ML20212F510

Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1), Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components)

ML20212F510
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	01/07/1987
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20212F507	List: ML20212F501 ML20212F510
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8701120038
Download: ML20212F510 (2)

Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGitLATION GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)

EOUIPMENT CLASSIFICATTON (RTS COMPONENTS 1 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1,2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348/364 INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. The incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation o# the automatic trip sional.

The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications

• of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8,1983, requested all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to the generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28 requires each licensee to confirm that all Reactor Trip System Components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:

Licensee and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

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The followino is our evaluation of the response submitted by letter dated November 4,1983, by Alabama Power Company the licensee for the Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, for Item 2.1 (Part 11 of Generic letter 83-28.

EVALUATION l

The licensee stated in the submittal dated November 4, 1983, that all Reactor

! Trip System.(RTS) components are supplied as part of the Nuclear Steam Supply I System designed by Westinghouse and that the RTS components are classified as safety-related equipment. Procedures are identified that control safety-related activities such as maintenance work and parts procurement for this safety-related equipment. .

8 NOII$00 m - -_ . -

CONCLUSION Rased on our review of this response, we find the licensee's statements and summary program description for identifying, classifying and treating RTS components as safety-related, meet the requirements of item 2.1 (Part 1) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and therefore are acceptable.

Dated:

Principal Contributor: D. Lasher