ML20210U875
| ML20210U875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1985 |
| From: | Galanti D, Hayes B, Herr R NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17198A304 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-211 4-83-030, 4-83-30, NUDOCS 8610100281 | |
| Download: ML20210U875 (18) | |
Text
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p UNITED STATES I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[". g O Mj OFFICE OF INVESTIG ATioNS FIELD OFFICE. REGION IV
% ,,,,,+ * " $1NG ,TE Sf REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Title:
Case Number: 4-83-030 ALLEGED FALSIFIED QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS CONCERNING GULF ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC. Date of Report: 2/13/85 Control Office:
OIF0:RIV Status:
CLOSED Licensee / Vendor /0ther:
Gulf Engineering Company, Inc.
1000 South Peters Street Related Data: None New Orleans, Louisiana Docket No. 50-382 Basis of Investigation:
On December 15, 1983, the Region IV Office of Investigations Field Office received a a written request for investigation from the Region IV Regional Administrator.
Region IV advised that an alleger telephonically contacted the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Headquarters duty officer and alleged improper torquing of bolts associated with the emergency diesel generator by Gulf Engineering Company, Inc., a subcontractor at Waterford SES Unit III, Taft, Louisiana. The alleger explained that required torquing had been accomplished on two technical modifications established by Cooper Energy Services, utilizing a torque wrench 38 percent out of tolerance. Additional allegations were also presented with regard to the Gulf Engineering Quality Assurance Manager altering associated emergency diesel generatcr records to reflect only a few bolts were affected, and threatening the Gulf Engineering QC supervisor with termination if he did not " sign off" on the emergency diesel generator documentation.
This investigation reports the results of 01's investigative effort.
Distribution: orted by:
/Qd4/
V e a ninistrator pf David M. 'GalMti Investigator. 0!F0:RIII Approv d by:
./ '
Richarc K. Herr ~
Director 0!F0:RIV
[
Participating Personnel:
Julie A. Metzger Ap r d by:
l[ /
,i M Investigative Assistant 01 Headquarters N'
6(4N W Hayes V ' '
Director, Office of Inyesti tions 8610100281 861001 PDR FOIA GARDE 86-211 PDR
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 SYN 0PSIS Investigative assistance was requested by the Region IV Regional Administrator upon receipt of information that Gulf Engineering Company, Inc., a subcon-tractor for Waterford Steam Electric Station (SES) Unit III, improperly torqued bolts associated with the emergency diesel generators -A- and -B-;
falsified associated records; and ordered the alleger, who was the Quality Control (QC) supervisor, to approve the procedures or be terminated.
When recontacted, the alleger explained that modifications were performed on cam followers of the two emergency diesel generators with a torque wrench which was approximately 38 percent out of tolerance; and to compensate for this the Gulf Engineering Quality Assurance (QA) manager directed him, under threat of termination, to prepare Discrepancy Report No. 047 to incorrectly reflect a 10 percent higher original setting on the torque wrench so that only a few bolts would be affected by the calibration error. He also maintained that someone had used a duplicate of his QC stamp to approve the retorquing of all the bolts on the traveler packages. Accordingly, he concluded that the discrepancy report, which indicated all bolts had been retorqued, was a total fabrication since, in his opinion, no retorquing of either generator was accomplished after the torque wrench was discovered to be out of tolerance.
The alleger also identified a technical issue concerning rain water draining into both emergency generators from uncovered exhaust pipes.
Investigation disclosed one of two torque wrenches utilized during the emergency diesel generator modifications was out of tolerance; however, once the error was discovered by Gulf Engineering Company, Discrepancy Report No.
047 was initiated which appears to have corrected all deficiencies. Review of emergency diesel generator traveler packages identified the dates and subse-quent approval of the rework by the QC supervisor; however, torque values were not listed in the packages for specific bolts.
Interview of the Gulf Engineering QA manager resulted in his denial of directing the QC supervisor to falsify emergency diesel generator records or threatening to terminate the QC supervisor if the records were not altered or 2
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 the work packages were not " signed off." The QA manager stated the Gulf Engineering,QA program identified that a torque wrench utilized on the diesel generator modifications was out of calibration; and as a result the QC supervisor initiated a discrepancy report which ensured that questionable work involving torque values was re-evaluated and/or retorqued under the personal supervision of the QC supervisor. The QA manager conceded that the QC supervisor's (alleger's) entry on the discrepancy report indicating the torque wrench was initially set 10 percent higher than required, was unusual; and te was unable to offer an explanation. The QA manager acknowledged that no supportive documentation was initiated on the retorquing of either generator.
However, he stated Discrepancy Report No. 047 states the retorquing was accomplished and, therefore, no additional documentation is necessary. He noted there are no duplicate QC stamps and the QC supervisor was solely responsible for stamping the approval block of the traveler packages signifying that all bolts had been retorqued.
Individuals whose signatures are also contained on Discrepancy Report No. 047 were interviewed, and each confirmed that all retorquing as listed on the discrepancy report was performed; however, none of them actually observed the rework. These individuals attested to the validity of the QC supervisor's notation concerning the 10 percent higher setting. They explained they would not have signed the discrepancy report without proof or otherwise being aware of a logical explanation for this entry. Individuals responsible for the retorquing were not identified through interviews or available records.
Interview of the independent contractor who was dedicated to the emergency diesel generators at Waterford, disclosed that generator -B- had been taken apart and reassembled under his direct supervision at least twice since the original modification work was accomplished by Gulf Engineering. He advised that on each occasion, the Torque Specification Manual Table was used as a guide for retorquing all the bolts associated with these disassembly and assembly procedures. He stated that to the best of his knowledge, emergency diesel generator -A- has not been totally disassembled since the original work modification was completed. He was, therefore, unable to state whether the bolts which were originally torqued with the improperly calibrated torque wrench were ever retorqued to proper specifications due to the absence of any traveler packages of the retorquing rework.
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. i REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 !
4 l All investigative requirements have been completed and no additional involve-ment by the Office of Investigation is contemplated; however, .the issue of rain water being contained within the engine compartments of both generators has* been referred to the Waterford Technical Task Force for resolution.
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 APPLICABLE STATUTE, REGULATORY, AND LICENSE REQUIREMENTS 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires that licensees will get construction permits implementing a Quality Assurance program meeting the criteria of Appendix B for all activities, including inspections, which affect the safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Further, Criterion 1 states, in part, "The persons and organizations performing QA functions shall have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality problems... including sufficient independence from cost and schedule..."
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance record Criterion 17 requires that inspection and test records shall, as a minimum, identify the inspector or data recorder, the type of observation, the results, the acceptability, and the action taken in connection with any deficiency noted.
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 DETAILS INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS REGARDING THE ALLEGATIONS OF FALSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR RECORDS AT THE DIRECTION OF THE GULF ENGINEERING COMPANY QA MANAGER AND HIS SUBSEQUENT ORDER TO THE GULF ENGINEERING COMPANY QC SUPERVISOR TO APPROVE SAID RECORDS OR BE TERMINATED On December 15, 1983, the Region IV Office of Investigations Field Office received a written request for investigation from the Region IV Regional Administrator (Exhibit 1). Available information indicated Richard WADE, Quality Control (QC) supervisor, Gulf Engineering Company, Inc.,
telephonically reported that a torque wrench used by Gulf Engineering during modifications to the emergency diesel generators at the Waterford SES was 38 percent under-calibrated. He alleged that the Quality Assurance (QA) manager, Raymond RONQUILLO, changed records to indicate only a few bolts were affected by the torque wrench, and directed him (WADE) to sign off on associated documentation or be terminated.
INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Although the reported falsification of records and intimidation (threat of termination) were presented by WADE as two separate allegations, they are addressed concurrently in this report due to their interrelationship. Attempts to further identify and interview two individuals identified as witnesses by WADE were unproductive. These efforts included a review of available records, interviews of former co-workers, and contact with a relative. Since the issues were resolved through other sources, these efforts were discontinued. Unrelated technical concerns alleged by WADE were referred to Region IV for evaluation and appropriate action.
On April 24, 1984, Mr. Richard C. WADE was telephonically interviewed by NRC Investigator David M. GALANTI and related that he had worked as a QC supervisor for Gulf Engineering Company, Inc. at the Waterford SES Unit III plant from August through October 1980. WADE identified Raymond RONQUILLO, the Gulf Engineering Company QA manager, as his immediate supervisor. WADE stated his major responsibility while working for Gulf Engineering involved two modifications to the Cooper-Bessemer diesel generators at Waterford. WADE stated all work modifications on the diesel generators were completed during the first 3 weeks of September 1980, and shortly after the completion of the 6
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 work Gulf Engineering discovered that one of the torque wrenches utilized during the work modification had been out of calibration at the time the work was being accomplished. WADE stated that when he brought this to the attention of RONQUILLO, he was directed by RONQUILLO to write-up a discrepancy report, and that Gulf Engineering would " write it off." WADE explained that he was told by RONQUILLO to write on the discrepancy report, which WADE identified as 047, that the torque wrench which was out of tolerance was originally set 10 percent higher than the wrench actually had been during the original modification, and this would compensate for the percentage the torque wrench was off when it was discovered out of calibration. WADE stated RONQUILLO had directed him to " write it off," in that manner, "or he would be terminated." WADE related that when he made his original allegation to the NRC in November 1983 about the Gulf Engineering QA manager falsifying records he did not in fact, actually mean that the Gulf Engineering QA manager falsified the records, but rather that he (WADE) was directed by the Gulf Engineering QA manager to falsify the records.
WADE also related that someone had apparently used his QC stamp (number 18) to '
stamp the " inspected by" QC approval area of the traveler packages for all the bolts. He noted that the Gulf Engineering office had a duplicate of his QC stamp.
WADE stated the reason he recalled the work on the emergency diesel generator at this time was that when Gulf Engineering pulled the front head off one of the generators, the engine compartment was filled with rain water. WADE said a subsequent inspection by Gulf Engineering determined that all cylinders, crank cases, pistons, and every component of both generators -A- and -B- were totally filled with water. WADE stated this situation was due to a lack of rain covers over the top of all the exhaust pipes of both generators, and every time it rained the exhaust pipes filled with rain water which drained into the engine compartment of both generators. WADE stated that to the best of his knowledge rain covers have not been placed over the top of the exhaust pipes, and opined that both generators were probably still filled with water.
Appended to this report as Exhibit 2 is the Report of Interview with Richard WADE.
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Numerous attempts to contact WADE during the initial phases of this investigation met with negative results; however, on April 24, 1984, WADE telephonically contacted reporting investigator and desired to be interviewed over the telephone due to his transient status.
On April 3, 1984, William E. DENNY, an independent, self-employed contractor working directly for Louisiana Power & Light (LP&L), was interviewed by NRC Investigator David M. GALANTI and NRC Investigative Assistant Julie A.
METZGER relative to this matter. DENNY stated that he has worked at Waterford for approximately 4i years, and that for the last 3 years his major responsi-bility has been the Cooper-Bessemer emergency diesel generators -A- and -B .
DENNY provided copies of Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiencies Nos. 6 and 10, (Exhibit 3), and identified them as the only two modifications performed on the diesel generators since they were originally received from the factory, which he identified as Cooper Energy Services, Mount Vernon, Ohio. DENNY said that neither of the deficiencies identified in Report Nos. 6 and 10 addressed torquing issues. DENNY stated that the work modifications on the two diesel generators was the first work performed on the generators and since the completion of that work modification in September 1980, generator -B- has been taken apart on several occasions under his direct supervision. DENNY stated that each time gent r' dor -B- was taken apart, it was put together again using the Torque Specification Table from the Cooper-Bessemer instruction manual (Exhibit 4). DENNEY related, however, that to the best of his knowledge diesel generator -A- has never been taken apart since the modification work was completed in 1980. Therefore, in respect to generator -A , DENNY was unable to state with certitude whether the bolts which were originally torqued with the uncalibrated torque wrench were ever retorqued to proper specifi-cations since the torque values of the rework were not documented in the traveler packages. DENNY related that the actual work conducted during the modifications was not on the cam' followers themselves, defective cam shaft springs, or emergency generator rolling pins. DENNY provided schematic 225-1-2, Revision 8 (Exhibit 5), and schematic KSV-11-3, Revision 6 (Exhibit
- 6) depicting the location of the modifications. DENNY identified Gulf Engineering Traveler Package Nos. P5-233 and P5-229 (Exhibits 7 and 8, 8
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 respectively) as the traveler packages which Gulf Engineering was required to traintain during the work modifications. Since DENNY was not employed by Gulf Engineering and was not involved in the rework of the generators in the Fall of 1980, he was unable to furnish information concerning the absence of individual torque values for the rework in the traveler packages, the 10 percent over-calibration entry in Discrepancy Report No. 047, or the utilization of WADE's QC stamp in the traveler packages.
DENNY related he was not familiar with any rain water seepage problem into either generator from exhaust pipes, and stated that both generators had been fully operational on numerous occasions since the original work modification was completed in 1980. Appended to this report as Exhibit (9) is the Report of Interview with William DENNY.
On April 18, 1984, Gulf Engineering Traveler Packages No. P5-253 (Exhibit 7) and No. P5-229 (Exhibit 8) were retrieved from the Ebasco records vault and reviewed by Rolf WESTBERG, NRC Technical Inspector, Region III, Waterford Task Force, and Investigator David M. GALANTI. The review of each package con-firmed that all work on both diesel generator -A- and -B- had been accom-plished during the first 3 weeks of September 1980. It was noted that in all cases the individual craft workman who did the torquing and Gulf Engineering QC inspector (WADE) had properly signed off as completing all work. Absent from both packages were the results of individual torque values which should have been recorded at each location where bolts were removed and reinstalled.
Documentation disclosed that torque wrench nos. G224 and QC4.4.4 were the two torque wrenches utilized during the modification work on the diesel generators.
Therefore, calibration records for torque wrench nos. G224 and QC4.4.4 were obtained and reviewed. Calibration records for torque wrench QC4.4.4, dated July 17, 1980 (Exhibit 10), and September 26, 1980 (Exhibit 11) revealed that torque wrench QC4.4.4 was in calibration immediately prior to and following the work performed on the emergency diesel generators. However, the review of calibration records for torque wrench G224 (Exhibit 12), calibrated on September 23, 1980, disclosed the wrench was 24 percent out of tolerance at low range (50 ft pounds), 11 percent out of tolerance at mid range (100 ft. pounds), and 5.3 percent out of tolerance at high range (150 ft. pound range) for a total under calibration tolerance of 40.3 percent. A review of Traveler Package 9
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 Nos. P5-233 and P5-229 disclosed that all work performed with torque wrench G224 required at least 150 ft. pounds; therefore, the only significant percentage error was 5.3 percent. Records contained Gulf Engineering Company Discrepancy Report No. 047 (DR 047) (Exhibit 13) which identified torque wrench G224 as being out of calibration at the time work was performed on the diesel generators. Examination of DR 047 disclosed that all fuel nozzles originally torqued with torque wrench G224 had been retorqued; however, the requirement for retorquing the rocker arms was not accomplished since DR 047 reported that the torque wrench had been set 10 percent higher than called for during the original torquing. WESTBERG observed that even though retorquing was reported completed in DR 047, work traveler packages should have also been prepared for the retorquing. Review of Gulf Engineering records failed to identify any traveler package for the retorquing rework.
On May 8, 1984, Winston M. JENKINS was interviewed by NRC Investigator David M.
GALANTI and NRC Investigative Assistant Julie A. ME17GER relative to this matter (Exhibit 14). JENKINS related he worked for Gulf Engineering for approximately 17 years and the last 6 years he was a general foreman for Gulf Engineering at the Waterford III site. JENKINS related he was familiar with the rework modifications performed on the emergency diesel generators, and commented that, in fact, all the work that was accomplished on the generators was done twice. JENKINS recalled that there was a problem with one of the torque wrenches utilized on the work modification to the diesel generators.
However, he stated he was positive, because of DR 047, that once the torque wrench was discovered to be out of tolerance the required retorquing was in fact accomplished, otherwise he would not have signed off on the DR as the approving Quality Assurance supervisor. JENKINS further related that it was a normal procedure that a new traveler package be initiated on all rework, and he identified the retorquing of the bolts associated with emergency diesel generators as rework requiring traveler packages. However, he was unable to offer an explanation for the retorquing rework not being documented in this instance. JENKINS related that generally he verified rework as it was being accomplished; however, JENKINS could not specifically state that he physically observed the retorquing of the bolts associated with the emergency diesel generators. JENKINS stated that his signature on DR 047 signified that he concurred with the final disposition. JENKINS felt he must have known 10
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 something, or seen proof that the torque wrench was set 10 percent higher than required during the original torquing, otherwise he would not have concurred with the rework by signing off on the discrepancy report. JENKINS was of the opinion that the QA manager, Ray RONQUILLO, is an individual of impeccable integrity who would never, under any circumstances, compromise his principles by falsifying any records or directing that records be falsified. JENKINS concluded his comments by stating that he was aware rain water had seeped into generators -A- and -B , but believed the matter had been resolved.
On May 9, 1984, Robert B. CONSTABLE, Lead Auditor, LP&L, was interviewed by NRC Investigator David M. GALANTI and NRC Investigative Assistant Julie A.
METZGER relative to this matter (Exhibit 15). CONSTABLE stated that he worked for Gulf Engineering from July 1980 until April 1981 as a QA engineer. During that period of time, he was responsible for all audits, and was the lead auditor and approved all work procedures including traveler and work-related documents. CONSTABLE stated he was responsible for making any decisions as to safety and nonsafety work being performed on the equipment at Waterford by Gulf Engineering. CONSTABLE stated he was the only person besides the QA manager who had made decisions regarding corrective action taken, and that included Discrepancy Report No. 047. CONSTABLE related that his signature simply means that he concurred with the recommended disposition by WADE as to what action needed to be accomplished in order to satisfy the requirements of the discovery of the torque wrench being out of calibration at the time the modifications were performed. In this regard, he noted that he must have been furnished with a logical explanation for the notation on DR 047 indicating torque wrench G224 had been set 10 percent higher than required during the original torquing. CONSTABLE said he did not physically inspect the modification rework; however, he was positive all work was accomplished because it was stated as being completed on the discrepancy report.
On April 18, 1984, Raymond M. RONQUILLO, Jr., was interviewed by NRC Investigator David M. GALANTI and NRC Investigative Assistant Julie A. METZGER relative to this matter. RONQUILLO stated he is presently employed as the Quality Assurance manager for Gulf Engineering and has been in that position since 1976. RONQUILLO stated that Gulf Engineering completed all work at Waterford in September 1983, and at that time all records maintained by Gulf 11
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 Engineering were " turned over" to Ebasco for permanent retention in the storage vault. RONQUILLO related that one of the Quality Control supervisors who worked for him at Gulf Engineering during the Fall of 1980 was Richard WADE. RONQUILLO stated that WADE worked for Gulf Engineering for approxi-mately 21-3 months, and simply failed to show up for work one day and was terminated. RONQUILLO related that WADE had poor work habits; however, the quality of his work was adequate.
RONQUILLO stated that while WADE was working for Gulf Engineering, one of the projects he was responsible for was the factory directed modifications of the Cooper-Bessemer diesel generators. RONQUILLO stated that to the best of his recollection there was never a problem with either of the modifications to the diesel generators. R0NQUILLO stated that-he did recall having a problem with one of the torque wrenches utilized on one of the generators, however, that matter, to the best of his recollection, was corrected. RONQUILLO stated that all the work on the diesel generators was performed in early September 1980, and it,was not until September 23, 1980, that the torque wrench utilized during the modification was discovered to be out of calibration. RONQUILLO stated that apparently the torque wrench in question, G224, was out of calibration enough to cause WADE to initiate DR 047 which identified Operation 520 and Operation 560 of the generators as having been calibrated with torque wrench G224 in eary September 1980. RONQUILLO stated that an unusual entry on DR 047 was a comment made by WADE that during the initial utilization of the
' wrench the torque wrench was set 10 percent higher than called for during the original work. RONQUILLO stated that he was confused and was unable to explain why the torque wrench would be set 10 percent higher during the initial work. RONQUILLO stated that DR 047 is the only supportive documen-tation to indicate that any work was " redone" as a result of calibration torque wrench G224 being discovered out of tolerance. RONQUILLO stated no traveler packages were initiated on the retorquing rework requirements.
RONQUILLO further denied telling anyone to put a torque value of 10 percent on the DR or telling anyone that engineering would " write it off."
RONQUILLO also advised that duplicate QC stamps are not authorized. In this regard, he denied that Gulf Engineering had a duplicate of WADE's stamp or 12
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 that anyone other than WADE had stamped the " inspected by" approval block of the traveler packages with WADE's stamp.
RONQUILLO stated he did not understand why WADE would initiate such allegations against Gulf Engineering, particularly since he had not been employed by Gulf Engineering for over 3 years. RONQUILLO stated that WADE did contact him two or three times within the past 2 years and was visibly upset with him because of poor recommendations that he (RONQUILLO) had given to potential employers regarding him. RONQUILLO explained that in view of WADE's marginal job performance and the fact that he owed Gulf Engineering money for a transfer of his household affects to the New Orleans area once he obtained a job with Gulf Engineering, he could not in all honesty recommend WADE to any construction company. RONQUILLO stated that he never threatened WADE with termination if he did not sign off on any type of generator paperwork, and that he never directed or personally altered, changed, or destroyed any emergency diesel generator paperwork.
RONQUILLO statei that the work on the Cooper-Bessemer diesel generators was supplemental work for Gulf Engineering employees. He explained that the advantage of supplemental-type work was simply that Gulf Engineering had absolutely nothing to gain by completing the work in a short period of time.
He continued that if in fact there was a problem with the torque values as WADE alleged, the problem would have benefited everyone at Gulf Engineering because as long as Gulf Engineering was working on the generators, they were being paid extra money above and beyond their normal salary. RONQUILLO advised that as soon as the job was completed the money for the supplemental-type work on the generators was terminated.
RONQUILLO commented that Gulf Engineering's Quality Assurance program was designed to recognize defective test equipment and in this case involving the Cooper-Bessemer diesel generators, problems with a torque wrench were recognized and documented in DR 047. He concluded that as a result of Gulf Engineering's Quality Assurance program, all work which was originally torqued with the questionable torque wrench was re-evaluated and retorqued as indicated on the completed DR; therefore, the Gulf Engineering Quality Assurance program did exactly as it was designed to do. Appended to this report as Exhibit (16) is the signed statement of Robert M. RONQUILLO.
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION l The allegation relating to rain water seeping into each Cooper-Bessemer diesel generator was referred to James GAGLIARDO, Region IV, NRC, and Les CONSTABLE, Senior Resident Inspector, Waterford III, Taft, Louisiana, for resolution by the NRC Waterford Technical Task Force.
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 EXHIBITS -
(1) Region IV Letter (requesting investigative assistance) / dated December 13, 1983 (2) Report of Interview with Richard C. WADE / dated April 24, 1984 (3) Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiencies Nos. 6 and 10 /
dated September 23, 1980 (4) Torque Specification Ttble / dated August 1980 (5) Cam Shaft Schematic Z25-1-2, Revision 8 / Undated (6) Cam Shaft Schematic KSV-11-3, Revision 6 / dated October 19, 1976 (7) Gulf Engineering Company Traveler Package P5-233 / dated April 1978 (8) Gulf Engineering Company Traveler Package P5-229 / dated April 1978 (9) Report of Interview with William E. DENNY / dated April 3, 1984.
(10) Torque Wrench Calibration Record / dated July 17, 1980 (11) Torque Wrench Calibration Record / dated September 26, 1980 (12) Torque Wrench Calibration Record G224 / dated September 23, 1980 (13) Gulf Engineering Company Discrepancy Report No. 047 / dated October 23, 1980 (14) Report of Interview with Winston M. JENKINS / dated May 8, 1984 (15) Report of Interview with Robert B. CONSTABLE / dated May 9, 1984 (16) Statement of Raymond M. RONQUILLO / dated April 18, 1984 15
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J2 On December 15, 1983, Region IV Office of Investigations Field Office received a written request for investigation from the Region IV Regional Administrator.
Rsgion IV advised that an alleger called the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission He:dquarter's Duty Officer and alleged improper torquing of tolts associated,pgig,h the emergency diesel generator by Gulf Engineering a subcontractor. The allgar
- explained that after torquing had been accomplished the torquing wrench was f00nd to be 38's under calibrated and subsequently, the QA manager changed records to
. indicate only a few bolts were affected.
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Case No. 4-83-030
Title:
Gulf Engineering Company, Inc.
Alegation: During modification to Emergency Diesel Generators A & B, a torque wrench was found to be out of calibration upon completion of work. The Gulf QA Manager altered records to show only a few bolts were affected and ordered the QC Supervisor to sign off on the documentation or be fired.
Findings: All work on the generators was completed during the first three weeks of September 1980. Gulf torque wrench G224
/ was found 5.3% out of tolerance in the 3d range (150 ft.
pounds) on 23 September 1980. 4%, plus or minus, out of tolerance was acceptable. Review of Gulf records 7
( disclose work traveler package could not be altered because individual torque valves were not listed and the
/ only item which could be falsified were the individual torque valves for each bolt. A gulf QC Inspector L
submitted Discrepancy Report 047 which reports retorquing
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the bolts that were originally torqued in the 3d range.
p ,h Alleger maintains the DR was written at the direction of NL/ ga YT the QA Manager, even though the retorque has never been U done and he was told to sign off on the DR or he would be
,d fired. QA Manager, when interviewed, denied threatening
[ alleger or altering records.
Technical: 1. Alleger reports exhaust pipes to both generators A & B do not have any type of cover over them.
Subsequently, during normal rainfall the pipes fill up with rain water and leak into the engine compartment of
, the generators. Alleger repor'ts each time generators have been worked on the engine compartment was filled h with water.
\
M[, 2. Generator B has been torqued several times IAW torque j
J/ . specification tables since modification rework by Gulf.
\ Generator A has never been worked on since Gulf h.\
\ J modification rework in September 1980.
v NRC inspectors Constable (SRI Waterford) and Gagliardo O (Task Force Director) are cognizant of Technical Issues
\ one and two.
ECD: Investigation completed. Report in typing.
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b.,. Dece.mber 21, 1983 t1EMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino FROM: Ben B. Hayes, Director Office of Investigations EUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF OPENING OF OI INVESTIGATIONS The Connission has directed that you be informed whenever OI opens a new investigation. The attached document briefly sets forth information responsive to this requirement. If you desire more detail on any OI investigation, please let me know.
Attachment:
Investigation Status Record, Case No. 4-83-030 Distribution:
Case No. 4-83-030 01 Commission 0I s/f Notification / Opening of 01 Investigation 01-c/f 01-r/f Pending 5520/N0TI83/0 01 01 f.
WJWard/jh RAFortuna BBHayes 12/21/83 12/jV83 12/ /83
-19N79)? 74- 1p .
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- e ' # * *4, UNITED STATES
[ ,, *' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 *(
, e 5* E HEGloN IV
.- 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000 5 .. . 8 ARLINGTON. TEXAS 76011 DEC 131953 MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard K. Herr, Director, Office of Investigations FROM: John T. Collins, Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD ALLEGATIONS Attached is a memorandum to file from Thomas F. Westerman, Enforcement Officer, dated December 2, 1983, relating to possible wrongdoing by a company called Gulf Engineering.
The allegation deals with improper torquing of the bolts which could result in potentially defective emergency diesel generators. The records involved are alleged to be falsified, and the QC supervisor was alleged to have been threatened with removal.
I request that an investigation be made into this allegation. The Region IV Project Staff will examine the allegations relative to the Magna Flux Company.
O,
.Stw ohn T. Collins Regional Administrator
Attachment:
As stated cc: W. A. Crossman T. F. Westerman
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i EXHIBIT (1)
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REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 LOUISIANA 342 DaAnONoe Sincer POWER & LIGHT P. O. BOX 6008 NEW OnLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 . (504) 366-2345 EuSiEsbsE D. L ASM I September 23,1980 ve. prn.o nt-%, proeuct.on I LPL 15163 hp h <9g 4g42526p4 Q-3-A35.07.06 Q-3-A35.07.10 Q-3-A35.02.01 Mr. K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV g SEP1980 .g U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5 RATT.RFORD 3 Office of Inspection and Enforcement % Mcavm .'
611 Ryan' Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 %,, '
Arlington, Texas 76012 N
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiencies No. 6 and No. 10 No. 6 " Emergency Diesel Generators - Defective Shaf ts & Springs" No. 10 " Defective Emergency Diesel Generator Roller Pins"
REFERENCE:
LP&L Letter, LPL 10343 dated December 29, 1978 LP&L Letter, LPL 10233 dated December 5, 1978
(; As amended by LPL 10316 dated December 19, 1978 As amended by LPL 11903 dated August 31, 1979 As amended by LPL 12319 dated October 31, 1979 LP&L Letter, LPL 13322 dated March 14, 1980
Dear Mr. Seyfrit:
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copics of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 6,
" Emergency Diesel Generators-Defective Shafts & Springs" and two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 10, " Defective Emergency Diesel Generator Roller Pins."
If you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours, D. L. Aswell DLA/LLB/grf cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 15 copies of each report) t
- 2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 1 copy of report) EXHIBIT (3) d 90t B s W 2pr-
Mr. K. V. Seyfrit Septemb er 23, 1980 cc: G. D. McLendon, Les Constable, Ebasco (2), J. M. Brooks, J. Crnich (2),
L. V. Maurin, D. B. Lester, F. J. Drucnond, T. F. Gerrets, C. J. Decareaux, T. K.t A'rmington, P. V. Prasankumar, D. C. Gibbs, Richard Hymes,- L. L. Bass, M. I. Meyer, R. Hartnett, L. Stinson, Central Records, Nuclear Records (2).
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EXHIBIT (3)
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f TTf)a)MEtJT A COOPER.DESSET.'.En CCT.'iPANY .
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July 25,1973
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Office of Inspecticn and Enforeccent -
U S. fiucicar P.cgulatory Com ission
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1.11 ashing ton , D. C. 20555 . . .
Director of' Inspection and Enforcccents . ..-
Attn: ..
.."Gentleaen:
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. In accordance with'10CFP. Part 21, this letter will provide c :. tuo notification of a defect that has been deter::ined to exist in ccergency standby diesel-generator sets st:pplied to Ebasco i . Services , incorporated, Rew York, fi. Y. for Louisiana Power
. and Light Ccapany's Waterford .t'ucicar :.
Station !3 .y at Taf t, . . <- -
Louisiana. - . .
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QThe defect exists in the two shafts which' drive the engine speed control governor and the engine overspeed shutdown governor on occh engine. The splined driven end of thn shaf ts tras t anu-factured two inches longer than required by design specificatien.
The additional length causes the .shaf t spline to =isalign with the splined drive bushing, resulting in carginal, engagccent of .
the splined surfaces. . y ,.
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The dicsol-generator units are not operational at this ti=e, If i so there is no actual safety hazard created by the defect.
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the units were operational and the shaf ts were to fail, follow- -
ing would be the consequences: .
Overspeed Shutdoun Governor shaft failure, .cnly - The unit would cent.inue to operate norcally, but usuld lose overspeed .
protection.
Speed Control Governor shaf t failure, oniy - The unit speedthe Overspeed~ ~
uould rapidly proceed to overspeed, et which point _
. Governor would cifcct a shutdown of the unit.
I
(' Sicultanctus failure 'of both shafts - The unit soecd would of centrol until a cechanicci failure rapidly increase out l
occurred, placing the unit out of service. . . . .
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The equipnent identified in this letter is the only equipnent l.nown to be delivered to a nuclear f acility by C.E.S. that -
contains the defect described.
Ylic C.E.S. . Customer Services Department is responsibic for replaccrent of the shaf ts. Replacement will be comp.leted by -
Septesber 30, 1978. .
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. B. B. Bender, Vice-P' resident .
0 Operattons *
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D. Sand {forth, Supervising Enginecr' 92 ipP.. -
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- Ebasco Services, Incorporated -
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Two Rector Street C=- !!cu York, !!.Y. ' 1000t>
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L. Spinson. Site Quality Progran Hhrnger , ..
P.O. Dox 70 .
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El11ona, LouiMar.s 70356
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< -1 COOPER EriERGY SERVICES k CNef t I ~
'"E July 25,1978 -
Office of Inspection and Enforceacnt .- "
U. 5. iiuclear Regulatory Conmission ..
l Hashington, D. C. 20555 .
. .: l Director of Inspection and Enforcecent
. ATTH: -
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In accordance with 1GC n Part 21 this letter will provide notification of a defect that has been determined to exist in six ecergency standby diesel-generator sets supplied to nuclear facilities by. Cooper Energy Services. ,
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Four of the diesel-generators in question were procured by Dechtel Ccrporction, San Francisco, California for the Pennsyl-
- vania Pouer and Light Cce.pany's Susquehanna Stea.: El ectri c The ree-in.ing two were
$ Station at Ceruick. Pennsylvania.
procured by Ebasco Services, Incor;: orated, tiew Yori:, it.Y:, for Louisiana Pcwer and Light Company's Waterford Huclear Station #3
. ' at Taft. Louisiana. , . . . ,.
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The defect exists in a spring which operates the overspeed .
- shutdoun butterfly valve on the eng'ine turbethanger air inlet connectien. The s.pring is picted with cicctrolytically deposited cadr,iun to prevent corrosion. Several identical springs have recently failed on units till in the process of nanufacture at C. E. S. The cause of failure has been deter =ined to be cracks in the basc ectal,' caused by tne electrolytic plating process.
Ik1 t hough the springs tnat are installed on .the above identified
~
delivered units have not f ailed, the possibility of eventual failure necessitates replacement of the spring on the delivered
. Units. - -
. Hone of the delivered units are operational at this tice, so there is no actual safety hazard created by the defect. If the units were cr.crational and the spring uere to fail, one of the ttfo overspeed protection cevices provided on cach engine would fail to perforn. However, the other overspeed protection device, 3, a fuel shut-of f techanisn activated by a nochanically driven
- cd cercrncr. :::c!d n:t ':0 affr:ted h; tha t:ri:: failurc 2nd would provide independently ef fective engine overspeed protection.
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'. The equipnant identified in this lett.cr is the only equipnent )
delivered to a nuc1 car facility by C.E.S. that could contain the defett described. - -
The shring will be rtipicced with one cade fra:m a.natorial that vill not crack when cadniun plated. The C.E.5. Custo.a:cr Services departrent is responsible for acccr.plishino the replacement, i sthich we expect to complete by September 30 1978. . .
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B. B. Bender Vice-President Operations . .
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cc: J. R. Schmiedel . Profect Engineer - '-: -
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. . Bechtei Corporation . . . . . .
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V 5J' P. D. Box 3955 -
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. San Francisco, CA 94119 .
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D. Sandiforth, Supervising Engineer ' '.. t ... ;.=: .'t e- .,
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Ebasco Services. Incorporated .
. .. .x Two Rector Street
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f(cu York,ti.Y. 10006 -
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Epinson, Site Quality Progrs= P.tnacer - . . J' - ' :.' '. ,, . : -
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Ategehment A - P8 18f 2 . , ,
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I CDDPER-BESSEMER C051PMJY ,
m Ilove.T.ber 3, 1978 , 9
'Of'fice of Inspection and Enforcement .'
U. S. Hucicar Regulatory Commi.ssion Washington, D. C. 20555 .
AT'TH: . Director o'f Inspection and Enforcement Gentlemen:
In'.accordsnce with 10CF.P. Part 21, th'is letter is notification of a deficiency found 9-13-78 within a KSV Power ThisEngine enginesupplied is and manufactured by Cooper Energy Services. -
part of the emergency standby diesel-generator set supplied for .
installation at (4) four licensees' stations. -
Each power cylinder
.'.The extent of the deficiency is as follows:
has (1) inlet and (1) exhaust push rod assemb.ly and (2) valve .
This sub-assembly crosshead assemblies Part No. Z25-1-2#10.
~ h . contains; Ho. 'JS-25-1P, a crosshead and a pinPart collarNo.Part JS-25-1G, No. JS-25-1M. a rollerDuring pin Part a recent performance test on this engine, it was found that some sub-assemblies No enbine shutdown showed abnormal nor mal-function wear has on' been the surface experienced,- of the roller
. pin.
but it is felt that over a longer period of. engine operation this abnormal wear could p'rogrest. f ar enough to cause tiie, engine to mal-function..
The corrective action taken by C.E.S. is to redesign to increase the diameter of the roller pin (JS-25-1P) to provice an inter-ference fit at assembly between the roller pin and the crosshead d
,(lS-25-1G) and reduce the clearance between the roller pin anIn additi
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the collar (JS-25.1M).
to seat the. pin ends into chamfer on the crosshead;has been The replaced by a more consistent and positive press operation.
sub-assemblies in field unit;s named The time below span arethe for to be inspected execution of the and replaced if required.
change out by C.E.S. on field units will be dependent u cable. .
The following engines which have had field . running at the lice,nsees'
,i sites are to be inspected by C.E.S. to determine if cam rollers Cam i have become slupgish and incipient cam scuffing is occurring.
or cam roller scu'ffing can,be an indication of a worn roller pin .
, or collar. . . ,
CONTINUED gg 2 .
EXHIBIT (3)
- --.....L........ s 4 3 ., , . ,sj O N E 412/452 8000
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.2- (,.'mber3,1978
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!!cbraska Public Power, Cooper Station', Sii's 7102 L 7103.
Commonwealth Edison, Zion 1 & 2, Sli-7090, 7091, 7092, 7093
& 7094. ,
The following engines at the licensees' sites which have'not had field running are to have the inlet and exhaust valve cross- '
head assemblies replaced with those of the new design - .
Pennsylvania Power & Light,- Susquehanna 1 & 2, SN's 7157, 7158, 7159 and 7160. .
L'ouisiana. Power & Light, Waterford 3. SN's 7170 & 7171.
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B. B. Bender Vice President & General 14anager '
CB Reciprocating Products
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s cc: Ebasco Services, Inc. .
Two Rector Street .
( ,. New York, N.Y. 10006 . .
D. Sandiforth, Supervising Engr.
A.TN:
L Spin' son, Site Quality P,rogram 14gr. .
P.O. Box 70 .
8 Kill ona, Louisiana 70065.
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c-4 IAUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPMW WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Final Report of ,
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 6 Emerge 7cyDieselGenerators-DefectiveShafts& Springs Reviewed by -
Av- ) 9 J Cruicii - Site Manager Date '
Reviewed by - ~
l R. J. MilNiser - Project Superintendent Date #
Reviewed by 8 I /'// //d' i/ M d4 l J. Mart - Project Licensing Engineg'r
/Date ' '
Reviewed by I h i b
R. A.Hiartnett - Q. A. Site Supervisor Date September 18, 1980 e
EXHIBIT (3)
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FINAL REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 6 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS-DEFECTIVE SHAFTS & SPRINGS INTRODUCTION i This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) (3). It describes a deficiency in the emergency diesel generators supplied by Cooper- ~
Bessemer Company for LP&L's Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit No. 3.
DESCRIPTION On July 25, 1978, Cooper-Bessemer Company pursuant to 10CFR21 notified the USNRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C., of defective shaf ts and springs in the Emergency Diesel Generators supplied for LP&L's Waterford SES Unit No. 3 at Taf t, Louisiana.
A. Shafts The defect exists in the two shaf ts which drive the enginc speed control governor and the engine overspeed shutdown governor on each engine. The splined driven end of the shaf ts was manuf actured two inches longer than required by design specification. The additional length causes the shaft spline to misalign with the splined drive bushing, resulting in marginal
(; engagement of the splined surfaces. This defect is considered to be reportable and is described in Attachment A (Cooper-Bessemer Co. letter to NRC dated July 25, 1978).
B. Springs The defect exists in a spring which operates the overspeed shutdown butter-fly valve on the engine turbochanger air inlet connection. The spring is plated with electrolytically deposited cadmium to prevent corrosion. Several identical springs. have recently f, ailed' on units still in the process of manu-facture at C.E.S. The cause of failure has been determined to be cracks in the base metal caused by the electrolytic plating process. This defect is considered to be non-reportable and is described in Attachment B (Cooper Energy Services letter to NRC dated July 25, 1978).
$AFETY IMPLICATIONS A. Shafts If the units were to fail during operations, the fcilowing consequences would result:
Overspeed Shutdown Governor shaft failure, only - The unit would continue to o operate normally, but would lose overspeed protection.
Speed Control Governor shaf t f ailure, only - The unit speed would rapidly proceed to overspeed, at which point the Overspeed Governor would effect a shutdown of the unit.
EXHIBIT (3)
Simultaneous f ailure of both shaf ts - The unit speed would rapidly increase out of control until a mechanical f ailure occurred, placing the unit out of service.
, B. Springs If the units were operational and the spring were to fail, one of the two overspeed protection devices provided on each engine would fail to perform.
However, the' other overspeed protection device, a fuel shut-off mechanism activated by a mechanically driven speed governor, would not be affected by the spring failure and would provide independently effective engine overspeed protection. .
CORRECTIVE ACTION Cooper Energy Services has fabricated new governor drive shaf ts, thus correct-ing the deficiency in the length of the shaf t.
I The defective spring has' been remanufactured from a material that will not crack as a result.of,the electrolytic plating process.
Replacement of the new shaf ts and springd was accomplished by Gulf Engineering Company, Inc., under the supervision of a Cooper-Bessemer representative. The work was completed during the week ending September 19, 1980, and is docu-(f mented in Gulf Engineering Traveler Nos. P5-233 and P5-229.
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- v. 1 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 l
Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No.10 Def'ective:. Emergency ~. Diesel Generatore. Roller' Pins
?
Reviewed by I b
. J. rnich - Site Manager Date I
- Reviewed by - - l 9 R. J. MflhT/er - Project Superintendent Da'e t i Reviewed by i) dR t/ ///// J d/8 I J. Hart - Proje(t Licensing Eng$tieef ' [ ate I..
Reviewed by ( d R. A.Alartnett - Q. A. Site Supervisor I
Date '
September 18, 1980 e*
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EXHIBIT (3)
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FINAL REPORT j SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO.10 i
DEFECTIVETEMERGENCY I)IESEL" GENERATOR ROLLER PIN INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) (3). It describes a deficiency in the emergency diesel generators supplied by Cooper Energy Services for Louisiana Power & Light Company's Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit No. 3 and others.
DESCRIPTION On November 3, 1978, Cooper Energy Services pursuant to 10CFR21 notified the USNRC-Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. , of a defective roller pin in the crosshead subassembly of each power cylinder within a KSV Power Engine.
1 The extent of the deficiency is as follows: Each power cylinder has one inlet and one exhaust push rod assembly and two valve crosshead assemblies.
The valve crosshead assembly contains a crosshead, a roller pin, and a pin collar. During a recent performance test on this engine at another facility, it was found that some subassemblies showed abnormal wear on the surface of the roller pin. No engine shutdown nor malfunction was experienced, but it
() is felt by the manufacturer that over a longer period of engine operation this abnormal wear could progress far enough to cause the engine to malfunc-tion. This defect is considered to be reportable and is described in Attach-ment A (Cooper Energy Service letter to NRC dated November 3,1978).
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS This deficiency, if left uncorrected, could possibly cause an engine malfunc-tion. There would be no significant safety implication of engine malfunction during normal plant operation. However, this deficiency could invalidate some of the assumptions used in the safety analysis report. If a design basis acci-dent (e.g. , LOCA or main steam line break) were to occur coincidentally with a ' loss of offsite power, and the diesel-generators did not perform in accordance with specifications, then some essential equipment used to mitigate the conse-quences of the postulated accident could be degraded.
CORRECTIVE ACTION The corrective action taken by Cooper Energy Service was to redesign the diameter of the roller pin to provide an interference fit at the assembly between the roller pin and the crosshead and reduce the clearante between $he roller pin and the collar. In addition, the hand flaring operation to seat the pin ends into chamfer on the crosshead has been replaced by a more consistent and posi-
' tive press operation.
EXHIBIT (3)
Corrective action work on the emergency diesel generators was accomplished by Gulf Engineering Company, Inc. , under the supervision of a Cooper-Bessemer representative.
Corrective repairs consisted of replacement of the inlet and exhaust valve crosshead assemblies with those of the new design. This work was completed during the week ending September 19, 1980, and is documented in Gulf Engi-neering Traveler Nos. PS-233 and PS-229.
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EXHIBIT (3)
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, UNITED ST ATES v +; NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION *
!5 ' g OFFICE OF INVESTIG ATIONS FIELD OFFICE REGION IV
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 1000
% . ' */ ARLINGTON. TEXAS 760?1 July 26, 1983 t DO NOT DISCLOS-MEMORANDUM FOR: File FROM: D. D. Driskill, Investigator 01 Field Office Region IV
SUBJECT:
ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE OF INQUIRY 04-83-017
- 1. On July 15, 1983, 01 Field Office, Region IV, opened an Inq0iry, Case File hc. 04-83-017, reoardinc 6n allegation of intimidation.
of outlity control inspecto'sr by Aercury Co., a subcontracting fir 2r at Waterford-3. Interview of the alieger disclosed an investigation is warranted. --
- 2. Based on the foregaong ir. formation Inquiry 04-83-017 is administrative 1y closed and investigation 4-E3-014 is opened, cc: R. K. Herr u.
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- u. 11 arch 25,1984
+ . .- o-i MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino FROM: Ben B. Hayes, Director Office of Investigations
SUBJECT:
NOTIFICATION OF OPENING OF OI INVESTIGATIONS The Conunission has directed that you be informed whenever 0I opens a new investigation. The attached documents briefly set forth information responsive to this requirement. If you desire more detail on any OI investigation, please let me know.
Attachments:
Investigation Status Records, .
Case No. 4-84-020 4-84-021 4-84-022 4-84-023 4-84-024 Distribution: /
Case No. 4-84-020 V ,
4-84-021 4-84-022 4-84-023 4-84-024 OI Commission OI s/f Notification / Opening of OI Investigation 01-c/f OI-r/f Pending 5520/ NOTI 84/0 OI ef ECGilbert h OI k RAFortuna OI [
BBHayes 03/23/84 03bf84 03/11/84 Mp7+3fAW Op -
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.LtbhkJCitC% 5: Teils form is to be comp'eted whentwe sqVilcarit activi!y het ocmprod ro'etiW to a case e* et lear- s'avry 33 days, if no Chtvj. has esaarved (s4 W4 -
,w.iw. i. wo e in.,uu w a.xu ..u e . .im rc .ne , eon. i.m.acomm.
334.,.re w OMeos of is.estig.tes.
LATE Gomy of PsCE C.*J E 8v".V33 4 o . o,sur..c an.c,o. . . i~oiviovat ues.aer 01 FIELD OFFICE 4-84-020 x e. ,. ,,, .,,ts,, vet REGION IV 01R4-84-A-0029 y.g,gagota ye,,,,
ssance WAT MFORD 3; Ai.LEGED FORGERY OF usm io ra FROST QA RECORDS OF SUBCONTRACTOR (S)
~ r ETATUS ISsach e'ere. .nd cro<ide . trief c eatr!? tion)
This investigation was initiated o'n March 16, 1984, after cor.1pletinn of a' review of an alleger'.c allegation concerning forgery of subcontractor (s)' Quality Assurance (QA) records and/or documents. This allegation, along with other allegations of a technical nature, is included in the alleger's testimony that was given to a Region I'/ 01 Field Office (OIFO) investigator and recorded by a f court reporter. The above transcript was provided to the NRC, Region IV, on [g Janua ry 26, 1984, under OlF0's Report of Inquiry No. Q4-84-005. ECD: 8)nknown 0
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c.nc some sos unuct aa mULAT?OV COASCOSICA' d" -
INVESTIGATK)N STATUS RECORD i te85T RUCTaONS This term is to tue cupmpleted who'ww+ ecfant actmty has occurred reistin to a mee or et tees eve') 30 deys 11 no cheny has occurred during the 4 30 day reporting per nd 6ndate "ho Cheny" in the status t> lock. Keep the onens' wit
- the cose file end so*id one copy to Headquarters, e l Office of lavest pdons l CAslsevuttp C.TEcome o8 FeCE o . ora. vi e. .evo. -
. . oivios.u.co.sii 01 FIELD OFFICE 4-84-020 T e- REGION IV OIR4-54-A-0029
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. . . 1, . .w, m Assri,%ED To Susst CT N [RbObb 3. kid.EbEb F0kb[ist hi FROST / DRISKILL QA RECORDS OF SUBCONTRACTOR (S)
STATUS (Spec,fy dere, and porasr a enef damerspreal This investigation was iritiated or. Earch 16, 1984, after completion of a review of an alleger's allegation concerning forgery of subcontractor (s)' Quality Assurance (QA) records anc/or documents. This allegation, along with other allegations of a technical nature, is included in the alleger's testimony that was given to a Region IV 01 Field Office (01F0) investigator and recorded by a court reporter. The above transcript was provided tc the NRC, Region IV, on January 26, 1984, under OIF0's Repcrt of Inquiry No. 04-84-005. ECD: Unknown l DATE: March 31, 1984 - This investigation is scheduled te begin the first week of April 1984. On March 28, 1984, a meeting between investigators from OIF0:RIII and RIV was held for investigative status update and case reassignrent. ECD: May 1984.
DATE: April 30, 1984 - This investigation has been reassigned to an 01:RIV investigator the first week of April 1984. Investigation is 60 percent complete and anticipate final report to be completed during July / August 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: May 31,1984 - This investigation is approximately 65% complete.
Anticipate final report to be completed during July / August 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: June 30, 1984 - This investigation is approximately 80% complete.
Anticipate final report to be completed during July / August 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: July 31,1984 - This investigation is complete. ROI is in preparation l and anticipate completion of draft report during August 1984 time frame.
ECD: Unknown l
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- Paga 2 of 2 NRC PORM 308 d.S. NUCLEAR REIULATOGY COMMISSION INVESTIGATION STATUS RECORD INST"ZUCTIONS: This form is to be completed whenever s+puficent activity has occurred relative to e case or at least every 30 days. If no change has occurred during the 30 day reporting gened, indicate "No Change'* in the status block. Keep the original with the case file and send one copy to Headquarters, Office of Investigations.
CASE NUMetn CATEGony OFFICE o .o, nariNo ntacron i . moiviouat uc"" OI FIELD OFFICE 020 g e.nggg.Wod" c _
" =^75a'a w 'us' REGION IV V .VENDOM X .OrME.
- ' WATERFORD 3: ALLEGED TORGERY OF
^8"gyR$ SKILL OUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS OF SUBCONTRACTOR (S)
STATUS (Specify cl rte, and prende a bnef dancreationl DATE: August 31, 1984 - This investigative report is in a final draft status ,
and scheduled for completion during September 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: September 50, 1984 -
The ROI remains in a final draft status and anticipate completion of this report during October 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown
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mac comes as s o.s. wuctaAn r.a:ULATo;Y COMM18SloN 1
isen INVESTIGATION STATUS RECCRD insTnucTioses: Th vorm is to b. cornpi.e.d wh.n r .ienific.nt .ccivity h occun.d r.wi to e c or . i t rv m d.y.. it no ch.ne h occun d durine th.
30 d.y reports, p. nod, indic.t. No W* in th. status block. K p th origin.1 with th me. fil. .nd e.nd on. copy to Headqu.rters, office of in c, tioni.
CASE NUMSER CATEGORY OFFICE 4-84-020 O . 0,ERATING RDCTOR 1
- iNOiVIOUAL UCENSEE Q{ ((((Q Q(((({
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,...r ,,, ,,uG' REGION IV V . VENDOR X .OTHER
^**' "jyR$ SKILL ** 7 WATERFORD 3: ALLEGED FORGERY OF OUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS OF SUBCONTRACTOR (S)
STATUS ($p.cafy cler., andprovnlie a bnef cl crvtnus)
DATE: August 31, 1984 - This investigative report is in a final draft status and scheduled for ccmpletion during September 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: September 30, 1984 - The ROI remains in a final draft status and anticipate completion of this report during October 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: October 31, 1984 - The ROI remains in a final draft status and has-been submitted for typing. .An t.ic ip a t e completion during November 1984 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: November 30, 1984 - Anticipate typing of final draft during December 1984 and will forward to 01 headquarters during January 1985 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: December 31, 1984 - Anticipate typing of final draft during January 1985 time frame. ECD: Unknown DATE: January 31, 1985 - Report draft complete, anticipate final typing to be' completed during February 1985 time frame. ECD: Unknown
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- Page 3 of 3 4
Si FomM 506 U.S. NUCLE A2 CE!ULf.TOLY COMMISSION ca.
INVESTIGATION STATUS RECORD INSTEUCTIONS: This form es to be completed whenever signifcant actmtv has occuned reistive to a case or et leart every 30 days. If no change has occurred durene the 30 day reporting period. ind cate "No Changr~ .n the status block. Keep the originst with the case fue and send one copy to Headouarters, office of Investigations cui hu ia caricoav o,..ca OI FIELD OFFICE 4 82-020 - - REGION IV x_ * "gNR"c'?*o,'" _
= - unreai.ts,,u o V vfND0a x .OTMia
" TAI S K I L L **kATERFORD: ALLEGED FORGERY OF QUALITY ASSURANCE RFCORDS OF SUBCONTRACTOR (S) status tsoec,r oer,.
r .,,a aro ,o, e er,er oe.er,,r,o,e DATE: February 28, 1985 - A final review process of ROI in progress. Anticipate completion during March 1985 time frame. ECD: March 29, 1985 DATE: March 31, 1985 - Field review completed. Anticipate forwarding ROI to OI headquarters for final review this month. ECD: 4/85 DATE: April 30, 1985 - Final review and corrections completed. Anticipate forwarding ROI to 01:HQ during the next two weeks. ECD: 5/85 DATE: May 31, 1985 - This investigation was forwarded to 01:HQ on May 10, 1985
- for final review. ECD: 6/85
=
DATE: J NE 17,1985 THIS CASE IS CLOSED
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UNITED STATES
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' -E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
$' REGloN IV
. 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 1000
"% ,[. ' ., , #, ARLINGTON. TEXAS 76011 DEC 13 ES3 MEMORANDUM FOR: File FROM: T. F. Westerman, Enforcement Officer
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD DIESEL ALLEGATIONS On November 16, 1983, the Headquarters Duty Officer notified the Regional Duty Officer that a Richard Wade (telephone (216) 428-2053) had contacted him with allegations relating to improper torquing of the bolts associated with the emergency diesel generator by Gulf Engineering, and to improper calibrations performed by the Magna Flux Company.
Subsequently, I placed a' telephone call to Mr. Wade on November 17, 1983. He made the following allegations regarding the modifications made by Gulf Engineering to the emergency diesel generators:
- 1. The torque wrenc.* used during modification of cam followers in the Waterford Cooper .'ecsemer Diesels was 38% under calibrated.
- 2. QA Manager, Roy Quii: 3 (sp?), changed records to indicate only a few bolts were affected by the torque wrench in question.
- 3. Mr. Wade, as QC Supervisor, was ordered to signoff on diesel or be terminated by QA Manager Roy Quilla.
- 4. He also stated that an N2 purge was not performed.
- 5. Mr. Wade indicated that a young red-headed fellow named Don (last name unknown), who is still employed by Gulf Engineering, and-Spencer Broper,
- who is no longer a Gulf Engineering employee'(Mother's telephone (401) 828-2318) were witnesses.
With regard to the Magna Flux Company, Mr. Wade made the following allegations:
- 1. Six years of weld inspections without a rejection.
- 2. He had purposely put through a defective weld test plate which was found by the Magna Flux Company to be acceptable.
- 3. The piping systems were never purged. _
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- 4. Calibrations performed were faulty, including improper humidity and temperature control in the test lab, which was an ordinary office trailer.
- 5. They had been fined in Pennsylvania on conspiracy and fraud for double i billing.
- 6. Magna Flux Company was stated to have performed all calibrations on site during initial construction.
N '
T. F. Westerman Enforcement Officer e
P
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 REPORT OF INTERVIEW 0F Richard C. WADE
- On April 24, 1984, Richard C. WADE, telephonically contacted Investigator David M. GALANTI, Office of Investigations Field Office, Region III, NRC,-
~
l and related that he had received information that the Nuclear Regulatory Comission was attempting to contact him. WADE was advised that the'NRC has-been trying to contact him since April 2, 1984, in order to obtain additional i information relative to his allegations concerning Gulf Engineering Company i and improper torquing of bolts on the emergency diesel generator at the Waterford SES Unit III plant in Taft, Louisiana.
! WADE stated he worked for Gulf Engineering Company at the Waterford plant from August'through October 1980. During this entire time at Gulf Engineering, WADE was a' Quality Control (QC) supervisor and was directly responsible to Raymond RONQUILLO, who was a Gulf Engineering Quality Assurance (QA) manager.
WADE said that one project to which he was assigned while working for Gulf Engineering at Waterford involved two modifications to the Cooper-Bessemer emergency diesel generator's -A- and -B- at Waterford. WADE said the modifications required that the generators be taken "all the way down" in order to complete the modification work requirements. WADE said the reason he recalled the emergency diesel generator. work so well was because when they pulled the front head off one of the generators, the engine compartment was 3 filled with water. Subsequent inspection of both generator -A- and -B-determined that all cylinders, the crank case, the pistons and every internal component of both generators were totally filled with water. WADE attributed this situation to a lack of top covers for the exhaust pipes on both generators and reported that every time it rained, the exhaust pipes filled t
with water which drained into the engine compartment of the generators.
WADE said that both modifications to the emergency diesel generators were completed during the first 3 weeks of September 1980 and shortly after the work had been completed it was discovered that one of the torque wrenches was out of calibration during the time the emergency diesel generator' work was
- being accomplished. WADE said that he thought the total percentage the torque
' . wrench was out of calibration was approximately 38 percent, and that figure EXHIBIT (2) 4
,.,-------m--,-,--,,.r,,w--..-----~-.-.,--,,-,.---, , - -
REPORT NUMBER: 4-83-030 (38 percent) was obtained by him, by adding all three levels which appeared to be out of calibration. WADE said that he presented the information to RONQUILLO who directed him to prepare a discrepancy report (DR). He related that RONQUILLO told him to write on the DR that the torque wrench was set 10 percent higher than it actually was, and that this would compensate for the percentage the torque wrench was off. He added that RONQUILLO told him to prepare the DR in this manner so that Gulf Engineering could " engineer the matter off," or "he would be terminated." WADE said he wanted to keep his job, so he complied with RONQUILLO's request and prepared the DR as he was directed. According to WADE, generators would have had to have been torn down completely in order to retorque all the bolts so that only the bolts which were easily located were retorqued even though the DR reported that all bolts were retorqued. WADE identified his QC stamp number as 18, and stated that the Gulf Engineering office had a duplicate stamp and they simply stamped his number on the " inspected by" QC approval area of the traveler package. WADE said that he did not know who had stamped his number on the traveler package approval block, but he did notice that all the bolts had been stamped " number 18" even though he did not approve of the procedure. He maintained that no retorquing of either generator was accomplished after the torque wrench was discovered to be out of tolerance. In view of the above circumstances, WADE asserted that the DR which he originated at the direction of the QA manager was a complete fabrication.
WADE stated the problems with the emergency diesel generators at Waterford were well known by everyone at Gulf Engineering, and even after both of the diesel generators were found full of water, nothing was done to correct the problem. WADE opined the generators were still probably full of water because the exhaust pipes, to the best of his knowledge, still did not have any type of cover over them.
1 ,
WADE was unable to provide any additional relevant information and the interview was terminated at 10:45 a.m., April 24, 1984.
EXHIBIT (2)
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