ML20237K800
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:- $a n% DATE: // b'9 .#[ UNITED STATES / [ ( p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHWGTON, D, C. M55 s....../ MEMORANDUM FOR: f),h(>D/f4/3 l h htAmnyn k. Od b - COOL [E h FROM: Hazel Smith Planning and Program Analysis Staff, NRR (
SUBJECT:
FOIA # 31) - T5 0 ( hg ) 2<elAlvJ h % lt h f cf & MAnA0?m k %- lcm */ Pk (v2 CI A 93e 90CA tw %& 10 tw. C c'rMHxh t P< td Pleaserespondtotheattachedrequestby9GSff)Ihaveenclosedaform memorandum for your use. If you expect your search time to exceed 2 hours, i please call ASAP. See the attached hereto for other pertinent instructions. i Proprietary or Privacy Act information is to be When only portions of a document are to be withheld, provided at all times. bracket in red; DO NOT DELETE!.!! .j i Documents which may be contained in the Docket / Central Files are also to be considered. If assistance is needed, contact me or I. Bailey (X27123). This request has also been sent to Contact me immediately if any other~. office should receive this request. J e( Haze Smith (X-28730) Planning and Program Analysis Staff Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation P-433 Attachments-1. FOIA Request ~% '**C'"*" '4Yy' 2. Pertinent Instructions ^ 3 i C. C_ AuMf N,, r s 3. Form memorandum for Staff V response to FOIA f-r /- h. LMuy.s & ' y ,)' 1 {;X d - g E /.hb l 8708270301 870819 {i L ' [D L. <YS r PDR FOIA - h/(J \\ ( _/ - - BAUMAN87 -A-14 PDR 9 / ,3 ri e.
I Attachment j Jre: FOIA's) Requested material does not have to be 4 *PDR availability" accession number. provided when the documents have For all such documents list the who it's to and from,"and the subject. accession nueer, cocket number (when When this infomation can not be ) provided, copies 'of all written material within the scope of the request I are needed. When the neuest involves proprietary infomation for which the staff has ir not issued a proprietary determination, the staff sust supply the transmit-tal letter and supporting affidavit. When the proprietary determination has been issued, the licensee / vendor's request for withholding and NRC's determination letter are needed. infomation which is subject ta this nquest sust be provided.In either cas All material submitted in nsponse to the F0!A should be listed in your written nsponse to me, in either or all of the following categories: i _Apoendix A For release to the public Jooendix 8 Not to be n1 eased to the public. (A supportive discussion for each item mustbeprovided). .Apotndix C ?pDR evallability accession numbers for correspondence or material which is within the scope of this report. Also indicate the date, subject and to and from infomation. PM's should also consider the need to serve parties to proceeding copies of tele'asable correspondence or documents provided for an FOIA request, when such material has not been served on the parties through the nomal channels. In addition pM's should advise WRR's ACR$ Coordinator when requested infomation r, elates to a' subject which 15 schedules to~be considered by the ACRS. Response memoranda er route slip must be signed by tran signature requirement also includes a negatlve response.ch Chief. This All time expended on this request should be nported on respective RA".5 .Shee ts. 4
Enclosure:
Guidance from FotA sranch
O (; r please infom the F0IA Branch staff of your responses to the '0UEST!09: following questions within five days of your receipt of an FO!A i request: 2. Does your office have agency records subject to this. request? If y If expected search time.es, will significant search time be required? NOTE: exceeds two l hours, do not begin search until first talking to the FOIA Branch contact. l I 2. Do you anticipate any significant problems in processing this request and responding in the allotted time? If so, inform the FOIA Branch contact imediately. 3. Is there any other office not listed above which might have records subject to this request? If so, infom the FOIA Branch contact imediately. YGIA SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS: The following instructions are to be used in searching for 3 records and processing FOIA requests: $cepe of Search -2_. 2. As a general rule, a search is adequate when all records are locsted which individuals 1 familiar with the subject matter of the request can retsonably be expected to find in a reasonable amount of time. 2. The staff does not have to look into every conceivable file for records subject to a request, but the staff likely to be familiar with the subject matter must be consulted, and those files likely to contain records must be reviewed. 14ency Records 3 A request applies only to records in existence on the date the request is received by HRC. "In exister4e" includes records in a computer data file. Even though a copy of the computer data file may belubject, no new programing is required to extract the data. However, if the infomation is retrievable by use of an existing print prog' ram the subject information can be provided by printout. (Records created after a request is received by.NRC ray be made available as a matter of discretion with the staff, l'.e., if the additional records are necessary to' provide a complete picture of a situation or te avoid possible ambiguity). 4. If the requested information does not exist in record or computer format at the time a request is received, there is no obligation under the FOIA to create a record in order to be responsive to the request. 5. If records have been destroyed prior to the recei et of the request, there is no . obligation under the FDIA to tell the requester wiat was destroyed, when it was destroyed, c'r why it was destroyed. Note, however, that no records any be destroyed after a request is received. 6. If a request also asks for all records enated in connection with the processing ~cf the n quest, it is not necessary to make these records available since the records were not in existence at the time the request was received. The FDIA imposec no obligation en staff offices to retain such records. (However, there may be a separate,laterrequest,fortheserecords). 7. If a request siks for records maintained at a person's residence snd a stcff mmber has any ques' tion as to whether the records are personal records o,r agency records, the f staff member should coritact the FO!A Branch. (Normally records maintained at a person's residence are not ' agency records'). )
- 9* r e
/ dd TECHNICAL REVIEW 0F PHILLIPS' ISSUES CONTAINLU IN LUMANLht PEAK IN5PECTION REPORTS INTRODUCTION This is a technical review of the issues contained in inspection reports 85-07/05, 85-14/11, and 85-16/13. The review of these issues should provide input to address the following PHILLIPS allegation: " Region IV management harassed and intimidated inspectors to pressure them to change or delete proposed inspection findings and to change or downgrade proposed inspection violations at CPSES." is a listing of 34 technical issues that were included in PHILLIPS' draft inspection reports and were discussed with Region IV person-nel, principal?y WESTERMAN, during OIA interviews. In addition, the technical issues applicable to inspection reports 85-14/11 and 85-16/13 were listed in a matrix that was prepared by PHILLIPS to point out which of his proposed violations were changed, downgraded or deleted by Regional management. However, for the purpose of this review, only the 16. technical issues that were specifically raised by PHILLIPS during his March 19, 1986, interview with 01A were reviewed (see underlined items in Attachment 1). A review of 16 issues should provide an indication of how PHILLIPS and Regional management generally addressed technical problems at CPSES. It is unclear whether the
- remaining 18 issues were specific concerns that PHILLIPS wanted 01A to address.
If they continue to be concerns to Mr. PHILLIPS, it is suggested that a technical team composed of non-Region IV inspectors be utilized to review the remaining issues. This review will address how the issue was originally stated in the draft findingorviolation;therationaleusedbyRegionalmanagem)enttochange,inspecti k delete, or downgrade the finding or violation; and conclusions that could be made based on a review of the testimony presented by both parties and a review of TUGC0 documents. s It should be understood there are limitations on the reliability of the testimony received by OIA and supporting evidence because it is unclear whether this evidential matter was developed during the inspections, shortly after the inspections, prior to issuing the inspection reports, or just prior to 01A's meetings with the parties. L
I l Concern No. 3 i PHILLIPS was concerned that Region IV management downgraded the following audit-related violation to an unresolved item: " Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII and TUGC0 QA Pica W Section 18.0, there was no evidence that TUGC0 had audited either Unit 2 y), reactor vessel' installation specifications, placement procedures, actual hardware placement, or as-built records." According to the draft inspection report, the inspector requested TUGC0 QA audits or surveillance performed by TUGC0 of the Unit 2 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) installation. TUGC0 did not make available to the inspector any audit or surveillance reports of : specifications for placement criteria, placement procedures, hardware placement or as-built records. Underlying this issue (HUNTER] stated in a referenced document that the generic implications of this finding'(i.e., inadequate implementation of the QA audit and/or surveillance program concerning RPV placement 3ctivities) are extremely significant, indicating a ote ial QA program breakdown concerning a major equipment installation. UNTER tated that: "The licensee apparently did not ensure adequate audits and/or surveil-lance during the placement of the RPV and it is not likely that such adequate audit and/or surveill6nce activities were provided during the placement of other safety-related equipment at CPSES." After a series of Regional management reviews, the final report identified this as a finding in the following way: "TUGC0 did not make available any documentation of an audit or surveillance which evaluated specified placement criteria, placement procedures, hardware placement, or as-built records. This item is unresolved pending a more comprehensive revi~" of these activities " i S 4 l
6 WESTERMAN and BARNES told 01A that the utility is not required to perform an audit in this area. WESTERMAN also stated that, in general, the effectiveness of such audits would be very questionable; audits don't always catch every-thing; and, if TUGC0 made some minor changes to their surveillance for the installation of the vessel, they could have made an audit out of it. However, 01A asked WESTERMAN if he had PHILLIPS check TUGC0's audit plan when PHILLIPS proposed this violation. WESTERMAN told OIA that he did not know whether the audit plan was adequate and did not have PHILLIPS pursue this issue. In any case, he included this finding in the inspection report as an unresolved item to demonstrate to the inspector that he did not avoid the issue. Technical Evaluation of This Concern OIA reviewed the general requirements for audits, including the specific activities and equipment to be specified in an audit plan. According to the ANSI Standards (ANSI N45.2.11 and N45.2.12), the audit plan identifies the audit scope, particularly, the functional areas to be audited and the extent of the audits within these areas. The regulations (10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVIII) only address the need for a comprehensive system of planned and periodic audits. The inspector would have to refer to the audit plan to determine: (a) if the vessel installation activity was included but was not accomplished; (b) the adequacy of the audit plan itself; (c) and whether the system of audits or surveillance implemented by TUGC0 satisfies Appendix B. In the absence of such a review, none of these determinations could have been made. Conclusion For This Concern ' Based on the available information, it is inconclusive whether a violation is appropriate for this issue, because the inspector would need to review the audit plan to ascertain the licensee's compliance with the regulations and/or its confomance with the ANSI standards. Therefore, until the Region accomplished this, the issue should have been and, correctly, was considered unresolved. (This finding might have been resolved q:Ockly had WESTERMAN instructed PHILLIPS to look at the audit plan.) The rationale used by Regional management to include this issue as an unresolved item was not based on any further NRC action, including the review of the audit plan. This practice is contrary to the requirements ir. Chapters 0400 and 0610 of the IE Manual for the reporting of findings and potential enforcement action. Concern No. 4 PHILLIPS was concerned that Region IV management dropped the following traceability-related violation: "Contrar., to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VIII and TUGC0 QA Plan, Section 8.0, Revision 0, dated July 1, 1978, and Article NA 3766.6 of ASME, Section III, 1974 edition, spool piece 301 (DWG No. BRP-CS-2-RB-76) had neither been marked with the material specification and grade nor y heat number nor heat code of the material." According to PHILLIPS' testimony, a mark identifying the spool piece number and drawing number was found by TUGC0 several months after the conclusion of
- e 7
4 the inspection. He questioned whether this was an appropriate practice considering that the final report did not state that the identification number was located months after the initial drafting of the report. After a series of Regional management reviews, the final report did not identify this as a finding and stated the following: "The installed spool piece was inspected for weld quality and to verify that marking and traceability requirements had been met. The item had been marked with the spool piece number (3Q1) and the Brown and Root (B&R) drawing number which provided traceability to the material certification." Both WESTERMAN and BARNES stated that the inspector rechecked the spool piece and found a marking on the spool piece that provided sufficient identifica-tion. BARNES stated that, according to the ASME code, a mark number was I sufficient and there was no requirement to maintain specific design specifica-l l tions, graded materici, and heat number or heat code, because the spool piece was part of a piping subassembly that could be traced back to the vendor and l the vendor's processes. It is questionable whether BARNES' argument was used by the Regional management while changing and finalizing the inspection l report. It is unclear whether the piping subassembly identification was a j faci.or considered by the Region when accepting the spool piece number and the drawing number, because the final report does not mention piping subassembly traceability at all. Technical Evaluation of This Ccncern 'This technical evaluation is meant to address the adequacy of TUGCO's traceability of the spool piece but not to address the timejjness of finding any marking on the spool piece. According to a referencedQiUNTER document, l this part of the inspection was to verify that the licensee's practices regarding identification or traceability by means of markings was in l accordance with ASME code requirements and Criterion VIII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Appendix B states that identification and control measures should be designed to prevent the use of incorrect or defective material, parts, and equipment. It was not reported in the draft or final inspection report that I there was any use of a nonconforming spool piece. Further, the licensee generally establishes an appropriate program to control traceability at the plant, whether at the subcomponent, component, or system level, at which point specific design, manufacturing, and procurement information is included. Neither the regulations nor the code are prescriptive about the type of item that needs to be traced. If the spool piece needed to have sufficient identification (heat number, design, specifications, etc.), then a marking that did not contain all the requisite traceability data would not have been l sufficient to comply with the regulations. l Conclusion For This Con 9rn l Based on the available information, it is inconclusive whether a violation is appropriate for this issue. Even after a mark was found, it is unclear I whether it provided sufficient traceability that is required to be in compliance with Appendix B; however, licensees generally are given latitude on establishing an appropriate level of traceability. The matter of finding a l lu
8 i marking on the spool piece after the initial drafting of these inspection report an:i including it in the final report is an inspection policy issue and not a technical issue. ~ 1 Concern No. 5 PHILLIPS was concerned that the Region required no response concerning the violation (in the Notice of Violation for Inspection Report 07/05) fer the failure to document or provide record evidence that the cement mixing blades had been inspected quarterly since 1977. PHILLIPS believed, even though this was not a hardware problem, it was a QA/QC problem that should have been addressed. In the draft inspection report, the inspector did acknowledge that: (1) the vendor representative stated that the mixing blades were periodically inspected and laboratory testing would have probably indicated if there was a problem with the mixing blades; and (2) strength and uniformity tests have consistently been within the acceptable range indicating that. coccrete production was acceptable. However, PHILLIPS stated that, without a TUGLO response, TUGC0 did not have to look into the issue and determine what the cause of the problem was to preclude repetition. He believed that it was possible that other inspections, required by procedurer, were not being documented. In the Region's letter dateo February 3, 1986, forwarding this inspection report, it stated that no applicant response to this violation was necessary because(1)theprocedurehadbsenrevisedtoprovidedocumentedinspectionof the blades, (2) no abnormal blade wear had been identified, and (3) there had ebeen consistent concrete strength and uniformity tests. The Region received comments from HAUGHNEY, the NRC consultant, who did not believe inspection time should be expended in this area at this late date. The Region took HAUGHNEY's opinion and changed the language in the Notice of l Violation, based on the rationale, that: (1) the concrete w rA at CPSES during l this period appeared adequate, and (2) inspections were periodically conducted. However, HAUGHNEY and the Region never reviewed or asked the inspector to review other areas that required QC documentation. Technical Evaluation of This Concern All parties agreed no hardware problem resulted from the lack of documentation of inspections. The only issue is whether TUGCO's inspections of quality activities are not documented in other quality areas. The inspectors provided no evidence to support this hypothesis. Therefore, it was not necessary for the licensee to respond to the violation. Conclusion For This Concern Based on the available documentation, it appears there was no need to include language in the Notice of Violation to require an applicant response to the violation involving a lack of documentation of inspections of mixer blades. However, the Region should consider possible OC documentation problems in [ tuture NRC inspections. w-_.-____________-_____--_____
1 i i 17 4 concern why the travelers were not placed in the master data base or QA vault for more than a year after the travelers were completed. l t After a detailed review, Region IV management changed this potential violation l to an unresolved item, to allow TUGC0 to evaluate the inconsistencies with the 1 documentation for NAMC0 switches and determine if there is other documentatinr. l to account for the inconsistency. WESTERMAN provided OIA copies of a TUGC0 ] nonconformance report and four travelers to substantiate that one of the j switches was powering a non-safety-related system and, in the other case, the i correct NAMC0 switch was obtained. However, WESTERMAN told OIA that he did { not ast PHILLIPS or another inspector to expand the sample si k to determine 4 j if cther switches had documentation problefus. Regional management believed ) that, based on PHILLIPS' findings, no hardware problem was involved with this issue. J Technical Evaluation of This Concern A review was conducted of the inspector's log for revieHng travelers and the portion of the IE Bulletin applicable to NAMCO switches, the nonconformance report addressing the identification problem for travelers concerning NAMC0 switches, portions of TUGCO's audit response involving IE Bulletin 79-28, and internal TUGC0 documentation itivolving NAMCO switches. It was learned that NAMC0 switches were being replaced in tha plant to confonn to IEB 79-28, and l l the only issue is whether old or new switches were present. According to the { IE Bulletin, the old limit switches were defective because above 175*F their l top cover gaskets emit a vesin vapor that condenses into deposits on the l normally open contacts and thereby causes the switches to malfunction. ' Conclusion l Based on the available information, OIA cannot determine if a violation should have been imposed in this area. The Region should have continued to review l the area by expanding the semple size and determining the hardware I implications. It was identified as unresolved so that TUGC0 could locate the appropriate documentation. i i Concern No. 5 PHILLIPS was concerned ab potential wrongdoin g Brand Industry Services, j Inc. (BISCO) in their cer ficatier of tMr aesign tests for fire seals. PHILLIPS reconmend an 01 investigation and IE vendor inspection of the matter in two draft memoranda. PHILLIPS' management criticized both draft memoranda because Regional management considered them inflammatory. On April 4, 1986, 3 Region IV management did refer PHILLIPS' concern to IE management; this was at l least six months after the findina. Also, PHILLIPS had identified in his l l draftinspectionreport(85-16/13) issues involving the filing of a false report by BISCO, insufficient evidence of successful testing of BISCO fire seals; and potential violations involving the utility's failure to adequately l l evaluate and report a construction deficiency, per requirements in 10 CFR I 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21. The failure of Region IV to promptly consider PHILLIPS' concern as potential investigative matter was communicated by PHILLIPS to 01A. However, PHILLIPS' concern about downgrading violations and j changing his findings concerning the BISCO seal problem was identified in his j r i l i . - _ _ - - _ _ _ - ~ _ -
IB \\ { matrix but was not addressed by PHILLIPS during his interview with OIA. There i might have bee 7; potentially safety significant issues that were dropped and I changed in the draft report (those should be referred to the EDO for his j follow up and not considered to be part of this investigation). PHILLIPS wrote two memoranda to his management and one memorandum to IE Vendor Branch about the generic implications of certification problems with BISCO saals. According to PHILLIPS' and draft memoranda, the records for fire i rating tests at BISCO were destroyed by a fire at BISCO during 1976, but BISCO J maintained certification on these seals in the absence of these records. JOHNSON told OIA that he did not discuss the technical issues with PHILLIPS but he did discuss the wrongdoing aspect with a Regional 01 official who chose not to pursue it. JOHNSON was upset that PHILLIPS desired to comunicate { directly to IE's Vendor Branch and not through Region IV management. 1 WESTERMAN told OIA that he chose not to pursue the violations concerning the l utility's failure to file a 50.55(e) and the lack of an adequate engineering evaluation concerning these seals. ] Technical Evaluation Of This Concern It was learned that, based on the April 4 Johnson letter, the IE staff did pursue the matter.The IE staff acknowledged that BISCO fire seal problea might have been a generic problem. The IE staff referred 01A to a Region III inspection report at the Clinton facility. This report concludes that the inspectors found that the BISCO fire seals did satisfy the regulatory requirements. However, it is unclear whether these seals are similar to the ones at Comanche Peak. Conclusion For This Concern I Based on the information in PHILLIPS' draft memoranda, the Region should have I promptly referred the matter to IE to determine the generic implications of J L the BISCO fire seal problem. Until e determination is made concerning the
- K safety significance of PHILLIPS' findings and whether the resolution of the t
fire seal problem at Clinton applies to the seal problem at Comanche Peak, it is premature to determine whether an 01 investigation is required. l 1 l l
19 ATTACHMENT I LISTING OF-PHILLIPS' PROPOSED VIOLATIONS DOWNGRADED, DROPPED, OR CHANGED INSPECTION REPORT 85-07/05 ISSUE RESOLUTION IN FINAL. REPORT 1 1
- 1. Failure to translate design criteria Violation downgraded to an 1
into installation specifications, unresolved item procedures and drawings; and failure (446/8505-U-06). to control deviations from the 1 requirements contained in these documents. 1
- 2. Failure to maintain tolerances Violation downgraded to an
~ required and failure to report unresolved item tolerance deviations on a non-(446/8505-U-05). conformance report.
- 3. Failure to perform audits or Violation downgraded to an surveillance of reactor pressure unresolved item vessel specifications, procedures (446/8505-U-07).
and installation.
- 4. For the CVCS spool piece, failure Violation dropped.
to maintain traceability of item by 1 applicable specification and grade l of material and heat number of heat I code.
- 5. Deferral of hydrostatic test on cold Unresolved item in draft report leg test subassembly.
was dropped in final report.
- 6. No objective evidence (records) that Violation maintained but no mixing blades had been inspected requirement for utility to quarterly since trucks were placed respond to this violation.
in service in 1977. l k
20 INSPECTION REPORT 85-14/11 ISSUE RESOLUTION IN FINAL REPORT I
- 1. FSAR does not describe TUGC0 Violation downgraded to records system.
unresolved item (445/8514-U-04; 446/8511-U-04).
- 2. QA manual does not address ANSI-Violation downgraded to N45.2.9 requirements / commitments.
unresolved item (445/8514-U-05; 446/8511-U-05).
- 3. TUGC0 failed to have/use procedures Violation established based to control shipment of original on TUGC0's failure to have records to Stone and Webster.
site procedures.
- 4. Original design records shipped Violation dropped.
in cardboard boxes to Stone and Webster.* j i
- 5. No backup copy of records made Unresolved item dropped.
J for records shipped to Stone and Febster.* j
- 6. Failure to control and account Violation dropped.
for records transferred to { Stone and Webster.
- 7. Site records of Chicago Bridge Violation dropped.
ard Iron shipped to Houston, Texas in cardboard boxes.**
- 8. No backup copy of records made for Violation dropped. An open records shipped to Chicago Bridge item created involving records and Iron.**
received from vendor (445/8514-0-06;446/8511-U-06).
- 9. TUGC0 failed to inventory records Violation dropped. Unresolved sent to Chicago Bridge and Iron.
item created involving Chicago Bridge and Iron records control (445/8514-U-06;446/8511-U-06).
- 10. TUGC0 did not document audit Violation dropped.
of records.
- and ** items were combined for the purpo.ses of this review.
21 ISSUE RESOLUTION.IN FINAL REPORT
- 11. Failure to preclude rain from Violation downgraded to Open-entering QA intermediate records Item (445/8514-0-02; vault over several years time.
446/8511-0-02).
- 12. Failure to preclude food and coffee Violation dropped, pot from QA intermediate records vault.
- 13. Failure to install fire suppression Violation downgraded to system, drains, and a sloped floor unresolved item at permanent vault.
(445/8514-U-08; 446/8511-U-08). I
- 14. Plant records stand in ' folders or Violation downgraded to binders in open face cabinets at unresolved item records center.
(445/8514-U-07; 446/8511-0-07).
- 15. Failure to provide temporary or Violation downgraded.
permanent storage facility for records co-mingled with in-process documents in paper flow group.
- 16. Weld rod not identified at main Violation dropped, distribution station.
S l e 4
.--_--~._--------------_-a
1 22 INSPECTION REPORT 85-16/13 .; ISSUE RESOLUTION IN FINAL REPORT
- 1. Failure t develop / implement Violation downgraded 4
procedure to demonstrate 50.55(e) to unresolved-deficiencies correctid. (445/8516-U-01; 446/8513-U-01).
- 2. Failure to revise implementors Violation Downgraded procedures containing 50.55(e) to unresolved reporting.
(44E/8516-U-01; 446/8513-U-01).
- 3. Failure to maintain retrievable Violation downgraded
) 50.55(e) files. to unresolved J (445/8516-U-01; 446/8513-U-01). 4
- 4. Failure to report to NRC corrective Violation downgraded actually action taken on 50.55(e)s.
to unresolved. )
- 5. TUGCO's 50.55(e) files not audible.
Violation downgraded to unresolved.
- 6. TUGC0 never responded to all aspects Unresolved item downgraded of IEB 79-14.
to open item (445/8516-0-03; 446/8513-0-03). s
- 7. TUGCO's IEB record files were Unresolved item downgraded incomplete.
to open item (445/8516-0-05; 446/8513-0-05).
- 8. NAMC0 switches IEB 79-28 were not Violation downgraded to i
properly identified on travelers. unresolved item (445/8516-U-04; 446/8513-U-04). ~
- 9. Deficiency ir. TUGCO's procedures Violation downgraded to to handle IEBs.
unresolved item (445/8516-U-02; 446/85136-U-02).
- 10. No focal point at TUGC0 to track Violation / unresolved item IEB actions.
dropped.
- 11. TUGC0 internu letter stated that Paragraph dropped in final TUGC0 not identify non-conformance report.
on IEB 79-14 to NRC.
- 12. Insufficient evidence of successful 01 investigation requested testing of BISCO fire seals - filing but rejected by Regional of false report by BISCO - Validity management.
Inspector's of BISCO seals questioned, unresolved items maintained (445/8516-U-06,446/8513-U-06); 445/8516-U-07;446/8513-U-07).
/ j ( APPENDIX C - GENERAL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS i The following statement of general policy and procedure explains the enforcement policy and procedures of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its staff in initiating enforcement actions and of presiding officers, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards, and the Commission in reviewing these actions. This statement is applicable to enforcement in matters involving the public j health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment.1 I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE The purpose of the NRC enforcement program is to promote and protect the radiological health and safety of the public, including employees' health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment by: Ensuring compliance with NRC regulations and license conditions; Obtaining prompt correction of noncompliance; Deterring future noncompliance; and Encouraging improvement of licensee performance, and by example, that of industry, including the prompt identification and reporting of potential safety problems. ~ Consistent with the purpose of this program, prompt and vigorous enforcement action will be taken when dealing with licensees who do not achieve the necessary meticulous attention to detail and the high standard of compliance which the NRC expects of its licensees. Each enforcement action is dependent on the circumstances of the case and requires the exercise of discretion after consideration of these policies and procedures. In no case, however, will licensees who cannot achieve and maintain adequate j levels of protection be permitted to conduct licensed activities. II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK i A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY The NRC's enforcement jurisdiction is drawn from the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended. Section 161 of the Atomic Energy Act authorizes NRC to conduct inspections and investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common defense and security or to protect health or to minimize danger to life or l . property. Section 186 authorizes NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances (e.g., for material false statements, in 2 Antitrust enforcement matters wil-1 be dealt with en a case-by-case basis. )
'o response to conditions that would have warranted refusal of a license on an original application, for.a licensee's failure to build or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the permit or license, and for violation of a NRC regulation).- Section 234 autho.rizes NRC to impose civil penalties not to. exceed $100,000 per viola. tion per day for the violation of certain specified licensing-provisions of the Act, rules, orders, and license terms implementing ~ these provisions, and for violations for which licenses can be revoked. Section 232 authorizes NRC to seek injunctive or other equitable relief for violation of regulatory requirements. Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act authorizes NRC to impose civil penalties for knowing and conscious failures to provide certain safety information to the NRC. Chapter 18 of the Atomic Energy Act provides for varying levels of willful violatio,es (i.e., monetary fines and imprisonment) forns of the.a criminal penalti Sections 65, 161(b), 161(i), or 161(o) of the Act. Section 223 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on certain individuals employed by firms constructing or supplying basic components of any utilization facility if the individual knowingly and willfully violates NRC requirements such that a basic component could be significantly impaired. Section 235 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who interfere with inspectors. Section 236 provides that criminal penalties may be imposed on persons who attempt to or cause sabotage at a nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel. Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act are referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. B. PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B, of NRC's regulations sets forth the procedures the NRC uses in exercising its enforcement authority. 10 CFR 2.201 sets forth the procedures for issuing notices of violation. The procedure to be used in assessing civil penalties is set forth in 10 CFR 2.205. This regulation provides that the appropriate NRC Office Director initiates the civil penalty process by issuing a notice of violation and proposed imposition of a civil penalty. The licensee is provided an opportunity to contest in writing the proposed imposition of a civil penalty. After evaluation of the licensee's response, the Director may mitigate, remit, or impose the civil penalty. An opportunity is provided for a hearing if a civil penalty is imposed. The procedure for issuing an order to show cause why a license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action should not be taken is set forth in 10 CFR 2.202. The mechanism for modifying a license by order is set forth in 10 CFR 2.204. These sections of Part 2 provide an opportunity for a hearing to the affected licensee. However, the NRC is authori' zed to make orders immediately effective if the public health, safety or interest 50 requires or, in the case of an order to show cause, if the alleged violation is willful. 2 I J
l ? III. SEVERITY OF VIOLATIONS Regulatory requirements 2 have varying degrees of safety, safeguards, or environmental significance. Therefore, it is essential that the relative. importance of each violation be identified as the firLt step in the l enforcement process. Consequently, violations are categorized in terms of.five levels of severity to show their relative importance within each of the following seven activity areas: Reactor Operations; Facility Construction; Safeguards; Health Physics; l i Transportation; Fuel Cycle and Materials Operations; and Miscellaneous Matters. ~ Within each activity area Severity Level I has been assigned to violations that are the most significant and Severity Level V violations are the least significant. Severity Level I and II violations are of very signi-ficant regulatory concern. In general, violations that are included in these severity categories involve actual or high potential impact on the public. Severity Level III violations are cause for significant concern. Severity Level IV violations are less serious but are of more than minor concern; i.e., if left uncorrected, they could lead to a more serious Severity Level V violations are of minor safety or environmental concern. corcern. The relative seriousness of violations at the several severity. levels applies within each activity area, but comparisons between activity areas are inappropriate. For example, while the immediacy of any hazard to the public associated with Severity Level I violations in Reactor Operations .is greater than that associated with Severity Level I violations in Reactor Construction, both areas have violations which cover the full range of severity levels. This disparity in relative seriousness of violations in different activity areas is due to the diversity of licensed activities regulated by NRC and the need for continuing improvement in licensee performance of certain activities. l 2The term " requirement" as used in this poliqy means a legally binding requirement such as a statute, regulation, license condition, technical specification, or order. 3
\\ ~ 1 f While examples are provided.in Supplements I through.VII.for determining the appropriate severity' level for violations in each of the seyen activity areas, the examples are neither exhaustive nor. controlling. These examples 1 do not create.new requirements. They reflect the seriousness of violations of requirements. Each of the examples in the supplements is predicated I on a violation of a regulatory requirement. In each case, the severity of a violation will be characterized at the level best suited to the significance of the particular violation.- Licensed ] activities not directly covered.by one of the.above listed areas, e.g., export license activities, will be placed in the activity area most suit-able in light of the particular violation involved. 1 The severity level of a violation may be-increased if the circumstances I surrounding the matter involve careless disregard'of requirements, deception, l or other indications of willfulness. The term "wi11 fulness" as used here embraces a spectrum of violations ranging from deliberate intent to violate or falsify to and including careless disregard for requirements. Willful-ness.does not comprehend acts which do.not rise to the level of careless disregard. In determining the specific severity level of a violation invol-ving wi11 fulness consideration will be given to such factors as the position of the person involved in the violation (e.g., first line supervisor or i senior manager), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent i of the violator (i.e., negligence not amounting to careless disregard, careless disregard, or deliberateness), and thE ec:nomic advantage,.if any, gained by the violation. The relative weight given to each of these factors in arriving at the appropriate severity level will be dependent on the circumstances of the violation. The NRC expects licensees to provide full, complete, timely, snd accurate l information and reports. Accordingly, unless l Supplements, the severity level of a violation,otherwise categorized in the involving the failure to make a required report to the NRC will be based upon the significance of and the circumstances surrounding the matter..However, the severity level of an untimely report,.in contrast to no report, may be reduced . depending on the circumstances surrounding the matter. IV. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS This section describes the enforcement sanctions available to NRC and specifies the conditions under which each may be used. The basic sanctions are notices of violation, civil penalties, and orders of various types. Additionally, related administrative mechanisms such as bulletins and confirmatory. action letters are used to supplement the enforcement program. In selecting the enforcement sanctions to be applied, NRC will consider enforcement actions taken by other Federal or State regulatory bodies having concurrent jurisdiction, such as in transportation matters. With very limited exceptions, whenever noncompliance with NRC requirements is identified, enforcement action is taken. The nature and extent of the enforcement action is intended to reflect the seriousness of the violation involved. For the vast majority of violations, action by an NRC regional office is appropriate in the form of a Notice of Violation requiring a formal response from the licensee describing its corrective actions. The 4 4
- ]
i l relatively small number of cases involving elevated enforcement action-receives substantial attentidn by the public, and may have significant impact on the licensee's operation. These elevated enforcement actions include civil penalties; orders modifying, suspending or revoking licenses; 3 or orders to cease and desist from designated activities. A. NOTICE OF VIOLATION A notice of violation is a written notice setting forth one or more i violations of a legally binding requirement. The notice normally j requires the licensee to provide a written statement describing (1)- corrective steps which have been taken by the licensee and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which will be taken to prevent recurrence; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved. i NRC may require responses to notices of violation to be under oath. Normally, responses under oath will be required only in connection with civil penalties and. orders. NRC uses the notice of violation as the standard method for formalizing the existence of a violation. A notice of violation is normally the only enforcement action taken, except in cases where the criteria for civil penalties and orders, as set forth in Sections IV.B and IV.C, respectively, are met. In such cases, the notice of violation will be issued in conjunction with the elevated actions. Because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiative for self-identification and correction of problems, NRC will not z generally issue a notice of violation for a violation that meets all of the following tests: j j (1) It was identified by the licensee; i (2) It fits in Severity Level IV or V; (3) It was reported, if required; (4) It was or will be corrected, including measures to prevent i recurrence, within a reasonable time; and (5) It was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous i violation. Licensees are not ordinarily cited for violations resulting from matters not within their control, such as equipment failures thht were not j avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance' measures or manage-ment controls. Generally, however, licensees are held responsible for i the acts of their employees. Accordin construed to excuse personnel errors. gly, this policy should not be. j Enforcement actions involving i individuals, including licensed operators, will be determined on a case-by-case basis.8 35ection 234 of the Atomic Energy Act gives the Commission authority to impose civil penalties for violations on "any person." " Person" is broadly defined j in Section 11s of the AEA to include individuals, a variety of organizations, and any representatives or agents. This gives the Commission authority to impose civil penalties on employees of licensees or on separate entities when a violation of a requirement directly imposed on them is committed. 5
l 1 1 } B. CIVIL PENALT/ j 1 A civil penalty is a monetary penalty that may be imposed for violation of (a) certain specified licensing provisions of the Atomic Energy Act or supplementary NRC rules or orders, (b) any requirement for { which a license may be revoked, or (c) reporting requirements under Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act, Civil penalties are designed to emphasize the need for lasting remedial action and to deter future violations. Generally, civil penalties are imposed for Severity Level I and II ~ violations, are considered and usually imposed for Severity Level III I violations, and may be imposed for Severity Level IV violations that i are similari to violations discussed in a previous enforcement con-ference, and for which the enforcement conference was ineffective in achieving the required corrective action. In applying this guidance for Severity Level IV violations, NRC nor-J mally considers civil penalties only for similar violations that occur i after the date of the last inspection or within two years, whichever period is greater. Enforcement conferences are normally conducted for all Severity Level 1, II, and III violations and.for Severity Level IV violations that are considered symptomatic of program defi-ciencies, rather than isolated concerns. Licensees will be put on notice when a meeting is an enforcement conference. Civil penalties will normally be assessed for knowing and conscious violations of the reporting requirements of Section 206 of the Energy j Reorganization Act, and for any willful violation, including those 4 at any severity level. NRC imposes different levels of penalties for different severity level violations and different classes of licensees. Tables lA and IB show the base civil penalties for various reactor, fuei, cycle, and materials programs. The structure of these tables generally takes into account the gravity of the violation as a primary consideration and the ability to pay as a secondary consideration. Generally, cperations involving greater nuclear material inventories and greater potential consequences to the public and licensee employees receive 'iigher civil penalties. Regarding the secondary factor of ability of various classes of licensees to pay the civil penalties, it is not the NRC's intention that the economic impact of a civil penalty be such that it puts a licensee out of business (orders, rather than civil penalties, are used when the intent is to terminate licensed activities) or adversely affects a licensee's ability to safely conduct licensed activities. The deterrent effect of civil penalties is best served when the amounts of such penalties take into account a licensee's " ability to pay." In determining the amounts of civil
- The word "similar," as used in this policy, refers to those violations which could have been reasonably expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for the previous violation.
6
penalties for licensees for whom the tables do not reflect the ability to pay, NRC will consider as necessary an increase or decrease on a case-by-case basis. NRC attaches great importance to comprehensive licensee programs for detection, correction, and reporting of problems that may constitute, or lead to, violation of regulatory requirements. This is emphasized by giving credit for effective licensee audit programs when licensees find, correct, and report problems expeditiously and effectively. To encourage licensee self-identification and correction of violations and to avoid potential concealment of problems of safety significance, application of the adjustment factors set forth below may result in no civil penalty being assessed for violations which are identified, reported (if required), and effectively corrected by the licensee, provided that such violations were not disclosed as a result of overexposure or unplanned releases of radioactivity or other specific, self-disclosing incidents. On the other hand, ineffective licensee programs for problem identi-fication or correction are unacceptable. In cases involving willful-ness, flagrant NRC-identified violatiens or serious breakdown in management controls, NRC intends to apply its full enforcement auth-ority where such action is warranted, including issuing appropriate orders and assessing civil penalties for continuing violations on a per day basis, up to the statutory limit of $100,000 per violatien, per day. NRC reviews each proposed civil penalty case on its own merits and adjusts the base civil penalty values upward or downward appropriately. Tables 1A and 1B identify the base civil penalty values for_different severity levels, activity areas, and classes of licensees. After considering all relevant circumstances, adjustments to these values may be made for the factors described below: 1. Prompt Identification and Reporting Reduction of up to 50% of the base civil penalty may be given when a licensee identifies the violation and promptly reports the violation to the NRC. In weighing this factor, consider-ation will be given to, among other things, the length of time the violation existed prior to discovery, the opportunity available to discover the violation, and the promptness and completeness of any required report. This factor will not be applied to violations which constitute or are identified as a result of overexposure, unplanned releases of radioactivity or other specific, self-disclosing incidents. In addition, no consideration will be given to this factor if the licensee does not take immediate action to correct the problem upon discovery. 2. Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence Recognizing that corrective action is always required to meet regulatory requirements, the promptness and extent to which the licensee takes corrective action, including actions to prevent 7
recurrence, may be considered in modifying the civil penalty to be asrc aed. Unusually prompt and extensio corrective action may ra g, in reducing the proposed civil penalty as much as 50% of the base value shown in Table'1. On the other hand, the civil penalty may be increased as much as 25% of the base value if initiation of corrective action is not prompt or if the cor-rective action is only minimally acceptable. In weighing this factor consideration will be given to, among other things, the timeliness of the corrective action, degree of licensee initia-tive, and comprehensive' ness of the corrective action--such as whether the action is focused narrowly to the specific violation or broadly to the general area of concern. 3. Enforcement History The base civil penalty may be increased as much as 25% depending l on the enforcement history in the general area of concern. Specifically, failure to implement previous corrective action for prior similar problems may increase the civil penalty value. 4. Prior Notice of Similar Events The base civil penalty may be increased as much as 25% for cares where the licensee had prior knowledge of a problem as a resu of a licensee audit, or specific NRC or industry notificat. ion, and had f. ailed to take effective preventive steps. 5. Multiple Occurrences The base civil penalty mey be increased as much as 25% where multiple examples of a particular violation are identified during the inspection period. This' factor is applicable only where NRC identifies the violation, or for violations associated I with self-disclosing incidents. The above factors are additive so that the civil penalty for any severity level may range from plus or minus 100% of the base value. However, in no instance will a civil penalty for any one violation exceed 5100,000 per day. The duration of a violation may also be considered in assessing a civil penalty. A greater civil penalty may be. imposed if a violation l continues for more than a day. Generally, if a licensee is aware of the existence of a condition which results in an ongoing violation and fails t'o initiate corrective action, each day the condition existed may be considered as a separate violation and, as such, subject to a separate additional civil penalty. Generally, for situations where a licensee is unaware of a condition I resulting in a continuing violation, a separate violation and attendant civil penalty may be considered for each day that the licensee clearly should have been aware of'the condition or had an opportunity I to correct the condition, but failed to do so. 8
s Civil penalties in excess of 3.75 times.the maximum civil penalty for a single Severity Level I violation for each type of licensee require specific Commission approval in accordance with guidance set-forth in Section VI below. NRC statutory authority permits the assessment of the maximum civil penalty for ehch violation. The Tables and the mitigating facters determine the civil penalties which may be assessed for each violation. However, to emphasize the focus on the fundamental underlying causes of a problem for which enforcement action appears to be warranted, the cumulative total for all violations which contributed to or were unavoidable consequences of that problem will' generally be based on 3 the amount shown in the table,'as adjusted. If an evaluation of such, multiple violations shows that more than one fundamental problem is involved, each of which, if viewed independently, could lead to civil-penalty action by itself, then separate civil penalties may be. assessed for each such fundamental problem. In this regard, the j failure to make a required report of an event requiring such reporting 3 is considered a separate problem and will normally be assessed a l separate civil penalty. l l j l b l e e t 9
BASE' CIVIL PENALTTES For Sever My I Violations Trans o.rtation l Low Specific Safeguards High Level Activity Plant Opns, Waste, Spent Type A Const and ,Non
- Fuel, Limited Health Category Category Type B Quantity Physics la 1
Packages Packages
- a. Power Reactors
$80,000 $80,000 $40,000 $80,000 $5,000
- b. Test Reactors 10,000 10,000 5,000 10,000 2,000
- c. Research Reactors &
Critical Facilities 5,000 5,000 2,500 5,000 1,000
- d. Fuel Facilities 40,000 80,000 40,000 40,000 5,000
- e. Industrial Users 5,000 2,000 of Material **
8,000
- f. Waste Disposal 6,000 3,000 Licensees 6,000
=
- g. Academic or Medical 2,500 1,000 Institutions ***
4,000
- h. Other Material 2,500 1,000 Licensees 1,000 "Citegory 1 licensees are those authorized to possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (10 CFR 73.2(bb))
- Includes industrial radiographer, nuclear pharmacies, industria'l processors and firms engaged in manufacturing or distribution of byproduct or source.
materials.
- This applies to nonprofit institutions not otherwise categorized uhder a
~ through f in this table, TABLE 1B BASE CIVIL PENALTIES BASE CIVIL PENALTY AMOUNT SEVERITY LEVEL (% of Amount Listed in Table 1A) I 100% II 80% III 50% IV 15% V 5% 10
l 1 C.. ORDERS 'An order is a written NRC directive,to modify, s? spend, or revoke a license; to cease and desist from a given practice or activity; or to take such other action as may be proper (see 10 CFR 2.202'and 2.204). Orders may be issued as set forth below. ' E ders may'also be issued in lieu of, or in' addition to. civil penalties, as appropriate.. (1) ' License Modification Orders'are issued when some change in licensee equipment, procedures, or management controls'is necessary. (2) Suspentiion Orders may be used: 4 (a) To remove a threat to the public health and. safety, common defense and security, or the environment; i (b) To stop facility construction when (i) further work could I preclude or significantly' hinder the identification or- ' ] l correction of an improperly' constructed safety-related j system or component, or (ii) the licensee's quality assurance ] program' implementation is not ad. equate to provide confidence that construction activities are being properly carried i out; j 1 (c) When the licensee has not responded adequately to'other enforcement action; (d) When the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspec-3 tion or investigation; or ] ~ (e) For any reason not mentioned above for which license revocation is legally authorized. Suspensions may apply to all or part of the licensed activity. Ordinarily, a licensed activity is not suspended (nor is a suspension prolonged) for failure to comply witn requirements where such failure is not willful and adequate corrective actiori has been taken. (3) Revocation Orders.may be used: (a) When a licensee is unable or unwilling to comply with NRC requirements, 1 (b) When a licensee refuses to correct a violation, (c) When a licensee does not respond to a notice of violation where a response was required, (d) When a licensee refuses to pay a fee required by 10 CFR Part 170, or t 11
(e) For any other reason for which revocation is authorized under.Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act (e.g., any condition which would warrant refusal of a license on an original application). (4) Cease and Desist Orders are typically used to stop.an unauthorized i activity that has continued after notification by NRC that such activity is unauthorized. Orders are made effective immediately, without prior opportu_ pity for hearing, whenever it is determined that the public health, interest, or safety so requires, or when the order is responding to a violation involving wi11 fulness. Otherwise, a prior opportunity for a hearing-on the order'is afforded. For cases in which the NRC believes a basis could reasonably exist for not taking the action as proposed, the licensee will ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to show cause why the order should not be issued in the proposed manner. D. ESCALATION OF ENFORCEMENT SANCTIONS NRC considers violations of Severity Levels I, II, or III to be serious. If serious violations occur, NRC will, where necessary, issue orders in conjunction with civil penalties to achieve immediate corrective actions and to deter further recurrence of serious violations. NRC carefully considers the circumstances of each case in selecting and applying the sanction (s) appropriate to the case in accordance with the criteria described in Sections IV.B and IV.C, above. Examples of enforcement actions that could be taken for similar Severity Level I, II, or III violations are set forth in Table 2. J The actual progression to be used in a particular case will depend on the circumstances. However, enforcement. sanctions will normally escalate for recurring similar violations. Normally the progression of enforcement actions for similar violations will be based on violations under a single license. When more than one facility is covered by a single license, the normal progression will be based on similar violations at an individual facility and not on similar violations under the same license. However, it should be noted that under some circumstances, e.g., where there is common con-trol over some facet of facility operations, similar violations may be charged even though the second violation occurred at a different facility or under a different license. For example, a physical security violation at Unit 2 of a dual unit plant that repeats an earl.ier violation at Unit 1 might be considered similar. 12
TABLE 2 { EXAMPLES OF PROGRESSION OF ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR SIMILAR VIOLATIONS IN THE SAME ACTIVITY AREA UNDER THE SAME LICENSE Number of similar. violations from the date-i Severity of the last inspection.or within the previous j of two years (whichever period is greater) Violation 1st 2nd 3rd 2 a+b a+b+c d ll a a+b a+b+c III a(consideration of)' a a+b a. Civil penalty b. Suspension of affected operations until the Office Director is satis-fied that there is reasonable assurance that the licensee can operate in compliance with the applicable requirements; or modification of the license, as appropriate. j ~ c. Show cause for modification or revocation of the license, as appro-priate. d. Further action, as appropriate. l l l l 13 E___
E. RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS In addition to the formal enforcement mechanisms of notices of viola-tion,. civil penalties, and orders,.NRC also uses administrative mechanisms, such as enforcement conferences, bulletins, circulars, l information notices,' generic letters, notices of deviation, and i confirmatory action letters to supplement its enforcement program. 'NRC expects licensees to adhere to any obligations and commitments resulting from these processes and will not hesitate to issue appro-priate orders.to make sure that such commitments are met. (1) Enforcement. Conferences are meetings held.by NRC with licensee management to discuss safety, safeguards or environmental problems, licensee compliance with regulatory requirements, a licensee's proposed corrective measures (including schedules.for implementation) and enforcement options available to the NRC. l (2) Bulletins, Circulars, Information Notices and Generic Letters are written notifications to groups of licensees identifying specific problems and recommending specific actions. (3) Notices of Deviation are written notices describing a licensee's ) or a vendor's failure to satisfy a commitment. The commitment involved has not been made a legally binding requirement. The notice of deviation requests the licensee or. vendor to prov.ide a l written explanation or statement describing corrective steps. taken (or planned), the results achieved, and the date when corrective action will be completed. l (4) Confirmatory Action Letters are letters confirming a licensee's agreement to take certain actions to remov.e significant. concerns about health and safety, safeguards, or the environment. l F. REFERRALS TO DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Alleged or suspected criminal violations of the Atomic-Energy Act (and of other relevant Federal laws) are referred to the Department of Justice for investigation. Referral to the Department of Justice does not preclude the NRC from taking other enforcement action under this General Statement of Policy. However, such actions will be coordinated with the Department of Justice.to the extent practicable. V. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, all enforcement actions, inspection reports, and licensees' responses are publicly available for inspection. In addition,-press releases are generally issued for civil penalties and orders. In the case of orders and civil penalties related to viola-tions at Severity Levels I, II, or III press releases are issued at the time of the order or the proposed imposition of the civil penalty. Press releases are not normally issued for Notices of Violation. 3 14
VI. RESPONSIB1L8 TIES The Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement,.as the principal enforcement officer of.the NRC, has been delegated the authority to issue. notices of violations, civil penalties, and orders.5 In recognition that the regulation of nuclear activities in many. cases does not lend itself_ to a mechanistic treatment, the Director must exercise judgement and discretion in determining the severity levels of the violations.and the appropriate. enforcement sanctions, including the decision to impose a civil penalty; and the amount of-such penalty, after considering the general principles of this statement of policy and the technical significance of the. viola-tions and the surrounding circumstances. The Commission will be provided written notification of all enforcement actions involving civil penalties or orders. The Commission will be consulted prior to,taking enforcement action in the following situations (unless.the urgency of the situation dictates immediate action): (1) An action affecting a licensee's operation that requires balancing the public health and safety or common _ defense and security impli-cations of not operating with the potential radiological or other hazards associated with continued operation; (2) Proposals to impose civil penalties in amounts creater than 3.75 times the Severity Level I values shown in Table 1A; (3) Any proposed enforcement act' ion.on which the Commission asks to be consulted; or (4) Any action the Office Director believes warrants Commission involve-ment. 7 I \\ l 6
- The Directors of the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulat' ion and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards have also been delegated similar authority, but it is expected that normal use of this authority by NRR and NMSS will be confined to actions necessary in the interest of public health and safety.
The Director, Office of Administration, has been delegated the authority to issue orders where licensees violate Commission regulations by nonpayment of license fees. It is planned. to consider redelegation of some or all of these authorities to the Administrators of the NRC Regional Offices over the'next several years. 15 m
1 1 l SUPPLEMENT I - $EVERITY CATEGORIES ~ ~ . REACTOR OPERATIONS A. Severity I - Very significant violations involving: 1. A Safety Limit, as defined in 10 CFR 50.36 and the Technical Specifi-cations, being exceeded; 8 2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able to perform its intended safety function 7 when' actually called upon to work; 3. An accidental criticality; or 4. Release of radioactivity offsite greater than ten (10) times the Technical Specifications limit.s B. Severity II - Very significant violations involving: 1. A system designed to prevent or mitigate serious safety events not being able to perform its intended safety function; or 2. Release of radioactivity offsite greater tKan five (5) times the-Technical Specifications limit. C. Severity III - Significant violations involving: 1. A Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operatio.n being exceeded where the appropriate Action Statement was not satisfied that resulted in: l (a) Loss of a safety furiction; or (b) A degraded condition, and sufficient information existed which l should have alerted the licensee that he was in an Action Statement condition; 6"$ystem" as used in these supplements, includes administrative and managerial control systems, as well as physical systems. 7ssIntended safety tunCtion" means the total safety function, and is not directed toward a loss of redundancy. For example, considering a BWR's high pressure ECCS capability, the violation must result in complete invalidation of both HPCI and ADS subsystems. A loss of one subsystem does not defeat the intended safety function as long as the other subsystem is operable. 8The Technical Specification limit as used in this Supplement (Items A.4, B.2 and C.5) does not apply to the instantaneous release limit. 16
4 - 2. - 'A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious. safety event not being able to perform its intended function under certain cor.ditiens (e.g., safety system not operable.unless offsite power is available;. materials or components not-environmentally qualified); 3. Serious dereliction of duty on the part of personnel involved in licensed activities; 4. Changes in reactor parameters which cause unanticipated reductions in margins of safety; 5. Release of radioactivity offsite greater than the Technicci Specifications limit; or 6. 10 CFR 50,59 such that a' required license amendment'was not sought. D. Severity IV - Violations involving: 1. 10 CFR 50.59 that do not result in a Severity Level I, II, or III. violation; q 2. Failure to meet regulatory requirements that have more than minor j safety or environmental significance; or i 3. Failure to make a required Licensee Event Report when the reported matter does not constitute a violation. l E. Severity Level V - Violations that have minor safety or environmental significance. i i 9 a t 9 4 f ', 4 s b. f . e t,. + 1 h 1 y e 1
~ SUPPLEMENT II SEVERITY CATEGORIES PART 50 FACILITY CONSTRUCTION i j A. Severity 1 - Very significant violations involving a structure or system that is comoletedS in such'a manner that it would not have satisfied its intended safety related purpose. B. Severity II - Very significant violations involving: 1. A breakdown in the quality. assurance program as exemplified by deficiencies in construction QA related to more than one work activity (e.g., structural, piping, electrical, foundations). Such deficiencies normally involve the. licensee's failure to con-duct adequate audits or to take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits and normally involve multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknown quality due to inadequate program implementation; or 2. A structure or system that is completed in such a manner that it could have an adverce effect on the safety of operations, j C. Severity III - Significant violations involving: f 1 1. A deficiehcy is a licensee quality assurance program for construction related to a single work activity (e.g., structural, piping, elec-trical or foundations). Such significant deficiency normally involves the licensee's failure to conduct adequate audits cr to take prompt corrective action on the basis of such audits, and normally involves l multiple examples of deficient construction or construction of unknowr. qua;ity due to inadequate program implementation; j i 2. Failure to confirm the design safety requirements of a structure or system as a result of inadequate preoperational test program impie-mentation; or 3. Failure to make a required 10 CFR 50.55(c) report. D. Severity IV - Violations involving failure to meet regulatory requirements includirg one or more Quality Assurance Criteria not amounting to Severity Level I, II, or III violations that have more than minor safety or environ-mental significance. 3 l E. Severity V - Violations that have minor safety or environmental significance. 7# ohipleteo" weans completion of construction including review and acceptance C by the construction QA organization. 18
SUPPLEMENT III - SEVERITY CATEGORIES SAFEGUARDS A. Severity I - Very significant violations involving: 1 1. An act of radiological sabotage or actual theft, loss, or diversion of a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear materia 12o (SSNM); 2. Actual entry of an unauthorized individual into a vital area or material access area from outside the protected area (i.e., pene-tration of both barriers) that was not detected at the time of ] entry; or ) ) 3. Failure to promptly-report knowledge.of an actual or attempted theft or diversion of SSNM or an act of radiological sabotage. B. Severity II - Very significant violations involving: 1. Actual theft, loss or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) of moderate strategic significance.12 2. Failure to use established security systems (including compensatory measures) designed or used to prevent any unauthorized individuai from entering a vital area or material access area from outside the protected area (i.e., entry through two barriers) so that access could have been gained without detection; 3. Failure to implement approved compensatory measures when the central (or secondary) alarm station is inoperable;. 4. Failure to establish or maintain safeguards systems designed or used to prevent or detect the unauthorized removal of a formula quantity of SSNM from areas of authorized use or storage; or 5. Failure to use established transportation security systems designed or used to prevent the theft, loss, or diversion of a formula quantity of SSNM or acts of radiological sabotage. O Severity III - Significant violations involving: 1 1. Failure to control access to a vital area or material access area from inside the protected area or failure to control access to a protected area from outside the protected area; (i.e., such that only a single security element remained); avsee 10 CFR 73.2(bb) 185ee 10 CFR 73.2(x) 19 l
2. Failure to control ' access to a transport vehicle or. the SNM being transported that does not constitute a Severity I or II violation; 3. Failure to establish or maintain safeguards systems designed or used' to detect.the unauthorized removal'of SNM of moderate strategic signi-ficance from areas of authorized use or storage; or 4. Failure to properly secure or protect classified or other sensitive safeguards information. D.- Severity IV - Violations involving: 1. Failure to establish or maintain safeguards systems designed or used to detect the unauthorized removal of SNM of low strategic signifi-12 from areas of authorized use or storage; cance 2. Failure to implement 10 CFR Parts 25 and 95 and information addressed under Section 142 of tt.e Act, and the NRC approved security plan relevant to those parts; or 3. Other violations, such as fai10re to follow an approved security plan, that have more than minor safeguards significance. E. Severity V - Violations that have minor safeguards significance. i 2"See 10 CFR 73.2(y) i 20 3
I SUPPLEMENT IV - SEVERTTY CATEGORTES i I HEALTH PHYSICS 10 CFR PART 2018 A. Severity I - Very significant violations involving: d 1. Single exposure of a worker in excess of 25 rems of radiation to the { whole body,150 rems to the skin of thq whole body, or 375 rems to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms; 2. Annual whole body exposure of a member of the public in excess of 2.5 rems of radiation; 3. Release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area in excert of ten times the limits of 10 CFR 20.106; 4. Disposal of licensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of ten times the limits of 10 CFR 20.303; or Exposure of a worker in restricted areas of ten times the limits of 10 CFR 20.103. i B. Severity II - Very significant violations involving: l ~ 1. Single exposure of a worker in excess of 5 rems of radiation to the whole body, 30 rems to the skin of the whole body, or 75 rems to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms; I 2. Annual whole body exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.5 y rems of radiation; 3. Release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area in excess of five times the limits of 10 CFR 20.106; 4. Failure to make an immediate notification as required by 10 CFR l 20.403(a)(1) and 10 CFR 20.403(a)(2)- l 5. Disposal of licensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of five times the limits of 10 CFR 20.303, or 6. Exposure'of a worker in restricted areas in excess of five times the limits of 10 CFR 20.103. C. Severity III - Significant violations involving: 1. Single exposure of a worker in excess of 3 rems of radiation to the whole body, 7.5 rems to the skin of the whole body, or 18.75 rems to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms; i 23 Personnel overexposure and associated violations, incurred during a life saving effort, will be treated on a case-by-case basis. 21
o, q 4 2. A. radiation level in an unrestricted area that' exceeds 100 millirem / l
- s..
hour for a one hour period;- l 3. Failure to make a 24-hour notification as' required by 10 CFR ] 20.403(b) or an immediate notification required by 10 CFR 20.402(a);- 4. Substantial potential for an' exposure or release in excess of 10 CFR 20 whether or not such exposure or release occurs (e.g., entry into high radiction areas, such as under_ reactor vessels or in the vicinity of I exposed radiographic sources, without having performed an adequate j l survey, operation of a radiation facility with a nonfunctioning l interlock system); 5. Release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20.106; 6. Improper disposal of licensed material not covered in Severity Levels I or II; 7. ' Exposure of a worker in restricted areas in excess.of.the limits of 10 CFR 20.103; 8. Release for unrestricted use of contaminated or radioactive materiai or equipment which poses a realistic potential for significant exposure to members of the public, or whicR reflects a programmatic (rather than isolated) weakness in the radiation control program; 9. Cumulative worker exposure 8bove regulatory limits when such cumu- ) lative exposure reflects a programmatic, rather than an isolated weakness in radiation protection; 10. Conduct of licensee activities by a technica11y unqualif.ied person; or 11. Significant failure to control licensed material. D. Severity IV - Violations involving: j i 1. Exposures in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20.101 not. constituting Severity Level I, II, or III violations; 2. A radiation level in an unrestricted area such that an. individual could receive greater than 2 millirem in a one hour. period or 100 millirem in any seven consecutive days; 3. Failure to make a 30-day notification required by.10 CFR 20.405; 4. Failure to make a followup written report as required by 10 CFR 20.402(b), 20.408, and 20.409; or i l S. Any other matter that has more than minor safety or environmental significance. E. Severity V - Violations that have minor safety or environmental signi-ficance. 22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------ - J
.) 1 \\ SUPPLEMENT V - SEVERTTY CATEGORIES 1 ~ 1 J TRANSPORTATION 14 i A. Severity I - Very significant violations of NRC transportation require-1 ments involving: ) 1 1. Annual whole body radiation exposure of a member of the public in l excess of 0.5 rems of radiation; or 2. Breach of package integrity resulting in surface contaminat'cn e,- external' radiation levels in excess of ten times the NRC limits. i B. Severity II - Very significant violations of NRC transportation require' ments involving: 2. Breech of package integrity resulting in sur' face contamination or external radiation levels in excess of NRC requirements; ) 2. Surface contamination or external radiation levels in excess of three j times NRC limits that did not result from a breach of package integrity; or 3. Failure to make required initial notifications associated with ] Severity Level I or II violations. i C. Severity III - Significant violations of NRC transportation requirements involving: I l 1. Breach of package integrity; 2. Surface contamination or external radiation levels in~ excess of, but less than a factor of three above NRC requirements, that did not result from a breach of package integrity; 3. Any noncompliance with labelling, placarding, shipping paper, packaging, loading, or other requirements that could reasonably result in the { following: l a. Improper identification of the type, quantity, or form of i material; or I b. Failure of the carrier or recipient to exercise adequate controls; and I "Some transportation requirements are applied to more than one licensee involved in the same activity such as a shipper (10 CFR 73.20) and a carrier (10 CFR 70.20a). When a violation of such a requirement occurs, enforcement action will be directed against the responsible licensee i which under the circumstances of the case may be one or more of the I licensees involved. i 23 l 1
Substantial potential for personnel exposure or contamination, c. or improper transfer of material; or 4. Failure to make required initial notification associated with Severity Level III violations. D. Severity IV - Violations of NRC transportatica requirements involving: 1. Package selection or preparation requirements which do not result in a breach of package integrity or surface contamination or external radiation levels in excess of NRC requirements; or l 2. Other violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significance. E. Severity V - Violations that have minor safety or environmental significance. A 9 i 4 4 l 24
l 1 ~ SUPPLEMENT V1 - SEVERITY CATEGORIES FUEL CYCLE AND MATERIALS OPERATIONS A. Severity I - Very significant violations involving: 1. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed ten times the limits specified in the license; 2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not I being operable when actually required to perform its dasign function; or 3. A nuclear criticality accident. B. Severity II - Very significant violations involving: i I 1. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or relea.ses that exceed five times the limits specified in the licen'e; or s 2. A system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event being inoperable. I C. Severity III - Significant violations involving: l 1. Failure to control access to licensed materials for radiation purposes l as specified by NRC requirements; 2. Possession or use of unauthorized equipment or materials in the conduct of licensee activities; 3. Use of radioactive material on humans where such use is not authorized; I 4. Conduct of licensed activities by a technically unqualified person; 5. Radiation levels, contamination levels, or releases that exceed the limits specified in the licensa; or 6. Medical therapeutic misadministration. D. Severity IV - Violations involvir.g: I 1. Failure to maintain patients hospitalized who have cobalt-60, cesium-137, or iridium-192 implants or to conduct required leakage or contamination tests, or to use properly calibrated equipment; 2. Other violations that have more than minor safety or environmental significance; or 3. Medical diagnostic misadministration. E. Severity V - Violations that,have minor safety or environmental significance. 25 i
i 1.+ - l SUPPLEMENT VII - SEVERITY CATEGORIES MISCELLANEOUS MTTERS15 l A. Severity I4-Very significant violations involving: l l 1. A Material False Statement (MFS)18 in which the statement made was l deliberately false; 2. A failure to provide the notice required by Part 21 under circumstances, ) for which a civil penalty may be imposed under section 206(b) of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA); or 3. Deliberate action by management to discriminate (in violation of Section 210 of the ERA) against an employee for attempting to com-l ~unicate or actually communicating with NRC. B. Severity II - Very significant violations involving: l 1. A MFS or a reporting failure, involving information which, had it been available to the NRC and accurate at the time the information should have been submitted, would have resulted in regulatory action I or would likely have resulted in NRC seeking further information; 2. A MFS in which the false statement was made with careless disregard; 3. Discrimination (in violation of Section 210 of the ERA) by manage-ment at any level above first-line supervision, against'an employee for attempting to communicate or actually communicating with NRC; or 4. A failure to provide the notice required'by Part 21. C. Severity III - Signif,icant vio,lations involving: 1. A MFS not amounting to a severity level I or II violation; "As noted in Section III, in determining the specific severity level of a vio-lation, consideration will be given to such factors as the position of the person involved in the violation (e.g., first line supervisor or senior manager), the significance of any underlying violation, the intent of the violator (i.e., negligence not amounting to careless disregard, careless disregard, or deliberateness), and the economic advantage, if any, gained by the violation. The relative weight given to each of these fattors in arriving at the appropriate severity level will be dependent on the circumstances of the violation. 1 sin essence, a Material False Statement is a statement that is false by omission or commission and is relevant to the regulatory process. 26
4 7 This failure to provide minimum piotection from fire, water, and other possible i detrimental conditions is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, CriterAa IVII. p 7 The supervisor, when questioned, also stated that they do not know the number of pages shipped. That is they did not count the number of pages per package shipped. When asked, he estimated that each of the 20,000 packages may contain as many as 50 pages (different documents) per package. Inventory sheets or package checklist were not aveilable on site. The question was asked as to how TUGC0 could be sure they received all the contents of a package back and the reply was "TUCCO will audit the packages when returned", The NRC inspector stated that this appears to be impossible since no one knows how many pages were in each package. This failure to maintain control of and accountability for records removed from storage is a deviation from TSAR commitment to ANSI N45.2.9., paragraph 5.3(6), 1 The supervisor was asked why copies were not r:ade and the response was the task was so large and costly they decided to proceed at risk, Also, it was stated that a totally new analysis would be done by SWKC and these would become the official design records and replace the old design and records, C. STORAGE AND TRANSMITTAL OF CONSTRUCTION RECORDS TO CHICAGO BRIDGE AND IRON A third NRC inspector not involved with the SWKC records transmittal remembered a similiar incident. In late July,1985, he had asked for records pertaining to Unit 2 reactor containment liner and mechanical penetrations but was inicuad 4 they were not available on site because they had been sent to CBI, Houston, - 't, to be copied. On October 16, 1985, he became aware of the SWKC transmittal the fact that records were not afforded adequate protection while shipped g,,,,n up4es were' retained and remembered that the transmittal to CBI, Houston / similiar. He reinspected this area and found that the original construe rds
~ 3-were transmitted to Houston, Texas, without retaining a copy and CBI procedure HRP-1 (Nuclear Records Procedore} states that corrogated cardboard packing is satisfactory for small shipments and that wood should be used for large freight shipments. The procedure forther states that shipping by air freight, air express, or UPS is required for shipments containing documents difficult or impossible to replace. l The NRC inspectors interviewed the TL'GC0 civil engineering Project Contact and B & R sub[ contract supervisor'to determine if the CBI records were transmitted in accordance with a TUGC0 procedure as these records belong to the o<ner and l sIwc/ removal from site s.uch be controlled by them. They were also asked how the records were shipped and if a method of eccounting for these records was described in TUGC0 procedures and followed. No TUGC0 procedure es identified and there was no record ~ of a detailed inventory litt or accounting for records transmitted. This failure to transmit records in accordance with a procedure and afford protection in transit equal to temporary storage requirements are additional examples of violation identified in paragraph
- aboye, reurdJ The failure to maintain control and provide accountability of removed from stprage is another example of the deviation identified in paragraph above.
4 The NRC inspector review two recent TU6CO audits of CBI to determine if the QA records system was audited. Audits TCB-5 and TCP-6 dated Narch 21 and itay 7,1985, respectively, documented audits of CBI construction organization on site and the Quality Assurance office at Hooston, Texas. The NRC inspector contacted the TUGC0 Audit Group located in Dallas, Texas, to find out if they knew how records were stored on site, transmitted from site to Houston, Texas, and determine if the Houston facility was adequate and had procedures to receive, control and account
7- .4-for these records. The NRC inspector contacted an auditor. Subsequent to contacting this auditor the QA Service Supervisor contacted the NRC inspector-and stated that he had met with two other TOGC0 personnel to discuss this issue and he stated that the TUGC0 decision to sen8 records to CBI was at TVGCO's own risk. The NRC inspector was not provided answers to the questions asked. An additional reason that the NRC inspector contacted the Audit Group, was to determine why Audit TCB-6 Audit Scope included Quality Assurance records but the report failed to report on this subject. An auditor who participated on this aedit did not know why this subject was not covered in the audit. This failure to document audit results is a violation of IOCPR Part 50 Appendix B Criterian XVIII (445/8514-
- 446/8511-
). I i l l l ~ ~
1 d. Inspection of Storage Facilities _ i i The NRC inspectors inspected all site storage facilities to determine if storage, l preservation and safe keeping of records are as required by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterim TVII and ANSI N 45,'2,9', Draf t 11, Revision 0 paragraph 5, " Storage Preservation and Safe Keeping". The facilities inspected include TUGC0 Records Center, Permanent Plant Record Vault (PPRV), Interim Record Vaalt (IRV), l Satelite Storage Areas for Unit 2 Mechanical and Electrical Paper Flow Groups, and Procurement Records Storage Area, The facilities for the Paper Flow Group and Procurement records are not discussed or identified in TUGC0 or trown A Root i procedure, however, these facilities and the PPRV and IRV were evaluated and results are as follows: (1) TUGC0 Records Center This vault is the final repository for Unit 1 records which~ describe completed construction and Unit 2 record packages for systems that have been completed, This facility was completed about Narch 1983 The NRC inspector found that this vault had access control; records were stored in approved containers or in binders on top of cabinets, Radiograph and other special processed records are protected by controlling temperature and humidity. The design of this facility is as discussed in paragraph 5.6 j ] " Facility" of ANSI N45.2.9 and is constructed to protect contents against fire, flood, tornadoes, rodents and deterioration cause by extreme temperature j hunidity condition. The facilities meet the requirements of ANS! N45.2.9 s except as follows: j The five protection system discussed in ANSI N45.2,9 paragraph 5.6 1 item (B) specifies a dry chemical or gas fire protection system but 4 TUGC0 elected to install a water sprinkler system. TUGC0 personnel r stated that a water sprinkler system was installed instead of gas / dry cheemical because water would extinguish a deep seeded fire. Tnis
. J presents a problem because the records that are stored in open faced e 1 4 cabinets in folders or binders will be deluged with water and will likely deteriorate. There.is no evidence that TOGC0 Submitted a for eS description of this facility te-tet approval for this change to the commitment in the FSAR. This k failure to install a system as described in ANSI N45.2.9 on or describe t+rts <ernative method for suppressing fire to protect records is a diviation from FSAR commitment in Appendix 1 A(B) and FSAR Section 17.1.17 (445/8514-
- 446/8511-
) l i '.(2) Permanent Plant Record Vault i This vault' served as the permanent vault until March 19B3. This facility I has controlled access. It meets the design features for permanent _ facil.1,ty .G0b4 P% 1 in part but does net fully meet either permanent design features as' follows: (a) There is no fire suppression system inside this vault. Two hand-held extinguishers and a two inch fire hose are located outside the vault. One hand held extinguisher is located inside the vault. Fire detectors and alarms are inside to alert the on site fire department if a fire occurs. (b) If the 2 inch fire hose is used to extinguish a fire, there are no fire drains to prevent flooding and water would enter cabinet drawers. pfw N'g
- 'c y
(3) Interim Hecord Vault This area is not a separate buildir<g but is an area of the permanent vault
3-that is set aside as an interim storage area prior to placing records in the area designated for. permanent records. This area has an access point s e nt ra /c that is-4444+ rent from the permanent area and is controlled, The facility is the same as the permanent area except a wall separates the two. They share the same forced air system. This meets the requirements of IOCFR Part 50 Appendix B and ANS N45.2.9 except as follows: (a) Water had been leaking through the forced air system and beside a support girder. Approximately 2 3 gallons of water had leaked and was caught by a container. The temperature / humidity control chart ff/W indicated high humidity (55 6BF) from October 14 through October 20, 1985 Interviews with vault and other site personnel revealed that the g er7,* m m /p roof and vent system have been leaking for ; m th:n two years and perhaps longer. Radiographs, photographs, microfilm and other sensitive recerds were stored in the PPRV and IRV until approximately December 26, 1984. (b) The NRC inspector observed a coffee pot, sugar, and crumbs on an adjacent tat.le where food had been brought into the vault area, {b Nt d YN This failure to protect records from moisture and/or condensation for extended period, and the failure to preclude food materials Ng) which encourage rodents, is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterim XVII (445/8514-
- 446/8511-
). (4) Satd i tt Storace Areas The NRr inspectors inspected the electrical and mechanical Paper Flow arcp 4 determine how records are stored. ANSI N45.2.9 defines QA records as ? records which furnish documentary evidence of the goality of items
-4 and of activities affecting quality for the purposes of this standard,a document is considered a quality assurance record when the t'has been compl eted. " The paper flow groups have such records mixed in with incomplete documents where work is in process. NRC Special Review Team Report dated July 13,1984, identified a potential enforcement issue because original ASME records such as soment restraint packages are stored in trailers in non-fireproof cabinets without a backup copy in a separate and remote location. l On October 21, 1985, NRC inspectors inspected the Paper Flow Group storage facilities and determined that a larger number of nechanical and electrical Au/. l records #rt been removed from the pemanent storage area and have been An/ l Prey 5ous NRC inspections in f placed in these non-fireproof cabinets. this area documented isolated QC records, however during this inspection I it became clear that large nutbers of all type' construction records are stored in those files. The paper Flow Group personnel were asked if ] records of component installation were stored in these files and the answer was affimative. The t!RC inspector asked if records such as l l steam generator records / packages were so stored and the answer was j affirmative. They were asked why such records were not in fire rated cabinets and the response was that it cost too noen. This failure to protect records (as defined by ANSI N45.2) ) is a violation of 10CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterin XVII (445/8514-446/8511- }. (5: Storage of Procuraent Records f,// r in warehouse 'A" cecntement records were stored in non-firerated and
i fire rated cabinets. Since this fac'i'lity is not described in the FSAP. I or procedures, there is no way to determine whether duplicates exists and what must be stored in fire rated vabinets. This item is unresolved pending identification and description of this facility and indexing of l records recently received from the TUGCO Dallas Texas office to determine what records most be in fire rated cabinets (445/0514-
- 440/8511-
- ). 4 k l j l l 4 i i
e a h. Audit of QA Record Systeus/ Facilities 1 The NRC inspector asked if the unacceptable condition identified l s above in paragrapns had been identified by TUGC0 or Brown & Root audits. TUGC0 audit (TCP.85-20 dated January 16, 1985) of the permanent plant records vault failed to identify any problems with the facility. ANSI N45.2.9 specifically states that periodic audits shall be performed to assure facilities are in good condition and temperature /hunidity j controls and protective 6evices are functioning properly. Two auditors audited this area from December 17 through December 20,1984 and 1 their report did not identify any storage facility problems. EBASCO audit dated June 16,1981 page 4 of 25 item g. stated "It is an established fact that the QAR vault does not meet the requiren'e7ts 1 for a single storage facility and that duplicate files are not maintained e in lieu of single storage."Of"ctobere/o co<reeJ ds W*W l 23, 1985, the NEC inspector requested s/,na /dir- .ths-441c pa-s-ite which would show action taken' TUGCOs Project and QC i Acow.4As organizations had no such -Me. This item is unresolved pending Se review of the response to this audit finding. The NRC inspector asked PPRV personnel if Brown & Root had audited the l TWem I record keeping / facility 0:ndit'on and were infonned that it had been several years since Brown & Root had perfotmed such cudits. This item is unresolved pending the review of Brown & Root audits (445/8514-446/8511 .) l I l j
I I 4 l 1 4. 33 l ~ Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13 Item 12 ) 1. DIA Statement of the Issue (See Attachment MM) l l Issue Resolution in Final Report 1 12. Insufficient evidence of successful 01 investigation requested ] testing of BISCO fire seals - filing but rejected by Regional 1 of false report by BISCO - Validity management. Inspector's j of BISCO seals questioned, unresolved items maintained (445/8516-U-06; l 446/8513-U-06), i 9 445/8516-U-07; 446/8513-U-07). l I 2. Expanded Description of the Issue and Related Backcround Information I The OIA statement of the issue should be corrected to indicate " violation ) deleted," in the Resolution in Final Rent.ri, The basic issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows: l The inspector (H. Phillips) and his consultant (T. Young) believed that, because TUGCo failed to document deficient 81500 fire seals on a nonconformance report as required by QI-QP-16.0-4, Revision 1, i I a
y 1 34 l ] "IdentificationofClassIEEquipmentwithDeficientIEEE-32.3/344 Test Reports" and CP-0-16.'0, Revision 19,."Nonconformances" dated October 16, j 1985, they violated 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, " Nonconforming ] 1 Material, Parts, or Components." c i On the second part of this issue, the inspector (H. Phillips) and his-consultant (T. Young) believed that because the TUGCo engineer who was. interviewed stated that they did not evaluate whether the penetrations with BISCO seals affected systems required for safe shutdown, TUGCo had ] I therefore failed to adequately evaluate and report a construction 1 l deficiency, a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e). i l i On the last part of this issue, the inspector.(H. Phillips) and his assigned consultant (T. Young) believed his request for an 01 investigation was ignored. He also believed that a vendor program branch inspection should be performed at BISCO and that this was an unresolved item. l This issue was identified in draf t Ia, paragraph 6 (Attachment 2) as one i unresolved item and two violations. In draft 3, paragraph 7 (Attachment 4), the issues were identified as 3 unresolved items (in the inspector's handwriting) and following discussions with Regional management. In draft 4, paragraph 6 (Attachment 5), the inspector notes that he is revising paragraph 6 based on reviewing his consultants work l and because of a recent meeting with the utility. These issues are i
t t 35-identified as unresolved items in the ' final report,. paragraph 6 l (Attachment 8.a). j l 3. Safety Significance of the Issue 1 l There is a potential generic issue regarding BISCO fire seals which has been forwarded to IE;HQ for review. It was forwarded to IE:HQ on April 4, 1 1 1986. Regional management has concluded that there is no' safety issue at CPSES, since the issue has been formally identified as a TUGCo Nuclear Engineering Design Deficiency Report (TDDR) FP-85-D63 ( Attachment 16). Resolution will be required prior to plant licensing, I e l The significance of the individual issues is as follows; 1 j With regard to documenting the seal deficiency on a TDDR in lieu of a nonconformance report, the inspector was requested by the NRC supervisor to determine if a TDDR was adequate for identifying a nonconforming item. The issue was made unresolved while the inspector conducted further review. 'l 1 Subsequent to the inspection report, the supervisor has reviewed Ql-QP-160-4, Revision 1 (Attachment 17), " Identification of Class IE l Equipment With Deficient IEEE-323/344 Test Reports." This procedure indicates the purpose and scope as: "The purpose of this instruction is to detail the use of the nonconformance report to identify, trace and i I I 1 m__________________._____.__________________.______________________._ ___________________j
- ..e....,
6 36 close out deficient environmental. test documentation for Class IE equipment and components. This instruction is only' appl 4 cable t'o this equipment and purpose." Regional management has concluded that there was no violation of CP-QP-16.0-4, since the BISCO penetration seals relate to 10 CFR 50, Appendix' R requirements (which are covered by ASTM E-119.and IEEE 634). The issuance of a TODR by TUGCo was proper. With regard to the second. issue, the belief that the failure of TUGCo to properly evaluate and report the fire seal problem as a construction deficiency was as a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e), it must be noted that it was the inspector himself who determined that-further followup was necessary before he could determine if it was a violation. Regional management concluded that this was appropriate. The inspector was going to base the .) violation solely on a statement by a TUGCo engineer that he did not know if [ the electrical penetration affected safe shutdown equipment. The engineer's rationale for not reporting haa not been determined during the inspection. It must also be noted that the consultant had not determined the location of the penetration or if indeed the penetrations affect safety related equipment. (As a side note, TUGCo has completed its evaluation of this item and determined that it is not reportable.) With regard to the request for an 01 investigation of BISCO, the inspector provided to his supervisor a memo dated November 25, 1985, (and a revised one on December 2,1985) which contained the requests for OI investigation and a vendor program branch inspection of BISCO. This memo included background material relative to the seal testing. This memo was forwarded' i . i
' '...l '. 6 37 to the Division Director who showed it to, and discussed.it with the. Region IV A1, legation's Coordinator and a representative of Region IV Field .0ffice of 01 (who was acting for the Field Office Director)in early December 1985. The Division Director asked them whether there was' sufficient information in the memo and background material that would indicate that an investigation was warranted. They concluded that, based on the information provided, an investigation was not warranted,~and suggested that the 6ppropriate action was to forward the issue to the Vendor Branch. Based on results of their inspection, additional information might be developed that would then make it apparent that an-investigation was warranted. The Divisinn Director informed the inspector of this in mid-January 1986, and requested the memo be revised to request the vendor inspection. With regard to the need for a vendor program branch inspection of BISCO to determine the generic significance of the issue, the matter was forwarded to IE:HQ for review (on April 4, 1986). 4. Region IV Management Handling of the Issue i Regional management concluded that using a TDDR instead of an NRC to report the penetration deficiencies was appropriately classified as unresolved since further NRC inspection was needed. This item can now be changed to an open item, since using a TDDR was appropriate and the open item would track the item for NRC inspection to close it. I t
l t. 6-38 .:4 Class #ying the issue related to the reporting of the def.iciency under 50.55(e), as unresolved, was appropriate since the inspector had not l developed all the necessary information to determine if a violation existed. Regional management did inform the Region IV, OI Field Office of the potential for falsification. It was suggested that additional information was needed before it could be determined that an l investigation was warranted and that the vendor inspection could accomplish this. Regional management has concluded that the forwarding of the BISCO issue to IE:HQ could have been more timely. It has been in IE:HQ since the first of April 1986. There has been no determination of its generic or safety significance since that time. i Footnote 4 Exception is taken with the conclusion in the OIA Report Summary that Regional management did not provide adequate direction or guidance to the inspectors to obtain the additional information believed necessary to either develop violations or resolve the issues. Included in the statement "... (3) not directing Phillips to determine the safety significance of the findings regarding the BISCO fire seals." This conclusion appears completely unfounded in that the issue had been properly identified by TUGCo in a TDDR, and corrective action will therefore be required. IE:HQ is assessing the potential safety significance of the issue which is beyond the expertise expected of the inspector, Neither Attachment MM or Attachment HH (where the technical issues are viewed) state that Regional management failed to direct the inspector to assess the safety significance of the BISCO seal issue. The report of the investigation so,nehow comes to this conclusion, t
o 1-1 (1/EC/87) o TASL Gf:0UP 1 l TASK FCR DETERMll;1NG WHETHER THE CURREfT AUGMENTED REVIEW AND It;SPECT10N EFFCET AT COMANCHE PEAK IS SUFFICIENT TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY IDENTIFIED WEAKNESSES If: REGION IV's INSPECT 10f; PROGRAMS f,0TE Performance of this task accepts as the baseline or standard the existing IE construction inspectico prograr,. as identifitc by JE in resicnse to trt Comanche Feak Report Review Group (CPRRG) Letter RG IE-01. It is agairst i this baseline that the efforts at Comanche Peal will be ccap6 re d. The basic tasi is to identify and report whether the total agercy inspecticr f effort at Cor.onche Peak, regarcless of by whom performed, meets or is ,I eauivalent to, the existir.c IE construction inspection progrem. The Test Group will havt 6sailable to it: I 1. The information f rom IE in response to CPPEG Letter RG IE-02. This i information establishes the best against which inspectico activitics I performed are to be compcred. i ) 1 The informStior fror Regier IV ir response to CPPRG Letter RG FIV-C:. This ir.formatior prcvides the Region's view of the inspection i l 1
__j
1-0 l performance of the Region against the IE construction inspection requirements. 3. The inform 6 tion from the Comanche Pect Letter RG-P0-01. This information provides the Project Office's view of its performance ag6 inst the IE construction inspection requirements. 1 4. Ecsic inspection documentation and individuals who performed or ) reviewed inspections or supervised or maneged the irispection progrcr: .~ for Comanche Peck. l Insofer es possible, the performance of this task should rely on the written '<~ <- record where that record provides sufficient information to support .j. 4 it is necessary to extend this record, this should be ocne. 2^ c conclusions. Where i r, w ri t, og or t y irterview. Trtr. scripts are tc be mace of interviets. 1 1 In 6ccition to si: ills available within the agency, Task Group 2, whenever necessary or desirable, mey use outside experts to provide needed stills er,c objectivity. This T6sk Group sh611: l l 1. Audit information provided ty IE, Recion IV, the Comanche Peak Project Office and others against the primcry or source documer,t er
1-3 information 10 cssess the accuracy anc completeness of the input provideo. '\\ I 2. Compare the scope., frequency snd thtaMPdepth of inspections by (a) ) Region IV; (b) the Comenche Peak Project Office (CPP0); (c) any other elements of NRC (such as inspections managed by IE Headquarters, NRR, or other Regions) against the current construction inspection prograr of IE. This ccr.parison shcil be in terms of specific items or activities, ek44f"cepth and timeliness., i k 1 l 3. Identify where inspection performance: (c) meets IE program requirements l l (t) exceeds IE program requirements (c) does not meet IE program requirements. l l In the repcrt of ttis tesi, ccr.plete and specific referen:es shcult te grcviced i: ctcurented inferrstior. thci providec the tasis it' : h. l ider.tification of inspection performance. If a requirement was ca.ly partially met, th( report should so indicate and explan.. For any current prograr requirer.er ts not met through Regier IV or CPp0 actisitits, specify the requirements in effect at the tine of tn e insit:tior if diffe rent fror current reccirements and describc t&t degret tc which the then existing inspection requirement was fulfilled.
gg ~~ 3 ' 'f. 6 ' }? y.j ef y 69 a 3 s,, - 1, < -yr s 1 i i> g 4 Describt sp6cif f Hns pection requirements which.hav.e.4.f._iot been j ? (.. y~ p. i comsetc,ly fulf.M..M_d__by th_e.s.pa.._cf' t. tot'}1 inspect 3oneffort. This j / porapl ete.d.ful il,Naent is with regard to activity, nim; titteliness, J ~ '\\ andcompletegess.]Referencesaretobe-madetoMcJirementsinthe ] 1 a i rIE defined program and to inspection re.corts (Fsgardless of by 'whor.' 1 1perfcrmee and reported) 50 that infomation on nature and cigree of i s i )' any ircompletcfstatui of apy curre.nt. inspection racpii'emcuts. can be ioentified. y 1 E. Identify inspectior, find %@ or results that showed "open" items, unresoived iterr.5., it~'r.s of r.cr.compliante, violatior.cr any other , * * ~ ~ ~~ -. > j finding or conclusion where theQspection activity is not "closec'.", l Tract tie documentation of tnete'iterJ fn4 identification te currer,1 r 's. s t a t u s.,-,fep ci. t '.. - tk ti W 'i:1, r :E tr da m.irtirn r e m =- tas I l i S b-e -er:e : g. % n.c s ;.c~tw : cttww - de :. ' " /' tw-s.--u, \\ seee rfte P J cr i A, c..g.W n h id L p4y M ~ N -' idw M rw ui m i. w on a h Mt r's c W w.-l e.1 steints-4:r 10:r: ' + 6. Report en the.taSL efforts: .i q-n )) i a. Lescribe noe thi task wes performee. ~ h .e b. Identify the ihfurmation base on which the task grour's i. tenclusions ar: 'c a s e d This sh3ule describe the results of activitics ti; assure. the eccuracy of the information base. ;. w*3 s r.: ...'k
- E i
g g l ' ~ k s 3 ,.d \\ m\\ g 4,., r y ]
- s. t 9'-
k44 g .{ l 9
- '%A,
(( I (51 y A. f ...u [.
,A l 1 1-5 c. Provide complete and specific references'to the informaticr that served es the basis for the conclusions and findings, d. Where the conclusion is that inspection performance does not nicet 1 current IE program requirements, specify, 4s det;i' i tt i 1 re+ < r ' : : ^;. ;.,d how the performance is deficient. NNJ wh NO k w Where the inspection findines or results have been modified frut, j e. j 1 / initial identification to :1;;.. :r current status, specify, ir. j cetail with references, where the modifications have occurred. Schedult
- /:0/E7 Tesi Leacer appcinted 1/;E/07 l'erbership, Crger.iration 6 Apprc6th established 1/23/f?
Start weri un example (pilot effcrt) 1/27/E7 Review pilot effort with CFRRG 1/30/E7 Cneck for possible inipact of Tasi.1 on Test 2
- /4/E7 Subr;t final report to CPEEG 1
l
1-1(1/20/E7) TASK GROUP _2 TASK FOR EXAMINATION OF ISSUES RELATING TO PROCESS AMD CISPOSITI0f 0F INSPECTION FlhDINCS OF OIA REPORT 80-10 1 This task relates to examination of the 34 issues of Attachment I tc Attachrent u te.l of 01 A Report E6-10 and any additier.el process ar.d disposition issues revedled ty the activities of Task Group 1. These Tast Group 1 issues woulc be l as a result of Tes6 Group 1 activities under Itcr. E (and docuniented in Iter 6e) of the tasi descripticr. TASK GROUF 1-TASK FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE CL'FFE!.~ AUG"EtlTEF REVIEL Af;E If;SPECTICf EFFORT AT C0f'AliCHE PE4 IS SUFFICJEf." "O C0!JEhSATE FCF Af:Y IDENTIFIED WEAKhESSES IN REGICh IV's INSFECTIO!.: PF(GRA"5. j The basic tesk is te identify the processing and disposition, of issues and l ins pectier.i fir.cings in the Pegion ]V ir.specticr, cf Comar.:he Fett reactcr erf to compare the actual processing against policy or practices of the NEC, IE, anc hegion IV. The 7656 Grtup will hast available tc it: l l l \\
2-2 1. The information from IE in response to CPPF.G Letter RG IE-02. This info mation establishes the Dcsis from IE for inspection reporting; item identification, classification end disposition; and *- responsibilities. for insoection performance and reporting. 2. The information from Region IV in respor.se to CPPRG Letter RG RIV-0;. This information establishes the basis from Gegion IV for inspection reportir.g; item identification, classification and disposition, cr.c' responsibilities for inspection per'ormance and reporting. 2. Anj infcraction from OGC relative to NRC ;olicy and prcctices ftr prccessing and disposition of issues and inspection findings. 4 The i nf c rr.4 ti ch of srtcific process 6nc cisrcsition issLes frcr C:' Feport 06-10 (esser.tially the 34 issues in Atttchment I te Attechn. cot if ui OIA Repcrt E6-10). Any proces> anc cis ;sition issues from the wtrk of Test. Crcup 1. E. s 6. Basic inspection and enforcement documentation and individuals who are irvolved in the process of identifying, processing, and dispcsing 1 of inspection fincines and issues. I l J 1 l t
E-2 i Insofar as possible, the performance of this task should rely on the writter, j record where that record provides sufficient information to support conclusions. Where it is necessary to extend this record, this shohld be done in writing or by interview. Transcripts are to be made of interviews. J This Task Group shcil: I i l 1. Audit information provided by IE, Regicn IV, the Comanche Peak Project Office or others against the primary o. source document or information to assess tne accuracy and completeness of the inpu*. provided. E. Anclyze each issue and cescribe the process by which it ectusily was hcndled. This relates to its identification as an inspection " finding (or other result of an ir.spection), classification as tc anclysis should sher (with complete and specific referenccs) the iter frce the point of identification by the inspector, inclusior, in field notes, ar.d draft reports to the fit,a1 report, any tracking or mes.itoring system used by the inspector, supervisors, or the F.egion to maintain awcr ress cf the iter ar.d its status. For these iters e where +here is an absence of agreer.cht on process or disposition, l ict r.tify the bcsis for the disagreement and any record of disegreernent and its processing. Particular attention should be 1 given to signatures ano concurrences and timeliness of these l i I
l 3-1 (1/20/66) TASK GROUP 3 1 TASLFCREXAMlhAT10NRELATIVETOSAFETYSIGNIFICAf:CEOFISSUESOFOTAREPCFi 86-10 This task relates to examination for safety significance of the 34 issues cf Attachnent 1 to Attachment MM of 01A Report 86-10 anc the safety significance of ar,) additional issues revealed by the activities of Task Group 1 and Task Grcup 2. The efforts relative to Tast Group I would be to describe the saftt-significance of failure by the agency to perform inspection requirements of the I l IE cor;structicr. inspectior, procram, particularly these requirerients which l i \\ l c6nnct now be fully performed due to the extent of the plant completion. These 1 l iters would be the result cf Task Group 1 activities under Items 4 and 5 (and describec in Iter (c') of the tesi c'escriptier. TASK GROUP 1-TASK FOR DETERMlh:h; J l WHEThEi' TFE CUEFEf,i AUGNENTE; REVIEW AND If;SPECT10t; EFFORT AT COMANCHE PEAL.E ] I SUFFICIEh! TC COMFENSATE FCF AhY IDENTIFIED WEAKhESSES IN REGICh IV's ) ) II.SPECTICh PROGRAMS. In addition, the efforts relative to Task Group 2 wct,1d 1 be the safety significance of process snd disposition, issues identified by Tasi l Grcup 2. These items would be the result of Tast Group 2 activities unoer Items I ai.c E (ano describeo in Items 4e and 1) of tcsk performance in the tesk description TASK GFCUP E-TASL FCR EXAMIN/TIOk 0F ISSUES RELATING TC PROCESS At:0 DISP 05:T10f, OF INSPECTICN FINDlt;GS OF 01A REFORT 86-10. The Test Group will have available to it: 1. The information of issues from OIA Report E6-10 (essentially the issues in Attachment I tc Attachment W of OIA Report E6-10).
i l L-4 1 I l t sianatures anc concurrences in relationship to changes in j l do:umentation. 1 3. Analyze each issue and independently describe the process anc l disposition by which the item should have beer. handled. Reference 1 I the guid6nce or practice that was used in making this independent determination. Compare this independent determination with the i handling and disposition that actucily occurred. Where there ere i differences in the process and disposition between what independent i J determination describes anc what actually occurred, explain the j 1 differences. Reference reports, guidance, practic0s that prOVidi the i l 1 l basis for these explanations. I 4 Feport on the task e#ferts: 1 a. Describe how the tesk was performed. 1 l l b. Idchtify the information base on which the task group's conclusions are based. This stculd cescritt the results of actisities tL hssure the accuracy of the informtticn.btse. 4 l c. Provide complete and specific references to the infcrmatien trit served as the basis for the conclusions and findings. l
]
- C I
B d. Identify where there are differences between agency guidance, IE i l guicance, and Region IV guidance and areas where guidance does not crist or is subject to wide interpretations. Where the conclusion is that identification, processing, and e. disposition have not followed expressed agency, IE, or Region IV guidance, specify, in detail and with references, where and how this ftilure to follow guidance has occurred. f. For items of disagreement involving disposition, or the hinc'lirc l of chchges in the report or reccrds, describe the disagreement anc e> press an opinion on whether the guicance for process and dispositiur, was, or wes not, folicwed. For disagreement for which no guidance exists, express en opinion on the apprcpriater.tss of the process anc disposition, actu611y performed.in light of the significance and implications of the disagreement. g. Where guidu,te cues not exist, express ar. opinion as to what guidarce is needec, h. Enere guidance does exist, but there are differing interpretations, recomnrend a course of action.
2-6 Schedule 1/20/C7 Test Leader appointed 1/22/E7 Membership, Organization & Approach estblished 1/23/87 Stert work on example (pilot effcrt) 1/27/87 Revier pilot effort with CPRRG 1/30/87 Check for possible impact of Task 1 on Test 2 2/4/87 Submit final report on CFRRG j i e I l f e i 1 )
3-2 2. Any other issues needing safety significance review from the wert: of Tasi Croup 1. 3. Any other issues needing safety' significance review from the work of Task Group 2. 4. .Easic inspection and licensing information and individuals knowledgeable of issues. 1 Insuftr cs possible, the performance of this task should rely oi. the writter. recorc where that recora provices sufficient information to support ~ conclusions. k't.cn it is necessary to extend tnis record, this should be dct:c l in writir.g cr by interview. Transcripts are to be made of interviews. ( 1r. a ddi tiu tc skills available within the ager.cy, Task Group 3, whenever 1 necessar; or cc-sirctic, shcult use outside experts to provide neecec' siills arr ) i o b j e c t i Vi l'.. This lask Grcup shall: i 2. Anal; tad. issue 6r.d cEscribe its safety significance to the i Comenche Peak reactor assuming that the condition of the issue is as statec in O!A Report 80-10. The purpose of this or,alysis is it specify the worst safety case" that may result assuming that.the issue exists es stated without correction or recogr.ition that the edverse situation exists, that is, es if it existed and was undetected. In this 6nalysis, provide complete and specific i references that serve as the basis for determination of safety sip ificance.
3-3 2. Analyze the 6ctions which were taken or which are plannec to be taken to alleviete any safety significchce associ6ted with each of the 3C issues at Comanche Peak icentified in CIA Report 86-10. In this analysis, give references to reports and other documents that servt as the basis for determining the actions teken or planned anc their effect in alleviating concerns. Evaluete the actions to determine I the extent to which they alleviate or resolve the safety concern. If the actions taken or planned do not sufficiently 611eviate the safety i concerns, describe actions which, if teken, would alleviate the concerns. Give references in support of opinicas or conclusions regarcing corrective actions. 3. Evaluate the safety significance of the failure to completely perforn the inspection requiremer.1 in accordance with the IE construction ittspecticn program. (hote: The input for this item will come fror Tasi fcrce 1.) Tne al clysis sbculc tak-it.tc account all inspect.s: l attivities associated with an incomplete or non-performed iter. I Safety concerns should be described. If agency actions alleviate concerns, these should be described, li the actions taken or plannec l co not allevicit congerns, describe action 3 which, if taken, would l cele \\iatt Concerns. l l 4 Evaluate the so fety significance of items identified by Task Force : that were not processed accordine to guidance or which are in dispute as to correctness of processing and disposition. All safety ccncerns should be idertified. If actions have alleviated t,hese concerns, these cctions shuuld be describec. If no action has been taken or if acticns taken or plenned do r.ct alleviate Ihe concerr describt actions which, if 16 ken, would 611eviate concerns. E
?- 5. Report on the task efforts: a. De.': ribe how the task was performed. b. Identify the information base on which the task group's are I based. This should describe any aud! ting to assure the accuracy of the informaticr. base. i c. Prcvide complete and specific references to the information, that serves as the basis for conclusior,s ano, findings. d. Hichlight any safety sicr.ificance i ssues where agency actior,s or piens may r ct alleviate safety ccr.cerns. Schedule i 1/20/E7 lask Leuc'er appointed 1/;;/E7 Membership, Orgar.ization & Approach estchlishec 1/22/E7 Start wori cr example (pilot effort) Review f lot effort with CFRRG 1/17/C7 i 2/5/E7 Av,elyze reports of Tests 1 anc 2. Factor irito icsk 2 2/9/87 Submit final report to CPRRG O ~ __p
1 I pv I f lf fJAb41., f^M^* Aa AoA h swa 'A i LO) %S- 01lo S OE RP/ ht80 7y M "t ffV %% 6*O W WL = os W
- '^
h. 3 aQ q h ') + ss - ot/os 4d th% 5pd0 i ze $
- D$ l6V
/ h o '?kuek) SS*- 14ln p<pyd / p+ j mpd 'Lya p W ky s5 14/a ff e;A.. *A w a + / \\ / GFl'llIl N cNl6a /L d Nb ~'b ) *
- f ~ #'/ G
- 0 f% "M dp '#6 'N-'I d
,/ .h a a l i i
f ,a quq*2 ak)u QN mtd6) + sr - cy/cs @. a -L L/p h /4d3 I go 3 Rf/ W L ) + as-og/.c
- @. q~g 4 E
i l ss ag j,1 '(9 ~ a.+. { u t a w u % % xiiii bseAgu.) + sr-ajos
- g, h M us L A.j d e.rzut La%4 ss -ap
- s a au g
i ss'-Nln
- (.i) fssc A aaA s r H/n ek A - ad (g) s s.; n/u "Q,
call of M -% W o -n/a % s /cau pa 94-N/n f W of ad s 4 -11la (o 64d ej A4 (PM Lv.) 4 4} +]it 7 ktk
- lawAo
'A ) l
r -e,- L er,9,
- r m-u p a sl of >&
s c-11l, +1 A caLLj.nands %f i+)! fa sc - nja 'My w-tJ oj oA La) < -, + t,e nu g 1
u p y%s n ss -u,ja W m j~ a E 1 (m3y 's ed2 A% ) A 1 l l M469) 6 ~ b f /3 b M E ss - taja
- 7 wfu G.2 QlA: k A Q
- 8s q a afn 4
M xa 1 es - u.)a
- s
~ q~ w w - iqa 'n ~~fn L w - sy,s
- n
~4~ S L i 1 f rc 1 I a ll 4 p nuat%.- TS-o4laS k] Q Qt.u-4a a l 4 i ,i hAloy-h ADT ~ u 1 = 1 "0 l W b& o 6.uw_ sr - 4A,.1) ) W - u.jo
- 1 iLitd %itL Alomcc i
l _ _ _ = l s 1 13 i i inspection Report 50-445/85-14; 50-445/85-31 l Items 7, 8, and 9 i 1. 01A Statement of the Issue (See Attachment M4) j Issues Resolution in Final Report ,I t /- 7. Site records of Chicago Bridge Violation dropped. / l and Iron shipped to Houston. Texas l l in cardboard boxes. 8. No backup copy of records made for Violation dropped. An open \\ 1 records shipped to Chicago Bridge item created involving i I and iron. records received from vender (445/8514-0-06; 446/8511-U-06). 9. TUGCo failed to inventory records Violation dropped, Unresolved sent to Chicago Bridge and Iron. item created involving Chicago Bridge and Iron l records control (445/8514-U-06; 446/8511-U-06). h s j l 1 w-__-___ r e 14 2. _ Expanded Description of the issue and Related Backgrcund Infomation The basic-issue as understood by Region IV management is as follows: l l The NRC inspector (H. Phillips) and his assigned consultant (T. Young) believed that the CB&I shipment of records off site ia cardboard boxes for small shipments and wooden crates for large shipment in accordance ~ with CB&! Procedure NRP-1 (Nuclear Records Procedure) did not afford Y adequate protection since no backup copies were retained on site. / They also believed th?t, although the CB&1 records in question were always in the possession of and controlled by CB&l on site in accordance with the CBal QA program, TUGCo should heve had a procedure for transmittal of these records as the inspectors asserted that the records belonged to the owner and remeval from the site should be controlled by TUGCo. They believed that the failure of TUGCo to maintain control and provide 4 accountability of the Chicago Bridge and Iron records was similar to the Stone and Webster violation discussed previously for items 3. 4, 5, 6. Item 7 was initially identified in draft 1 of the construction inspectibn report, paragraph 5.c (Attachment 1) as a violation. As indicated in Mr. Phillips' ' Matrix of Drafts for Rpt 8514/11(Appendix"D*)" (Attachment 2), draft 2a, paragraph 5.c (Attachment 3) was revised (in the inspector's handwriting following discussion with Regional management) to an unresolved item. In draft 4.a. paragraph 5.c the is ne of the J I I r- -l l l i 15 j l Chicago Bridge and Iron records controls was condensed by management and the issue remained an unresolved item. The note on the front of draft 4.a from Mr. Barnes to the inspector requested his consnent on the i changes proposed by management. Mr. Barnes indicates he received no comment from Mr. Phillips. Management, ther? fore, assumed Mr. Phillips i concurred with the changes to the r,eport. Item 8 is essentially the same as Item 7. Item 9 in Mr. Phillips' ~ I i " Matrix of Drafts for Rpt 85-14/11 (Appendix "D")" (Attachment 2), j I states that "TUGC0 failed to inventory Chicago Bridge ar.d Iron records sent to Houstor, TX. Therefore, cannot determine records that must be returned. Violatior Criterion Xyll (QA Records) (T. Young)." In the body u'f draf t 1, paragraph 5.c (Attachment 1), it states "The failure to be able to readily retrieve and maintain control and provide accountability of records removed from storage is a violation of 10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXVII(QARecords).* In draft 4.a. paragraph 5.c. this violation was incorporated into the unresolved item. The note on the front of draft 4.a from Mr. Barnes to the inspector requested comments on changes to the report. Mr. Barnes indicated he received no comments from Mr. Phillips. Therefore, concurrence with I these changes was assumed. 3. Safety Significance of the issue 'N .) r j I 16 This is has no safety significance. The CB&! records in question were for the Unit 2 reactor containment liner and mechanical penetrations. CB&I as a subcontractor to Brown and Root conducted the containment liner erection activities on site. CB&I maintained their own independent temporary storage area on site for QA f records in accordance with their own QA program, which was approved and audited by Brown an:d Root and TUGCo. The CB&I records were never in the 7 Y possession of TUGCo during construction of the containment liner. All I CB&I records were, however, available for TUGCo review. CB&I was f contractually comitted to adherence to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B and ANSI N45.2.9. In accordar.ce with the CB&I " Nuclear Records Procedure" y q p_ g h-1)(Attachment 13), on completion of the erection and engineering 1 hr. f activities, all records are indexed and sent with inventory to the CB&I Nuclear Records Vault for storage and microfiching. The procedure recomends that records sent to the Nuclear Records Vault be placed in suitable containers after first wrapping with plastic or some other waterproof material. The procedure allows the use of corrugated cardboard for small shipments and wood for larger shipments. I After processing at the Nuclear Records Vault, a set of records is sent from the Nuclear Records Vault to the owner of the project (e.g., TUGCo) with a letter of transmittal identifying the items sent and requesting signed acknowledgement. J i .) i { l y 17 Region IV management is aware of no regulatory position relative to the protection requirement for the shipment of records. ANSI N45.2.9 l cddresses pennanent storage and or temporary storage in fire resistant { cabinets or a duplicate set of records in a separate location. A record-in shipment is not in pennanent or temporary storage. The organization placing a record in shipment, as in other cases when records are removed l from storage locations, has responsibility for safety of the record. ? Chicago Bridge and Iron addresses the protection of shipped records in i j that a reliable means of transportation (i.e., air freight or air express) is r.crmally utilized. The records are wrapped in plastic to protect them from moisture. The records are placed in a contriner. It appears that l this issue is moot since Regional management has been infonned by TUGCo that the Chicago Bridge and Iron records for the containment liner at 1 CPSES were sent one shipment at a time, in a pickup truck accompanied by a Chicago Bridge and Iron scpervisor, using a single drawer fire-rated file cabinet. It is reported that the records were inventoried for receipt at the NRV in Houston, TX. This was confinned by phone conversation with the Chicago Bridge and Iron supervisor. Chicago Bridge and Iron had a QA records Procedure NRP-1, which was inI accordance with the Chicago Bridge and Iron QA program approved by TUGCo. The Chicago Bridge and Iron records were on site because Chicago Sridge and Iron was performing its work on site. At the conclusion of the contract Chicago Bridge and Iron would process the records and turn them 'N ) l I F 18 over to TUGCo. Until that time, the records were under control of Chicago Bridge and Iron. l 4 Region IV Management Handling of the Issue Regional management has concluded the handling of Chicago Bridge and Iron records controls as an unresolved item is proper pending verification by ~ the staff of proper implementation of record controls. l Region IV also left open the inspection of the receipt of Chicago Bridge j 1 and Iron records on site. Foctnote o 01A assessment in Attachment MM regarding concerns 4 and 5 is confusing and misleading. Regional management was certainly aware of TUGCo's continued responsibility under 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. DIA uses a very l 'imited interpretation of the term " ultimate responsibility," as addressed in Mr. Westerman's transcript pages 284-285. " Ultimate responsibility in this context means that TUGCo had the responsibility to impose on CBal the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and ANSI N45.2.9. TUGCo or its representative had the responsibility to review and approve the Chicago Bridge and Iron QA program. TUGCo had the responsibility to audit the Chicago Bridge and Iron QA program. The concluding statement in m states, "In addition, the Regional ransgement should have had the inspectors follow up on whether TUGCo was not conforming to Section 5.3 of ANSI N45.2.9-1979, regarding the establishment to control and account for such record." This statement would appear to indicate that TUGCo shoul have a separate procedure for the control of and accountability for rec rds removed from the Chicago Bridge and Iron storage facilit{. The logic of this is faulty. Regional management indicate, as "open, that the inspector would verify that TUGCo conducted a proper receipt of Chicago Bridge and Iron records when finally returned to the site. J l 1 ) t-l 1 l e o 8% WI e o$. 4 0 k 4y 4t lx 1 (q su4 kk (, { w h i e U " e i .g, y h hog 1) ? ' ~a
- d
= 4 ae e u i v .i ^ Q. ) 1 e = ? 4 7 E D 1 wojw ( et, h !
- u
(; s - 0 % 9 4. { a g N t w C $$ sa 4 hh b -) w, t 3 2 Y[ Y 0 kuk'd )M 0, 1
- y
- 6 on v
N EN i <m N k W 4* V - 3a = e t = w% i v ,s w et i s = V e g-s Q x Tx 1 US w e ~ k at \\ 0 i \\ App. A(VI) App, B(Ill) PART El e DOMESTIO LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES l storage coolant *laventory under scendent APPENDIX B-OU ALITY ASSUR ANCE CRI. performtng quality assurance functions than conditions. TE Rf A iOR NUCLE AR POWE'R PL ANTS report to a managemeent level such that this Crucesos gf-Perrention of catricatify in AND FUE L REPROCESSING PL ANTS required authority and organtenuonna free. j fassi storage end headling. Crtlacattty in the ~ ferroeuctsees. svery appnennt ser a son. dom, including susesset ladependence from fuel storage and handling system shall be struction perin11 to required by the provtalona cost and schedule when opposed to safety j prevented by physical systems or processes, of f 60.84 to include in tts preuminary amfety conalderations, are psovide6. Seemuse of the 3 preferably by use of geosmetricaDy safe analysis report a desertption of the que21ty Inany variables invetood, such as the suasber - i configurations assurance program to be applied to the do. of personnel, the type of activity being per. Craterson g3-Montforfar fuel and teesfe algo, fabricauon, construction, and testing h formed, and the loessaan or locations where E eforage. Appropriate systems shall be pro. of the structures, eyetems, and components M activities are performed, the organtastional S vided in fuel storage and radioactive waste of the factitty, every appDeant for en operst. M etructure for esecuuas the quality assurance % systerns and assocanted hand 11ag arvea O) ing lleense as required to laclude, in ita [ Program may take eartous forms provided to detect conditions that may result in lose Anal anfety analyeas report,inforenauen pet. that the persons and organlantions easigned .taJning to the eunagerial and.adm. in,istrative $ the quality assurance funettons have this of residual heat renseval espabulty and es* omin redauen ionis and m to mute entrois to be u.ed to naure af 0 or.uon. quired authority we.rganasamon.i fre. appropriate safety settons-Nuclear powerplants and fuel reprocess 6ng dom. Irrespective of the organlastional #true. Crfferson gd Mositoring radioseffrffy re. plants
- anclude structures, sys-tuse, the individual (s) assigned the respon.
Irases. Means shall be provided for monitor. tems, ano ecumpenente that prevent or miti. s1 butty for assuring edestive esecutaon of any tog the reactcy containment atmosphere, gate the consequences of postulated accidents portion of the quality assurance program spaces containing components for rectreutsi that could cause undue flak to the health at any location wbut acuriuee subject to isen of loss.or. coolant accident Sulda, efttu. and esfety of the pubuo. This appendis estab. this Append 1s ese bolag performed chau have ont discharge paths, and the plant environs k es:es quality assurance requkements for the Insb direct secoma to such sovels of management for tadloseurity that may be released frorn l d gn, construcuon, and operation of thces _as may be neeeamary sc perform this funcuon, mor r.a1 opera tions, including anticipated structures, systems, and components. The operational occurrences, and from postulated [ pertinent requirements of thir appendis sp. sectdents. ply to an actiftues affecting the safety. E quam Aamosam pasas p related functions of those structures. sys. The appliciant sh&Il estabilah at the earnest i tems, sad components: these activities lna pracucable time.=ama.* ant ettb the schedule stude dealgning. purchasing, fabricating, for nocompushing the eruviues, a quanty as. handitag. sh;pping, storing, ensaning, erset. aurance program wheen complies writh the ing, instauing, inspecting, testing, operating, requirements of this appendia. This prgram maintaining, repairing, refusiing, and aball be documented hg written pouelas, pro. modifyLog. eedures, or instrucuans and shall be carried As used in this appendis, aquality assur. out throughout plantilfe in accordance with ance" comprises au those planned and sya, those poucles, procedures, or instrueuens. I tematic actions necessary to provide ade. The applicant abau identify the structures, quote con 8dence that a structure, system, systems. and connponents to be sovered by 1 or component wiu perform satisfactory 117 in the quality assurance program and the major i service. Qual:ty assurance includes quality organnsauona parucipaslag in the prograan, control, which comprises those aus11ty assur. together 1rith the designated funct10ns of ance actions related to the phraical charse. these organizations. The quality assurance terisucs of a material, structure, component, program aball provide sontrol over acuvtues or system which provide a means to control safecung the quality of the ident18ed strue. s the quality of the material. structure, com. twes, systems. and counponents, to en estant ponent, or system to predetermined require, consistent with Wir tanportance to eaMy. -ments. Aellvlties affecting qus11ty sha:1 be accom. puabed under suttably contreued candluons. ~
- 1. Onoasrstaview Controlled condluons include the use of The applicant 1 shall be responsible for the appropriate equipment; outtable anviron.
Inantal condluons for accompbahicg the establishment and esecution of the quality acuvity, such as adequate cleanness; and as. assurance program. De appucant sney dele
- surance that au prerequisites for the given gate to othere, such as contractors, agenta, acuvity have been satisted. 'rhe program or consultants, the work of establishing and than take into account the need for special esecuting the quality assurance progvam, or controls. processes, test equipment, tools, and any pt.rt thereof. but aball retain respons1 J sklus to attain tb4 required qus11ty, and the bunty therefor. The authority and dutnes of need for vettocauon et quality by inspec.
persons and organizations performing ac. ( tion and test.The program thau provide for tiettles afecting the safety.related functions indoctrinetten and tramlet of personnes per. of structures, systems, and components sh&H forming scuvlues 48ecting quality as neces. h be clearly estabinshed and delineated in writ. N aary to assure that cultaale proaciency is & tats. These activities instude both the per* achieved pad samlateland.The applicant shau M forming funcuona of attaantag quality ob. regularly rettew the Status and adequacy of E Nettres and the quauty nasurana functions. the quality assurance program. Management
- The quality tasurance functions are those of of other organisauona parucapating in the '
S (a) aanuring that an appropriate quauty quauty assuranos program abau regularly assurmace program to estemanshed and sornow the status and adequacy of that part egeettvely enscuted and (b) verifytag, such of the quality maanraner prort/am which they as by checking, audiung, and snapecuan, are esecuung. that activiums aSecting the safety.related functions have been correctly performed. IIL sasser DopTeat The persons ans organlaattans perforen* Measures thau be estabilahad to assure tag quality assurmaee fumettsues shat! that applicable regulasary requirements and have suScient authority and organlaa. the design basis, as desned in 6 60J and as tional freedom to identify quality prob
- epectaed in the lleense appucauon, for those lems: to inttinte. recommend, or per". 4e rtrwtures. systems, ani a.omponer ts to which and te terify ample *,.T.1 vf ints appanus ofNies a e urreely tr.m.
v t Juwe, solvtlons. Such persons and organimauona lated lu.o steuacauona. drawings proce. dures, and instrucuans. TheGe sneaRures shall include provisacns to assure that appropriate
- F*hile the term
- applicant" le used in qusMtv standards are spec 19ed and included these criterna, the requiremmeta
- are, in design documents see that devisuona of soures, appilcable after auc'n a person from such standards ese centreusd. Measures has received & Itoenas to construct and shall also be estaDisabed for the eclecuon and operate a nuclear power plant or a fuel review for suitability of application of mate.
reprocessing plant.11nese artterts will also rials, parts, equipment, and processes that be uend for gundname in evaluating the ado, are essential to the esfety-related functions quacy of quality tasursnoe programs in tnne of the structurop, sysnesia and components. by holders of construellon permite and enc ,. Measures shan be estabilahed for the identiscation and control of desagn inter. etsting incenses. v ' Amended 36 Fe 1630L faces and for coordinauen among participat. 60 41 December 30,1982(reset) 4 i a . ') r i sf APP, U(Ill) App,g(xyggy PART OD e DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES int deelgu organlasuona These measures at the contaener er euhoontractor souros, eyeteams, andt ts, 'fhet prosseures aballinclude the estabushment of procedures and owninaason of products upon deuvec, thau laclude prettstona for assuring that 631 asnong parucapaung design organizations for Documentary evidenee that maternal and preregunstles for the given test have been met, that adequate test lastrussentatia.t is / the stuw, approval, selease, distribution, equipment see8ess to the procurement r6,. avaliable and used, and that the test is par. an1 tevtalon of docuanents involving destga quinments shall he eenlaaWe at the suonse farened under euttaNo enetreamental ens. Interfaces, powerpland or fuel reprocessing plant' site dauene. Test resulta shall be deoussented and '1%e design control ammasures shall prettoo pr6or to installation or use for vertrytag or 'ehechlag the adequacy of of seek Isenertal and egulpment. This deau, evaluated to eesure that test requarviseate hare been estassed. desten, such as by the performance of design mastery evidence shau he sotalmed at the nuclear isnt or fuet reprocessmg SE opwmt, or assascanno aars veer i e.lant* s.bwer[shall t>f suffi-reviews. by the use of alternate or ensupuSed a P ent i we.n=y e openino,e.ui,ements, anm of a.nal methods.,g.r,ogram.e perfo,rm,. esiculatio o by th u=we teau m,e 1f. tag or ebeaktag prosess shan be portarened by such as codes, standards, or spectaantees* Measures shall be estehushed to neeure ' Individuals or groups other than those who Feet by the purcht Ad esoternal and equip
- that Scois, geges, i._.,
ts. and tther amant. The ageotiveness of the centere of aneecurtag and tesQq dettees used tg p' performed the original design, but who amay be frorn 2e same ergentsauon, Where a test quauty by onestractors and subcontractors tivtute ageoting quality are properly erua program to used to vertfy the adequacy of a ahau be essessed by the appuaant or eleaignee troued, caubrated, and adjusted at spectarr - spealac deelgo feature in lieu of other vertif. at latervale somalatent with the lamportance, periods to emaintain acewecy ylthin BMW ing or ehecting processes, at shall include complesity, and cuantity of the prettuct or eary limite. a eerytcas. suitable quenocatjon testing of a prototype Xill HANDLING, STOR AGE. AND SHIPPING unit under the most adveres deangn sondt. vais. sorwrIrICavloW AND Cownos, or as&TealAIA, tions. Design control measures abau be cp. ""'""8'""8"" Measures shall be estabbahed to control the piled to stems such as the fouowing: reactor handling, storage, shsppsng, cleenms, and phystes, etrese, eersnal, hydraulle, and acct. Measures shall be estabinshed for the iden. dont analyase; compatibiuly of enasertans; 118esuon and control of amtertala, pens. preservauen of amaterial and equipament in accessibluty for inservlee inspecuon. analate. and components, including perually fabri, accordance with work and inspection an. mance, and repatri and deuneauan of aseept. ented aresenthes 'Itsee measures chau empure structions to prevent damage er deteriora, anee artnerts for inspections and tests. that identi$estden of the testa is maalata$aed lion. When Decessary for parucular prod. by r,est number, part number, eartal number, ucta, special protectsto environment. such Design changes including Send abanges, or other appropriate means, eitber on the as inert gas atmosphere, spectSc moisture ahan b."e subject to design control measures $ tem or on reoords traceable to the item, as conteDt level 8. and temperature levels, abau urate with those applied to the eriginal design and be approved by the er. required throughout fabrienteen, erection, be spectaed and provided. gantention that perforumed the original design tastallauen, and use of the item. 'linese iden. gm g,,,,em,, i unless the appucant desigustes another re. t1Acation and control measures shall be eponalble organization. designed to prevent the use of incorrect or Measures aball be established to indiosta, defecute Inseertal, parte, and components. by the ues of enarkings such as stamps, tage, E reocossasswt socobssNT CosrTaoL intels, routlag easda, er other su.seble ameans Measures abad be established to assure the status of inspections and tests perforened' that applicable vogunatory requirements, de. Measures aball be estebuabad to assure upon individualitems of the nuclear power. alge bases, and other requirements which are that special processes, including welding, plant or fuel reprocessing plant,' These mess. becessary to assure adequate quauty are best treating, and pondretrucu<e testing, ures shall provide for the r 6ultably included of referenced in the docu. are cotstrolled and accomplished by quait. Mentif%uon of leaans which have antaafno. . I Sed personnel using qualtted procedures tortly panned required inspections and tests, V meets for procurement of anatselal, equip. in accordance with applicable codes, stand. $ where necessary to preclude inadvertent by. , ment, and services, whether purebnaed by other g paasing of such inspecuens and testa. Meas. the applicant or by its contractors or sub g ards, specifications, criteria, and ures sha!! miso be estabushed for indiosting contractors. 'Ib the estent necessary. pro. w spects.1 requirements. W 8 " "
- 8I*$0 and cornponents o'f the n'delear
[ curement documente shall require cor trac.$ d a IsrsencTsoN program for inspection of scuvitJee N Fl. int or fuel coprocessing plant,pwer-tors or subcontractors to provias a qwtuty N assurance program constatant witti the A pertinent provisions of this appens:s affecting quality shall be estabitaned er.d sure as Dy tagging valves and evitches, to executed by or for the organtaation perforus, prevent inadvertent operauon. e smevnocrsoms, reocesonas, aus paawtwos Ang the acurity to verify conformaoos with 3,. gronooggyos errwo atavasta14, pas s e, ce Activttles agecting quauty shall be pre. the documented instructions, procedures, conspoerswn scribed by documented instructions, proce. and drawings for accompushtng the activity, Measures shall be established to control dures, or dravtags, or a type apprcprate to such inspection aball be perforrned by V d), viduals other than thoes who performd snatartala, parts. or componente which do not the circumstances and aball be accore,nsbed the activity being inspected. Esaaninauau, osoform to requirements in order to prevent in scoordance with these instrucuan pro. endures, or drawings. Instrucuans, proce. eneasurements, or teru of matertal or prven their Landvertent use or instmustaan. =rbese dures. or drowinge shall toclude appropriate ucts proorened shall be performed for each meeeures sha!! include, as appropriate. pro-erfences for l@nttSc4 Mon, documentauon, quantitauve or qualitauve acceptance cri. work operation where noosemary to testra teria for determining that tanportant activi. quality. If inspecuan of,_ " matertet ses*egation, disposition, and sou8eaMon to toes have been asustectoruy acessapuebad. er products la impossible or diendeantageous, altected organtenuona. Stonecaforatag itemas d, indirect control by monitoring processtag aball be reviewed and accepted, rejected, vt goepasr#v coNvaot methods, equipment, and persJanet shall tep repaired, or reworked in accordance with docu-provided. Both,tnapoction and prooMe mont, mentad procedures. Measures shall be asubliebed to control toring aball be provided when esatrol is 371. cosasc' revs ac'rson the toewmass of doeuenentA such as lastrue. inadequate without both. If mandatory to. . bsM M b MM M eMN M Stees, posendures, and drewtags, teoludstg specWn hold potate, whleb poquin wit. considens admee to quality, suett m fail. ebanges thereto, whleb presethe all activities sneestag or inspecuas by the appucant's agoottas quality.These measures aball assure designated representauve and beyond whirn uret, samtfumet6 ens, des-.a deflattens. defocum mateHan and equipmet, and son. that documente, taeluding changes, are ro. work shan not proceed without W comerat conformaness are preemptly teenttaed and viewed for adeguacy and approved for release of its designated representative are seguired, fm eond by authertsed pereenmal end are eastributed the ease, to and tened at the location where the pro, the spectBC hold potata aball be trwltested in g certbed neuttty is perforened. Changes to appropriate documents' assure that the uuse of the condluon is E M OoerMot, MMMd auf MeeM acWe tehn to g)gf h[ t' the aA r rganass ns *h p o ,e e the origiua' rettrw and appr ora) unteus the A leu ovram tN,1 be es a%ushea to i sppuent designates another responsible ensare that all teaung requntwo.a demon
- enues of the aandiuen, and tlae merectin orgamassuon.
atrate that structures, systeaa, and essaph aetnea tahan aball be documented and neau wiu perferen estaataotoruy in servlee to yeported to appropriate novels of management, 9tt. Soproot, es ponessasen tsarentat, sectr. identt6ed and performed in accordanoe with avsk esaLary asemarcs escones j hisNL aMe aesticas wntten test protedures which inecryorate himseures shall be "Mh to escure the requireemente nad asseptance tuotte een* Sultalent records shall be anstatatand te l that purebened Imaterial, equipenent, and talked in appliemble design documents. N furt.lsh evidence of acuviues efeettag servidte, whether purettened direecy er teet program shall include, as approrn%te, queuty. The records thau taclude at least through centrasters and subocetractors, eso. proot testa prior to tastausues, peampara* the fouoving1 Opersuas logs and the results form to the presurement doeusseate. These temass teste, and apernelonal testa duftedae of revlows, inspecticas, tests, audite, meal. emesoures ehest teelude provietoes, as appre. clest gewerplant or f eet reprocessing 8 tortag of wort pertomaaneo, and meteeness /' prtete. for eeures evaluation and esteetton, plant operatton, of struct ures-analyses. N records thfl! also p enjective evidence of quality furnished by cicesly.related data su6 q%It.he of Q i I pomoanet, pnoodures, and onhuest. Is.
- "* "** ""* * '**"O '""** ' Amerded 36 FR 18301.
epecuan and test recorde eh to a asias. l 1 December 30,1982(reset) 50 42 .b f I App.E App. D(XVil; PART 50 e DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRCOUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES l e 1 E8'iS888 8/58"UC8/88 808'8 U* Commission reserves the richt however. to infonnation that wdl normally be required of s[e Y Se.' require addibonal financie.1 (Llorwtton at spphcanta which m newly formed entibes su reou ts. the Construction perm}t euge, particidarly AD will not differ in scope from that required of ooptability, and the action taken in non. nection with any deaetenews noted. nieoords cases tri which the proposed power estabbshedorgantiations. Accordmgly. ) shalt be ident184ble and retrievable. Ocu1* nerating facihty will be GUmnionly owned appbcants should submit estimates as i state s 6 wie appucable regulatory require-two or en esting companies or in described above for estabhahed l menu t.he smLeant shan estabush regnre. monts oceaanung record nienuon. such whlch financing depends upon long term organizations. ma auratiati. Locat6on, and easigned arrangements for sharing of the power from
- 2. Source of construction funda. The
"' pons btusy. the facihty by two or more electrical application should specifically identify the utn.avrme generating companies, source or cources upon which the opphcant g APpbcants are encouraged to consult with rebes for the funds necessary to pay the cost i 3 A comprehenalve system of ptanned and I - pertodic muelta shan be carried out to eartry the Commission with respect to any of construenng the facihty, and the amount to j c' comp 11ance with all aspecta et the quauty questions they may have nlating to the be obtaiaed from each. With respect to each ' assurance is s'am and to det. ermine the requirements of the Comminion's reparations caho sh d in l tw p rrorm"ed In ore "e%$ or the information set forth la titis 6, spend)x. soy e a g '.ra d$rs"orNtNddioe74*$
- t. Applicants Which Are EstMshed relationships with its stockholders. corporete
'P batt.o. in the was bitns audited. Aust:t re. Organizations affibates, or others (such as fmancial t U*",* "[g *h5
- *PP &',i*
$?tNs $$'$po*ia"tb5ts ?n y funds rehed uponinclude parent A APP cottonsjWconstructionperrnits li g, _g EtYbNtEt area $.NI NeIw'by
- 1. Estimato r%nseruction costs. Ft" M of electric utth'ies, aoal apphcant a teiowte of a carnpanies or other corporate effihetes, indsomied.
the total cost of te proposed facdy should ' information to support the hnancial be broken down ma follows and be ' % capabihty of each such company or affihate accompanied by a statement desenbing the to meet its commitments to the apphcant pendix C-A Galde for the Financial bases from which the estimate is derived-shouM be set forth in the apphcatwn. This M W IMtH Mformadon in!prmation should be of the same kind and Aaqukeed To Establish Finarncial scope es would be required if (Fe parent Oualif6 cations for FaciHty Construth ITE5E" wen.[.no'"e.*n. sW ' ".".... companies or affihetes were in fact the ee.m._.. g. pq w ma.sr km sweneer saw or arar cor ' -.. t.. .jpphcant. Ordmanly,it will be necesury that copies of agreements or contracts among Osmeral information fees esersg., am. 6.. the companies be submitted. his appendix is intended to appnse ,s e s = w w on % e w tv orto.n As noted nrher in this appendix. en ens e se==== c ww.ne was, em
- appbcant which p a uwIy fonned nW will appbcants for heenses to construct production or utihzation facihties of the types
- '"e*'8"'*"*c'"*****""**8**8"c',
n rmally n t be in a position to submit the w described in i 50.21(b) or i 50.22. or testmg facihues, of the general kinds of Anancial ~ If the fuelis to be acquirnt by lesa.e or other data and other related information that wiu { arrangement than pux6ane.the application [p'[,"[,f'T c s ntYou$d ho e er. demonstrate the hnancial quahfication of the m should so state. he items to be included in include in its appbcation a statement of its apphcant to carry out the activiues for which a these catesones should be the same o tnose essets, habihties, and capital structure as of the permit is sought. De kmd and depth of ' denned in the apphcable electne plant erd ,the date of the apphcation. information desenbed in this guide is not I nuclear fuelinventory accounts prescribed by k1 tended to be a rigid and absolute requirement. the Federal E.nergy llegulatory Commission or 111. Annual financlel Statement in some instances, additional pertinent an explanation given as to any departure Each holder of a construction permit material may be needed. In any case, the therefrom apphcant should include information other Since the composition of construchon cost for a piaduction of utihration farihty of g than that specified. If such information is estunates for production and utihzation a type described in i 50.21(b) or { 50.22.
- pertinent to estabhshing the appheant's facihties other than nuclear power reactors or a testing facility is required by a fmancial abihty to construct the proposed will vary accordmg to the type of facihty. n i 50 71(b) to ile ita annual financial f
5 facihty. particular formet is suggested for submiums report with ;he Commission at tile time $ It is impurtant to observe also that both such estunales. He estimate should. of issuante thereof.This requirement
- l 60.33(f) and this appendix distinguish however be itemized by categories of cost in dO" not apply to licensecs or holders of between appbcants which are established sufficient detail to permit an es aluation of its o
E construction permits for medical and organirsuons and those which are newly. . reasonableness. E research noctors. formed entitres organiaed primardy for the 1 Source of constmetion funds he g purpose of engagmg in the actmty for which oppbcation.hould inchde a brief statement IV. Additionalinformation the permit is sought. Rose in the former of the apphcants genml hoancial%m for g The Comm sainn may, from time to category will normaUy have a history of g financing the cost of the facihty,idenuf)ing tine. f eqW st the Opplicant, y hether an a cperstmg experienos and be able to submit the tioum or purces upon which the hnancial statements reflectmg the financial established orgirir.ation or newly appbcant nhes for the necausry results of past operations. With respect, bowever, to the appbcant which is a newly construction funds, e.g.,interal sources such forrned entif y. to submit additinned or e formed company estabbshed primardy for the S as undistributed eamings and drpre:iat<on more detailed information respecting da pespose of carrying out the hcensed activity. 3 accruals, or external soum sv.ch s' financial arrangements and sietus of wnb httle or uno prior operating history. (borrowmr'- funds if such inirmation is deemed 3 Appbranrsfinancfolefaciettis The necessary to enable the Commission to somewhat more detailed 14te and supponing documentauon will geners'h be necessary' epphcation should also inch & the deterrnine an app'hanre financial appbcant s tatest pubhshed samual hmcial quahIicutions for the hcense. se eyt ecops 4 f to be Included in aPPbeatioe.s by each of these two. ~ MPort. together e any cmnt intenm* financial statemente thst are pertnent If an Appenoa D (nemer139 FR 26279) f, annual fmancial report is not pubbshed. the bAppendia F-Luergency Planning and in ter a appbcant's !Loancial d o qualification. the Commission will require the Propandness for Production and Utilization i ,7 h" """"h", E together with all pertment notes thtreru and
- Tobhm/ Contents
I g certification by a pubhc accountant should be y 1. Introduction prescribed ubmitting the information. In fumiaM , 11 The *rehminary Safety Analysis Report many cases, the financialinformation usuaHy 41 *Ie4 Analy a pod contained in current annual financial reports,
- 11. Appkan:s Which Are Newly Formed W Comt oWergency Plans includmg summary data of prior yeare. will Entities
.V. Implementing Procedures be sufficient for the Commission's needs. He A. Applications for construction pennits 50 43 May 3L sk oume.. e -a=es.we+ehen a. M 4-, e-su-M == g ess -ea e ei a gy ,mei e +e=,- ==w em- -we'
- hA 4
-*-'No+ -- + a M ,p w+4 - 4es wousm ae
- e
- 4-wp.
a a,, h = ees,see===- '*m*-w+m'***'M^ 8>*" 9- 'ame,w.
- n. We m-m i;'.
gp g,._. ..e. o .e -IV l s <e P5 3 at 2\\ I k. 2 & * (i d {N S l
- O 2h d
l P. e s ( IIkk kOE l l T T 2 t I a ~ ~ c' v s f D e,
- sc h k YI l
c', EU t f (' s' b i s; Y c s en 2
- 3 Th AL Q d'
i 4 i,?R-o'* i ,$(6E de 2 ! QT t + l i l \\ -d ( 3 o o s J G s F s. JY y e h Y Y
- s. > ;.,
T gj (. [ P . g D A a i, -{ /a ~, e M ;, K u ~7- - my v;,,, K~ }
- I 3
3 " ' ' ' ^ s I 5 f Ih, t I i r p, k. l s' l k $, 5, k i \\ 1 9 s, 9e N ) \\ s v '.. c, -3 z + i s \\ I 9 1 m x e tl a b((3 ' y(i g .V. *. t g 3 n's ~. l I D klO .i 3g I 3 l ,8 s. 'g i ~ ( \\ 1 i .s 1 2 m. 31 ~s, g4 ,t y 4 o s - , a _1 I gq e 1 s q x q ~ s i 4 ) I t 4 4 s at ) D f k j(. '4 i W. O x t i K 1 k
- 1 l
i s :.; g d tQ t cg L ?w,s ? th s q Stu a y y 4 gt s e s. s \\ D E r,, a 1s N c n 4 s t D 1 i n 4 t t g 1 t t 1 , _...~... r i i =r.. l I =r 1 =:,,, .._._...u.. ,.....a. '_,i ~. ..u. m.~.,.., u ~ ~.. 2 u. t' "".u.
- ~ ~. ~..
.o. .b ~ > ~= w= - I --a=* _i_..i... ,i .aw,.. ..v.,. = .i. .g oc,. 1 ~. 'pu ~ l n 6 sa I I I I J .. i;**3_ G:_a..I.._a i .. ~.. __1
- =g,,, 7
,k .~_ 2.,. i .~..m... po.y m,,a.;,
- i. m....
. f_ m.. .a, _ ~..... o . s p.c,. w.. . m. :.....,. c I-. '...._I t g s_ ..u.. ..um. .= = 1 r.._._. ~-., .~ i ~ -... .~- 1 . ~ _ 3 ;.. , pm curem ~ a W ch.or . _ ~.. _ &. a. > _ i. ,.. _ - a.- ...s ,y ~.. ,, n _,m.. _m ~ 3 .. g.. n;a g... 3 = = = =. n. d $ I .g
- .. :.==
4 g r qs> =.. , -,. au.. g + \\ , _ -. ~.. _ ~ a.y a1 i j ~ _, 3.s,u- - - y; .. ~ l y...g, i. r di. .M o..b C b. .uusi.,, _.. _ ~ b.mc. ^q d* a. F9 2 il ..a..,w 3 1 .f I ,,QW 4 w,.. i ' g ;. T u L 7w%.m, i + m. 1 o c..i..rm.m m ,,p,,,,,,,,.
- '.****'".e,
=0q .;qd' ' s' .: Q" '
- jf j
NUCLEAR RULEMAKING REVIEW (NRR) )
- o.._._ w
- t..
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE REVIEW -. i. L -.~. LICENSING INFORMATION SERVICE (L 1 Q; yi a ..u =. o ..p.c.; . r w w. 3, .m, u a" ..a. r 4.'.'y Q %[ c..a mim, e n OCTOBER 4. t985 v~ A'.- g a ,2 ( i -,m ., qe '.;,,3 _o_., LJ ~"[*'h d'.' ..a.a=".. 4,cf f "0""* .ua 4 COAPORATON 1 l .A H3&My)CQr7)p3rty y1 a < .} D
- g i, 1-
7~A 'c e E J ? t;Z C ? 'sa f' & h)/D l Ch:C' 5/~f~d~A /'/ }C!~- ^* Q.*t t * ? (x ~/O, t l i ) .l ' ^" Ar Tr,* et r s caJ r TRsIc Z~)5-Gacaf2 Cv4*< '? 3 i nm .s o /A 7(a ~/0 //fsffc1%c s) Effoeg~Aa 2~TdH Nc, '7Af;A. Nr. Su E,$ (~<[ F l ?~5"~t*7lc.,:, ~.f. Af#,/ F' ~C '~' ~ V. - O le ?.f 8f)V ~ DEST' i'/J C's'< Y/ : /i ._ L 14/113r a..- at. L. J 7~ R w Been ners 1 . ~ $.- Y't' ?N~0 p_~.~JA " 0 7. b f S* 8 $Al. A O O / I" 5 V' loc /t 7~r o *J "URo ***Pl~b. 'l S. f C L C 3~ So#Q Ot' f/d~~<'f' I .Ut tW3oc-s/G k.keA*ED Z~ . E.7_ -. hy'PRQ 7~fSr*~~ DE/~/~WAfi f.-- - 3~ / 9sf.sf$1"c1*C*/ t i 0G ] (oNCfCTG M i W(8. N( f%'5 5 1. .A'% /th"0a'~O L -. i-. b I l p'v'y*/$$~/*/ - 44 ~c Y ??~~/V/// t- 'l J. 7 l~SA R T.br5 Ner VScarer 7teter
- l Yy'Cy2 $~// - u - W' avsy S n q a -c.s-
. d. ' +'W4/ /s~tt - et ~ 0:~ f ?7 QA t1wdi; L v'S / ^/.5 I N 4 3~~2. Y t w'.s -/ P3 */ V - V - 0 2 f
- v'v4/EY4 t,
J.,7 XECCK s'- S [tY(f f f? T~ 0, W ~ v' ~ a Y Y 'o G A Tou,su d d o P/ f' O l0
- f. ?
SEz*o f:02 5H;/ / f p //! ? : 1.175. j I ,LltJ/'E:o n J/.*b D o s H ~& // l 7 fvh E r1C n :.J {
- 6..* ;
cir 5t* M* i I -ur C srl' /L ,: i j'G ( of {' Jt ccoa.i r14 g.. s < o e i, r, e o)
- l Vlo at. no-J 'ui.o F/s O
/f .f. ~7 ' C Bk: Tres:
- ~
,y, - :, st Ebw ~ ., y :~/ 7:~/'r' ~ M ' c%- 1 i +'+'C/ 7 Y// ~ J ~CC l'
- l. 7 A/o bCKaf fc/ f ef h= w,
l l 8% / 7:" r 't* l 94/' / rrit -a -o G S ' 3. i Ri~c*c/:/. ii & c.u N i /> hlL.- ( l y \\ / r /c /sc: tr, i Trcs i c /v l 7^ (( Tir;* :3/.J ) / ;, ? { Wr/S.5 /V - c> - o z. j l // J+'S., / 7.'~~ '/ <> ~ o s l'? f "I '?p;7; j, W *,,(l /:. r /$ VIo: Ai'res./ k ffY[ T T,9 /~c: [] f. p p & /~,rj~[,z' ~~~. y*f' r 4s/>~/lbW -U oP l b -.. W't'(oll[! ~f/ 'd ~O? /? _-. j
- l.
. //Af.2dff'ffff(Q& _.jN_ }{f.V:,,T W s~/fr W - " ~ o'? //' 4%f W/f 4 -o 7 l 26. l. 3 7.. j. s'?fcorep.5 rAJ 6.'AJDE,65 b ). vs /'ra /t' - u ~ ? S ys- / t>~<t.. t L ~ 0 9 ?~ l 37 i 8'fcoRP 5 Cc- /44 /ED /co ) wei.n ne.o k erre c 2 r~ 39 l wecp
- 2. c ice.un ry i
t f Arriaqric - g, m c;/2>. s c-e,, v. = 0iA E(o -/0 g N.'a tidirw) kt to & ~//o n, 2 .3 5~.)6JJC 7 HY/rs7d -Lt-o/ I 77- /cfs i ; se.,' r.s /s - i.L. -o / 23 i J. /c C D,<>. Hsecputee ~ qvsytrig o ' 2.k. Ys/G /.n?$ - J ~ o I ?. f. /</o Erv't.5 2 .C D/2 . TM<rf & urd'3 ws-/ rs /s, - o - o r 8 t 2.-l.;M. % f >..b7 3 -C ' 0 5 _E 4... ._ J < J O-.. Yl?ik/G V'A BLE. Gd? 'S 1 ystra/ fr/c - u u o 'Y.'/ V 4 / 1) ? J o / S(o j 3r/0 .[L*looseT~ O R Acdsn( fic n a qqy/ rrs o.t S~ l.wva,/ rris - a -v
- 2. 7 J< / o dDKs Ale h /h>cor F E c
y.ty,/ yr/c - C -o 3 l EV \\ L /t' . 2 E.1 ?e 1)S E To IE0 7 7 ~/ V (o i Vv4 / Fr/J - O. - o 3 ~ yes,/ rra - o - 0 :-, 29 J,/-2 Z E 8 /~tett isJ: e sufcJ iY \\ ,l ' '/VG j' Pa*/? - c - g g y / T3-/c - a -o V T y vt,,/ r.< 7 ; et c 9' 5o .5 / 9' //A Hec) s o.>; m /~'/~. yyy/ 77/6 - </ o L ? YYC f 73~s3 ci. o 2. E/ 5 /2. ItT0 f.d o c E' D O N E S /0 V/eLi'i~res) ~$kis'N"D Ej j, ( 2. ffc foc.,9 c &,, 73,, 3 r,- 'e // Ud o e t t: & d'3 s,/J .Z%~tj 7,v / y'.% <>co,v/,,, m /Jr.c.c h s :,/rg A t o c., IA- '/VG/f.b ~ff -- Q -Q;c ?V l r / 3 ~~ p} / 5 ('O [Cr :. 7-l l 1 .._]. i l ( 1 l 1 i i i 1 ,4 Pago 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ) 'g INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT MANUAL i f l CHAPTER 0500 i i HC 0535 - STATISTICAL DATA REPORTING (766 COMPUTER SYSTEMI i D535-01 PURPOSE The 766 computer-based information system has been developed to improve organizational effectiveness and efficiency in the areas of collection, processing, retrieval, analysis and management of inspection'related data. This data, a combination of statistical, planning and textuc1 information, is recorded on Forms NRC 766 and 766A. ] This chapter provides the instructions for the completion and handling ) of the Forms NRC 766 and 766A for the various statistical, planning j and textual data concerning inspection, investigation, inquiry, and ossociated enforcement actions conducted by the Office of Inspection l ond Enforcement. Th'e instruction also discusses the j responsibilities cf the appropriate persons for filling out the f&rms. { I D535-02 BACKGROUND The 766 System is a management tool used to e,apture, maintain and report statistical and planning data concerning inspection, investigation, inquiry activities, and associated enforcement acticns conducted by IE. l The data is captured via the Forms NRC 766 and HRC 766A and maintained un e computer disk file at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Computer Center. The 766 forms are used to' record basic statistical data concerning each inspection, investigation or inquiry, related Module Trackins information, violation statistics and the text related to each item of violation and deviation. The forms function as computer input forms and, accordingly, information must be recorded in strict compilance with certain conventions and criteria as discussed later in this chapter. Incomplete, inaccurate or illegible data entered on either form will result in the intro-duction of faulty data into 'the statistical data bese. The result of faulty data ulll be_ extra staffhours of regional inspector, and Region Computer Staff and headquarters personnel time to trace and correct the errors. D535-03 DBJECTIVES 031 General The System has been designed to record in one place pertinent manage-ment-oriented information for each inspection, investigation and inquiry of concern to management and includeu: Page 2 m. The number and types of inspections and investigations. ( b. The number and nature of Inspection findings with associated text of violation item and deviation. c. The action taken and by whom. d. The numbers and types of modules inspected and related statistics. e. Elapsed time statistics. 032 Minimirino Recetitive Daig The NRC 766 and 766A forms have been developed with the objective of minimizing the number of times inspection related data must be recorded der entry into computer based information systems. The basic 766 system serves as the primbry source of all statistical information relating to inspections, investigations, inquiries and enforcement. It also serves as the primary source of all text on items of violation and deviations. Data from the system is used to analrie various aspects of the inspection programs; answer inquiries from Congress, the*Commissien and other sources; provide part of the basis for budget requests; help in the analyses of enforcement cases; and provide requested data to licensees and contractors regarding the compliance records of licensees. Since this data base serves so many important purposes, it is important that data be entered completely and accurately. D535-04 DEFINITIONS - TYPE OF ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED (Columns 37/38) This section defines the types of activities (inspection, inquiry, investigation) listed in columns (37/38) of Form NRC 766. 041 Inspections a. Safetv (02) Construction, quality assurance, operational safety, radiological health and safety, environmental protection and. emergency planning inspections performed at prescrl' bed frequencies and in accordance with the procedures and instructions covering the routine inspection program as decribed in the IE Manual. Safeguards inspections (material accountability, plant security, etc.) and vendor inspections are not included here. Routine inspections are structured such that through one or more inspection visits over a period of time a complete review will be made of major activities authorized by a limited work authorization construction permit or license. For some ( cases the review may be completed in one inspection every year, every two years or every three years. In other cases portions of the review are made during each of several inspection visits made during a yearly period. Pc90 3 Frequently during a routine inspection visit, a review will' be made of the status of previously identified enforcement .( matters, reported incidents or abnormal occurrences and other matters identified for followup review. b. Incident (03) Unscheduled inspections performed as a result of an inc5 dent or reported by others as having occurred at a licensed facility or associated with some aspect of a Alcensee's ( activities, involving construction deficiencies, equipment-failures, exposure to radiation, release of radioactive matorials, loss of use of facility, property damage, a.ccidental criticality, contamination problems, loss or theft of material, transportation, and similar types of unusual or unforseen events. c. Enforcement (04) Nonroutine inspections performed for the exclusive purpose of j reviewing in a timely manner a licensee's corrective action or response to a significant item of violatior< identified during a previous inspection. Such inspections'may be performed prior to or subsequent to the issuance'of a notice j of inspection findings to the licensee. d. Menacement Audit (05) Comprehensive team inspections, scheduled as a result of i programm4 tic requirements or as a result of inspection findings which focus on the management aspects of facility licenses for purposes of ascertaining how the corporate entity, l l as an NRC licensee, is organized to effectively implement regulatory requirements as they relate to nuclear safety. a o. Hanseement Visit (06) Those periodic visits to faellities, performed es a result of programmatic requirements, the main purpose of which.ls to inform the licensee management of IE inspection practices.and methods. Such visits normally occur shortly after a utility has indicated to NRC that it ul11 or intends to apply for a construction permit and whenever the inspection responsibility shifts between various groups or branches in a Regional Offi.ce. The visits do not involve fact gathering activities. l Pogo 4 f. Sbeelal (07) (- Nonroutine inspections performed when it appears that significant regulatory requirements are not being fully complied with, or when potential safety items have been identified, the and prompt resolution of matter l'censee to assure continued safe operetions.is required by A speesel inspection may include the performance of supplemental inspection items. 1 g. _ Vendor (08) Inspection activities performed of those companies or organizations which comprise the architect-engineer, steam system supplier', and component supplier groupings nuclec,r j identified in the vendor program, or t vendor inspections the continuation of such facility. that might be conducted at a Ilcensed h. Noterial Control and Accountino (Matl Acetl (09) Inspections performed in the areas of material control and accounting and licensee measurement programs covering 'all components of muesurement used f or material accounting purposes. control und (Safeguards only) 1. Plant seevritv (10) Inspections per formed for physical protection of SNM of fixed sites i and of plants in which SNH is used for the purpose of protection against acts of industrial sabotage and thefts of SNM. j. Inven.torv Verifiention (11) Inspection performed to evaluate licensee programs for accounting of SNM and for the conducting of physical inventories in order to provide independent assurance that the licensee's program is diversion of SNM. capable of detecting losses or k. Shloment/Froort (12) P 1. Shipment (of SNM) Inspections performed of and SNM in-transit forin the area of physical protection against theft and sabotage.the purpose of protection { Pogs 5 2. Export tof SHM) l ( Inspections and independent verification to determine the element and isotopic content of all exports of SNM to a s s.u r e integrity,of such shipments and to ascertain whe,ther physical security requirements are being met. 1. lmoorts (of SNM) (13) Inspections and independent verifications to determine the gro,ss quantitles and integrity of import shipments of SNM to assure that the licensee, upon receipt of the shipment takes required setions. 042 I r.c u l e v (14) An inquiry is an activity wherein e minimum amount nf Investigative j technique (telephone,' correspondence, or in-office review of material) is used to determine if an i investigation, a routine or special inspection, or no action i s required as a result of (1) an allegation, complaint or report related to licensed facilities or materials, or meterials subject to licensing or (2) inaction by a recipient to an order issued by NRC (see NC1210 for further information). 043 Inye tication (15) An investigation is an activity conducted 'in response to a complaint, incident or an allegation to gather, correlate and evaluate material in depth for.the purpose of establishing the cause, nature, extent end particulars of a condition or occurrence; the status of compliance with Regulatory Requirements adequacy of actions being taken by a licensee; assistance needed by a licensee; and corrective actions i needed to minimize or preclude,such conditions or occurrences. An investigation for matters other than a complaint or allegation may be i j requested by IT HQ. 0535-10 INSTRUCTIONS - GENERAL l 101 Use of 766/766A Forms The 766/766A forms are designed so that when inspections of the same activity types are conducted, they can be recorded on the same form. If occh inspection action i s unique, a separate form 766/766A is propored. Whenever items of violation or deviation have been identified in the report to the IIcensee, a 766A form must be completed. f l 1 9 e 9 } ] Renort Numberine Pago 6' 102 Evstem "(, The numbering system for activities will be as follows: The combination of the dockat number and controlling identificat!on for each activity reported t report' number is the. system. o the 766 a. For each Ilcensee, investigation er fecility or inquii y conductedvendor the first inspection,- commence with the number 01 in each calendar year will j the year preceded by the and run consecutively througheut last two digits of first report for any.octivity related to a I the year, i.e., the
- licensen, vendor, appilcants etc., for 1981 will be 8101 and pkrticular the second report will be 8102, covers inspections, etc.
investigations andOne numbering systam inquiries. b. For persons other than licensees, inspection, investigation or applicants and vendors, report for each calendar year willwithin each regional office report number each j The.first such i the second report XXO2 (where XX reprern tcommence with Aumber XXO1, etc.), organizations may beregardless of the fact.that differentn s the year - 80, 81, individuals or Section 0535-153 and the subject of the 154). activity (see also { c. The revised 766/766A Forms minimite administrative } paperwork for inspeutoes. e i identical, inspections, whereInspectors may new enter results of several types of activity cunducted are { on a 3 ingle form. number must be issued for
- However, a separate each inspcetion.
report d. For " assist" inspections, the corresponding with the licensee (1ssueRegion responsible for complete and input the data on a 591 or letter) will taken tu coordinate with the Region holdi the 766 flie. Car.e must be a correct report number i ng the unique report number s given to the activity. license that for Only one j computer syttem each kctivity is allowed in the docket number will cause the record to b(dupilcate report numbers particular } involved in inspections of Ilcences e rejected). Regions of Use must coordinate on the report numbering swith mult!ple 30 ca example, a Region I license having authorized places ystem. For Region I and Region III requires to Region III for that Region 1 of use in number inspections conducted byessign a report Region III. thost F I i L 4 I 8 l Page 7 1 e. For inspections performed by a Resident inspector or a Performance Appraisal Team the regional effice in which the inspection was persormed will.be responsible-for assigning a Report Number and performing the 766 data entry functions. The 766/766A forms should be completed by the Resident Inspector or Perf0rmance Appraisal Team and sent to the appropriate restonal office'. I 103 Sobmittino Comoleted Forms l Compacted Forms NRC 766 and NRC 766A are to be reviewed by th6 Regional Information Systems Coordinator before being entered into the computer I systom. Completed forms should be entered into the computer on a j wookly basis. This will result in a quicker update to th.e 766 file ond therefore, more timely access to the dats. The Form is considered j complete when the Regional Office has entered data in all required l sections end: I q
- A Form NRC-591 is issued; or l
1 oA letter (report) har been sent to the licensee following an I inspection or investigation. I 104 Attachments to MC 0535 ) l j = l Enclosure A-Form NRC 766 EncIssure B - Form NRC 766A d 1 0535-15 PREPARING FORM NRC 766 FRONT SIDE'(Columns 1/15) l The superviser of the principc1 inspecter who is in direct charge of the inspection / investigation / inquiry is responsible for what appears on the Form NRC 766. Thoge' parts of the form completed by the regional office staff can be filled out by anyone in the regional office, i including the cler(cal staff. Nevertheless, the iddividual-in-eharge (the principal intpector. sanler resident) should' review the form or for correctness. The followlag are the 8tems on the NRC 766 fctm and l the instructions for completlent i 151 Identifvino Inf_ormstlon i The Licensee / Vendor Name, Principal Jnspector, Inspector (s) (for this i.nspection, etc J. and the Reviewer items et the top of the page tre to be filled in but the data is not esptured by the computer. This Opuce has been provided for regiona! office ute end the items are self-9Wplanattry. i Poge 8 152 Transaction Tvoe (Column 1) ( The four tr,ansaction types used to capture and~ maintain data in the 766 dato base ares 1
- Insert -- to add a new record to the data base
- Modtfy -- to alter information in the data base
- Delete -- to remove a record from the date base f
a Replace - to rewrite textual data in the data base Datolled instructions on these transactions are found in the Users I Guide. 153 Docket Number er.Jieense Number fBv-ProdtLL1 (Columns 2/14) I The appropriate 8 digit numeric Docket Number (e.g.,
- 03004960, I
05000341) or project number (00000476) for nondocketed fa'cilities is recorded for all activities involving reactors, special nuclear motorial, source and ' priority I naterial licensees. For materiel licenses other than priority I It is preferable that the appropriate 030XXXXX docket number be used; however, th2 By-Product License i Number can be recorded on the form and the corresponding' Docket l Number will be entered by the computer. l The License Number must be entired exactly as it appears on the license (include hyphens, leading zeros s'nd left justify). l Exemples: 45-00317-0IE l SUB-520 XSNM-453 Docket numbers for vendors and A/E's are the unique 999XXXXX number for occh. The docket num'oer to be recorded for a'nonlicense is 99'99000R, where R is the numeric region number (e.g., for Region I ,99990'001, Region II - 99990002, etc.). l The Docket Number is one of the key fields that uniquely defines the records in the system. Be extremely careful net to make l orrors in coding as a time consuming manual correction effort will result. iS4 keoo_rt Number (Columns 15/18) The oppf opriate 4 digit neuerGe (e.g.: 8101) Report Nomber should be recorded with the first I numerals for the calendar year and the second 2 numerals for the report. Refer te 0535+102 above for a more detailed explanetton of the report numbering requirements. Within each region the reports foe nonlicensee docket numbers (e.g., Region I 99990001) must be uniquely numbered, commencing with XX01 for <cacG calendar year, The Report Number is'ene of the key fields that uniquely defines the records in the system so be very careful not to mcke coding Qrrorse , Pago 9 155 Aloha Secuence Codes (A. B. C. D) (Column 19) ( When there is more than one inspectisn of the same type perfor.ned, the c1pha sequence codes are used in recording data of different dockets on the same form. When filling out the form, the inspector should pay spocial attentloa to the docket / license number, Columns 2914, inspection / investigation findings, Column 39, total number of violations and deviations, Columns 40-41, enforcement conference held, Column 42, report contain 2.790 information, Column 43, module trccking Information and on 766A, site related, Col 9mn 28. 156 Next Inseeetten Date foottonal) This date is supplied by the inspector after a material license inspection is performed. It is used by the MIS Coordinator to update tho material mester flie only. 157 _ Period of Inveiligation/Inseeetten (Columns 20/31) l If the effort began and ended on the stes date, entor this date in I both Columns (20/25) and ( 2 6/ 31 ). f a. From Date (Columns 20/25) Enter the date that the activity began in the format MMDDYY i including leading zeros (e.g., 010181, 1001813. If out-of-office direct effort was levolved, enter the date it bugan but do not include travel time. If no out-of-office effort, enter'the date in-office direct effort began. b. To Date (Columns 26/31) Enter the date that t'he activity ended in the formet MMDDYY including leading zeros (e.g., 011681, 100681). If out-of-office direct effort was involved, enter the date it 3 onded but do not include travel time. If not ou't-of-office, enter the date in-office effort ended. I 158 Inseection Performed Bv (Column 32) Check the appropriate box to indicate whether the inspection was l porformed by the regional office staff, a resident inspector or a performance appraisal team member. If an inspection is performed by o combination of any of the above persons or groups, then tt.e principal inspector should prepare the 766/766A forms. He should indicate the unique modules inspected and obtain a report number from j the 3ppropriate source. NOTE: Box Other has been added to j secomodate additional groups which perform inspections. Codes for i special inspection groups include: (4) combination inspectica by ragional staff and resident inspector (5) emergency preparedness, ,oppraisal team, (6) construction inspection team, (7) health / physics i oppraisal team. Other codes for additional special inspection groups will be furnished by Headquarters. { I ( l l j -Pogo 10 a 159 Organization Code of Recion/HQ Conductina Activity (Columns 33/35) i 1 "The organization code will be adapted from the NPS code Appendix B, j Chapter 0530 and will include the region, division and branch. o. Reelen (Celumn 33) 1 Enterithe hPS IE HQ/ Region Identification code for the Region' conducting the activity, whether or not the facility listed in Columns 2/14 is in that region. b. Dlvision (Column 34) q For the division code. enter the HPS first organlaaticnal subdivision with IE KQ/ Region code, c. Branch (Column 35) For the branch cods, enter the MPS second organizational subd5vis)on with IE HQ/ Region code. 1510 Recionel Action (Column 36) For inspections and i investigations record the completing action by checking the appropriate box. Leave blank if report sent to HQ for oc.tlen. 1511 Tvoe of Activitv Conducted (CoJumns 37/38) Check only one box. (See Sections 041-043 for definitions.) 151? Inseeeti~n/ Investigation Findincy (Column 39) ] o For inspections and i investigations check only one box to record the appropriate findings. If there are no items of violation, the inspection should be checked as Clear (Eox 1). 1513 Total Humber of Violations and Deviation (Column 40/4'i) Record the number of cited items of Violation and Deviation for the docket in the letter to the licensee. 1514 Enforce 3ent Conference Held (Column 42) Indicate by checking this box whether an enforcement conference was port of the inspection. If the purpose of the activity was for enforcement the Type of Activity, Columns 37/38, box 04 should be chocked along with this box, if appilcable. ~ 1515 Reoort Contain 2.790 Information (Column 43) This column should be checked only when there is a text within the report that has been' marked as " exempt". 4 ) 1 Pogo 11 1516 lettee or Rece_r_t Transmittal Date (Columns 44/55) ( Tha Report Transmitted Date wust be greater To Datn (Columns 26/31). th4n or equal to the m. NRC Form <591 or Recional letter _Jssued (Columns 44/49) Enter the date that tha letter or Form 591 was sent to the licensee by the regional oftlte in the format MMDDYY including leading zeros (e.g.,'020181, 110181). 8 b. Fecort sent to llo for Action (Columns 50/55) i Report Sent to Headquarters for Action 'o not enter D information in this eclemn unitss the report is sent toany Headquarters for enforcement action or, for en inquiry. Enter the date in the format MMDDYY including leading zeros (e.g., 020181), 0535-16 FREPARING MODULE DATA The follewing programs are currently modularized and the appropriate modele numbers should be used for module numbers. reporting purposes instead of dummy MC-2500 Reactor Incpection Program ~2510 Light Water Reactors -2520 HTGR -2540 Research Reactors (Effective 01/01/77) MC-2600 Fuel C'cle' Facility Inspection Program y -2610 Reprocessing Facilitias -2620 P l u t o r, I u n, F a c i l i t i e s -2640 Uranium Facilities -2650 UF-s Conversion Facilities -2660 Uranium Mill.s -2670 Fuel Receluing & Sto'rege Facility -2680 Fuel Facility Safeguards 1.nspection program MC-2700 Licensee Contractor & Vendor Inspection Program -2710 Nuclear Steam System Suppliers -2720 Architect Engineering Firms -2730 Independent Suppliers -2740 Third Party Inspection Organizations MC-2800 Katselais Inspe,ction Program -2820 Processors and Distributors -2830 Radiography -2840 Haste Disposal -2850 Industrial, Academic, Environmental, Source haterial end SHM (other l than Fuel Cycle Facilities covered by MC 26XX series), '0ther specific Ilcenses -2860 Medical -2870 Shipping Casksi Transportation PcDo 12 This part of the form has byer, developed to provide a vehicle for the recording and collection of basic data concerning the st'atus of the ( Inspection program as applied to each Individual facility. The data recorded on Form NRC 766 will be stored in tha 766 file for future reforence and analysis. Tho Module Inforsaation part of the form will also be used to relate all cited items of violation listed in enforcement correspondence to a spocific procedure (module) or a programmatic function or activity (dummy af.dule) as discussed in Enclosure C. In oli instances where vloistion is listed a module number must be rocorded on the form. Tho use of this forr wil'1 require that, for each inspection performed, the inspector record: o. What modules were inspected, b. What modules were completed, I i c. What modults were left open2 d. How much of each module has been (cumulative) inspected (*), erd 4 o. How much time nas spent. f f. Priority ranking of each Inspection Procedure Do not code vloistion against modules which are intended to inform the ( licensee of 6cr programs, summarize inspection results (such as 30702, j 30705, 30800) or followup on actions or events for which violation j would be charged to en intpection module. Indicate which module, other than the three types specifi'ed above, was in violation. 161 form Processina The Module Information portion of the Form NRC 766 provides for the recording of information on each module inspected and relates it to the inspection trip and report. For each module number entered on the form, the status, the percent complete, and the professional stoffhoors expended art; recorded. A specific module must be listed on the 764 whenever any time has been expended on it during the inspection. The cpecific data elements present on the form are to be completed as follows: 162 Record Tvec B t o o l umt. 1) Tha "B" show1d be entered in col.umn one to indicate a module record. s 2 Page 13 i 163 Record Number (Columns 2/3) ( Tho record number Ic the numerical sequence in which data is stored i in the file and must be supplied by the MIS Coordinator. I 164 Nedule Number (Columns 4/10) The seven-digit number assigned to this inspection module. The mod 9le number it composed of four parts: Phase, Manual Chapter, Procedures, and Level of Effort, for a total of seven positions. Phase (Column 4) A number from 0 to 7 indicating the p,hase of the module arsigned by the Manual Chapter. Phases 1 to 7 are LWR pnases and Phase 0 is for dummy modules: Phase 0 Dummy Module (see enclosure C, page 21) = Phase 1 = Pre-CP Phase 2 = Construction Phase 3 Pre-Operation = Phase 4 = Startup and Power Ascension Phase 5 Operation = Phase 6 = Decommission Phase 7 = Major Modification Work B. Manuel Cheeter/ Procedure Number (Columns 5/10) The five digit number from the I&E Manual which identifies the discrete inspection manual chapter and procedure being documented. Level of Effort - The one alpha chabacter corresponding to the A, B, or C level of effort to be expended. This may not be applicable for various modules. NOTE: A module number may be entered on the individual 766 i form only once. The recording of a module number more { than once is not valid except in the case of module number 92701B. C. Erioritv (Column 12) For the construction pregram enter the priority ranking from MC 2512 using arable symbols (either 1, 2, or 3). For all other programs leave blank. D. Direct Inseerften Effort in Staffhours Excended This Insoection (Columns 13/15) For each module listed indica,te the total professional staffhours of direct inspection effort expended on completion of the line items in this module during the period covered in this report by all inspectors who participated. Only WHOLE e + e Pego 14 HOURS are recorded. The system does not accept tenths of hours. Therefore, for any inspection involving two or more 't modules it may be necessary to show 0 hours for some modules on the 766 form so as not to distort the distribution of time i spent on modules or to inflate the total time actually spent on the inspection. For example, if the total site time is in the order of 1 or 2 hours, the 15 or 20 minutes spent on 30703 should not be rounded up to I hour. A distorted picture of the inspection could result. The following guidance is suggested to prevent introduction of misleading site (Direct Inspection Effort) hours into the 766 system. Record 0 hours against 30703 If the total man-hours of direct inspection effort for an inspection is less than (a) 2 hours, or (b) 4 hours and less than 1/2 hour is spent on 30703. The total inspection time should be recorded against the major inspection module used. The regional staff,will have to exercise judgement on other variations, such as use of 9xxxx modules and different combinations of program inspection and exit interview time', in order to maintain a correct balance of recording time against codules so as not to exceed the total time actually spent conducting an inspection. The only staffhours to be reported here are as follows: 1. Out of Office Inspection Effort, which includes onsite and offsite inspection effort, and 2. In Office Inspection Efforts which includes the inspec-i tion of licensee records; fact gathering activities which are more efficiently performed in the office than at the licensee's facilit and inspec, tion process,y; an extension of the field but performed in the office. Only the time actually required to complete inspection of the line items contained within a speelfle module should be In the event problems or potential attributed to that module. problems are identified during the completion of a module, the time evpended in resolving the problem should be attributed to the appropriate fo110w-up module 92701B. NOTE 2 Direct inspection effort does not include preparation for en inspections documentation of and reporting the results nf the inspection; preparation of regular and enforcement correspondence; or travel to and from the site. E. Percentece Con'eleted to Date (Columns 16/18) For each module listed, the percent complete is a judgement on the part of the inspector reflecting the amount of effort i expended es a percent of the total effort to be eventually required as defined by the Manual. (In instances where all the individual line because of the nonexistence ofitems of a procedure cannot be accomp.lished referenced systems, components. s l Pogs 15 reports, etc., then the percent of total effort should be be based,on what is appilcable at that. facility.) ( percent should be rounded,in multiples of 10, The cumulative to date. For example, and must be 70% complete the first time it was if a module was reported the module status form documentingremaining 30% was co j { inspection, then would show a total the second inspection of 100% i.e., complete at the time of the report. the actual total percent 100% is the maximum entry. Computation for Determining % Complete L Total Staffhours Expended Through Current i the total I Inspection, over estimated staffhours needed to complete module, times 100 equals the parcent. j i NOTE: \\ for Moaula 30703,Do not enter Percent Complete or Status on' Form 7 mndules in the 92XXX, 93XXX and 94XXX s e r i e's, or modules designated "When Required". j F. Status (Column 19) { For each module listed, Indicate the appropriate status code, as follows: ( { Blank = Open: Leave open, this module is to be inspected } l further on a subsequent inspection. C = Closed: If all line items for an inspected, then the module inspection have been situations when a should be closed. are other (Note there module should be closed.) L = Reopen and Le;vo Open: This code is used in c' eses where The inspector closed module and now wantsis able to do additional work on a previously it left open indefinitely. By using the L code, the module is reopened and left open indefinitely or until the inspector decides to close later. it P= Reopen for this Transaction Only: a manner This code is used in similar to the L code above, closed previously will be reopened to receive additi except that a module staffhours or one occasion only,a revised percent complete estimate foronal and will then be closed. this E e Pogo 16 l G.. Modules reeuirine followun (Columns 20/26) '(, When a problem or potential problem is identified by the inspector in resolving the problem or' potential' problem sh expended be attributed to Module-92701B ould Identified Problem). problem or potential problemThe module being(Follow-up on Inspecto inspected when the is in the column " Module Req. identified should be recorded Follow-up". follow-up should be documented on a separate liEach module requiring module information portion of the 766 form. ne on the H. Buldance for use of Module 92701 Any' time spent ~ following up on what are normally referred to as " unresolved items", identified during accomplishment of aor other time spent on resolv[ problems module should be reported under specific 92701 module licted as requiring follow-up. with the appropriate the review of log books specified As an example, during in 71710 - Review of Plant operations, the inspector inoperable control may infer that the number technical specifications. rods exceeds the limit specified of 7he in inspection effort on the controltime expended for follow-up under 92701 wi th 71710 listed on rod problem is reported requiring follow-up. form 766 as the module-In contrast, unrelated to the module (s)a situation'may arise'which is totally ^ being inspected. As if during the conduct of the inspection procedurean example, explosion occurred j inspection time expended forin the OFF-GAS system 71710, an the at a BWR the
- facility, t
unplannad event will be charged agtinstfollow-up or this { signift: ant event that occurs during 93701 - follow-up on i the inspec-tion procedure inspection. Conduct of 71710 identification of the " problem". in.no way leads to the 1 1 i l I i i B l l l Pogo 17 1. Guidance for use of " Independent Insoeetion Effort" Reoorted under Module 92706. I. As stated in Section III of the procedures for this module, the deft.ned inspection requirements contained in the manual are to c.pnstitute 80% of the allotted onsite inspection effort. Twenty percent of the inspection effort'is available to the inspector for activities outside the defined inspection program. "Outside" the defined inspection program means that the activity exceeds the frequency, scope, sample size, etc., j j prescribed in other modules. For example if the inspector examines aspects of core physics, fire protection, training, j welding, modifications, etc... which are not included in the inspection procedures, the time would be charged against module 92706. Likewise, any violation identified by the inspector i during the additional inspection effort would be coded against Module 92706. i 0535-17 PREPARING FORM NRC - 766A (Columns 27/28) 1 71 IdentIfvino Information The docket /11 cense, Report, Sequence and the module number must i i be ontered on the form 766A. These elements are the link between } the 766 form and the 766A form. (The 766A form is to be used 2n12 I when a deviation or violation occurs.) i 172 Vfelation Severity or Deviation 766A (Column 27) '1 l A. Violation Severitv (Column 27) Enter the severity level assigned to the violation item for those violations identified in the enforcement letter or on j a Form NRC 591. See 45RF66754 for information on the coding ) of severity levels. Where a modular inspection program is In effect, i.e., inspection procedures have been defined in I the IE Manual, the severity should be entered on the line with the corresponding Module that was being inspected at ) the time the violation was uncovered. i If inspection procedures have not been established (see Section 0535-16 for modularized programs), a dummy module j must be entered (See Enclosure C for the module number and Instructions?. Enter any dummy module. violation severity relating to the 1 l i l i l Pogo 18 B. Deviation (Column 27) h When a licensee does not conform to commitments to the Commission, or to the provisions of guides, codes and j standards or to acceptable practices which were ) approved by j the Commission and made available to the licensee and such lack of conformity does not constitute a violation, j then it j is referred to as a " deviation". A "D" is entered in Column 27 whenever a deviation has been found. The actual i i deviation code should be placed in the first five positions ) of the deviation text. (See Section 174, Text, for more details about the textual information.) j \\ 173 Site Related (Column 28) In some instances, during an inspection trip at a multi-unit power rocetor station, a specific item of violation or deviation is found that does lead to a citatJon against more than one unit at that station. Whon the above situation occurs 1. Enter "S" in the box entitled Site Related (beginning with Box A) on 766A form for one unit only. 2. On each additional unit at that same site, enter "A" in the cucceeding boxes entitled Site Related. NOTE: Eremole 1. During an inspection at the Dresden site a violation or deviation is identified which is charged to units 1, 2, 3. On the form 766A for Dresden i enter "S" in box A, entitled Site Related. On the form 766A for Dresden 2 enter "A" in box B, entitled Site Related. On the form 766A for Dresden 3 enter "A" in box C, entitled Site Related. NOTE: Examole 2. During an inspection at the Harris site, a violation or deviation is identified which is charged to units 2 and 3, but not 1 and 4. ~ I Pogo 19 j On the form 766A for Harris 2 enter "S" in box A, entitled Site I Related. ( i On the form 766A for Harris 3 enter "A" in box B, entitled Site Related. 174 Tewt (Columns 2/51) For each violation or deviation begin the text with the statement l " Contrary To" and specify the specific guide or standard that the text refers. Provisions have been made for capturing up to 2400 J characters of text of violation and deviation items. Should the cetual text of the item, in appearing in either the enforcement lotter or the report details, exceed this number it will be necessary to paraphrase the item to keep within 2400 characters. Nothing procludes paraphrasing all such items, but it should be recognized l thet the wording will be used verbatim as the input to the Enforcement Status of the " Rainbow" books. O. Violation Each violation must be described in detail to include the appilcable requirement and the factual information that demonstrates that a violation existed. (The requirement should be referenced, not described. If c3ted, this item should appear essentially as it appeared in the enforcement letter to the licensee. The text should be developed in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 1000. If the violation is associated with a NRC Form 591, the text is to be the statement of the vloistion as it appears in the NRC Form 591. For example, the text of a eltation for failure to post a radiation area would be " Rooms or areas were not properly posted to indicate the presence of a radiation area." b. Deviation Each deviation must be described in detail to include the item not compiled with and the factual information that demonstrates that a deviation existed. The first five positions in the text should contain the deviation code. In general, the appilcable commitment, code, guide, standard or acceptable practice should be referenced, not described. Usually, the reference must be specific. In some cases, in order to clarify the applicable commitment, code, Dulde or standard, it may be necessary to provide a brief description in addition to the reference. This item should appear essentially as it appeared in the letter to the licensee. The text should be developed in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 1000, Manual Chapter 1005, Section 1005.25. Pogo 20 0535-80. PREPARING FORMS NRC 766 and 766A FOR 766 MASTER FILE CHANGE . i _ f,' ' 801 General Once a' record has been created on the 766 Master File, i e., the Form 766 and Form 766A have been processed and the data entered into the esoputer system, modifications to the record for that inspection, inquiry or investigation are made through the use of the same forms (NRC766, 766A) used to originally create the record. 802 Resoonsibilltv As the regions accept the responsibility for their own 766 data entry cnd pre-edit processing they ulll also be responsible for the accuracy of the 766 Master File. This ulil require the use of Forms NRC 766 and 766A to delete and modify the 766 Master File data. 1 j 1 '1 i l I l = l l l' t I Pogo 21 ENCLOSURE C (REVISION II) 1 (- DUMMY MODULES (PROCEDURE) NUMBERS Uso of these modules, in the absence of an appropriate procedure number for those programs currently modularized, is required for each inspection and investigation (see Section 171 for a list of asdularized programs). The purpose of the dummy module. number is to provide a record of the direct inspection effort and related violation associated with those specific (or general) programmatic functions or activities conducted by IE which are not presently nodularized, l The modules are to be used for all activities whether clear or not cloor. For each dummy module entered.on the 766 Form, record the hours of direct inspection effort and any vloistion according to the Instructions under MC 0535 Sections 163. The use of these modules l will enable the field inspection staff to further define the nature of.the various activities. The Phase in the Module Number Inspected i field must always contain a zero (0) when a " dummy" module number is being used. List of "Dummv" Modules f Module Identifleation Module Number (Includino Phase) { i Abnormal Occurrence 099001 1 Emergency Planning 099002 l Environmental Protection 099005 i General Health & Safety 099004 Material Control & Ace't 099005 Nuclear Safety 099006 Plant Security 099007 Radiological Protection 099008 Roactor Construction 099009 Reactor Safety 099010 Transportation 099011 LWR's Under Construction (to be deleted) 099012 l LWR's Being Decommissioned 099015 l Investigations 099014 l 3 Mile Island Inspections Per Sandia Study 099015 l Test & Startup (Region II) 099016 Vondor Inspection 099017 l HTGR - Power Ascension Phase (Region IV) 099018 Possibility Study of Independent NDE 099019 Construction Deficiency Reporting - 50.55(E) 099020 Systomatic Assessment of Licensee Performance 099021 l ~,; .'For nodularizod programs Page 22 cedularized programs) (see Section (choptersforalltypesofreportableuse the appilcable proc thot have been established in the 9200. 9300 and 9400 (modules) unplanned activities. modularized use the " dummy" modules.For all other, noncoutine and programs that are not Uso of these codes is on an of inspection requirements interim basis pending into the IE manual. incorporation t i i. t
- f
\\ R I B w ' l: f 4.s-a .11 .\\ 4 7 A l !\\ f.' b k ,,' A y s 1 ) ( 1s Wnb/ ~ M 4 ~ tu.tSed M l~7
- M 1'
i ~ <{ hqd [ y@ e 4 O e' M AC 4 iL i \\ r b O b7 N Eb kdi 9-Q sA 8 ) b, x WW Pre-d,'a o. M -ta,.A c -w h k Q. y.y) i.< 1 1 F \\ i. 8 s* \\ k i 'f i Of}}