ML20237J415
| ML20237J415 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1987 |
| From: | Croley B, Humenansky D, Stock F SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237J375 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708180170 | |
| Download: ML20237J415 (28) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:__ -_ i ', .l EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM (EXPANDED ASRTP) EVALUATION. OF THE-l MAIN-STEAM' SYSTEM SUBMITTED BY: DATE: 9-I'87 FRANK STOCK TEAM LEADER W DATE: ['l-f~/ CONCURRENCE: we VlD HUMENANSKY [ EXPANDED ASR1P PROGRAM ANAGER CONCURRENCE: DATE: / / B(IB CROLEY DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR TECHNI AL~ SERVICES i L B708100170 070810 ' ' ~ l DR ADOCK 05000312 PDR WP34258/D-0183B t
LI,- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Number
1.0 INTRODUCTION
3' 2.0 PURPOSE 14 1 3.0 SCOPE-5 2 4.0L OVERALL'RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 6 i.. 5.0 DETAILED OBSERVATIONS - REQUESTS FOR'INFORMATION 9-6.0 ATTACHMENTS 10 6-6.1 ' List of Reviewed Documents 6.2 ' Status of RIs [ \\ a !
(__-- i er ' j q EXPANDED AUGMENTED SYSTEM REVIEW AND TEST PROGRAM { EVALUATION OF THE MAIN STLAM SYSTEM t
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Rancho Seco Ixpanded. Augmented System Review and Test Program j [ASRTP] evaluation effort involves an assessment of the effectiveness of the System Review and Test Program (SRTP] and an ) analysis of the adequacy of ongoing programs to ensure that systems will continue to function properly after restart. The Expanded J ASRTP is a detailed system by system review of the SRTP as implemented on 33 selected systems and an in-depth review of the engineering, modification, maintenance, operations, surveillance, inservice testing, and quality programs. It also conducts a review, on a sarry'.ing basis, of many of the numerous ongoing verification and reviaw programs at Rancho Seco. Six multi-disciplined teams composed of knowledgeable and experienced personnel are tasked with performing the Expanded j ASRTP. Each multi-disciplined team consists of dedicated personnel with appropriate backgrounds to evaluate the operations, maintenance, engineering, and design functional areas. Independence, perspective, and industry standards provided by team members with consultants, architect engineer and vendor backgrounds are joined with the necific plant knowigdge of SMUD team members. Each team performs an evaluation on a selected system using the same fundamental evaluation techniques employed by the NRC in the ASRTP inspection. System Status Reports are used as the primary source of leads for the teams. They are augmented with references to available source and design bases documents as needed. Team synergism and communication is emphasized during the process in order to enhance the evaluation. Each team prepares a final report for each completed selected systert evaluated. This report is for the main steam systerr. I b L l i l i i
2.0 PURPOSE The objectives of the Expanded ASRTP evaluation are to (1) assess the adequacy of activities and systems in sLpport of restart and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of established programs for ensuring safety during plant operation after restart. \\ 1
c 3.0 SCOPE To accomplish the first objective, the steam plant team evaluated the main steam system to determine whether: 1. The system was capable of performing the safety functions required by its design bases'. 2. Testing was adequate to demonstrate that the system would perform all of the safety functions required. 3. System maintenance (with emphasis on Dumps and valves) was adequate to ensure system operability under postulated accident conditions. 4. Operator and maintenance technician training was adequate to ensure proper operations and maintenance of the system. 5. Human factors relative to the system and the system's supporting procedures were adequate to ensure pr,oper system operations under normal and accident conditions. To accomplish the second objective, the steam plant team reviewed the programs as implemented for the main steam system in the ? following functional areas: 1. Systems Design and Change Cpntrol 2. Maintenance 3. Operations and Training 4. Surveillance and Inservice Testing 5. Quality Assurance 6. Engineering Programs The steam plant team reviewed a number of documents in preparation for and during the Expanded ASRTP evaluation of the main steam system. This list of documents is found in Attachment 1. The primary source of leads for the team were the problems l identified in the Main Steam System Status Report. Various source documents such as the USAR and Technical Specifications and j available design bases documents were reviewed as needed to augment the information needdd by the team. The evaluation of the main steam system included a review of pertinent portions of support systems that must be functional in order for the main steam system to meet its design objectives. J
r 4.0 OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS The more significant issues identified pertaining to the adequacy of the SRTP and the effectiveness of programs to ensure continued safe operations after restart are summarized below. The summary focuses on the weaknesses identified during the evaluation. Section 5.0 provides detailed findings by providing the Request for Information (RI) forms that are used by the Expanded ASRTP teams to identify l potential concerns during the evaluation. The numbers in brackets af ter each individual summary refer to the corresponding RIs in Section 5.0. 4.1 Design and Engineering 4.1.1 A system walkdown revealed that the current atmospheric dump valve (ADV) and turbire bypass valve (TBV) configurations c l did not adequately provide for thermal expansion and valve movement during operation. Specific deficiencies were noted with respect to: inadequate lengths of flexible hosing possible interference with conduit and nearby structures inaccessibility to a handwheel operator on an ADV instrument air tubing which will move, and possibly fracture, during valve operation. [RI 19] [RI 97] I Since these deficiencies pertain to a number of ADV and TBV's in the plant, the potential for loss of operability of s or2 or more of these valves is apparent. 4.1. 2 The USAR, system design bases document, and the applicable surveillance procedure do not utilize the same acceptance criteria with respect to the main steam line break analysis and closure time for turbine-throttle stop valves. The surveillance procedure utilizes a value approximately 15 times greater than that contained in the USAR t therefore 4 does not verify that the acceptance criteria contained in the USAR with respect to the accident analysis are valid. This inconsistency was identified in NCR-5576, and later voided by memo, however the explanations provided did not address increased OTSG blowdown. It appears as though this analysis should be reevaluated. [RI 15] i 4 _A
{!.' OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued) 4.1.3 A review of the System Design Basis, Revision 1 (Draf t), I indicated that main steam is no longer addressed as a secondary source of steam to the gland seal steam (GSS) system via the auxiliary steam header. 4 i A review of'the related P& ids, line designation sheets, and' the Master Equipment List (MEL) identified the fact that main steam, at 900 psig, can enter the auxiliary steam header if MSS-035 is open. Since there is no pressure relief valve or no pressure reducing valve downstream of the MSS valve, this could result in a pipe rupture or component failure resulting in a loss of the ASC header and valves, and plant auxiliaries. [RI.46] 4.1. 4 The System Status Report identifies four (4) problems related to the performance and reliability of the MSSV acoustic monitors. An inspection of the system design,. installation, and test requirements indicates that the poor reliability and performance may.be the result of; excessive lengths of cab a which are unsupported or not run in conduit for all 18 valves bare signal cable strapped to the relief pipe for ( e 3 valves calibration procedures which do not provide for e performance evaluation The performance and reliability of the MSSV acoustic monitors is necessary as a means for the monitoring of radioactive releases in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix A, Criterion 64. [RI 10] 4.1.5 In response to SSR Problem #10, the installation of the backup instrument air supply was evaluated. The latest calculations for the backup instrument air supply contained inaccurate assumptions regarding air consumption and bottle depletion rates. In addition, the corresponding special test pr ocedure which is to be utilized for verifying the calculation data and alarm setpoints references an earlier revision of those calculations. This same surveillance test procedure is also intended to verify the identified bottle depletion rates and actual air I consumption rates, however, the test is performed in a cold condition without steam flow. The amount of air consumed by the valve positioner will actually' be greater when hot and with steam flow present since the valve will require more force to stroke. Therefore the special test procedure is not adequate for verifying b'ottle depletion rates and air consumption,[without some additional testing being performed. RI 37] [RI 47] 2
OVERALL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS (Continued) 4.2-Progransnatic 4.2.1 Several instances were noted in which equipment / components had not been installed in accordance with vendor recommendations / instructions. [RI 10] [RI 66] [RI 14] 1 \\ { l ( l. a
5.0 DETAILED OBSERVATIONS - REQUEST FOR-INFORMATION During an evaluation, all potential concerns are' documented on Request for Information sheets (RIs) that are sent to the responsible organization to receive their input concerning the potential' concern. RIs are also used to request information that the EASRTP team'is having difficulty obtaining. These RIs are considered drafts throughout the entire evaluation until they become part of the final-report. Responsible organizations can accept the potential concern as valid or they may j disagree with the potential concern. If they disagree, they can submit information that convinces the EASRTP teant members that the potential' concern is not valid, or they may redirect the EASRTP members to better focus--the concern. RIs developed during the system evaluation comprise this section of the report. ' Attachment 2 of the report provides RI status as of this report date. ' An RI is considered closed if the Team Leader was convinced a-potential concern was not valid or not significant enough to be'an RI. An RI would also be closed if requested information was provided. All other RIs are open. Acknowledged RIs are open RIs that have been accepted as valid by the responsible organization. Approximately one week will be provided after the report is issued to provide time for departments to address each RI for validity. A k revision to Attachment 2 will then be issued to reflect the status of RIs. All RIs not acknowledged at thg end of this period will have an "Open" status. RIs are then transferred into the Restart Scope List tracking system for resolution and corrective action . implementation. I l _g. _~
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 010 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-20-87
SUBJECT:
MSSV ACOUSTIC MONITORS . DEPARTMENT: SYSTEM ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: JOHN ITTNER TEAM MEMBER: T. LOVETT TEAM LEADER: F. STOCK E. ORTEGA i POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION: The design and installation of the acoustic monitors does not provide a reliable means for complying with requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 64, with respect to " monitoring of radioactive releases." The ' SSR identified 4 problems relating to the acoustic monitors. The following items have been identified with respect to the above and capabilities for monitoring offsite dose releases. a) Visual inspection of the signal cable installation l. Bare signal cable strapped to relief pipe could affect the transmission of the signal itself due to temperature and grounding considerations. 2. Excessive lengths of cable are coiled and left s unsupported. This could introduce unnecessary signals due 1 to pipe or wind motion. 3. The existing installation, in about half the cases, does not meet the manufacturer's recommendation stated in TEC Technical Manual (30120-0M-01), Section 2, " Sensor Cabling." This requires that these cables be supported or run in conduit, b) Review of related calibration and test procedures, did not provide for specified calibration frequencies or methods to provfde for performance evaluation. 4 I i 1, -__m_.___.______..___ _._-.J
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 014 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-21-87
SUBJECT:
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN 0.P., A.6. A.46 AND A.53 PROCEDURES DEPARTMENT: OPERATIONS COORDINATOR: R. MACIAS TEAM MEMBER: HARLAN COOMES TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK i PROCEDURES REFERENCED: 0.P. A.6, Steam. Generator Secondary Side System, Revision 26 0.P. A 46 Main Turbine System, Revision 20 0.P. A.53 Extraction Steam, Reheater and Feedwater Drain System, Revision 20 Concern The MSR main steam coil could be subjected to uneven heatup and possible tube. bundle failure. The procedures and valve line ups used in the present configuration are not in conformance with Westinghouse recommendations for MSR main steam coil isolation, evacuation and startup. ( The Westinghouse recommendations in I.L.137p-1482, Rev.1, state: 1) " Positive isolation of the high pressure tube bundles from j heating steam must be assured until the turbine generator j reaches the specified load for reheater acti<ation. A leak off valve must be located downstream from the main steam shut-off valve to prevent leakage through the control valve during the startup operation." i 2) "It is necessary to evaluate the non-condensibles from the tube bundles prior to the admission of steam in order to warm the tubes evenly." 3) " Controlled admission of heating steam to the high pressure tube bundle is required in order to avoid excessive thermal shock." 'l 4) " Venting of 2% of the heating steam entering each tube bundle must be vented through the vent condenser over all operating conditions." " Failure to provide this positive isolation system can result in premature and uneven heating of the tubes with subsequent tube bowing and tube failures." ; l I -i_________________
RI NO: 014 (Continued) The valve line up in A.53 is used as a prerequisite for performing Section 4.2 of A.46. The valve line ups in A.53 and A.6 conflict with the desired initial position of valves manipulated in A.46, Section 4.2. The MSR main steam coil purge block valves, main steam coil regulator block valves and the main steam coil 1" purge valves are required to be open per the normal valve line up. A.46 directs opening of these valves in the procedure. This will result in steam being admitted to the MSR main steam coil when it is not desired. The condenser leakof f lines are closed in the valve line up and A.46 directs closing these valves. The valves should be open during heat up to prevent steam inleakage to the main steam coil. The main steam coil vents to condenser are closed and should be open to provide tube bundle evacuation during heat up. I ocedures A.46 and A.53 do not direct manipulation of the main steam coil vents. 5 \\ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO:: 015 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-22-87 i
SUBJECT:
MAIN TURBINE T'4ROTTLE/STOP VALVES STROKE TIMES DEPARTMENT: SYSTEM ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: J. ITTNER TEAM MEMBER: _ TIM LOVET) TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK POTENTIAL CONCEitN/00ESTION: The USAR main steam line break analysis may be a non-conservative assumption that does not reflect the actual closing time of the turbine throttle stop valves. The assumptions used in the USAR steam line failure. analysis have not been verified by the surveillance procedure, nor is the USAR analysis consistent with the surveillance procedure and the System Design Bases Manual, NEPM 5444. Section 14.2.2.1 of the USAR steam line failure analysis assumes that turbine throttle stop valves close within 0.5 seconds after receiving a trip signal. NEPM 5444', System Design Basis, page 9, states " Turbine stop valves have minimum and maximum closing time of 0.20 and 0.30 seconds respectively. The stop valve closing times used in the steam line break analysis is 0.25 seconds." Section 10.3.1 of the USAR states ( that 0.25 seconds is the closing time used in the steam line break accident analysis and also states that the closing time during normal g operation is 0.20 seconds minimum to 0.30 seconds maximum. The surveillance procedure SP.210.03C, " Turbine Throttle Stop Valves Fail Test," lists as an acceptance _ criteria, "The turbine throttle stop valves shall move from open to closed in three seconds or less." The discrepancy between the value used in the USAR accident analysis and the SP acceptance criteria was addressed in NCR S5576. This NCR was later voided by memo SRT 86-154. The memo states that the three second ~ acceptance criteria "will be maintained as a conservative limit and check." The explanation given is " Excessive Flow through the High Pressure steam chest will peak at a value equivalent to over 400% of full Reactor Power. Since the closure time of the Turbine Throttle Stop Valves is affected by the Steam Flow Rate, this will have the effect of reducing the Throttle Stop Valve closing time." .. The Turbine Stop Valve closing time has, in fact, not been precisely measured," and "The existing surveillance does not model the USAR Analysis and that we will not be able to model the USAR Analysis via surveillance." The explanations for voiding the NCR 55576 are not supported by calculation Z-MSS-M0829 that shows that 6 seconds af ter the break, stearp flow has decreased to 112% of rated flow. The.400% of full reactor power steam flow noted in the' memo is used as a basis for the assumption that the closing time of the' Turbine Throttle 3 top Valves will be reduced by ] steam flow through the H.P. steam chest. { l
n_-_-_. R1 NO: 015 (Continued) The reasons for voiding NCR 55576 do not address the possible consequences of extending the blowdown time of both OTSGs. It appears i that a reevaluation of the discrepancies in the USAR, surveillance procedure and design bases for the throttle stop valve closing times is necessary. l a l l i O \\ l l 1 REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 019 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-22-87
SUBJECT:
. ADV & TBV INTERFERENCE CAUSED BY THERMAL EXPANSION DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: RON LAWRENCE TEAM MEMBER: WAYNE ADACHI TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION: During operation the valve movements could either damage the valve (s) or valve positioner or the instrument air tubing and could eventually render the valve inoperable. The existing MSS configuration does not' provide adequate movement clearances around the atmospheric dump valves (ADV) and turbine by-pass valves (TBV) caused by operational thermal expansion, design loads, flow loads and valve operation. For the ADVs, the following total movements occur from calculation l Z-MSS-M2055, Rev. 0: Inches 6 Valve No. aX AY aZ PV-20562A - 4.275 +.05 - 3.48-PV-205628 - 4.28 .039 - 3.487 PV-20562C - 4.297 .038 - 3.431 PV-20571A -.943 +.237 - 1.575 PV-20571B -.939 .087 - 1.594 PV-20571C -.939 .053 - 1.627 For the TBVs the following total movements occur:from calculation Z-MSS-M0430 Rev. 3, M0431 Rev. 4: Inches ( PV-20561 + 1.071 +.329 + 606 PV-20563 + .792 &.438- - + 655 PV-20564 + 1.452 &.231 - + 889 PV-20566 .97 +.653 + 997 PV-20571 A in train A has movements such that there is valve o } positioner interference with the newly installed conduit 710013 and l 710084 and conduit support #169. l PV-20562A in train B has 4.28" movements in the north direction and 0 has possible positioner interfe'rence with conduit support #182 when the valve opens and creates vibration of the valve. , j I
.i-w f1s RI N0;f 019 -(Continued)' All of the valves have-newly installed flexible stainless steel tubing. Some.of the flexible tubing.are installed such that the valve movements can stretch and damage the tubing. PV-20561. The:new flexible instrument air tubing.is mounted inside i i of a support and exists at right angles 'around a corner of the support. The braided tubing and the corner are about 1/2" apart. With approximately1one inch movement in the south direction, the braided tubing will contact'the support corner and the braided i tubing could become damaged. The two instrument air tubings to the. valve near the positioner cross over. The two tubes are close enough that they could make contact during pipe' vibration and result in tube damage. PV-20564. The two new instrument air flexible tubings to the TBV are installed with no tubing slack to account for the 1.452" movement in the south direction. The resulting movement could damage the' flexible tubing. l f,' i, \\ i -1. l l J ) l l i
il b /y J REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 037 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-24-87
SUBJECT:
CALCULATION AND VERIFICATION OF BACLUP INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: RON LAWRENCE TEAM MEMBER: WAYNE ADACHI TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION: The calculations and surveillance procedures utilized for design and test of backup instrument air supply do not contain proper assumptions and are not performed under conditions which will verify operability in accordance with specified requirements. The Design Basis Report for ECN-A5743, Rev. 6 specifies that a procedure will be performed to test the backup instrument air system gas bottle The supply in case of a, loss of the normal instrument air supply. following is to be performed: ~ "In addition to pressure integrity test, an STP will be written to verify the data used in the calculation No. 2-IAS-M2084 for air consumption / bottle depletion rate when -{ the ADV's are being' operated. Valve stroke time under system pressure should also be verifiedsas part of this test. The test should also verify the IDADS alarm upon degradation of the system pressure," STP.744, Rev. O, addresses the first two items, however the'IDADs alarm setpoint is not defined. Reference is made to calculation Z-IAS-M2084, Rev. O, which indicates pressure alarm setpoints for 3 hours (1200 psig) and 2 hours (750 psig) to go. STP.774 indicates a single alarm in each train (P-1775 for train A and P-1774 for train B). The calculation indicates that only one alarm is required, preferably the "2 hour to go" pressure setpoint. The test personnel have no way of determining _which value to use from this STP, Subsequently Rev. 2 of calculation Z-IAS-M2084 has been calculated for the "2 hour to go" pressure of 850 psig. The current STP does not reflect this change since it only references Rev. O of the calculation. A similar type of problem exii.? f or the Appendix "R" gas bottle where-the P-1780 alarm setpoint is not identified in the procedure and there is a difference in values from the referenced Rev. O and the subsequent l Rev. 2 of the calculation. 1 \\ 1 'l
RI NO: 0,_32 (Continued) In calculation Z-IAS-M2084 Rev. 2, sheet 7A, the volume of the valve modulation was calculated and the total volume accounted for only a single valve modulation in the train. Assumption D on page 3 incorrectly states that only one ADV is in service at'a time. In reality it is possible to have three valves per train in service at ihe same time. The calculation should be revised to ensure no invalid results have been utilized. \\ \\ t __.
'o REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 046 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-27-87
SUBJECT:
POTENTIAL FOR HIGH MSS PRESSURE TO ENTER LOW PRESSURE AUXILIARY STEAM HEADER DEPARTMENT: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: RON LAWRENCE TEAM MEMBER: WAYNE ADACHI TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK REFERENCES 1) P&ID M-530, sheet 3, Rev. 17
- 2) SMUD Rancho Seco Nuclear Generatiag Station, Systems Training Manual-Main Turbine-Chapter 16 and 16 c.
- 3) Main steam system design bases, Revision 1 (advance copy)
- 4) MEL for GSC and ASC 5)
Line designation. sheet no. 158, 162, 298 6) Piping Design Specification Rev. 9 7) P&IO M-537, sheet 3, Rev.13 4 POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION: The low oressure ASC header could be exposed to main steam pressures of l 900 psig, which is beyond the ASC component ratings. This can result in a pipe rupture or component f ailure causing a loss of plant auxiliaries g due to loss of the ASC header. Additional piping and component damage could also result from the energy release from the rupture or f ailure. The main steam at 900 psig (from Ref. 5) is normally supplied to the ASC through a pressure reducing Valve PV-36014A and/or PV-36014B (see Ref. 7) at a maximum of 250 psig. An alternate steam source, as identified in Ref. 2 and shown in Ref. 1, is through valve MSS-035 and line 30125-4"-EAI to the gland seal steam. MSS-035 is shown as'normally This is an error since the plant configuration is normally open. closed. However, with MSS-035 open, the 900 psig main steam can potentially enter the ASC header since there is no pressure reducing valve downstream of valve MSS-035. The Ref. 4 MEL sheets for the ASC header were reviewed for maximum pressure that would occur in the ASC valves. These valves are: VALVE MAX. PRESSURE (PSIG) ASC-470 500 ASC-587 500 ASC-603 500 ASC-601 500 i
1 R1 NO: 046 (Continued) Other, surrounding valves did not have a maximum pressure listed on the MEL. It is possible that with MSS-035 open, that the above ASC valves and,the ASC header will be exposed to the 900 psig main steam pressure, which is above tiie maximum pressure stated in the MEL. The Ref. 3 system design bases does not discuss this line. 0 ' I f \\ l I 'i !
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 047 SYSTEM CODE: MSS /IAS ISSUE DATE: 07-30-87
SUBJECT:
DESIGN BASIS TESTING OF BOTTLED AIR BACKUP FOR ADVs DEPARTMENT: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: JOHN ITTNER . TEAM MEMBER: TIM LOVETT TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK ~ ^ POTENTIAL CONCERN /0UESTION . STP-774, Rev. O will verify that the backup bottle system has CONCERN: the capacity to meet the design basis requirements for the valves in the cold condition with no steam flow, however it will.not verify adequate capacity for the' valves in actual operating condition. Since the valve requires more force to stroke when it is hot with steam flow present, the total amount of air consumed by the positioner will be greater. Therefore, STP-774 alone is inadequa-te to verify backup bottle system capacity. The Design Basis for the bottled air backup system for Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) and Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) includes a requirement that the bottled air backup systems provide the capability to " operate and control" the valves for 2 hours, for the EFIC or QA Class 1 backup S system, and 100 hours for the Appendix R or QA class 2 system. STP-774, Rev 0 is intended to verify that the backup bpttle system has sufficient capacity to meet the design basis. However, STP-774, Rev. O is performed with ADVs and TBVs cold with no steam flow.
T REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RI) RI NO: 066 SYSTEM CODE: MSS = ISSUE DATE: 07-29-87
SUBJECT:
SNUBBER INSTALLATIONS DEPARTMENT: MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR: J. DARKE TEAM MEMBER: HARLAN COOMES TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK POTENTIAL CONCERN /0VESTION
REFERENCES:
o M.21.08A ITT/Grinnell Hydraulic Snubber Vendor Manual M.40, R'ev. 4 Maintenance Procedure " Removal / Repair / Installation of o Hydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestors" o Technical Specification 3.12 and 4.14 M-486 SHT. 7-64 Rev. 2 M-486 SHT.. 7-67 Rev. 2 M-486 SHT. 7-70 Rev. 2 \\ POTENTIAL CONCERN: A variety of snubber mounting and pinning methods / techniques are utilized within the plant without specific criteria identified. Two of the MSS technical specification snubbers (75W-30800-12 and 75W-30800-14) have been installed in a manner which does not conform to vendor recommendations contained in technical manual M21.08A. It was also observed that some Seismic I snubbers in the main steam system do not contain fastening or locking devices on those which have attaching pins of "all-thread" or " load studs." ! r
),. t' REQUEST FOR INFORMATION-(RI) RI NO: 097 SYSTEM CODE: MSS ISSUE DATE: 07-31-87
SUBJECT:
BACKUP INSTRUMENT AIR FOR THE ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVES DEPARTMENT: SYSTEM ENGINEERING COORDINATOR: J. ITTNER TEAM MEMBER: R. FISH TEAM LEADER: FRANK STOCK M. HORHOTA POTENTIAL CONCERN /00ESTION Backup instrument air tubing for the ADVs could fracture as a result of valve movement, leaving backup instrument air inoperable for the valves. Inconsistencies exist in the installation of the backup instrument air tubing. DETAILS: During a system walkdown and review the following discrepancies were noted for the ADV backup instrument air tubing: .Various horizontal and vertical tubing runs between the ADVs and o the control panel were found to have axial movement through their' clamps, while other tubing rugs were clamped tight, allowing no movement. Tube clamps along various runs were found to be the incorrect o-size allowing movement of the tube in the clamp (3 axis). Tubing clamps were found with no jam nut installed, jam nuts o installed loose, or jam nuts installed with the clamp loose. t i i I i 1 l J
1 1 E 6.0 ATTACHMENTS o 6.1 List of Reviewed Documents 6.2 Status of Ris l 4 \\
s. LIST OF REVIEWED DOCUMENTS USAR l System Status Report Technical Specifications Master Equipment List (MEL) MIMS Nucleis Process Standards System Design Bases .0verall Plant Operating Procedures System Operating Procedures ~ Emergency Operating Procedures Annunciator Procedures Casualty Procedures g Special Test Procedures Surveillance Procedures Station Manual QA Manual P& ids System Training Manual (s) System Lesson Plan Maintenance Manual Line Designation Sheets 158,162, and 248 i i ATTACHMENT 1 L _--________________._____________.-s
- s LIST OF REVIEWED DOCUMENTS (Continued)
ECNs: A-5415C, A-5415Z, A-5415AE, A-5743, R-0043, R-03578,- R-0518, R-0828, R-0861, R-1003, R-1367, A-3683-H, A5106, A5152, A5546, R-0859, R-0968V, R-0968W, R-0968Z, R-0968ZZ NCRs: S-5577 Rev. 3, S-5576, 5-5885, S-5512 Rev.1, S-5507 Rev.1, and S-5328 Rev. 2 WR: 83890, 118092 through 118109,117008 through 117010, 117013, 120782, 121721 Vendor Manuals: M2.02-45, M19.02-313,.M21.08A, N6.03 IMO, 30120-0M-01 & -02 (Tec. Accelerometers). B&W Site Bulletin 81-076 Dresser Report SV214, Rev. 0 E&QC Memo 81-38 ASME III, Article 9,1968 Nameplate Data Spare Parts Listings Equipment History IE Notice 86-05 DG Memo 86-272 Design Specifications Design Calculations: Z-IAS-M2084, Rev. 2, Z-IAS-M2085, Rev. 2, Z-MSS-M0430, Rev. 3, Z-MSS-M0431, Rev. 4, Z-MSS-M2055, Rev. O, Z-MSS-M0829, Rev. O ATTACHMENT 1 a s-LIST OF REVIEWED DOCUMENTS (Continued) Da0is Besse-TAP Report on March 2, 1984 Trip Regulatory Guide-10 CFR 50, Appendix A, B & R NRC ASRTP Report Memo GVC-87-681 j I&C Calibration & Maintenance Records Precursor Review Task Final Report Deterministic Failure Consequences Recommendation 0588 -f \\ ATTACHMENT 1.
n--_. a STATUS OF RIs a RI NUMBER STATUS RSL NUMBER 01 0 Open RSL-RI 010 1 014 Open RSL-RI 014 01 5 Open RSL-RI 015 019 Acknowledged RSL-RI 019 037 Open RSL-RI 037 I 046 Acknowledged RSL-RI 046 047 Open RSL-RI 047 066 Open RSL-RI 066 097 Open RSL-RI 097 \\ ATTACHMENT 2. -_____-_-__-__--a}}