ML20203B758

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 126 to Licenses NPF-2 & NPF-8,respectively

ML20203B758
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	02/05/1998
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203B754	List: ML20203B750 ML20203B758
References
NUDOCS 9802240414
Download: ML20203B758 (4)

Text

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UNITED STATES s

j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS810N "g

g WASHINGTON D.c. 30006 0001 as,e*

e SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT No.134 TO FACILITY OPERAT,!NG LICEniSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO.126 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 SOUTH"RN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC. ET AL.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 13,1997, as supplemented by letter dated January 7,1998, the Southem Nuclear Operating Co npany, Inc. (SNC) et si., submitted a request for changes to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would (1) add a note to TS 3.9.13 to specifically indicate the normal or emergency pcwor supply may be inoperable in Modes 5 or 6 provided that the requirements of TS 3.8.1.2 are satisfied; and (2) extend the TS 3.9.13 completion time allowed for retuming one out-of-service penetration room filtration system from 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to 7 days. Subsequently, by letter dated January 7,1998,~ SNC requested to eliminate part 2, mentioned above, from the original submittal, which constituted a partial withdrawal of the license amendment application. The Commission issued a Notice of Withdrawal of Application forAmendments to Facility Operating Licenses published in the Federal Reaister on January 21,1998 (63 FR 3174).

The January 7,1998, revision to the June 13,1997, application did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determinatices 2.0 EVALUATION The staff has reviewed the proposed changes to TS 3.9.13 and its associated Bases section of the TS for the penetration room filtration (PRF) system for Fariey Units 1 and 2. The staff's evaluation is as follows:

Addition of a Footnote M to TS 3.93 The purpose of the PRF system is to ensure that radioactive material released as a result of a fuel handing accident (FHA) in the spent fuel pool room will be filtered through the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal absorcers prior to discharge to the atmosphere. For each unit, there are two PRF systems located in two trains. To support PRF function during refueling operations (Modes 5 and 6), TS 3.9.13 currently states:

9802240414 900205 PDR ADOCK 05000348 P

PDR

2-Two independent penetration room filtration systems (Specification 3.7.8) shall be OPERABLE and aligned to the spent fuel pool room:

SNC proposed to add a note () after the word OPERABLE that states:

• The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5 or 6 provided that the requirements of TS 3.8.1.2 are satisfied.

According to TS 3.g.13, both independent PRF systems are required to be operable when the PRF system is aligned to the spent fuel pool room during fuel movement. Because the TS does not explicitly state the electrical power requirement (e.g., either the offsite or emergency diesel generator (EDG), or both) f?r each PRF system, the application of the TS definition of

" Operability" requires both a normal and an emergency electrical power source to make a PRF system operable. Furthermore, to make both PRF systems operable at Farley, TS 3.g.13 could be interpreted as requiring that at least two offeite circuits and two EDGs must be operable when.

the PRF system is aligned to the spent fuel room during refueling operations. Since TS 3.8.1.2,

• Electrical Power Systems," requires one offsite circuit to the onsite Class 1E distribution system:

and one of the EDGs to be operable for the electrical power source during refueling (Mode 5 and 6), SNC states that such an interpretation of TS 3.g.13 would be inconsistent with TS 3.8.1.2 for the plant operating Modes 5 and 6 at Farley.

In accordance with the Bases section (B.3.8.2), "AC Sources - Shutdown," of "Elecidcol Power Systems" in the improved Standard TS (ISTS), the assumption of a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power (e.g., two offsites and two EDGs) is not required. But, the TS should ensure the capability to support systems necessary to avoid immediate difficulty, by assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite power. Therefore,in order to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, SNC aligns electrical power as follows: (1) with one of the offsite power supplies available during refueling, both PRF systems are powered by cross-connecting two trains; and (2) should a loss of offsite power occur, it will render one train of the PRF system inoperable due to load shedding of the cross-connected load centers.

However, SNC stated that the control room operator can reconnect the inoperable PRF system to the operable power train manually by closing the circuit breakers. SNC believes that the allowance to have both PRF systems powered in re.cordance with TS 3.8.1.2, when they are aligned to the spent fuel pool room, is consistent with the Farley licensing basis.

SNC has also reviewed the applicable accident analyses, that demonstrate a single PRF system is capable of ensuring that 10 CFR Part 100 limits of offsite dose are not reached in the avent that the worst casa assumed--dropped fuel assembly event - occurs, in order to resolve the TS definition of " Operability" that requires both a normal and an emergency electrical power source, which conflicts with the electrical power requirements in accordance with TS 3.8.1.2, SNC has proposed to add a note to TS 3.g.13 to clarify the application of TS definition of " Operability" relative to required electrical power sources for the PRF system when it is aligned to the spent pool during refueling operation.

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9 3-T he staff has reviewed the proposed note (*) that provides clarification relative to the required electrical power sources for the PRF system when it is aligned to the spent pool room during refueling operation and finds it to be consistent with the Farley design basis for electrical sources. Therefore, the staff concludes that the addition of the footnote is acceptable.

Modificatior of Bases Sectio 7s 3/4 9.12 and 3/4 9M3 Cunently, the Basas section of the TS conceming " Storage Pool Ventilation System" states:

The limitations on the stcrage pool ventilation systsm ensure that all h-radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered 4

through the HEPA filters and charcoal absorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyr as.

The licensee proposed to add the following paragraph:

The note regarding PRF electrical system OPERABILITY is provided for clarification to spct@ cation 3/4.9.13. In MODES 5 cr d 6, thr; electrical power requirements do not require considering a single failure coincident with a !oss of all offsite or all onsite power. The design basis for electrical sources during refueling requires at least on3 offsite circuit through the 1E distribution system be operable and at least one of the emergency dMels be operable. The electrical requirements of 3.8.1.2 meet the electrical sources OPERABILITY requirements for two independent PRF systems.

Since the electrical power requirements during refueling operations, as referenced in the Bases section (3 B.3.8.2) of the ISTS, to mitigate the consequences of the oostulated accidents (e.g., FHA) do not require consideration of a single failure coincident with a loss of aii offsite or all onsite power, the staff finds that the proposed modification of the TS Bras section is consistent with the footnote added to TS 3.9.13. Therefore, it is acwptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

in accordance with the Commission's regu;ations, the State of Alabama official was actified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The C' ate official had no comments.

4.0 #1VIRONMENTAL.C.QNSIDERATION The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use o' a tvi,ity component located within the restricted aree as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined thet the amendments involve ao significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the typu, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that

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4 there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no s

significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 38138, July 16,1997). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

s The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasoriable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation ire the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3)ine issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and securitsj or to the healin and safe:y of th? public.

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Principal Contributor: P. Kang

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Date:

February 5,1998

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