ML20207C441
| ML20207C441 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1988 |
| From: | Bores R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Eric Thomas Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| References | |
| OL-S-005, OL-S-5, NUDOCS 8808090218 | |
| Download: ML20207C441 (25) | |
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'88 JUL 19 P5 :37 Regional Assistance Cecrnittee Federal Emergency Management Agency 0FHE . . . c-t John W. McConnack Post Office and Court House 00mgggm Boston, Massachusetts 02102 8
Dear Mr. omas:
Reference:
Your memo of December 31, 1985 relative to the beach populations in the Seabrook area As requested, I am responding to your memo regarding the adequacy of the New Hampshire RERP relative to the protection of the beach population. My response is based on Revision 2 of the NH RERp; the RAC/ contractor coments on it, including the Seabrook Evacuation Time Study; the analyses of specific Seabrook Station features; and my professional knowledge and judgement related to The bases of my opinion that the plans are or will be emergency adequate (prepa redness. contingent on ccmpletion of actions by New Hampshire to concerns) to protect the beach population (both the beach transient group and those wno inhabit unwinterized accomedations) are provided in the Enclosure to this correspondence.
Shculd you have any questions concerning the above, please contact me at FTS 488-1213. I would be happy to meet with you and/or the RAC to discuss my response, d
Robert Bores, Technical Assistant i Division of Radiation Safety l and Safeguards ;
Enclosure- As Stated cc w/ encl:
W. Lazan;s, RI NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS10tl N 1 ?b. b ' Mhi al Exh. No.
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PROTECTION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE BEACH NPUt.ATIONS BACXGROUND The requirements for emergency preparedness stem from 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1) and (2), which state that except as provided in 10 CFR 50.47(d) (relative to licensing of a facility for operation up to 5% of rated power), no operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is inade by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEFA findings and determinations as to whether state and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented, and on the NRC assessment of the adequacy and implementability of the licensee's onsite emergency plans.
The FEFA finding is primarily based on the review of the state and local emergency plans. Any other infonr.ation already available to FEFA may be used in considering whether there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented. Paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 50.47 requires that the onsite and offsite emergency response plans for nuclear power reactors meet 16 specified planning standards.
NUREG 0654/FEFA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants",
Q was issued to provide a coninon reference and guidance source for state and local governcents and licensees in the developeant of eeergency response plans and preparedness for response to a radiological emergency ana for FEFA, NRC and other federal agencies for use in the review of those plans and preparedness.
The planning basis adopted by NRC and FEFA for emergency preparedness around nuclear power plants was taken from NUREG 0396/ EPA 520/1-78-016, ' Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants". 'The overall objective of the emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases, irrrrediate life savings) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs" (NUREG 0654). NUREG 0396 intended that the planning basis range from trivial events to worst case accidents and it attempted to identify the boundary parameters based on available knowledge of potential accident consequences, timing of releases, and release charac-teristics (source term). It should be noted that doses in excess of the EPA PAGs do not equate with loss of life or even a. health hazard. The PAGs were intended for use by protective action decision makers in arriving at a balance between radiation risk and that of taking a protective action in the absence of constraints to that action.
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O Relative to the adequacy of emergency preparedness for the Seabrook beach population, NUREG 0654 elements J.9 snd J.10 appear to be pertinent to the situation. Element J.9 states, in part, that each state and local plan must l establish a capability for implementing protective measures based upon protec-tive action guides and other criteria. Element J.10 states that these plans to implement protective measures shall include, in part: maps showing evacuation i routes and areas, relocation (reception) centers and the population i distribution around the nuclear facility by evacuation areas; the means to notify all segments of resident and transient population; the means for pro-tacting persons whose mobility may be impaired; the means of' relocation; reception centers / host facilities; projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes under emergency conditions; control of access to evacuated areas and organizational responsibilities for control; identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments to use of evacuation routes and contingency measures; tire estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis; and the bases for choice of recomended protective actions for the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions, including consideration of local protection available and estimated evacuation times.
REVIEW OF HEW HAMPSHIRE plan, REVISION 2, AUGUST,1986 J.9 -- The RAC review of element J.9, the establishment of capability for i O implementing protective reasures, for both the State and local level plans, has indicated that no apparent action was warranted by the State at this time for this element. This elecent was rated
' inadequate" for the State, however, because the RAC had not yet resolved the "beach population issue", the subject of this docurent.
New Hampshire is also currently reexamining all emergency resource needs and the resource availability and distribution to support protective action implementation. The resource needs and availability area will be reviewed by the RAC after ccrpletion of the NH study. Based on the RAC and my examination of the plans and preparedness for the beach population and those individuals in unwinterized housing, l conclude that these populations can be appropriately protected by implementing those provisions of the current NH emergency plans. There appears to be no unique problem in this area that has not been adequately addressed.
J.10.a -- The RAC review of element J.10.a relative to beach population protective action implementation, i.e. , the maps of evacuation routes, of evacuation areas, and of reception and host areas for both the State and local plans, reveal no inadequacies. (An
' inadequacy" was identified with regard To the r.ap of the environ-mental sampling locations; however, this is unrelated to beach population protection measure implementation. Several minor clari-fications were recommended for bus route maps. Rcwever, relative to the becch population, tnis eierent appears to be adequate.
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J.10 b -- The PAC review of element J.10 b, maps showing population distri-bution by' evacuation areas around the nuclear facility, indicate no inadequacies for either the State or local plans. No actions were required of nor recomended to the State for this element.
J.10.c -- Relative to J 10.c the means for notifying all segments of the population, the RAC left the evaluation of the State portion of this element 'open" pending completion of the FEFA-REP-43 (new FEFA-REP-10, Nov. 85) review of the alert / notification system. For the local plans this element was rated "inadecuate" because details were not provided relative to provisions for identifying siren failures and for providing backup notification in those instances of identified siren failures. It should be noted that this inadequacy was generic for all town plans and was not applicable only to the beach population.
The physical siren system and the administrative procedures, plans and means for alerting and notifying the public appear to be in place and adequate. Provisions for early notification of beach populations with both siren tones and voice message capability are in place. The alert / siren system can be activated on an individual stren basis, in groups, or as the entire system to provide flexibility to the 3 decision makers to accomodate the circumstances of the event, l O J.10.e -- Relet 4ve to J.10.e, the means for protect 4ng persons , nose mobiiity !
is impaired, the RAC identified no inadequacies at either the State !
or local level. Provisions were found adequate for health care '
facilities, Rockingham County Jail, schools, etc. Relative to !
"individuals with special needs", however, the RAC left this item "open" pending a review at a future date by FEM of the lists of such l I
sec lal needs individuals. This open item is generic to the entire EPZ and is NOT unique to the beach population. l 1
The RAC also recoar. ended that.the protection factors for special '
facilities be considered in any XI administration decision as they are when considering evacuation of these facilities. (The current provisions use no designated protection factors for special facil-ities when calculating projected thyroid doses for purposes of KI edministratior, decisions.)
i J.10.e -- Element J.10 e provisions for use of KI, is not appitcable to the beach population, at least not in any unique sense. Therefore, no l evaluation is considert:d here. The RAC rated this element "ade- ,
quate". l l
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l O l J.10.f -- Element J.10.f, decision naking for use of KI is not directly i applicable to the beach population and, therefore, is not considered i he re. The RAC rated this element "adequate".
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J.10 9 -- Relative to J.10.g, the sneans of relocation, the RAC found pro- l visions to be ' adequate" at both the State and local levels. The RAC 1 did, however, have a number of recocrnendations in this area relative l to plan and procedure inconsistencies in the bus and ambulance '
resource needs, resources available, resource response times and in the mechanism for detennining precisely the number of special needs persons to be acccmodated by the identified resources.
These inconsistencies, however, were closely evaluated by the RAC and were judged not to result in a lack of resource provisions to adequately accommodate those needing transportation. l J.10.h -- Relative to J 10.h, relocation centers, the RAC found that provisions l for reception centers and host facilities were ' adequate". No addi-tional needs or recomendations were identified.
J.10.1 -- Relative to J.10.1, projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes, the RAC indicated that the appropriate traffic capacity data were provided. No inadequacies were identified for this element. ,
1 J.10.j -- Relative to J.10 f, control of access to evacuated areas, the RAC O found no inadequacies. The State has responsibility and adequate provisions to perfom this function. The only RAC recom.endations for this element concerned radiological directions for emergency workers and access logs.
1 J.10.k -- Relative to J.10.k, identification of and means for dealing with ;
potential impediments to the use of evacuation routes, the RAC found !
no inadequacies but did have one additional recomendation to be !
considered by the State for possible improvement. Inventories of l equipment, procedures and letters of agreement were provided and were '
found to be "adequate".
J.10.1 -- Relative to J.10.1, evacuation time estimates, the RAC has reviewed the "Seabrook Station Evacuate Time Estimate Study" (Vol. 6 of the RERP) and concluded that although the study was "essentially adequate" in terms of format, there still exist a number of technical issues that are of concern and need be addressed. The bulk of these technical concerns can be grouped into several areas: the evacuation times appear to be overly pessimistic in that the "worst case situa-tions" were generally utilized whenever there were uncertainties in data or conditions; inconsistencies in data or results were not satisfactorily explainad; the bases for data /results were not always clear; and maps and tables had some inconsistencies.
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O it should be noted that the purpose of Evacuation Time Estimates ~
(ETEs) is not to provide data showing that any or all areas can necessarily be evacuated prior to plume arrival, but rather to provide the decision makers with the best estimate of times needed to evacuate a given area (s) under the circumstances such that the rest appropriate decision can be made relative to whether to evacuate an area (s) and the timing of such recomendations.
J.10.m -- Relative to J.10.m, bases for choice of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway, the RAC left this ites 'open', citing element J.9 in its coments. No specific actions were asked of nor recom-mended to the State to resolve this issue. As with J.9, there appears to be no unique problem associated with the beach populations which has not Eeen adequately addressed by the NH plans.
Sumary - In reviewing the RAC coments relative to the adequacy of provisions for being able to protect the beach population, only element J.10.c was left "inadequate" (lack of detailed provisions in local plans concerning the identification of siren failures and backup notifica-tion capability). Element J.10.d was left "open' pending FEMA review of lists of "individuals with special needs". This item is not specific to the beach population but is generic to the EPZ. Elements J.9 and J.10.m were lef t "open", basically awaiting RAC resolution of Q the "beach population issue", but citing no specific inadequacies.
As noted above, no additional or unique actions appear to be required to adequately protect the beach populations. Element J.10.1, although rated "adequate", can be considered "open" pending the provision of additional clarification of data / assumptions /results in the evacuation time study. Overall, there appears to be no identified technical problem which has a signiJicant potential for precluding adequate protection of the beach populations (including those persons residing in unwinterized shelters). l AD0!TIONAL PLAN DISCUSSION The New Hampshire RERP for Seabrook site appears to meet or will meet the NUREG 0654 criteria (after RAC comments are resolved) in the generic sense. This means that the plan should be adequate to provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety can be protected during a spectrum of emergency scenarios. In addition, particular attention was given to specific features of the offsite land uses and demography. Specifically, the nearby b1ach areas and high seasonal populations have been studied in depth over a number of years and by a number of organizations. Volume 6 of the NH RERP, Seabrook Station Evacuation Time Study, incorporates many of the results of those studies, e.xpands on other studies and provides additional data and clarifications in other areas. While the scope of Volume 6 includes the entire EPZ, particular attention was focused on the beach areas, the seasonal pcpulations and their O of conditions in all were examined in this study). evacuation For sumer accident during an emergency i
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1 scenarios, the evacuation time estimates for the beach populations ranged free I about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 10 minutes to about 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes after the order to )
evacuate individual areas has been given. Similar evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for the population area within a 2-mile radius of the plant range from 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 20 minutes to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 40 minutes according to the studies. Again, these studies tended to maximize parameters in the direction of increasing )
evacuation times. (The nore likely situation would involve sore rapid evac- '
ua tions. ) As noted earlier, the ETEs are required to provide the decision makers with the best infor .ation (neither under-estimates nor over-estimates) of the times likely to be needed to evacuate a given area under the specific circumstances at the time of the accident. This inforr.ation is necessary to l make the optimum decision relative to the type and timing of protective action recomendations for a given situation.
The State and local plans include many special considerations for protecting the beach populations. Some of those considerations are listed below.
- 1. Provisions have been made to consider closing the beaches or restricting public access to the beach at the Alert emergency classification. At this classification level, no offsite action would be ordinarily warranted to protect the public, but its consideration here would provide additional time to clear the beaches or prevent additional public access to the beach, just in case the situation worsens. Note: Even at the Site Area O, Cmergency classification, one would ordinarily expect that offsite pro-tective actions would not be necessary to protect the public.
- 2. An alert and notification system has been installed with the beach areas to provide siren coverage. The sirens can be activated individually, in selected groups or as the total system, can be rotated for better coverage or fixed in any direction, and can also carry voice messages and emergency instructions.
town.
The system has backup activation capability locally in each
- 3. Administrative provisions and coordination of emergency instructions to be broadcast have been provided to enable the decisico rakers the flexibility to get the rnost appropriate message aired in a timely manner for the spectrum of possible scenarios. The scope of situations covered range frcm that when the emergency organizations are fully staffed and are follcwing a sicwly developing situation to the unlikely case when the situation is rapidly developing, obyfously severe in nature, and occurs prior to emergency organfzations being able to fully staff or assess the situation.
4 Procedures and resources have been provided to assist the public in evacuating the beaches, for directing and controlling traffic, for )
providing transportation for those without vehicles and for removing impediments or obstructions along evacuation routes, l
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..- 7 D 5. Provisions have also been made to coordinate New Hampshire decisions regarding New Hampshire beach populations with Massachusetts for con-sideration regarding the Massachusetts beach areas.
PLANT FEATURES AND CONSIDERATIONS Seabrook Station is a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor (PWR) with a l large, dry, strong containtnent system. Public Service of New Hampshire, the !
licensee, has prepared two documents, "Seabrook Station Risk Management and Emergency Planning Study" - PLG-0432 and "Seabrook Station Emergency Planning i sensitivity Study" - PLG-0465, to provide the detailed analyses of potential '
accident sequences, chronology of accident and release sequences, source tenns and risks specific to Seabrook Station, t I
Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) reviewed the above analyses and performed additional analyses of the systems and features of Seabrook Station. In December 1986, BNL released the "Draft Technical Evaluation of the EPZ Sensi-tivity Study for Seabrook", Technical Report A-3852. The source terms utilized in the New Hampshire Yankee and BNL studies were developed using the "Reactor Safety Study" - WASH 1400 (RSS) methodclogy and did not utilize potential 5,ource term reductions under consideration in current NRC and industry studies.
Using the RSS assumptions, the New Hampshire Yankee and SNL studies indicated
- t. hat a severe accident at Seabrook Station posed a public health risk at about Q two miles from the station that was essentially the same ragnitude as considered in NUREG 0396 at 10 miles from a nuclear plant.
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Ext concluded that "(t)here is negligible probability of prompt containment failure (at Seabrook). Failure during the first few hours after core melt is l also unlikely and long compared the to the timing of overpressure failure (of containment) is very RSS.
Most core melt accidents would be effectively nitigated by containment spray operation. 'The above conclusions were not based on Seabrook specific calculations performed at BNL but reflected our best judgment based on extensive reviews of other similar containmer,t designs..."'
BNL reviews of containment bypass accident scenarios also indicated that significant releases from such accidents were also not likely in the first hours af ter a severe accident.
Relative to the beach population, the distance to the Seabrook Station from the nearest beach area is almost two miles. This distance provides additional time to evacuate beach areas from the time of release until the front edge of the plume arrives over the beach area (assuming the wind is blewing to the beach),
This distance also can provide considerable dispersion and dilution of the plume activity in traveling from the site to the beach. (The magnitude of concentration decrease is dependent on existing meteorological conditions, but could be several orders of magnitude.) Note: If dispersion and dilution are small, then the impacted, albeit "hot" area must be small and the corresponding nurrber to protect.
of affected persons is also considerably smaller and presumably easier
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O It is also noted that when large, seasonal beach crowds are likely to be present (on hot and sunny days), the typical wind pattern is frca the offshore, cooler surface to the onshore, warmer surfaces of the land masses. This :reans that any "sea bree:es' would likely prevent the plume frcm traveling to the nearby beach r.reas when the beaches are most heavily populated.
DISCUSSION The foregoing discussions have indicated that 'th'e current NH plans meet or will I neet the criteria of NUREG C654 in a generic sense. Specific and detailed l procedures have been provided to assure early notification and evacuation of l the beach population can be effected should the plant status appaar to be threatening. The review of these plans and procedures do not indicate the presence of concerns or situations involving the beach populations which warrant unique solution or provisions beyond those already incorporated.
The beaches themselves are nearly two miles from the station at their closest a pproa ch. This distance provides for dispersion and dilution cf the plume as well as additional plume travel time for a plume to reach the beach area from the site. Additionally, because of the sea breeze situations nomally I
associated with sea coast areas, the wind direction will be normally on shore, i.e., toward the plant, rather than off shore from the plant to the shors) during hot, sunny days when the beaches are likely to be most populated.
The analyzed severe accident scenarios (core melt with early containment failure) indicate that the major portion of the dose to the affected population frem such an event is due to exposure to deposited radioactive materials en the l ground surfaces rather than from the passing plume. Tne risk / consequence codes I generally used (CRAC models or MACCS) all assume that the population is exposed !
to this ground deposition for 24-hours after the arrival of the first portion l of the plume and to any additional plumes over that area. In other words, the codes assume that no protective actions are implemented for 24-hours af ter the release reaches thTbeach (or other areas of interest). In view of the NH plans for beach closure and access control as early as the Alert classification; the cited "negligible probability of pro @t containment failure" at Seabrock and icw consequence /lcw probability of serious containment bypass sequences; the plume travel time to the beach areas and the relatively short (2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) time estimated to clear the beaches, it appears that risks to the beach population are a small fraction of the cited risks in NUREG 0396 for this distance. Thus, even ff there were a prompt, severe, contaminating release and a portion of the beach population were caught in or under the plume for two hours during the evacuation process, their exposure to deposited radioactivity would only be approximately 2/24 or less than one-tenth of the code assumed dose. In addition, they would be avoiding any additional exposure to the plume (s) after leaving this area.
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...to provide dose savings (and in some cases, imediate life sayings) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs.
It has never been the intent of emergency preparedness /eeergency plans to guarantee that no one would ever be exposed to radiation, or exposed in excess of the EPA PAGs as a result of any acr.ident or postulated accident. Rather, the purpose is to minimize the risks (produce dose sayings) to the extent possible under the circumstances of the given accident. In this context, it is clear that it would be inappropriate to judge the adequacy of emergency planning on the basis of whether or not the plans and preparedness can guarantee that no one would be exposed in excess of the PAGs as a result of any accident scenario. As stated earlier, the PAGs are guidance tools for use by decision makers and are not levels of acceptable or unacceptable risks. The adequacy of emergency plans must be based on a finding that "there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.' Edward Christenbury of the NRC defined the NRC position relative to "reasonable assurance" in his letter to Spence Perry of FEMA, dated June 18,1986, (copy attached). This position appears to be applicable to the protection of the Seabrook area beach populations.
A similar analysis for persons inhabiting nonwinterized facilities would parallel the above. Further, this subset of the beach population wculd appear to be less at risk than the beach population with no shelter; would be a smaller number than the beach peculation; and would generally be treated as O Part of the local popuietica sroup. (those perseas in properties on the beach i front would be considered part of the beach population during daytime beach !
season.)
l Since precautionary evacuation for nearby areas appears to be the accepted federal and state protective action strategy if the EPA PAGs are projected to be exceeded, the sheltering potential of bu11 dings, other than identified special facilities, is generally not considered for populations within about a 2 mile radius. Persons inhabiting unwinterized buildings in this area wculd be l j
treated in the same manner as other (year around) residents, i.e., evacuated. i Persons outside this area may be considered separately on an ad hoc basis by j the decision makers. Finally, it is noted that habitation of unwinterized buildings is generic to all sites with nearby beach or resort areas and that i i
this situation is not unique to Seabrook. The New Hampshire provisions for these individuals near the Seabrook site appear to be well advanced in ,
comparison with those at other applicable sites. I i
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l O I CONCLUSIONS l Following are sorne of the areas considered above which were utilized in arriving at a conclusion relative to the beach populations.
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. NH state and local plans essentially rneet NUREE 0554 criteria generically
. Special pro' visions for beach populations in place
. No identified problems requiring unique or unaddressed solutions
. Provisions for early warning of beach populations
. Adequate transportation resources available for those needing public transit
. Beaches are nearly two miles from station affording delay in plume arrival and dilution and dispersion of plume
. Sea breezes would tend to keep plume from traveling directly toward beach when beaches are rnost populated O - etts for beaches are roietively s=411
. Containtnent at Seabrook is very strong; probability of prompt containmant failure is negligible
. Containment bypass is unlikely to cause severe offsite problems
. Site specific stuoies for Seabrook indicate risks at two miles are.
comparable to NUREG 0396 analyzed risks at 10 miles "Re&sonable assurance" does not equate with "absolute safety", i.e.,
guarantee of no exposures or exposures above the pAGs Based on the above, it appears that contingent on the completion of action by the State to resolve the other RAC concerns with the New Hampshire and local plans, those plans appropriately provide for dose sayings for the spectrum of possible accidents and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the beach and unwinterized housing populations will be protected and that these plans will essentially rneet the criteria of NUREG 0654 and the intent of the NRC regulations in this area.
I Attachment Letter from Christenbury to Perry dated June 18, 1986 .
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/[.,( ,%[ vmito87ATts NVCt. EAR AEGUt.ATORY COMMIS$lON
{g, wAsmotow, p. c. nees
,, June 18,1988 cc: J. Allan J. Gutierru Spence W. Perry, Acting Generaj R. Starostecki Counsel I
- Dd Fe<$eral Emergency Management Agency S. Ebneter
% 34g B. Johnston 504 C Street, S.W. T. M n Washington, D.C. 20472 R. Bellamy B. Lazarus 6/24/86-TEM In the Matter of Pubife Service Company of New Hampshire, et, al,.
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL and 50-444 OL
Dear Mr. Perry:
In response to a request made by Edward Thomas of FEMA Region I, we have ev aluated, in conjunction with Joseph Flynn of your ofSce, an undated memorandum prepared by Thomas Dignan of Ropes and Gray on beh of the applicants for the Seabrook nuclear plant ("Dignan O uevaluation e =>alf oraneu=". a co97 or is set forth ist hich i- attachee the following discussion.ta At t>cs=e nt ^). our The Dignan Memorandura addresses what are descdbed as "three misconcep-t3ce s" pert aining to offsite emergency planning for the Seabrook nuclear plant , and concludes that they are "false as matter of law" (Dignan Wecorandum at 1). These purported "misconceptions" are as follows:
A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse effects on the public health and safety will occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrcok.
B. That it must be demonstrated that the plans wC1 assure that all persons located in the Emergency P1*ndng Zone or some certain portion of it can be evacuated in some certajn time. . -
In' particular, there have been assertions that the plans must assure the sheltering or evacuation of persons from the beaches in appro:cimately 1/2 hour.
O I lt should be noted, however, that under the Cocu=f sdon's regulations, le CFR I 50.3, only written regulatory interpretations provided by the General Counsel will be recognized as binding upon the Commission.
ATTACHM2MT
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- s pe'n ce P e rry , Esq . . O C. That the plans murt be designed, and shown to be 1
l able, to cope with a particular type of accident -- in '
particular, one involving an early release of I radioactivity off-site.
For the reasons set forth below , it is ou'r opinion that, with minor clari-Scation, Mr. Dirnan's conclusions are essentially correct as to items (A) and (B) above; however, his discussion of item (C) appears to cont *'.n an error which requires correction.
171S CUSSION A. Absolute Assurance of Perfect Safety.
As set forth above, item (A) concerns the question of whether an emergency response plan must be shown to guarantee that no adverse health and safety effects will occur, regardless of what kind of accident may occur at the plant . In our opinion, Mr. Dignan correctly concludes that "[n]either the Atomic Energy Act nor any regulation of NRC, whether dea. ling with emergency planning or not, requires absolute assurance of perfect safety" (Dignan Memorandum, at 1-2).
As you know, prior to issuance of a full power operating license, NRC regu-Q lations recuire a finding "that there is reasonable assurance that adequat e protective measures can and wiU be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R . I 50.4 7(a)(1) . With respect to effsite matters, the NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findngs and determinations "as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented."
Id., I 50.47(e)(2). These regulations plainly do not require any "deihonstration of "absolute assurance" that the public will be totally protected in the event of a radiological emergency. Rather, the intent of t.hc Commission's emergency planning regulations is to reduce the impact of l an accident and achieve "dose savings" through protective actiona that take into consideration plant conditions , evacuation times, shelter factors, and other conditions that may exist at the time of the accident. NO R.E G-0654 /
FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 states as follows (at 6):
The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life i saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce .
offsite doces in excess of Protective Action Guides l (P AGs) .
The Appeal Board has similarly stated, "(t]he basic goal of ec:ergency planning is . . . the achievement of maximum dose savings in a radiological emergency. " Cincinnati Gas n Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power O Stetson unit No. t) ^taa-227.17 sac teo. 77o (1983).
l
( Cpence Perry, Esq. -
-J-O fn Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units .2 and J), CLI-83-lo, 17 NRC 528, 533 (1983), the Commission summarized its rationale for selecting an emergency planning basis as foDow s:
The underlying assumption of 'the NR C's emergency planning regulations in 10 CFR f 50.47 is that, despite application of stringent safety measures, a serious nu-clear accident may occur. This presumes that offsite individuals may become contaminated with radioactive matorial or may be exposed to dangerous levels of radi-ation or perhaps both. Planning for emergencies is required as a prudent risk reduction measure for those individuals. Since a range of accidents with widely differing offsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumptico that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact no specific accident sequences should be specifed be-cause eich accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree. Although the emergency planning basis is independent of specific accident se-quencer a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in development of the Commission's regulations, including the core melt ace! dent release categories of O the ee ctor saretr stuer (wasa-14oo).
These statements demonstrate that the goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents, and that emergency planning may satisfy NRC regulations even though the potential for adverse health effects in an emergency has not been tota]!y j eliminated .
Notwithstanding our opinion that Mr. Dignan is essentially correct in his conclusion as to item (A), two statements contained in this portion of his memorandum require clarification. Mrst , he goes too far in asserting that
S t has been recognized from the outset . . . that if one assumes a major accident with offsite releases, some adverse effect on the public will, by,,
deSnition, occur" (Dignan 5femorandum at 2; emphasis added). Contrary to this assertion, the occurrence of a major accident accomp.nfed by offsite re-leases will not necessarily lead to adverse health effects. Rather, in some circumatances, emergency planning may serve to avert the occurrence of any adverse health effects. Fu rther , whether any such health effects occur.
and the extent of any such effects, will depend upon a host of factors, such as the type and quantity of release, the plume direction , meteorological conditions , exposure durations , and the timely implementation of an appropriate protective response.
S e condly , his memorandum states that emergency planning is intended to l any adverse health effects to as low a level as reasonably possible, O "imit given the facilities at h an d" (Id.), possibly implying that additional
' I ' ftpence P e rry , Esq . , tseilities wu] never be required to be built or instaDed to satisfy NHC ec>ergency planning regulations. In support of this statement, Ur. Dignan cites the San Onofre deciafon, supra. However, that decision provfdea only liarited support for this conclusion. There, the Commission addressed only the issue of whether additional hospital construction should be undertaken, an<$ concluded tht; such extraordinary meas'ures an not required.
B. Evacuation Within A Specific Time Period.
The second item addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether the Applicants must desnonstrate that all or part of the plume exposure pathway EPZ can be
) evacuated in some specified time; in particular, this item addresses the question of whether the beaches in the Seabrook vicinity must be evacuated within approxima'ely one-half (1/2) hour. J+ fa Mr. Dignan's conclusion that NRC regulations b not require that an evacuation be assured within any particular time (Dignan Memorandum at D . We concur with Mr. Dignan's conclusion as to this item.
In support of his conclusion on thb. matter, hit. Dignan cites two decisions:
C1.ncinnati Gas n Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Str.tfon, Unit
~
No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 "IUt'U 760, 770 (1983), and Detidt Edison Co. (Enrico Te.rmi A tomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1069 n.13 (1983). In Zimmer, the Appeal Board stated as follows:
4 The applicants are . . . correct in their insisterce that the Commission's emergency planning requirements do not prescribe specif:e time limits governing the evacua-tion of plume EPZs. The matter of the time in which evacuation can be acecmp11sned is left to be determined on a case-by-case basir upon co.. sideration of all rele-vant :onditions prevailing in the specific locality. But it does not follow, as the applicants would have it, that a particular evacuation plan need not be concerned with the efficiency with w hich ev acutic - might tt accom-plished given the conditions under Mch It must tGa place [n. 16] . Indeed, the Commissa guidelines sug-gest the contrary. . . . If the responsible govern-mental off! cia we to make an informed decision respecting u r.at is appropriate protective action in a given radiological emergency, they must have available t'; them tima estimates which are realistic appraisals of tY cMimum period in which, in light of existing local e ~~:U.7s, evacuation could reasonably be accom-A And, the nearer to the plant the area that
+ / ' ave to be evmated, the greater the importance
,: - s crate time estimates. '
)
Q .
i 1/ Those conditions include, for example, the size nature of the population , the available
' lponce Perry, Esq.
. O trin Portattaa recititi.. . the topographical features and political boundaries. . . .
xt>< tar road =etwor*.
Emmer aupra, 17 NR C at 770-71. '
Similarly. In the Fermi decision the Ap-peal SoaN stated: .
. . . (T]he Commission's emergency planning regula-tions do net specify the time within which the plume EP2 must be evacusted in the event of a nuclear emer-gency. 10 C.F.P.. Part So, Appendix E. I 17, requires only that applicants provide "an analyvis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protsetive actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EP2 for transient and perma-nent populations."
Ferci, supra,17 NRC at 1069 n.3,3. Thus, there is no requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within 30 minutes. Whi*d sece other functions must be capable of being accomplisheo within that time frame , those functions generally involve the notification of appropriate governmental officials and notiScation of the public. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, I IV.D.
C. Planning for A Particular Type of Accident.
The third issue addressed by Mr. Dignan is whether a facility's emergency l plans m;;;t be designed to cope with a particul.ir type of accident and, in particular, an accident involving an "early release of radioactivity off-site." l Two conclusions appear to be reached by Mr. Dignan in this regard: (1) !
that while emergency plans must be designed to cope with a spectrum of accident s , they need not be designed to cope with a specific accident or "any worst case accident" (Dignan Memorandum at 4), and (2) that emergency ple.ns are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity Id. , at 9-3) . While we agree with the first of these conclusions , the second (lnclusion is incorrect and requires clari5 cation.
First, Mr. Dignan is arrect in stating that the emergency plana must be de-s:fgned to cope with a spectrum of recidents, but are not required to address any particular accident sequence or a "worst can accident . " The !
Commission has decided , on a generic b asis , that compliance with its !
mergency planning regulations provides the reasonable assurance required by 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a); accordingly, offsite emergency plans sre not required to address particular accident sequences. !n the Statement of l Consideration published upon adoption of the Commission's final emergency planning regulations, the Commission stated as follows: .
The Come.ission recognizes that no single accident scenario should form the basis for choice of notifkation
@ capability . equirements for offsite at.thorities and for
i
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!? pence Perry, Esq. - .
O the pubtfe. Emergency plans aust be developed that will have the flexfhi.lfty to en_ sun response to a wide spectrum of accidents. This wide spectrum of potentfal accidents also reflects on the appropriate use of the
- tfsite notiScation capability. . . .. i l
Any acefdent involving seven fue; degradation or core i melt that results in signfScant inventorfee of Sssion products in the containment would warrant immediate public notiScation and consideration, based on the particular circumstances, of appropriate protective action because of the potential for leakage of the con-tainment building. In addition, the warning time avail-able for the public to take action may be substantially l
less than the total time between the original initiating event and the time at which signfScant radic ctive re- '
leases take place. . . . The reduction of notiScation times from the several hours required for street-by-str9st notiacation to minutes will signfScantly increase the options 1tysflable as protective acticas un-der seven accfdent conditions. These acthns could include staying indoors in the case of a release that has already occurred or a precautionary evacuation in the I O case f a Potential release thought to be a few hours away. Acefdents that do not result in core melt may also cause relatively quick releeses for which protective actions, at least for the public in the immediate plant l vicinity, are desirable.
45 Fed. Reg. 55402 (1980). Similarly, NUREG-0654/TEMA Rep.1, Rev. 1. -
provides as follows (at 6-7):
No ringle specific accident 'equence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences , both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible selectior. for a planning basis is very large, starting witl4 a sero point of requiring no planning at all because s!gnif! cant off-site ::.dic!ogical accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, re- .
gardless of its extrecely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA l Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident l sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Rath- )
er, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which l planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the !
potentini consequences, timing, and release characterfs-tics of a spectrum of accidents. Although the selected planning banis is independent of spccific accident se-Q quences, a number of accident descriptions were con-sidered in the development of the guidance, including i
- _ -2 .___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _
- "Spence Purry, Esq. . 7
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l O ihe core meit accieent rerea>e categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
A ccord . S an O nofre , supra, 17 NRC at $33. In Long Island Lightintr Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Statfon), LBP-85-12, 21 NRT $43, 888 (1985) (cited in Dignan f.lec1orandum at 4), the Licensing Board dismissed a contention as-serting that the emergency plans must be capable of ceping with any worst esse accident (there involving the possible loss of offsite power); the Board stat ed , "NUREC-0654 does not require an adequate response for the ' worst possible accident' at Shoreham. . . .
In sum, these regulatory pronouncements. and decisions clearly demonstrate that emergency planning for a nuc! car plant is not required to be designed to cope with any particular accident sequence or a "worst case accident." In this respect, we concur with Mr. Dignan's me norandum.
ne Dignan Memorandum !s inenrrect, however, in its conclusion that the emergency plans are not required to be designed to cope with an early release of radioactivity (Dignan 5femorandum at 2-3). This error appears to have resulted by confusing the "worst possible seddent" for any accident involving an early release. While the "worst possible accident" could involve an early release of radioactivity, other less severs accidents might also result in early releases and were included within the parameters which established the Commisdon's emergency planning basis. The Statement of ,
Con sideration , quoted above, clearly recogni:es that 'early releases" may I O occur; it is for this reason, in part, that the 11censee la required to notify offsite authorities within 15 minutes after the licenset has declared an eme rgency , and that responsible o!fsite authorities have a capability to notify the public within 15 clinutes after they have received notiScation free the ifcensee of an emergency condition. !
The following guidance is previded in NUPEG-0654/FE5tA Rep.1, Rev.1 (at 1 3 -14):
The range of times buween the onset of accident cond!-
tions and the start of a major release is of the erder of one-half hour to several hours. The subsecyent time period over which rsdloactive material may be e:rpected to be released is of the order of one-half hout (short- l term release) to a few days (continucus releam). ... l
[G]uidance on the time of release . .. . has been used l In developing the critaria for notification espabilities . .
(Other reasons for requiring prompt notification capabilities include faster moderate releases for which protective actions are desirable and the need for sub- i stantial lead times to carry out certain protedive mea-sures. such as evacuation, when this is indcated by plant conditions.)
It should be noted that the responsible offsite authorities are not necessarily O required. ia a22 cases to actier the Puhite ithia 15 miautes after ther have l
Spence Perry , Esq. -
l received notincation by the licensee. Rather, the time !n which the public is notided will range from immediate notidention (within 15 minutes after ;
state and local ofdef ats are notided .that a situation exists which requires urgent action) to the more likely events where there is substantial time available ' for them to ma.ke a judgment as to whether or not to activate the public notiScation system. Also, it should be noted that the 15 minute c:riterion refers only to the time in which the pubBc is to receive notiScation, and does not refer to the time in which protective actions are to bie completed.
In sum, responsible offsite authorities must have received notidention of the emergency situation within !$ minutes after the licensee has declared an er.>ergency, and the offsite authorities must have the capability to notify the public within 15 minutes after they have received notification from the licensee. Emergency planning for accidents involving 'early releases" is required --
although the protective action recommendatjons may be issued before, during or after the occurrence of an offsite release of radioactivity. ;
There is no requirement that protective actions be completed within 30 minutes after the Ifeensee has declared an emergency.
CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the following conclusions are offered as to O, the matters referred to in the Dignan Memorandum:
- 1. The basic goal of emergency planning is to reduce the impact of and achieve dose savings for a spectrum of accidents; however, there is no requirement that absolute assurance be provided that adverse radiological effects will not occur.
- 2. The Commission's energency planning reguta-tions do not require that the evacuation of aD or part l of a plume exposure pathway EPZ be completed within l any particular time. l l
- 3. The emergency plans must comply with the Commissfoa's emergency planning regulations anJ there-by should be capable of responding to a wide spectrum of accidents; however, the plane are not required to be designed for any specif!c accident sequence or a "worst case accident."
O l
Cpence Perry. Esq. - .
O 4. Accidents involving early releases an within i
the Commission's emergency planning basis, however, the regulations do not specify a time within which the recommended protective actions an to be coepleted.
Sincenly ,
Edward S. Christenb[
Dinctor and Chief ! Tearing Counsel Enclosure cc: J. Taylor E. Jordan T. Murley O
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. 1 O xm==
This memorandum addresses three misconceptions which h.ve arisen as to the standards to,which state and mucacipal emergency plans will be held in an NRC licensing proceeding.
Stese misconceptions are:
A. That the plans must be shown to guarantee that no adverse eff ects on the public health and safety vill occur no matter what kind of accident occurs at Seabrook,
- b. That it must be demonstrated that the plans will assure that all persons located in the Emergency Planning Zone or some certain portion of it can be
() evacuated in some certain time. .
In part::ular, there have been assertiens that the plans must assure the shelter:ng or evacuation of persons from the beaches in app:oximately 1/2 hour.
O. Tha ,
the plans must be designed, and shown to be able, to cope with a particular type of accident
- - - - ~ --
in particular, one involving an early release of I 1
radioactivity off-site. l Each of these propositions is false as a matter of law, i
First, the issue of ab so lu t e safety: Neither the Atomic '
Energy Act ner any revelation of NRC, whether dealing with )
(~/
T e. .e rgency pla..ning or not, raqu:res absolute assurance of l I
l i
l l
i 9
, perfe- safe y. Indeed, it has been recognized from the
(} outset of the formulation of the current emer9sney planning regula:: ens tha: if one assumes a major accident with ef f site releases, some adverse eff.ect on the pub:ic will, by _ -
definition, occur.
-- The purpose of emergency planning is to have in place means and methods of coping with such an event in order to keep those effects to as lov a level as reasonably possible given the facilities at hand. Southern
)
Cal fornia Edison Co. (San Cnofre Nuclear Generating j
Station, Units 2 and 3), CL1-83-lo, 17 NRC $28, 533 (1983). I second, as to the proposition that the plans must be l demonstrated to be capable of assuring evacuation of certain areas within a certain time: This simply is not the law.
g
\-)
The Appea.' Boards of the Comm:ssion have so held - flatly and w;;hout equivocation.
C ..cinnati Cas & Electric Cemeany 1 gwe M.
n.13 ( 19 83 ) . - Indeed, the only activity which the regula:::ns spec:fically require to be capable of a cc ompli shment in one-half hour is public notification. And i i
it is in that context the 1/2 hour rule is discussed in '
NUREC-0654, the NRC emergency planning guidance document.
Third ,
the proposition that the plans will be judged as te adequacy against a certai.. type of accident and in p a rticular ene :nvolving a release as seen as 1/2 hour:
()
o 1
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(
. . 1 That prepos:: en is not only bad law. It is directly l
(]) contrary to the theory of the NRC emergency planning i criter:a.
The theory upon which the regulations were based was that the planners should consider a spec t rum o f accidents.
The key is that the plan be shown to be flexible and capable of reducing the adverse effects to the greatest extent reasonably possible.
The Commission i tself has stated:
"Since a range of accidents with videly dif fering of fsite consequences can be postulated, the regulation does not depend on the assumption that a particular type of accident may or will occur. In fact, no specific accident sequences should be specified because each accident could have different consequences both in nature and degree.
Although the emergency planning basis is O independent of specific accident sequences, a number of accident descriptieaa were considered in developmeae of the Comm:ss:en's regulations, including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400).
"It was never the intent of the regulation to require directly or indirectly that state and local governments adopt extraordinary measures, such as construct:en of additional hospitals or recruitment of substantial additional medical personnel, just to deal with nuclear plant accidents.
The emphasis is on l
p ruden t ri sk reduction mea'sure s. The regulation does not require dedication of resources to handle every possible }
accident that can be imagined."
CLI-83-10, 17 NRC at 533.
O
l Turthermore, there is no requirement that it be l O demonstrated that a plan w:ll cope with any worst case ace: dent. NURIC-0654 simply does not require an adequate f i response for the worst poss:ble accident.
- Long Island j 1
L qhting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LSP-85-12, 21 NRC 603, 886 (1985). l In short. the standard by which any emergency plan is to be judged is whether or not :t represents the best efforts of knowledgeab'e people through the use of reasonably l
available fae:11 ties to teduce to the maximum extent reasonably possible the adverse ef fects on the public health 1 1
and safety which will result from off-site releases l l
resulting from a spectrum of accident scenarios. The qu; ding prine:p'es, . as recently stated by an S3C Licensing 3 card are:
"The purpcse of emergency planning :s to ach eve dose savings to the general pub '. t c in the event that radioactive material is accidentally released off ;
s:te. There is no minimum standard of public radiation dose which must be met '
in emergency planning.
1
" Ab sciute protection of the public against all radiation doses cannot be i quaranteed and is not required for all 4 posstble accident scenarioe.
"The emergency response plan should not be developed for any specific I
preconceived accident sequence. It shou'd instead be framed to cope with a spectrum of accident possibilities i nc '.u di ng the worst accidents.
O 4-
- - - - - - , , ,~ ~ ,m- --
. "There :s ne standard : me required to be me; for evacuation in a radiological emergency. Estimates are necessary to de: ermine accurately the actual t:;ne required for evacuation. These es:: mates are needed to aid in prc:ect:ve action decisi,onmaking.
'No massive investment of resources (s:cckpiling of supplies or construction of hospitals) are required for emergency planning. We will apply a practical i standard of efficience of utill:atien of existing resources (such as roadways and manpower) in evaluating the acceptability of the evacuation plan."
L37-85-12 a: 782.
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