centro 11ing offsita response functions.

4 The offsite response organization shall provide for timely activation l and staffing of the facilities and centers described in the offsite plan.

7. The offsite response organization, where appropriate, shall provide for offsite radiological . moi.itoring equipnient in the vicinity of the nuclear facility. *

10. The offsite response organization shall make provisions to inspect, inventory and operationally check emergency equipment / instruments at least once each calendar quarter and after each use. There shall be sufficient reserves of instruments / equipment *;o replace those which are remcved from emergency kits for calibration or repair. Calibration of equipment shall be at intervsis recommended by the supplier of the equipment.

11. The 6ffsite plan shall, in an appendix, include identification cf emer-

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gency kits by general category (protective equipment, communications equipment, radiological monitoring ecuipment and emergency supplies).

12. The offsite response organization shall establish a central point (pref-erably associateo with the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility), for tu receipt and analysis of all fielo monitoring data ar.c cecrdination of sample media.

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1. Accident Assessment Plonning Standard Adequate methods. systems and equipnent for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency cerdition are in

'use.

Evaluation Criteria

7. The offsite response organization shall describe the capability and re-sources for fielo monitoring within the plume exposure Emergency Planning '

Zone which are an intrinsic part of the concept of operations for the facility.

5. The offsite response organization, where appropriate, shall provide methcds, equipment and exper,tise to make rapid assessments of the actual or potential magnitude ano'1ocations of any radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways. This shall include activation, noti-fication means, field team composition, transportation, communication, n.onitoring equipnent and estimated deployment times.

9. The offsite response organization shall have a capability to detect anc measure radiciocine concentrations ir Eir in the plume exposure EPI as low as 10-7 mci /cc (microcuries per cubic centimeter) under field conci-tiens, interference from the presence of noble gas ano background racia-tien ,shall not cecrease the stated minimum detectable activity.

10. The otihite response organization shall establish means for relating the sarious measured parameters (e.g., contamination levels, water and 61r activity levels) to dose rates for key isotopes (i.e., those given in Table 3, page 18 of NUREG-0554/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1) and gross radioactivity measurements. Provisions shall be mace for estimating integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates and for comparing these estimates with the protective action guices. The cetailed provisions sh611 be described in separate procedures.

11. Arrangements to locate and track the airborne radioactive plume shall be mace, using either or both Federal and offsite response orSanizatier resources.

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J. Protective Response Planninc Standard A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure path- I way EPZ for emergency workers and the public. Guicelines for the choice of protective actions, caring an emergency, consistent with Federal guaance, are

! developec and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion expcsure path-l way EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

QaluationCriteria

1. Each licensee and offsite response organization shall make provisions for evacuation routes and transportation for onsite individual; to some suit-able offsite location, including alternatives for inclement weather, high traffic density and specific radiological conditicns.

9. Theoffsiteresponseorgani$ationshallestablishacapabilityforimple-menting protective measures based upon protective action guices and other criteria. The offsite response organization shall describe the means for recommending . protective actions to the public, for activating the alert and notification system, and for netifying the public of prctective ac-tion recommendations. This snall be consistent with the reconeendations of EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive otrborne clumes (EPA-520/1-75-001), and with those of DHHS/FDA regarding radicac-tive contamination of human food ano animal feeds as published in the Feceral Recister e on October 22, 1982 (47 FR 47073).

10. The offsite response organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathwey shall include:

a. Maps showing evacuation routes, evacuation areas, preselected radio-logical sampling anc monitoring points, relocation centers in host areas, and shelter areas (icentif1 cation of radiological sampling and monituring points shall include the designations in Table J-1 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 cr an equivalent uniform system cescribed in the offsite plan);

b. Maps showing population distribution around the nucitar facility.

This shall be by evacuation areas (licensees shcIl also present the information in a sector format);

c. Means for notifying all segments of the transient and resioent population;

d. Means for protecting those persons whose mobility n.ay be impairec due to such factors as institutional or other confinement. These means shall include notification, support and assistance in implement-ing protective measures where appropriate;

e. Provisions for the use ci racioprotective drugs, particularly for emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the plume exposure EPZ whose inrediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult, including ouantities, storage, and means of c1stribution:

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f. The offsite-response organization's plans should-incluot the methed 1^. by_which decisions by tbc State Health Department for administering.

radioprotective drugs to the general population can be made curing an_

1* emergency. The plan-shall adopt the methed used by the Etate where i' .such a method is available. The plans shall- provide for advising E . State Health Departments regarding such decisions; and tne predeter-mined condition under which such drugs may be used by offsite emergency.

l' workers;1-J 'g. Means of relocation;.

h. Relocation centers 1n host areas which are at least 5 miles, ano preferably -10 miles, beycnd the boundaries of the plume e::posure emergency planning zone (see J 12.);

Projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes unoer emergency

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j. Control of access to evacuated areas eno organi:e. tion responsibili- -

ties for sucn control;

-k. Identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments (e.g.,seitsonalimpassabilityofroads)touseofevacuationroutes, and conti:1gency measures;

1. Time esticates for evacuation of various sectors and distances baseo C

on a cynamic analysis (time-motion study under various conditions) for the'phme exposure pathway emergency planning zone (see Appen-ci:: 4, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1); and

m. The bases for the choice of recommended protective actions from the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions. This shall in-clude expected local protection' afforded in residential units or other shelter for direct-and inhalation exposure, as well as evacua-tion time estimates.2 15ee DHH5 Federal Register notice of July 24,1985 (50 FR 30252) entitico Federal Policy on Distribution of Potassium lodide Around Nuclear Power Sites for.t!se as a Thyroid Blocking Agent.

2The following reports may be considered in determining protection afforoec.

(1) "Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents" Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and Private Structures" (SAND 77-1725), Sandia 1.aboratory.

(2) " Examination of Offsite Radiological Emergency Measures for Nuclear Reactor Accioents involving Core Melt" (SAND 78-0a54), Sanoia Laboratory.

(3) " Protective Action Evaluation Part li, Evacuation and Sheltering as Pro-tective Actions Against Nuclear Acetoents Involving Gaseous Releases" (EPA 520/1-78-0015). U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

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11. ThEoffshteresponseorganizationshallspecifytheprotectivemeasurch j to be used for the ingestion pathway, including the rethods for protect- 0

.ing the public from consumption cf contaminated foodstuffs. This shall

-include criteria for oeciding whether dairy animals shall be put on stored feed. The offsite plan shall identify procecures for detecting contamination, for estimating the dose commitment consequences of uncon-

t. rolled ingestion, and for imposing protection procedures such as impounc-ment, decontamination, processing, decay, product ' diversion, ar.d preserva-tien. Maps for recording survey and monitoring data, key land use data (e.g., farming), cairies, food processing plar.ts, water shecs, water supply intake and treatment plant: and reservoirs shall b; maintained. Provisions for maps showing detailed crop information may be by inclucing reference to their availability ano location anc a plan for their use. The niaps shall start at the f acility and include all of the 50-mile ingestion pathway EP"'

Up-to-date lists of the name and location of all facilities which regulat .

process milk preaucts and other large amounts of food or agricultural products originating in the ingestion pathway Emergency Planning Zone, but located elsewhere, shall bp maintainea.

12. The offsite response organization sha11' describe the means for register-ing and monitoring of evacuees at reloc6 tion centers in host areas. The personnel and equipment available sna11 be capable of meritoring within about a 12-hour period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.

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K. Radiological Exposure Control Planning Standard Means for controllir.g radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. The means for controlling radiological exposures shall irclude exposure guidelines consistant with EPA Emergency Worker anc Lifesaving Activity Prctective Action Guices.

Evaluation Criteria

3. a. The offsite response organization shall make provision for 24-hour-per-day capability to determine the doses receivec by emergency perscnnel involveo in any nuclear accident, including volunteers wno are part of the offsite response organization. They shall also make provisions for 01stribution of oos1 meters, both self-reacing and permanent record devicgs,

b. The offsite response organization shall ensure that desimeters are i reaa at appropriate frequencies and provide for maintaining dose  :

records for emergency workers involved in any nuclear accident. 1 I

4.- The offsite response organization shall establish the decisicn chain for j authorizing emergency workers to incur expusures in excess of the EPA '

General Public Protective Action Guides (i.e., EPA FAGS for emergency workers and lifesaving activities).

5. a. 'The effsite response organi:ation, as appropriate, shall specify action levels for determining the need for decontamination.

b. The offsite response organization, as appropriate, shall establist the means for radiological decontamination cf emergency personnel wounds, supplies, instruments and equipment, and for waste disposal.

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I L. Medical and Public Health Sucport Planning Standard Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.1 Evaluation Criteria

1. The offsite response organization shall arrange for local end backup hospital and medical services having the capability for evaluation of radiation exposure and uptake, including assurance that persons provicing these services are adeountely prephred to handle contaminated individuals.

3. The offsite response organization shall develop lists inoicating the location of public, private anc military hospitals and other emergency medical services facilities within the State or contiguous Stater con-sidered capable of providing medical support for any contaminated it.jured inoividual. The listing r#,il include the name, location, type of facility and capacities and any special radiological capabilities. These en:ergency medical services should be able to radiologically monitor cen-tamination personnel, and have facilities and trained persorr.el able to Care for contaminated injured persons.

4 The offsite response organization sball arrange for transporting victims of radiological accidents to medical support facilities.

1The avai;aD111ty of an integratec emergency medical services system and a public health emergency plan serving the ared in which the facility is located and, as a minimum, equivalent to the Public Health Service Guide for Developing Eealth Disaster Plans, 1974, and to the requirements of an emergency medical services system as cutlined in the Emergency Pedical Services System Act of 1973 (PL 93-154 and amencrr.ents in 1979 PL 96-142), should be a phrt of and con-sistent with overall State or local disaster control plar,s and should be com-patible with the specific cverall emergency response plans for the facility.

t M. Recovery and Reentry Planninc and Postaccident Operations Planninc Standaro-General plans'for recovery and reentry are developea.-

. b aluation Criteria

1. The offsite response orgdni:ation, as' appropriate, shall develop general plans and procedures for. reentry and recovery and describe the means by which decisions to relax protective measures (e.g., allow reentry into ar.

evacu:stec area) are reached.- This process should censider both exiscing and potential conditions.

3. The offsite plan shall specify means for informing members of the offsite response organization that a recovery operation is to be initiated, anc of.any changes in the organi,Iational structure that may occur.

4 The offsite plan shall establish a method for periodically estimating total population exposure.

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i N. Exercises and Orills j Plannint Stan6ard Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portion of emer-gency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) concucted to skills, and deficiencies icentified es a result of cevelop exercises or drills are- (will be) corrected.

and maintain key <

Evaluation Criteria i I

1. a. An exercise i; an event that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency pre-  ;

paredness plaas and organizations. The emergency preparedness i exercise shall simulate an emergency that results in offsite radio-logical releases which will require response by offsite response j organi:ations. Exercises shall be conductec as set turth in NRC anc <

FEMA rules. " '

b.- An exercise shall include mobil 1zation of offsite response crgani-zation resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario reouiring response. This includes the demonstration of offsite response organization capabilities to interface with non-participating State and local government, but does not include the use {

of stand-ins for the anticipated State and local response. The offsite .

response organization shall provide for a criticue cf the biennial '

exercise by Federal and offsite response organization observers /

' evaluators. The scenario [sha44] should be varied from exercise to exercise such that all major elements of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a six-year period. Each organi:ation

[sha44] should make provisi a u start an exercise between 6:00 p.m.

and 4:00 a.m. Exercises [shal;] should be conducted curing different seasons of the year. At least one exercise shall be unannounced.

2. A drill is a supervisec instruction period aimec at testing, ceveloping and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a '

component of an exercise. A drill shall be supervised and evaluated by a qualifiec drill instructor. The offsite response organization shall conduct drills, in acdition to the biennial exercise at the frequencies ]

1no1cated below: )

a. Communication Drills Communications between the licensee and the offsite response organiza-tien within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning lone shall be tested monthly. Communications with Federal emergency response organizations arc offsite response organizations within the ingestion pathway shall be tested quarterly. Communications between the nuclear facility, offsite response organization's operations centers, ano fiele assessment teams shall be tested annually. Communication drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of )

messages. If practicable, attempts should be made to include non-participating organizations in tne monthly communications crills.

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c. - Medical Emergency Drills

.. - A. medical emergency drill involving a simulahed contaminated individ-J +,. ual which ccntains- previsions for participation by the local support services agencies (i.e., ambulance ~ano offsite medical treatment

, S facility) shall be conducted annually.: The offsite portions of-the medical drill may be4 performec as part of. the required biennial exercise.

d.. Radiological Monitoring > Drills

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. Plant environs'and radiological monitoring drills (ensite and cfi-

, site)'shall.be conducted _ annually. These:orills shall include.

H collection ano analysis:of all' sample media (e.g., water, vegetation, soil and atr).: anc. provisions for communications and record keepng.

Where appropriate, local organizations shall participate.

e. . Health ~ Physics Drill rf

' Health Physics crills-shall be conductec semi-annually which involve respense to, and analysis of, simulated elevated airburne and licuid samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.

2. The offsite response organization shall oescribe how exercises and drills are' to be carried out to allow free play for.cecisionmaking and to meet the. following: objectives.1 Pending the development of exercise scenarios anc exercise evaluation guidance by NRC and' FEMA the scenarios for ose in exercises and drills sFall include but not be limited to the following: ,

a. The basic objective (s) of each drill and exercise and appropriate evaluction criteria;

b. The date(s), time period, place (s) and participating organizations;

c. The siniulated events;

d. A time schedule of real and simulateo initiating events;

e. A narrative summary describing the ccnduct of the exercises or drills to include such things as simulated casualties, of fsite fire department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective cloth-ing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public infor-nation activities; and

f. A description of the arrangements for and advance materinis to be <

proviced to offit.tal observers.  !

4. Off.cial observers from Fecieral government and the otisite response organization shall cbserve, evaluate, and critique the required exer-cises. A critique shall be scheduled at the conclusion of the exercise to evaluate the ability of organizations to respond as called for in-the offsite plan. Th3 critique shall be conducted as socn as practicable after the exercise, ano a formal evaluation shall result from the critique.

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5. The offsite respense organization shall establish means for evaluating

' l observer and participant comments on areas needing improvement, including i emergency plan procedural changes, ano for assigning responsibility for implementing corrective cetions. The offsite response organization shall establish management control'used to ensure that corrective actions are 1mplemented.

6. .The offstte response organization shall attempt to involve the non-participating State and local governments in the exercises anc crills, but their participation is not required.

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O. Radiological-Emergency Response Training Planning Standard Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

Evaluation Criteria

1. The offsite response organization shall assure the training of appropri-ate-individuals. The offsite response organization shall participate in dnd receive training, hhere mutual aid agreements exist between local agencies such as fire, police and ambulance / rescue, the training shall also be offered to the other departments who are members of the mutual aic cistrict.1

4. The offsite response organization shall establish a training program for instructing and cualifyins'versonnel who will implement radiological emer-gency response pl6ns.2 The specialized initial training and periccic retraining programs (including the scope, nature and frequency) stall be provided in the following categories:

a. Directors or coordinators of the response organizations;

b. Personnel responsible for accident assessment;

c. ._

Radiological monitoring teams anc radiological analysis personr.ci; iTraining for hospital persennel, ambulance / rescue, police ard fire department shall include the procedures for notit1 cation, basic radiation protection, anc their expected roles. For those local services support organizations who wil:

enter the site, tra1ning shall also incluce site access procedures and the icentity (by position and title) of the indivicual in the onsite emergency organization who will control the organizations support activities. Offr4:e emergency response support personnel should be provideo with appropriate icenti-fication carcs where recuired.

2If the offsite response organization lacks the capability and resources to acccmplish this training, they may look to the licensee and the Feceral govern-ment (FEMA) for assistance in this training.

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d. Police, security and , fire fighting personnel;

f. First aid anc rescue personnel; 9 Lccal support services personnel including Civil Lefense/ Emergency

- Service personnel;

h. Med1 cal suppoit personnel;

3.  : Personnel responsible for transmission of emergency information and

,.. 1 instructions; and

k. Liaison personnel responsible for interfacing with State ano local respenders.

5. The offsite response organization shall provide for the initial and annual retraining of personnel with emergency response responsibilities,

6. The offsite. response organy.etion shall offer training tc non-participating State and local governments and other organizations.

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P.- ResponsiSilityforthePlannineEffort: Development. Periodic Review and V U n ributien of Emergency Plans

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Planning Standard Responsibilities for p1&n development and review and for distribution of. emer-O gency plans are established,. and planners are properly trdnes.,

Evaluation Criteria 1.. The offsite response organization shall provide for the trainir.g of indi-

, vicucis responsible for the offsite planning effoit.

2. The offsite response organization shall identify by title the individual with the overall authority and responsibility for radiological emergency response planning,

, 3. The offsite response orga% ration shall designate an Emergency Planring i Coordinator with respcr.sibility for the development and updati:19 of emer-gency plans and coordination of these offsite plans with other response orger.izations.

4 The offsite response organization shall update its pian and agreements as needed, review and certify it to be current on an annual basis. The update shall take into account changes identified by drills and exercises.

5. The offsite emergency response plans and approved changes to the plans

. , hall be forwarded to all participating organizations and appropriate individuals with responsibility fer implementation of the plans. Revised pages shall be odted ano marked to show where changes have been made.

6. The offsite plan shall contain a detailed listing of supporting plans and their scurce.

7. The offsite plan shall contain as an appendix listing, by title, pro-edures recuired to implement the offsite plan. The lisoing shall include the section(s) of the offsite plan to be implemented by each procedure.

8. The offsite plan shall contain a specific table' of contents. Plans sub-mitted for review should be cross-referencea to these criteria.

10. The offsite response organization shall provide for updating telephcr.e numbers in emergency procedures at least quarterly. 1

11. The offs 1te response orgerization shall provide copies of the offsite plan and its revisions to non-participating State and local government entities where interfaces are ioentifieo in Planning Standaro A.

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Analysis of Coments 0

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, .Coment #1: Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy This document is basically flawed in that it assumes that in an actual radio-

'f logical emergency, nonparticipating State and local. governments wilf in fact cooperate with the utility plan and will have. sufficient resources to implement-the plan. .There is ne' basis in reality for this assumption. The only rational and conservative' assumption is that the nonparticipating organizations will do exactly- asnthey have promised, i.e., refuse to participate in an emergency.

This assump' tion also' guts the essence of emergency planning in that it takes

", the planning out of emergency planning and retreats to a pre-TNI.ad hec treat-ment of emergency planning. This draft NUREG should be withdrawn.

Response

As noted in Comment #2b, among others, NUREG-0654/ FEMA-rep-1, Rev. I, Supp. 1 (hereinafter referred to as.Supp.1) includes the following assumptions for the development, review and evaluation of utility offsite plans and preparedness:

"1. ~In an. actual radiological em,rgency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in emergency planning will: . .

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public; 1

b. Cooperate with the utility and follow the' utility offsite plan; anc

c. Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility plan where State and local response is necessary."

The first assumption comes directly from the Connission's regulations in 10 CFR l

50.47(C)(1)(fii)(B) which states "...In making its determination on the adecuacy of a utility plan, the NRC will recognize the reality that in an actual emergency,  ;

state and local government officials will exercise their Sest efforts to protect  !

the health and safety of the public..." In adopting this so called " realism" rule, the Commission specifically and pointedly rejected comments that state and local governments would refuse to participate in an emergency [See the Federal Register published November 3,1987 at 52 FR 42078].

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_y The second. assumption comes from the same rule except that the " rebuttable L

' presumption" in the rule is not included in Supp. 1. Section 50.47(C)(iii)b L provides:

"In addressing the circumstance where applicant's inability to comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section is wholly or substantially the result of non-particiaption of state and/or local governments, it may be pre-sumed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency state and local officials would generally follow the utility plan. However, this presumption may be rebutted by, for. example, a good faith and timely proffer of an adequate and feasible state and/or local radiological emergency plan that would in fact p be relied upon in a radiological}, emergency."

The " rebuttable presumption" aspect is missing from Supp. I becuase the assump-tion is valid until a' party to the hearing process challenges it under the guidelines set forth in the rule. During the plan preparation and FElm review process it is a valid assumption.

' Finally, the third assumotion is a workine assumption for the purposes of utility plan preparation and initial FEMA reviews. As such, the third assumption, that State and local officials will have resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where state or local response is necessary, goes beyond the provisions of the rule. The assumption is provided in Supp. I by the NRC so that utilities can develop offsite plans and FEMA can review those plans, without having to evaluate the resources of a non-participating state er local government. The resources of non-participating State and local governments ma'y ha"? to be evaluated at some point. [Thus,-the-th4rd-assumpt4en-4s-a-work 4ag a s s wmp t 4 e n-fe r- th e-pu rp o s e s-o f-w t 444 ty-p4 a n-p repa ra t 4e n-a n d-44444 a 4- FEMA- rev 4 ews . ]

J We do not ' agree with the connenter that Supp. I and its assumptions gut the essence of emergency planning and retreats to pre-THI planning. To the atrary, the first two assumptions track with.a rule that was intended to facilitate emergency planning arcund nucicar power plants and the third assumption is intended to further facilitate the planning and review process.

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Coment #2a: Seacoast Anti-Pollution League At the outset, SAPL would object to the serious procedural error in having this document applied for interim use before all the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act have been fulfflied. SAPL endorses the coments sent to Mr. Deve McLove11n, Deputy Assocf ate Dirwetor, Stata and Local 4

Programs and Support Directorate, FEMA on December 11, 1987 by counsel for the <

New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollutica (copy appended).

Response

New England Coalition and Nuclear Pollution comments were docketed separately.

See Coment #22.

Comment #2b:

As far as the substance of this document is concerned, SAPL would highlight and object to an egregious retreat from safety in an assumption set forth in the document at page 2 which was in no way provided for, reflected in or even anticipated in the language of the final rule adopted by the Commission on Octcber 29, 1987, that is assumption 1.c., which states that:

- In an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in emergency planning will have the resources sufficient to implement those portiens of the utility plan where State and local response is necessary.

This assumption represents a gigantic backward step in terms of assurance of public safety and departs from the standards by which State and local government plans have been evaluated heretofore. It is wholly unreasonable to proceed witn an assumption that State and local government plans are backeo by a sufficient base of personnel and material resources when they may not be and indeed are unlikely to be 1f they have not engaged in prior planning for a radiological energency response. It ought continue to be the burden of the Applicant utility to show that adequate resources can and will be marshalled ,

and made available. Shif ting the burden of proof on this issue very seriously l diminishes the level of assurance of safety that the public can expect to l result from the plan review and evaluation process under NUREG-0654. '

Response

The response to Comment #1 addresses this issue under the discussion of the third assumption.

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Cc went #2:** cont. Coment #2c:

SAPL also strongly disagrees with assumption 1.b. and in part with assumption 1.a. bu: will not comment on those assumptions here since they are congruent with the final rule. SAFL is challeng' o that rufe through the judiciaf process and will therefore confine th% :onnent to addressim) the reesons why this criteria dccument is not an s Nguate measure for evaluating utility emergency plans even were assumptions 1.a. and 1.b. to be accepted. SAPL sees e.s a major failing of this document that it does not provide clear and express guidance as to how the offsite response organization will provide compensating actions through the use of liaisons to deal with the coordination of information and resources with State and local governments. Other than baldly stating at C.5. that they will do so, the document provides no specific guidance as to where use of liaisons is desirable, what roles they can reasonably be expected to fulfill and how to evaluate whether or not their roles are being adequately carried out. A careful evaludion of the use of these personnel is necessary before there can be any reasonable expectation that a coordinated response will be carried out in the absense of State and local government participation in planning.

Response

Supp.1 identifies the need for liaisons under a new Evaluation Criterion C.5.

as follows:

"The-offsite response organization shall [ prev 4de3 identify liaison personnel to advise and assist State and local officials during an actual emergency in implementing those portions of the offsite plan wnere State or locai response is identified."

To meet this criteria the utility will provide for liaisons in the plan where State or local government response is identified in the plan. FEPA will review the adequacy of M plan vis a vis this Evaluation Criterion. The guidance does not identify where the State or local response is needed - except for the so called " legal authority" issues. (See also the response to Comment #12g regard-ing a [m4ner] the underlined changes to Evaluation Criterion C.S. and the response to Comment #4m regarding the evaluation of these interface positions.)

Comment #2d:

The functions which require State and local authorization before implementation have been identified at A.2.a. Again, there ought be specific guidance as te how that authorization is to be sought to assure it is done in a coordinated and adequate fashion.

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pmment#2: ~ cont. L

Response

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Supp.1 identifies areas that " require" State and local authorization at A.2.a.

and provides specific examples. Since thi's is still an evolving area of the 1

l law, this Evaluation Criteria will be revised to state that these functions may require State and local authorization before implementing. Also, since f I

these " legal authority" issues may well.be site specific, the guidance cannot '

be more specific as requested !n this comment. However, the FEMA review will help ensure that the plan'ider/Nffed requests for authorization that can be accomplished in a coordinated fashion.

Comment #2e:

The requirement at F.1 for the utility and the offsite response organization to establish the capability to communicate with non-participating State and local governments ought to be very much strengthened to require that there be some extraordinarily reliable system for communicating with those entities. *" The primary system should be a dedicated phone link up and the back up system should be a high quality radio system.

Response

F.1-provides that the utility and the offsite response organization shall estab-lish the capability to communicate with non-participating State and local govern-ments via normal emergency telephone number (s) (e.g. 911) and via existing emergency radio frequencies. While the system described by the commenter may be better, it is not considered to be necessary.

Comment #2f:

The_ guidance for written agreements at A.3 and B.4. ought to be made more specific in order that the written agreements will assure that services will be perfurmed and equipment and personnel will be provided as planners expect.

The guidance criteria for these written agreements as orafted are far too I vague and general. Particularly in the situaticn where State and local governments may not be in<olved in prior planning, it is very important that these written agreements assure the provision of services and resources and specify in great detail how, when and by whom they are to be provided.

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Comment #2: cont. Response:

The language in A.3. and B.4. is virtually identical to the same Evaluation

Criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. which has been used effectively since

'1980. We have no basis to find that the agreements for a utility offsite plan should be different than the agreements in State and local governments' offsite plans. These ~ agreements are struck between entities participating in the plan-ning process. No agreements are necessary between the utility and non-participating State and local governments.

Comment #2g3 Finally, there ought to be a listing of each individual relied upon to provide a service (for example, driving buses) and a certification that each such individual has been fully informed of and has consented to assume those responsibilities.

Response

This has not been necessary for State and local offsite plans and there is no basis for requiring it of utility offsite plans.

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(. Comment'#3- Kelli O'Neill This rule change will allow your agency to license Seabrook and Shoreham, and in the process put the lives of. millions of people in jeopar(y.. I whole-heartedly oppose this rule changed!

Response

The comment is noted, l

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Comment #4a: Public Service of tiew Hampshire In addition to these' specific items, NHY would like to propose the concept that a federal emergeng preparedness team, perhaps comprised of one FEMA representative and one USDOE representative, should be established in the region of any nuclear power plant site that faces government non-participation.

- This team would be on the ground floor of an cmergency response for such a site and could be an early lead in the activation and response under the Federal Radiological Emergency. Response Plan (FRERP). In this way, there would be early federal involvement in the response to an actual emergency that could be used to help develop and issue protective action recommendations.

The result of this should provide better protection for the public.

Response

,v-The present response scheme, with the utiitty and State and local governments as first responders and Federal government responding through the Federal Radio-logical. Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) is considered to be acecuate whether an offsite plan is developed with or without the participation of State and local governments. . State and lo:al governments who do not participate in the planning process 'are, nevertheless, expected.to respond to a real emergency on a "best efforts" basis and to generally follow the utility plan.

Comment #4b:

Page 2 - D. Assumptions It is therefore suggested that assumptions 1.a and 1.b be expanded to read as follows:

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public, for example:

• Manning of existing emergency response facilities;

• Establishing communications links with the utility, the offsite response organization and other appropriate response organizations; and

• Mobilizing and applying available state and local resources.

b. Cooperate with the utility, follow the utility offsite plan, and provide timely coordination of response efforts.

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fComment'#4i cont. Response:

See the response to Consnent #1 for a detailed accounting of the genesis and utfif ty of.the three assumptions in Supp. I. We do not have a basis for expand-ing these assumptions as suggested. . The above suggested assumptions begin to provide.the contents and substance of the utility offsite plan. We would expect the offsite plan to detail exactly;what the utility needs from State and local

governments in order to execute the.offsite plan.

Cor,snent #4c:

Page 2 - D. Assumptions-The activation and response or the Federal Government under the terms of the FRERP, as outlined in Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 217, pp. 46542-46579, is an additional assumption that should be included.

Response

, - The activation and response of the Federal Government under the FRERP is a_ given for radiological emergencies of all types. In the case of nuclear power plants it would be the same whether the offsite plans were developed by State and 1

local governments or by a utility.

Comment #4d:

Page 2 - D. Assumptions The assumption that stete and local authorities will appropriately use their existing emergency preparedness and response capabilities, particularly RERP knowledge,'should be explicitly noted in Section I.D. Proposed language is as follows:

d. Avail themselves, to the fullest extent possible under the circum-stances, of existing capabilities, emergency preparedness procedures, training and resources.

ksponse:

See the response to Comment #1 for a detailed accounting of the genesis and l utility of the three assumpticris in Supp.1. We do not have a basis for expand-l ing these assumptions as suggested.

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1 Cogment #4: Cont. Comment #4e:

1 Page 2 - E. Scope The statement taat starts on line 11 ("The utility offsite plans and prepared-ness...") is in need of clarification. If this statement is meant to say that any predefined or exist 1rg state or local capabilities, such as communications systems or emergency response facilities, may be relied upon in a utility offsite plan, then that should be so stated. A utility plan should be expected to account for varying degrees of participation in response to an actual radiological emergency. It should not be required to account for arbitrarily varying degrees of participation during the planning process, as the cited sentence presently could be read to require.

Fesponse:

u This statement will be modified [te-4nd4 sate-eswe-s4early-that-44-en4y-app 44ec te-state-and-4esa4-geveFnments-Part4E4 Pat 4ng-4n-th&-plann4mg-pFeseSs.] The offsite response organization was envisioned to consist of the utility and, if possible, some other participating voluntary and private organizations and local, State and Federal governments. [The-werds" vary 4mg-degrees"-w444-be de4 et e d -be s a w s e-4 4-h a s -b ee n -mi s t a ken 4y-sen s t FW e d-by- s eme- semme n t e'r s -a s -en sem-pass 4mg-nen-pap 44s4pa64mg-ent444es.] Under 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1)(ii), the utility is expected to make a sustained good faith effort to secure and retain the participation of pertinent State and/or local governments. If secured, that degree of participation should be reflected in the offsite plan.

Comment #4f:

Page3 - G. Summary of Changes Item 2.c The phrase,"* emergency operations facilities" should be changed to " emergency response facilities" to be consistent with other federsi publications. i l

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" Emergency cperations facilities" is in common usage among State and local l

governments and will be retained here for facilities designated for the response offsite.

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l Comment #4: cont. Comment #49 :

l Page 5 - Evaluation Criteria A.I.c This criterton appears to oe inconsistent with element A.1.b. Should a utility offsite plan be developed to reflect the various modes of operation discussed in A.1.b, it would be rather difficult to display a definition cf the " rotes for the offsite response organization and non-participating state and local govern-ments" on a single block diagram. Since these " roles" are defined within the varicus modes, this requirement should be deleted.

Response

- Evaluation criterion A.1.6 refers to the words that describe the concept of operations of the offsite play; ' Evaluation criterion A.1.c refers to a block diagram describing that same concept of operations. This guidance implies a single block diagram and that is in fact what is preferred. Alternatives will be considered; however, it is comon knowledge that simpler systems are easier to implement. As a rule of thumb, if it can't fit on a single block diagram the concept of operations may be too complicated.

Cement #4h:

Pages 5, 6 ano 19 - Evaluation Criteria A.2.a and J.10.k Certain functiers Ifsted in the first paragraph of criteria A.2.a and considered in J.10.k fall within the day-to-day responsibilities of state and local govern-ments independent of radiological energency response plans. Functions such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, public health and sanitation, snew removal and ,

emergency medical services are independent of radiological emergency response I needs and should not carry over as requirements of utility sponsored offsite I plans. See e.g., Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, Vol. 21 NRC 644, 815 (1985).

Resoonsei The items mentioned need to be provided in offsite emergency plans whether the plans are developed by State and local governments or by the utility. duwever, Supp. 1 does not dictate who is to provide these resources. It is acceptable for the utility offsite plan to specify that certain parts of the plan will be i implemented by State and local governments who are not participating in the planning process but, nevertheless, are expected to respond to a real emergency with their "best effurts" and to generally follow the utility plan.

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Comment #4: cent. Comment #41:

Page 5 and 6 - Evaluation Criteria A.2.a The If sting of f unctions includec in c;riterion A.2.a for which it is necessary to obtain offsite authority authorization before implementation shculd be clarified. The criterion calls for authorization from both state and locai officials for functions that actually are under the statutory purvE of one or the other, not both. Rather than call for " state and local authorization,"

line 5 of page 6 should be changed to " state or local authorization."

Response

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The suggested change will be made.

n Comment #4j:

Page 5 and 6 - Evaluation Criteria A.2.a A numoer of functions listed as reouiring state or local authorization may not be required in an offsite plan, or may not require state or local authorization.

For example, item 111. (posting traffic signs) and item ix. (dispensing fuel to automobiles along roadsides) are not required to be included in offsite plans. See e.g., Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), L89-85-12, Vol. 21 NRC 644, 816 (1985). Additionally, state and local authorization for access control at utility controlled facilities is not required as may be interpreted in item x. Therefore, it is suggesteo that this listing be refined to reflect only those functions that require state or local authori-zation prior to implementation.

Furthermore, item v. should be revised to read, " Activating the alert and noti-fication system and directing the broaocast of protective actions." Criterion E.5 does not require "EBS" messages and other organizations are not precluded from issuing informational press releases.

Response

See the response to Comment #2d. ,

Comment #4k:

Page 14 - Evaluation Criteria G.5 1 Evaluation criterion G.5 shculd be expanded to allow credit for news media 4 orientation programs conoucted for a nuclear power plant site by other organi-zations; e.g. , the licensee or a participating state for a portion of the EPZ.

Comment #4: co n t.' Response:

Participating State and local governments are considered as part of the Offsite

. Response Organization (ORO) and are included in the definition of the ORO on page 3 of Supp. 1. Evaluation Criterion G.5. refers to training pruvided to the media by the ORO. Thus, participating governments can provide the training called for under Supp.' 1 under the present ' guidance.

Comment #41:

page 22 - L. Medical and Public Health Sup) ort These evaluation criteria should reflect tav use of FEMA Guidance Memorandum MS-1, " Medical Services. "

Response

As stated on page 2 of Supp.1, appropriate FEMA guidance memoranda, policy memoranda and REP docume'nts will be applied to define the conditions of adecuacy 1

and inadequacy of emergency plans and preparedness for specific evaluation criteria. With a minor exception (see the response to Comment #12k.), we did not undertake to incorporate the substance of these many documents into Supp.1.

Comment #4m:

.Page 24 - Evaluation Criteria N.I.b The second sentence of criterion N.I.b appears to be internally inconsistent.

It considers a demonstration during an exercise of " capabilities to interface with non-participating state and local government," yet excludes the use of governmental standins to support this demonstration. We believe that the use of standins would be a beneficial way to demonstrate, and therefore evaluate, the effectiveness of an offsite response organization to cocrdinate with non-participating governments during an exercise. In the absence of stanoins, '

whether physically present, remotely located, or a combination of both, further definition of how this function will be demonstrated curing an exercise is needed.

Respense:

l FEMA ' Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX-3 Amendment dated March 7,1988 which is guidance for pre-licensing (cualifying) exercises under Supp.1 explains that:

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Comment #4: cont. " FEMA will evaluate the timeliness, completeness and effectiveness of interfaces between utility offsite response organization personnel through interactive communications and exchanges with controllers and evaluators. While the con-trollers will not function as stnad-ins, they will provide appropriate opper-tunities for the players to demonstrate the knowledge and interfa:e capabilities of utility offsite response organization personnel. The utility offsite response organization personnel in facilities will be expected to make telephone calls and forward information to control cells. For utility offsite response organi-zation persennel in the field, evaluators will use directed questions to deter-mine their ability to carry out their interface capabilities. Thus, FEMA will use informattun secured by both exercise controllers and evaluators to assess the utility offsite response organization's interface and liaison capabilities."

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-Comment #5a: Town of Amesbury The Town of Amesbury's initial response to the concept of the proposed document' was one of the appearanca of an. inherent redundancy in offering-public coment on a document intended to usurp the authority anc. intentions of local and State public entities. Notwithstanding the aforementioned notion,

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the Town stands firm in its opposition to the document and intends to continue its fight in the Courts to overturn the recent rule change which precipitated the drafting of this document.

.The proposed criteria is nothing more than a self-serving publication that aods to the public . perception that the NRC will let nothing stand in its way Lto prevent the licensing of a nuclear power plant. Interim use of the<

document defies logic - how isfthe NRC to honestly assess the ruerits of a utility plan when guided by a a'ocument that may face dramatic revision? Would the NRC take it upon itself to go back, and demand utility plan changes to a submittal the NRC may have already deemed adequate? The experience gained by the Town of Amesbury in current NRC proceedings suggests but one answer - N0!

Response

The comment is noted.

Corrent #5b:

The Town of Amesbury also feels interim use of the document, prior to public comment and final adoption, violates the accepted principles of procedure, including provisions of the Administrative procedure Act. There is no national emergency or national security issue at hand that would allow such interim use.

Response

The prior notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (ApA) apply to agency rules. As stated on page 1 of Supp. 1:

"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have added a supplement to NUREG-C654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 that provides guidance for the development, review and evaluation of utility offsite radiological emergency response planning and preparedness for tnose situations in which State and/or local governments decline to participate in emergency planning. (emphasis added)"

As guicance, the prior notice and comment provisions of the APA de not apply to Supp. 1. The public notice and comment period were included in the process to try to . improve the document. This does not limit the document's utility in the j present. Hence, the terminology " Draft Report for Interim Use and Comment" is i

used in the titie to describe the status of the published Supp.1. Further, as I

Cc ument #5: cont. with any guidance, observance of its provisions neither assures that the Commission's rules have been satisfied nor prevents others from calling into ouestion the adequacy of the utility's plans. The point is that these issues could still be examined in the normal porcess of the adjudication.

Comment #5c:

The document assumes (at D.I.a) that in an actual radiological emergency local officials would " exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public". In contrast, ?,2 Town feels it is making its best effort to protect the public by fighting the imposition of unworkable plans.

Response

The coninent is noted.

Comment #5d:

In conclusion, the document 'should be immediately withdrawn pending cutcome.of the numerous court challenges to the rule change. Only after a court decree:;

that State and municipal rights can be cast aside for the economic benefit of a handful of investors should the concept of utility plan evaluation be reconsidered.

Response

It is not necessary to withdraw the document simply because the rule is being challenged in court. [De-nie-4s-va44d-and-san-be-4mplemented.] We consider the rule to be valid and accordingly that it should be implemented as effectively j as may be possible.

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J Comment #6a: Edison Electric Institute In response to the above Federal Register notice on NUREG 0654-FEMA REP-1 REY-1 Supplement 1, the' Edison Electric Institute (EEI) commends the Nuclear Regulatory Constission (NRC) and the Federa' Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for effectively addressing emergenqy preparedness in the vicinity of nuclear energy plants for those infrequent situations where a state and/or local government refuses to participate in the preparation of emergency plans.

Response

The comment is noted.

Comment #6b: ,-

We agree with the assumption used to develop Supplement I thct, in an actual radiological emergency, state and local officials that have declined to participate in emergenqy planning will, in fact: exercise their best efforts to protect the public health and safety of the public; cooperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan; and have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the offsite plan where state and lccal response is necessary.

Response

The comment is noted Comment #6c:

Utilities want and encourage state and local participation in the development of emergency plans. In every case except two, emergency plans have been developed and tested with full cooperation of state and/or local governments.

But, whenever a state and/or local government declines from or withdraws participation in the emergency planning effort, the utility is handicapped and must develop alternate means to compensate for this action. This new guidance provides the necessary foundation for emergency plans to be developed and tested whenever compensating measures 'become necessary.

Response

The comment is noted.

Comment #6d:

We appreciate the opportunity to provide our comments and urge the NRC and FEHA to proceed with implementation.

Response

The comment is noted.

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t Comment #7a: Shaines & McEachern, professional Association, Attorneys, Town of Hampton Interin use of the Supplemant, as set forth on page 1, therein, violates the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act by injecting regulations into operating license proceedings, including the Scabrook licensing proceeding, prior to a full and fair opportunity for public comment or lawful adoption of the Supplement.

Response

Sco the response to Coment #5b Comment #7b: n The Supplement is a bald attempt to circumvent the inherent and exclusive

police powers of state and local governments to ensure the safety of their citizens. By imposing certain. irrational " assumptions" onto operating license proceeding, FEMA, and the Comission, are plainly attempting to " assume" a workable evacuation plan, irrespective of numerous and substantial deficiencies have led certain state and local governments in the Seabrook proceeding not to participate in an unworkable emergency plan.

Response

The coment is noted.

Coment #7c:

The Supplement is a blatant attempt to role back emergency planning for nuclear facilities to pre Three Mile Island levels by allowing licensing of nuclear facilities over the objections of state and local governments. It is clear that following TMI, the Comission itself recognized that the more stringent emergency planning rules then put in place would provide states defacto veto power over the licensing of nuclear facilities. Recognizing the substantial safety concerns raised by THI, however, the Comission agreed to place this authority in state hands, which the present Supplement now seeks, unreasonably, to revoke.

Response

The comment is noted.

Coment #7d:

The three assumptions which are at the heart of the Supplement are unreason-ab le, and contrary to common sense. The first assumption is that state and local officials will use their "best efforts" to protect the health and safety of the public. While it can be expected that in the event of a nuclear

cont.

Comment #7: emergency, certain sate and local government officials, on an ad hoc basis, would likely attempt to respond, this hardly constitutes a "best eTTort",

particularly where many government officials may experience role conflict and leave their positions, or delay an emergency response, in order to attend to their own families. FEMA has previously taken the position that an ad hoc emergency response is per se inadequate. Embarrassingly, FEMA has new blatantly retreated from this position.

Response

See the response to Comment #1'regarding the three assumptions.

The referenced FEMA position was qualified in that the Agency agreed to support the NRC rule amendment provided that appropriate cuidance be developed to address those situations where State and local governments decline to participate in emergency planning. Such guidance (i.e., Supp.1) has been developed; thus, FEMA supports the implementation of this rule amendment conditioned by the three assumptions discussed in detail in response to Comment #1.

Ccceent #7e:

The second s;.umption provides that state and local governments w11' ccoperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan. Since the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and many New Hampshire and Massachusetts communities, have already determined the utility offsite plan to be grossly inadequate to protect the public safety, it defies logic that this demonstrated inadequate plan would be utilized for an emergency response during an actual emergency.

As a practical matter, particularly during a fast breaking release energency, it is likely that the state and local governments would proceed on and ad hoc basis to protect the public, particularly in view of the inadequate resources with which they would be equipped to perform such tasks as evacuation of the beach areas.

Response

See the response to Comment #1.

i Comment #7: cont. Comment #7f:

The final and most outrageous assumption provides that state and local governments have resources sufficient to implement the utility plan. Since a lack of adequate resources is a primary reason why the Commonwealth of '

Massachusetts and many local governments strongly believe the emergency plan is urworkable, and these entities are obviously more familiar with their cwn resources and capacities than the utility, it defies logic to assume these governments will in fact have sufficient resources to implement an unworkable plan.

Response

See the response to Comment #1 3 Comment #7g:

It is indeed a sad comment that FEMA has retreated from its more robust position of placing the public safety before the licensing of the Seabrook reactor. Essentially, the Supplement can only be construed as FEMA knuckling under to NRC pressure to license this facility irrespective of the adverse public safety consequences. The Supplement is illegal as an interim document and relies upon unrealistic assumptions. The Supplement shoula be rejected.

Response

[The-semme n t-4 s-ne t ed. ] See the response to Comment #7d.

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Comment #8a: State of Illinois, Department of Nuclear Safety After careful review, the consensus of IDh5 staff is that the assumptions on which this document is-based are incorrect. This lack of an appropr14to basis shoule invalidate the entire document. The assumptions and our objections are examined in detail below.

"In an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in energency planning will:

a. LExercise their best efforts to protect the health anc safety of the public..."

While it is likely that State an'b' local officials will respond to an actual radiological- emergency, it is not a certainty. hor is it the least likely that these "best efforts" would be in any way coordinated or effective.

...b. Cooperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan..."

There is no guarantee that State or local personnel would follow a utility plan. in fact, it seems far more probable that they would follow their normal procedures for other' types of eniergencies, as they were applicable to the situation.

...and c. 'have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary."

1 If State and/or Local agencies decline to participate, there will be no way of determining whett er their resources are sufficient for this purpose. Without l

proper planning and exercising, there is no ident1tication of what is necessary, let a*0ne sufficient.  ;

Response

See the response to Comment #1.

Comment #8b:

...the utility's offsite response plan and the ot'fsite response organization w111 provide compensating actions through the use of liasons to deal with the coordination of information and resources with State and local governments and to provide advice and assistance to responding State and local governments in implementing their assigned roles and functiuns under the utility's offsite response plan."

In general, utilities have neither the resources nor the lecal authority to carry out many of the actions associated with effective response. Additionally, the reliance on liaisons is questionable at bost. If State and/or local governments were ceclining to participate, the utility's credibility would likely be so low that liaisons would either be refused access to local ano State facilities, or be ignoreo.

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-Response:

We disagree-and stana.by the guidance in Supp. I which implies that the liaisons E

will'be useful and used.

. Comment #8c:

The document, which presents many of the same familiar standards as in the

[- original 0654, depends heavily on this rather elastic definition:

'"Offsite Response Organization (ORO): The utility offsite emergency n response organi:ation alonVwith other participating voluntary and j private organizations, and local, State, and Federal governments engaging ;

, g, in the development of offsite emergency plans and preparedness for a nuclear power-plant."'

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The first problem with this definition is that it assun.es some participation by local and State government, which may not be the case. The secono problem  ;

is the inelasticity cf the requirements. Obviously the extent to which the I ORO will .be able to meet the extei.sive requirements will depend on the size and composition of the ORO, which is undefined.

Respy.se:

The cefinition of the ORO does not assume isny participation by State or local

, governments. What it does is accomocate such participation if it exists. Tbc exact size of the ORO will be dependent upon site specific needs and will be defined in the offsite plan.

Comment #8d: ,

In summary, we find th1s docunent to be flawed in its basic assumptions and therefore invalid. We request that NRC and FEMA reevaluate these assumptions and issue new guidance.

Res pons'e:

i-See the response to Comment #1.

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Comment #9a_1 The Chairman, The Public Utilities Comission, Ohio Adopting Supplement 1 woula merely effect " bookkeeping" adjustments to reflect

l. the shifting responsibilities and burcens of emergency planning that the NRC has decided to create in its November 3,1987 rule change.' Supplement 1, te  !

l the extent that it purports to make possible NRC/ FEMA review of utility

l. emergency planning in the absence of State or local approval or participation, only creates a sterile format change tu.make such reviews possible and further exacerbates the problems of rationalizing an inherently irrational policy decision.

The old adage of "bac cases make bad laws" is the premise underlying the design purpcses that Supplement 1 will implement. The proposed Supplement 1 changes to NUREG 0654 fails to ,iuvide any basis for the planning and evaluation strategies inherent in the " realism doctrine"--the assumption that State anc local gcVernment will " exercise their best efforts to protect the hecith and safety of the public, cooperate with the utility anc follow the utility's offsite plan, and have resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility's of tbite plan where State and local response is necessary". Emergency planr.ing is a responsibility that the State and local governments in Ohio devote great resources to support and have oeveloped a joint comitment to effectively protect Ohio Citizens from nuclear plant accidents.

The effects of Supplement 1, to strip the State of its decision-making role and to make a substitution for its authority with the " realism doctrine" and te implement such a pelicy with a sifting and sorting of mere worcs, undermines the natural and rational structure of government planning, authority, ano especially, responsibility. Building a policy on the basis of "having it both ways" crtMes bad policy, rules, and consequently injures public protection, ano the public's confidence in the planning process. Public confidence in emergency planning, rightly, depends on the perception of a consensus plan.

The ccesecuences of adopting Supplement 1 will have an adverse impact on future Ohio emergency planning activities.

Response

Supp. I coes not " strip" the State cf its decision-making rule. To the contrary it provides a mechanism, via the offsite plan along with the utility resources, for the State to exercise its decisionmaking to the greatest advantage during on actual emergency.

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Cornment #9: cont. 1 Ccen.ent #9c:

The State of Ohio objects to adopting Supplement 1 because the criteria, relying as it does on the " realise doctrine", ignores the importance of State )

responsibility, participation, and commitment to assuring the citizens of Ohio I that acequate protective measures wi1T be taken in the event of a radiological emergency for application in potential future emergency response planning -

activities, l

Response

i The comment is notec.

Eomment49d: ,,,

We strongly object to the adeption of Supplement 1.

Accption of the Supplement will belittle the role of the State, diminish public confidence, and further errode Federal government credibility.

The creation of the altered regulatory environment thet is proposed will result in the unirtended diminishment rather that the enhancement of future emergency preparedness and radiological. protection of the citizens of the State of Ohio.

Response

The comment is noted.

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j. l Comment #10a: Yankee Atomic Electric Company n 'YAEC endorses the effort expended by the NRC and the FEMA.to develop this suppl es.ent. ye agree that utility cavaloped compensatory measures resulting from the non-participation of state and/or local governments in emergency

• preparedness must be inclucec in the subject document.  ;

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Response

I The comment is noted.

Comment #10b:

First, criteria for explicit it.Gision of the concept of the " graded apprcach" in the document would improve overtil protection of public health and safety .

in tne plans. The graded approach mandates that protective actions must be {

instituted commer.: urate with the public risk presenteo. The advantage is that '

resources are allocated on the basis of degree of actual risk. Under this regire sheltering is identifiable as a legitimate and sometimes preferred response to an event. In addition, this change nelps to mitigate public perceptien that a massive evacuation is always necessary er that it is either the best or the only response..

Response: , ,

i NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. I and hence Supp. I are sufficiently general to l acccmodate the socalled " graded approach" to emergency plar.riing. Figure 1 on page 16 of NOREG-0654 is a depiction of a " graded" type response.

Ctruent #10c:

Second, we recommend that a federal emergency preparedness team be set up for sny state which chooses not to particip6te in emergency planning ano orills.

A team consisting of Department of Energy and Federal Emergency Management Agency representatives located within that state could respond quickly under i the Federal Radiological Emergency Response plan (FRERP) in the event of a '

real emergency and thus more effectively support the state as it fulfills its obligations.

Pesponse:

See the response to Question #4a.

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Ccement #10: cont. j i

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Thirdly, we agree with and support the " realism" concept. That is: in an actual radioicgical emergency, state and local officials that have declined to participate in emergency planr.ing will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public. We believe that state and local officials will exercise their best efforts to respond to a real emergency.

This concept should be further developed in the intrccuction with specific actions that oelineate how these governments will discharge their responsi-bilities as follows:

- Manning existing emergency response facilities;

- Establishing communication (links with the utility, the offsite response i organization ano other appropriate response organizations;

- Mobilizing anc applying available state and local resources; 1 i

- Cooperating with the utility, following the utility offsite plan and providing '

timely cceroination of response efforts;

- having the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where state and local response is necessary; ano

- Avail tn'emselves, to the fullest extent possible uncer the circumstances, of capabilities, existing emergency preparedness procedures, training anc resources.

Resoonse:

See the response to Comment #4b.

Comment #10e:

The scope section of the document states that utility plans will be expected to account for the varyirg degrees of participation from state and local organi-

ations. We recommend that this section be clarified to indicate that plans should account for predefined or existing state or local capabilities, like communications systems er emergency response facilities, which may be relied upon in the offsite plan. Tbc section should be clear that a plan is not required to account for arbitrarily varying degrees of participation during the planning process.

Respense:

See the response to Comment ase.

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Comment #10: cont. l Comment #10f:

f l

The organizational control section of the docunent requires a block diagram in i the plan which illustrates interreittionships, defines roles, and identifies lead interfaces. These roles vary with each emergency mode. Illustration of this multifaceted array in a one block diagram is unrealistic. This l requirement should be deleted in favor of a narrative.  !

Response

)

See the restonse to Comnent #4g.

t Comment #10g: r j The organizational control section lists a rumber of state and local government a functions, which should not be requirements of utility spon:;ored offsite plans.

Functions such as fire and rescue, law enforcement, public health anc sanitation, snow removal, and emergency meoical services are routine, day-to-day respon-sibilities independent of any radiological emergency. They should be deleted from this section.

Response

See the re'sponse to Comment #4h.

Comment #10h:

Some emergency planning zones estend across state lines and could involve both participating and non-participate,"q stctes. Evaluation criterion G.5 should be expanced to allow credit for new: media orientation programs cenducted by another state for a portien of the zone.

Response

See the response to Comment #4k. '

Comment #101:

The section on Medical and Public Health Support should be revised to include FEMA Guidance Memorandum MS-1, " Medical Services".

Response

See the respcase to Corrment $41.

I Comment #11a: Kirkpatrick & Lockhart The Draft'is flawed in many respects. Accordingly, it should nct be utili:ed for any purpose on an interim basis .nd should not be adopted as a final supplement.to NUREG-0654. The Govermeents' reasons are set forth below.

1. The Draft is designed to implement changes.in the NRC's rules as described in 52 Fec. Reg. 42,078 (1987) (the "new rule"). The new rule, however, is unlawful and, therefore the' Draft which seeks to implement the rule is also unlawful. Because the new rule is legally defective, it has been challenged on seversi grounds in proceedings censolidatco before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Suffolk County and the State of New York are tiling a brief with that Court tomurrow, March 1, 1988. The brief will  !

demonstrate why the new rule #3 unlawful. A copy of the brief will demonstrate '

why the new rule is unlawful. A copy of the brief will be forwarded to you shortly, and will constitute a portion of these comments.

Response

See the response to Ccmment #5d.

Comment #11b:

The Draft' specifies that the following " assumptions are used for the development, review and evaluation of utility offsite plans and preparedness."

Craft at 2.

In an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have declineo to participate in emergency planning will:

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety cf the public.

b. Cooperate with the utility ano follow the utility offsite plan; ano

c. Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary.

Assumptions (b) and (c) are not consistent with the new rule, or with reality.

With respect to Assumption (b), the new rule does not provide that State and local officials "will cooperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan..." Rather, the new rule makes clear that the so-calleo presumption in 10 CFR i 50.47(c)(1)(iii) is: (1) not mandatory but rather is a presumption that "may" be adopted, depenoing upon the facts in each particular case; and (2) is rebuttable. In fact, even the NRC/ FEMA Task Force which developed the Draft acknowledged that under the new rule, "using [a]

See Attachment 2 hereto. Assump-utility) tion (b plan is Draft in the [a] rebuttable provicespresumption."

for no rebuttdl, ano thus is inconsistent with the rule.

Response

See the response to Comment #1

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c Comment #11: cent. ,

Ceneent #11c:

' Assumption'(c) also cannot be adopted because it.has nc basisiin the 'new rule. . The new rule contains no support whatsoever.for the assumption that State a'no local governments h6ve sufficient resources to implemert any portion of a utility's plan. Attachment 2 hereto confirms that the-Task Force recognized that the new rule is silent on this' matter cf the adequacy of-Stete i and local government resources. .In essence, Assumption (c) has simply been '

fabricated. The Draft provides no basis tor this fabrication.

Response: 1 See the response to Comment #1.

re Comment #11d:

~

The Draft erroneously assumes that non-participating State and local' governments will work with the utility through socalled " liaisons" and otherwise. Again, this is pure fabrication. In the only proceeding thus far, the Shoreham litiga-tien, the sworn, unrebutted statements of New York Governor. Mario Cuomo (Attachment 3 hereto) make clear that the Governments would never work with utility officials. These afficavits document in cetail the many ratior.nl bases for the Governments' decision and further underscore the invalicity of '

Assumptions (b) and (c).

. Response:

The comment is ncted.

Comment #11e:

The Draft assumes that the utility will be able to implement ccrpensatory

i. measures and that State and local governments will participate in planning anc cenmit resources to the planning process. _No basis is provided -- or exists --

for this assumption. These are factual matters that would require investigation on a plant-specific basis.

Response: j Supp. I does not assume that State and local governments will participate in

, the planning process. See the response to Comment #1 for a detailed explanation of the assumptions in Supp. 1.

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Coment #11: ' con t. Coment #11f:

The Draft proceeds on the assumption that a utility plan lawfully may be implemented by a utility, so long as some sort of official governmental sanction or approval or delegation is provided. See Draft at 3, S-6, II. The Draf t ignores _New York case law, which holds that a utility, even with

. government approval or authorization, could not implement a plan. _See Cuomo

-v. Long Island Lighting Co., Concol. Index. No.

op. Feo. 20,1985), aff'd 127 A.D.2d 626, 511 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1987 ,84-4615 (N.Y. S vacated for lack of justiciabTTTEy,, (N. Y. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1988); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shorenam Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-67-26, 26 NRC 201 (1957).

-l i

Response: e

[The-New-Verk-sa s e-4aw-s 4 te d-by- the- sessme n t e p-ha s- 4 n -f a s t -b ee n -va sa ted-a s 4 ad 4 s a t ed- 4 H - th e- semme n t e pi s- s 4 t a t 4 e ri . ] We are not aware of ar.y authoritative judicial ruling that would prevent a utility plan fron being implemented. At l this point, it is not clear that the utility needs " legal authority" to icole-ment the provisions of the plan. The guidance in Supp. I provides for tnat contingency.

Coment #11g:

The Draft's description of an " exercise" (Draft at 24) is inconsistent with the Partial Initial Decision in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclecr Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-32, NRC (Dec. 7, 1987). This decision emphasizes that an NTOL initial exercise must be more comprehensive than the type of exercise called for in the Draft. 4

Response

Comenter does not substantiate the claim. Exercise guidance for this type of pre-licensing exercise without State or local participation is described in the j

{

Amendment to FEPA Guidance Memorandum EX-3. l I

I Comment #11h:

Th Naft proceeds throughout on the apparent assumption that a plan will be auquete if it includes various written provisions as specified in the body of the 3eaft. However, the Draft ignores whether these provisions would actually work and be adequate to protect public health and safety. The Draft is deficient, therefore, because it basically calls for check-list paper reviews, rather than hard looks at' the implementability of a plan.

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, J Coment #11

' cont. Response:-

FEMA reviews are not check-list paper reviews. There will be an exercise of the implementability of the pian.

Coment #111:

-The deficiencies described in points I-7 pervade the entire Draft and make it unsuitable for use. It should be discarded.

Response

J';n The coment is noted.

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L l Comment #12a: Nuclear Management and Resources Council A federal response upability is avafiable and has been demonstrated on two occasions in full field exercises (St. Lucie and Zion) from the twelve federal mener agencies of the Federal Radiological Emerg6ncy Response Plan (FRERP),

as outlined in the Federal Register, Vol. 50, No. 217. pp. 42542-46579. The purpose of the FRERP agencies is to protect public health; as such, it should be recognized in Section I.D, " Assumptions," page 2.

Response

l See the response to Coment #4c.

Corment #12b:

A number of functions listed requiring state or local authorization may not be required in an offsite plan. Certain functions listed in Section II. A.2.a.

" Assignment of Responsibility," pp.5 and 6, and Section II.J.10.d and J.10.X,

" Protective Response," pp.18 and 19, fall within the day to day responst-bilities of state and local governments independent of radiological emergency response plans.Section I.0, " Assumptions," page 2, notes that in an actual radiological emergency, state and local officials that have decifned would make best efforts to participate, cooperate and provide resources as necessary to protect the health and safety of the public. Therefore, it is recommended that functions such as Fire and Rescue, law enforcement, Public Health and Sanitation, snow removal, and Emergency Medical Services in the absence of Radiological Medical Response Services, should not be requirements for utility supported offsite plans.

Response

See the response to Coment #4h.

i Comment #12c: i The statement (A.I.b) "and will specify the various modes of operation" needs clarification. This is an expansion of NUREG-0654 and no frame of reference is given for its intent.

Response: i i

See the response to Comment #4e.

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,I Comment #12: cont. i Coment #12d:

1 The definition (A.I.d) for "off-site response organization" includes the utility I and participating voluntaar, privata and governmental organizations. This cri- l terion does not provide the latitude necessary to designate all the appropriate i persons in charge. The criterion should identify by title the individual who is in charge overall as well as individuals in charge of support organizations. }

Also. even though governmental agencies may not be participating, they may have statutory requirements to be "in charge" and this criterion does not seem to address this.

Response

Evaluation Criterion A.2a E Mtes that the offsite response organization'should specify the functions and responsibilities for major elements and key -(ORO) individuals by title for both the offsite response organization and the non-i participating State and local organizations. The definition of the ORO is not  !

an appropriate place for this detail or for criteria.

Coment #12e:

This criterion (A.4) does not appear to provide the latitude for designation of all persons in the various organizations who are responsible for continuity of resources.

Response

This Evaluation Criterion is virtually identical to its companion in NL' REG-0654 Evaluation Criterion A.2a covers designation of individuals.

Comment #12f:

The criterion (C.2.c) should specify whether or not it is intended that repre-sentatives are expected to go to both participating ano non-participating organizations' Emergency Operatiun Centers (EOC).

Response

The Evaluation Criterion states that the offsite response organization (ORO) shall prepare for the dispatch of a representative to principal offsite govern-mental emergency operations centers. Since the ORO by definition incluces L_

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N Comment #12: cont. participating local and State governments participating in planning, it'should-

'.be 'clea'r that the CR0 dispatches representatives to'non-p' participating governments' emergency operations' centers.

Comment #129:

Clarification is needed (C.5) to determine what is expected by. the statement

" advise and assist." :s this applicable when state and local officials decide to' participate?-

Response: 3 The underlined words have been added to Evaluation Criterion C.5 as follows:

h',& assist'the offsite response organization shall [pwev4de]' identify liaison personnel to advise

' -3 tate atd local officials during an actual emergency in implementing those portions of the offsite plan-where State or local response is identified.

The word " identify" replaces the word " provide" for consistency with other criteria-in that section. The word " liaison" modifies personnel to clarify  !

t % / role. The phrase "during an actual emergency" specifies the timing of t r-roles. It'is not' applicable per se for participating governments because the liaison function is accomplished between ~the utility and the participating governments under Evaluation Criteria #2.c. in NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1.

Coment #12h:

Clarification (for E.3) is needed. Does this criterion mean that the utility responds to both off-site response organizations and the non-participating state / local agencies within the 15-minute requirements? Or does the off-site

. response organization have an additional 15-minutes to notify the non-participating state / local agencies?

Response

Planning Standard E is a reiteration of the NRC requirement 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)

.which is supported by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E Section D.3 which requires that licensees have the capability to notify responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. Supp. I neither addresses nor modifies this regulation, i.e., there is no aooitional 15 minutes.

I Cetment #12: cent. y Comment #12i:

The sentence (F.1) "The utility and the off-site response organization shall establish the capability to communicate with non-participating state and local governments via normal emergency telephone . number (s) (e.g. 911) and via one other back-up mode..." could be difficult at best to achieve if the state and/or. local government is a non-participant. If the non-participant refuses to answer the call or have the equipment installed, criteria F.1 and F.3 could not be met. If it is to remain, the sentence should be changed to "The utility and the off-site response organization shall attecpt to establish..."

Response

Thecontinuationofthecitspquotationis: "...such as the ability to transmit via existing radio frequencies." It is reasocable for the offsite response organization (ORO) to be able to establish communications with non-participating State and local governments during an emergenpy. The offsite plans should include the appropriate telephone number and radio-frequencies and the communi-cations equipnent should be available to the ORO. The commenter's proposed  ;

change would be more appropriate as an implementing procedure rather than an evaluation criterion.

Comment #12f:

Criteria for distribution of radioprotective drugs (KI) should be standardized.

If the state were to become a non-participant, there is no guarantee that the Health Department would offer a " method" for distribution of KI. Without a standard, numerous contingency plans will be necessary to cover all potential situations.

Response

1 The Federal Register notice of July 24, 1985 (50 FR 30258) entitled " Federal policy on Distribution of Potassium fodide Around Nuclear power Sites for Use as a Thyroid Blocking Agent" allows each State to determine its own policy.

This is so whether State and local governments participate in the planning pro-cess or not. Few States have acopted a policy of either stockpiling or pre-distributing XI around nuclear power plants. It is not appropriate for Supp. I to set a new standard.

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t Comment #12: cont. a Comment #12k:

The reference to not using " stand-ins" needs.further clarification. It is not clear'who the stand-ins are: the non-participants or the off-site response organizations? The criterion uses " shat 7" statements in discussing exerefse l ' schedules instead of "should" statements as used in NUREG-0654 The Supplement is more restrictive than NUREG-0654 in that it states an exercise must be scheduled between the hours of 6 p.m., and 4 a.m. NUREG-0654 uses G p.m. to 6 a.m.

(Note: This criterion includes some guidance from a FEMA Memorandum to all Regional Directors (Draft), January 11, 1988, from Grant C. Peterson, Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support;

Subject:

Unannounced and Off-hours REP Exercises.h.

Response

The response to Coment #4m. addresses the issue of stand-ins and exercises.

The "shalls" and "shoulds" will be changed to be the same as NUREG-0654, as they should. However, since NUREG-0654 is guidance undue emphasis should not be placed the.use of the word "shall". All of the "shalls" and " wills" will be changed to "shoulds" and "coulds" when and if NUREG-0654 (and Supp. 1) is completely revised.

NUREG-0654 calls for two off-hours exercises one between 6:00 p.m. and midnight and one between midnight and 6:00 a.m. FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM) PR-1 relaxes this to one off-hours exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. In general, in Supp. I we have attempted to leave the words exactly as found in the original NUREG-0654 and allow the FEMA GMs to modify Supp. I as they have for many years (See response to Coment #41). However, in this case we believe that the simple change noted here is warranted because of the easy opportunity to avoid confusion. It snould be noted that the FEMA guidance accomplishes the same goal as the original !!UREG-0654 guidance, i.e., testing the ability of State and local governments to noster an emergency response during non-duty hours, with less resources.

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Cor:qent #13a: United States Department of the Interior ,

The subject document appears to be written in a cumbersome sty's that is overly involved with process rather than concise directian. Through;,n the docusant, the offsite response organization (ORO) is referenced as the responsible party for providing direction. It appears that the coordinator, as identified on page 5 under Section II.A.1.d., should be the cited responsible individual providing direction for the ORD. When noting that the ORO is responsible for cost actions, the reader is left woncering who exactly will take responsibility in providing direction.

Response

Evaluation Criterion A.I.d sYates:

The offsite response organization shall identify a specific individual by title who shall be in charge of the emergency response.

Thus the plan should identify who is in charge.

Comment #13b:

As stated on page 2, Assumptions, it is not assumed that non-participating State and local organizations will be faiiifTiar with the utility offsite plans.

However, if these guidelines are to assist in compensating for the it.ek of involvement in the planning process, they mtst involve clarity and more -

concise direction. Further, if the utility's offsite response plan and the offsite response organization will provide compensating actions through the use cf liaisons to deal with coordinating information and resources with State and local governraents and assist States in implementing their assigned roles ano functions under the utility's offsite response plan, it must be assumed that close coordination will occur with non-participating States and local organizations. It is confusing as to how effective this coordination will be, if the States have not been initially involved in the planning process. 3

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Respcnse:

The full statement onpage 2 is:

Although it is assumed that non-participating State and local organizations will repond and follow the utility's offsite plan, it is not assumed that l these organization will be as f amiliar with the plan as if they had partTci l pated in tne planning process ano exercised with the utility. Therefore, tne utility's otisite response plan and the of f site response organization I

l will previde compensating actions through the use of liaisons to deal with the l coordination of information and resources with State and local governments and to provide advice and assistance to responding State and local governments in i

implementing their assigned roles and functions under the :111ty's offsite response plan. (Emphasis added.)

l.

1 Comment #13: cent. It is generally recognized as preferable to have State and local governments participate in the planning process. What we are discussing is the less than optimal situation where State and local governments refuse to participate in  !

emergency planning.

i Commqnt #13c:  ;

Further, it is essential that large Indian tribes shculd participate in any .!

local or State organized effort in off-site radiological emergency preparedness where the location of a nuc'4ar reactor is within a 50 mile radius of an Indian reservation. Some reservations may have an emergency plan in place; thus tribal participation will enhance coordination and strengthen response action in case of emergencies.

Response

It is a long standing FEMA policy that States and local governments are [re44ed wpen-to-4dentify-the-peFsens-44-P4sk-with4n-iG-m4 es-of-a-nWele&P-poweF-p4&n%e T h 4 s -4 s -944 e- s pe s 454 s -a n d -h a s -b ee n -a s semp 44 s h e d - pe r-444 -s p e ra t 4 m g - F e & s t e P G -a R d I few-these-under-senstrwet4en,] to involve Indian tribes in radiological emergency preparedness where their lands are within the Emergency Planning Zones of nuclear power plants.

Comment #13d:

One would hope, the local and State governments would have in place evacuation and other plans to use in event of a catastrophe, albeit not a nuclear accident /

incident per se. It would be assumed more logically that local / State officials would use their own plan and if it fits with the utility's plan so much the better.

Response

See the response to Comment #1 regarding the rebuttable presumption that the non-participating State and local governments would generally follow the utility plan in an actual emergency.

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. Coment #13: Coment #13e:

If would seem usefUl for NRC/ FEMA to require the utility to' be f amiliar with the non-participating officials' ~ plans, and to utilize them to the maximum y; - extent practicable.

Response:~

It might be unreasonable to " require"la utility to acquire the non-participating y ,

' government's plans. Emergency plans can be updated frequent 1y' and non-partici-pating State or local governments may not be willing to share their plans with

. the utility. /

- Comment #13f:

Page 3,. Sec. G.2.h. 'It may be difficult to state that the ORO shall have the means but not the responsibility for activating the alert and notifications system.

Response

Public notification. is' a/ very important aspect of offsite emergency and it has a major regulatory time constraint, i.e.,15 minutes. It is important that the ORO have the administrative and physical means to activate the alert and noti-ficational system even though they may not have the responsibility to notify the public.

Comment #13g ,

Page 6. - The functions Ifsted in 1.-x. involve State and local agencies. The paragraph after this listing states that the plan shall also identify similar functions for an anticipated State and local response to an emergency. It is unclear as to what other functions the plan should identify. .)

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Response

The functions listed in A2(a)i-x. are the so called " legal authority" issues.

The other functions that the plan should identify are listed in A2(a): Command i and Control Alerting and Notification, Communication, Public Information, Accident Assessment, Public Health and Sanitation, Social Services, Fire and a Rescue, Traffic Control, Protective Response and Radiological Exposure Control.

_a - .---_-.mmm._____ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ m_______.._

p l Consnen,t #13: cont. 1 Comment #13h:

Page 12. Para.8. Emergency messages should be immediately released by the licensees to the States as informative bulletins. No concurrence with States should be required in an emergency.

Response

Evaluation ~ Criterion E.8 states:

"There shall be provisions for coordinating emergency messages with participating and non-participating State and local governments."

a Coordinating messages intended for the public has been a long-standing practice.

>s.

These emergency messages are intended to inform the public of what protective actions are necessary, e.g., sheltering or evacuation. It is very important that the pubif e receive a single, coordinated message.

Comment #131:

Page 20.-Paragraph II. We recommend that the maps to be maintained should include wells of significant capacity as well as surface-water intakes, treat-ment plants, and reservoirs within the 50-mile ingestion pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ). Maps locating livestock and dairy animals should also be available. We believe protective measure for the ingestion pathway in the EPZ should also consider fish and wildlife. resources which may be in the food chain. Also fish hatchery operators should be notified about contaminated fish stocks and feed. They may need to modify their fish release schedule. Consider-ation should be given to showing fish hatcheries on the maps.

Since the information contained on the maps would have significant value during an emergency, this section should indicate what agency would be respon-sible for maintaining the maps; how frequently the maps would be updated and who would provide copies of these maps to federal, State and local agencies and at what frequency. We believe the availability of current up-to-date maps locating sensitive sites is very important in a response to a radiological emergency, and more detafis should be provided on this issue.

Response

(

FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM) IN-1 "The Ingestion Exposure Pathway" instructs

]

states that: i 1

" Maps for reading survey and monitoring data, key and use data (e.g., farming, I dairies, food processing plants, watersheds, watersupply intake and treatment i plants and reservoirs) shall be provided. Provisions for maps showing general 1

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crop. information may be met by including all' of the 50-m11e ingestion pathway EPZ. ' Up-to-date lists of the normal location of all' facilities within the -

ingestion pathway EPZ which regularly process milk products and other food er agricultural. products originating in that EPZ shall be maintained."

- This'GM as well as all the other FEIM GMs and memoranda buttress NUREG-0654 and Supp. 1.

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Comment #14a: North Carolina 2epartment of Crime Control and Public Safety This is to encourage you to publish this supplement into a revised NUPEG C654 occument. Tco many fraomented requirements currently exist. I recome.nd this, entire document be rewritten into a simpler more usable form. I further recommend that a task force of users (i.e. these planners from local and state governments and utilities) who must use this document be brought together to agree on a fermat rather than an NRC/ FEMA task force who developed the criteria but can not promulgate that information in a readily usable form.

Response

It is generally recognizeo tbgt NUREG 0654 is in need of revision as it is 8 years old and the fielo of emergency planning has evolved significantly during those years. The exact form and forum for that revision have nuc been determined. FEMA GMs and Supp. 1 would be incorporated into a revision of NUREG-0654 The suggestion of a task force of users will be censioered. In any case., broad comment on any revision of NUREG-0654 will be solicited.

Comment d14b:

I request that Paragraph J.10.F be deleted. This requirement to " plan for the  !

administrating of radioprotective drugs to the public" has not been demonstrated as necessary or tnat it can be done in a safe manner.

Resoonse:

See the respense to Comment #12c.

Comment #14c:

Recommend Paragraph 0.6. be deleted. Training schedules are currently filleo for those participating personnel in the local community who currently reouire training. Making provisions for the training of non-participating organizations is beyond the scope of this directive.

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Comment #1A: cont. I Fesponse:

Evaluation Criteria 0.6 states:

The offsite response organization shalf offer training to non-participating state and local governments and other orgentrations.

This is consistent with FEMA and 14RC views concerning the importance of training in emergency reponse.

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l Comment #15: cent.  !

Comment #15a: Baltimore Gas and Electric 4 BG&E applaucs the NRC/ FEMA efforts in developing and issuing this document in such a timely manner. While the phenomena of non-purtichation has existed  !

for many years, and been dealt with in va.ying ways, it is clear that this aspect of emergency planning is new to the regulatory process anc deserving cf time anc attention.

Response

The consnent is notec.

Coreent #15b:

i-General concern regarding the draft document includes the apparent contradic-tion regarding the extent of involvement that a non-participating agency will ,

have in a real en:ergency response. Contrary to Section I.D., Assumptions, I there are several instances in the evaluation criteria that call on the offsite response organization to assume responsibility for functicrs that are normally reservea for State and local agencies (e.g. I.G.2.a.; II.E.4.; II.E.6.;

II.E.7.; II.J.9.; II.J.10.d.; etc.). In many instances, these functions challenge the authority issue of police power. It is our time belief that adequate offsite response planning can only be realizec if the offsite respense urganizetion has. .the legal right to implement its actions. A workable plan can be developed in sccordance with Supplement 1 criteria if these criteria clearly reflect the assumption that State and local agencies will ccoperate with the utility to exercise their best efforts to protect public health and safety.

Resoonse:

Clearly, an assumption explicit in Supp. 1 is that in an actual emergency State and local officials will cooperate with the utility and follow the utility offsite plan (See the response to Comment #1). Also, Supp. 1 acoresses what may be legal authority issues at certain sites (See the response to Comment 2.d). However, Supp.1 cannot grant utilities authorities that they do not possess uncer State and Federal law and their NRC license. l i

Comment #15c: 3 A second concern is the endorsement of FEMA guidance policies, guidance memoranda sna REP documents in the draft supplement. Reference to these documents in  !

this manner conveys their subject matter to NUREG-0654, Supplement 1. Con-sequently, offsite p .n development will be inpacted by documents that do not .

receive the same regul6 tory processing (a formal review, ccmment, approval and l i

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i Ccmment #15: -

. distribution-mechanism) as the' parent document. Particularly troublesonie is -

the fact that there -are' existing guidance memoranda that expand NUREG-0654, its-draft . Supplement 1- and Federal Regulation. Additionally, since-guidance p> . policies are essentially internal FEMA documents the' full extent of these is unknown.

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Response

FEMA GM's'are used for three purposes: (1) To set forth FEMA policies and pro-

!cedures~ relatea to Radiologieel Emergency Preparedness (REP) regulations or general Agency policies that impact the REP program; (2) to-prcvide guidance to

>FEMALRegional Offises, State 'a d local governments to clarify, interpret and

- apply' criteria contained in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and'(3) to provide information of a.more technical nature to support the development and enhancement of the REF program. Guidance in GM's that is applicable.to State and local governments is

'ntended

. to be used by these jurisdictions to develop and enhance their planning and preparedness 'and by FEMA to evaluate the acequacy of State and local emergency planning and preparedness. GM's are occasionally used to modify evaluation criteria (not the planning standards) contained in NLREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1.

FEMA.dces not issue GM's for public comment. FEMA does cocrainate its GM's with NRC, with other Federal agencies or the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coor-dinating Committee (FRPCC), with State government agencies, ar.d with nuclear power irdustry groups and public interest grnups. FEMA believes that this cocroination is sufficiently broad to result in sound guidance documents.

Comment #15d Our last general concern is the frecuent reference participating organi eHons  !

in Supplement 1. As noted in our attached comn(nt Supplement 1 must acdress j non-participating organizations as defined in Section 1.F., Definitions. Parti-cipating State and local agencies are subject to criteria in the body of NUREG-06E4 ano should nct be incluceo in Supplement 1.

1e s e

l Coment #15:' Pesponse:

Supp.1' applies where State and local governments are not participating in the planning process but it necessarily accommodates any governments that wish to participate. See the response to Comment #8c regarding the inclusion of participating governments in the ORD.

Coment #15e: l For I.E. delete: " ...and t identified and committed by)a, theresources utility and tobyimplement the offsite State and local plan must be governments participating in the planning process."

' Utility offsite plans must account for any participation from State and local organizations. In doing so, NUREG-0654 criteria must be satisfied. NUREG-0654 criteria requires resource comitments from the utility, State and local agencies; therefore, this statement is not necessary in Supplement 1. Eliminat-ing this statement will ensure only two situations exist: either an agency participates and is subject to NUREG-0654 or an agency does not participate and Supplement I must be applied. It will ensure that comitments are not

, expected-from non-participating agencies.

. Response:

This statement has been modified to reduce confusion (see the response to Coment #ae). However, Supp. I will still be used to evaluate the offsite plans that are submitted by a utility even if there is a mixture of partici-pating and non-participating State and local governments.

Coment #15f:

For I.D. delete: "The appropriate FEMA guidance memoranda, policy memoranda and REP document (e.g. REP-2, 10, 12) will be applied to define the conditions of adequacy and inadequacy of emergency plans and preparedness for specific evaluation criteria."

It is not appropriate to endorse FEMA policy memoranda, guidance memoranda and REP documents in this manner. By doing so, the guidance in these documents in ,

conveyed to NUREG-0654, Supplement 1, and hence to offsite plan development, without due process of review and comment or the benefit of a formal control mechanism. Particularly troublesome is that there are existing guidance l

Coment #15:- cont. -

memoranda that expand NUREG-0654 and Supplement I criteria. If this endorse-ment is not deleted, then all FEMA guidance must be appended to NUREG-0654, Supplement 1:and be given the same regulatory process (public notice and-review and comment) as the parent document. As written, the scope of Supple-ment I t is. without bounds. Thfs fs an untenable situation for offsite plan oevelopers.,

~ Response:-

See the response to Comment #15c regarding the purpose and status of FEMA GMs.

Whether or not Supp. I references the FEMA GMs, their status remains the same.

- The GMs need not be appende(to Supp.1. State and local government offsite plans have been evaluated under.the criteria in NUREG-0654 as supplemented by the FEMA GMs. Utility prepared offsite plans will be evaluated under the criteria in Supp. I as supplemented by the FEMA GMs.

Comment #15c:

For I.G.2.a. delete: " Identification of the functions which require State and location (Sic'.) authorization before implementing (A.2.a.)."

Implicit in this statement is that there will be functions carried out by the offsite response organization that are not within its authority to perform. l (This implication is enforced by section II.A.Z.a.) The offsite response organization must have the authority to perform all of its functions. Absent this authority, the plan will be-inadequate. As noted in Section I.D., Assump-tiens, it is expected that non-participants will exercise their best efforts to protect public health and safety by cooperating with the utility. Therefore, the offsite response organization does not have to assurre police power. Compen-sating actions, including the use of liaisons, will be in place to coordinate State and local resources during. the response.

Response

See the response to Coment #15b.

Cominent #15h:

For II. A.2.a delete: "This description shall specify those functions which recuire...for an anticipated State and local response to an emergency.*(inclusive)

As noted above for I.G.2.a., the offsite response organization must have the authority to perform all of its functions. The offsite response plan will be

( adequate and will meet the intent of 10 CFR Part 50.47 c)(1) and 10CFR50, Appendix E, section IV.F. (October 29, 1987; 52FR42078 by specifying the functions and responsibilities for major elements and key individuals of the emergency response.

Comment #15: cont. ' j i

l The last sentence of section II.A.2.a contradicts secticn I.D. , Assumptions.

The offsite' plan will be written " assuming" State and local response. Given

.this assumption, one need not " anticipate" a State / local response; it will be done inherently.

Response

Evaluation Criteria A.2.a. states that the plan must specify the. functions and responsibilities for major elements and key individuals of the ORO and also identify similar functions for the anticipated State and local response to en emergency. This is censistent with the concept of plar.;ing before ar er emergency.

Comment #153 for II. A.2.b delete: "

... including those that reserve functions to State and local. governments."

By including a legal basis for " authorities" in the offsite plan, thuse authorities reserving functions to government authorities is necessarily included. The addition of these words (beyond the current NUREG-0654 wording) accentuates a point that could be an issue with non-participating agencies.

Response

If there are some legal authorities that are reserved to the State and local governments the plan should identify them.

Comment #15j:

For II.C.I.b delete: "..., including expected times of arrival at specific nuclear facility sites;..."

A time estimate for arrival of Federal resources is not necessary. Generally, people are aware of Federal resource locations and travel times to specific sites. This will be adequate.

Response: '

There is no simple way to check the validity of the commenter's claim, however, general awareness is not a substitute for specific information in a plan.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . - .-_ _ ___ _ _ _ . _ _ _ ______i

4 l" p '

~

Comment'f15: cont. ' 50-

>Y Comment #15ki Delete II.C 2.b entirely.

The licensee is .the offsita response organization; therefore, II.C.2.b. will be satisfied by implementing II.C.2.c. Utf11 ties should not be burdened with

-noving to send multiple people to State centers. As written, the utility must V dispatch three people to offsite ager.cies:

Z

• 1." licensee representative" (II.C.2.b.)

1 "offsite response organization representative" (II.C.2.c.) -t

• - 1"offsiteresponse'organizationadviserandassistant(II.C.5.)

All three roles can be accomplished by one person. The utility should oe free to decide on'a case basis # additional peaple are needed.

Also, II.C.2.b. addresses criteria applicable to participating governments.

This is beyond' the scope of Supplement 1. Licensee artions for participating governments are addressed in the body of NUREG-0654, Change.to: "The.offsite response organization shall prepare-for the dispatch of representatives to principal offsite governmental emergency operations centers. Representatives will advise and assist State and local officials in

, implementing their respective roles in the response plan."

As' noted-for II.C.2.b., the utiif ty should have the flexibility to decide the number of people to be sent to State / local emergency centers. By incorporating

" advise and assist" verbiage from II.C.S., the intent of the proposed guidance will be met without compromising the plan developers judgement on how best to meet.the spcific needs of individual offsite response organizations.

Delete II.C.S. entirely.

Resoonse:

We agree in principal. II.C.2.b and II.C.2.c will be deleted as being redundant with II.C.S. which is broader than either and includes liasons in addition to those needed at the principal offsite governmental emergency operations centers.

Coment #151:

For I!.D.4, delete: "... implementing emergency actions and that provide for advising State and local officials on..."

The addition of these words beyond the current wording of NUREG-0654 is not I necessa ry. The actions elaborated on (i.e., implementing emergency actions and advising.the State) are necessarily included in " emergency actions."

Singling out these items can imply that a special reference in the offsite plan must be present rather than having this implicitly accressed by accomplish- )

ment of response actions.

z_

Comment #15: cont. Response:

Evaluation Criterion II.D.4 states:

The offsite response organization should have procedures in place tnat provide for implementing emergency acetons and that pFUFidt for advising State &nd local officials on emergency actions to be taken which are consistent with the emergency actions recommended by the nuclear facility licensee, taking into account local offsite conditions that exist at the time of the emergency.

Advising state officials is impurtant and needs the visibility of explicit statement and implementing procedures.

n Comment #15m: ,

For II.E.4. delete: "

...(and to offsite authorities where possible)..." l The offsite response plan and organization is developed under the assumpticn that offsite authorities will cooperate with the utility to exercise their best efforts to protect public health and safety in the event of an emergency.

Given.this, it follows that the plan and organization must provide offsite authorities with follow-up messages. This is not an option. Provision must exist for the plan to be adequate.

Response

Evaiva; ion Criteria II.E.3 and II.E.4. Edeals-w4th-ia44ew-wp-messages-frem-the 44 s e n s e e- to-t h e-e f f s 4 t v-re sp o n s e-e pg a n 4 a a tio n,--A 4 s e-n a t i fy 4 Rg - th e-e f f s 4 te auther444es-where-pess4b4e-4s-4mportant-and-needs-the-v4s4b444ty-of-exp44s44 statementr] were deleted because they apply to the licensee and not to the OR0.

They remain in NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. I and will be evaluated as part of the utility ensite plan. This is referenced in Supp. 1.  !

Comment #15n:

1 For II.E.6 delete: "

...and FEMA-REP-10)." j As discussed previously (Supplement 1, section I.E., Scope), it is not appro-priate to expand (NUREG-055a criteria by endorsing FEMA-REP-10 with Supplement i since FEMA-REP-10 does not receive the same regulatory review as the parent document. Guidance documents developed by FEMA to aid internal evaluation of offsite piras are not subject to a formal review, approval and distribution control mechanism. Absent this control, there is no assurance that the adequacy of an offsite plan will survive over time.

l Coment #15: . cont. l Response:-

We agree to delete the reference to FEMA-REP-10 but only because it is covered by the general statement on page 2 that FEMA guidance mencranda and REY E documents will be applied to define the conditions of adequacy and inadequacy for specific evaluation criteria. FEMA-REP-10 must still be followed.

Comment #15o:

For II.E.6. change last sent.pnce to: "The offsite response organization shall have the administrative-and'pnysical means to activate the system or, in instances where the response organization does not have authority to activate the system, at least the administrative means to activate the system."

While administrative and physical means of activating the Alert & Notification System must exist, the offsite response organization need not have the ability for both in.all instances. If the response' organization has the physical means of activation (this requires that they also have the authority to activate it),

then they must aho have the administrative means to activate the system. If.

however the response organization does not have authority to activate the system (i.e., police power is required), then the organization can only have the admin-istrative means. of system activation. The non-participates,g agent will retain the physical means of activation. The offsite plan will provide that the non-participating agency will be notified at the appropriate time of the need to activa te the system. This agent will activate the system in the event of a real emergency based on Supplement 1, section I.D. assumptions.

Response

It is important for the ORO to have the physical means to activate the alert and notification system. If it is determined that they do not have the legal authority to activate the system, the state or local government may authorize them to do so in an actual emrgency.

Comment #15p: -

For II.E.7. delete: "The prescripted messages should address the various conditions such as the delegation of authority by the State and local governments to the offsite response organization to issue prompt instructions."

It is not logical or rational to assume that any government, State or local, that refuses to participate in preplanning for a fixed nuclear facility, will delegate any authority whatsoever to a utility offsite response organization.

I m_m_____ __.-.._ . . . _ _ _

s *t

9 i

'.' N>

<w Coment #15: ' cont. N Response:-

-'We do not agree.- We'believe that if the' utility needs the 1ecal authority from .

, ,.. the State 'or local government to perform an emergency function, that this author.

ity will be given as indicated in the offsite plan undbr the "best efforts" response

, .; concept of the rule.

! Comment #154:

For II.E.7. change the'4th se.ntence to: "Such messages should include the-

. appropriate aspects.of sheltering, ad hoc respiratory protection, e.g. ..."

This appears to be a simple omission from original NUREG-0654 verbiage.

Response

Agreed. This will be fixed in the final version.

- Coment #15r:

For II.E.8. delete: "

... participating and..."

, Supplement- 1 pertains to non-participating governments only. Criteria for participating governments are addressed in the body of HUREG-0654.

Response

See the response to Coment #15d.

Comment #15s:

For II.G.I.e. delete: "special steps to be taken to describe..."

These words, under the planning standard Public Education & Information and the introduction addressed in section II.G.I., give the implication that there

, will be-some actions on the part of the public because of the State's non- l 11 participation. Information disseminated to the public should include the role of.the offsite response organization vs. the State / local organizations. It need not address any "special steps" per se.

Response

Evaluation Criterion G.I.e. applies to public information material and states that the information shall include:

mm.____.____.m._...__.m._.m__. _

4-Coment #15: cont. .

' ... and, special steps to be taken to describe the role of the offsite response organization vs. the State and local organizations during the emergency.

We believe that it is important for the public to understand the functioning of the ORD.

C'omment #15t:

For I*.J.9 change the 1st sentence to: "The offsite response organization shall establish the means to implement protective measures based upon protective action '

guides and other criteria."f,-

Physical implementation of protective actions for the public is a function reserved for State and local officials. Offsite response organizations will not have the authority to implement protective measures. Therefore, the off-site plan must establish the administrative means of implementing the actions via the proper authorities. The werd change above will allow for this. This change is needed because " capability" connotes administrative ano physical ability to implement an action.

Response: '

The ORO needs to establish a capability for implementing protective measurcs.

This may well depend upon the "best efforts response" of state and local governments during an actual emergency.

Coment #15u:

For II.J.g. delete: "The offsite response organization shall describe the means l for recommending protection (sic.) action to the public, for activating the alert .

and notification system, and for notifying the public of protective action I recommendations."

This verbiage is an expansion of existing NUREG-0654 wording and is not neces-sa ry. Communication with the public is adequately addressed in Supplement 1, section II.E., Notification and Procedures and in section II.J.10.c.  :

Response

Planning Standard J and its evaluation criteria refer to the " recommendation of protective actions aspects" of notifications.

l l

i 1

_ _ _ - R

Coment #15: cont. Comment #15v:

For II.J delete: "These means shall include notification, support and assistance in implementing protective measures where appropriate."

As mentioned for II.J.9., the notification aspect of this criteria is redundant to Supplement 1, section II.E. and II.J.20.c. and, therefore, is not necessary.

The remaining aspects, support and assistance, are an expansion of HUREG-0654 criteria. Support and cssistance for the mobility impaired are handled by

' resources available to a State and local community on a day-to-day basis. . These resources will be brought to bear by the State and local officials in the event of an actual emergency under Supplement 1, section I.D.1.c. assumption.

Response: ,,.

See the response to Evaluation Criteria #15u.

Comment #15w:

For II.N.I.b. change 2nd sentence to: "This includes the demonstration cf offsite response organization capabilities up to the interface with non-participating State and . local government..."

lGiven that the exercise does not include stand-ins for the anticipated State and local' response, the interface with them cannot be demonstrated. During an exercise, the offsite organization will demonstrate capabilities up to this interface.

Response

FEMA ha's provided pre-licensing exercise guidance in an Amendment to CM-EX-3.

essentially, the new guidance states that the interface will be demonstrated through player interactions with controllers and evaluators. j

(

Coranent #15x: '

For II.N.I.6 change 4th sentence to: "The scenario should be varied from exercise to exercise such that all major elements of the plans and preparedness l organizations are tested within a six-year period."

The option should be available to not vary the scenario. This will alicw major elements of the plan to be tested as often as desired, but not less than once )

per six years.

Response

See tne response to coment #12k regarding the use of "should" and "shali".

q

.i IJ

, )

, Comment # 5: cont. ,

' Comment #15y:

L ForL-II.N.I.6. change 6th sentence to: " Exercises should be conducted during-

~ different seasons of the year."

, Given that the basis for this criteria ~ is to experience.the weather differences of each season, then flexibility should exist for utilities located in areas that_do not have four' distinctive weather patterns. Many regions have signifi-cant weather changes between summer and winter only. -Recuiring exercises in" each season will pose an. additional burden on exercise scheduling for tne

'r utility, NRC, FEMA and any participating State-or local agencies. The benefit derived from this will be insignificant.

Response

See the res,ponse to Comment #12k regarding the use of "should" and "shall".

Comment #15z:

-For II.N.2.a. delete: "If practicable, attempts should be made to include non-participating organizations in the monthly communications drills."

Repeated attempts to involve non-participating agencies in emergency response plans can lead to further hostilities between them and the utility. As noted in Supplement 1, section II.F., contact with non-participants will be by normal telephone numbers. Since normal telephones are used regularly at both communi-cation ends, there will be little benefit derived from monthly tests with non-participants.

Response

The c'iance does not state a frequency for the attempts to involve non-participating agencies in the monthl/ communications drills.

Comment #15aa:

Delete II.N.6. entirely.

As noted for II.N.2.a., repeated attempts to involve non-participating agencies in emergency response plans can lead to further hostilities between them and the utility. It is incumbent on the utility pursuant to 10CFR50.47(c)(1)(ii) to demonstrate to the Commission that it has made a sustained, good faith effort to secure the support of non-participating State and local officials.

Without this demonstrated effort, the utility would not be authorized to apply Supplement 1 planning criteria.

I G

l 0 .,

Comment #15: -cont.- Response:-

Evaluation Criteria II.N.6. states:

~

L ,

"The offsite^ response organization shall attempt to involve the non-participating

~

b ' State and ' local government in the exercises and drills, but their participa-ticr isLnot required."

We' would hope = that at some point non-participating governments will decide to

. participate in exercises and planning. This aspect of the guidance helps

" ensure that the door is always open to this participation, n

Consent il5bb:

' Delete 3rd sentence entirely and footnote 1.

If mutual: afd agreements exist between the local agency and the utility, then the agency does not. qualify as a non-participating agent. Therefore, they are outside the scope of Supplement I criteria.

. Response:

See the response to Comment Sc.

Comment #15cc:

Delete II.0.4. k. entirely.

Personnel responsible for interfacing with State and local responders are those people addressed in section II.O.4.a. , b. , c. , d. , f. , g. , h. and J. The off-site organization cannot do these functions without State and local responders.

Response

Evaluation Criterion 0.4.K. [regards] pertains to training of the persons responsible interfacing with State and local responders. We believe that this trainig can be accomplished in the absence of the responders participation.

Comment #15dd:

Delete 11.0.6. entirely. i As noted for II.N.6., animosities between non-participating State and local officials and the utility will be heightened with repeated petitions for involvement. The utility must exercise a sustained effort to get State and local support pursuant to 10CFR50.47(c)(1)(ii).

)

p,

$ ' f; . , . ,

. _Coment- #15: . cont. I L .

l. ~ Regarding "other organizations:", other organizations (i.e., participating

l. organizations) are offered training under : training criteria addressed in l :. NUREG-0654 proper.

1 Resoonse:

Evaluation Criterion 0.6 regards the offer of training to rion-participating

. State and local governments and other organizations. We believe that this offer _ is prudent.

1 n

l 4

,. l Comment #16a: Commonwealth Edison In general, the document is aimed at a situation with complete or large scale non-cooperation by offsite governmental authorities requiring massive compensa-tory actions by the affected utility. The docuaent is not suitable for much i lower levels of-non-cooperation such as withdrawal of a single town or v11149*

from an emergency plan. To cover these situations sensibly, Commonwealth Edison recommends that the document should be modified to provide for smaller scale compensatory measures commensurate with the reduced impact on emergency plan-ning that would result when the non-cooperating governmental entity is only a town or other small jurisdiction.

Response

States have proposed and FEs( has accepted compensating measures when local jurisdictions have not part'icipated in emergency planning. In these cases the State is the sponsor of the offsite plan. Supp. I applies to all utility sponsored offsite plans large or small in scope.

Coment #16b:

Additionally we recommend that, Section E of the document be revised to inciuce a clarification that utility offsite plans and preparedness would only have to address those planning non-participation organization (s) that are not being provided for by any of the participating governmental organizations.

Response

The following statement from 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) was added to Section E of the Introduction to Supp. I to deal with non-participating State and local govern-mental organization: I 1

"The applicant has made a sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain the participation of the pertinent State and/or local governmental authorities {

1 including tie furnishing of copies of its emergency plans." l To the extent that participating governmental organizations are included in k

the ORD, the utility offsite plans must address the degree that participation

/

and those resources. To the extent that the participating governments have separate plans, they may be evaluated under NUREG-OoS4 [but-must) and they J should be [4mtegrated-4ste] consistent with the utility offsite plan and vice versa. '

, :4 i

i Comment #17: Xirkpatrick & Lockhart On February 29,.1988, the undersigned sent to you comments on behalf of Suffolk <

County and New York State related to Draft NUREG-0654, Rev.1, Supp.1. Ir.

those comments. It was stated that Suffolk County and New York State were filing a brief on March I with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cfreuf t in which the Governraents would demonstrate that the underlying rule which the Draft NUREG-0654 supplement seeks to implement is illegal. We also stated that the Brief would be submitted to you as an additional comment on the draft supple-ment.

In conformance wi'.h my February 29 letter, I hereby enclose a copy of the -

"Brief of Petitioners New York State, Governor Mario M. Cuomo, and Suffolk County" dated March 1,1988, and filed in Docket No. 88-1121 in the United States Court of . Appeals for #Yhe First Circuit.

Response

This brief it being answered in Court by the NRC.

I i

y 7

- I

. Comment #18a: Coments of Long Island Lighting Company In addition, LILCO believes that several other revisions to NUREG-0654, Rev.1, not directly related to governmental non-participation, are required to reflect

-changes in other FEMA /NRC guidance that have occurred fullowing the ;ublication at:that doctnnent. These changes are detailed beTow.

1. More guidance is needed as to the method by which the interfaces with non-participating governments will be evaluated ouring FEMA-graded exercises. Supp.

1. recites,'in keeping with the new 10 CFR Part 50, App. ETIV.F.6, that the of f-site' response organization should attempt to involve the non'- participating governments ~ in exercises but.that their p6rticipation is not required. Should the non-participating governments refuse to participate in an exercise then Supp.1 requires 'only that the offsite response organization demonstrate its interface capabilities duriay an exercise. It adds that the demonstration "does 1

not include the use of- standins for the anticipated State and local response" (Criterion 11.N.I.b). Additional guidance is needed on how the interface 3 evaluation will be conducted. For example: Will the offsite response organi-zation be required to supply simulators to play the role of non-participating

. governmental officials? If so, will FEMA supply those simulators with a script?

Will FEMA instead use controllers to evaluate the interface? If so, will the controllers simply ask a given player to explain how he would interface with governecstal officials, or will they. conduct a d assume the ale of a governmental official for q.falogue uestioninginpurposes? which they willother Will methods of testing knowledge.be used? Will . telephone calls need to be made to simulated non-participating organizations? If so, will the person at the other end of the call be a FEMA evaluator or will it be a person supplied by the offsite response organization? If it is a FEMA evaluator will the evaluator have a-passive role, merely noting what he is told, or will he be allowed to supply the caller with the answers the caller may request? Other aspects of this issue need to be thought tnrough and more definitive guidance provided.

Response

See the response to Coment #14a regarding the possible future revision of NUREG-0654 and see the response to Coment #4m regarding testing the l interfaces during exercises.

Coment 18b:

l Supp. I fails to account for planning problems that can arise as a result of obstructive actions by non-participating governments to prevent planning from proceeding. For example, at Shoreham, Suffolk County passed an ordinance, later declared unconstitutional Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, 622 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y.1986), tnat suojected of fsite response organization

! 1 1

1

x ll

, ' Comment #18: cont. personnel to civil' and/or criminal . liability for- participating in (and perhaps. )

even planning and preparing for) a FEMA-graded exercise of the Shoreham offsite l

.pla,. Townships within Nassau County have used :ening croinances in an effort i I

to prohibit-LILCO's use of its own property as general population reception centers and to prevent that-property from being useo for training or during exercises and drilis. _A Suffolk County legislator has sent a letter, on

official Suffolk County letterhead, to all radio stations on Long Island that 1 are participating in the Shoreham EBS network, strongly urging them to withdraw ]

from that network. Suffolk County has refused to. renew the lease of a private  :

bus company for use of a building on Suffolk County property because the bus company was supplying buscs for the Shcreham offsite response organization.

~

In Massachusetts, various towns have deliberately diset, led the early-warning i siren system for the Seabrook plant. Supp. 1 neecs to be revised to provice l FEMA and.NRC plan reviewers whh flexibility to deal with these types of problems i on a case-by-case. basis to determine whether a plan's failure to meet a given planning criterior is the result of governmental intransigence that is incen-sistent with the "best efforts" assumption and if so, to find ways of satisfying the criterion met despite that intransigence.

3. Criterion II.A.2.a. should be revised in several ways. First, the first sentence should be clarified to note that while the offsite response organiza-tion is. responsible for specifying the furctions anc responsibilities for majur ,

elements of emergency response it is not required to carry out til those fune- 1 tions with its own response personnel. For example, non-participating local governments should always be expected to continue to perform normal Fire ano

. Rescue and Law Enforcement functions.

Response

FEMA and NRC evaluators have the flexibility to [ dea 4-w+th] assess the imoact of disruptive behavior [regardless-of-%he-eFkg4R-aRti-eeRleM%d on the exercise.

See the response to Comment #4h regarding fire, rescue and law enforcement functions.

Comment #18c:

Second, the criterion appears to assume that as a matter of law, an offsite response organization needs governmental authorization before it can implemert l

the ten listed functions. No such law exists. The ten listed items correspono to the issues raised by " legal authority" contentions in the Shoreham licensing proceedirig. In that proceeding, the rulings of New York State courts that had initially decided that legal authority was requirec for non-governmental entities to perform those functions were recently reversed by the New Ycrk State Court of Appeals in Cuomo v. LILCO, slip op. (February 17,1986). In so ruling, the court refused to provice a federal agency with what, in its view, was an advisory opinion on the legal authority question. More importantly, requiring a utility to opine whether or not it has legal authority to perform given plan cctivities is unnecessary given the Comission's ncw realism rule. It is unques-tiened that State and local governments possess the legal autnority to perform l-L-_________-__-_--_-__ - _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Connent #18: cont. all required emergency planning functions. Furthermore, under the Commission's new rule, these State and lecci governtnents would respond in a real emergency using their best efforts in coordination with the utility and the utility's offsite energency response plan and would provide additional rescurces as neces-sa ry. Thus, the key questfuns are (1) whether, between the offsite response organization and the non-participating governments, resources exist to perform the necessary functions, and (2) whether the physical interfacing of these non-participating governments with the offsite response organization will work; not the academic question of whether the offsite response organization pos-sesses the legal authority to perform given plan functions.

Response

See the respense to Evaluati c Criterion #4h.

Comment #18d:

I Third, if the decision is made to retain Criterion II. A.2.a in essentially its  !

current form, then the listed activities where legal authority must be obtained should only include activities that, on case-specific facts, are required com-penents of emergency plans; otherwise, the list might be construed to convert all listed activities into required plan elements. For example, during the Shoreham proceeding the Licensing Board has found that fuel disbursement is not required "by any regulation or guideline." Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322-OL-2, Board Orders (February 22,1988) (LILCO's summary disposition motion on legal authority to perform fuel distribution functions granted on the grounds that fuel distribu-tion is not a material factor in the Shoreham offsite emergency response plan). l Thus, at Shoreham at least, that activity shoulo be deleted frem the ten listed {

activities.

j

Response

See the response to Evaluation Criterion 2d.

l l

Comment #18e:

l The requirement for written agreements between the offsite response organiza-tion and other support organizations (Criteria II.A.3 and II.C.4) needs to be ,

refined to recognize that non-participating governments can pressure suppor+; l organizations not to sign formal letters of agreements when, in reality, trere is ample evidence to demonstrate that these correnunity-service organizations would assist during an actual emergency. For exarnple, at Shoreham, the Red Cross has refused to sign a formal letter of agreement with LILC0 even though it has affirmed in writing that it would follow its Congressional mandate of assisting in an actual emergency (FEMA has graced this an inadequacy in the LILC0 Plan while the Ccamission has found that a formal letter of agreennt is not a prerequisite for a reasonable assurance finding, Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unite'1), CLI-67-5, 25 NRC 8E4 (19a7)).

Similarly, many hospitals on Long Island have assured LILCO that during en emer-gency at Shoreham, as in other emergencies, they would fulfill their contunity obligation tc provide medical service to those in need; however, they are unwill-ing to sign formai letters of agreement that would be made publicly available.

p + , -

s (.i j i i

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^

. Coment #18: cont. .

Response

[ De se-oha n da a 44en s -may-be-pe 44'ed -upon -4 n- de-p 4an -u nde r- de- pe a 44 sai- ev 4 e r] '  !

' The regulatory in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) applies 'only to the non-participation '

~

of State and local governments. However, the Comission in Long Island Lighting 1 Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-8725, 25 NRC 884,-888 (1987), .

recognized that the American Red Cross charter from Congress and its national policy reouire t' hem to provide aid in "any radiological ~or national disaster, whether or not there are ldtters of agreement with the American Red Cross in j connection with a partic emergency plan.

u Consnent #18f:

- Throughout Supp.1, reference is made to " local" governments and " local" off t-cials.- LILCO believes:that the term " local" should be defined so that it is clearly understood that the term includes not just counties and other political subdivisions within the EPZ but also contiguous jurisdictions that may have roles in emergency planning such as the provision of reception and congregate care centers and assistance in traffic direction.

Response

Agreed. The term refers to State and local governments identified in a offsite plan. It is not restricted to governments within the EPZs. A footnote has been added the first time the term is used to clarify this peint.

Comment #189:

Criterion II.N.1 needs to be reviewed to decide how to square the limits on the scope of exercises posed by governmental non-participation with relevant regu-lations (especiaily 10 CFR Part 50, App. EfIV.F). In addition, the Criterion, and perhaps 10 CRF Part 50, App. EfIV.F, need to be revised to eliminate any confusion over whether NUREG-0654 and 10 CFR Part 50, App. E require different things. For example, footnote 4 of 10 CFR Part 50, App. E.YIV.F defines a

" full participation" exercise to include the testing of "the major observable portions" of offsite plans. By comparison Cirterion II.N.I.a describes an exercise as testing "a major portion of the basic elements" cf an offsite plan and further recuires that "[t]he scenario shall be varied from exercise to exercise such that all major elements of the plans and preparedness organiza-tions are tested within the six-year period." To eliminate this confusion, FEMA and the HRC need, at a minimum, to define what is meant by a " portion" and and " element" of an offsite plan and whether testing "all major elements" of an offsite plan over a six-year period satisfies the biennial full participa-tion recuirenent for testing "the major observable portions" of an offsite plan. i l

1

- - _ _ - - _ - - _ - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ - . - - _ - _ - _ . _ - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ - . - - - - - . - - - - - . . -- - -- __-__---__--_--___b

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b .Connent: d18i cont. .;- Response: ,

1 FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX-3 provides guidance on what'is meant by "all Q- .

major elements."' On pace 4:of this GM,'the " major elements" are ecuated with the 36 exercise ob,iectives listed un pages 11-16-of this GM. Also, the FEMA L GM EX-3 /.nendment dated March 7.1988, provides an additional objective for E , 'the situations where State and/or local governments-decline to participate in emergency planning. - [ FEMA-Gw4danee-Memorandem-fGM)-EX-3] Further, this Amendment

>~..

[ dated-Marsh-7 7 -1988]'provides guidance for pre-licensing exercises under Supp.1.

This guidance uses.as a' point of departure the requirements in 10 CFR 50, App. E.IV.F(1) that. a relicensing exercise be "A full participation exercise which tests 'as much of the licensee, State and local- plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation..." Note that both c,f these FEMA documents were concurred in NRC.

Corrent #18h:

Criterion II.J.12 addresses reception centers and is, of course, identical to the original Criterion II.J.12.except that the term "offsite response organi-zation" has been substituted for "each organization." LILCO submits that this guidance should be further revised to reflect developments in FEMA policy.

Specifically, the guidance should state that radiological emergency prepared-ness plans should include provisions at relocation center (s) in the form of c

trained personnel and equipment to monitor within about a 12-hour period a s minimum of 20% of the estimated EPZ population. This 20% reouf rement was estab- '

lished in a memorandum from Richard W. Krimm to the NTH Division Chiefs dated December 24, 1985; presented in testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Shoreham proceeding in July 1987; and restatea in a memorandum from Mr. Krimm to Frank Begley dated January 5,1988. Thus there is good reason to' include the 20% monitoring requirement in NtJREG-0654, Supp. 1.

Response

See the response to Comment #4.1 regarding other FDIA guidance.

) .

1 i

Corrcent #18: cont. i' Conrnent A18J:

Supp. I needs to be- reviewed in its entirety so that vague phrases like "offsite authorities" (Criterion II.E.4) and " local organtaations" (Criteriou LL.t!.P..c) are replaced with the defined tenn "non-participating organization." S imi la rly, Criterion II.X.3.a needs to be clarified to state whether " emergency personnel...

including volunteers" applies only to personnel of the offsite response organi-zation or whether it was also intended to include non-participating organiza-tions. If the intent is the latter, then the criterion should be revised to permit either the distribution of dosimeters to personnel of non-participating i organizations or personnel from the offsite response organization equipped with dosimeters ano cosimetry training to accompany personnel from non-participating-organizations into the Ep2. i

>~,

Response

Evaluation' Criteria II.E.4 has been deleted because it applies only to the licensee in its role in the onsite plan. Evaluation Criterion II.K.3.a has been modified to indicate the dosimetry to be provided to menbers of their  !

organization. If non-participating State and local governments did not provide dosimetry for emergency workers, the CR0 could provide the dosimeters or provide personnel to nonitor the doses to emergency workers, but this will not be identified in the guidance. Regarding the issue of the offsite response organi- 1 zation (ORO) providing dosimetry to emergency workers from non-participating State and local governments, Supp. I gives discretion to the OR0.

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c7-y Comment #19: Department of 2nergy

-c ....we continue.to believe that NUREG-0554, FEl%-REP-1-is unnecessarily complex  :

and overly prescriptive. Given that Supplemant 1 is solely based on this docu-- 1 ment, we are not inclined to endorse'it either.

L We haveiseen emergency preparedness submissions by -State Governments that run to. o 20 or 30' thick volumes of detailed plans and procedures for implementing 'an  ;

emergency plan.. This amount of detail will frustrate a clear, disciplined con _-

trol of the response process in' the event of any kind of real emergency, and -

will not obviously advance the safety of the public.

v Secondly, we regard the, intent of the_ recently adopted NRC rule as setting forth the standards and cric.rfa for handling those unique situations of non-cooperation by local governmental jurisdictions. To the extent that these criteria _ can be made direct, simple, and clear, they will . serve to increase the probability that prompt, thorough, and effective-communication-and coor-dination will result when it is most critical, f.e., during a real: emergency.

To require the spelling cut' of.every step,, as is suggested by the proposed guidelines, not only negates the value of local circumstances and knowledge, but practically guarantees that unique situations,f by definition, will be j hardpressed to. fit this universal mold we are requiring everyone to conform to equally...

o It continues to' b'e the Department's position that insistence on prescribing i complex, detailed requirements will result in less clarity, less safety, and an unnecessarily lengthy licensing process.. Nothing short of a rethinking and reevaluation of the purpose and goal of emergency planning requirements and the limitations to achieving these will serve to correct tne situation.

Response:'

See'the response to Comment #14a. The DOE would be involved in any revision  ;

i of NUREG-0654.

4 i hi; i

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-68 Comment #20a: Union of Concerned Scientist Comments FEMA's Role Under the New Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and Prepared-ners It . Inconsistent With Its Obligations Under Law ,

l

• • • In jointly. proposing, with NRC, the instant set of criteria for review of utility-drafted offsite emergency plans, FEMA has acted in a manner inconsis-tent with 'its legal mandate in the following ways:

• • • FEMA Has Unlawfully _ Abdicated its Responsibility To Determine Whether Pre-paredness to Cope With an Accident is Adequate

• • • FEMA has, by its own words, given up its responsibility to review the state of emergency preparedness ar.v' determine its adequacy or inadequacy in the case of nuclear plants to which the new NRC rule applies. This is an unlawful abdica-tion of the authority given to FEMA by the President.

Response

[fFEMA-te-respond,)] 4 6*

In a Memorandum of Understanding with the NRC, dated April 15, 1988, FEMA assumed  ;

an obligation to review, upon reauest from the NRC, offsite plans, not covered l l

by the procedrues in FEMA regulation 44 CFR 350. FEMA has agreed to review I utility prepared effsite plans in the context of the three assumptions cited in Section I.D. of NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1. Under these circumstances, FEMA is acting in a manner consistent with its position that the preferred method of achieving adequate offsite preparedness is to have State and local governments involved in and committed to the planning process.

r

_Co,mment #20b:

FEMA Has No Legal Authority to Review Utility-Orafted Offsite Emergency Plans Neither Executive Order 12148 consolidating federal emergency management func-tions within FEMA, nor the Presidential directive, nor any other grant of authority, permits FEMA to review utility-drafted offsite emergency plans.

FEMA described the scope of its authority in 1980 as follows:

On December 7,1979, the President directed the Director of FEMA to take the lead in state and local emergency planning anc preparedness activities with

, , respect to nuclear power facilities.

44 CFR s 350.3, emphasis added.

[- l

i Comment #20: cent. FEMA's rules implementing its authority, 44 CFR Part 350 are clearly limited to review and approval;of " state and local plans" and " findings and determin-ations on the current status of emergency preparedness." 44 CFR i 350.3(f).

FEMA has no legal authority to reytew uttitty-drafted offsita emergency plans or to review exercises with utility stand-ins.

Response

Unu-se-mpensn See the response to Coment #20a. There is a direct tie between the provisions of the MOU and 44-CFR 350.3(f). In addition, the conference' report accompanying H.J. 395, which became Publ A/ Law 100-202, directed FEMA te develop all necessary supplemental guidance to review and evaluate utility-sponsored emergency plans and exercises for nuclear power plants. FEMA is acting in a manner fully con sistent with this Congressional mandate.

4 Comment #20c:

The' criteria contain three " assumptions" to be used in evaluating utility off-site plans and preparedness. They are:

1. In an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in emergency planning will:

a. Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public;

b. Cooperate with the utility and follow-the utility offsite plan; and i

c. Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary.

Supp. I to NUREG-0554/FEPA-REP-1, Rev.1, p. 2. The first two of the assump-tions essentially restate the two " presumptions" containeo in the new NRC rule. i 10 CRF 50.4/(c). The third, the breathtaking " assumption" that state and local governments will have sufficient resources to implement the utility plan, dppearc for the first time in this document.

The second and third assumptions are nothing more than wishful thinking of the most egregiously expedient variety. They are fully contradicted by logic and  ;

i a-by the record in the NRC rulemaking. We incorporate herein the attached UCS Brief at 20-29, 39-41. Neither NRC nor FEMA is free to use " assumptions" which are at odds with reality. It is a self-delusion and inconsistent with the repeated assertions of the governments concerned to proclaim that, in the event l

of an accident, they would use evacuation plans which they have determined to i be ineffective te protect their citizens, tioreover, the assumption that the governments would magically have the necessary rescurces on hand to implement plans they have specifically rejected is absurd. ,

I The Criteria Do Hot Provide for Measures to Compensate for the Increased Risk to the Public l

i I

V, Certraent #20: cont. I' Response:

See the response to Coment H.

L Comment i20d:

6-While FEMA and NRC state that these criteria "have been modified with due allow-ance for the non-participation of State and local governments and for the compensatory measures that must be proposed, developed and implemented by the utility" (p. 2), the criteria do not, in fact, ensure or require any meanirgful

" compensation" from the point of view of the affected public. They call essen-tially for the utility to set up a " shadow government," with utility personnel and contractors standing in, at least for purposes of the plan, for the govern-ment officials who would acMa11y by law be required to perform the various emergency response functions during an accident. However, there is no effort whatever to take meaningful account of the acknowledged fact that, should an accident occur, these utility personnel could not and would not actually perform the functions to which they are " assigned" in the shadow government plan. At the very best, this means there would be substantial celay in effecting an evacuation or other emergency response. At the worst, it could mean chaos.

Fr m he standpoint of the public, the chance of being exposed to a dangerous d of radiation is far greater under these circumstances than in the case w ere State ano local government preparedness has been demonstrated. There are no measures required by these criteria which would compensate in cose-savings for the best-case delay in effecting emergency response, much less for tuc. worst case. Indeed, the whole concept of requiring substantial dose-savings to the public - i.e. reducing the risk of death and injury - seems to have been abandoned. There is nothing in this criteria that require substantial dose-savings or any measurable dose-savings. There is nothing to prevent licensing of a plant even if the emergency plan cannot be found to produce any significant dose-savings.

Response

The Statement of Considerations for the " realism rule" discusses these issues at length (52 FR 42084, 42085).

Comment #20e:

The failure of these criteria to assure an adequate emergency response can be plainly seen in just two examples. First, under planning standard A, " Assign-ment of Responsibility (Organization Control)," Criteria 2 a contains a list of ten functions which cannot be performed by the shadow " utility offsite response

, organization." As FEMA and NRC put it, these " require State and local authori-zation before implementing." (p. 6). This list includes virtually all of the critical tasks necessary to effect an evacuation, from "makin recommendations to the public" (i.e. ordering the evacuation)gtodecisions activatingand i the sirens, directing traffic, removing obstructions from the road, broadcast- i ing the messages to the public, etc. The utility plan is to " identify similar I functions and responsibilities and interfaces for an anticipated State and local

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 0

l r

)

Comment #20: cont. Response to an emergency." Id emphasis added. This presumably means that, using tne second anc third "E s,umptions," FEMA and NRC will pretend under these 3 criteria that the governments will come in and carry out the plan. As we have previously demonstrated, these assumptions are utterly without rational support.

But even were one to accept the assumptions at face value, there would be a great deal of time lost in performing these functions. For example, it would seem a practical impossibility to effect notification of the public within 15  ;

minutes, which is an HRC requirement. Should the accident develop quickly, and a major release occur early the delay would translate directly into lost l lives. The criteria provide no means to mitigate the time delay or reduce the 1 nutnber of deaths and injuries. '

Response

See the response to Coment #1 regarding the assurrptions and Coment (4h regarding legal authority issues.

Corrinent #20f:

A second example of the unreal nature of these criteria is contained in the section related to planning standard F, " Emergency Cocununication." (p.13).

The applicable standard itself requires a showing that " provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public." The NRC cases are full of references to the i

response. The criteria would allow this requirement to be inet if the utility {

has "the capability to cornmunicate with non-ments via normal emergency telephone number (participating s) (e.g. 911) and vid State oneand other local govern-backup mode such as the ability to transmit via existing emergency racio fre-quencies." (p.13).

Suggesting that the 911 line could be relied upon as the principal means to com-municate with the government during a nuclear accident is bizarre. The 911 line i connects with a dispatcher employed by the local police department. They have I no authority to order an area-wide evacuation, rnuch less the means to verify or I evaluate the significance of the-information being provided by the utility repre- l sentative on the other end of the line. Moreover, it is typical to encounter '

long delays in getting through on 911 in a ncrmal situation. In the midst of a nuclear accident, it is safe to predict an even longer wait.

Any applicant for a Ifeense to operate a nuclear plant (other than those covered )

by these new criteria) woula be rejected out of hand if it proposed to use the j 911 lines as the primary means of emergency notifications and coununication.  !

Such communications obviously do not satisfy the underlying planning standard.

! Response:

{

( See the respense to Coment #2e regarding communications.

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, _Connent #20

cont.  :

Comment #200:

For the reasons stated above, these criteria are unlawful and effectively con-stitute a repudiation of the peinefple that nuclear plant owners must demonstrate that effective prctective action can and will be taken in the event of a severe accident.

Response

The comment is noted.

I

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l Coment #21a: Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon These cements reflect the opposition of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the FEMA criteria for review of a utt11ty radiological emergency response plan in those circumstances in which responsible local and state officials have found adequate emergency planning infeasible and have not submitted governmental plans for review. The proposed FEMA criteria are contrary to the lessons learned by FEHA from years of experience as the expert federal agency in offsite emergency planning for radiological emergencies. The criteria fail to provide assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken under a utility plan in the event of a radiological emergency. The criteria violate provisions of existing FEMA rules and were implemented without prior notice and comment in violationoftheAdministrat)peProcedureAct.

Response

See the response to Comment 15b.

Coment #21b:

Because they rely on assumptions with no basis in fact and are directly contrary

-to FEMA's experience, the criteria fail to assure that adequate protective measures can and wi11 be taken in a radiological emergency.

• • • Thus,' FEMA now proposes to allow its review of utility emergency plans to become a paper game in which state and local implementation of adequate protec-  !

tive measures to protect the public are simply assumed to occur. Such a whole-sale substitution of assumption for investigated fact is not adequate to meet FEMA's responsibility to the public. The public health and safety is not acequately protected by the type of wishful thinking exemplified by the proposed criteria.

• • • The criteria should be revised to require adjudicated facts rather than assumptions when FEMA makes its judgement on the question of whether adequate protective measures can and will be provided.

Response

See the response to Coment il regarding the assumptions.

Comment #21c:

The criteria violate provisions of FEMA's own Rules.

It is fundamental that an administrative agency must follow its own rules.

FE1M's rules for review of emergency plans are set forth in 44 C.F.R. Part 350.

FEMA is explicitly prohibited by its own regulations from adopting and using the proposed criteria and conducting any review or evaluation of a utility offsite plan:

1

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[f )

' Cr. ment '#21:L cont.. l l

N ***If the proposed criteria purport. to be amendments to FEMA's rules they have been implemented in violation of the procedural reouf rements of 5 USC 553.

FEMA .is th'e federal .agene,y responsible fur establishing.and coordinating federal review and policies. for emergency planning. Executive Order 12148. 42 USC 5131 (1982).. Thus.it is FEMA's obligation to issue its own regulations ccncerning its actions in reviewing emergency plans.. FEMA has done so .for its review of radiological emergency; response plans in 44 C.F.R. Part 350.

As noted above, FEMA's existing regulations are geared solely to the review of state and-local p'1ans and prohibit its review of utility plans.

l

"*The Administrative Procedure Act requires FEMA to provide public notice and an ~ opportunity be amended. 5 USC 553 for 1982).

p(ubik FDM participation has not through providedcomments.before any notice of any intent a rule.can to amend 44 C.F.R. Part 350. Therefore, the criteria cannot be implemented.

Response

[(FEMA-to-respond,)] See the response to Cor=ent #5b regarding the Administra-tive Procedure Act. j Comment #21d:

Adoption of the proposed' criteria by FDM violates its legal obligations to runction as lead agency for offsite emergency planning.

By Presidential, orcer, the FEMA is to function as the lead agency for offsite radiological emergency planning. In this role, FEMA has primary responsibility a , for review and assessment of emergency planning. This responsibility reflects the expertise and experience of FEMA in this regard as well as the considered determination by Congress in 1980 that the NRC alone should no longer determine what standards or criteria should be used to evaluate offsite emergency plannine and should no longer conduct such evaluations. -SeePub.L.96-295,i109(b)(1)lA) and (8)(11), 94 State. 784 (1980).

Response

[ffEMA-to-Pespondei) See the resoonse to Corment #20b.

Comment #21e:

However,'although FElu infctmed the HRC that it disapproved of a rule amendment l

- that would no longer require state and local governmental participation prior J to plant licensing, FEMA has adopted these criteria which have the same result. I Moreover, from an examination of the process by which these criteria were draf teo and adopted 1t emerges that FEMA has given up its responsibilities as lead agency and yielded to NRC pressure to adopt criteria actually drafted by the NRC.

This agency ventriloquism has one agency tellirg ar.other what it wants that agency to say even tnough FEMA has lead agency responsibility in precisely this regard. Such agency process is simply unacceptable.

f' h5 .]

Q?. .e: 1 p-jy i y w . ....

I s

Comment #21: cont. i

Response

i 1

[@EMA-to-Pespen64 3'

m. FEMA leadership responsibilities in regard to offsite planning extends to offsite

,s planning of State and local governments. In the case of offsite planning by

[ ' utilities, NRC has the lead and FEMA's role is one of cooperating with the NRC.

W '

4- Comment #21f: ff The assumptions are not well drafted and leave open many critical' questions.

Does- Assumption Ic. on page 2 mean that the state and local governments will be assumed to have material ana-personnel? Does " sufficient to implement" mean that these resources will be' sufficient to implement the utility plan adequately?

Is FEMA prepared to assume this for Massachusetts even though FEMA has in fact determined in the past that the Commonwealth's " resources" are not adequate?

What are the portions of the utility plan "where state and locaT7esponse is necessary"? Is this operationally cefined on page 6 or only illustrated?

What is the actual function of liaisen? Where will these liaisons actually'go and how itill th'ey'do what is described'htrti kesponse:

See the response to Comment #1 regarding the assumptions. See the response to Comment #2d regarding the legal authority issues.

The liaisons are to advise and assist State and local officials in implementing those portions of the offsite plans while State and local response is identified. The plan will identify both where they are necessary and what their specific duties are. (See also the response to Comment #2c regarding liaiscn functions.)

Coment #21g:

The definition cf ORD on page 3 is unclear. Does the OP0 include organizations other than the utility offsite energency response organization? If so, many of the evaluation criteria become contradictory. *f not, this definition is poorly wordad.

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f Comment #21: cant. Response:

See the response to Comment #8c regarding the definition of the ORD.

Comment #21h:

' Generally, aside from the all-important planning assumptions, the changes from

. NUREG-0654, Rev. I appear to be nothing more than the substitution of the words

'foffsite response organization" from state and local governments. See page 3.

-However, as noted below, often the result is organizational confusion and the loss o.f any meaningful criterion or requirement.

Response: N The comment-is noted.

Comment #211:

- la: Definition of "offsite response organization" in footnote is contradictory.

Is "0R0" to include other non-utility organizations? If so, who speaks for these other organizations?

d: Unc-lear what being "in charge" of the emergency response means? This is the person designated by the ORD. Is she "in charge" of state & 1ccal officials who are assumed to participate in an actual emergency?

e: 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> day links maintained by ORO but what is being linked? In Rev. 1, each organization is linked with the others. What is linked here?

Response

See the response to Comment #8e regarding the definition of the ORO and Comment #12d regarding identifying, key individuals.

Evaluation Criterion C.I. stutes that the ORO shall identify a specific individual by title who shall be in charge of emergency response. This person would not be in charge of the non-participating State and local government response. The ORD will maintain communicaticos links for its organization.

Communications with non-participating State and local organizations shall be j accomplished per Evaluation Criterion F.1.

IJ Coment #21: cont. Comment #213:

2a: What does " require state and local authorization" mean? Is it imagined that these listed functions and acticns would be performed by non-1 governmental personnel? Could the state and locals legally authorize such actionst How? Tarough emergency appointment, deputization or delegation?

If performed by governmental personnel than this should state that these functions require " authorization" and " staffing" by state and local govern-ments. What does the sentence mean that imediately folicws the list of ten functions and precedes A.2b?

b: What does " legal basis for such authorities" mean? What is the referent intended by: . " including those that reserve functions tu state and Icesi governments"? e-Is the point here that the plan must set forth the legal basis for stating that certain emergency ~ functions must have state and local government authorization? If so, the phrase beginning " including those..." is redun-dant because the functions are already identified as those reserved by law

.to the state and local governments. Why limit the legal references to those-identified? The legal basis wf11 also be the state and federal constitu-tions and state and federal comon law.

Response

See the response to Coment #2d.

Comment #21k:

A.3: If the definition of offsite response organization set forth as a footnote i to A.la is accurate then these written agreements cust be between different parts of the same whole. "Offsite response organization" must be something different from the "other participating voluntary and private organizations, and... federal government [ ]" as defined in footnote 1. l j

Response

See the response to Coment #8e regarding the definition of the ORO. There may be "other support organizations" outside the framework of the ORO who l

provide services, e.g., contract bus services, ambulance services, etc.

Coment #211:

A.4: Assuming the "0R0" does not definitionally include any other organizations, then this 24-hour capability is rather limited. Rev. I required "each principal organization" to have 24-hour continuous operations. This

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Comment021VJcont. ,w included federal and prfvste sector organizations if they were consicered

" principal."' In Suppl >1. onig the ORO must be capable of 24-hour operations..

But if.there are other prTircipal organizations, they should.also have to

!have 24-hour' operations capability.

n Response:

Supp0111s. appropriately . limited.' The ORO is the principal organiz(*..n. The Federal governmeint [has-e-demonstrated] is not a principal organization and therefore does not need to demonstrate a 24-hour operational capability. The

. non-participating. State and4bcal government organizations will not have to demonstrate anything.

Comment #21mi ,

8: Supp.1 ignores Planning Standard 8 no doubt because it is entitled "On:ite Emergency Orpnization." However, there are important features of this criterion LWmake no sense without state and local participation. A key component to the Rev.18 plan'ning standard is. the provision of an

" interface" between onsite activities and offsite activities. For exmple,

'B.Treoufres a person to be identified who wil,1 initiate protective detion recommendations to " authorities responsible for implementing offsite emer-gency measures." 8.6 requires a block diagran linking onsite functions to

. .g the " state 'and local government resornse organization." Fina lly, 6.7L recuires specification of personne lor " management level interface with governmental authorities" and for " release of information to news media during an emergency (coordinated with governmental authorities)." None

'of these connections betwe6n onsite planning and offsite response are dealt with in Supp. I because it simply' states that planning standard S is "not applicable."

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Response

Planning Standard 8. applies exclusively to the " licensee" and the ensite plan.

Comment #21n:

C.1: In general, character of the Federal Raciologic6 Emergency Esponse Plan

("FRERP") is ignored. In fact, the FRERP was designed to interface with state ana local governments. What is the difference, it any, between the  ;

"Ticensee" and the "offsite response organization?" The Interagency Radio- '

logical Assistance Plan is ignored. Why?

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.C.5: ORO's persennel that are to advise and assist are not identified by function or task. Which portions of the plan require state or local response?

0: This standard still references state and local response plans.

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Response

See the response to comment fac regarding the FRERP.

The portions of.the plan that require State or local response are to be identi-fied in the plan. We expect this to be site specific.

Regarding Planning Standard D, the klanning standards in Supp. I are the 16 planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). They have not been changed. Only the Evaluation Criteria in NUREG-0654 which implement the planning standards have been changed.

Comment #210:

0.4. Should the implementing procedures provide for the emergency actions or provide for advising state and local officials on emergency actions?

E.1: Does this include notification of state and local officials?

l Response: '

The implementing procedures should provide both for the ORO to implement some emergency actions and for the ORO to advise non-participating State and local officials on emergency actions.

Comment #21p:

E.2: To the extent that state and local personnel are going to actually perform an emergency role or at least, are assumed to perform such a role, these people should be notified by somebody.

Response

Agreed. Evaluation Criterion E.2 has been changed to include alerting and noti- 4 fying non-participating State and local governments.

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Comment #Qgi E.5: ORO is to disseminate information to the public, including notification l of EBS and broadcast media. Can prtvate artjenizations do this? 1 E.6: Whose responsibility should it be to activate this systera of notification?

Also Supp. 1 references Appendix 3 for details of the " administrative and physical means" of notification. But Appendix 3 requires:

(1) organizations and individuals who will be responsible for actually notifying the populations, (2) provision for use of public media or corrcercial broadcast, M

(3) EBS on NOAA weathhr radio are to be put on alert at " Alert" category.

Who can do this?

(4) information is to be provided to public within 5 miles over radio and television within 15 minutes. Appendix 3 expressly references the state and local agencies. Emergency plans are to incluoe evidence of such arrangements including citation to appifcable laws.

(5) calls for primary and alternate channels of communications, (6)' alertand notification systems must be integrated with state and local EBS Operational Area Plan. "[A]ctual public notices would only take place upon authorization of governmental authorities." 3-15.

E.7 "[M]essages should address the various ccnditions such as the delegation of authority by the state and local governments to the ORO to issue prompt instructions." Is such delegation legal?

E.8 What is meant by coordination? When should it occur? In our case, would New Hampshire (a participating state) Massachusetts (a non-participating state) and the ORO and/or licensee do this coordinating.

Response

Alert and notification of the public may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but generally non-government organizations can dissennnate emergency information to the public and can notify EBS and NOAA. The remaining issues in this coment are site specific to Seabrook nuclear power plant and will be addressed in that licensing forum.

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Comment'#21: cont. "i

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. Comment #21r:-

.* i F.1: 'A 24-hour' hook-up is required but only' between the licensee and ORO. The

. hook-up to state and local governments can be via 911 plus a capacity ,to 1 transmit on existing radio frequencies. Does this make sense? 3 F.3: How is.this " entire system" going.to be tested?

Response

see tne response to Comment #2e. regarding communications. Non-participating State and 1ccal governments are not required to participate in emergency exercises per 20 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV.F.

Consent ~ i21s:

But how-will the public actually be notified and by whom?

Who are these other spokepersons?

Response

How the public will be notified depends upon the specific provisions of the plan. The utility may do this (with the authority delegated from the non-participating State and local government, at the time of the emergency if delegation is necessary). Alternatively the non-participating State and local government may do this.

Consent #21t: .

I For I.11. can federal resources simply be dovetailed with private efforts?

Response

l Yes.

I Comment #2:u:

For J.7. this criterion has not been changed although it requires a mechanism for licensee to recommend protective actions to state and local authorities.

Also, " prompt notification shh11 be made directly to the offsite authorities responsible for implementing protective measures."

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Conment #21: cont, - For J.9. " establish a. capacility for implementing protective measures." What does this mean in this context?

For J.11. what 1authority is needed for.ingestior, pathway measures?

Response

Evaluation Criterion J.7 applies to the onsite plan and, therefore is not part of Supp. 1.

Evaluation Criterion J.9. stag,es that "The offsite response organization shell

, establish a capability for implementing protective measures...". In this context it means recommending protective measures to the public, such as, sheltering and eva cua tion.

• The authority, if any, needed to implement protective measures for the ingestion pathway is site specific and depends upon Federal, State and local sws.

Comment #21v:

For K.3a, does ORO monitor doses for state personnel as well?

For K.3.6, how can OR0 ensure that state workers' dosimeters are reaa?

For K.a, can ORO decide to authorize that state emergency workers get doses in excess of PAGs?

l For ti.I, can ORO decide to " relax protective measures"?

Response

L The answer to these questions depends upon the specific situation at a given site. If non-participating State and local organizations die not provide dosiretry for emergency workers the ORO could provide dosimeters or provide personnel to monitor the doses to emergency workers. The ORO need not authorize State or local government emergency workers to receive any dose. This woule be j a function of State and local authorities. (See also the response to Comment #18j.)

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w Comment 321: cont. Commenth21w: s N.lb: "kdequate to verify the capability?" Without state acd local personnel how will this be verified? " Capabilities to~ interface with non-participating state and local governments." What does " interface" mean here~ and-what standard will be applied?

N.6: State and local governments need not participate. How could this ever

. establish or verify " capability to respond"? How could "all major elements of the plans "ever be tested?"

Response: f l

See the response to Comment #,4m regarding exercises.  !

Comment #21x:

For 0.1, who are " appropriate individuals"? They are not defined here. In fact, Rev. I states: "shall provide site specific emergency response training for those offsite emergency organizations who may be called upon to provide assistance."

CR0 is to train those who will implement. Does this include the state and local pecple? -Is FEMA assuming these people will be trained or not?

- ORD shall train:

(d) police, security and fire fighting personnel (g) local support services personnel including Civil Defense ORO offers training l to non-participating state personnel. But is it reoufred?

If not, how can a determination of adequacy be made? < i

Response

Supp. I reads the same as HUREG-0654 The latter quotation in this cocinent only has applicability to the licensee and the ensite plan and is therefore not repeated in Supp. 1. Evaluation Criterion 0.6 states that the offsite resconse o_rjanization shall offer training to non-participating State and local govern-ments and other organizations; however, training of [nen-partie4pating-State-and 4esa4-government-personne4]ofthesepersonnelisnotreovired.

>1 Comment #22: New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP)

We sre writing on behalf of the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP) to ob'ect strongly to the sericus procaoural defects of NURIG-%5/

FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 Supp.1, Noveeter,1987, " Criteria fer Utility Cf tsite Planning and Preparedness, Oraft Report for interim Use and Comment *. Such substantive regulations simply are not valid and cannot be applied to any utility emergency response plan unless FENA has first cgmplied with alt of the requirements of tre Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Although the' federal register publication identifies these rules as a joint issuance of FEMA and NRC, my comments are addressed to you because FEMA, and not NRC, is the agency responsible for evaluating utility emergency response plans.

From a 7etter we received on November 30, 1987, written by Edwin J. Reis, Deputy Assistant General Counsel o Fthe NRC, to the Seabrook Off-site Licensing Board in In re In the Matter of Public Service Cogany of New Hampshire (Seabrook

. StatToii~ Units I and 2), Docket Nos.50-44J, 50-444 (Off-site Emergency Planning),

S it is clear that tnese regulations are for immediate use by FEMA in evaluating the utility offsite radiological emergency response plan for the Massachusetts part of the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone. FEMA is also planning to use these regulations immediately to review the Shoreham emergency plans. Thus, without the priur opportunity for notice and comment rulemakirig required by the APA, these rules for " interim use" are going to be used to evaluate emergency response plans for the only two nuclear plants in the ccuntry in which utility plans wf11 be used .instead of state or local plans. Such action is contrary to 1:w, contrary to FEMA's statutory and regulatory mandate, and contrary to the public interest. Before such regulations can be applied to evaluate any utility plan, they must be lawfully promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking.

rEMA Must Issue Its Own Regulations Governing Utility Emergency Response Pier.s under section 201 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 55131 (1962),

as fmpismented by Executive Order 12148, the director of FEMA is charged with the responsibility for developing and implementing programs .for oisaster pre-parecness.

The APA sets forth the only lawful methods by which an agency may enact and apply substantive regulations, such as the ones recently published for " interim use and coment". Unless regulations fit within one of the statutory exceptions, I where an agency chooses to proceed through notice and comment rulemaking to l establish norms or rules governing agency action, then that agency cust abiae i by the requirements of section 553 of the APA.

• "!n simultaneously publishing and applying these new emergency planning rules, FEMA and HRC have failed to comply with each of the APA requirements. The agencies have thereby also uncermined the important purposes to be served t;y ,

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em-t Comment #22: cont. These~ Regulations Do Not Fit Within Any of the Section 553 Exceptions

• • • 1. The Regulations are Substantive Rules

• • • 2. The Regulations Oc Not Ff t Within the " Good Cause" Exception to Section 553

• • • Conclusion The requirements of the courts and of the APA are clear. Prepromulgation notice and comment are required fur rules like the ones drafted by FEMA and HRC for review of utility emergency response plans.

• • • We stress, in conclusforg,,that these are FEMA's legal. obligations. They nay not be evaded simply because the review is being conducted at NRC's request to be used in an NRC licensing proceeding. There is nothing in NRC's rules or in any Memorandum of Understanding whir.h can alter FEl4A's reouf rements under the APA. If NRC's lawyers have advised FEMA otherwise, they are incorrect. In this connection, you will note that NRC went through a formal rulemaking before adopting its own new rule. The same standard applies to FEMA; indeed it applies with greater force since the deta. ed substantive criteria for reviewing utility plans are FEMA's criteria and FEMA's re possibility.

We therefore urge you to assert your statutory authority te proceed to consider the solicited comments and finalize a lawful rule before conducting your review of the utility Massachusetts plan for Seabrook.

Response

See the response to Comment #5b regarding the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

and Comments #2Ca and b regarding FEMAs authorities and obligations.

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Coment #23a: Welles Hotchkiss In para. II.A.2.a. the following sentence appears "This description shall specify those functions which require State and local authorization before implementing, such as:..." This sentence is followed by a list of activities typically performed by, or directed by, government personnel, e.g., police.

Those people can be presumed to be familiar with whatever authorization they need to perform their duties. The basis of the recently revised emergency planning rule is that government personnel will perform their duty in an emer-gency. The sentence quoted above suggests that someone else will perform such duties and that someone will need " authorization". The sentence that follows the list of ten activities, and all of para.II.A.2.b., also imply that some governmental duties will be performed by others. Delete that part of para. II.A.2. ,,,,

Because the police and other government people will do their duty, but may not participate in planning or participate in drills, there should be a requirement in para. II.A.2. tnat the licensee identify those duties that will be done by people who do not participate in planning or drills. The licensee should also identify those non-utility duties that will be done by planning / drills partici-pants. No one should be presumed to need any authorization they do not alrency have to do their duty.

Response

See the response to Comment #2d regarding the legal authority issue.

See the response to Comment /4h regarding identification of duties.

Coment #23b:

para. II. A.3. should be clarified to distinguish between non-utility planning /

drills participants and non-utility non-planning / drills participants. Written agreements should not be expected between the utility and the non-participants.

Response: ,

i See the response to Connent d2f regarding that no agreements are necessary between the utility and the non-participants.

Corament #23c:

The plan should be considered satisfactory if the activities that are necess&ry in an emergency are identified and assigned to groups that can reasonably be expected to carry them out. It is hardly necessary, for example, to require police to participate in drills to determine if they can direct traffic.

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Coment #23: cont. Response:

The dual purposes of. an exercise are avaluation and training. Therefore, it' is preferable for the police to participate. However, under NRC regulations i in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F., participation of State and local government 1A an emergency exercise is not required. I l

Cement #23d:

One of the implications of n m-participation by local governments has been omitted in the supplement to flUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1. That is the issue of

" acoustic alerting signal", e.g., strens. It is a reasonable exercise of freedom for any comunity, through its elected officials, to choose not to '

accept the intrusfor. of sirens. This is especially true in the case of pro-tection from an accident at a nuclear power plant. Such an accident is l extremely unlikely. Moreover, the recent studies of accident source terms shew that the offsite consequences of an accident would most certainly be as significant as those following the accident at Three Mile Island. The enabling 4 legislation for emergency planning does not establish a federal requirement for towns to install sirens. Therefore the regulations and guidance should nct require sirens, 'or any other involuntary acoustic alerting signal.

Response

The NRC and FEMA have determined previously that a prompt public alerting system is necessary. Sirens, tene-alert radios, automatic telephone dialing or a combination of these systems have been accepted to meet this requirement.

Comment #23e:

Indeed, the entire obligation for all offsite activities should be the respon-sibility of the pecple's elected governments. The licensee's obligations should be two: First, the licensee should provide information about the likelibced and l

range of expected consequences of an accident. Second, the licensee should pro-l

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-l Comnent #23: cont. vide the funding for any extraordinary costs of local protective ' activities. 'It is not reasonable to expect a utility to do what. federal law has not mandated.

It is not reasonable to expect a local community, or. a- state to let a utility-

-usurp its powers.

Response

The connent is' noted.

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Comment #24: Tennessee Valley Authority

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- The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has revfewed and is pleased to provide comments on revision 1, supplement I to t;'JREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1 noticed in the Deceaber 2,1987 Federal Register (52 FR 45344-45346) regarding the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans. i l

This supplement provides modifications to criteria that will be used to evaluate utility developed compensatory measures resulting from the situations in wnich 4 State and local officials decline to participate in the planning process for radiological accidents.

This supplement-should be effective as a joint NRC and FEMA interim-use document with the understanding that it is to be used after the utility has made a sLs-tained effort to obtain thecooperation of the necessary governments and, as the last measure to be used, to compensate for the lack of cooperation.

It needs to be noted that thers are several logistic details concerning the interface between the offsite emergency response organization (as defined in the supplement) that will need to be addressed within the governmental structure that exists at the titue this document would be implemented, which cannot be generically defined ahead of time.

We appreciate the opportunity for comment.

Response

The connent is noted.

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