ML20207D697

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Requests Return of Study Team Supplemental Rept Dtd Sept 1985 Because of Errors Found.Rept Reissued
ML20207D697
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 10/16/1985
From: Gagliardo J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20205D361 List:
References
FOIA-85-799 NUDOCS 8607220163
Download: ML20207D697 (26)


Text

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(  %, UNITED STATES

r ', e g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I h E TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER

%,' V [/.f CsBORNE OFFICE CENTER, SUITE 200 CHATTANOOGA TN 37411

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DCT 161985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Comanche Peak Intimidation Panel and Advisors FROM: J. E. Gagliardo, Director, TTC, IE

SUBJECT:

STUDY TEAM REPORT With my memo of August 8, 1985, I transmitted to you a copy of the Study Team's Supplemental Report dated September 1985.

The report had a couple of errors and will have to be reissued. Please return the report to me so that I can dispose of it and take it out of circulation.

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L$.E.Gagliardo, Director Technical Training Center l Office of Inspection and Enforcement l

8607220163 860715 PDR FOIA GARDE 85-799 PDR

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director ,

i i Comanche Peak Task Force N Q f' A [' M FROM: Comanche Peak Intimidation Panel '

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SUBJECT:

REPORT OF COMANCHE PEAK INTIMIDAT

(

The attached report documents the results of the review and evaluation F  ;

1 of intimidation anlharassment issues at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric /

Station (CPSES). This review was performed by the Comanche Peak Intimida- /

tion Panel (Panel) and by a Study Team composed of a group of consultants.

and evaluation of all alleged TheStudyTeamperformedanindepthrevie[atthe(Attachments incidents of intimidation and harassment 1&2ofthe Report) that there was no " climate of intimidation" at CPSES.

The Panel agrees with the Study Team that the small number of reported incidents of intimiation at a large site like CPSES suggests that intimi-

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dation was not pervasive. The Panel is concerned, however, that the management style at CPSES establishes a work environment in which the right chemistry exists for actual or perceived intimidation to occur, given the right set of circumstances. We strongly recommend that the Applicants initiate prompt and effective action to offset this condition.

The recommended actions are addressed below.

- In their reports,the Study Team addressed the management style and interface problems as reported in depositions and in the surveys. The Panel is also concerned about the apparent autocratic / bureaucratic, and on occasions arrogant, style in the behavior to CPSES management. TRT personnel also informed the Panel that they observed a work environment characterized by employee fear of management at CPSES. Since CPSES is a non-union project, and there was no effective internal grievance system, each employee holds his or her position at the discretion of management.

In sum, it is the Panel's view that the environment created L-y the management style at the CPSES facility does not necessarily lead to improper construction or quality control. The Panel is aware that many projects have been built effectively with an unquestioning auto-cratic management style. However, it is the view of the Panel that an important ingredient for an effective QA program to monitor the quality l  % 2)

f Draft 1 - 8/28/85 of construction is an environment where employees may freely raise safety-related concerns to an interested management. While it is clear that employees did raise concerns, some even making allegations of intimidation, there was a perception by employees, whether valid or not, that some management personnel did not want to hear concerns nor did they always provide adequate explanations to employees that raised these types of questions. This is not to say that every employee had valid concerns: TUEC hires, trains, and directs the activities of the employee, but if it is going to keep the employee in a responsible position, it must assure that the employee understands his or her job.

TUEC cannot keep the employee in a responsible position and not provide adequate explanations or resolution of his or her concerns. Failure to do so will have an inpact on the attitude of the employees which can result in the employee not performing as expected. The Panel cannot conclude, however, that the management style at CPSES contributed in any way to the quality assurance problems there. Poor procedures, inadequate training, and insufficient management direction could also have caused or contributed to the quality assurance problems, which have been identified by the TRT.

The concerns expressed by some TRT participants and the collective findings of the Study Team and the Panel suggest a need for action by TUEC management. The Panel recommends that TUEC take action to assure that the management style of the TUEC organization is conducive to assuring a quality project. The Panel does not recommend any one course of action such as the replacement of one or more managers, or a reorganization, or a change in procedures such as to develop an internal grievance procedure. The Panel does not believe that any single action will change the attitudes and perceptions of the past.

TUEC's management should take an objective look at the past incidents described in this report, as well as the current situation at the site, and take steps as necessary to assure the establishment of a " quality first" attitude by its management and employees. The use of an inde-pendent consultant to conduct this evaluation may be appropriate and should be considered. The overall effort should be directed at estab-lishing trust between the employees and management which will eliminate any fear of reprisals for anyone who identifies safety concerns or questions safety procedures.

In making these recommendations it is important to reiterate that the Panel is not saying that there is a pervasive climate of fear or that TUEC's management style in fact directly contributed to the quality problems. But given the examples described in the record and the per-ceptions of some TRT members, the Panel believes that a concerned manage-ment would take aggressive and dynamic action to avoid and erase any question of a potential problem of intimidation or harassment.

CUmancne rTax-+5ER 13 t

Draft 1 - 8/28/85

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It is noted that e i: c'#^*+ d^ae ^^t #,clwJc a iiudings, (1) recently identified allegations, (2) intimidation issues reviewed by the Comanche Peak Ombudsman (B. Grier), (3) intimidation issues referred to the SAFETEAM, and (4) intimidation issues which are still being litigated (e.g.

Lipinsky). Ihr -a" iou nf thoco ice.iac will ha dneirmantad in = cirnnla-nnt:1 r:p;ct.

If you have any questions regarding this effort, the Panel is prepared to brief you and NRR management on this effort.

J. E. Gagliardo J. A. Axelrad J. Lieberman D. R. Hunter C;c.s..che Per,  ::R 1r

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G/f0/55-i SEPTEMBER 1985 REPORT OF THE REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF INTIMIDATION AND HARRASSMENT OF EMPLOYEES AT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION vsfTS 1 AND 2 by COMANCHE PEAK INTIMIDATION PANEL (NRC COMANCHE PEAK TASK FORCE) hache-Peak-SSEL+3-

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2. THE COMANCHE PEAK INTIMIDATION PANEL AND ITS ADVISORS AND CONSULTANTS Panel Members Axelrad, J. -

Enforcement Staff, IE, NRC Gagliardo, J. -

Technical Training Center, IE, NRC Hunter, D. -

Reactor Projects Branch - RIV, NRC Lieberman, J.

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Regional Operations Enforcement Division, ELD, NRC Panel Advisors Chandler, L. -

Hearing Division, ELD 3

Griffin, B. -

OI Field Office, RIV, 01, NRC Ippolito, T. -

Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Kaplan, B. -

EG&G Noonan, V. -

Comanche Peak Project, NRR, NRC Scinto, J. -

Hearing Division, ELD, NRC Treby, S. -

Hearing Division, ELD, NRC The EG&G Study Team and Its Consultants:

Andognini, G. -

LRS Consultants (September 1984 Report Only)

Bowers, D -

Rensis Likert Associates Kaplan, B. -

EG&G s

Margulies, N. -

Graduate School of Management, University of California at Irvine Rice, C. -

LRS Consultants Stratton, W. -

Iaaho State University

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W - 5/10/05.

As construction of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric. Station was nearing completion, issues that remained to be resolved prior to the consideration of issuance of an operating license were complex, resource intensive, and spanned more than one NRC office. To ensure the overall coordination and CL integration of these issues, and to ensure their resolution prior to licensing A

decision /, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations (ED0) issued a memo-randum on March 12, 1984, directing the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor

( # AA.

Regulatitn to) manage all necessary NRC acti,ons leading to prompt licensing

^ WRis decisions, and assigning the Director, NR&4 Division of Licensing, the lead responsibility for coordinating and integrating the related efforts of various offices within the NRC.

The principal areas needing resolution before a licensing decision on Comanche Peak could be sached included: (1) the completion and documentation of the staff's review of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR); (2) those issues in contention before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB); (3) the completion of necessary NRC regional inspection actions; and (4) the completion and documentation of the staff's review of technical concerns and allegations regarding design and construction of the plant.

To evaluate and resolve the technical concerns and allegations regarding design and construction of the plant, a Technical Review Team was formed. On July 9, 1984, the TRT begari a 10-week (five 2-week sessions) onsite effort, including interviews of allegers and TUEC personnel, to determine the validity of the technical concerns and allegations, to evaluate their safety significance, and r ch; Ten 55G 13

- / /.

i Tjijn Q -GiwlC5 to assess their generic implications. The TRT consisted of about 50 technical specialists from NRC Headquarters and NRC Regional Offices, and NRC consultants, who were divided into groups according to technical disciplines. Each group was also assigned a group leader.

Of the contentions before the ASLB, only one (Contention 5) remained unresolved in the CPSES operating license application proceeding. Contention 5 alleges that:

The Applicant's failure to adhere to the quality assurance /

quality control provisions required by the construction permits for Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2, and the requirements of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, and the construction practices employed, specifically in regard to concrete work; mortar blocks; steel; fracture toughness testing; expansion joints; placement of the reactor vessel for Unit 2; welding; inspection and testing; materials used; craft labor qualifications and

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working conditions (as they may affect QA/QC and training and organization of QA/QC personnel, have raised substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility. As a result, the Commission cannot make the findings required by 10 CFR S 50.57(a) necessary for issuance of an operating license for Comanche Peak.

Ceunrha PC SSM

A 0, mfr/ - TfllB/95 The ASLB decided in March 1984 3 ,that in order to resolve Contention 5, it must consider the allegations of intimidation and harassment. Prehearing conferences were held in June 1984; depositions were taken in July and August 1984; pre-hearing testimony was filed in August 1984, and thi hearings commenced on September 10, 1984. Thn howinnt will enntinna sf+ r th; i;;;;,,;; ;f ;,,43

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In July 1984, the Manager of the Technical Review Team (TRT), retained the services of a group of consultants (Study Team ) to determine whether or not a climate of intimidation was created by CPSES management among QA/QC personnel.

The Study Team's report, issued in September 1984, (Attachment 1) concluded that a climate of intimidation did not exist at CPSES.

Since the Study Team did not independently assess individual incidents of alleged intimidation and did not review all 0I investigation reports relating to intimi-dation issues at CPSES, NRC staff decided that the report would not constitute the sole basis for the staff's final position on intimidation and harassment issues at CPSEf. The report would, however, contribute to the staff's final determination of intimidation and harassment issues.

O The Study Team continued its review of all documentation available on alleged cases of intimidation and expanded its effort to include an assessment of 4tYit.wth individual cases of alleged intimidation. The additional documentation is a

listed in the Study Team's Supplementary Report (Attachment 2).

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@ j'j/S5 'T0 As the Comanche Peak TRT neared completion of its efforts, the NRC staff organized the Comanche Peak Intimidation panel composed of NRC senior managers to review, evaluate, and establish a position on all intimidation and harassment issues at CPSES. The Intimidation Panel (Panel) and the Study Team subsequently V

discussed their respective efforts and found that they were f = d crt:lly dupli-cative. At the time of these discussions, the Study Team had essentially com-pleted its review of the underlying information. In addition, based on the Panel's discussions with the Study Team and the Panel's review of the informa-tion, as completed to that point, it became evident to the Panel that the Study J6  ;

Team hed reached conclusions that were consistent with the views being formu-lated by the Panel. Accordingly, rather than continuing to duplicate the review's already completed by the Study Team, and recognizing the Study Team's uit substantial expertise, the Panel determined that it would .tPix the Study Team r ia e% as its consultant to develop the underlying evaluation. The

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PanelthereaftercontinuedtomonitortheStudyTeam'sactivitiesangmeet

,e et with them to n w p th,t +hy app e k x- '",, m'- m uv4 6 p y K.ap rtio p W NwM MAfd e Attachment 2 is the Study Team's Supplemental Report of which documents the Study Team's review of the additional material- orovided to it after its initial

\ effort. The Study Team, as part of its effort, first developed a definition of the word " intimidation." This definition is set forth in their September 1984 g) . In the Panel's view, the cefinition was some-Report (Attachment 1 at k p. 4) b diri An W%

what narrow in that it required^that the intimidated individual^ actually ar.n 'm h }wt n(t d 4,

f; m m . m .1 2 - .i m _ m act contrary to requirements. In the Panel's AM view, " intimidation" would be present if thinti;nidating act was reasonably likely to influence an employee to act contrary to a requirement. The Study Team subsequently agreed with and adopted the Panel's definition as reflected i

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S-initsSupplementaryReport(Attachment /). The Panel believes that, as modified, the definition now reflected in the Supplementary Report on pages 9-10, is

> appropriate for this proce'g\ing.

L,t Study,Telia s CondM After establishing the definition of intimidation,the Study Team performed a detailed review of all data available for each of the alleged intimidation events listed in their reports +. Their conclusions with respect to each alleged event appear in Appendix B of the Study Team's Supplemental Report, S ii d = t LL j 0verall, the Study Team con b ed that a climate of intimida-tion did not exist at CPSES.

> e 1. - gL-e In conducting +his, review the Panel was briefed by the OI investigator involved in the investigation of CPSES intimidation issues. He also provided each of the panel members with a copy of the investigation and inquiry reports that had been issued on the alleged intimidation events that were investigated by OI.

Additionally, to assist the Panel, staff counsel provided references to relevant information from the hearing record. The Panel also met with the TRT to deter-mine whether events which did involve intimidation reflected corresponding technical problems.

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The Intimidatio Panel revie d three all d or suspected incidents of intimi-

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dation that were at reviewed y the Study Team. These eve ts were reviewed

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only by the intimid tion panel because'they were forwarde to the panel late in

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the review process, a afteritwa's(determinedthatth alleged or suspected

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events were not of signi icant co.n'cern require a r iew by the Stud Team.

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A descr1 tion of each of the bree events an .the indings of the I timidation

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Panel are i,scussed below. }

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a. On January, 15, 1985 the Coman he Peak Pro'ect Director forw ded to

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theIntimidationPanelaportio of the deposition. of Mr. ouser, a

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former CPSES QC inspector. (The te al was forwarded t the panel at the suggestion of the Chairman o the ASLB.) In th'e eposition, (tr.

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Mouser. stated that he had inf med

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r. Tolscn (TUE QA Manager) as.to how'he and his fellow war rs were oing to rev ew and verify indiv'i, dual DCAs (Design Chang Authorizatio s) and CNCs (Component

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Modification Cards). Mr. T sonbecameupsetandfoldthem,"No.

l That's not the way I want t dons." Subsequent to this meeting ,/

Mr. Mouser and his super isor went back to Mr. Tolson, who agree'd to allow them to do th reviewastheyhadorihinallypropose

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This incident does ot constitute an act of.intimidatio ,'

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becauseMr.Tolsonfsstatementwasnotlik1 to have ca ed a rea-

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sonableindividuaItodosomethir.gthat[ascont'rarytoexsting

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requirements. Further, Mr. Tolson late'r changed his positio at the urging of his employees.

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b. On January 28, 19 5 the Comanche Peak Project Director fo arded to the intimidati aneY a portion of Mr. Mouser's dep sition in p/ /

which he alleged th t an NRC OI invest'igator had app ently discl

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ed confide ia information<to TUEC employe . Nothing i this al ged in ident l'nked any'CPSES employees to any impro r actions, d ,t'hus this ev nt does not constit e an act of intimidatio [

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c. OI Investigation Report 4-84-0 , conc rning alleged ntimidation

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of QC. personnel, i cluded an inte vi w of a former oilermaker foreinan. AlthoughN t investigatip concerned the alleged intimida-

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/ foremean//indicated that he had tion of\QC personnel, t .e boilerake

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been subj\ected'to systemmhtic N / \ arassme t, p/articularly following he identification of quality-re' ated defici nEies to the Brown an Root

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The . individual also' id ntified tecli ical concerns whic were

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f r,eviewed by the Tech calReviewjeam(TRT),ihcludjngconcerns i i

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' associated with th emergency / diesel generator shi' elds. The fuel

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trans tube (tr nsition p1 te), the stehm gend tor head insula-

/ tionsuppkts, he fuel pop'l iiners, cleanl o$ss swipe testing ,

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the componeri coolingwatersurge,tanksuppor , an weldingdo rebar. The results of/the TRT review of/the technical copc' erns

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are documented in SSERs 8, 10 and 11. The individual also

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provided informatio/n regarding the ;nain condenser installation, which is not saf ty-related, but n directly affedt the quality

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of the seco dary water being supplied to the main steam generators.

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. Q .Gi w/85 Subsequ~ t to the individu ls' , visit in late ummer of 1982 to the B&R corpor e manage' ment in bston,theboiler er foreman identified th was spe 1fic 11y given th third degree" by

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management up, is ret n to the lant si from H6 ston. urther, the inter w reve e that he was lac in" confine $en in the shop a in a "cag5' and was told to just make like was doing something." Thednterv ew revealed ha6. shortly a erwarhs,when

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he was faced with either ing tr sferredito an area where he did not feel / mfortable or ei subjected reduction-in .

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' force (RIF), the oilermaker reman quit B&R.\ The individ 1

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fte working,for B&R since 1 0. \

XuitB&R.inSeptember1982,

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Based on the informatio available f r review, the in imidation

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padelconcludedthat he facts prese t in the OI ' v stigation

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keport, associated iththe'Tinal/ months f emplo ent ofsthe

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boilermakerforeancertainly\6uldhaveha a illing ef ect on the identif cation of de 1 ies in the k perf,ormed fellow qual' y workers. This individual a eared osavebeens

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treated b managehent in'a fashion w ich demonstrate that, in

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this in tance, management was interes d in cost, produ tion,

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and s eduling of safe related a ivit.ies to the dretriment

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of quality.

Based on its revi of ti'e underlyi information and discussions h satisfied that the Study Team's /

with the Study Team, t /e Pa Reports fully and p;rropriately address a valuate the work

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. .2.up -4wss 1 environment at CPSES k ter .; cf .%u.ec a climate of ni ti 4detier n ;;ted at thc :ite. The Panel adopts as the staff's position

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$4 law s 1 the R rtt.which ce"-1"ede + hat , e-l im e + e er 4-t r e4,+ inn dir4 g A

evi:t. Ths "ancl xto: + hat, ia eachi.g thio uuociusiun, th:2

-a r: :dditional v..gving efiv wa windi nave not been incluued sucnw

+hm t inindy and carrTem  ;,,ue3.

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7 p reau o UNITED STATES d-y[~).,( ' f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3- -* , g WASHINGTON. D. C. 20655 Q 'f vf!

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/"q MEMORANDUM FOR: Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director Ccmanche Peak Task Forcc FROM: James Gagliarno, Chairman Comanche Peak Intimidation Panel

SUBJECT:

REPORT OF COMANCHE PEAN; INTIMIDATION PANEL The attached report dccuments the results of the review and evaluation of intimidation and harassment issues at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CFSES). This review was perfcemed by the Comanche Peak Intimidation Panel (Panel) and by a Study Team composed of a group of consultants.

The Study Team performed an in-depth review and evaluation of allegeo incidents of intimidation and harassment (Attachments 1 & 2 of the Report).

Both the Study Team and the Panel concluded that some instances of intimidation did occur. These are described in the Study Team's report Howe /er, the Study Team concluded, and the Panel concurs, that there was no " climate of intimidation" at CPSES.

In their reports, the Study Team addressed the manegement style and interface problems as reported in cepositions and in tha surveys. The Study been Team conducive noted to goodthat a number job performance andofwhich management practices may have ger.erated existed mistrustp r w suspicion ,and lack of management credibility. d e4 MbSd 4 w The Panel shares the concern of the Study Team that certain management practices at CPSES could create a work environment in which the chemistry would exist for actual or perceived intimidation to occur, given the right set of circumstances. The Panel recognizes that the environment created by these management practices would not necessarily lead to intimidation or result in improper construction or quality control. Indeed, neither the Study Team nor the TRT findings suggest that poor quality work resulted from the incidents of intimidation that did apparently occur and the Panel is aware that orojects have been built effectively by entities with an autocratic management style.

The Panel is also aware that recent chariges in' management personnel have been made at Comanche Peak that could result in changes in the management practices of concern.

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___ ._ __ _J Vincent S. Noonan Nonetheless, the Panel recommends that the licensee address itself to the questi,ogble p,anagement practices identified by the Study Team to detennine whethW cMaMes are necessary to ensure that its management style is conducive '

to producing a cuality product. We recomend that TUEC's management take an objective lock at the incidents described in:.this report, as well as the current situation at the site, and take whatever steps are necessary to assure the establishment of a " quality first" attitude by its management and employees.

The overall effort should be directed at establishing trust between the employees and management which will minimize fear of reprisals for identifying safety concerns or questioning safety procedures. <

The Panel and the Study Team's review warp based upon materials in the hearing record and Of reports completed by June 7/,1985. The Panei is aware that 0I is investigating other allegations of intimidation and harassment and that the hearing on the Lipinsky issues is not completed. Accordingly, the Panel and the Study Team may need to review additional materials that pertain to li J e n '

these issues to determine as a result of new information.whether The their Panel oveg?Mp?g!1sions

' needthem you-a notify to be changed when m ' ael the reccrd is sufficiently complete Se-tNe to close out this

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issue.

I hmes Gagliarco, Chairman Comanche Peak Irtimidation Panel

Enclosure:

As stated 0 r,l/ JV. .

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SEPTEMBER 1985 REPORT OF THE REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT OF EMPLOYEES AT COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 by COMANCHE PEAK INTIMIDATION PANEL (NRC COMANCHE PEAK TASK FORCE) ,

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2. THE COMANCHE PEAK INTIMIDATION PANEL AND ITS ADVISORS AND CONSULTANTS Panel Members i

Gagliardo, J. -

Technical Training Center, IE, NRC  ;

(Chairman)

Axelrad, J. -

Enforcement Staff, IE, NRC '

Hunter, D. -

Reactor Projects Branch - RIV, NRC Lieberman, J. -

Regional Operations Enforcement Division, ELD, NRC Panel Advisors  !

I.

Chandler, L.

Hearing Division, ELD

! Griffin, B. -

OI Field Office, RIV, OI, NRC '

i

, Ippolito, T. -

Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, 1

NRC -

Kaplan, B. -

EG&G i Noonan, V. -

Comanche Peak Project, NRR, NRC l l Scinto, J. -

Hearing Division, ELD, NRC l

! Treby, S. -

Hearing Division, ELD, NRC

, t l

The EG&G Study Team and Its Consultants: -

l Andognini, G. -

LRS Consultants (September 1984 Report Only) i

  • l Bowers, D -

Rensis Likert Associates i

t l Kaplan B. -

EG&G l

t Margulies, N. -

Graduate School of Management, Unive sity of California ,

at Irvine i Rice, C. -

LRS Consultants Stratton, W. . Idaho State University 1  :

i-

- ., .,, . . . . , - . , - . - . , . - - - . , . . - _ - - . _ _ _ . - . - . . ,- - - - -.- --.--..-.-.- -_- ..,..~. -

As construction of the Ccmanche Peak Steam Electric Station was nearing comple-tion, issues that remained to be resolved prior to the consideration of issuance -

of an operating license were complex, resource intensive, and spanned more than one NRC of fice. To ensure the overall coordination and integration of these issues, and to ensure their resolution prior to a licensing decision, the NRC's Executive Director for Operations (EDO) issued a memcrandum on March 12, 1984, directing the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to manage all necessary NRC actions leading to prompt licensing decisions, and assigning the Director, NRR's Division of Licensing, the lead responsibility for coorcinating and integrating the related efforts of various offices within the NRC.

The principal areas needing resolution before a licensing decision on Comanche Peak could be reached included: (1) the completion and documentation of the staff's review of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR); (2) thoce issues in contention before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ( ASLB); (3) the coropletion of necessary NRC regional inspection actions; and (4) the completion and documentation of the staff's review of technical concerns and allegations regarding design and construction of the plant.

To evaluate and resolve the technical concerns and allegations regarding design and construction of the plant, a Technical Review Team (TRT) was formed. On July 9, 1984, the TRT began a 10 week (fi/e 2-week sessions) orsite effort, including interviews of allegers and TUEC personnel, to determine the validity of the technical concerns and allegations, to evaluate their safety signifi-cance, and to assess their generic implications. The TRT censisted of about SO I

L

technical specialists from NRC Headquarters and NRC Regibnal effices, and NRC consultants, who were divided into groups according to technical disciplines. -

Each group was also assigned a group leader.

Of the contentions before the ASLB, only one (Contention B) remained unresolveo  :

i in the CPSES operating license application proceeding, Contention 5 alleges l that: '

The Applicant's failure to adhere to the quality assurance /

quality control provisions reg'uired by the construction permits for Comanche Peak, Units 1 and 2, and the requirements of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50, and the construction practic'es employed, I specifically in regard to concrete work; mortar blocks; steel; ,

fracture toughness testing; expansion joints; placement of the reactor vessel for Unit 2; welding; inspection and testing; materials used; craft labor qualificaticns and working conditions P

(as they may affect QA/QC) and training and organization of QA/QC personnel, have raised substantial questions as to the adequacy of the construction of the facility. As a result, the Commission cannot make the findings required by 10 CFR S 50.57(a) necessery '

for issuance of an operating license for Comanche Peak.

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1 The ASL5 decided in March 1984 that in order to resolve Contention 5, it must considsr tn3 allegations of intimidation and harassment. Prehearing conferences were held in June 1984; depositions were taken in July and August 1984; pre-heat ing tsst.imony was filed in August 1984; and hearings commenced on September 10, 1984.

in July 1984, the Manager of the Technical Review Team (TRT), retained the services of a group of consu2tants (Study Team ) to determine whether or not a cif e.e c' intimidation was created by CPSES management among QA/QC personnel.

Tha Study Tt..m's r% art, issued in September 1984, (Attachment 1) concluded that a 'climite of intimidation aid not exist at CPSES.

Since trie Stuoy Tsar. did not. iridependently assess individual incidents of allegec intimidatfa'n and did aot i'aview all OI ir.vestigation reports relating to i

intimidstion issues at CPSE(, Ni' staff decided that the report would not consti-tyte the sole basis for the riaff's final position on intimidation and harass-trent i $sues at l'FS ES. 7he rey;rt would, however, contribute to the staff's final det rnir.ation e of intimiGition 69d harassment issues.

The Study Team continued its reviw of all @ct met.tatt an available on the

, si'eged cases of Intim1ciatien 3nd agandec its effort to include an assessment of indiviceal ccsec of alleged intimidation. The additior:al docucentation reviewed is listed in tne Study Team's Stpplcmen; arf Rsport (Attachment 2).

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As the Comanche Peak TRT neared completion of its efforts, the NRC staff organized the Comanche Peak Intimidation Panel (Panel), composed of NRC senior managers to review, evaluate, and establish a position on all intimidation and harassment issues at CPSES. In conducting its review the Panel was briefed by the OI investigator who was primarily involved in the investigation of CPSES intimidation issues. He also provided each of the panel members with a copy of the investigation and inquiry reports that had been issued on the alleged intimidation events that were investigated by OI.

Additionally, to assi.st the Panel, staff counsel provided references to relevant information from the hearing record. The Panel also met with the TRT to deter-mine whether events which did involve intimidation reflected corresponding technical problems.

The Panel and the Study Team subsequently discussed their respective effcrts and found that they were duplicative. At the time of these discussiuns, the Study Team had essentially completed its review of the underlying information. In addition, based on the Panel's discussions with the Study Team and the Panel's review of the information, as completed to that point, it became evident to the

( Panel that the Study Team was reaching conclusions that were consistent with the views being formulated by the Panel. Accordingly, rather than continuing to i

duplicate the reviews already comoleted by the Study Team, and recognizing the Study Team's st.bstantial expertise, the Panel determined that it would use the Study Team, as its consultant to develop the underlying evaluation. The Panel thereafter continued to monitor the Study Team's activities and to meet with them to discuss their findings.

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The Study Team, as part of its initial effort, first developed a definition of the word " intimidation." This definition is set forth in their September 1984 Report (Attachment 1 at p. 4). In the Panel's view, the definition was somewhat narrow in that it required a finding that an intimidated individual was actually influenced to act contrary to requirements. In the Panel's view, " intimidation" would be present if an intimidating act was reasonably likely to influence an employee to act contrary to a requirement. The Study Team subsequently agreed with and adopted the Panel's definition as reflected in its Supplementary Report (Attachment 2). The Panel believes that, as modified, the definition now reflected in the Supplementary Report on pages 9-10, is appropriate for this proceeding.

After establishing the definition of intimidation, the Study Team performed a detailed review of all data available for each of the alleged intimidation events listed in their reports. Attachment 2 is the Study Team's Supplemental Report which documents the Study Team's review of the additional material pro-vided to it after its initial effort. Their conclusions with respect to each alleged event appear in Appendix B of the Study Team's Supplemental Report (Attachment 2).

Both the Study Team and the Panel concluded that some instances of intimidation did occur at CPSES. These are described in the Study Team's Supplemental Report. However, the Study Team concluded that a climate of intimidation did not exist at CPSES, and based on its review of the underlying information and discussions with the Study Team, the Panel is satisfied that the Study Team's Reports fully and appropriately address and evaluate the work environment at CPSES. The Panel adopt,s as the staff's position the Study Team's Report.

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In their reports, the Study Team also addressed the :nanagement style and interface problems as reported in the depositions reviewed and in the 1979 and

1983 surveys of emolayees at CPSES. Tne Study Team not.ed that a number of management practices exi W 1 wl.iit may not have been conducive to good joo performance and which may han JeMrated mistrust, suspicion and lack of manage-ment credibility.

The Panel Shares the concern of the Stuc!r Team that certain management practices at CPSES could create. a work environmtnt in which the chemistry would exist for actual or perceived intimidation to occur, given the right set of circumstances.

The Panel recognizes that the environmen', created by these management practices would not necessarily lead to intimidation or result in improper construction or quality control. Indeed, neither t* Study Team nor the TRT findings suggest that poor quality work resulted from the incidents of intimidation that did apparently occur and the Panel is aware that projects have been built effec-tively by ent. ties with an autocratic management style. The Panel is also aware that r.ecent changes in management personnel have been made at Coman:he Peak that could result in changes, in the management practices of concern.

The Panel recommends that the licensee address itself to the questionable nanagement practices identified by the Study Team to determine whether changes are necessary to ensure that its managemer.t style is conducive to producing a quality product. We recommend that TUEC's management take an objective look at the incidents oescribed in this report, as well as the current situation at the

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' site, and take whatever steps are necessary 'to assure the establishment of a

" quality first" attitude by its management and employees. The overall effort should be directed at establishing trust between the employees and management which will minimize any fear of reprisals for anyone who identifies safety concerns or questions safety procedures, s

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