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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20196D0241999-06-16016 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactivity Control Incorporating Operating Requirements That Are Consistent with NEDO-21231, Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence ML20206R8161999-05-11011 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re HPCI & RCIC Surveillance Testing ML20206H9771999-05-0505 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Licensing Basis for EDG on- Site Diesel Fuel Storage Requirements & Corresponding TSs ML20207F1171999-03-0303 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Page 3/4.6-13 Re Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program Withdrawal Schedule ML20237E0851998-08-24024 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Supporting Proposed TS Amend Related to EDG AOT ML20236X7191998-07-31031 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Page 3/4.9-5 Re Suppl to EDG for Allowed Outage Time ML20249C7101998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Correcting Typos & Updating Bases ML20249B3231998-06-15015 June 1998 Revised Complete Set of TS Pages Re Relocation of Radioactive Effluent TS & Radiological Environ Monitoring Program to ODCM ML20217F9341998-03-26026 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re EDG Allowed Outage Time ML20217H2791998-03-25025 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.6.A.1 & 4.6.A.1,pertaining to Primary Sys Boundary,Thermal & Pressurizations Limitations & Surveillance Requirements & Basis 3/4.6.A ML20203D4981998-02-20020 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Incorporating Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature of 75 F Into TS 3/4.5.B & Bases,As Required by Amend 173 ML20217K5691997-10-24024 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Page Adding Footnote Declaring One Containment Isolation valve,30-CK-432,operate for Limited Period Despite Not Being within IST Interval for Reverse Flow Testing ML20211G2311997-09-12012 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Radiological Environ Monitoring Program Moved to ODCM ML20210K4381997-08-0808 August 1997 Revised TS Pages 3/4.5-7,B3/4.5-6 & B3/4/.5-7 Requiring Verification That SBO-DG Is Operable Prior to Voluntarily Entering LCO ML20196J0041997-07-22022 July 1997 Proposed Revised TS Bases for Section 3.5.F,correcting Volume of Water Available in Refuel Cavity & Dryer/Separator Pool When Flooded to Elevation 114 Ft & Revising Torus Water Volume to Reflect Volume Above Min Pump NPSH ML20136J5501997-03-0707 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Rev for Section 3.10, Core Alterations Allowing Removal of Suspect Fuel Bundles Out of Planned Sequence ML20134C9671997-01-24024 January 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.0 Re Safety Limits ML20133A6511996-12-23023 December 1996 Proposed Revised Tech Specs 1.0 Re definitions,3.4 Re Standby Liquid Control sys,3.5 Re Core & Containment Cooling systems,3.7 Re Containment Systems & 3.9 Re Auxiliary Electrical Sys ML20132E5491996-12-10010 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Table 3.2.C.1 Re Instrumentation That Initiates Rod Blocks,Table 3.2.C.2 Re Control Rod Block Instrumentation Setpoints & Table 4.2.C Re Minimum Test & Calibr Frequency for Control Rod Blocks Actuation ML20135C1461996-11-26026 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Definition 1.M, Primary Containment Integrity, to Include All Instrument Line Flow Check Valves to Make Definition Consisten W/Lco 3/4.7.A.2.a.4 ML20134K4361996-11-0707 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Installation of BWROG Enhanced Option 1A ML20117K6551996-09-0505 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Revised TS Pages 3/4.5-7 & 3/4.5-6 ML20116M1561996-08-12012 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs to Plant TS Section 6.0,Administrative Controls & Sections 6.5.B.10.C & 6.14 of Util Quality Assurance Manual ML20111B4201996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Implementation of 10CFR50 App J,Option B ML20108C1071996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Administrative Controls Re QA Review & Audit Requirements of Section 6 from Plant TS to Boston Edison QA Manual ML20111C2761996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3.1.1 Re Reactor Protection Sys (Scram) instrumentation,3.2.C.1 Re Instrumentation That Initiates Rod Blocks & 3/4.4 Re Standby Liquid Control ML20108C0581996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Core Alteration to LCO & Surveillance Conditions Associated W/Secondary Containment ML20108A6561996-04-25025 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Part of Overall Effort to Improve Outage Performance at Plant ML20095E0771995-12-0808 December 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Bases Page B2-2,including GE11 GEXL Correlation Axial Power Profile & R-factor Ranges & Correcting Error in GE11 GEXL Correlation Mass Flux Range in GE Design ref,NEDE-31152-P, GE Fuel Bundle Designs ML20092A4421995-08-31031 August 1995 Corrected Tech Spec Page Re Reactor High Pressure Trip Setting ML20086K2661995-07-14014 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Section 2.1,Bases:Safety Limits; Section 3.3.C,scram Insertion Times & Section 4.11.C, Minimum Critical Power Ratio to Reflect Use of Advanced GE-11 Fuel Design in Cycle 11 ML20078R6221995-02-15015 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Substituting for Pages Contained in Proposed TS Amends Submitted Prior to 950130 Authorization ML20078N4861995-02-0909 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Reactor High Water Level Isolation Trip Level Setting ML20077M6921995-01-0909 January 1995 Proposed Reformatted Tech Specs & Bases ML20078K8151994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed TS Pages 3/4.2-20 & 3/4.2-35 Re Tables 3.2.C-1 & 4.2.C ML20078K7961994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Changes to MSIV Leakage Requirement ML20077A8991994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Suppression Chamber Water Level ML20077B1861994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs 3.5.F,4.5.F.1 & 3.9.B.1 & 2 Re EDG Allowed out-of-svc Time ML20072T0521994-09-0606 September 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Modification to Append a of Operating License DPR-35 Re Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe ML20072S0501994-09-0606 September 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Instrumentation That Initiates Primary Containment Isolation & Initiates or Controls Core & Containment Systems ML20072S0081994-09-0606 September 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Primary Containment,Oxygen Concentration & Vacuum Relief ML20072S0861994-09-0606 September 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Standby Gas Treatment & Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration Sys Requirements ML20069M3311994-06-0909 June 1994 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Allowed out-of-service Time from 7 Days to 14 Days for Ads,Hpci & RCIC Sys,Including Section 4.5.H, Maint of Filled Discharged Pipe ML20067B7111994-02-0909 February 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Wording for Page 3 of License DPR-35,clarifying Words to Aid Operators & Removing Obsolete Mechanical Snubber Acceptance Criterion BECO-93-156, Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Changes Supporting 24 Month Fuel Cycle (Submittal 3)1993-12-10010 December 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Changes Supporting 24 Month Fuel Cycle (Submittal 3) ML20059A9361993-10-19019 October 1993 Proposed Tech Specs for Removal of Scram & Group 1 Isolation Valve Closure Functions Associated W/Msl Radiation Monitors BECO-93-132, Proposed Tech Specs Removing Low Condenser Vacuum Scram in Order to Reduce Spurious Scrams,Unnecessary Plant Transients & Turbine First Stage Pressure Setpoint1993-10-19019 October 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Removing Low Condenser Vacuum Scram in Order to Reduce Spurious Scrams,Unnecessary Plant Transients & Turbine First Stage Pressure Setpoint ML20046D0441993-08-0909 August 1993 Proposed Tech Specs,Proposing 24 Month Fuel Cycle ML20044G1331993-05-20020 May 1993 Proposed Tech Specs Reducing MSIV Low Turbine Inlet Pressure Setpoint from Greater than or Equal to 880 Lb Psig to Greater than or Equal to 810 Psig & Reducing Min Pressure in Definition of Run Mode from 880 Psig to 785 Psig BECO-93-016, Proposed TS 3.5.C,D & E Re k-infinity Factor,Spent Fuel Pool Storage Capacity & Max Loads Allowed to Travel Over Fuel Assemblies,Respectively1993-02-11011 February 1993 Proposed TS 3.5.C,D & E Re k-infinity Factor,Spent Fuel Pool Storage Capacity & Max Loads Allowed to Travel Over Fuel Assemblies,Respectively 1999-06-16
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20196D0241999-06-16016 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactivity Control Incorporating Operating Requirements That Are Consistent with NEDO-21231, Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence ML20206R8161999-05-11011 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Re HPCI & RCIC Surveillance Testing ML20206H9771999-05-0505 May 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Licensing Basis for EDG on- Site Diesel Fuel Storage Requirements & Corresponding TSs ML20205A1451999-03-23023 March 1999 Core Shroud Insp Plan ML20207F1171999-03-0303 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Page 3/4.6-13 Re Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program Withdrawal Schedule ML20151S3851998-08-31031 August 1998 Long-Term Program:Semi-Annual Rept ML20237E0851998-08-24024 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Supporting Proposed TS Amend Related to EDG AOT ML20236X7191998-07-31031 July 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Page 3/4.9-5 Re Suppl to EDG for Allowed Outage Time ML20249C7101998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Correcting Typos & Updating Bases ML20249B3231998-06-15015 June 1998 Revised Complete Set of TS Pages Re Relocation of Radioactive Effluent TS & Radiological Environ Monitoring Program to ODCM ML20217F9341998-03-26026 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re EDG Allowed Outage Time ML20217H2791998-03-25025 March 1998 Proposed Tech Specs 3.6.A.1 & 4.6.A.1,pertaining to Primary Sys Boundary,Thermal & Pressurizations Limitations & Surveillance Requirements & Basis 3/4.6.A ML20203D4981998-02-20020 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Incorporating Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature of 75 F Into TS 3/4.5.B & Bases,As Required by Amend 173 ML20217K5691997-10-24024 October 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Page Adding Footnote Declaring One Containment Isolation valve,30-CK-432,operate for Limited Period Despite Not Being within IST Interval for Reverse Flow Testing ML20211N6871997-09-16016 September 1997 Rev 9 to Procedure 8.I.1.1, Inservice Pump & Valve Testing Program ML20211G2381997-09-15015 September 1997 Rev 8 to PNPS-ODCM, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Odcm ML20211G2311997-09-12012 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Radiological Environ Monitoring Program Moved to ODCM ML20216C0631997-08-29029 August 1997 Semi-Annual Long Term Program Schedule ML20210K4381997-08-0808 August 1997 Revised TS Pages 3/4.5-7,B3/4.5-6 & B3/4/.5-7 Requiring Verification That SBO-DG Is Operable Prior to Voluntarily Entering LCO ML20196J0041997-07-22022 July 1997 Proposed Revised TS Bases for Section 3.5.F,correcting Volume of Water Available in Refuel Cavity & Dryer/Separator Pool When Flooded to Elevation 114 Ft & Revising Torus Water Volume to Reflect Volume Above Min Pump NPSH ML20210K3551997-07-0101 July 1997 Rev 16 to Procedure 7.8.1, Water Quality Limits ML20136J5501997-03-0707 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Rev for Section 3.10, Core Alterations Allowing Removal of Suspect Fuel Bundles Out of Planned Sequence ML20134C9671997-01-24024 January 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.0 Re Safety Limits ML20133A6511996-12-23023 December 1996 Proposed Revised Tech Specs 1.0 Re definitions,3.4 Re Standby Liquid Control sys,3.5 Re Core & Containment Cooling systems,3.7 Re Containment Systems & 3.9 Re Auxiliary Electrical Sys ML20132E5491996-12-10010 December 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Table 3.2.C.1 Re Instrumentation That Initiates Rod Blocks,Table 3.2.C.2 Re Control Rod Block Instrumentation Setpoints & Table 4.2.C Re Minimum Test & Calibr Frequency for Control Rod Blocks Actuation ML20135C1461996-11-26026 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Modifying Definition 1.M, Primary Containment Integrity, to Include All Instrument Line Flow Check Valves to Make Definition Consisten W/Lco 3/4.7.A.2.a.4 ML20134K4361996-11-0707 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Installation of BWROG Enhanced Option 1A ML20117K6551996-09-0505 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Revised TS Pages 3/4.5-7 & 3/4.5-6 ML20116M1561996-08-12012 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs to Plant TS Section 6.0,Administrative Controls & Sections 6.5.B.10.C & 6.14 of Util Quality Assurance Manual ML20117K6611996-07-17017 July 1996 Rev 15 to PNPS Procedure 1.2.2 Administrative OPS Requirements ML20108C0581996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Core Alteration to LCO & Surveillance Conditions Associated W/Secondary Containment ML20111B4201996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Reflecting Implementation of 10CFR50 App J,Option B ML20111C2761996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3.1.1 Re Reactor Protection Sys (Scram) instrumentation,3.2.C.1 Re Instrumentation That Initiates Rod Blocks & 3/4.4 Re Standby Liquid Control ML20108C1071996-05-0101 May 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating Administrative Controls Re QA Review & Audit Requirements of Section 6 from Plant TS to Boston Edison QA Manual ML20108A6561996-04-25025 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Part of Overall Effort to Improve Outage Performance at Plant ML20095E0771995-12-0808 December 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Bases Page B2-2,including GE11 GEXL Correlation Axial Power Profile & R-factor Ranges & Correcting Error in GE11 GEXL Correlation Mass Flux Range in GE Design ref,NEDE-31152-P, GE Fuel Bundle Designs ML20100J2521995-11-22022 November 1995 Rev 7 to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Odcm ML20092B5861995-09-0101 September 1995 Rev 0 to Third Ten-Yr Interval ISI Plan for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20092C4331995-09-0101 September 1995 Startup Test Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Cycle 11 ML20092A4421995-08-31031 August 1995 Corrected Tech Spec Page Re Reactor High Pressure Trip Setting ML20086K2661995-07-14014 July 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Re Section 2.1,Bases:Safety Limits; Section 3.3.C,scram Insertion Times & Section 4.11.C, Minimum Critical Power Ratio to Reflect Use of Advanced GE-11 Fuel Design in Cycle 11 ML20078R6221995-02-15015 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs Substituting for Pages Contained in Proposed TS Amends Submitted Prior to 950130 Authorization ML20078N4861995-02-0909 February 1995 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Reactor High Water Level Isolation Trip Level Setting ML20077Q1181995-01-13013 January 1995 Owner'S Specification for Reactor Shroud Repair ML20077M6921995-01-0909 January 1995 Proposed Reformatted Tech Specs & Bases ML20077A8991994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Suppression Chamber Water Level ML20077B1861994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs 3.5.F,4.5.F.1 & 3.9.B.1 & 2 Re EDG Allowed out-of-svc Time ML20078K7961994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed Tech Specs Re Changes to MSIV Leakage Requirement ML20078K8151994-11-22022 November 1994 Proposed TS Pages 3/4.2-20 & 3/4.2-35 Re Tables 3.2.C-1 & 4.2.C ML20078N8421994-11-18018 November 1994 Rev 32 to Procedure 8.7.3, Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test 1999-06-16
[Table view] |
Text
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Attachment A Proposed Change A change is proposed to Technical Specification Section 4.7.A.2.a.4 to revise the acceptance criteria for allowable MSIV leakage from an individual valve leakage criteria to a maximum total ,
combined main steam line leakage. The allowable leakage of 11.5 scfh per valve would be ,
replaced with a maximum combined main steam line leakage of 46 scfh.
Reason for Chanae ,
This revision will provide a more realistic maintenance threshold resulting in reduced MSIV repair and refurbishment costs, reduced personnel dose exposures, shorter scheduled outages, and extended effective service life of the MSIVs. Although test data (attached Table
- 1) show improved leakage performance, MSIV leakage rates in excess of the current Technical Specification limit have still occurred. Although the MSIVs can be repaired or refurbished to r meet the current limits, the proposed change from 11.5 scfh per valve to a total of 46 scfh for all four lines provides a more realistic leakage limit. ;
Backaround Each of Pilgrim's four main steam lines contain two (inboard and outboard), quick-closing MSIVs. The safety function of the MSIVs is to isolate the reactor system to minimize loss of coolant inventory and provide primary containment to limit radiological release. In the case of a steam line break, as evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.5.4, closure of the MSIVs terminates the blowdown of reactor steam in sufficient time to prevent an uncontrolled release of -
radioactivity from the reactor vessel to the environment. In the case of a LOCA, as evaluated in Section 14.5.3 of the UFSAR, the MSIVs isolate the reactor from the environment and prevent the direct release of fission products from the containment.
The allowable leak rate of 11.5 scfh specified for each of the MSIVs is used to quantify a maximum volume of primary containment atmosphere that can bypass the secondary ,
containment and leak directly to the environment following a design basis LOCA. The ;
Technical Specification requirements assure that this MSIV leakage will not exceed the maximum leak rate of 46 scfh which was the leakage assumed in our LOCA radiological :
analyses. The calculated results are evaluated against the dose guidelines contained in l 10CFR Part 100 for offsite and 10CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) 19 l for the control room. The testing requirements for these valves are found in 10CFF Part 50, Appendix J, " Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Wais-Cooled Pov er Reactors" The type C test requirements in Appendix J typically result n, the waives being tested every refueling outage by local pressurization with air >23 psig, and the current Technical Specification limit per valve of 11.5 scfh.
Industry operating experience with the MSIVs indicates tha'. degradation occasionally occurs in the leak-tightness of the valves. During the early operating history of BWRs in the 1970s, a large number of MSIV leak test failures were reported. Because of concerns that this leakage could compromise the containment function, the NRC formulated a position to require installation of safety-grade leakage control systems to treat this leakage on all BWRs with construction permits issued after March 1,1970. (
Reference:
Regulatory Guide 1.96: " Design of Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Systems for Boiling Water Reactor Nuclear i Power Plants"). Pilgrim, along with other pre-1970 licensees, was exempted from this requirement as long as inservice inspection programs continued to ensure that the MSIVs 1 maintain leakage within the technical specification limits. If valve inspection showed recurring !
problems with excessive leakage, the NRC expectation was that plants experiencing the i leakage would give consideration to installation of a supplementary leakage control system. '
Since high leakages were continuing to be experienced by the industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group (BWROG) formed an MSIV leakage control committee to determine the causes of the high MSIV leakage rates and to develop recommendations for reducing the leakage.
9411250211 941122 PDR ADOCK 05000293 i P PDR l
Pilgrim personnel actively participated in this BWROG effort, and through actions taken in response to the resultant BWROG recommendations, valve leakage rates in excess of allowable have decreased significantly. Modifications made to the valve design and changes in the methods of refurbishment have improved the operability, testability, and reliability of the MSIVs. Table 1 shows the results of our last four tests conducted after modifying and refurbishing the valves. As shown in the table, only one valve has exceeded the Technical Specification allowable leakage criteria and was refurbished accordingly. A review of the data l also demonstrates that adopting a total-leakage criteria will offset the need to refurbish valves 1 I
should leakage exceed the existing per valve criteria, yet remain below the proposed total leakage critena. :
l Safety Evaluation and Determination of No Sianificant Hazards l l
The Code of Federal Regulations (10CFR50.91) requires licensees requesting an amendment to provide an analysis, using the standards in 10CFR50.92, that determines whether a significant hazards consideration exists. The following analysis is provided in accordance with ;
10CFR50.91 and 10CFR50.92.
- 1. The operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed Amendment will not !
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed amendment does not involve a change to structures, components, or systems which would affect the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the Pilgrim Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The proposed amendment results in no change in radiological consequences of the design basis LOCA as currently analyzed for Pilgrim Station.
These analyses were calculated using the combined total leakage factor of 46 scfh for determining acceptance to the regulatory limits for the offsite, control room, and Technical Support Center (TSC) doses as contained in 10CFR100 and 10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
The proposed change does not compromise existing radiological equipment qualification, since the combined total leakage rate of 46 scfh has been factored into our existing equipment qualification analyses for 10 CFR 50.49,
- 2. The operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. j l
There is no modification to the MSIVs or other plant system or structure associated with this amendment which could impact their capability to perform their design function. The total MSIV leakage rate of 46 scfh is included in the current radiological analyses for the assessment of dose exposure following an accident. This proposal changes the allowable j leakage rate from a per valve to a total combined line leakage acceptance criteria but does not j change the cumulative allowable value. Therefore, the proposed change does not create the ;
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.
- 3. The operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment will not i involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
l The allowable leak rate limit specified for the MSIVs is used to quantify the maximum amount of bypass leakage assumed in the LOCA radiological analysis. Results of the analysis are :
evaluated against the dose guidelines contained in GDC 19 and 10CFR100. The margin of safety in this context is considered to be the difference between the calculated dose l exposures and the guidelines provided by the GDC 19 and 10CFR100. Therefore, since the maximum allowable leakage for each valve was assumed and used as the total allowable leakage for the purpose of calculating potential dose, the margin of safety is not affected ,
because the dose levels remain the same. I i
The proposed change has been reviewed and recommended for approval by the Operations ,
Review Committee and reviewed by the Nuclear Safety Review and Audit Committee. I i
1
l t
Schedule of Chance
- j. The next scheduled testing of MSIV leak tightness will be conducted during our next refueling outage planned to commence April 1,1995. Therefore, we request this change on or before April 1,1995, to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
i I
r
TABLE 1 .
MSIV RFO 9 HFO 8 l MCO8 HFO 7 -
Date Iested LKG Date 1 ested LKG Date Iested LKG Date LKG (SLM) (SLM) (SLM) Tested (SLM) 1A 1993 3.331 1991 0.101 3/14/90 1.030 5/31/88 0.613 2A 1993 1.793 1991 0.629 3/14/90 1.030 6/1/88 0.613 1B 1993 0.550 1991 0.755 3/14/90 0.004 6/1/88 0.065 2B 1993 0.550 1991 10.93 3/14/90 0.004 6/1/88 0.065 1C 1993 6.295 1991 5.933 3/14/90 0.003 6/1/88 0.065 2C 1993 2.494 1991 0.824 3/14/90 0.003 6/1/88 0.065 1D 1993 0.542 1991 3.121 3/14/90 2.300 6/1/88 0.945 2D 1993 1.884 1991 1.082 3/14/90 2.300 6/1/88 0.945 Conversion Factor:
6.83 SLM = 11.5 scfh
O a e O
l
.i ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES l
4 i
f L
P
' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont) 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
A. Primary Containment (Cont) A. Primary Containment (Cont)
- 5. All containment isolation 4. Combined main steam check valves are operable lines: 46 scfh @ 23 or at least one psig.
containment isolation valve in each line having where x -
45 psig an inoperable valve is Lt - .75 La secured in the isolated La - 1.0% by weight of position. the contained air
@ 45 psig for 24 hrs.
Primary Containment Tsolation Valves ma n ontainment Isolation Valves
- 2. b. In the event any automatic Primary Containment 2. b. 1 The primary containment Isolation Valve becomes isolation valves inoperable, at least one surveillance shall be containment isolation valve performed as follows:
in each line having an inoperable valve shall be a. At least once per deactivated in the isolated operating cycle the condition. (This operable primary reluirement may be satisfied containment isolation by deactivating the valves that are power inoperable valve in the operated and isolated condition, automatically initiated Deactivation means to shall be tested for electrically or simulated automatic pneumatically disarm, or initiation and closure otherwise secure the times, valve.)*
- b. Test primary contaitunent isolation valves:
- 1. Verify power operated primary containment isolation valve operability as specified in 3.13.
- 1 solation valves closed to satisfy 2. Verify main steam these requirements may be reopened isolation valve on an intermittent basis under ORC operability as approved administrative controls specified in 3.13.
hiendment No. 113T -lH -H9T 3/4.7-5
. . . ~ _ . _ _ __ .____
4, k
e ATTACHMENT C CURRENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES ANNOTATED WITH PROPOSED CHANGES l
l l
l l
l l
1 l
l
.-4 .
- LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3,. 7 ' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (' Cont) 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Cont)
A. Primary Containment (Cont) A. Primary Containment (Cont) '
g ,- ~. ~
- 5. All containment isolation 4. Imy---min-staam N check valves are operable ;, kine-i-selseion-valve ;
or at least one containment isolation where x (1-1Lreffhr-@23-psig.
45 psig
~ " - ' - ~ '
valve in each line having Lt - .75 L a t an inoperable valve is C b la, J La -
1.0% by weight of secured in the isolated the contained air position. N '" '4
@ 45 psig for VG Scfh @ J3 fr @ . 24 hrs. 7 Primary Containment Isolation Valves Primary Containment Isolation Valves
- 2. b. In the event any automatic 2. b. 1 The primary containment Primary Containment . isolation valves Isolation Valve becomes surveillance shall be ;
inoperable, at least one performed as follows: !
containment isolation valve in each line having an a. At least once per inoperable valve shall be operating cycle the deactivated in the isolated operable primary condition. (This containment isolation ,
requirement may be satisfied valves that are power by deactivating the operated and inoperable valve in the automatically initiated isolated condition. shall be tested for Deactivation means to simulated automatic electrically or initiation and closure
. pneumatically dicarm, or times, otherwise secure the valve.)* b. Test primary containment isolation valves:
- 1. Verify power operated ;
primary containment isolation valve operability as specified in 3.13.
- 2. Verify main steam
- Isolation valves closed to satisfy isolation valve these requirements may be reopened on an operability as intermittent basis under ORC approved specified in 3.13.
administrative controls.
kvisionTf7)'-
Amendment No. 1131 -1367 -149 3/4.7-5 1