ML20212E645
| ML20212E645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1986 |
| From: | Mroczka E, Opeka J CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | Charemagne Grimes Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 A02959, A04135, A04557, A2959, A4135, A4557, NUDOCS 8608130121 | |
| Download: ML20212E645 (65) | |
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CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY B E R L I N. CONNECTICUT P.O Box 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 TELEPHONE cos-ees-sooo August 1,1986 Docket No. 50-213 A02959 A04135 A04557 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Mr. Christopher I. Grimes, Director Integrated Safety Assessment Project Directorate U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
References:
(1) 3. A. Zwolinski letter to W. G. Counsil, dated December 17, 1984.
(2) W. G. Counsil letter to D. M. Crutchfield/3. R. Miller, dated September 1,1983.
(3) 3. F. Opeka letter to 3. A. Zwolinski, dated July 12,1985.
(4) H. L. Thompson, Jr. letter to 3. F. Opeka, dated August 26, 1985.
Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 Emergency Operating Procedures Generation Packr.ge On December 17,1984 (Reference (1)), the NRC Staff trr.nsmitted its draft Safety Evaluation for the Haddam Neck Plant Emergency Operating Procedures Generation Package (PGP), which was submitted by the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) on September 1,1983 (Reference (2)).
The NRC Staff's draft Safety Evaluation concluded that the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) program for the Haddam Neck Plant was acceptable except for certain items identified in Section 2.0 of the draft Safety Evaluation. Responses to these items were provided to the NRC Staff on July 12,1985 (Reference (3)). During subsequent informal discussions with the NRC Staff, CYAPCO was requested to provide additional information regarding the development of the upgraded EOPs based upon the Westinghouse Owners' Group Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) and the use of loop isolation valves. This information is provided in Attachment 1. As indicated in our I response to Item 3 of Attachment 1, additional deviations from or additions to the generic ERGS may be identified as the result of our ongoing EOP verification / validation process. Since the upgraded EOPs are required to be 1Q implemented by September 1,1986 in accordance with Reference (4), any other i ip applicable deviations or additions will be submitted to the NRC on or about November 1,1986.
8608130121 860801 PDR ADOCK 05000213 j P PDR
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In addition, CYAPCO has revised the Haddam Neck Plant PGP to clarify the process used to develop and implement the EOPs. Those pages affected by Revision 2 of the PGP are provided in Attachment 2.
Should you have any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
( 9FKA
- 3. F. Opeka Senior Vice President n-By: E.7. fyjko'czka /
Vice Presttlent
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l Docket No. 50-213 -
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Attachment No. I Haddam Neck Plant Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Emergency Operating Procedures Generation Package 4
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August,1986 i
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Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding the Haddam Neck Plant Emergency Operating Procedures Generation Package Item 1:
What revision of the Westinghouse Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) were used during the Plant-Specific Technical Guidelines (P-STG) program?
Response
CYAPCO used Revision 1 of the Westinghouse ERGS.
Item 2:
Which version, i.e., reference plant, of the Westinghouse ERGS was used during the P-STG program?
Response
The high-pressure (HP) version of the Westinghouse ERGS was utilized for the development of the plant-specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) for the Haddam Neck Plant. As discussed in the Executive Volume of the Westinghouse ERGS, the HP version is applicable to plants that are designed with a safety injection system shut-off pressure greater than the pressurizer power-operated relief valve (PORV) setpoint.
The Haddam Neck Plant has two centralized charging pumps as part of the Chemical and Volume Control System. One. of these pumps would normally be operating, taking suction from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and supplying reactor caolant pump seal injection and charging flow to maintain pressurizer i level. The other pump would be in standby. Upon receipt of a safety injection l signal, these pumps are automatically isolated from the VCT and suction is i aligned to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). In addition, the stand-by l pump would automatically start. These pumps, along with the high pressure and l low pressure safety injection pumps will then supply safety injection flow from the RWST to the reactor coolant system. However, if offsite power is lost, the charging pumps will not automatically sequence onto the diesel generators. The other actions described above would still occur. The shut-off pressure of the charging pumps is above the PORV setpoint. Therefore, the HP version was utilized a the starting point for the development of the plant-specific EOPs for the Haddam Neck Plant.
l Item 3:
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- Using the criteria in Section 13.5 of the Standard Review Plan (Revision 0 - July 1985), identify deviations from and additions to the ERGS which are safety
( significant. Provide analyses or technical justification that support the
! acceptability of any deviations and additions.
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Response
Supplement I to NUREG-0737 states that the Procedures Generation Package (PGP) should include either the plant-specific technical guidelines utilized in developing the EOPs or a description of the means by which plant-specific EOPs are generated from generic technical guidelines. Since the Haddam Neck Plant EOPs have been developed based upon the Westinghouse Owners' Group
- Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS), the following process was described in the PGP which was submitted on September 1,1983.
During the development of the plant-specific EOPs,' each Westinghouse ERG step is reviewed.for applicability to the Haddam Neck Plant. In order to facilitate this review, various reference materials are utilized. These reference materials included, but are not limited to:
o The existing EOPs; o Adaptation of the Westinghouse ERGS; o Plant Technical Specifications; o Facility Description and Safety Analysis; o As-built drawings; o Experience gained from past operation of the Haddam Neck Plant and any other similar plant; and o Any other pertinent information.
Deviations from and additions to the generic ERGS are identified and justified, and documented on Step Documentation Forms (an example of which was provided in the PGP). As previously stated in CYAPCO's July 12, 1985 submittal, a comparison of the Haddam Neck Plant Emergency Operating Procedures and the Westinghouse ERGS did not result in the identification of any safety significant issues.
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- Even though Supplement I to NUREG-0737 does not specifically request the i submittal of these deviations to the NRC Staff, we have reviewed our I documentation files to determine which deviations meet the criteria in Section l 13.5 of the SRP. Although we do not necessarily agree that these criteria define safety significant deviations, we have provided in Appendix A to this attachment l
Step Documentation Forms for those deviations which meet the criteria in L Section 13.5 of the SRP. It is noted that the SRP is not directly applicable to operating reactors.
The Northeast Utilities Service Company Safety Analysis Branch performed a confirmatory review of deviations from and additions to the generic guidelines
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unless such occurrences were related to i
l o systems included in the ERGS which do not exist at the Haddam Neck Plant (e.g., the ERGS may direct operator action regarding proper valving of a boric acid injection system for which there is no equivalent system at the Haddam Neck Plant), and o strictly editorial differences.
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Additional deviations from or additions to the generic ERGS may be identified as the result of our ongoing EOP verification / validation process. Since the upgraded EOPs are required to be implemented by September 1,1986, any additional deviations or additions which meet the criteria in Section 13.5 of the SRP will be submitted to the NRC in a future submittal.
Item 4:
Does the Haddam Neck Plant have loop isolation valves? If so, develop guidelines and criteria for the use of the loop isolation valves.
Response
The use of the loop isolation valves (LIVs) following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) has been incorporated into EOP E-3, which is the Haddam Neck specific version of the Westinghouse Emergency Recovery Guideline E-3. There are two conditions under which use of the LIVs are acceptable following an SGTR. They are as an option for post-SGTR handling of the ruptured loop or when the ruptured steam generator also has a leak to the atmosphere. The post-SGTR option was incorporated into the last step of procedure E-3, along with the options of post-SGTR cooldown utilizing backfill, blowdown or steam dump. This incorporation allows the operator the flexibility of choosing the appropriate post-SGTR cooldown for the existing plant conditions. The second option was incorporated as a note to the beginning of the E-3, ECA 3.1, and ECA 3.2 procedures. For both options, the attached page provides guidance to the operator on using the LIVs in mitigating an SGTR. These steps also direct the operator to the appropriate EOPs if loop isolation is not successfully accomplished or to procedure E-1 so that orderly termination of safety injection and appropriate handling of the plant can be accomplished.
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NUMBER TITLE REV. lSSULDATE
-g E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE HP-Rev. 1 f Feb. 1, 1986
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STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ,
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- ATTACHMENT B RCS LOOP ISOLATION
- 1. Isolate flow from ruptured SG.
- 2. Isolate feed flow to ruptured SG.
- 4. Reset SI (see opposite page) . Perform the following:
- a. Open ekts 13A and 13B in DC panels.
- b. Reset SI WL switches.
[ 6. Isolate Hot and Cold leg IF,SGTR with leak to atmosphere isolation valves. or same SG is in progress, THEN go to ECA-3.1, SGTR WITF LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBC00 LED RECOVERY DESIRED. IF NOT, THEN go to appropriate post - SGTR recovery procedure ES-3.1, ES-3.2 or ES-3.3.
- 7. Isolate RCP seal injection and return in isolated loop.
- 8. Open. isolated Loop DH-MOV.
- 9. Open loop bypass valve.
- 10. Verify loop isolated. IF SGTR with lead to atmosphere or same SG is in progress, THEN go to ECA-3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBC00 LED RECOVERY DESIRED. IF NOT, THEN go to appropriate post - SGTR recovery procedure ES-3.1, ES-3.2 or ES-3.3.
NOTE: An isolated loop must remain isolated. Further recovery must be conducted as directed by Plant Engineering staff.
- 11. Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
Page 22 of 22
Docket No. 50-213 Appendix A to Attachment 1 Haddam Neck Plant Comparison of EOPs and ERGS August,1986 i
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The Haddam Neck Plant (HNP) is a four-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor. Some of the systems at the HNP are different than the generic four-loop plant design utilized by Westinghouse in development of the high pressure version of the Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS). These differences were accounted for in the development of the HNP specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). Two of the HNP systems (safety injection system and containment system) are discussed below along with the associated modifications to the ERGS for the plant-specific EOPs. They are discussed here generically and are not repeated Sr each individual EOP step in which they appear.
Safety Injection System The safety injection (SI) system provides borated water to the reactor coolant system for events that require engineered safeguards features operation. The SI system consists of the following four major subsystems.
Charging Subsystem The charging subsystem consists of two centrifugal charging pumps. These pumps are part of the chemical and volume control system and provide charging and reactor coolant pump seal injection flow during normal operation.
Upon receipt of the SI signal, these pumps are automatically isolated from the volume control tank and their suction aligned to the refueling water storage tank (RWST). However, the pumps are tripped on a simultaneous loss of offsite power. During recirculation, the charging pumps suction can be aligned to the discharge of the residual heat removal (RHR) system.
The discharge shut-off pressure of the charging pumps is greater than the RCS pressurizer PORV setpoint pressure.
High-Head SI Subsystem The high-head SI subsystem consists of two centrifugal high-pressure safety
! injection (HPSI) pumps. These pumps are part of the SI system and inject into each of the four cold legs. Upon receipt of an SI signal, the HPSI pumps automatically start taking suction from the RWST. During recirculation the HPSI pumps suction can be aligned to the discharge of the RHR system.
The discharge shut-off pressure of the HPSI pumps is approximately 1,400 psig.
Low-Head SI Subsystem The low-head SI subsystem consists of two centrifugal low-pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps. The LPSI pumps discharge into the RHR system piping and then to the core via four ports in the reactor vessel head. Upon receipt of en SI signal, the LPSI pumps automatically start taking suction from the RWST.
The LPSI pumps are not used during recirculation. The discharge shut-off pressure of the LPSI pumps is approximately 300 psig.
RHR Subsystem The RHR subsystem consists of two centrifugal pumps and two heat exchangers.
These pumps and heat exchangers are part of the RHR system and provide normal plant shutdown heat removal. These pumps are not used for injection.
During recirculation, the RHR pumps are aligned to take suction from the containment recirculation sump and to discharge, after the heat exchangers, to the suction of the charging or HPSI pumps or to the core via the four ports in the reactor vessel head depending on recirculation mode.
The discharge shut-off pressure of the RHR pumps is approximately 150 psig.
The heat exchangers are supplied with service water during Si recirculation modes.
Summary of SI System Differences Based on a comparison of the HNP SI system with that for the generic four-loop plant design utilized in the development of the ERGS, the following differences were noted.
- 1. The generic plant has LPSI injection into the RCS cold legs. The HNP utilizes LPSI injection into the RCS via four ports in the reactor vessel head.
- 2. The generic plant utilizes the RHR pumps both for injection and recirculation. The HNP utilizes two sets of pumps. LPSI pumps are used for injection and RHR pumps are used for recirculation with some of the piping shared.
- 3. The generic plant utilizes charging /SI pump injection through the BIT tank.
The HNP does not utilize a BIT tank for accident mitigation, nor realigns the charging injection path. In addition, the charging pumps are not automatically started for an SI signal coincident with a loss of of fsite AC power.
- 4. The generic plant utilizes simultaneous hot and cold leg recirculation for long-term core cooling and boron concentration control. The HNP utilizes cold leg and hot side recirculation (via the four ports in the reactor vessel head) for long-term core cooling and boron concentration control.
- 5. The generic plant utilizes four accumulator tanks. The HNP does not have accumulators.
The following modifications to the generic ERGS were made in the HNP specific EOPs to account for the above-mentioned plant differences:
o There are steps in the ERGS associated with establishing minimum normal charging flow, isolating the BIT and controlling charging flow to maintain pressurizer level. Since the charging injection path does not realign upon a SI signal, these steps (other than controlling charging flow) were deleted.
o There are steps in the ERGS associated with checking whether the SI accumulators should be isolated. Since the HNP does not have accumulators, these steps were deleted.
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o The terminology utilized at the HNP for simultaneous hot and cold side recirculation is different than that for the generic plant. Therefore, the
. terminology was changed to be HNP specific.
Containment Systems The containment systems provide containment atmosphere heat removal, filtration and pressure suppression for events that require ESF operation. The system consists of the containment air recirculation (CAR) fqns, coolers and filters. In addition, there is a back-up containment spray systemtl)which utilizes the LPSI, RHR or fire system pumps.
CAR System The CAR system consists of four fan coolers and a system of distribution duct work, instrumentation and controls. The fans take suction from the containment atmosphere in the annulus and discharge to the individual reactor coolant loop areas, the refueling cavity area and the containment dome area. The capacity of the CAR system is sufficient to effect the necessary reduction in containment temperature and pressure following any design basis loss of coolant accident or steam line break accident. The CAR fans operate in the emergency mode following a SI signal on low RCS pressure or high containment pressure. This signal also initiates containment isolation. Unlike the generic plant, there is only one containment isolation at the HNP.
Summary of Modifications Based on HNP Containment Systems The following modifications were made to the generic ERGS in the HNP-specific EOPs to account for the containment system differences:
o The generic ERGS have separate steps for resetting SI and containment isolation. Since these are not separate at the HNP, these steps were combined into one step, reset SI and containment isolation.
1 o The generic ERGS have steps for checking if containment spray should be stopped. Containment spray is a manual back-up system in case containment pressure approaches design pressure at the HNP. Therefore,
! these steps were modified to be appropriate for the HNP.
(i}The containment spray system is not safety grade and is not credited in any accident analysis.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. E-0 Page 3 of 12 EOP Step: 7 Verify FW Pumps Running ERG Step: 7 Verify AFW Pumps Rur>ning Justification for difference:
Feedwater for steam generator heat removal after a safety injection signal is supplied by either the main feedwater or auxiliary feedwater pumps. Therefore, this step was modified to be consistent with the plant configuration.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. E-0 Page 4 of 12 EOP Step: 11 (Attached)
ERG Step: 11 Verify Containment Fan Coolers - RUNNING IN EMERGENCY MODE.
Justification for difference:
Only one CAR fan is sequenced onto each diesel generator for an SI signal with loss of offsite power. Therefore additional guidance was provided on starting additional CAR fans. Face dampers open is the emergency mode.
EOP Writer
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Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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11 VERIFY CONTAINMENT FANS RUNNING WITH FACE DAMPERS OPEN:
Three or four fans running on normal Start all available CARFANS power. if off-site power is in service.
If on emergency power, verify start of one CARFAN on each diesel.
Start CARFANS as required.
Start third CARFAN within 15 minutes after accident.
Utilize alternate fan power supply.
If only one diesel operating, Start second fan within'10 minutes and third fan within 15 minutes.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. E-0 Page 4 of 12 EOP Step 12 Verify auto start of diesel generators.
ERG Step: 12 Verify containment ventilation isolation, Justification for difference:
Containment vent valves are closed normally and do not isolate automatically.
Diesels auto start on SI and a check of this feature was used in this step.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. E-3 Page 12 oft
, EOP Step: 20 Reset SI and Containment Isolation ERG Step: 8 Reset SI 9 Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B Justification for difference:
ERG steps 3 and 9 reset the SI and containment isolation. This is necessary at the generic plant to allow control of equipment and establishment of instrument air to containment. The reset is not necessary at the HNP for these purposes.
Therefore, the step was moved to step 20 in the procedure since it is not required and terminating leakage primary-to-secondary is a higher priority.
EOP Writer Date i The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all 4
cf the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may 4-be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. E-3 Page 16 of 21 EOP Step: 32 Check if RCP seal return flow is greater than .2 gpm.
ERG Step: 34 Check if RCP seal return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return valves do not close on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since the subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.1 Page 4 of 16 EOP Step: 4 (Attached)
ERG Step: None Justification for difference:
Charging and component cooling pumps are not automatically sequenced onto the diesel generators following a loss of offsite power. Therefore a step was added to determine if offsite power is available. If not, guidance is provided for loading charging and component cooling pumps onto the diesel generators.
The step was added after verification of automatic actions following a reactor trip.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may 4
be kept on record for future reference.
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NUMBER VITLE REV ISSURDOTE HP-Rev. 1 ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Feb. 1, 1986 i li STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OSTAINED 4 VERIFY ALL AC BUSSES ENEFGIZED BY Perform the following:
OFF-SITE POWER AND GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS OPEN AFTER 52 SEC. TIME a. IF necessary, THEN verify DELAY, diesel generators have energized the erergency busses, then (Breakers open immediately on perform the following actions:
electrical fault.) ,
o Check MCC-5 energized or energize.
o If RCP lower bearing temp is less than 170*F.
- 1) START one CC pump.
- 2) START one CHARGING pump.
- 3) Initiate Seal Water to RCP's.
-, o IF RCP lower bearing temp-I '
erature greater than 170*f.
- 1) Close thermal barrier return valve CC-V-841. ,
- 2) Isolate seal water supply valves I CH-V-345 A, B, C, and D. I
- 3) START CCW pump.
- 4) START CHG pump.
- 5) Slowly open thermal barrier return valve.
o Start CARFANS as required.
o Secure all radiological and chemical releases.
o Isolate steam to Air Ejectors.
o Try to restore offsite power -
See attachment B.
OP%e&3 Sea Page ( of 16
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.1 Page 7 of 16 EOP Step: 7 Verify all AC busses - energized by offsite power - and generator output breakers open after 52 sec. time delay.
ERG Step: 7 Verify all AC busses - energized by offsite power.
Justification for difference:
The generator breakers stay closed for 52 seconds. On a normal trip the operator should check that bus transfer occurs and output breakers open after 52 seconds.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference, i
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.1 Page 7 of 16 EOP Step: 3 Insure condenser steam dump operates in pressure control mode.
ERG Step: 8 Transfer condenser steam dump to pressure control mode.
Justification for difference:
At the Haddam Neck Plant two steam dump valves operate in pressure / temperature mode. The other eight valves operate in temperature control mode. There is no transfer from temperature mode to pressure mode for these valves.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have co'mmon features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-01 Page 6 of 12 EOP Step: 9 ' Check RCP status - #2 and #4 RCP running, #1 and #3 shutdown if on normal power.
ERG Step: 9 Check RCP status - at least one running.
Justification for difference:
- 2 and //4 RCP continue running after a reactor trip if on normal power - RCP 1 and 3 shut down after 52 seconds time delay.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.1 Page 10 of 16 EOP Step: 14 Perform the following steps.
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-ERG Step: None
'i Justification for difference:
The appropriate steps from the existing reactor trip response EOP were added so that the plant would have the proper initial conditions for the transfer to the Normal Operating Procedures. The. ERGS in step 13 (Response Not Obtained column) indicate "Go to appropriate plant procedure." The addition of this step and step #15 clarify the transition.
y) EOP Writer Date i
M The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formylate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a i documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.1 Page 11 of 16 EOP Step: Add step 15, refer to NOP 2.1.4 recovery from reactor trip.
ERG Step: None Justification for difference:
This step was added to transfer to a Normal Operating Procedure for guidance on further actions to be taken.
EOP Writer Date J
The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.2 Page 3 of 8 EOP Step: 7 Check core exit thermocouple temperatures less than 5500F ERG Step: 7 Check RCS Hot Leg Temperature - Less than 5500F Justification for difference:
Core exit thermocouples are used to monitor RCS temperature to ensure adequate subcooling.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may l
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-0.4 Page 5 of 9 EOP Step: Move Step 10 to after Step 14. Renumber Step 11,12,13,14 ERG Step: 10 Check if SI system should be locked out.
Justification for difference:
The plant specific requirement for disabling the SI system is below an RCS temperature of 3400F. Therefore, this step was moved to the appropriate place in the procedure.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES 1.1 Page 4 of 10 EOP Step: 16 Check if RCP seal return flow is adequate.
ERG Step: 16 Check if RCP seal return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return valves do not close on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since the subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES 1.1 Page 5 of 9 EOP Step: 17 Insure condenser steam dump operates in pressure control mode.
ERG Step: 17 Transfer condenser steam dump to pressure control mode.
Justification for difference:
At the Haddam Neck Plant two steam dump valves operate in pressure / temperature mode. The other eight valves operate in temperature control mode. There is no transfer from temperature mode to pressure mode for these valves.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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i Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES 1.1 ;
Page 5 of 10 i EOP Step: 18 Check RCS cold leg temperature stable, l ERG Step: 18 Check RCS hot leg temperature stable.
Justification for difference:
This step verifies that RCS temperature is stable. The step was changed to monitor cold leg temperatures stable.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the : --russ used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES 1.2 Page 11 of 16 EOP Step: 23 Check if RCP seal return flow is adequate.
ERG Step: 26 Check if RCP seal return flow should be established.
Justificatwa for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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~ Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES-1.3 Page 2 of 4 EOP Step: 2 Verify service water flow to RHR heat exchangers. Insure one service water pump is running for each RHR heat exchanger used.
ERG Step: 2 Verify CCW flow to RHR heat exchangers.
Justification for difference:
Service water is used for RifR heat exchanger during accident conditions. Also a check was added for the adequate number of service water pumps running to supply cooling to the CAR fans and RHR heat exchangers.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of tN series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept en record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ES 3.2 Page 2 of 10 EOP Step: 2 Borate the RCS for cooldown in accordance with SUR 5.3-19 boration requirements for reactor shutdown.
ERG Step: 2 Check if SI accumulators should be isolated.
Justification for difference:
This step in the ERG is for isolating the accumulators. This is not appropriate since the HNP does not have SI accumulators. Instead a step giving further guidance to the operators was inserted since step 3 verifies adequate shutdown margin.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 0.0 Page 11 of 15 EOP Step: 20 Step deleted.
ERG Step: 20 Verify containment ventilation isolation.
Justification for difference:
The containment isolation valves have already been locally verified closed or closed in step 19. Therefore, this step is not necessary.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 0.0 Page 11 of 15 EOP Step: 21 Check containment radiation levels to determine if a LOCA has occurred in containment.
ERG Step: 22 Check containment radiation level less than (12)
Justification for difference:
The containment isolation valves have already been locally verified closed or closed in step 19. Therefore, this step is not necessary. However, a check of radiation level is made to determine if a LOCA has occurred.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a
, documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 0.1 Page 5 of 11 EOP Step: 8 Maintain SG pressure at existing pressure using atmospheric vent or hog jet steam valve.
ERG Step: 8 Establish SG pressure Control.
Justification for difference:
The ERG step stabilizes SG pressure using the SG PORV and its controller. The HNP uses that atmospheric vent or hog jet to control SG pressure. Therefore, this step was modified to specify the plant specific equipment used in controlling SG pressure.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series .;f procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of f ? EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA.1 Page 5 of 10 EOP Step: 11 Check if RCP seal return flow is greater than .2 gpm ERG Step: 11 Check if RCP seal return flow should be established Justification for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 1.1 Page 3 of 8 EOP Step: 10 Monitor core cooling equipment for cavitation due to low RWST level.
ERG Step: 10 Verify no backflow from RWST to Sump.
Justification for difference:
The connection between the LPSI pumps for injection and RHR pumps for sump recirculation is downstream of the RHR pumps. Therefore, backflow from the RWST to the sump would not occur and the ERG step is not needed. A step to alert the operators to monitor pumps for cavitation was inserted.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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l Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 1.1 Page 5 of 8 EOP Step: 16 Depress AllIntact SG At Maximum Rate ERG Step: 17 Depress AllIntact SG to ( ) Pressure At Max Rate Justification for difference:
The ERG Steps are to depressurize the RCS, inject the accumulator inventory, and then isolate the accumulators before nitrogen from the accumulators can be injected. HNP does not have accumulators, therefore, the pressure criterion is not need:J. Also ERG steps 18 and 19 were deleted.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 2.1 Page 7 of 13 EOP Step: 19 Check RCS Cold Leg Temperature Stable or Decreasing ERG Step: 21 Check RCS Hot Leg Temperature Stable or Decreasing Justification for difference:
This step verifies that RCS temperature is stable. The step was changed to monitor cold leg temperature.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 2.1 Page 8 of 13 EOP Step: 25 Check if RCP seal return flow is greater than .2 gpm.
ERG Step: 27 Check if RCP seal return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 3.1 Page 14 of 21 EOP Step: 28 Check if RCP Seal Return flow is greater than .2 gpm.
ERG Step: 31 Check if RCP Seal Water return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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l Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 3.3 Page 7 of 14 EOP Step: 16 Check if RCP SW return flow is greater than .2 gpm.
ERG Step: 18 Check if RCP SW return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an 51 signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. ECA 3.2 Page 13 of 17 EOP Step: 22 Check if SW return flow is greater than .2 gpm.
ERG Step: 25 Check if SW return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an 51 signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. FR 1.1 Page 3 of 4 EOP Step: 4 Check if RCP Seal Water return flow is greater than .2 gpm.
ERG Step: 4 Check if RCP SW return flow should be established.
Justification for difference:
Seal water return flow is not isolated on an SI signal. The step was changed to a check of seal return flow adequacy since a subsequent step involves starting an RCP.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRC .1 Page 4 of 7 EOP Step: 10 Depress AllIntact Steam Generators At Maximum Rate ERG Step: 11 Depress AllIntact SG To ( ) psig Justification for difference:
This step is to prevent nitrogen from SI accumulators from injecting - HNP does not have accumulators, therefore the pressure criterion was deleted.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRC .2 Page 4 of 8 EOP Step: 5 Check RVLIS head indication ERG Step: 5 Check RVLIS Dynamic Head Indication Justification for difference:
This step checks to determine if RCS inventory has been restored. The RVLIS system does not have a dynamic head indication. Therefore, RVLIS head indication was used.
1 EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRC .2 Page 5 of 7 EOP Step: 9 Depressurize AllIntact SGs ERG Step: 10 Depressurize All Intact SG To ( ) psi Justification for difference:
The Haddam Neck Plant does not have accumulators. Therefore pressure criterion is not needed.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept un record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRH .1 Page 6 of 12 EOP Step: 19 Reset Si and Containment Isolation ERG Step 12 Reset SI 13 Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B Justification for difference:
Step sequence changed to expedite handling of accident - resetting Si is not required to open the pressurizer PORVs. Therefore as discussed in the ERG background information these steps were moved to later in the procedure.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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e Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRH .3 Page 2 of 4 EOP Step: 2 Isolate Affected SG(s)
ERG Stept 2 Verify FW isolation Justification for difference:
High SG level closes the associated FW reg. valve but does .nt close feedwater isolation vaives or trip the feedwater pumps. Therefore this step was modified to assure FW isolation to affected SG(s).
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
k Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRP.1 Page 5 of 11 EOP Step: 12 Check RCS Cold Leg Temperature Stable.
ERG Step: 13 Check RCS Hot Leg Temperature Stable Justincation for difference:
This step verifies that RCS temperature is stable. The step was changed to monitor cold leg temperature stable.
EOP Writer Date _
The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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,'/. Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRZ l
, Page 2 of 4 EOP Step: 2 Step deleted.
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ERG Step: 2 Verify containment ventilation isolation Justification for difference:
The Haddam Neck Plant does not have a normal, cperating containment ventilation system. The CAR fans which are also utilized for accident conditions are used.
EOP Writer Date __
The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRZ l Page 2 of 4 EOP Step: 5 Close main steamline isolation and bypass valves ERG Step: 5 Verify main steamline isolation and bypass valves - CLOSED.
Justification for difference:
Main steamline isolation valves do not automatically close on high containment pressure. Therefore, step was reworded to close them.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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Step Documentation EOP Rev. FRZ 3 Page 2 of 2 EOP Step: 2 Verify CAR Fan Dampers Are Open and Fans Are Running.
ERG Step: 2 Determine if Containment Atmospheric Filtration System Should Be Placed Inservice.
J Justification for difference:
The CAR fans are used for containment atmosphere filtration.
EOP Writer Date The Writers Guide which is part of this Generation Package will be used to formulate the Emergency Operating procedures in a uniform pattern so that all of the series of procedures will have common features.
The Verification and Validation Checkoff sheets will be used so that a documentation of the process used for the entire development of the EOPs may be kept on record for future reference.
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i' Docket No. 50-213 I
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Attachment No. 2 4
Haddam Neck Plant i
Revision 2 (Affected Pages)-
of the Emergency Operating Procedures Generation Package t
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! July,1986 1-i-
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Each revision number will be accompanied by a date, printed immediately below it.
Examples: Rev.2 1 MAY 1985 2.4 Page Numbering and Identification Each page of a procedure will be identified by the procedure title, alpha-numeric designator, revision number and date in a title block at the top of the page. Each page number will be specified as " of
" centered on the bottom of the page. The last page of each procedure (Page 2 of Z) will additionally be identified by the word "END" following the last instruction step.
- 3. Format The following format is to be applied consistently to all Emergency Response Procedures.
3.1 Procedure Organization All Optimal Recovery Procedures (E, ES, ECA) will have three (3) sections. The Cover Sheet will summarize procedure intent and state either entry symptoms or means of entry. The Operator Actions will comprise the bulk of each procedure and present the actual stepwise guidance. A Foldout Page will summarize information which is continually required for operator guidance. A single Foldout Page will be used for E0, El, E3, ECA 2.1, ECA 3.1, ECA 3.2, ECA 3.3 2
Series.
The function Restoration Procedures will have only the Cover Sheet and Operator Actions.
Page 9 of 56
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3.2 Page Formats All pages of the Emergency Response Procedures will use the same page structure except the Foldout Page which is discussed below.
This page structure employs a pre-printed border to assure all margins are correctly maintained, (margin right side +1/4", margin lef t side el 1/8") and pre-printed designator boxes and page cues to assure completeness and consistency. (See Figure 1.) Line spacing will be approximately 3/16".
The pages for presentation of operator action steps will use a two-column format within the pre-printed border. The left-hand column is designated for operator actions, and the right-hand column is designated for contingency actions when the expected response is not obtained. These pages will use pre-printed title blocks above the separate columns (including the " step" column) for uniformity (see Figure 2.).
The Foldout Page does not use the bordered-page format. It is intended to summarize only that information which an operator should have continuously available, so page content will vary by procedure. Each Foldout Page shall be titled at the top in large bold type " FOLDOUT FOR E-X SERIES PROCEDURES."
Steps for performing operations or list of valves may be placed on the opposite page to clarify procedures. They will be noted by "(See 2 opposite page)" or "(See Attachment A)."
3.3 Instructional Step Numbering Procedure steps will be numbered as follows:
- 1. High-level step
- a. Substep Substeps are lettered sequentially according to expected order of performance. If the order of substep performance is not important, then the substeps are designated by bullets (o).
Page 10 of 56
NUMSER TITLE REY. lSSUE/DATE Figure 1 Preprinted Page Format -
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1 OP5068-4 3-84 Of Page 11 of 56 I
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4 NUMBER TITLE REY. lSSUE/DATE J
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l STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED t
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i Figure 2 Preprinted Page (2-column) Format
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O OP5068-3 3M of Page 12 of 56
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This same numbering scheme is to be used in both the right and left columns of the procedures.
- 4. Writing the Procedure The following format is to be applied consistently when writing Emergency Response Procedures.
4.1 Cover Sheet Each cover sheet will contain two explanatory sections in addition to procedure and page designators. The first will be titled " PURPOSE" and will briefly describe what the procedure is intended to do for the operator. The second section is a summary of those symptoms which require entry into the procedure. This section will be titled
" SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS". Certain procedures such as E-O and ECA 0.0 can be entered purely based on symptoms; for th,ese l2 procedures, a symptom summary is sufficient (see Figure 3). For other procedures, which can only be entered by transition from previous procedures, a summary of the entry conditions (and procedure / step) should be provided (see Figure 4).
4.2 Operator Actions Steps directing operator action should be written in short and precise language. The statement should present exactly the Task which the operator is to perform. The equipment to be operated should be specifically identified, and only these plant parameters should be specified which are presented by instrumentation available in the control room. (If possible, use of qualified instruments is preferred).
It is not necessary to state expected results of routine tasks.
Page 13 of 56 1
NUMBER TITLE REV ISSUEDATE EO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HP-Rev.1 s
1 Sept. 1983 T
A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to verify proper response of the automatic protection systems following manual or automatic
- . actuation of a reactor trip or safety injection, to assess plant conditions, an! to identify the appropriate recovery guideline.
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS
- 1) The fo? lowing are symptoms that require a reactor trip, if one has not occured:
fp, (See Attachment A)
- 2) The following are symptoms of a reactor trip:
- a. Any reactor first'out trip annunciator lit.
- b. Rapid decrease in neutron level indicated by nuclear x instrumentation.
.T
- c. All shutdown and control rods are fully inserted. Rod bottom lights are lit.
- 3) The following are symptoms that require a reactor trip and safety injection, if one has not occurred:
High Containment Pressure 5 psig (2 of 3 Hcp mercoid) either train Low Pressurizer Pressure 1700 psig ( 2 of 3 PZR pressure channel)
- 4) The following are symptoms of core cooling actuation:
- a. Core cooling actuated annunciator lit
- b. SI pumps running.
- c. SI - WL Switches Trip
- d. Containment Isolation f
I Figure 3 Cover Sheet Example for E-0 0 "5 C' 8 -4 3~8' f Page 1 of 11 Page 14 of 56 J
asussagt 71TLE nav. issut/cAIt E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE IP-Rw. 1 L Sept. 1983 Figure 4 A. PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to terminate leakage of yeactor coolant into the secondary system following a steam generator tube rbpture.
B. SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from:
- 1) E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 23, when condenser air ejector radiation or SG blowdown radiation is abnormal.
- 2) E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 29, E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 4, E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 6, and FR-H.3, RESPONSE TO STEAM GENERATOR HIGH LEVEL, Step 7, when secondary' radiation is abnormal.
- 3) E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 28, E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 3 ES-1.2. POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 6, ES-3.1, POST-SGTR C00LDOWN USING BACKFILL, Step 4, ES-3.2, POST-SGTR COOLDOWN USING BLOWDOWN, Step 4, ES-3.3, POST-SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBC00 LED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 9, ECA-3.1.SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBC00 LED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 4, and ECA-3.2,SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED, Step 4, and ECA-3.3,SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL, Step 5, when an ,
intact SG narrow range level increases in an uncontrolled manner.
- 4) ECA-3.3,SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL, Steps 2, 3, and 4, when pressurizer pressure control is restored.
- 5) E-1 series foldout page whenever any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner or any SG has abnormal radiation.
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- Page 1 of 21 page 15 of 56
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NUMBER TITLE REl l55UE-o ATE , l EO REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HP-Rev.1 Sept. 1983 1
FIGURE 5 Instruction Steps Example STEP ACTION /EXFECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l
NOTE:eSTEPS 1 THROUGH 14 ARE IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS FOLDOUT PAGE SHOULD BE OPEN 1 VERIFY REACTOR TRIP, TRIP REACTOR IJ[ reactor will NOT trip, THEN go to FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO e All Rod bottom lights - LIT NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION /
e Reactor trip - Breakers OPEN ATWS, Step 1.
e Rod position indicators -D.V.M.
indicates rods on bottom IF two or more control rods o' Neutron flux - DECREASING NOT fully inserted, THEN l energency borate 200 ppm for each control rod not l
', fully inserted.
2 VERIFY TURBINE TRIP, TRIP TURBINE
's a. Both turbine stop valves -
,/ CLOSED
- b. A,ll 4 turbine control valves closed 3 VERIFEPOWERTOACEMERGENCYBUSSES
- a. AC emergency busses - AT LEAST a. Try to restore power to at ONE TRAIN ENERGIZED least one ac emergency bus,i If power can NOT be restored '
Bus 8, 4 and 5 isi at least one se emer-or gency bus, THEN go to Bus 9, 6 and 7 ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER, Step 1.
- b. AC emergency busses - ALL b. Try to restore power to ENERGIZED deenergized ac emergency busses.
Bus 8, 4 and 5, Bus 9, 6 and 7 4 CHECK IF SI IS ACTUATED: Check if SI is required. IF ,
SI is required, THEN manus 11y l SI WL switches tripped actuate. Ij[ SI is NOT required, THEN go to ES-0.1, REACTOR SI pumps START and valves TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.
actuated.
i E :e ; cf .'
Page 17 of 56 1
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As a general rule, neither a CAUTION or NOTE will be used to replace an instruction / operator action step. Notes should not i be used for procedure transitions. CAUTIONS or NOTES should 1
be complete on a page and not continued onto a new page.
1 4.2.5 Transitions to Other Procedures or Steps Certain conditions require use of a different guideline or step sequence. Transitions are specified by using the words "go to" followed by the procedure designator, title (in CAPITAL LETTERS) and step number.
Example: Go to ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.
l2 Transition steps will be in accordance with WOG Guidelines.
[1 Transitions to a different step in the same procedure are specified in a similar manner.
Example: Go to Step 20.
4.2.6 Component Identification Equipment, controls and displays will be identified in " operator language" terms. Standard abbreviations which may be used throughout the procedures are listed alphabetically in Table 2.
Since similar components are used in both primary and secondary systems, it is always necessary to clarify the location, even if the wording appears redundant.
A Example: PRZR PORV vs. SG PORV identifies the pressurizer power operated relief valve as distinct from a steam generator power operated relief valve.
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-4.2.7 ~ Level of Detail To allow an operator to efficiently execute the action steps in a procedure, all unnecessary detail must be removed. Any information which an operator is expected to know (based on his training and experience) should not be included. Many actuation devices (switches) in the control room are similar, even though the remotely performed functions are not, so certain action verbs listed here are recommended.
- o. Use " start /stop" for power-driven rotating equipment.
o Use "open/close/ throttle" for valves.
o Use " trip /close" for electrical breakers. (TRIP PULL-OUT or TPO for breake* switches with a pull-to-lock 2 feature.)
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l o Use " place in standby" to refer to equipment when actuation is to be controlled by automatic logic circuitry.
l 4.3 Foldout Page A single foldout page will be supplied for E0, El, E3, ECA 2,1, 2
ECA 3.1, ECA 3.2, and ECA 3.3 Series procedures. The sheet will be numbered as the final page of the last procedure in the series. (That procedure will still be captioned with "END" af ter the last instruction step.) The foldout page will be titled " FOLDOUT FOR EX SERIES PROCEDURES," (see Figure 6) and will use a single column format (vs. two-column).
Each set of operator information will be numbered sequentially and have an explanatory title. The title will be capitalized and underlined for emphasis.
Previously supplied guidance on writing instructional steps is applicable (Section 4.2), with the exception of right-hand column (contingency) instructions.
Page 22 of 56 i
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' 'T FOLDOUT FOR E-0 SERIES GUIDELINES
- a. High-pressure SI pump or charging pump - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
- 2. SI ACTUATION CRITERIA Actuate SI and go to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 1, if EITHER condition listed below occurs:
e RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN 30*F PRZR level - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 10% (17% FOR AD'lSERSE CONTAINMENT)
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- 3. RED' PATH SUEfARY
- a. SUBCRITICALITY - Nuclear power greater than 5%
- b. CORE COOLING - Core exit TCs greater than 1200'F l c. HEAT SINK - Narrow range level in all SGs less than 10% AND total feedwater flow less than 320 gpm.
- d. INTEGRITY - Cold leg temperature decrease greater than 100*F in last 60 minutes AND RCS cold leg temperature less than 222*F.
- e. CONTAINMENT - Containment pressure greater than 40 PSIG.
- 4. AFW SUPPLY MAKEUP CRITERION Start makeup to DWST before level decreases to less than 54,000 gallons.
Figure 6 Fold out page for E-0 i
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