ML20206U806
| ML20206U806 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1999 |
| From: | Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Avedon S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206U808 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905260023 | |
| Download: ML20206U806 (6) | |
Text
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E UNITED STATES y'
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055A001 yg May 20, B99 Ms. Sue B. Avedon South Fork Groundwater Task Force Harborview Professional Building, Suite A P.O. Box 2360 Sag Harbor, NY 11963
Dear Ms. Avedon:
I am responding to your letter of April 13,1999, to Chairman Jackson of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)in which you expressed concern about the use of standard emergency planning for the Millstone facility.
The fundamental requirements for the development of emergency plans, including the provision describing the establishment of emergency planning zones (EPZs), are set forth in the Commission's regulations, in particular 10 CFR 50.47 (Enclosure 1). The technical basis and rationale for the size of the EPZs are given in NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants"(Enclosure 2 selected parts). The size of the EPZs for commercial nuclear power plants takes into consideration the probabilities and consequences of a spectrum of accidents, and the extent of detailed planning that must be performed to ensure an adequate response.
Federal oversight of emergency planning for licensed nuclear power plants is shared by the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through a memorandum of understanding. The memorandum is responsive to the President's decision of December 7,1979, that FEMA will take the lead in offsite planning and response, that the NRC will assist FEMA in carrying out this role, and that the NRC will continue its statutory responsibility for the radiological health and safety of the public. As part of the NRC's Restart Assessment Plan for Millstone Unit 3, the staff consulted with FEMA regarding the adequacy of offsite emergency planning associated with the Millstone facility. By letter dated May 18,1998, FEMA confirmed that there were no issues associated with offsite emergency planning that would preclude the restart of Millstone Unit 3. The staff has recently consulted with FEMA J
rc,arding the restart of Millstone Unit 2, and FEMA reconfirmed its conclusion regarding offsite emergency planning.
I I
The NRC's EPZ policy was established following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, and l
since then some people have proposed increasing and others have proposed decreasing the i
10-mile EPZ distance. After consideration of these proposals and their supporting j
documentation and rationale, the Commission has consistently concluded that an EPZ of 10 miles in radius provides an acceptable planning basis for emergency response. (Enclosure 3 g
provides a specific Commission ruling on these types of concerns). One of the considerations O\\
supporting the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ is that detailed planning within 10 miles provides a g
substantial base for expansion of response efforts beyond 10 miles in the unlikely event this 7
)
ever became necessary.
/ A33 ER' $8E M88E4s MTf8Rs.ECB M COPY H
S.Avedon In a letter dated January 6,1999, to Chairman Jackson and the Commissioners, Congressman Forbes indicated that Northeast Utilities is assisting each of Long Island's five East End towns and Suffolk County in creating a coordinated emergency plan and establishing an open line of communication to ensure that eastern Long Island is considered when decisions are made regarding the Millstone plants. The NRC encourages the communities involved to continue the ongoing dialogue with Northeast Utilities, as well as with appropriate State and county officials, to develop the plans they believe are needed.
In your letter you discuss seven emergency shutdowns at Millstone Unit 3. The licensee shut Millstone Unit 3 down in August 1998 to repair a valve in the auxiliary feedwater system; manually tripped the plant three times in accordance with its procedures, in September, October, and November 1998 in response to high conductivity in the condensate and feed system (two times) and seaweed fouling; and had an automatic reactor trip in December 1998 during main steam isolation valve testir:g. None of these trips are considered emergency i
shutdowns and are not atypical.of a piant returning to service after a lengthy shutdown. Plant operators responded well to the challenges, exhibiting conservative decisionmaking and deliberate efforts to ensure compliance with procedural requirements. Licensee management initiated an assessment of the number and severity of challenges facing the plant operations i
staff since the return to power operations and has taken a number of steps to address them.
For example, during the recent outage to repair the main steam isolation valves, the licensee made a special effort to correct severalinstances where operator actions were necessary to compensate for material or equipment deficiencies (operator work-arounds) and control board deficiencies, and to reemphasize conduct of operations to reduce the challenges to the operators. While we consider the plant's operation to be acceptable, the NRC plans to continue increased regulatory oversight at Millstone Unit 3 until the plant establishes and consistently maintains an acceptable level of performance.
With regard to a decision to permit Millstone Unit 2 to restart, the NRC staff utilized NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350, " Staff Guidance for Restart Authorization," as a guide for plant restart. As part of its execution of IMC 0350, the staff developed a Restart Assessment Plan to identify the NRC actions required before the NRC could make its final restart decision.
On April 29,1999, the NRC concluded that the licensee has taken appropriate corrective actions to support restart of Millstone Unit 2. However, I assure you that the NRC will continue to monitor the performance of Millstone Units 2 and 3 to ensure that public health and safety are adequately protected. The NRC is committed to the level of regulatory oversight needed to carry out this mandate. We appreciate your comments and hope that this letter is responsive to your concerns.
Sincerely, uY N,Ibor Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated (3)
j S.Av: don % #' #
In a 1:tt:r dit:d J:nu ry 6,1999, to Chairman Jackson and the Commissioners, Congressman f
Forbes indicated that Northeast Utilities is assisting each of Long Island's five East End towns and Suffolk County in creating a coordinated emergency plan and establishing an open line of communication to ensure that eastern Long Island is considered when decisions are made regarding the Millstone plants. The NRC encourages the communities involved to continue the ongoing dialogue with Northeast Utilities, as well as with appropriate State and county officials, to develop the plans they believe are needed.
In your letter you discuss seven emergency shutdowns at Millstone Unit 3. The licensee shut Millstone Unit 3 down in August 1998 to repair a valve in the auxiliary feedwater system; manually tripped the plant three times in accordance with its procedures, in September, October, and November 1998 in response to high conductivity in the condensate and feed system (two times) and seaweed fouling; and had an automatic reactor trip in December 1998 during main steam isolation valve testing. None of these trips are considered emergency shutdowns and are not atypical of a plant returning to service after a lengthy shutdown. Plant operators responded well to the challenges, exhibiting conservative decisionmaking and deliberate efforts to ensure compliance with procedural requirements. Licensee management initiated an assessment of the number and severity of challenges facing the plant operations staff since the return to power operations and has taken a number of steps to address them.
For example, during the recent outage to repair the main steam isolation valves, the licensee made a special effort to correct several instances where operator actions were necessary to compensate for material or equipment deficiencies (operator work-arounds) and control board deficiencies, and to reemphasize conduct of operations to reduce the challenges to the operators. While we consider the plant's operation to be acceptable, the NRC plans to continue increased regulatory oversight at Millstone Unit 3 until the plant establishes and consistently maintains an acceptable level of performance.
With regard to a decision to permit Millstone Unit 2 to restart, the NRC staff utilized NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350, " Staff Guidance for Restart Authorization," as a guide for plant restart. As part of its execution of IMC 0350, the staff developed a Restart Assessment Plan to identify the NRC actions required before the NRC could make its final restart decision.
On April 29,1999, the NRC concluded that the licensee has taken appropriate corrective actions to support restart of Millstone Unit 2. However, I assure you that the NRC will continue to monitor the performance of Millstone Units 2 and 3 to ensure that public health and safety are adequately protected. The NRC is committed to the level of regulatory oversight needed to carry out this mandate. We appreciate your comments and hope that this letter is responsive to your concerns.
Sincerely, Original sianeri by:
Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
As stated (3)
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1 NUREG-0396 EPA 520/178-016 l
<l e
y
- 4ff, PLANNING BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
~
I?T STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT y't?
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS T
\\
\\
IN SUPPORT OF
^
IJGHT WATER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS l
9g)
A Report Prepared by a
.g U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and i4 l
Q U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Pd Task Force on Emergency Planning Ji; H. E. Collins
- B. K. Grimes" h(
Co-Chairmen of Task Force F. Galpin'"
w Senior EPA Representative I
1
[
v Manuscript Completed: November 1978 1-Date Published: December 1978 L
t,
' Office of State Programs I
" Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
{
"' Office of Radiation Programs I
p U. S. Environmental Protection Agency i[l Washington, D. C. 20460 1
I kt l
1 1"
- ,3 n: Sus % 3IV-
!!!. RECOMMENDED PLANNING _RASIS, 1
A.
Emerge,ncy Plannin LZones With regard to the area over which planning efforts should be carried out, the Task Force recommends that " Emergency Planning Zones" (EPZs) about each nuclear facility be defined both for the short term " plume exposure pathway" and for the longer term
" ingestion exposure pathways." The Emergency Planning Zone concept is illustrated in figure 1.
EPZs are designated as the areas for which planning is recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident. Responsible government officials should apply the applicable planning items listed in NUREG-75/lll I2) in the development of radiological emergency response plans.
The following are example planning elements considered appro-priate for the EPZs:
(1)
Identify responsible onsite and offsite emergency response organizations and the mec'hanisms for activating their
- services, (2) Establish effective comunication networks to promptly notify cognizant authorities and the public, (3) Designate pre-determined actions as appropriate (2,3,4) i
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1 13 (4) Develop procedures for use by emergency workers, (5)
Identify applicable radiation measurement equipment, (6) Identify emergency operations centers and alternate I
locations, assembly points, and radiation monitoring l
locations,
)
(7)
Imnlement training programs for emergency workers as appropriate, and (8) Develop test procedures for emergency response plans.
Emergency planning should predetermine appropriate emergency responses within the EPZ as a function of population groups, j
environmental conditionsk), plant conditions and time available to respond.
For the plume exposure phase, shelter and/or evacuation would likely be the principal immediate protective actions to be recommended for the general public within the EPZ. The ability to best reduce exposure should determine the appropriate response. The key to effective planning is good communication to authorities who know what they are going to do under pre-determined conditions.
i For the ingestion exposure Emergency Planning Zone, the planning effort involves the identification of major exposure pathways from contaminated food and water and the associated
~
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14 -
control points and mechanisms. The ingestion pathway exposures in general would represent a longer term problem, although some early protective actions to minimize subsequent contamination of milk or other supplies should be initiated (e.g., put cows on stored feed).
It is expected that judynent of the planner will be used in determining the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local conditions such as demography, topography and land use characteristics, access routes, jurisdictional boundaries, and arrangements with the nuclear facility operator for notification and response assistance.
The EPZ guidance does not change the requirements for emergency planning, it only sets bounds on the planning problem. The Task Force does not recommend that massive emergency preparedness programs be established around all nuclear power stations. The following examples are given to further clarify the Task Force guidance on EPZs:
No special local decontamination provisions for the gera "1 nublic (e.g., blankets, changes of clothing, food, special showers)
No stockpiles of anti-contamination equipment for the general public No construction of specially equipped fallout shelters
No special radiological medical provisions for the general public No ne_w construction of special public facilities for emergency use No special stockpiles of emergency animal feed No special decontamination equipment for property and equipment No participation by the general public in test exercises of emergency plans.
Some capabilities in these areas, of course, already exist under the general emergency plans of Federal and State agencies.
B.
Size of the Emergency Planning Zone Several possible rationales were considered for establishing the size of the EPZs. These included risk, probability, cost effectiveness and accident consequence spectrum. After reviewing these alternatives, the Task Force chose to base the rationale on a full spectrum of accidents and corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations. These rationales are discussed more fully in Appendix I.
The Task Force agreed that emergency response plans should be useful for responding to any accident that would produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs. This would include the more severe design basis accidents and the accident spectrum analyzed in the RSS. After reviewing the potential consequences associated with
i p=
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\\
these types of accidents, it was the concensus of the Task Force l
that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out
]
to which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such accidents. Beyond this ceneric distance it was concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial action determinations.
i The Task Force judgment on the extent of the Emergency Planning Zone is derived from the characteristics of design basis and Class 9 accident consequences. Based on the information provided in Appendix i
I and the applicable PAGs a radius of about 10 miles was selected for the plume exposure pathway and a radius of about 50 miles was selected for the ingestion exposure pathway, as shown in table 1.
Although the radius for the EPZ implies a circular area, the actual j
shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular site.
The circular or other defined area would be for planning whereas initial response would likely involve only a portion of the total area.
l The EPZ recommended is of sufficient size to provide dose savings to l
the population in areas where the projected dose from design basis l
l accidents could be expected to exceed the applicable PAGs under unfavorable atmospheric conditions. As illustrated in Appendix I, consequences of less severe Class 9 accidents would not exceed the l
l l
i l
r.
PAG levels outside the recommended EPZ distance.
In addition, the j
EPZ is of sufficient size to provide for substantial reduction in early severe health effects (injuries or deaths) in the event of the l
more severe Class 9 accidents.
Table 1.
Guidance on Size of the Emergency Planning Zone Critical Organ and Accident Phase Exposure Pathway EPZ Radius Plume Exposure Whole body (external) about 10 mile radius
- Pathway Thyroid (inhalation)
Other organs (inhalation) l Ingestion Pathway **
Thyroid, whole body, about 50 mile radius ***
bone marrow (ingestion)
F 8u~d'gmen't-should be used in adopting this distance based upon considerations
~~
of local conditions such as demography, topography, land characteristics, dLCess routes, and local jurisdictional boundaries.
- Processing plants for milk produced within the EPZ should be included in the emergency response plans regardless of their location.
- The recommended size of the ingestion exposure EPZ is based on an expected revision of milk pathway Protective Action Guides based on FDA-Bureau of Radiological Health recommendations. The Task Force understands that m'asures such as placing dairy cows on stored feed will be recommended 1 $r projected exposure levels as low as about 1.5 r m)to the infant thyroid. Should the current FRC guidelines,10 rem 8, be maintained, an EPZ of about 25 miles would achieve the objectives of the Task Force.
I
t
- C.
Time Factors Agociated with Releases The planning time frames are based on design basis accident considerations and the results of calculations reported in the Reactor Safety Study The guidance cannot be very specific because of the wide range of time frames associated with the l
spectrum of accidents considered. Therefore, it will be necessary for planners to consider the possible different time periods between the initiating event and arrival of the plume and possible time periods of releases in relationship to time needed to implement protective actions. The Reactor Safety l
Study indicates, for example, that major releases may begin in the l
range of one-half hour to as much as 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> after an initiating event and that the duration of the releases may range from one-l half hour to several days with the major portion of the release occurring well within the first day.
In addition, significant plume travel times are associated with the most adverse meteorological l
conditions that might result in large potential exposures far l
from the site. For example, under poor dispersion conditions l*
associated with low windspeeds, two hours or ex. e 4 l
for the plume to travel a distance of five miles. Higher wind-f 1
speeds would result in shorter travel times but would provide j
more dispersion, making high exposures at long distances much less likely. Therefore, in most cases, significant advance warning
of high concentrations should be available since NRC regulations ( '
require early notification of offsite authorities for major releases l
of radioactive material. The warning time could be somewhat different for reactors with different containment characteristics than those analyzed in the Reactor Safety Study.
The range of times, however, is judged suitably representative for the purpose of developing emergency plans. Shorter release initiation times are typically associated with design basis events of much smaller potential consequences or with the more severe Reactor Safety Study accident sequences.
The planning basis for the time dependence of a release is expressed as a range of time values in which to implement protective action.
This range of values prior to the start of a major release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours. The subsequent time period over which radioactive material may be expected to be released is of the order of one-half hour (short-term release) to a few days (continuous release).
Table 2 summarizes the Task Force guidance on the time of the release.
The time available for action is strongly related to the time consumed in notification that conditions exist that could cause a major release or that a major release is occurring. Development and periodic testing of procedures for rapid notification are encouraged.
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Table 2 - Guidance on Initiation and Duration of Release i
l i
Time from the initiating event 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to one day to start of atmospheric release Time period over which radioactive 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to several days material may be continuously released Time at which major portion of 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to 1 day after release may occur start of release Travel time for release to exposure point 3 niles - - 0.5 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (1timeafterrelease) 10 miles - - 1 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> D.
Radiological Characteristics of Releases i
To specify the characteristics of monitoring instrumentation,* develop decisional aids to estimate projected doses, and identify critical exposure modes, planners will need information on the characteristics of potentidl radioactivity releases. For atmospheric releases from nuclear power facilities, three dominant exposure modes have been identified. These are (1) whole body (bone marrow) exposure from external ganma radiation and from ingestion of radioactive material; (2) thyroid exposure from inhalation or ingestion of radiodines; and 7)orce on Emergency Instrumentation (offsite) is now
- An Interagency Tas f
on the type and quantity of instruments needed preparing guidance for the various exposure pathways. Federal agencies represented on the Instrumentation Task Force include NRC, EPA, DCPA, HEW, and D0E.
(3) exposure of other organs (e.g., lung) from inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials. Any of these exposure modes 3
could dominate (i.e., result in the largest exposures) depending upon the relative quantities of various isotopes released.
'i Radioactive materials produced in the operation of nuclear reactors include fistion products and transuranics generated within the j
i fuel material itself ana activation products generated by neutron l
exposure of the structural and other materials within and immediately around the reactor core. The fission products consist of a very large number of different kinds of isotopes (nuclides), almost all of which are initially radioactive. The amounts of these fission products and their potential for escape from their normal places of confinement represent the dominant potential for consequences to.the public. Radioactive fission products exist in a variety of physical and chemical forms of varied volatility.
Virtually all activation products and transuranics exist as non-volatile solids.
The characteristics of these materials shows quite clearly that I
the potential for releases to the environment decreases dramatically in this order:
(1) gaseous materials; (2) volatile solids; and 1
(3)non-volatilesolids. For this reason, guidance for source terms representing hypothetical fission product activity within
! ld a nuclear power plant containment structure emphasizes the development h
of plans relating to the release of noble gases and of volatiles such I
as iodine. However, consideration of particulate materials should not be completely neglected. For example, capability to determine the presence or absence of key particulate radionuclides will be needed q
to identify requirements for additional resources.
Table 3 provides a list of key radionuclides that might be expected to be dominant for each exposure pathway. More detailed lists of core inventories are presented in Chapter 15 of recent Safety Analysis Reports and in Appendix V of the Reactor Safety Study. Both of these l.
sources give details on the time histories of the release fractions for a spectrum of postulated accidents, i
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i Cte as 26 NRC 383 (1987)
CLl4712 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
COMMIS$10NERS:
}
l Lando W. Zoch, Jr., Chairman Thomas M. Roberts l
Prederlek M. Bernthel Kenneth M. Carr Kenneth C. Rogere Docket No. 54322 OL 3 in the Matter of (Emergency Planning)
LONG ISLAND UGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuetear Power Station, November 5,1987
,[
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De Commission reverses ALAB 832,23 NRC 135 (1986), insofar as it k ' ' ' 'W -
e allowed the admission of two contentions for evidentiary hearing on whether the Shoreham Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone should be I
expanded by a few miles to: (1) provide an adequate base for the expansion m
of emergency response efforts beyond the EPZ in very severe accidents; and (2) minimize the occurrence and effects of spontaneous evacuation from outside the EPZ. The Commission affirms the ALAB-832 remand to the Licensing Board for funher consideration of evacuation plans for hospitals in the Shoreham EPZ.
EMERGENCY PLAN: EMERGENCY PLANNTNG ZONES (SIZE) he NRC/ EPA task force report (NUREG 0396), which formed the basis for the "EPZ" concept in NRC's emergency planning regulations, indicates clearly that the margins of safety provided by the recommended 10 mile radius were not calculated in any precise fashion but were qualitatively found adequate as a maner of judgment. EPZ shape and size can be somewhat different than the 10-mile circular radius implies without compromising emergency planning goals, L
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383 l.
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l as evidenced by the following statement in the report " judgment... will be used in determining the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local condidons such as demography, topography, and land _use haracteristics, access j
routes, loca! Jurisdictional boundariesgarrangements with the nuclear facW r65erator for notifcauon and response assistance."(See 10 C.F.R.150.47(cX2)
(1987).
i EMERGENCY PLAN: EMERGENCY PLANhTNG ZONES (SIZE) i e
Nothing in NUREG 0396 or in any part of the emergency planning rulemak.
ing record compels a inding that EPZ adequacy is especially sensitive to where exactly the boundary falls, and any such conclusion old seem to be at odds with the overall thrust of the report. In particular, the NUREG 0396 analysis indicates that " adequate protective measures"in the context of emergency plan-ning is not a precisely de6ned concept.
l EMERGENCY PLAN: CONTENT (PROTECTIVE MEASURES)
NRC emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimurn evacuation time I,
for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a i
I, serious accident. Rather, those requirements are designed to achieve reasonable 2.L.:-
- m. Q and feasible dose reduction under the circumstances; what may be reasonable
,, _.1 _.
or feasible for one plant site may not be for another. Long Island Ughting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Urdt 1), CL186-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986).
EMERGENCY PLAN: EMERGENCY PLANSTNG ZONES (SIZE)
Implicit in the concept of " adequate protective measures" is the fact that emergency planning will not climinate, in every conceivable accident, the possibility of serious harm to the public. Emergency planning can, houver, be expected to reduce any public harm in the event of a serious but highly unlikely accident. Oiven these circumstances, it is entirely reasonable and appropriate for j.
the Commission to hold that the rule precludes adjustrnents on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is "about 10 miles in radius." In the Commission's view, the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact site of the EPZ on the basis of such straightforward administrative consideratioru as avoiding EPZ boundanes that run through the middle of schools oc hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions. The goal
(
m 384 L
7 is merely planning simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the locadon of the boundaries.
EMERGENCY PLANNTNG: EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES Even though sheltering will quite hkely be the preferred protective action for EPZ hospitals in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham, evacuation should not be prejudiced by the failure to plan in advance. Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 requires evacuation time estimates for the EPZ without excepdons for special facilities such as hospitals. Moreover, hospitals, as a kind of "special facility, are speci6cally mentioned in the principal guidance document in this 6 eld, NUREG-0654, and there is no suggestion in this guidance that hospitals are to be treated specially as exempt from the evacuadon planning requirement that applies to other segments of the population within the EPZ.
EMERGENCY PLAN: CONTENT (PROTECTIVE MEASURES)
A Commission conclusion that NRC reguladons require Applicant to fulfill the same emergency planning obligadons for Shoreham with regard to hospital evacuadon as those imposed by the Licensing Board in cennecdon with other like segments of the EPZ, such as nursing / adult homes, does not necessarily mean that the applicant's emergency plan is inadequate with respect to hospitals. Under 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(cX1), the Licensing Board could still approve the utility plan ifit found that the de6ciencies related to the hospitals were not signi6 cant for f; a
w :. w.s aw.
- -. + -
Shoreham.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER in ALAB 832,23 NRC 135 (1986), the Shoreham Appeal Board reversed and remanded three issues, among others, to the Licensing Board: the Licensing Board's refusal to permit an evidentiary heanng on whether the Shoreham Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) should be expanded by a few miles to provide an adequate base for ad hoc emergency response efforts beyond the EPZ in very severe accidents (Contendon 22.B); the Board's refusal to permit an evidentiary hearing on whether the FP2 should be expanded by a few miles to minimize the occurrence and effects of spontaneous evaccation from outside the EPZ (Contention 22.C); red the Board's approval of the applicant's provisions for hospital evacuation. In an Order dated September 19,1986 (unpublished), the Commission took review of these three issues and requested briefs from the parties.
385 a
f
)
7 l
I On review, Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) and the Staff support the Licensing Board's decisions on these issues and oppose the Appeal Board's decision. The Intervenors take the opposite view.
We conclude on the EPZ issues that while the decision of the Appeal Board is a reasonable one in light of the available, but limited, adjudicatory precedent, additional Commission guidance is needed After careful review of the history of our regulations, w conclude that Contentions 22.B and 22.C constitute challenges to these regulations. Since Intervenors have declined to cast their contentions in the alternative as challenges to the regulations under at i 10 C.F.R.12.758, litigation of these issues must be disallowed. As for hospital evacuation, w agree with the Appeal Boan! that LILCO's plans do not fully l
satisfy NRC's emergency planning regulations.
1 L EPZ SIZE A.
Background
Section 50.47(c)(2) of 10 C.F.R. provides that, generally, the EPZ for power reactors shall be "about 10 miles" in radius, with the exact boundanes to be determined "in relation to local ernergency respor:se needs and capabilities as they are affected by such condiuons as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdicuonal bounda-ies." LILCO's plume EPZ is about 10 miles in radius, In Contendon 22, a four part, ten page (double spaced) contention. Inter.
e venors argued that the proposed LILCO plume EPZ was not large enough, for
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severs! reasons.' In subpart B, it was argued that a myriad of local conditions p%-
mandated a larger plume EPZ because, in a severe accident, LILCO mould not be able to adequately extend emergency response efforts outside the 10-mile area on an ad hoc basis, j
i, In subpart C, Intervenors argued that local conditions demanded an EPZ 1arger than 10 miles, most importantly because massive spontaneous evacuation by those outside the EPZ would have two disastrous effects: first, residents of j
the eastern end of Long Island would spontaneously evacuate through the EPZ i
to avoid being trapped, either passing through contaminated areas or impeding evacuation frorn inside the EPZ; and second, spontaneous evacuation from est of the EPZ would impede e scuation of the EPZ.
- lhe Licensing Board denied admission of these contentions on the ground that they challenged the Commission's generic determination of EPZ size, as 8 m
.t c na.a e s.*. e. App.da 0 et her).e. w.n-ne w o.s.
L l
i L
l manifested in 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(c)(2)* in dismissing Contendon 22.B. the Li-censing Board noted the Commission's explanation of the 1980 amendments to the emergency planning rules, where the Commission stated that "[t]hese dis-tances are considered large enough to provide a response base that would support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed " Special Prehear-ing Conference Order. Aug. 19,1983, at 10, guoting 45 Fed. Reg. 55,409, col. 2 (Aug.19,1980). The Board also explained that, contrary to the Commission's generic determinanon, Contendon 22.B un assens. [in essence!, that advance ptanrung, as apposed so ad Aac planning, is reqwed beyond ihs 10aine EPZ because of ibe ciahi alisted "disusiguishing chsenetensuca." To the samni that this conunuan assen.s that ad hoc emergency resp:mse would be impossible, n must be rejected as a chalbnge to (So 47(c)(2) To the enient that it chaljenges the TACO plan in specif6c matters, via transion populauan, inadequate roads, adverse weather, etc.,
i these concerns have already been essened in other contenuons which we haw admated Order Ruling on Objections to Special Prehearing Conference Order, Sept. 30, 1983, at 4. The Licensing Board stjected Contendon 22.C for much the same reasons.
In ALAB 832, the Appeal Board reversed the Board's disallowance of these contendons, reasoning that "these contentions do not appear to seek anything more than that to which section 50.47(c)(2) entitles intervenors: a determinadon of the ' exact size and configuration
- of the EFZ based upon, ly tater alia, local conditions."2 On the ground that one set of facts might support more than one contention, the Appeal Board also rejected the Licensing Board's
[
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.C.".? * * *?
reasoning that because Intervenors were being permiued to challenge the overall Q_
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adequacy of the plan to deal with spontaneous evacuadon, the disallowance of
?
Contendon 22.B had no effect on Intervenors' ability to lidgate the safety matters 9
at issue. Id.,23 NRC at 148.
in taking review of the rulings on Contendon 22.B. the Commission asked:
(1) whether.. the admission of Carmentum 21B erryerenissibly chatlenges the genene rutemakeg Ernding that a 10eDe EPZ w6ll prtmde an adequate basis far asusfactory ad hoc emergency response beyond 10 muss should this be required (see 45 Fe4 Ileg 55,do6 col 2)(Augua 19,1980),* and, i
8 specu! Preheansts Confounsa order, Aug 19,1983 (urpubhshedk ords: Ruhna en otyneusis to spenal Prehmanns Centween order. sept 30,1983 (mipubhahed) 3 D NRC st 148 Ho=u'*er, the Appen! &aant repmad Irmarveers' arpswou that us anly lopumsw istuu en she maa of um f.PZ are shaus brans dissed by inca] sendsuans bened. maad the Appet aanrd. the regatsuans perms senadersuen enly of "suner adjammunes $mmah as e emis er emo),,. k at 149 m 41. Cy est et 148 a.37.
'Camneseen order deiad sept 19,1984, at 1 As maad obs=e. sha Cennusman maud an the mind redreef Aegiaire meure that
- mans dananema ers manndeed largs sunch se peswies a rumpanas bens that would suypen eeunty smaade the plasmung saw should Gus ever be emedad
- M M1 e
L
(2) an the cemen af Carmenoon 22 C: (e) (whetherl ihere is e logical connsa.on beween plane EPZ sin mid the abWey to sesolve potderns associmied wkh possible spamaneous emanauen, and (b)[wheiherl the aguts6 ens oornempime that the possitnhey of sponsaneous evacuauan is a
- lace! ammeuen" whnds ehoidd moult us adjusonensa no en EPZ.
B.
Parties' Arguments Before the Commission 1.
latervenor Argumens Imervenors assert that the contendons, far from challenging the regulations, merely seek to enforce them. Thus, Intervenors argue, the Appeal Board correcdy acknowledged the importance of the generic considerations that led to the choice of the 10. mile guideline,8 but most imponantly recognized that
"[nlotwithstanding these generic considerations,,.. section 50A7(cX2) goes on to direct that the ' exact site and configuration' of the plume EPZ *shall be determined in relanon to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdicuonal boundaries.'"*
Imervenors offer two main arguments on the interpretation of this regulation.
Ftrst they argue that while spontaneous evacuadon and lack of local government cooperadon aren't listed in the reguladons as local conditions, the conditions listed are exemplary rather than exclusive. Second. Intervenors emphasne that
=
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"the determination of the exact size and configurabon of the EPZ must be ma6e 'in reladon to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by...'" local condiuons. Brief at 13 (emphasis in Brief). The concept of " local emergency response needs and capabilines," they continue, encompasses 1.!LCO's alleged failure to plan for spontaneous evacuation, an evacuation that will result directly from listad conditions such as the land characteristics of Long Island.'
Thans amans amendesweis em that "0) pressunad deus funn mest emodems wedd as esammi Federn!
8 (pao) dans levels bayeruf thei Asiasum frun ens Snehip ad G) ensand planarg within 10 mains amidd psende e nessanusJ hans fe espannen af suspenne dans if aus benams nummmary
- ALAa r32. 3 NRC as id$. maad MlRaGC96 and NL,* rag 004 e3 NRC at les. In sker asyty ansf. Ismarwunnes shasse est IJLtl0 and ihm snerf stre arpneus is the camrinnae en APE mas eun lassaly addams guarums she than esse thei en carnmemen asums is sevm. Esydy anaf ei 3 has= ears slasm ifwi esy don't susped to ihas snpropesy esend argwnses, and that the Comm.mnen uhmad an emade then Home=ar, sury eenarna, af ou Canmmmer, suands is amadse I
esas anysere es)mmes, een a ahnde effe learwoess e appenswy is suspens is fea.hsuover.lmaresure es as mandy suo pagn af went fannse* pass seynes e emas LA404eaff erpsumes ser amply aner sa 61
'bueveners add ihet ihn assesseery of caususan 21C e amarmed by ihe sanns Lasonsqs eed's maiseau n
met e amad eminde one enen af lonel amedmen en aPZ esas The assamer assed sisend esi wenher er as emmeuens wuss sennused en es sema, a wedd anvem.gew wasahar. "hmens of es paysphy of tais laland, sussuansen piennen4 suhm en appuunemens 16ents EPZ may am he edag. sis honouns af the snymes of peesse anses and to the esa af abs aPZ shemmqs is avsmasas and heress in de a by esams ihaugh ens API.*
13P.8219, is PSC 401,61619 (19s2) tJtfC einens that ihm amas was nnisaisd e ihn teen of Caesusens IBD (eineunue e e andem s pasasse essen benauss tJtfC heen emadsud es esams of spumanness p"wn 388
p l
Rejecung charges that they challenge the regulations by seeking a 20-mile EPZ, or one that is dramadca!!y enlarged," Intervenors assen that what they seek is only what the regulations demand, i.e., an EPZ based on local conditions, whatever the size.'
The Licensing Board had agreed with the Staff and LILCO that litigation of Contention 22.B required Intervenors to obtain a 62.758 exception to the mie prohibiting challenges to the regulations, something Intervenors never sought. But, say Intervenors, Commission precedent includes cases requiring no exception for challenges to the 10-mile EPZ, cases relied on by the Appeal Board as well as Intervenors.' Even if LILCO, the Staff, and the Licensing Board are correct that only minor adjustments are permitted, Intervenors add, I
they were precluded from litigadng for these adjustments. Reply Brief at 6.
Finally, while claiming that the Commission did not take review of the l
Appeal Board holding in ALAB P32 that a utility-only emergency response is a
" local condition" to be considered in determining EPZ size, Intervenors assert in response to a LILCO argument that the Appeal Board correctly decided this quesdon.
.l 2.
Staff and LilLO Arguments I
i The Staff and LILCO oppose the admission of Contentions 22.B and C mainly [
e
,a on the ground that the contendons challenge the generic 6ndings underlying ss~-
=a the Commission's determination that a 10-mile EPZ for power reactors is adequate to protect the public. The Staff and LILCO contest the Appeal Board's conclusion that Contention 22.B was aimed at determining the exact size and r
shape of the EPZ based on local conditions. Rather, they claim, it is a direct ensueuen tw mu ensur) and 23)I(LEfo has faamd is prends far u~a d = is provers sponsrums eveamus fvera amarvis sumurmna6ad mens er eks ErZ pie pews. ally harmma een and arryedans evna.euen frern she E.PI) Reply anaf et 9 The 1.asernam6 aamrd feed far Laco en hem of thess seeniers 8 Senh LAfo and buar=wwei sus e C-_
r dem en 3es onsh se mappes ibar pensens $senhaan Ce4/eam., KAsee Ce (see ormfn Nudmar omerstang suna. LJan 2 and 3) CU.8310.17 NRC s28 s33 (1983) traar ears pass se the Camnaseen's danmpuen genre of the energeuy plaming segulsi.au a seg uernerms fe **eare pt.anrung wi$ macuru pnemans aam,hir to deveJay e romanshie ed Aec rumpanas is n
shams very ennan hs probshlair sendous esi amad aftsa ibe s.e,ars! pm,hlac ** amply anst at s Allihs, eesk, asy baawenors, as e chanse to apkre e,4raba* the *amre plannmg* papesed by Utfo as an feat 'adoeu*
end has maffinou *$naatmhiy* to paraul ths ' downlap [mes ef) e sessenshus ad her soupmat'* id
'The mans med era Dade Pew Ce (Causts N,alear Suuen, t. hues I and 2), tJp 6637, a0 NRC F33. F79 89 0964), af d. ALAR 813. 22 NRC M (1983). and Pa.Jad, vane Ed cow Ce Ctanwie Omsreung S6suan. thuw I and 2). IAP 8514, 21 NaC 1219. ID4 (19tsk adF4 m evenant part ALAS.D4 Il Nhc 479. 492 500 Comine,s.es reven, shchaedt July at.1984 le mar view, thane snee prends ordy margan! e6ppwl fe leseiene la esidur seas ses abs peuyney or eeniaang om aanwmees shallenged hafere em AppesJ Be id nderes=w. en pruners senseam en temenwa was amashed is sw sharnson, emnesung that to pse*ws emeuens anade and adpots te en EFZ hundary fessu bnpeding evesusuan irarn wahss ths EPZ. s ses naessaary ashre to sapend es E72 er es prends addimenal Welle eenuel abmseds the EF2. IB esefes, Ceaseadas 219 shd 21C emeR 9tM $m shI Woy to othply Wdh f
ew NRC s suspwwnees e is empend shs EFE This, caser ire dess esa dwese emppen knarvenes' pummen-r 349 l
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challenge to the Commission's determination that a 10 mile EPZ in all cases would provide a substanual base for ad hoc expansion of any emergency i
response. Staff Brief at 12; LILCO Brief at 3 4. As to Contendon 22.C, the Staff and LILCO make three main points: 6tst, that the contention challenges the generic determinations in 6 50.47; second, that the local conditions cited by Intervenors are not the type contemplated by the regulation; and third, that Intervenors' concerns were litigated before the Licensing Board in the context of other contendons.88 De Staff and LILCO contend that the rules conumplate clearly drawn EPZs, with minor devianons from the 10-mile radius where dictated by geographic fac.
tors. To support these proposidons, the Staff further argues that the Commission decided in its 1980 rulemaking that-Predetermined presenws acnons are needed for EPZs;.. is is those withan this serie for whom prodsermeed praecuve acuans are nanded in order so pervent esposure to airtiorne radaanuchdas. sus predsiermined manens are not nesdad for those suuide this sone.88 Further, LILCO notes the conclusion of the NUREG 0396 task force relied upon f;
by the Commission in the rulemaking:
....._._2 m.amr...a r --wr ;4
- (T)t was the sonnesus of the Task Foros that emergency plans sound be bened upon a senent distance out of which predsurmeed asians would provide does envings for
- ~ ~ ~ * *
- any sud ace, dents. Beymd uus gensnc distance it was sonrJuded that acnes sound be inken on e ad hoc basis using the same sensidereuens that won suo the ininal acuan p
daaermmsies. [Thus). the sine of the EPZ4 aand nei be sim spacine. [es] amersency l-plannes needs seen no be best eerwd by adquing uruform EPZ4 for isunal planning studies for all Lght osar reactors.-12 i
Hus, LILCO argues, while obviously there are both generic and site specific components to $ 50.47(cX2), the site speci6c component is merely a Sne tuning I-mechanism such that it makes sense to depart from a perfect circle in order to I
run the boundary down a prominent highway so that people will know clearly where Lhe boundary is, and... to avoid bisecting a discrete population."
LILCO Reply Brief at 2.
To bolster the posiden that only geographical condidons mere to be consid-ered and then lead to minor adjustments. if any, LILCO cites the NRC Staff's presentation to the Commission in 1980, where the Staff explained that the factors to be considered were "*aarrowed to a relatively small sange,'" e.g., a 88 6aar n
e.i en Arp nl a us mamnis en opnem, sad eman om ese
- dendes em w se. em Arp=1 saud ndas spir nst
- 11.
a a
88 sener aner a is mas es Fed ass ss.406 tams 19.1900) and Mac Palwy sammans as 'hment sans le asspume w Nusamar power Aandnes
- 44 Fed aas 61.123 tout 25.1979) na Laro anst a 1215 e 17. espons NUnacet6 m 4 ID 7. 8.
390
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"' major population camer* crossing the 10. mile boundary and ' abnormal topo.
graphical situations, a very peculiar river valley.'" LILCO Brief at 5 n.6. Even in these " abnormal" situnuons, Staff's iment was to adjust EPZ boundaries "'by small amounu.'" 14.
The Staff adds that "the cure for any EPZ-related problem arising from evenu taking place ouuide the EPZ is not to expand the sone, but to factor those mat.
ters into the planning for the protective actions to be taken for those within the
- 10. mile sone." 14. LILCO agrees, stating that the record shows that providing accurate, consistent information to the public will minimize spontaneous evacu-ation, and that this is the remedy contemplated by the reguladons. LILCO Brief at 10, citing Pacific Ga,r and Electric Co. (Diablo canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Uniu I and 2), LBP 82 70,16 NRC 756,779 (1982).
Further, even if spontaneous evacuauon is to be considered a iocal condition, they submit, it isn't the type of local condinon that can cause adjustments in EPZ size, because the condinons contemplated in the regulanon are those unique conditions exisung around each plant, as opposed to those that might arise at the time of an accident at any plant. Staff Brief at 1516; LILCO Brief at 12.
,, s A
Conunuing, they argue that Contendon 22.C challenges the regulations in WW"
two ways. First, it posiu nongeographic conditions, e.g, spontaneous evacuation and the utility only nature of the response organization. Staff Brief, n.8; LILCO Brief at 4 5,14. Second, the contention argues for more than minor adjustmenu j
to EPZ size based on these "condinons." 1hus LILCO contrasts the 10 mile generic Anding (in NUREG 03% and in the Commission's 1980 preamble to the rule) with Contention 22.C's implicit call for a dramanc EPZ expansion,i.e.,
an expansion "to the west to encompass those persons who may be involved in protective actions" and to the east to include " East End residents"(which could include those 50 miles from the plant) who may have "the perception that they would be trapped if the wind blew to the east."
For such a chauenge to the rules, Intervenas aDegedly should have sought permission under $ 2.758 to litigate the contenuon, something that was suggested to Intervenors early in the proceeding.
The Staff and LILCO also deny that thee is any logical connocuan between plume EPZ size and the ability to deal with spomaneous evacuation. LILLO argues Ihat "no maner where the boundary is drawn, there will always be people ouuide k who then become part of a new hypothesized ' shadow,'"
a problem earlier recogniacd by a TM/ Licensing Board LILCO Brief at 10, guating Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Stauon, Unk 1),
LBP 8159,14 NRC 1211,1553 (1981). Thus, says LILCO, with the ase of 391
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Intervenors' theories to determine EPZ boundaries,"the EPZ spreads out like oil on water till it runs out of people." 14.85 l
Finally, LILCO and the Staff note that the Licensing Board specifically b6 l considered potential problems associated with spontaneous evacuation by those outside the EPZ, rejecting several Intervenor assertions:
that spontaneous evacua6an would prevent the evacuaUan of those ins
- ihe EPZ (Canientians 23.A.C),
that spontaneous evscuation of shone ausside the EPZ would siged6caraly and adversely l
e affect evacus6an umes from wisin the EPZ (Canaenuans 65,21D and 23.H),ts I
that spanianeous evacuses from outs 4 ihe EPZ might harvn themselves by entering e
contaminated areas, and might impede evnaua6an from within the EPZ (Caniennon 23.H), and that ULCO had drawn the EPZ boimdary snproperly sudt that it tusected d,screte e
popula6aru and junidacsians (Contenuan 22.D).
LILCO Bnef at 14 U
f r
J '?
J...,,,,_.4_... a' C.
Commission Decision Resolution of this issue requires that we examine carefully the history of f @-
~
the EPZ concept. The EPZ concept in NRC's emergency planning regula-tions defives from the repon of an NRC/ EPA task force on emergency plan-ning, NUREG 0396, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Gs emment Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Suppon of Light Water
!- 2 r Powe. ~4 ants," December 1978 (Repon"). The Repon's conclusions oft EPZ size were based on analyses of both design-basis and serious Class 9 ssAa ds frwn the last d a lesa! eunresuan, says tJLfo. bearvees' propanal he two ede snperiani defecu Finn, si would fece tJ1ro is see Isruisd plaroung saneasses is pumpis who panen!!; will nei mand thes second. s make unpenable the task of the place sywig to dands en EFZ beundans Fire, the tamarwome slaan that the smestery placer snum pund.ca bee sas.h opensarmous everusuan that is, how snany peupla ed how far sosy) een will be si en emergency of minewn notes sensures bi ehs fun.ra Thas inah a snpses.ble Gn=erwners wedd une publes epimen pous far tius purpose, but shs susard shows that epsman pets enma prud.et eca.nl enersary behsvier)., Eve ensuming the planner se pred.a the estou of spanianasus evneusuari, he then has is 1.sve a suenen is when se drew the has (Opuuan paus, for eaanple, will ghow fewer spenaaemas emmewens as chases surn r
the plam mesnaams. as whsi paws em thas dessenets sisusa dans aus and shs EFZ1) These is as sush a
amerien a NRC seaplaume er gedames 1.afo anaf si 11.
88ase 1E4o Aaswar ei H.maatPID 1. 21 NRC es Eas,90400 ('tJLtlo has sie sensensbne saindsonan to en pensites sapans er shades eveensuem e suomasue uafhs ensamthem wahm eks EF4" *ensus _
no harme is evenaahan of all er pan af the E70 senfr Snef at 14 eines 21 NRC ss 30109 Q tJtfC Onaf et 12 (maag Commasen es)
- h Bessd fesnd ihat *wase she eina sis isinesumienly besmas of fear er sidesman sudd she hs== enung m
meuveuen as to amar ihm E.PZ." and that Lafo's plans for EFZ perusmar annual aus sunneekk PID,28 NRC et god 392 L
a p
l accident consequences using analydcal techniques and information available at I
that time.8' l
For design basis / loss of coolant accidents (DBA/LOCA), the Report con.
cluded, among other things, that for most plants the 25 rem (thyroid) and 5 rem
~
(whole body) EPA protective action guides would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles from the plant, even using conservative assumptions and analyses. Re.
port, Appendix 1 at 4-6. As for serious Class 9 accidenu involving core melt and containment failure, the Report concluded that these protective action guides generally would not be exceeded beyond 10 miles unless the containment failed catastrophically and there was a very large release of radioactive material. The Report funher concluded that even for very large releases, ernergency actions such as sheltering or evacuation within 10 miles would result in significant re-ductions in deaths and early injuries. ld. at 6 7. From a probability standpoint, the Report concluded that the probability of large doses from core-melt accidents drops off substantially at about 10 miles from the reactor. Id. at 37.
Based on these considerations, the Report concluded that:
IE)mersency response plans should be assful for responding to any acodant ihai would poduce offsite doses e eason of the PAGs This would eclude the snore severe essign j
basis accdenu and she acaderu spaanam ana!ysed in abe RSS Aher reviewing the pasanual
' I 8
a cesequeces assoamed wish these types of acaderas, is was the sonounsus (sac} of the
["
- 4. '.. - - -
Task Force ihat emergency plans could be based igscm a genene diamos out to which
"~'" " f '
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4' padeacrmined ensans would provide done savings for any such accadess. Beyond this geeric J.
~ ~ ' "
~
disiance it was concluded ths asianc emind be taken an an ad hoc basis usms the same sensideranme that went inne the imidal acuan determaassans.
The Task Foros padsmeru on the essers of the Emergency Planes Zone is sierived frorn she e
l sharacaensdcs of design basis and Cass 9 accidet consesp,anssa. Based on the afarmanon prcmded in Appendis I asd she appticable PAG: a radius of about 10 miles was enlemed for the plame esposure poibwey and a radius of about 50 miles was saleaad for the agesuon saposure pathway, as shown in table 1. Ahhou6 the radius for the EPZ impties a circular h
area, the acsual shape would depend upon the characterisscs of a particular sue. The circular er other defined area would be for planneg whereas ininal response would likely irrvalve erJy a poc. son of the essa! mesa.
Report at 16.
8' A om, a. es a e
.em,.d i. m.
nm. in ps.m.m.luy mas is quo. p.nne as-i pourisme e the emar af a sammer immluy such ammasas suuld uswahm esqumes of assonneve fenhsu men es=we than dies penmulaisd fa the papaus of amablishing the damp base fe peame's rymens and meanseed anley fasa sun (Qnas 9 eves amquaisse mehses thems Isadams to smal ese seek and auques dayndsuen af the esmasones neadary and Wisse landvig as pum Anal eled faalasse er pasmal adt wash - "
' andwas of she ensuavemos baandary) PfURaG496 m at asp,,,,,,,,,,,,,,g,,,,,j,, or og,,,,, g, og,,g, gr,,ejamed as be sumaned by as admeant, weild entress psummeve asum ase Afsamsf s(Proeureis Atere osadas and Preamrew Areses jbr Muclear Anadsass apA-sIV1 ?S#1 (sepassuine Ifts).
393
e 4
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A reading of the Repon indicates clearly that the margins of ufety provided by the recommended 10 mile radius were not calculated in any precise fashion but were qualitatively found adequate as a maner of judgment. Given the uncer-tamties in estimadons of Class 9 accident probabilities and consequences, there was no other feasible choice in this regard. The EPZ's shape could be somewhat different than the 10 mile circular radius implies, without compromising emer-h gency planning goals. Indeed, the Report is explicit that " judgment... will be used in determining the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local conditions such as demography, topography, and land use characteristics, access routes, local jurisdictional boundaries and arrangements with the nuclear facil-ity operator for notificadon and response assistance." These are, of course, the considerations later cited in 6 50.47pf)(2) with regard to determining the " exact site and configuration" of the EPZ.
Nothing in the Repon or in any other matenal in the emergency planning rulemak.ing record compels a 6nding that EPZ adequacy is especially sensitive to where exactly the boundary falls, and any such conclusion would seem to be at odds with the overall thrust of the Report. In panicular, the task force's analysis indicates that " adequate protective measures"in the context of emergency planning is not a precisely de6ned concept. Earlier in this proceeding a
we explained the concept of " adequate protective measures" in our emergency f
planning regulations in CL1-8613,24 NRC 22,30 (1986), as follows:
I;
(
id^' ' ~ ' -
- t; 8 1bs roor que:Uon emnot be anseered without some discussion of what is snears by f*d-
- adequate pracaive maamms" Our emergency planning regulanons are an imponant part of the ngulatory framework for prascung the public heahh and safery. But they differ in charneser from most of our sinns and engineenng design requiremesas which are darscsed T
si ad.eving or mairuining a minimum level of public anfery proieaica Sea. ed.,10 C.F.R l1o111. Our emergency planning mquiremeras do not reciuire that an adequate plan achieve a presci rrunimwn radianon dose savmg or a minimwn evacuanon ume for the plume exposure pathosy emergency planning acne in the evers of a serious socidan. Rather, they atacrnp to actaeve rtanonable and feasible dose todactam inder the cirmamstancas what may be reasonable or feasible for one ptant sits may na be for another.
It is implicit in this concept of " adequate protective measures" that a de-terminadon that a particular EPZ size will provide " adequate protective mea-sures" does not in fact mean that emergency planning will eliminate, in ev-cry conceivable accident, the possibility of serious harm to the public. If this were actually the criterion, it would be dif6 cult if not impossible to set any a priori limiu to the size of the EPZ or to the scope of required emergency planning. Emergency planning can, howver, be expected to reduce any public harm in the event of a serious but highly unlikely accident.
g-But the rule clearly wat intended to set such limits. Even under the Appeal h
Board's analysis..the rule snounts to a Commission inding that adequate e
394 L
e protecdon can be provided by an EPZ of limited size,10 miles in radius, give or take a few miles, but certainly much less than 20.
Oiven these circumstances, we think it is entirely reasonable and appropriate for the Commission to hold that argumenu for " adjusting" a 10 mile EPZ to improve safety, especially arguments that entail complex analysis and lengthy litigation, are an impermissible challenge to the rule. The Appeal Board has in effect e.lso treated the rule as imposing a cutoff, which the Appeal Board places at somewhere more than 10 miles but certainly less than 20. The Appeal Board's approach is not much different from simply reading 50.47(bX2) as requinng an EPZ "about 20 miles in radius" and then taking the posidon we adopt. i.e., refusing to accept contentions that would enlarge an EPZ that meets the criterion. But the rule says 10, not 20. The " outward creep" the Appeal Board would allow seems in the end to have no logical limits, as LILCO and the Staff argue.
Accordingly, we think the better interpretation is that the rule precludes adjustments on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is "about 10 miles in radius" and that Contentions 22,8 and 22.C should on this ground be deemed impermissible challenges to the rule. In our view, the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact size of the EPZ only on the basis of j
such straightforward administrative consideradons as avoiding EPZ boundaries that run through the middle of schools or hospitals, or that arbitrarily carve out small portions of governmental jurisdictions. 'Ihe goal is merely planning
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simplicity and avoidance of ambiguity as to the location of the boundaries. With such clarity, plans can be implemented with an understanding as to who is being directed to take particular protective actions."
D.
HOSPITAL EVACUATION A.
Background
Two hospitals, and perhaps a third as wc!!, are located within the Shoreham 10 mile EPZ. The LILCO plan lists several hospitals outside the EPZ to which I
"uiid. ic cra. sits: ihe urey sana.wy er e meas trz y em hs.han.p.4 hand. e she-eg that thee un syman3 x-c = far ou penander oss shes use as amadeed a the emaryswy p&sevis maismakeg W. weis est fuDy femalaar web est males a es sugard. hs=e shaam me en esa ther someussa a the the asuve as nds shaumga meer 6 2 Ts4 Ove 4 pass have ese elapsed ones the euhmaanen af eussgency plaanut mm.as for ime6suan and a summmung er Camsmes 21e and ILC es mas shaumpus waand he immmair o es essens6 Diewetheles, whahe thes ass spessa! '- _
s h est aus oss erwissmund b te ndsambsg and that would make b eispyreynets is apply es IM IFZ nals to Shasuham een still be amendered a pan er das NRC seaf's suruse er immasammed uses To ha ese esa en haywissa seiny innes has ham ametsuked in this essa. we sumpses NRC Sant is sorwe ens immas and to nyan to the Commmene a k pner as any humung eksus M power. '
i I
395
I e
hospital evacuees might be sent. But the Licensing Board found that LILCO had not obuined leuers of agreement with hospitals outside the EPZ concerning transfer of patients, had not provided for transportation for evacuadon of EPZ hospiul patients until individuals in other "special facilides"(e.g., nursing homes and nursery schools) were evacuated, had not calculated evacuation times for e
two of the three EPZ hospitals, and had not predetermined the circumstances under which EPZ hospital patients would be evacuated.
~
Nevertheless, the Licensing Board concluded that the LILCO plan was adequat-In the Board's view, arrangements for the relocation of patients to hospitals outside the EPZ could be made while the emergency was in progtess. His was consid red adequate because the hospitals are close to the outer edge of the EPZ, where the likelihood of receiving doses requiring evacuation is small, sheltering is the preferred emergency response in any event because of the risks suendant upon the movement of patients, and the EPZ hospitals were constructed so as to be panicularly suitable for shchering.
De Appeal Board reversed. It characterized the LILCO arrangements as ad hoc, and found that contrary to the regulations' requirement for EPZ evacuation time estimates, LILCO had not provided tirne estimates for each EPZ hospital.
De Appeal Board also noted the Licensing Board's contrasting treatment of I
hospitals and nursing homes. While the Licensing Board found no de5ciency in LILCO's failure to obtain agreernents with hospitals for relocation of hospital 2 Q-~j-....: 2 ; s' c-k-patients, it found deficient LILCO's failure to suf6ciently identify and to include
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leuers of agreement with facilities outside the EPZ for accommodating EPZ nursing home residents. De Appeal Board was puzzled by the Licensing Board's contrasting treatment of these two areas.
In taking review, the Commission asked whether the regulations, including
( 50A7(c)(1), " require evacuation plans for hospitals in the EPZ even though sheltering would be the prefened option in most circumstances "
B.
Parties' Argu::nsts Before the Commission
'~
1, 12LCO and Ssqff Argsents LILCO argues before the Commission that NRC's emergency planning regulations do not require evacuation plans for hospitals. LILCO argues that the hallmark of the Commission's emergency planning requirements is Acaibility, recogniz.ing the appropnateness of different approaches at different sites and for different potential accident sequences. %e key regulation, says LILCO, is 10 Cf.R.150.47(b)(10), which requires "(a] range of protective actions... for
{,
the plume exposure pathway EPZ...." This range of protective actions.
LILCO continues, in practice includes sheltering and evacuauon.
M R
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While conceding that its plan doesn't have all of the detail contemplated i
by NUREG-0654 LILCO argues that the standards of NUREG 0654 do not constitute requirements, but rather are suggestions. LILCO then lists some of for protecting [ hospital padents).... means of relocadon,... time estimates l
those NUREG 0654 *suggesdons," c.g., that plans "shall include... means l
for evacuadon,
.. an estimate of the [ hospital] population... [which)
'shall usually be done on an insdtution by. institution basis, [and] the means a
of transportation... [for the hospital populadon).'" Brief at 19 20. LILCO concludes from these passages that "none of these provisions requires every licensee to maintain a detailed plan for both sheltering and evacuation of every i
facility and population group in the EPZ." LILCO 6nds sapport for its position in the EPA Manual of Proteedve Action Guides, which " expressly acknowledges the need in certain circumstances to apply different criteria in establishing appropriate protective action for special populations such as hospital padents."
- 14. at 20. Thus, Lilf0 concludes, "the regulations and guidance 'caplicitly' allow different treatment for different groups such as hospital patients."
LILCO's next argument on the hospital evacuation issue, and the only I
argument offered by the Staff on this issue, is that even if the regulations generally require evacuation plans, the Shoreham plan is not significaruly de6cient in this regard, and thus, under $ 50.47(c)(1), the Commission is not compelled to deny the issuance of a license. Both LILCO and the Staff support this argument by pointing to the Licensing Board's 6ndings on the distance of j
M. Q the hospitals from the plant (over 9 miles), on the heavy masonry construedon of the hospital buildings leading to 0.2 shielding factors (i.e., the dose inside b'
l the buildings would be 20% of the dose outside), on the danger of evacuation
]
for patients, on the low probability of accidents that would require evacuation for those more than 9 miles from the plant, and on the existing arrangements for eventual evacuation of the hospitals.
Finally LILCO argues,it has developed reasonable evacuation plans for the hospitals. Evacuadon vehicles 6tst would complete their nursing / adult home runs, and then report to hospitals on an "as needed" basis, as determined by hospital administrators upon balancing information including that on weather, projected doses, and the risk of transporting patients. Moreover, LILCO argues, the Appeal Board was mistaken that LILCO had not adequately calculated evacuation times for hospitals, since the Licensing Board speci6cally found that the hospitals could be evacuated within 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br />."
" Tbs Lassmana Sand fasad dist:
LA>nbidanase
- mad nas -,.__ 'y omnes en satisa Casuy Idemary aseil eens s beims. 50 enemme aAs ens suual assasem...The sessusman er bespnak ese# emit est, amJar asioner of aser et less we seead is amendammes... tWeb suced to suuhunsmask ens bespeak one e e sander pasman its em sefen Coeur Idemary, re etsch sueulses s=esuenen sul take a housi. 40 numass).
LAP 8s-12,21 NRC a 64s46 (asiphans edese as 397
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2.
Intervenor Argumentr a
Intervenors argue that "LILCO's failure to plan for evacuadon of hospital patients is total," with vehicle arrangements " expressly acknowledgeld)" in the plan as ad hoc, and provisions for evacuation only "if vehicles become available." Brief at 15.These aspects of the plan allegedly violate the regulations and NUREG-0654 by failing, for example, to identify relocation centers for hospitals (an alleged violation of NUREG-0654 lill.A.3, J.10.d, and J.10.h),
by failing to provide evacuation time estimates for each facility (an alleged violation of Append 2x E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50), and by failing to plan routes or procedures for hospital evacuation (an a!!eged violation of both 150.47(b)(10) and EPA Protecdve Acdon Guidelines).
Intervenors support the Appeal Board's view that the improbability of ever needing to use any given protective acdon is irrelevant under the NRC's emergency planning rules because those rules are based on an assumpdon that a serious accident might well occur. Brief at 19 20, citing FAiladelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generadng Station, Units I and 2), ALAB 819,22 NRC 68),713 (1985), review declined CLI 86 5,23 NRC 125 (1986). Moreover,Intervenors assert that LII.CO's a!!egedly " complete failure" to plan for hospitals can never yMy
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be viewed, using i 50.47(c)(1), as insignificant.8 F-C.
Commission Decision We agree with the Appeal Board's reasoning on this issue. Even though sheltering will quite likely be the preferred protective sedon for EPZ hospitals in the event of a serious accident, evacuation should not be prejudiced by the failure to plan in advance. Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 requires evacuadon time estimates for the EPZ without exceptions for special facilities such as hospitals. Clearly, evacuation plans for hospitals must at least be developed in suff cient detail to provide a basis for these estimates. Moreover, hospitals, as a k.ind of "special facility," are speci6cally raentioned in the principal guidance document in this field, NUREG 0654, and there is no suggestion in this guidance that hospitals tre to be treated specially as exempt from the evacuation planning requirement that applies to other segments of the population within the EPZ.
We therefore conclude,in agreement with the Appeal Board, that the regula-3 tions require the Applicant to fulnll the same planning obligations with regard to hospital evacuation as the Licensing Board imposed in connection with other like segments of the EPZ, such as nursing / adult homes. This conclusion does not P
18 6n empeus is IACO's Snef, bearveien casen out em Commassen ehmuld ans,3wd emesy of IACO's argumanns basauas dwy an ames ow samps er de Catw,uss,en's so.ww apastaans, penandarty manier as LACO emenpu is shoe that dice a edequem plannang and puparenb ns fe W evacuanat 398 1
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P necessarily end the inquiry as to whether LILCO's Emergency Plan is adequate with respect to these hospitals. Under $ 50.47(c)(1), the Licensing Board could still approve the LILCO plan if it found that the def ciencies related to the hospi.
tals were not signi5 cant for Shoreham. In fact, the Licensing Board did identify factors that may have rekvance to this question, such as distance from the plant b
and construction characteristics of the hospitals. However, it is not char to us that this was a matter adequately presented to or considered by the Licensing Board, since the Licensing Board did not speci6cally discuss I 50.47(c)(1). On remand, LII.CO and Staff are free to raise the issue for appropriate resolution.
III.
SUMMARY
In summary, we take two actions. First, we reverse the Appeal Board's decision it. ALAB 832 insofar as it admits Contentions 22.B and 22.C for hearing. However, the NRC Staff is to advise us prior to issuance of any license for operauon above 5% power whether there are special circumstances at Shoreham that wre not envisioned in the emergency planning rulemaking, and that would make it inappropriate to apply to Shoreham the geactic decision that l
an EPZ of about 10 miles is adequate for emergency planning purposes. Sg.
li,
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,j; w uphold the Appeal Board's decision in ALAB 832 that the proceeding must e x.w.-.4 be remanded to the Licensing Board for further consideration of the evacuation
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plans for hospitals in the EPZ.
11is so ORDERED.
l For the Commission
- SAMUEL J. CHILK Secretary of the Commission Dated at Washington, D.C.,
this 5th day of November 1987.
[The appendix has hen omiued from this publication but can be found in the Public Document Room,1717 H Street, NW. Washington, DC 20555.]
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'Suo 3. Avedon' FINAL REPLY:
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IVACUATION PLAN FOR MILLSTONE Travers Knapp Miraglia Norry Blaha DATE: 04/16/99
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Miller, RI ASSIGNED TO:
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CRC-99-0333 LOGGING DATE: Apr 14 99 ACTION OFFICE:
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LETTER DATE:
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