ML20216C063

Semi-Annual Long Term Program Schedule

ML20216C063
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	08/29/1997
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20216C061	List: ML20216C057 ML20216C063
References
PROC-970829, NUDOCS 9709080216
Download: ML20216C063 (37)

Text

, 8 8 s ATTACHMENT 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS LTP Schedule B ltems LTP LTP Page Schedule Number Title Number l 8 377 Neutron Flux Monitoring (GL 82 33) 1 B 410 Seismic Verification Program (GL 87 02) 4 B 255, Salt Service Water System (GL 8913) 9 473 8 487 Safety Related MOV Testing and Surveillance (GL 8910) 12 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety Related, Power-Operated Gate Valves (GL 95-07)

Periodic Verification of Design - Basis Capability of Safety Related, Motor Operated Valves (GL 06 05)

B 489 Severe Accident Management Program 19 8 504 BWR Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities (GL 94-02) 21 8 669 lGSCC Core Shroud (GL 94 03) 24 B 645 South Weymouth Naval Air Station 26 8 723 ECCS Pump Strainers (Bulletins 95-02,96-03) 28 8 706 Technical Specification Conversion Project 30 8 707 Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pools (GL 96-04) 31 B ---

Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity 32 During Design-Basis Accident Condition (GL 96-06)

B --- Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits (GL 96-01) 34 Itp97 toc. doc 9709080216 970829 PDR ADOCK 05000293 P PDR

! ATTACHMENT 2 s

SCHEDULE B l

NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING (GL 82 33)(LTP #377)

Commitment Descriptiori Generic Letter 82 33 required utilities to report on implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Boston Edison, and some other utilities with Boiling Water Reactors, took exception to requirements related to neutron flux monitoring systems. Subsequently, the BWR Owners Group submitted NEDO 31658 that proposed alternate criteria for neutron flux monitoring. NRC issued a safety evaluation and accepted the NEDO 31558 criteria in Reference 1.

In Reference 2, the NRC requested utilities to review the neutron flux monitoring instrumentation against the NEDO 31558 to determine whether the installed system meets the criteria and to submit a letter to the NRC with the results of the review.

Boston Edison's reply (Reference 3) Identified that Pilgrim Station met the criteria of NEDO-31558 with certain clarifications and exceptions.

Our exception concerned the requirements for uninterruptible power supplies (Criterion 5.2.8 of NEDO-31558). Boston Edison took exception and provided a basis for the acceptability of the present Pilgrim Station design (Reference 3). We are taking no further action on this item.

In Reference 3, Boston Edison committed to perform an analysis of the ATWS conditions in the drywell for comparison with NMS design specifications. We further stated we would be working with other BWR owners on this issue.

(BECo IADB RL 95.0011)

References

1) NRC Letter dated January 13,1993, from A. Boyer to C.L. Tully, BWR Owner's Group

2) NRC Letter dated August 11,1993, Reg Guide 1.97, BWR Neutron Flux Monitoring (TAC M77660)

3) BECo Letter 93136 dated October 21,1993

4) BECo Memo EED 97 084 dated July 22,1997.

Commitment Historv/Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1993 - January 31,1994 As planned, Boston Edison has joined with several other BWR owners through the BWR Owners Group to sponsor an analysis to determine the ATWS environment and to compare the calculated temperatures with design specifications. The BWROG task is underway and expected to be complete in opproximately 6 months. We will provide an update on the analysis and its results in the next LTP update at which time we expect to be able to identify what, if any, additional efforts will be required.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1994 July 31,1994 As planned, Boston Edison supplied various input data on plant parameters to GE for their use in modeling the containment and plant systems for the ATWS analysis. (Three other utilities are also pcrticipating in the task and are supplying corresponding data.)

GE and the BWROG now expect to complete the ATWS analysis and issue the preliminary report to sponsoring utilities in early December,1994.

Page 1 of 34

l  !

ATTACHMF.NT 3 s

SCHEDULE B We will provide an update on the analysis and its results in the next LTP update. By that time, if the analysis has been available for sufficient time, we expect to be able to identify what, if any, additional efforts will be required, Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1994 January 31,1995 We continued to supply input data to General Electric and to coordinate with the BWROG and other participating utilities on various questions regarding the analysis. GE has not, however, issued their report we now expect a report in late April,1995 We will provide further information in the next LTP update and should then be able to identify what further action will be taken.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1995 July 31,1995 Boston Edison has received and reviewed the draft final report from GE of their analysis to ,

determine the ATWS environment for neutron monitoring equipment. From our review, we expect to require testing to demonstrate that one or more components (cables, connectors) are adequate for the ATWS conditions. We plan to have test results by the end of 1996, if testing and analysis are utiable to demonstrate the adequacy of the affected components, replacements will be scheduled for a future refueling outage.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1995 January 31,1996 Boston Edison received the final report from GE of the analysis to determine the ATWS environment for neutron monitoring equipment. The report is based on the Dresden Plant and .

envelopes Pilgrim and 3 other plants with similar piping configurations.

NEDO 31558 requires a plant specific evaluation of ATWS environments in comparison with

- design specifications to assure NMS system performance. Qualification to design basis environmental standards required by RG 1.89 is not necessary.

Several design specifications and vendor Certificates of Compliance have been reviewed. This preliminary review concludes the temperature specifications for the components were higher than ATWS temperatures We are currently performing a review of the cable connectors. A simple temperature test may be required to assure that these connectors will meet the ATWS environment. Test results are expected to be complete by the end of 1996.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1996 July 31,1996 No progress was made on this issue; however, we expect to complete the review as scheduled. )

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1996 - January 31,1997 All reviews have been completed. The NMS cable connector temperature test was performed on February 14,1997, and met our acceptance criteria. We are prepaling the final documentation package. All activities associated with Neutron Flux Monitoring will be completed 6/30/97.

Page 2 of 34 J

I ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEQ Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1997 July 31,1997 l

The Electrical Engineering department issued report 97XE 1 ER NQ on the Neutron Monitoring System for Regulatory Guide 1.97 on 7/22/97, (Ref. 4). This item is now closed and will be removed from future LTP updates.

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)

i ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULllLR SEISMIC VERIFICATION PROGRAM fGL 87 02)(LTP #410)

Commitment Description The NRC's final Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on Revision 2 of the Generic implementation Procedures (GIP 2) for A 46 was issued via Generic Letter 87 02, Supplement 1, on May 22,1992 (Reference 4). By September 21,1992, each licensee was required to respond to the SER stating whether they intend to follow the GIP 2 guidance, provide a schedule for implementation of the GlP including submission of a report summarizing the results of the A 46 review, and provide information on the procedures and criteria used to generate the in structure response spectra used for A 46 Implementation. Evaluation of equipment is to include (a) adequacy of equipment anchorage; (b) functional capability of essential relays; (c) identification of potential outlief s and deficiencies; and (d) seismic systems interactions, in our response (Reference 5), we committed to implement GIP 2 in its entirety and provided a description of the procedures and criteria used to generate the in structure response spectra. A schedule of GlP 2 implementation and submission of a summary report was deferred to the February 1993 LTP semi annual update (provided below).

In Reference 6, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) approving our response. The SER cssumed a commitment on BECo's part to implement the GlP 2 in its entirety and noted our in-structure response spectra should be treated as median centered. We affirmed the NRC assumption to be correct in Reference 7 and clarified our continued commitment to implement the seismic verification program at Pilgrim Station through the GlP 2 and its subsequent revisions.

Our schedule for completion of the GIP and submission of a summary report is scheduled for 9/30/96.

(BECo IADB RL 05.0003)

References

1) NRC Letter dated February 19,1987, GL 87 02

2) BECo Letter 88145, dated October 11,1988, Response to GL 87 02

3) NRC Letter dated June 7,1989, Acknowiedgment of BECo Response

4) NRC Letter dated May 22,1992, GL 87 02, Supplement 1,

5) BECo Letter 92109, dated September 21,1992, Response to GL 87 02, Supplement 1

6) NRC Letter dated November 18,1992, SER of PNPS Response to GL 87 02, Supplement 1

7) BECo Letter 93 019, dated February 11,1993, AdditionalInformation Regarding NRC SER of PNPS Response to GL 87 02, Supplement 1

8) BECo Letter 9416 dated February 9,1994, Additional Response to GL 87 02, Supplement 1

9) NRC Letter dated June 17,1994, Re evaluation of Approval for Develeping Floor Response Spectra for the Resolution of USI A 46.

10) BECo Letter 96-068 dated July 12,1996, Revision of A-40 submittal date.

11) BECo Letter 96 085 dated September 30,1996, Summary Report, GL 87 02 (USl A 46).

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I ATTACHMENT 2

! SCHEDULE B fdEE8HEMilM9DlEL9E111 Progress and Summary of Changes March 1989 to February 1990 A. Develop safe shutdown equipment list Schedule Revised B. Recreate original seismic design basis documentation Schedule Revised C. Training and commence walkdown of accessible areas Schedule Revised The schedule for performing these three items was revised from Cycle 8 to Cyck,9 as a result of our re assessment of the work to be performed for this seismic issue, with respect to the generic work scope fer other similar existing and emerging seismic issues. By incorporating the similarities of work scope for each of the below listed issues into one set of physical activities, we can best optimize our resources. Other seismic Issues include:

. Seismic Design Basis (USl A 40) e Eastern Seismicity and Seismic Design Margins e

Extemal Events (seismic) for IndidJual Plant Examinations Progress and Summary of Changes February 1990 to November 1990 A revised schedule for implementation of the seismic verification program will be developed after issuance of the NRC SER resolving the GIP open issues.

Progress and Summary of Changes December 1990 to February 1991

. No changes from the previous report period.

Progress and Summary of Changes March 1991 to August 1991 e

A schedule for implementation of the seismic verification program will be developed after issuance of the NRC SER resolving the GIP open issues.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1991 to February 1992 A schedule for implementation of the seismic verification program will be developed after issuance of the NRC SER resolving the GlP open issues.

Progress and Summary of Changes - March 1992 to August 15,1992 Reference 4, issued the final NRC SER (SSER No. 2) resolving the GIP open issues and superseded all previous NRC SER documents. A response containing the following information will be made by September 21,1992:

A statement whether we commit to use both the SQUG commitments and the implementation guidance provided in GlP 2 as supplemented by the SSER No. 2 for the resolution of USl A 46, e

A plant specific schedule for the implementation of the GlP and submission of a report summarizing the results of the USI A 46 review.

e Detailed description of the procedures and criteria used to generate the in structure response spectra.

Page 5 of 34

• ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEB Progress and Summary of Changes August 16,1992 February 15,1993 e Three BECo personnel and a contractor have completed the GIP Selsmic Walkdown and Evaluation SQUG Training Program, o

A safe shutdown equipment list has been developed and is undergoing final review and approval.

A portion of the seismic walkdowns began in MCO #9. On line walkdowns continue during operating cycle 9. Outage walkdowns are planned for RFO #9 with any further on line portions in operating cycle 10. Remaining off line portions will be done in MCO 10 and RFO

1. 10.

• At BECo's request, a meeting was held in our Braintree offices on September 3,1992, in which we presented our intended approach to A 40 resolution and solicited NRC feedback print to preparing our Generic Letter 87 02 response letter.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 16,1993 July 31,1993 Walkdowns scheduled for RFO #9 were completed and other walkdowr.s are continuing while on-line. The goalis to minimize the impact of performing walkdowns during an outage where safe and practicable, e

Relays associated with the safe shutdown equipment list are being assessed via a full circuit analysis. This is a task being worked by Engineering and Operations.

e The majority of the SSEL equipment and relay evaluations are expected to completed by RFO #10.

Cable tray walkdowns have been completed and the evaluations are expected to completed by RFO #10.

Four more engineers have completed the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course (Total of 7 engineers now certified).

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1993 January 31,1994

• Remaining SSEL walkdowns have been planned and scheduled for MCO #..

Relay evaluations are neadng completion. Discussions between engineering am operations conceming essential relay designation is progressing.

A letter requesting a review of our A 46 plan has been sent (Ref. 8). We have completed an initiative that demonstrates the conservatism of the PNPS design basis spectra. This would justify it to be classified as a " conservative design" spectra for A-46 implementation, e

Documentation packages are being assembled to support close-out.

Page 6 of 34

e o ATTACHMENT 3 SCHEDULEB Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1994 - July 31,1994 Final SSEL walkdowns are scheduled for MCO #10.

Seismic Evaluation Work Sheets for SSEL components are progressing.

NRC approved PNPS classification as a " conservative design" spectra for A 46 Implementation above 4Hz.

. Relay qualification has been initiated.

l Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1994 January 31,1995 Final SSE walkdowns are scheduled for RFO # 10 Relay qualification is progressing.

We have rescheduled the report submittal date to 6/96. Greater than 90% of the walkdowns are complete. However, completion has been slowed by the temporary reassignment of uniquely qualified personnel to support significant emergent issues, e g.,

the extended main generator forced outage, and the core shroud repair preparation.

Progress and Summary of Changes - January 31,1995 - August 1,1995 SSEL walkdowns are now completed.

Relay qualification is approaching completion.

Seismic Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) development is nearing completion.

Final report will be started in the 4th quarter Submittalin June 1996 remains unchanged.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1995 January 31,1996 Seismic Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) are complete.

Relay qualification assessment essentially complete.

. Assessment of " potential outliers" initiated.

Development of documentation and final report is progressing and the submittalis planned for June 1996.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1996 - July 31,1996 Requested and received an extension of the final report submittal date from June 1996 to September 1996.

Page 7 of 34

ATTACHMENT 2 o

SCHEDULE B e Outlier assessments are continuing.

• Validations and verification of safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL) pathways on simulator completed. Feedback is being incorporated into the program.

e Operations review of the program is in progress.

• Final report development continues.

Progress of Summary and Changes August 1,1996 January 31,1997 e Final report submitted for NRC review in September 1990.

. Outlier disposition work plan developed based upon program findings.

• Walkdowns supporting outiler disposition scheduled for RFO #11.

e Outlier disposition has been prioritized and is proceeding, e Current planning, which is linked to receipt of an SER in 1997, calls for disposition of known outliers by RFO #12.

Progress of Summary of Changes February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 e Outlier disposition work plan updated to reflect progress and RFO #11 walkdown findings.

• Resolution of spatialinteractions and completion of SEWS for items walked down during RFO #11.

e PDCs (FRNs) and MRs have been issued to address a family of spatialinteraction outliers that can be worked during plant operation (on line).

e Participating in the ongoing dialog between the NRC and SQUG concerning issues associated with the use of Generic implementation Procedure (GIP) Method A (a method used to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment installed in operating nuclear plants).

e Identifying outliers for potential field modifications during RFO #12.

Page 8 of 34

I ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEB t .

SALT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (GL 8913)(LTP #255,473)

Commitment Description Generic Letter (GL) 8913 required licensees to review and evaluate the adequacy of the service water system and all safety related heat exchangers. The review identified a number of enhancements to ttle PNPS programs and procedures. As a result, BECo committed via Reference 2 to th< ,ollowing

Prior to end of RFO #8, modify the RBCCW heat exchanger test procedures to include an analytical model to calculate RBCCW heat exchanger performance at test and design conditions. (Complete) e Conduct tests with modified procedures during Cycle 9. (Complete) e Prior to end of RFO #9, modify the RHR heat exchanger test procedures to include an analytical model to calculate RHR heat exchanger performance at test and design conditions. (Complete) e Conduct tests with modified procedures during Cycle 10. (Complete) e Develop a regular maintenance / test program on heat transfer capability of the remaining heat exchangers by RFO #9, (Complete) e Conduct a single failure analysis for the RBCCW subsystem by end of RFO #8.

(Complete) e Prior to end of RFO #8, upgrade the licensed operator training module to include a loss of all service water. (Complete)

Complete SWOPlitems by the end of RFO #11. (BECo IADB RC 95.0053, SW95.XXXX)

Credit was also tr ken in Reference 2 for the SSW piping inspection and replacement program already underway at Pilgrim which, henceforth, will be integrated as part of our Generic Letter 8913 implementation efforts.

References

1) NRC Letter; GL 8913: " Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety Related Equipment

2) BECo Letter 2.90.047, dated April 2,1990, " Response to GL 8913" Commitment Historv/Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - March 1990 to November 1990 The licensed operator training module upgrade is complete. There are no changes to the other above described commitments and schedules; Page 9 of 34

I ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B Progress and Summary of Changes December 1990 to February 1991 A single failure analysis of the RBCCW subsystem has been performed. There are no changes to the other above described commitments and schedules.

Progress and Summary of Changes March 1991 to August 1991 RBCCW heat exchanger test procedures have been modified to include an analytical model to calculate RBCCW heat exchanger performance at test and design conditions.

l In addition, activities associated with SSW piping inspection and replacement are being integrated under our GL 8913 effort. Further inspections of the SSW piping will be scheduled during each planned mid cycle or refueling outage of sufficient duration. It remains our intention to replace SSW piping when the inspection of piping shows that to be necessary.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1991 to February 1992 Efforts to enhance the Salt Service Water System are proceeding as indicated in our response to Generic Letter 8913. There are no changes to the above-described commitments.

Progress and Summary of Changes March 1992 to August 15,1992 A decision was made to replace the buried SSW piping with corrosion-resistant titanium. Five Plant Design Change Packages were prepared to facilitate replacement of the pipe.

Construction of a pipe vault at the intake structure is in progress. Replacement activities will continue through MCO9 and RFO9. Above ground piping will be routinely examined by non-destructive technology (typically UT) and will be replaced as required. Efforts to enhance the SSW system are proceeding as indicated above.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 15,1992 February 15,1993 There are no changes to the GL 8913 (LTP 473) commitments described above.

We are currently installing replacement SSW underground piping (LTP 255) in preparation for system tie in RFO #9 (4/93). To support this effort, during MCO 9 (10/92) we replaced spool pieces in the Auxiliary Bay and Screen House. We also plan to replace the remainder of the intake Structure and Auxiliary Bay above ground inlet piping and tie in the new inlet loop buried piping in RFO #9.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 15,1993 - July 30,1993 RBCCW Heat Exchanger testing was completed on schedule in cycle 9. The RHR Heat Exchanger Test Procedure and Analytical Model was completed on schedule in RFO #9. The Heat Exchanger Maintenance and Test Program for Heat Transfer Capability was also completed on schedule in RFO #9. There are no changes to the remaining GL 89-13 (LTP 473) commitments described above.

Replacement of the SSW piping (LTP 255) was completed on schedule in RFO #0 Through RFO #9,250 feet of above ground rubber lined carbon steel pipe has been replaced. In addition,430 feet of buried rubber lined carbon steel pipe has been replaced with Titanium pipe. Augmented ISI of above ground rubber lined carbon steel pipe was also completed on schedule in RFO #9. Future ISI will be captured under LTP 473. LTP 255 is completed.

Page 10 of 34

I

• ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1993 January 31,1994 There are no changes to the remaining GL 8913 commitments described above. In summary, I

RHR heat exchanger tests will be conducted with modified procedures during Cycle 10.

Ongoing inspections of the Salt Service Water System have been incorporated into our ISI program.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1994 July 31,1994 There are no changes to the remaining GL 89-13 (LTP 473) commitments described above.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1994 January 31,1995 We perforrned an extensive self assessment of the Salt Service Water System and our response to GL 8913 (Reference 2). We are in the process of developing a plan to address issues and enhancements identified in the self assessment.

RHR heat oxchanger tests were conducted with modified procedures during Cycle 10. Ongoing inspections of the Salt Service Water System have been incorporated into our ISI program.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1995 July 31,1995 We are implementing a comprehensive set of enhancements identified in the Salt Service Water System self assessment (SWSOPI). We plan to implement most of the enhancements prior to the end of 1995, and all of these enhancements are currently scheduled for completion by the end of RFO-11.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1995 January 31,1996 We are currently on schedule to complete the SWOPlitems by the end of RFO #11.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1996 July 31,1996 Of the original 149 SWSOPl action items,21 remain open. All SWSOPI related action items are scheduled to be completed by the end of RFO #11.

Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1996 January 31,1997 Ten SWSOPl action items remain open. These items are now scheduled for completion aftei RFO #11. A final closeout report will be issued before July 31,1997.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 July 31,1997 Three SWSOPl action items remain open. A NRC Special Inspection began May 14,1997, to review the disposition of all SWOPl action items and related GL 89-13 issues. Supporting this inspection, along with actions taken to respond to severalissues raised, has affected the completion of the close-out report. A new schedule will be determined after the conclusion of the specialinspection.

Page 11 of 34

ATTACHMENT 2 w

SCHEDULE B SAFETY RELATED MOV TESTING AND SURVEILLANCE (GL 89101(LTP #487)

PRESSURE LOCKING AND THERMAL BINDING OF SAFETY RELATED. POWER OPERATED GATE  :

VALVES tGL 95-07)

PERIOD.C VER FICATION OF DESIGN BASIS CAPABILITY OF SAFETY RELATED MOTOR-OPERATED V%VES (GL 96 05)

Commitment Description Generic Letter (GL) 8910 (Ref.1) expands the scope of the motor operated valve program required by NRC Bulletin 85-03 and its Supplement, to include additional testing, inspecting, and maintenance for all safety related motor operated valves.

In our Reference 2 response to the GL, we committed to develop a program to enhance the maintenance, analysis, and testing already being conducted on MOVs at Pilgrim. The GL calls for the development of this program within 1 year or one refueling outage from the date of the letter, whichever is later. For BECo, this schedule translates to RFO #8. Our plan was to begin a design basis review of MOVs in the first quarter of 1991 and to begin testing in RFO #9. Based on resource constraints in 1990, we revised the design basis review schedule to commence in the last quarter of 1991. This revision continues to support our commitment to begin testing in RFO ,

1. 9 and supports our program development schedule. We anticipate the testing will require three refueling outagos, based on the extent of known scope. Additional scope determinations as a ,

result of NUMARC and BWROG involvement will be factored into our final scope and schedule as appropriate.

Reference 6 requested Licensees to perform a plant specific safety assessment to determine if generic safety assessments performed by the NRC staff and the BWR Owners' Group are applicable. If MOVs are discovered with potential deficiencies of greater significance than the HPCI, RCIC, and RWCU MOVs, planned activities to address the generic letter were to be re-prioritized accordingly. Notification within 30 days of receipt of Supplement 3 was required verifying a plant specific safety assessment was perbrmed and identifying whether there were MOVs with deficiencies of greater safety significance than in the HPCI, RCIC, and RWCU systems. An additional notification within 120 days of receipt was also requested to provide the criteria reflecting operating experience and the latest test data applied in determining whether deficiencies exist in the HPCI, RCIC, and RWCU MOVs.

In our Reference 7 letter, we concluded the subject valves in the HPCI, RCIC, and RWCU systems were capable of performing their safety function to provide containment isolation in the event of a line break outside containment. This submittal provided our 30 and 120 day response to the generic letter and precluded having to perform a plant specific safety assessment. We also committed in Reference 7 to conduct diagnostic testing on the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU)

MO 12012 valve during RFO #8, We expanded our planned RFO #8 testing to include 2 additional valves: RWCU MO 12015 and Closed Cooling Water MO-4010A.

The NRC issued a Request for Additional Information (RAl) (Ref.10) after reviewing our Reference 7 and 8 responses to GL 8910 Supplement 3. BECo responded to the RAI on August 29,1991 (Ref.11).

During the week of March 9-13,1992, the NRC conducted an inspection of the PNPS GL 89-10 MOV program. As a result of this inspection Boston Edison committed to resubmit the GL 8910, Supplement 3, response and accelerate th9 schedule for priority 1 valves to have the GL 89-10 actions completed by the end of RFO #10.

Pata 12 of 34

s

• ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B RFO #10 is scheduled for 1995. The remaining safety-related valves will be completed by the end of RFO #11.

(BECo IADB RL95.005)

References

1) NRC Letter dated June 28,1989, GL 8910

• Safety-Related MOV Testing and Surveillance"

2) BECo Letter, dated January 15,1990,2.90.013

3) NRC Letter dated June 7,1990, Response to GL 89-10

4) NRC Letter dated June 13,1990, Supplement 1 to GL 8910

5) NRC Letter dated August 3,1990, Supplement 2 to GL 89-10

6) NRC Letter dated October 25,1990, Supplement 3 to GL 89-10

?) BECo Letter dated December 17,1990,2.90.158

8) BECo L etter dated February 26,1991,2.91.022

9) NRC Letter dated April 1,1991, Meeting Summary BECo/NRC

10) NRC Letter dated June 24,1991, RAI regarding GL 89-10 Supplement 3 i 11) BECo Letter dated August 29,1991,2.91.111 l

12) NRC Letter dated February 18,1992, Closure of GL 89-10, Supplament 3

13) NRC Letter dated February 12,1992, GL 89-10 Supplement 4

14) NRC Letter dated Juno 3,1992, Inspection 50-293/92-80 Motor Operated Valve inspection.

15) NRC Letter dated May 5,1992, Motor Operated Valve Inspection at PNPS (NRC Inspection Report 50-293/92-80).

16) BECo Letter oated April 14,1992, Revision to GL 89-10 Supplement 3 Response,2.92.044

17) NRC Letter dated June 28,1993, GL 89-10 Supplement 5

18) BECo Letter dated October 21,1993, Response to GL89-10 Supplement 5,2.93.135

19) BECo Letter dated January 7,1994, Update to GL89-10, Supplement 3 Response,2.94.005

20) NRC Letter dated April 19,1994, GL 89-10, Supplement 5

21) GL- 95-07, Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety Related Power-Operated Gate Valves (BECo #1.95.131)

22) BECo Letter dated October 16,1995,60-Day Response to GL 95-07,2.95.108.

23) BECo Letter dated February 23,1996,180-Day Response to GL 95-07,2.96.013

24) NRC GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design - Basis Capability of Safety - Related Motor-Operated Valves, September 18, F96.

25) BECo Letter dated November 15, r.96, Response to GL 96-05,2.96.099

26) BECo Letter dated May 19,1997, MOV Closure Letter (GL 8910),2.97.055 27)- BECo Letter dated June 18,1997,180-Day Response to GL 96-05,2.97.064 Commitment History /Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1990 to November 1990 Begin a design basis review of MOVs is on schedule for first quarter of 1991.

Begin testing is on schedule for RFO #9 (completion within 3 refueling outages).

30 day notification in accordence with Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 3 is planned for submittal by December 13,1990.

120 day notification efforts are plenned for submittal by March 13,1991.

Progress and Summary of Changes - December 199C to February 1991 The schedule for commencement of design basis reviews of MOVs is being changed from the first quarter of 1991 to the last quarter of 1991. This schedule revision continues to support our commitment to begin testing in RFO #9.

Begin testing is on schedule for RFO #9 (completion within 3 refueling outages).

30 day and 120 day notifications are complete.

Page 13 of 34

5 ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B

• 3 safety related valves are on schedule for diagnostic testing during RFO #8 (MO-12012, 12015, and 4010A).

Development of a Program Plan is on schedule for completion by May 1 1R -

Progress and Summary of Changes - March 1991 to August 1991 Commencement of design basis reviews of MOVs is on schedule for the last quarter of 1991.

Begin testing is on schedule for RFO #9 (completion within 3 refueling outages).

Diagnostic testing of MO-12012,1201-5, and 4010A was conducted during RFO #8. In addition to this testing, we completed diagnostic testing on the remaining GL 39-10 Supplement 3 MOVs (4 valves) and on another 10 safety related MOVs.

. Development of a Program Plan is complete.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1991 to February 1992 Design basis reviews of MOVs continue to support our commitment to begin testing in RFO #9.

Testing is on schedule to begin in RFO #9 (completion within 3 refueling outages).

Procedures are in preparation describing design basis review methodology, control of switch settings, and degraded voltage analysis. Additionally, a Nuclear Organization Procedure establishing our MOV program is in final review.

The schedule for static testing of MOVs has been accelerated and some testing will be done during our mid-cycle outage prior to RFO #9.

MOVs tested using MOVATS test equipment were reviewed and have been retested using more accurate diagnostic test equipment or been reviewed to ensure there is sufficient margin.

Progress and Summary of Changes - March 1992 to August 15,1992

. Design basis reviews of MOVs continue to support our commitment to begin testing in RFO

1. 9.

. Testing is on schedule to begin RFO #9.

. GL 89-10 activities will be completed for priority 1 valves by the end of RFO #10.

. Reference 16 submitted a revision to GL 89-10, Supplement 3, response (Reference 8).

. Nuclear Organization Procedure 92M1 " Motor Operated Valve Program" has been approved.

. Procedures describing design basis review methodology and control of switch settings are approved. Draft procedures for degraded voltage of motors are being revised to include temperature effects on available torque. Additional procedures are being developed as necessary.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1E,1992 - February 15,1993 i

. Design basis review is on schedule to ;upport commitment to complete Priority 1 valves by RFO #10.

. Static testing was performed during MCO #9.

. New state of the art test equipment was purchasad that provides direct stem torque and thrust measurements.

. Significant MOV testing, maintent.nce, and inspections scheduled for RFO #9.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 15,1993 - July 31,1993 Design Basis Reviews (DBR) and Diagnostic Testing are on schedule to complete Priority I MOVs (55 valves) by RFO #10. DBR and Testing related to the remaining Safety Related (SR) MOVs (35 valves) is also on schedule and is expected to be completed by RFO #11.

Page 14 of 34

• ATTACHMENT 2 s

SCHEDULEB Significant MOV testing, maintenance and inspections were completed in RFO #9. Maintenance and inspections were conducted on 56 SR MOVs. Diagnostic Testing was completed on 21 SR MOVs.

l Through RFO #9,46 out of a total population of 90 SR MOVs have been set up via diagnostic testing techniques. Through RFO #9,29 of 55 Prionty 1 MOVs have been set up via diagnostic l testing techniques.

MOV testing, maintenance, and inspections are scheduled to continue in MCO 10, including the first phase of Dynamic Testing.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1993 January 31,1994 Design Basis Reviews (DBR), Diagnostic Testing, inspections, Maintenance and Modifications are on schedule to support the commitment to complete Priority 1 MOVs (55 valves) by RFO #10.

Similar efforts related to the remaining Safety Related (SR) MOVs (35 valves) are also on schedule and are expected to be completed per the current commitment, RFO #11.

The first phase of Dynamic Testing is on schedule to commence in MCO 10.]The use of an altemative valve and actuator design is under consideration for implementation on a certain population of MOVs. Candidate MOVs are those which would require significant modifications utilizing typical manufacturer product design and applications. The altemative design has several advantages including a solid state control system, enhanced repeatability, reduced electrical power demand and a reduced preventative maintenance frequency. The attemate design would also decrease the probability of potential common mode failure issues and diversify plant design.

Our response to GL 89-10, Supplement 5. (Ref.18), indicated actions to be taken to resolve the accuracy issues associated with the use of Liberty Technologies VOTES equipment. The following actions were required:

Update the VOTES test results using the revised property constants and torque correction factors. This action is complete. Subsaquent to this action, Liberty issued Customer Service Bulletin (CSB) 031 that requires review of test results due to a software problem in the VOTES equipment. This new action will be completed and updated by our next LTP submittal.

a Revise Liberty Technologies test results to use a curve fit algorithm and determine extrapolation error. This action is complete. Subsequent to completion, Liberty issued CSB-031 causing a need to review post test results. This new action will be completed and updated by our next LTP submittal.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1994 - July 31,1994 Design Basis Reviews (DBR), Diagnostic Testing, inspections, Maintenance and Modifications are on schedule to support the commitment to complete Priority 1 MOVs (55 valves) by the end of RFO #10. Similar efforts related to the remaining Safety Related (SR) MOVs (35 valves) are also on schedule and are expected to be completed per the current commitment, RFO #11. The work scope applicable to the Priority 1 MOVs includes approximately (90) Inspections, (17) Overhauls, (48) Static Diagnostic Tests, (36) Dynamic Diagnostic Tests and (52) Modifications.

The first phase of Dynamic Testing is on schedule to commence in MCO #10.

Page 15 of 34 1

__J

l I ATTACHMENT 2 m '

SCHEDULEB The use of an alternative valve design, as previously discussed, is being aggressively pursued for l implementation on (4) MOVs in RFO #10. The use of an alternative actuator design is also being I

aggressively pursued for implementation on (1) MOV in RFO #10. The alternate design incorporates GL 89-10 ' lessons leamed' as well as the most recent EPRI and INEL technical information. Back-up plans are also being developed should new product qualification issues not support our RFO #10 schedule commitment.

Progress and Summary of Changes - July 31,1994 - January 31,1995

'GL 8910, Safety Related MOV Testing and Surveillance' activities continue on schedule to support the commitment to complete Priority 1 MOVs (55 valves) by RFO #10, with the remaining Safety Related (SR) MOVs (35 valves) following per the current schedule commitment, RFO #11.

Significant progress was made during the generator forced outage in the Fall of 1994. The forced outage enveloped the original scheduled MCO #10. A total of forty-nine (49) MOVs were worked during the Fall outage. Industry corrective actions and GL 89-10 design changes accounted for thirty-six (36) of the forty nine (49) activities performed. Activities ranged in complexity from complete actuator replacement / valve disassembly to simple changes in gear ratio and EQ inspections.

Valve modifications were completed on three (3) MOVs for the purpose of installing pressure locking relief paths. Potential over thrust /over-torque conditions were also dispositioned on two MOVs in the RWCU and RCIC systems.

The first phase of Dynamic Testing was completed during the Fall outage. Differential pressure diagnostic testing was completed on thirteen (13) MOVs. Static diagnostic testing also continued during this outage with twenty-five (25) MOVs being set using state-of the art equipment and industry data.

The use of an altemative valve _ design, as previously discussed, is scheduled for implementation on (4) MOVs in RFO #10. The use of an alternative actuator design is also being aggressively pursued for implementation on (1) MOV in RFO #10. The alternate designs incorporate GL 89-10

' lessons leamed' as well as the most recent EPRI and INEL technical information. Back-up plans are in place to install a conventional design actuator should delivery of the new actuator not support our RFO #10 schedule commitment. Whichever actuator is installed, committed actions will be completed in RFO #10.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1995 - July 31,1995 The first phase of GL 8910, Safety Related (SR) MOV Testing and Surveillance activities (55 Priority i MOVs) was completed on schedule in RFO #10. The remaining Safety Related MOVs (35 valves) will follow per the current schedule commitment, RFO #11.

Significant progress was made during RFO #10 (Spring 95). A total of sixty eight (68) SR MOVs were worked during the refueling outage. Industry corrective actions and GL89-10 design changes accounted for forty (40) of the sixty eight (68) activities performed. Activities ranged in complexity from complete valve / actuator replacement to simple changes in gear ratio and EQ inspections.

Valve modifications were comp leted on five (5) MOVs in RFO #10 for the purpose of installing pressure locking relief paths. This brings the total number of MOV related modification 3 to eight.

No additional MOV modifications related to this issue are expected.

Page 16 of 34

I

• ATTACHMENT 2 s

SCHEDULE B

' During RFO #10, differential pressure diagnostic testing was completed on thirty five (35) MOVs.

Static diagnostic testing also continued during the RFO with forty (40) MOVs being set using state-of-the-art equipment and industry data, j

Design basis operation for eight three percent (83%) of Priority 1 gate and globe motor operated valves has been confirmed via differential pressure diagnostic testing. Static diagnostic testing has been performed on all Priority 1 gate and globe motor operated valves (47).

The installation of an alternative valve design ("Sentiner), as discussed in the previous update, was completed on (4) MOVs in RFO #10. Three of the six GL 89-10 Supplement 3 MOVs were replaced with the new design. RFO #10 test results indicate excellent performance characteristics. The use of an attemative actuator design is also continuing to be aggressively pursued for future implementation. The attemate designs incorporate GL 89-10 " lessons learned" as well as the most recent EPRI and INEL technicalinformation and thus represent a truly engineered solution to many outstanding design issues.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1995 - January 31,1996 The scope of work associated with RFO #11 will be similar in nature and in quantity to that accomplished in RFO #10 (summarized in the previous update). Certain Priority i MOV's will again be worked for the purpose of accomplishing standard preventative maintenance, disposition of emergent generic industry issues, or to inspect for potential degradation for trending or corrective maintenance. The strategy is to complete as much of the scope on line within the scheduled system windows as possible. This strategy optimizes resources and considers ALARA.

The issue of " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding..." with respect to MOVs is essentially complete. Twelve (12) MOVs have been determined to be susceptible to pressure locking and three (3) MOVs have been determined to be suscept;ble to thermal binding. Physical modifications are complete on eleven (11), procedure changes are planned on four (4), with the remainder being dispositioned via engineering evaluation as not susceptible. Specific details are available in our 180-day response to GL 95-07 (Ref. 23)

Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1995 - July 31,1996 The remaining Safety Related MOVs (35 valves) are on schedule to complete per the current commitment, RFO #11.

BECo is also pursuing a permanently installed MOV monitoring system. It is designed to be a non-intrusive device capable of automatically acquiring critical valve performance parameters. It will record and store the valve data onto a removab'e cartridge for future analysis. The system provides a method of trending valve performance to address periodic test verification requirements.

The installation of an attemative valve design ("Sentiner), was completed on (4) MOVs in RFO

1. 10. Three of six GL 89-10 Supplement 3 MOVs were replaced with the new design. RFO #10 test results indicate excellent performance characteristics. Confirmatory flow and thermal effects testing was conducted by OEM (General Electric) in May 1996. The testing identified conditions which are not specifically or conservatively addressed in GL 95-07 (Pressure locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves"). This issue was identified in our response to RAI TAC No. M93504 and will be followed/dispositioned under GL 95-07.

Page 17 of 34

O i ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B 4

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 31,1997 There are no significant changes to the commitments identified or referenced above.

The first phase of GL 89-10, Safety Related (SR) MOV Testing and Surveillance activities (55 Priority i MOVs) was completed on schedule in RFO #10. The remaining safety related MOVs (35 valves) are on schedule to complete por the current commitment, RFO #11 (February 1997).

The scope of work associated with RFO #11 will be similar in nature and in quantity to that accomplished in RFO #10. Approximately fifty (50) safety-related MOVs make up the RFO #11 scope. Certain Priority 1 MOVs will again be worked for the purpose of accomplishing standard l preventive maintenance, trending, disposition of emergent generic industry issues, or to inspect j for potential degradation and perform the associated corrective maintenance.

l l Approximately thirty safety-related MOVs were completed on-line within the scheduled system windows. This strategy increases design margin at the earliest possible time and optimizes resources / ALARA considerations.

Pilgrim also intends to install and test the ' Sentry' on-line monitoring system on approximately eight (8) MOVs in RFO #11. This system has the capability to record and store diagnostic data which can be used to analyze the MOVs performance over time. Pilgrim intends to utilize this system as one of the elements of the Periodic Verification Program (GL 96-05). BECo Letter 96-099, dated November 15,1996, provides our current commitment relative to periodic verification to be established by September 30,1997.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 All activities and commitments associated with GL 89-10 have been completed (Ref. 26).

The MOV verification program will be established by September 30,1997.

Boston Edison Company expects to begin implementation of the MOV verification program by December 31,1997. (Ref. 27).

)

Page 18 of 34

o i- ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEB SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (LTP #489)

Commitment Description By letter dated March 24,1995, we informed the NRC that Pilgrim Station intends to implement ,

the formalindustry position on severe accident management approved by the Nuclear Energy institute's Nuclear Strategic issues Advisory Committee on November 21,1994, from NEl to the Director, Office of Nuclear Regulation states that:

Each licensee will:

Assess current capabilities to respond to severe accident conditions using Section 5 of NEl 91-04, Revision 1," Severe Accident issue Closure Guidelines."

e implement appropriate improvements identified in the assessment, within the constraints of existing personnel and hardware, on a schedule to be determined by each licensee and communicated to the NRC, but in any event no later than December 31,1998.

Ba. sed on previous interactions between NEl and the NRC, we understand the NRC agrees with the need for licensee flexibility in their methods of assessing and establishing severe accident management gu, ;nce. Utilizing the associated implementing guidance (contained in NEl report 9104, Revision 1), our target date for completion of the assessment of severe accident management capabilities and implementation of any identified enhancements is December 31, 1997.

Although product development activities are progressing well, impacts on our schedule will be experienced shortly due to RFO #11 and the NRC requalification license examination in the Fall of 1997 We expect all products to be completed, except for Operator Training and final validation and verification, by December 1997. As such, we will complete full implementation by June 1998.

(BECo IADB RC 96.0001)

Commitment HistorvlProaress Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1995 - July 31,1995 Multi-disciplined Task Force and Project Manager assigned to Program.

. Integration with EOP update initiated Project goals, objectives, schedules, costs, and task ownership approved.

. Detailed task assignments have been made.

Continued interaction with the BWROG's Severe Accident Working Group.

. Detailed reviews of goveming guidance documents have been initiated.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1995 - January 31,1996

. Vendor selected to complement in-house resources.

Continued interaction with the BWROG's Severe Accident Working Group.

. Data collection to support calculations initiated.

. The following tasks have been initiated:

develop Plant Specific Technical Guidelines and Plant Specific Severe Accident Guidelines evaluate Emergency Response Organization verify technical guidelines

- formulation of design decisions Page 19 of 34 ,

\ ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1996 - July 31,1996

. Continued interaction with BWROG's Severe Accident Working Group.

. Work is continuing in the following areas:

Plant specific technical guidelines / plant specific severe accident guidelines.

Evaluation of the Emergency Response Organization.

Verification of technical guidelines and formulation of design decisions.

Full task force Niew and approval of Interim products is progressing.

Progress and Summary of Changes- August 1,1996 - January 31,1997 Continued interactions with the BWROG's Severe Accident Working Group and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) to follow emergent activities affecting program completion.

. Work is continuing in the following areas:

-- Development of proposed EOP revisions (including flow charts).

- Preparation for revised EOP validation program.

- Revision of EOP satellite procedures.

- Existing EOP training provided to project task force.

- Development of Pilgrim Station Severe Accident Management Guidelines (flo.< charts).

- Revising portions of the Pilgrim Station Emergency Plan and implementing procedures. ,

Assessing the integration of the EOPs and Severe Accident Management Guidelines with the Emergency Response Organization.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 Participated as an observer in Virginia Power's North Anna Severe Accident Management demonstration (July 1997). Although North Anna is a PWR, the lessons leamed will serve as a means to self-assess the Pilgrim Station Severe Accident Management program for completeness.

. Work is continuing in the following areas:

Verification and validation tasks are proceeding and will be completed in the fourth quarter by working on the plant simulator with an operations crew.

- Assessing the integration of the EOPs and Severe Accident Management Guidelines with the Emergency Response Organization.

- Defining training requirements based on functional responsibilities and developing training modules.

Per schedule, organizational-wide training should begin in the first quarter of 1998.

Page 20 of 34

_. . . . . . _ . . . )

,-\ ATTACHMENT 2 s

SCHEDULE B -

BWR THERMAL HYDRAULIC INSTABILITIES (GL 94-02) (LTP#504)

Commitment Description The NRC issued this Generic Letter (GL) 94 02 requesting each BWR licensee take

- appropriate actions to augment its procedures and training for preventing or responding to thermal-hydraulic instabilities in their reactors. Each licensee is to submit a plan describing which long-term stability solution hardware option it has selected and provide a proposed implementation schedule for the necessary modifications.

Boston Edison implemented the Stability Guidelines (Reference 3) coincident with startup from RFO #10. Boston Edison willinstall Enhanced Option 1 A as its long-term stability solution.

Milestones are:

. Submit for NRC approval an evaluation October 30,1996 demonstrating that the existing Technical Specifications encompass Option 1 A modifications (No Technical Specification amendment required)

. Option 1 A modifications implemented 4th Otr/1997 at PNPS (BECo IADB RL 95.0016)

References

1) NRC Letter dated 7/11/94, GL 94 02: "Long-Term Solutions and Upgrade of Interim Operating Recommendations for Thermal-Hydraulic Instabilities in Boiling Water Reactors "

2) BECo Letter dated 9/9/94,-BECo Response to GL 94-02,2.94.102,

3) BWR Owners Group Letter, dated 6/6/94, "BWR Owners Group Guidelines for Stability Interim Corrective Action" 4

4) BECo Letter dated 11/7/96, " Power-Flow Stability Technical Specifications Related to Pilgrim's Installation of BWROG Enhanced Option 1A," 2.96.094 Commitment Historv/Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - July 31,1994 - January 31,1995.

In Reference 2, Boston Edison informed the NRC we would, within design and license constraints, modify procedures and conduct operator training contistent with the guidelines provided in reference 3. These actions will be implemented coincident with startup from RFO #10, currently scheduled to start March 25,1995.

Page 21 of 34 i

o

\ ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B Also in Reference 2, BECo stated we are presently planning to install the Enhanced Option 1A stability solution at Pilgrim Station by the end of 1997. The proposed milestones for Option 1 A were included in reference 2 as follows:

Milestone Owner Date l Submit PNPS specific power / flow map PNPS 3rd Qtr/1995 region boundaries to NRC for review and approval NRC approval of submitted region NRC 2nd Qtr/1996 boundaries Submit Tech. Spec. changes for Option 1 A PNPS 3rd Qtr/1996 I modifications NRC approval of Tech. Specs. NRC 3rd Qtr/1997 Option 1 A modifications implemented at PNPS 4th Otr/1997 PNPS We also stated we are continuing to monitor the Option 3 progress and would inform the NRC via

! the LTP Update process if Option 3 became a more viable long-term solution for PNPS.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1995 - July 31,1995 The milestones reported on the last LTP are unchanged except the NRC has indicated at a July 10,1995 BWROG meeting that we do not have to separately submit the PNPS specific power / flow MAP region boundaries to the NRC for review and approval. We can submit the boundaries as part of the technical specification package for the hardware modifications. BECo may separately send these proposed boundaries to the NRC in support of requesting approval for our use if such boundaries offer significant relief from the in-place BWROG interim corrective action guidelines, Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1995 - January 31,1996 The design of hardware and software modifications is in progress. The project is on schedule.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1996 - July 31,1996 BECo continues working with the BWROG and NRC in resolving final comments on the NRC safety evaluation of the BWR thermal- hydraulic instability. BECo will provide an evaluation demonstrating PNPS does not need a Technical Specification change to address stability issues.

Page 22 of 34

h ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 January 31,1997 On November 7,1996, Boston Edison submitted (Ref,4) to the NRC its review of the BWROG l proposed Standard Technical Specifications for Enhanced Option 1 A vis 4 vis Pilgrim's Technical i Specificatior,s and concluded our current Technical Specifications and administrative controls address this modification with minimal changes being required. These changes will be part of the conversion to 3tandard Technical Specifications. We continue to work to a December 31,1997,-

completion date for fullimplementation of the Enhanced Option 1A modification.

Progress and Summary of changes - February 1,1997 July 31,1997 in February 1997, Boston Edison completed Phase 1 of modification implementation. One new Flow Control Trip Reference (FCTR) circuit card was installed in APRM A. One new Period Based Detection System (PBDS) circuit card was installed in LPRM A and one in LPRM B. -The digital port output from the PBDS cards was connected to a system to collect data and operational experience during downpower and power ascension for RFO #11 and to monitor the PBDS response during various plant operations.

The above data from Pilgrim and other BWROG Enhanced Option 1A plants was reviewed by the BWROG in July. - Utilities experienced higher than expected counts at stable, rated power conditions with the least sensitive PBDS settings of period tolerance and corner filter frequency.

The frequency of Hi alarm signals due to these high counts is unacceptable because it is not a meaningfulindication of stability conditions. The BWROG is modifying the firmware of the PBDS card to increase the filter range. To accommodate this hardware improvement and additional testing, BECo is revising its finalimplementation date to June 30,1998.

1 Page 23 of 34

. ',- ATTAC'IMENT 2 SCHEDULE B INTERGRANULAR STRESS CORRO$lON CRACKING OF THE CORE SHROUD (GL 94-03) (LTP

- #669)

Commitment Description This Generic Letter (GL) requires an inspection or repair of the Core Shroud no later than the next scheduled Refueling Outage.

During RFO #10 (April 1995, shroud stabilizers will be installed in lieu of an inspection of horizontal welds. These stabilizers will vertically and laterally support / replace the circumferencial welds (H-1 through H-10) in the shroud and will be designed to meet the BWR Vessel & Internals Project (BWRVIP) generic repair criteria. Selected vertical welds, ring segment welds, and vessel attachment l

welds will be inspected to ensure structural adequacy.

l A detailed plan for installing 4 shroud stabilizers and inspecting selected parts of the shroud was submitted to the NRC on January 16,1995.

l (BECo IADB RL 95.0012) l References

1) NRC Letter dated July 25,1994,1.94.152, GL 94-03: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in BWR's

2) BECo Letter dated August 27,1994,2.94.090, Response to GL 94 03

3) BECo Letter dated January 16,1995,2.95.004, Core Shroud Stabilizer Design.

4) BECo Letter dated March 21,1995,2.95.037, PNPS response to the NRC Staff request for additionalinformation concerning the Pilgrim Core Shroud.

5) BECo Letter dated April 14,1995,2.95.048, Additionalinformation concerning our planned modification of the Pilgrim Core Shroud.

6) BECo Letter dated April 27,1995,2.95.056, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Pilgrim Core Shroud Modification.

7) BECo Letter dated May 3,1995,2.95.060, Commitment letter to provide Inservice inspection 1 plan by November 9,1995 and information on XM-19 by August 9,1995.

8) NRC Letter dated February 1,1995, Request for withholding information from Public disclosure.

9) NRC Letter dated February 24,1995, Request for Additional Information.

10) NRC Letter dated March 14,1995,1.95.042, Request for AdditionalInformation, 11)- NRC Letter dated April 17,1995,1.95.066, Request for Additional Information.

12) NRC Letter May 12,1995, Safety Evaluation Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Core Shroud Repair.

13) BECo Letter dated July 24,1995,2.95.079, provided additional test data on air cooled XM-19.

14)- BECo Letter dated July 29,1996,2.96.071, Core Shroud Post-Modification Inspection Plan.

15) BECo Letter dated October 30,1996,2.96.091, inservice Inspection Plan.

Commitnant History /Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1994 - July 31,1994 We submitted a response to the Generic letter on August 27,1994.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1904 - January 31,1995 Installation and inspection plan submitted to NRC, per BECo Letter 2.95.004 dated January 16,1995.

Page 24 of 34

ATTACHMENT 2 s

SCHEDULE B Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1995 - July 31,1995 The Core Shroud stabilizers (4) were installed at PNPS during RFO #10. In our May 3,1995 ,

letter (Reference 7) we stated we would submit our reinspection plans in November 1995.

These plans will be based on the BWRVIP Guidelines that are now expected to be finalized in June 1996. We will provide a status of the reinspection program in our next LTP update.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1995 - January 31,1996 Inspection plans for the core shroud and stabilizer hardware will be in compliance with the BWRVIP Guidelines. These guidelines are currently expected to be finalized by June 1996.

We will include these inspection plans as part of our standard refueling outage inspection plan submittal. This plan will be submitted six months prior to the start uf the refueling outage.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1996 - July 31,1996 The BWRVIP submitted the Core Shroud Reinspection Guicelines to the NRC in March 1996.

The NRC has issued a request for additionalinformation questioning a number of issues l including bolt torque, inspection of threaded fasteners, and load bearing welds. Our inspection i

plan will be finalized and submitted to the NRC when these issues are resolved. It is our intention that our inspection plan will follow the BWRVIP Guidelines (Ref.14).

l Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 31,1997 BECo submitted the Core Shroud Reinspection plan as part of RFO #11 Inservice Inspection Plan (Ref.15). The core shroud will be inspected during RFO #11 in accordance with the BWRVIP-07 Guidelines for shrouds that have completed repairs.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 Core shroud inspections were completed in RFO #11 in accordance with BWRVIP-07 for shrouds that have been repaired. One tie-rod assembly (25%) was examined to VT-3 standards and 134'(25%) of vertical weld seams were UT examined. No indications were found.

We will continue to monitor industry events involving the core shroud issues and participate in the BWRVIP program. Currently, there are no core shroud inspections planned for RFO #12.

This item is now closed and will be removed from future LTP updates. l Page 25 of 34

,( ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEB SOUTH WEYMOUTH NAVAL AIR STATION (LTP #645)

Commitment Description We committed to include a status of the possible closure of the South Weymouth Naval Air Station and its impact on Emergency Planning for Pilgrim Station in this Long Term Program Report.

The Massachusetts Emergency Preparedness Agency (MEMA) has overall responsibility for Radiological Emergency Response planning in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

(BECo IADB RC 95.0059)

References

1) BECo Letter dated September 30,1995,2.95.098 Commitment History /Proaress l

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1995 - July 31,1995 I

A final decision has not been made regarding the closure of the South Weymouth Naval Air Station. Formal Congressional approval is not expected until December.

We met with the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency on August 17th to discuss plans should the federal government close the station.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1995 January 31,1996 The South Weymouth Naval Air Station is expected to be officially closed as a naval air base in September 1997. It is our understanding the base will be tumed over to the local communities at that time.

Approximately 100 emergency personnel are required to staff the South Weymouth reception center. During 1994 and 1995, approximately 135 Navy, civilian, and local volunteer personnel were trained and assigned to the reception center.

Some emergency personnel are expected to be transferred out of the area when the base closes. Additional emergency personnel from the surrounding local towns ware recruited in October 1995. Approximately 100 additional personnel were identified as emergency volunteers.

On November 17,1995, and February 7,1996, classroom training was held for both new and existing personnel. On February 24,1996, a training practical at the reception center will be conducted.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1996 - July 31,1996 The South Weymouth Naval Air Station is not expected to close until September 27,1997. It is expected that the buildings and grounds will be tumed over to local communities at that time.

All Navy aircraft are expected to move out of the facility on August 27,1996.

Page 26 of 34 i

U

\ ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEB During the month of February 1996, approximately 130 people from the surrounding communities were trained to staff the reception center. MEMA Area ll and emergency management agencies from the surrounding communities continue to recruit volunteers to maintain proper staffing levels for the reception center. They are also seeking attemative locations in case the reception center in South Weymouth cannot be maintained.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 31,1997 The South Weymouth Naval Air Station (NAS) remains scheduled for removal of naval personnelin September 1997, with ongoing movement of personnel and securing of facilities.

Staffing of the reception center remains virtually unaffected due to the closure, since reception center functions are assigned to and performed by trained volunteers from the surrounding communities. We have recently been requested to relocate the reception center equipment from the existing gym and chapel areas by June 1,1997, in order to facilitate temporary closure of these facilities. MEMA Area ll, assisted by Boston Edison staff, is seeking alternative locations in case the reception center at South Weymouth cannot be maintained. Additionally, i we have been in contact with the NAS Reuse Planning Committee and are exploring the use of subleases for the existing facilities, or altemate NAS facilities, in order to establish interim and continued use of the base as a northem reception center.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 l

l MEMA Area 11, with Boston Edison assistance, gained approval for the use of Braintree High School as the new northem reception center. The command center which supports the northern reception center was mvved from the chapel at the South Weymouth NAS to the Braintree Emergency Operations Center on May 21,1997. Tabletop drills and training were conducted to support the transfer of the reception center and command center. The physical move of the equipment was completed, and a successful walkthrough demonstration was conducted on May 31,1997. Public information advisories, " clip and save" paper announcements, and radio spots were placed in local newspapers and radio stations announcing the move of the reception center. The transfer of the northern reception center was reviewed and evaluated by FEMA and MEMA. This item is now closed and will be removed from future LTP updates.

Page 27 of 34

,,'\ ATTACHMENT 2 s,

SCHEDULE B ECCS PUMP STRAINERS (Bulletin 95-02) , (Bulletin 96-03) (LTP #723)

Commitment Descriotion:

Pilgrim has performed testing for the purpose of confirming suppre.sion pool and strainer cleanliness.

The testing confirmed strainer cleanliness, and the results were transmitted to the NRC (Reference 3).

Pilgrim will inspect the ECCS suction strainers in RFO #11 and will also continue with pool cleaning in that outage. Future pool cleaning frequency will be based on a plan consistent with generic studies currently on going via the BWROG. Pilgrim completed foreign material exclusion (FME) procedure enhancements on February 8,1996.

Bulletin 96-03 requested that appropriate procedural measures and plant modification to minimize the potential for clogging of ECCS suppression pool suction strainers by debris generated during a LOCA.

BECo plans to install new ECCS suction strainers that will increase the design margin relative to the existing design basis.

(BECo IADB RL 95.0033)

References:

1) NRC Bulietin 95-02, " Unexpected Clogging of a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cool Mode", dated 10/17/95 (BECo Letter 1.95.165)

2) BECo Response dated 11/16/95 (BECo Letter 2.95.118)

3) BEs 120-Day Response dated 2/13/96 (BECo Letter 2.96.007)

4) NRC Bulletin 96-03, " Potential Plugging of Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling Water Reactors", 5/6/96 (BECo Letter 1.96.078)

5) NRC Regulatory Guide 1.82, Rev. 2: Water Sources for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a Loss of Coolant Accident, dated May 1996 (B5Co Letter 1.96.086)

6) BECo Letter dated 11/1/96,2.96.092, Pilgrim's 180 Day Response to NRC Bulletin 96-03,

7) BECo Letter dated 2/7/97,2.97.012, Additionalinformation regarding pump suction strainer installation at Pilgrim Station.

Commitment HistorvlProaress:

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1995 - January 31,1996 Pilgrim has conducted a review of ECCS capability and has determined that the ECCS systems are operable, the strainers are not clogged or degraded, and N suppression pool is free of debris that is or can become suspended and result in strainer clogging, This conclusion is based on previous pool cleaning activities and inspections and verified by representative pump performance testing.

Foreign material exclusion (FME) procedures are in place that should prevent the introduction of material with the potential to compromise ECCS capability. Further enhancements to drywell cleanliness practices are planned to reduce the potential for foreign material entering the torus.

Trending in terms of water cleanliness and pump suction pressures are in place and will continue in order to monitor water quality with respect to this issue. Suppression pool cleaning is scheduled for RFO #11. ' This and subsequent cleaning / inspection are intended to be consistent with BWROG guidance with respect to items such as sludge generation rate and cleanliness criteria. Pilgrim is active in the BWROG committee and intends to participate Page 28 of 34

2\ ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULEB aggressively in the development of the Utility Resolution Guide (URG) currently being de < eloped by the owners group.

Progress and Summary of Changes February 1,1996 - July 31,1996 Plans are being developed for the purpose of increasing design margin consistent with the Bulletin and Regulatory Guide identified above. Resources are being applied to the design and procurement of extended surface area passive strainers and the review of options related to minimizing material transport post LOCA. Pilgrim is active in the BWROG committee and intends to participate aggressively in the development of the Utility Resolution Guide (URG) currently being developed by the owncts group. Based on the Bulletin / Regulatory Guide and the URG, Pilgrim will make modifications to increase design margin at the earliest possible I

scheduled outage of sufficient duration to implement the respective modification. Based on the analytical and test data currently available, Pilgrim's licensing basis, and the BWROG preliminary recommendations, we would expect to install extended surface area passive strainers in RFO #11. In addition, we are ev ' ..ating the potential of modifying susceptible insulation. Our required 180 day response to the Bulletin / Regulatory Guide will provide specific detail.

Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 31,1997 There are no significant changes to the commitments identified or referenced above.

Pilgrim continues to move forward with the design and installation of passive, extended surface area ECCS suction strainers in RFO #11 (February 1997). The installation of the new strainers willincrease design margin relative to the existing licensing basis. The new strainers will be installed per our design change process under 10CFR50.59 since the modification represents a design change improvement within our current licensing basis.

This modification may represent Pilgrim Station's final resolution of Bulletin 96-03. This determination will be made when the NRC formally approves either the BWROG Utility Resolution Guide (URG) or the Pilgrim specific design criteria. BECo Letter 97-012, dated February 7,1997, also communicates this intent.

Pilgrim's request for schedule extension, BECo Letter 96-092, remains in place primarily due to the lack of approved generic design criteria relative to Bulletin 96-03 and the uncertainties relative to installation of the strainers in the suppression pool during RFO #11. NRC response to this request has not been received.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 New ECCS suction strainers were installed during RFO #11. Engineering is working on its analysis of the new strainers in accordance with Bulletin 96-03.

Page 29 of 34 o

• \ ,.* \ ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CONVERSION PROJECT (LTP #706)

Commitment Description We committed to convert the current customized Pilgrim Station Technical Specifications to the NUREG-1433 " Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants BWR/4", also known as Improved Standard Tecnnical Specifications (ITS). This conversion is contingent upon agreement with the NRC that ITS requirements deleterious to Pilgrim Station and are outside the current license basis will not be incorporated in the converted Technical Specifications. This project, to the extent practical.

willincorporate approved revisions to NUREG-1433.

The conversion project is expected to be complete and submitted to the NRC in the third quarter 1998.

(BECo IADB RC 96.0052)

L References j 1) NUREG-1433 " Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants BWR/4" Commitment Historv/Proaress

- Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1996 - July 31,1996 The project team is being assembled and will consist of representatives from Operations, Operations Support, Regulatory Affairs, Engineering, and Training. It is expected that an administrative Technical Specification amendment request will be submitted in early 1997. This  ;

request will convert sections 4,5, and 6 to the standard format and content. The second and final submittal is scheduled for third quarter 1998. i Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 1,1997 The project team has been assembled and consists of representatives from Operations, Operations Support. Regulatory Affairs, Engineering and Training. It is expected that an administrative Technical Specification Amendment request will be submitted early in the second '

quarter of 1997. This request will convert sections 4,5, and 6 to the standard format and content. The second and final submittalis scheduled for first quarter 1998.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 The administrative Technical Specification amendment request will be submitted in September 1997; We are re-evaluating our schedule for the final submittal.

l Page 30 of 34

-\,,. \ ATTACHMENT 2 SCHEDULE B

+

BORAFLEX DEGRADATION IN SPENT FUEL POOLS (GL 96-04) (LTP #707)

Commitment Description Generic Letter 96-04 (Reference 1, NRC Letter dated June 26,1996,1.96.107) required utilities /

licensees using Boraflex as a neutron absorber in spent fuel storage racks to provide a response within 120 days that: (1) assesses the capability of the Boraflex to maintain a 5-percent suberiticality margin, and (2) submits to the NRC a plan describing its proposed actions to provide assurance that the 5% subcriticality margin continues to be maintained in the future.

Boston Edison requested an extension to December 18,1996 (Reference 2, BECo Letter dated September 2,1996,2.96.107) to allow blackness testing to be conducted and an assessment of the test results.

In Reference 3, Boston Edison committed to the following:

o Pertinent Boraflex analysis information concerning the >5% suberiticality margin will be incorporated into the FSAR.

• Another blackness test of selected Boraflex cell panels will be conducted in 1998, e

The post-1998 schedule for direct material surveillance will be determined using the 1996 and 1998 blackness testing data and will consider spent fuel pool silica data.

(BECo IADB RC 96.0031)

References

1) NRC Letter dated June 26,1996,1.96.107, Generic Letter 96-04, "Boraflex Degradation in Spent Fuel Pools".

2) BECo Letter dated September 23,1996,2.96.084, Request for Extension.

3) BECo Letter dated December 18,1996,2.96.107, Response to GL 96-04.

Commitment History /Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 1,1997 Boston Edison performed a blackness test of the Boraflex materiaiin its spent fuel pool racks; expected shrinkage of the Boraflex was observed. Re analysis of the spent fuel pool subcriticality was also performed assuming degradation of the Boraflex that far exceeded the level observed in the most recent tests; the analyses confirmed Pilgrim's margin to criticality is greater than the minimum required of 5%.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997.

We moved fuelin the spent fuel pool for blackness testing in 1998.

Page 31 of 34

,' \ ATTACHMENT 2

\,.

SCHEDULE B ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS (GL 96 06)

Commitment Description Generic Letter 96-06 (GL) (Ref.1) requested licensees to determine the susceptibility of their facility containment air cooler water systems to either waterhammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions, determine the susceptibility of piping systems that penetrate the i

containment to thermal expansion of fluid and over pressunzation, and assess the operability cf affected systems and take corrective action, as appropriate, to satisfy system design and operability requirements. Licensees were requested to submit a written report within 120 days of the GL issuance.

Boston Edison responded to Generic Letter 96-06 in Reference 2, BECo Letter 97-06, dated January 28,1997.

The reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system loop B provides the cooling water for the containment air coolers. The containment air coolers at Pilgrim Station do not perform any active safety-related function in response to any postulated design basis accidents. An evaluation of the RBCCW system inside containment subject to heating during design basis loss of coolant accidents was conducted and concluded the system is not susceptible to waterhammer or two-phase flow. The system is operable and corrective actions are not required, A review of drywell penetration piping was performed to determine the susceptibility of each line to thermal expansion of fluid such that thermal pressurization of the line could occur. As a result, Boston Edison committed to the following:

. Add PSV-4033 to the IST program and test or replace with a new relief valve during RFO #11.

Open Valves 1400-64A and 1400-63A during RFO #11 to prevent build-up of pressure in the line. (Complete)

Add a pressure relieving device to the drywell floor and drywell equipment sumps discharge lines ensuring pressure build-up due to fluid thermal expansion is limited. (Complete)

(BECo IADB RC 97.0002)

References

1) NRC Letter dated September 30,1996,1.96.143, GL 96-06, " Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment integrity During Design Basis Accident Condition."

2) BECo Letter dated January 28,1997,2.97.006, "120-Day Response to GL 96-06."

Page 32 of 34

' ' ,- , ,,* \. _

ATTACHMENT 2

\

SCHEDULE B 4

Commitment Historv/Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes August 1,1996 - January 31,1997.

The committed actions are scheduled for implementation during RFO #11.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 During RFO #11, the following actions were completed:

• RBCCW valve PSV-4033 was replaced with a new relief valve.

Core Spray valves 1400-64A and 1400-63A were opened.

in lieu of adding a pressure relieving device to the drywell floor and drywell equipment sump pump discharge lines, a hole was drilled in a pump discharge check valve in each line to preclude pressure build up due to fluid thermal expansion.

The inclusion of PSV-4033 into the IST program is in progress. The valve has been included in the IST program revision that is in the approval process and should be issued by September 30,1997, Page 33 of 34

)

' \([, d - ATTACHMENT 2 '

SCHEDULE B TESTING OF SAFETY-RELATED LOGIC CIRCUlTS (GL 96-01)

Commitment Description Generic Letter (GL) 96-01 alerted licensees of potential problems in Logic System Functional Testing (LSFT) activities. Pilgrim conducted a review of past and present activities and practices associated with LSFT.

Boston Edison responded to GL 96-01 in Reference 2.

Boston Edison committed to the following:

l =

Pilgrim will re-review two LSFT systems in response to GL 96-01. The re-review results will determine the need to review other LSFT systems. Actions associated with GL 96-

01 will be completed before startup from the next refueling outage (RFO #11).

(Complete)

. A letter to the NRC confirming completion of these actions will be submitted 30 days after completion. (Complete)

(BECo IADB RC 96.0004)

References >

1) NRC Letter dated January 10,1996,2.96.07, GL 96-01; Testing of Safety-Related Logic Results.

2) BECo Letter dated April 19,1996,2,96.037, Response to GL 96-01.

3) BECo Letter dated March 7,1997,2.97.028, Final Response to GL 96-01 Commitment History /Proaress Progress and Summary of Changes - August 1,1996 - January 31,1997.

The re-review of the two LSFT systems, Core Spray and Automatic Depressurization Systems, is complete. The confirmation letter documenting the completion of GL 96-01 actions will be submitted to the NRC by March 8,1997.

Progress and Summary of Changes - February 1,1997 - July 31,1997 The re-review did not indicate a need to perform re reviews of other logic systems. The confirmation letter documenting the completion of GL 96-01 actions was submitted to the NRC on March 7,1997.

This item is completed and will be removed from future LTP updates.

Page 34 of 34 j

e r..

ATTACHMENT 3 [

Page 1 of 2 -

LTP SCHEDULE C ITEMS

• LTP No. Title Auaust 1997 Target Schedule Comments --

108 Setpoint Calculation Project 1998 No Change 448 Inspect / Replace Lower Core Support Plate Flow RFO #11 This item is complete.

Plugs (GE SIL 359) 486 Intake Canal Dredging Phase 1: 1997 underway, to be completed in Phase I was approximately the summer of 1997. 30,000 cubic yards and has

' " " * ' 8" Phase 2: 1998 is approximately 40,000 cubic yards.

524 Replace Simplex Panels 1998 Revising SJA to make adequate spares available.

528 Radwaste Filter Demin 1996 This item is complete.

546 Instrument Recirc. Pump Shaft RFO #12 Hardware and software construction is complete.

Final turnover once testing is complete.

590 Turbine Building Effluent Monitoring June 1998 Training to be completed once monitors are retumed to service.

621 3D Monicore - Simulator Upgrade June 1998 On - Schedule 628 Emergency Preparedness Facility Upgrade 1998 On - Schedule f

This list represents a portion of major plant bettarments at Pilgrim Station. The total LTP contains additional plant bettermer.ts, programs / projects, and issues.

KRD/dmotTP1LTP97-A3

a 4

ATTACHMENT 3 Page 2 of 2 -

- LTP SCHEDULE C ITEMS

• LTP No. Title August 1997 Target Schedule . Comments  ;

646 Gaitronics Mods 1998 No Change 684 Augmented Offgas System Upgrade RFO #12 AOG system installed during RFO #11. Testing for PDC 95-08 will be done in RFO #12 under MR19403940..

687 EPIC Upgrade 1997 Testing in progress.

Expected completion December 1997.

689 Simulator Core Model Upgrade 1998 No Change 690 Electronic Imaging 1999 System is in acceptance testing and validation for the distribution of plant procedu es. It is expected to be expanded on a continuing basis to include other documents.

691 Plant Material Condition Upgrade Ongoing - to be completed in 2000 Project to continue through 1997 with limited scope.

700 Personnel Contamination Monitor Upgrade 1998 Four additional portal monitors to be purchased and installed in 1998.

722 Chemical Decontamination Project 1998 Chemical decon of Recirc piping was completed during RFO #11 (final report was issued 4/7/97).

Chemical decon of RHR to be done in 1998.

• This list represents a portion of major plant betterments at Pilgrim Station. The total LTP contains additional plant betterments, programs / projects, and issues.

KRD/dfrc/LTP/LTP97-A3 l _ - _ - _