ML20209E598

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 70 & 62 to Licenses NPF-2 & NPF-8,respectively
ML20209E598
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20209E571 List:
References
TAC-60355, TAC-60356, NUDOCS 8704300080
Download: ML20209E598 (5)


Text

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eg UNITED STATES

-g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g,

.j WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 o

a gv.....f SAFETY EVAltlATinN BY THE OcFICE Or NiiCLEAD REACTOR DEGillATION '

DELATED TO AMENnWENT NO. 70 TO FACILITY ODERAT AND AVEN0 MENT MO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICEN I

ALA9AMA D0k'ED COMPANY Y

JOSEPH M. FADLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, ilNIT NOS. I ANO 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 ann 59-364 JNTDODUCTION By letter dated December 9,1985, Alabama Power Company (APCo the lic requested amendnents to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-? and NPF-8 for the Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The requested revisions involved a Specifications /TSs). number of administrative, editorial or clerical change i

needed based on recent operating experience.APCo states that these admi In addition, ADCo contends that these changes do not significantiv increase the probability or consequence kind of accident from that previously evaluated and reduction in the existing margin of safety.

Following disct/sions with the NRC staff Pro.iect Manager, APCo provided supplementary inforr. ' tion dated February 19, 1986.

proposed by the licensee. Our evaluation follows for each spet (fic TS change EVAlllATION TS 4.3.3.9.1 refers to Table 3.3.1? which contains both h 4

Thus, a change to indicate that the smoke detectors are to be functionally r.

be tested by means of a hitested by means of an aerosol test device and tha change and is acceptable. gh temperature heat source device is a clarification TS 3.3.3.9, Table 3.3-12 has been revised to indicate the exact number and location of the fire detectors provided for the areas above and below the suspended ceiling of the control room complex and in the strainer bay of the service water intake structure.

Also, the train designation for~ each battery room has been changed to correspond to the correct train, i.e., batterv roo has been changed from train IA to IB, etc.

i editorial corrections and clarifications and are acceptable.These changes are i

devices for use in emeroency situations instead of ce TS 4.5.3.2 has been revised to reflect the separate disconnect device m in the locked open position.

the charging pump discharge valves to the reactor coolant system is for clarification and is acceptable, This change gh Y

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TSs 4.7.7.b and 4.7.7.e.4 have been revised to indicate that ventilation systems provided for the control room only the pressurization type systen contains heaters. The original TS was in error. The heaters for this system are to be verified operable during the surveillance which 4

is conducted each 31 days.

and is acceptable.

This is considered to be an editorial correction t

TS 4.7.11.1.3(c),(1) has been revised to delete the requirement to ins

" cell plates" for each batter.y. The batteries are not designed for visual inspection of the cell plates.

The original TS was in error. Since the surveillance requirements of TS 4.7.11.1.3.fa).f?)

would verify that no physical damage or abnormal deterioration exists, batteries would be considered operable.

is acceptable.

This is an administrative change and TS 3.7.11.2, Table 3.7-5 has been revised to include the two automatic systems recently installed within the service water pump area.

were installed to meet fire protection commitments to the NRC. These systems administrative change and is acceptable.

This is an k

TSs 4.7.11.3.2.(b).(2) and 4.7.11.3.3.(b).(2) have been changed to dele visual inspection of CO, discharge from each nozzle during the system " p test."

Verification of discharge is to be performed by visually observing the discharge from the exterior of the switchgear panels and cabinets protection is provided for the interior of a number of switchgear cabinets CO 2

Most of these switchgear panels are normally energized when the test is r but the CO, nozzles are located within the switchgear cabinets.

red, CO, from these normally inaccessible nozzles would represent a :fgnifican To observe potential personnel hazard and a potential source of plant transient due to personnel opening the panels or cabinets.

Verification of-#1ow from the exterior of the cabinets provides reasonable assuranc 2

i the intent of the National Fire protection Association Standard 17111 This is an administrative change and is acceptable.

TS 3.7.11.4, Table 3.7-6 has been revised to indicate that the fire hose fo t

the hose stations within containment is located within a hose storage lock adiacent to the personnel hatch to each containment structure.

requirements for this fire hose and the containment fire hose stations are The surveillance clarified.

Revisions are also made to indicate the correct location of fire hose within the service water _ intake structure and the of Room 602.

These changes are considered to be editorial and are acceptable.

TS 3.7.11.5, Table 3.7-7 has been revised to assign the correct valve /

number for the hydrants located ad.iacent to the service water intake stru This is an editorial correction and is acceptable.

By letter dated February 18, 1986, proposals relating to fuse size verification for Unit 2 only.APCo supple

, 1985, of the containment penetration conductor overcurren TS 4.8.3.1 for t

Justification for this change is based on:

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- electrical conductor of specified electrical properties container.

Fuses are simple, highly reliable, passive devices which have~been deterrined to have a very low probability of failure to open on demand.

Fuses required to be operable in Modes 1 a are backed up by another fuse or mechanical breaker which further assures containment penetration protection.

Operational experience indicates the protection capability of current limiting fuses does not decrease with service life, periodic fuse testing i

is not meaningful and additional handling of fuses during surveillance testing may compro, mise fuse integrity.

To essure the correct fuse sizes are installed, the licensee is to maintain the existing surveillance program to verify, at least once per 18 months that the proper fuses are provided for the containment penetrations.

program will verify the correct fuse size for a representable sample of at This least 10' of each type fuse.

For each incorrect fuse size identified, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of tha fuse size for all fuses of that type have been verified.

This change is consistent with industry practice and is acceptable.

TS 4.8.3.11 for Unit 2 has been revised by relocating the list of Table 3.8-1 to ifcensee documents. containment penetration conductor ov With staff proposed changes made to clearly indicate the devices to which the limiting con is no relaxation in the LCO or reduction of SR.

the safety analysis report, or the conduct of tests or e described in the safety analysis report, are subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

a license amendment as is required by 10 CFR 50.59 for cha Specifications.

Other changes under 10 CFR 50.59 can be made without a license amendment only after the licensee completes a written safety 1

evaluation which provides the bases for the detemination that the change, test or experiment does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

absence of an unreviewed safety cuestion prior to chan

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relate to changes to the facility or procedures, and to tests or experiments.

That safety evaluation would be available for staff review prior to implemen-i tation of the change.

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-a-not related to chances in the facility or procedures, or to e

l experiments.

significant reduction in the LCO or relaxation in Sp.The staff conclu concludes that the elimination of fomal processing of such changes isTherefo acceptable.

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TSs 4.8.3.1 and 4.8.3.2 have been renumbered 4.8.3.1.1 confusion with 4.8.3.2 on oage 3/4 8-29 of the Unit 2 TS.

administrative and are acceptable, These chances are i

TS 3.9.14 and TS Bases 3/4.6.1.7 for Unit I have been re the 18-inch mini-purge isolation valves have been replaced with 8-inch vel a

These valves were changed to meet earlier comitments made to the NPC ves.

change is an editorial correction and is acceptable.

This TS 4.11.1.1.2, Table 4.11-1 Notation "b," and TS, "i' have been revised to describe the appropriate methods of perfo4.11-2.1.2, T o ation ccmposite samplino for liquid and gaseous effluents an rming what action is to be taken should a discrepancy occur.d provides guidance as to revised to delete reference to I-131 and other gamma emitters from theTable a particulate sample gama enitter Minimum Detectable Concentrations (MDC) ments and correct MDC notation *n" to notation "h."

require-in nature and are acceptable.

These changes are editorial TS 5.1.3, Figures 5.1-3 ano 5.1-4 are revised to re# leet the completion of the Training / EOF Center.

This is an editorial correction and is acceptable.

T'; 6.9.1.10 has been revised to indicate NRC management title changes Director, Office of Management and Program Analysis has been changed The title Director, Office of Resource Management.

is acceptable.

This is an editorial correction and TS 6.10.2.1 has been re. vised to require the retention of safety relate assurance records required by the licensee's cuality assurance program b uality currently described in TS 6.10.1.

and is acceptable.

This change is an editorial clarification ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change in the installation or surveillance re or use of the facilities components located within the restricted areas as quirements defined in 10 CFR 20.

The staff has detemined that these amendments involv no significant increase in the amounts, and no sionificant change in the i

of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no signific increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposu

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1 Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendme re. The involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no publi s

comment on such finding.

criteria for cateoorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c1(9.Ac c

need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the Pursuant essment

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-s-4 CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations d

, that:

not be endancered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) suc e,public will will be conducted in cortpliance with the Comission's regulations and issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to t security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: April 10, 1987 Principal Contributors:

W. H. Miller Jr., Region II E. A. Reeves t

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