IR 05000440/1997012
| ML20202C915 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202C903 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-440-97-12, NUDOCS 9712040100 | |
| Download: ML20202C915 (15) | |
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I U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION lli Docket No: 50-440 License No: NPF-58 Report No: 50-440/97012(DRP)
Licensee: Centerior Service Company Facility: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Location: P. O. Box 97, A200 Perry, Ori 44081 Dates; August 9 - October 4,1997 Inspectors: D Kosloff, Senior Resident inspector J. Clark, Resident inspetor K. Zellers, Resident inspector, Davis-Besse G. Campbell, Project Engineer Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Jg20401oo971126 0 ADOCK 05000440 PUR i
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Perry Nuclear Power Plant NRC Inspection Report No. 50-440/g7012(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maktenanco, engineering, and plant support. The report covers an 8-week period of resident inspectio Operat&O1
- A non-conservative decisicn regarding the authorization of a functional check of a source range monitor concunent with the authortzation for core c::tivities in the same core region resulted in the identification of a non-cited violation (Section 01.5).
- Operations personnel effectively took the plant through several rnode changes and power changes. In particular, the shutdown activities to commence Refueling Outage 6 (RFO6),
including simulator practice sessions, were well planned and perfomied (Section 04.1).
- An Individual removed the *LG" fuses from the wrong safety-related cubicle, which resulted in the loss of power to safety-related bus EH11, actuation of several containment isolation valves, and entry into several TS action statements (Section 02.1).
- While testing the refueling interiock by moving the reactor mode switch from the refuel position to the startup/ hot standby position and back to the refuel position, operators caused an cutomatic reactor protection system logic actuation. The operators exhibited a lack of understanding cf a specific function of the reactor mode switch during this event (Section 04.3).
- Tumover briefings continued to be clear and effective. However, evolution briermgs were sometimes weak in communicating required personnel respenses to abnormal conditions during evolutions (Sections 01.1, O1.2 and O4.2).
htintenance
- The inspectors observed good coordination between work groups as the Work Control Center effectively hzadled a large volume of work for the commencement of RFO6 (Section M1.1).
- The inspectors identified a violation of administrative requirements associated with improperimplementation of a surveillance procedure (Section M1.1).
Enoineerina
- The inspectors observed that engineering work packagis were detailed and presented in an easily understood manner. Engineering packages had in-depth analyses and calculaNos to support the associated activities (Section E2.1).
Elant Support
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Security activities were handled well, including increased personnel access controls and monitoring for the refueling outage (Section St.1).
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Report Details Summary of Plant Status The unit operated at full power until August 10,1997, when power was reduced to 72 percent to adjust control rod positions. The plant was retumed to full power the same day. On August 15 power was reducer a about 23 percent and the main turbine-generator was removed frcm service to repair a .ydraulic leak. The plant was retumed to full power on August 18. On August 23 power was reduced to 72 percent power to adjust control rods and retumed to full power on August 25. On August 26 the operators reduced power in response to decreasin0 main condenser vacuum. Vacuum was restored and the plant was retamed to full power the same day. Reactor po;ver began to slowty decrease due to fuel bum un on September 1 and the unit was shut down for 'ts sixth refueling outage on September 12. The unit remained shut down for the rest of the inspection perio l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operation .1 Brietina for Placina Moisture Seoarator Reheaters in Service Inpection Scope (71707)
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The inspectors observed a pre-job briefing for placing the moisture separator reheaters (MSR) in service and then observed the evolution, Observations and Findinas On August 26,1997, the operators began to place an MSR in service. The steam supply
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valvo for the operating main condenser steam Jet air ejecter (SJAE) unexpectedly automatically closed during this evolution and main condenser vacuum began to decrease. The operators regained vacuum by reducing reactor power to 75 percent, reducing steam flow to the MSR, and restoring steam to the SJAE. The licensee concluded that providing steam to warm the MSR had reduced steam flow to the SJAE enough to cause the SJAE steam supply valve to close. Set points for instruments that initiated SJAE steam supply isolation, although within the allowed ranges, had reduced the operating margin for increasing steam flow to the MSRs. The instruments were adjusted to increase the operating margin and the impact of changing steam flow to the MSR was reviewed with the operators. The inspectors observed the operations pre-job briefing for the second attempt at retuming the MSRs to service. The biiefing was effective in familiarizing , ,e operators with the planned evolution. However, at the end of the bdefing the inspectors were unsure of the termination criteria for the evolution and I asked the shift supervisor for clarification. Once the inspectors asked the question, l several operators asked similar questions ani the shift supervisor clarified the termination
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cdteria. The inspectors informed licensee senior management that they were concemed that the operators had not asked their questions before the enc of the briefin l l
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After the briefing, the shift supervisor established proper command and control for the evclution. The operators were observant and used applicable instructions to successfully retum the MSRs to servic .
01.2 Retumina Unit One Startuo Transformer to Service Inspection Scopo f71707)
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The inspectors evaluated the performarece of an infrequently performed test or evolution (IPTE), including the pre-job briefings. The IP TE was for testing the non-safety-related Unit One Startup Transformer, and retuming it to service, Observations and Findir!al The inspectors observed implementation of Temporary Instruction (TXI) 258, " Unit 1 Startup Transformer Energized Testing,' Revision 0 (August 1997). The evolution was selected for performance as an IPTE and was conducted on day shifts only, from September 5 through 7,1997, in order to raise awareness of the performers and to mitigate the risk significance of the evolution. Plant Administrative Proedure (PAP) 1121, " Conduct of Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions,"
Revision 0 (July 1990), required, in part, that a pre-job briefing specifically address expected plar.t responses, termination criteria, and required actions of team member The briefing property included extended discussions of the exact meaning of TXI steps; however, the detailed technical discussions appeared to have diverted some attention from the other objectives of the briefing, including response to unexpected condition Subsequent to the briefing, personnel appropriately raised additional questions regarding prcper TXI step performance. The TXI was modified to allow it to be performed in accordance with operations administrative procedures and instructions. The imbalance between technical content and e.xpectation on task performance resultti in weaknesses in task performance including, acthns taken without proper documentation er approval i including troubleshooting an unexpected annunciator and re-perfomled steps wers not annotated in the TXI. Further, these issues were not documented until the inspecbrs discussed the activities with senior plant management. While the specific issues were associated with non safety related equir. ment, the inspectors were concemed because l the same process is used to control Temporary Instructions on safety related equipmen .3 Reactor Feedwater System Realianments tr11paction Scope (71707)
l The inspectors observed several mactor feedwater system pump and controller l realignments during the plant downpower maneuvers on August 23 and 24,1997.
! Observations and Findinas f The inspectors observed that the operators were well prepared for the planned l realignments. The shift supervisor verified that all participants were familiar with the plan j and established proper command and control for the evolution . _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
l 01.4 ldentification of Turbine Control System Hydractic t.eak (71707) Inspection Scope (71707 and 92901)
The irspectors evaluated the operators' identification and respense to a hydraulic oilleak on tubing to a main turbine control valv Qhservations and Findina On August 15,1997, a nonlicensed operator identified a hydraulic oilleak. An effective l
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search of a high radiation area located it.e leak in time to allow an orderly power reduction and repair of the leak. The power reduction was well planned and controCe Appropriate precautions were taken in removing the main turbine-generator from _ service and retuming it to service after the leak was repaired. The shift supervisors established proper command and control, and there wcs appropriate oversight and verification of reactivity contro .5 Non-Conservative Decision Durino Core Alterations (71707) Inspection Scope (61726. 71707 and 92001)
The inspectors evaluated personnel actions during core alterations, Observations and Findinas On September 28,1997, at approximately 1:59 P.M., authorization was given by the unit supervisor allowing operators to perform core alterations. At approximately 2:10 P.M.,
authortzat;on was given by the unit supervisor allowing technic.ans to perform a functional test on Source Range Monitor (SRM) *C.* The unit *upervisor indicated to the inspectors that he was aware that SRM functional test must be completed by the time core
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alterations commenced in core Region "C," but he did not Indicate this to anyone else at the time of the authorizations nor did he verify that this would be the case. At approximately 2:47 P.M., the unit supervisor became aware that a fuel bundle was being
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moved in Region "C." At this time, SRM "C" had not been declared operable and the unit l
supervisor halted the core alterations. A subsequent review identified that, while the l
paperwork for the functional test was , tot completed and tho SRM was still not declared l
operable, the SRM was fortuitously capable of performing its safety function, and J
therefore was technically operable, as the actual functional test was completed ininutes before the fuel bundle movement in Region 'C'. The authorization to perform an SRM functional test concurrent with the authorization for core alterations in Region 'C'
did not meet licensee management's expectations for plant operations and the inspectors considered this to be a non-conservative decision by the unit superviso (TS) 3.3.1.2, Table 3.3.1.21, and Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.2.2 required an operable SRM in a region of the core where core alterations were taking place. The Basis for TS 3.3.1.2 states that the SRM operability requirement is intended to insure that control of reactivity is maintained. Procedure PAP 201," Conduct of Operations,'
Revision 9 (December 1994), required the unit supervisor to maintain " positive control" over core reactivity *at all times." The unit supervisor failed to mzintain positive control over core reactivity by authorizing maintenance that jeopa'dized his ability to monitor
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, ouvity changes. The licensee took a number of actions to address this problem i
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bdudmg the implementation of enhanood communications in the control room during ;
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core alterations. This licensee-ident(ed and corrected vblation is being treated as a J l Non Cited Vlotation consistent with Sodion Vll.8.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV !
50 440f97012 01(DRP)).
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01.6 Conclusions on Conduct of Operathns t
I Observed activities were usually proplanned and well controlled with appropriate !
self-checking and oversight. Weaknesses were noted in the area of procedure ;
implementation and control during two infrequent plant evolutions. In addition, a ,
non-conservative decision to authortre a functional check of a source range monitor concurrerd with authortred core alterations in the same region resulted in the
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identmcation of a Non-Cited Volation.
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- O2 - Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment ,
0 Imoroner imolementation of Safety Taaolna
! ' Inspection Scope (71707. g2700. emi g2g01)
inspectors reviewed the safety tagging procedure and observed personnel actions associated with tagging the Division i Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). ,
' Observations and Findinas t '
l On August ig,19g7, a nonlicensed operator was implementing tag-out number 287g2 for
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the Division 1 EDG. The tag-out was part of the preparations for on-line maintenance of ,
- Division 1 equipment. One tag-out stop was removal of the *LG" fuses in the safety related EH1115 breaker cubicle. Proced"re PAP-1401, ' Safety Tagging,"
j Revision 8 (August 1g94), required, in part, that the individual placing the tags confirm the proper component. Contrary to the direction and self-checking guidance of PAP-1401,
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- the individual removed the "LG" fuses fram safet/-related cubicle EH1103, the wrong cubicle. This resulted in the loss of power to safety-related bus EH11, actuation of .
several containment isolation valves, and entry into several TS action statement Because equipment lost power that had not been intended to be taken out of service,
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plant risk was higher than planned until the equipment was restored to servic '
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Reatoration of the bus and associated equipment was also an unnecessary challenge to the operators; The Division 1 EDG did not start because it had already been removed from service for maintenanc After the incorrect fuse was removed, all Division 1 on-line maintenance was placed on
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- hold and all Division 1 equipment was retumed to its normal alignment. The operator who made the error was removed from shift duties for remedial training. The operations superintendent provided special training on safety tagging to each oncoming operations shift during their shift tumover meetings. The licensee promptly initiated a
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Potential Issue Form (alF) to enter the event in its corrective action program. The PIF was eppicpi'ately classified as a Category 2 PlF, which required a Human Performance
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Enhancement System evaluation as part of the PIF investigation. The licensee also .
scheduled an effectiveness review of the planned corrective actions. This non-repetitive,
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i licensee-identi6ed and corrected violation is being treated as a Non Chad i Violation (50440/9701242(DRP) consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the - !
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i i Conclusions
- The tagging procedures and instructions were adequately developed to property !
Implement this tag out. A personnel error caused by a lack of plant awareness and poor :
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attention to detail resulted in a Non-Cited Violation for failure to follow the presortbed ,
actions in the procedur !
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04 Operater Knowledge and Performanes !
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0 Power Operations and Mode Channes !
, Inspection Scope (71707) !
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I The inspectors conducted numerous observations of daly operations activities. Panel
- walk downs were conducted. The inspectors questioned operators about plant and
equipment status. The inspectors reviewed preparations for the plant shutdown and
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oooldown for the refueling outage (RFO6) and observed the shutdown and cocidown.
L Obsenations and Findinos i !
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4 Inspectors observed appropriate operator attention to plant activities and alarm Procedures and instructions were routinely and effectiveW employed. Operations l i' personnel effectivey took the plant through several mode changes and power changes.
! In particular, the shutdown activities to commence RFO6, including simulator practice ,
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1 Conclusions
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Unit operations and modo changes were usually conducted in a safe and efficient
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manner,
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i 04.2 Shift Tumover and Evolution Briefinns
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i- The inspectors observed numerous shift tumovers and plant evolution briefings during
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the inspection period.
! Observations and Findinas i
The inspectors had the following observations:: l
. Discussions of daih work, plant equipment problems, and available resources ;
were extensive, with all members of the crew activey engaged. Supervisors would sometimes ask individua:s specific questions to encourage participatio ,
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- Plant operators demonstrated understanding and interest during briefings when asked questions by supervisio + Training sessions at the beginning or end of the tumover bdefings engaged the crew in lessons leamed or upcoming activitie + Some observed briefings for plant evolutions, such as IPTEs, were not conducted as well as tumover briefings. Severalinstances of confusion were noted in the areas of personnel responsibilities, hold and termination cdteria, and abnormel responses (see Sections 01.1 and 01.2).
+ Supervisors gave very good briefings on the preparations for the refueling outage and for strike contingencies, Conclu'l201 l
Tumover briefings continued to be clear and effective. However, evolution briefings were sometimes weak in communicating required personnel responses to abnormal conditions during evolution .3 Operator Error Durina Mode Switch Interiock Testina Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's initial evaluation of a personnel error that caused an automatic reactor protection system (RPS) logic actuation during the refueling outage, Q servations and Findir121 On September 23,1997, with the reactor shut down and in Mode 5, Refueling, the operators tested the refueling interlock by moving the reactor mode switch frorn the refuel nosition to the startup/ hot standby position and back to the refuel position. The scram discharge volume instrument volumes (SDIV) tvere filled with water due to a system tagout. The bypass switches for the SDIV high water level automatic RPS logic trip were in the bypass position. When the operator moved the mode switch to the startup/ hot standby position, the SDIV bypasses were automatically cleared and an automatic RPS logic actuation occurred. Although the automatic RPS actuation was the correct equipment response, the operators had not expected the SDIV bypasses to clear. Since all control rods were already fully inserted, there was no rod motion. The inspectors discussed this event with the shift supervisor whose crew had failed to anticipate the SDIV bypass response. He stated that he and his crew had reviewed and discussed plant conditions before moving the mode switch and concluded that they would not initiate an automatic RPS trip by taking the mode switch to the startup/ hot standby position. The unit supervisor initiated PlF 971663 to enter the event in the licensee's corrective action system and the licensee notified the NRC of the event in compliance with 10 CFR 50.72. The licensee classified the PlF as a Category 2 PlF, which requires a Human Performance Enhancement System evaluation. The licensee evaluation had not been completed at the end of the inspection period. The inspectors will complete their evaluation of tt,is event when they review the licensee event repor .. - -
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l Conclusions Operators did not property assess the consequences of placing the modo switch in the startup/ hot standby position. This event had no safety consequence Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 fClosed1 t.ER 60-440191-009-00: *0persfor Error Causes Invalid Engineered Safety Feafure Actuation." The error that caused this event was categodzed as a non-cited violation in section 02.1 of this report. Corrective actions are appropriate, jl. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments jrnpection Scope (60705. 61726. 62707. 71500. and 92902)
The inspectors observed several work and surveillance activities. Observed actMtles included normal operation and refueling outage task Observetions and Findinas The inspectors observed several v,ork activities before and dudng RFO6. These activities included electro-hydraulic control system calibration, breaker inspections and refurbishment, reactor cort ! solation cooling system valve troubleshooting, diesel generator maintenance, and a recirculation pump survoillance. Work activities were usually well coordinated with operations and performed in accordance with procedur.is
and instructions. The Work Control Center, established for RFO6, effectively handled a large volume of work for the commencement of RFO6. Documentation reviewed at the werk sites was complete. The liconsee identified a weakness in control of a diesel generator normal shutdown during vibration monitor calibration During performance of Surveillance instruction (SVI) 833 T0257, *End-Of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip Breaker Arc Suppression Response Time," Revision 2 (March 1992), an inspector noted that time increments had been incorrectly marked on chart recorder paper used to record test data. The chart paper time increments were marked for 1 millisecond durations instead of 10 milliseconds. The inspector later noted that the individuals performing the test also used the wrong required data from previously performed tests to evaluate acceptability. The two incorrect items ! nit!alty caused the test to be considered unsatisfactory. After the inspector presented bis observations on the test data to the individuals, the correct chart values and data were used to detemiine that the test was satisfactorily, The NRC-identified errors in implementing the SVI is a Violation (50-440/97012-03(DRP)) of TG 5.4.1.a for inadequate implementation of procedures and instructions for systems referenced in Appendix *A* of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision .
l Conclusions The licensee identified a weakness in the area of prrecedure implementation and contro The NRC identified that a procedure implementation violation occurred when incorrect data was used in the performance of a surveillance tes M2 Maintenance and Matertal Condition of Facilittas and Equipment M2.1 Material ConditiQD Inspection Scope f71707. 92720; The tripectors observed plant conditions curing plant walk downs and reviewed reports and evaluations of equipment deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the imprct of observed plant conditions. The inspectors evaluated the administrative control of plant deficiencies for proper development of corrective actions and consideration of maintenance rule requ!rements, Observations arid Findinas During plant walk downs, the inspectors observed that appropriate plant housekeeping continued to be maintained and noted that supervisors placed an emphasis on workers performing end-of shift and daily clean up of their work areas. The inspectors also observed that mirior maintenance items, such as inoperable doors and failed gauges, were identified and repaired in a timely manner. The maintenance backlog continued to be reduce Personnel routinely wrote Potential lasue Forms (PIFs) or deficiency tags on material conditions that did not meet their expectations. A continuing program for discussion of PiFs at upper level management meetings facilitated appropriate prioritization and resource allocation for important item Preparations for RFO6 caused a significant increase in the use of temporary storage areas and the use of tempomry power. Appropriate controls were in place to control these items during the outage, Qonclusions in general, plant equipment was well maintained. Personnel effectively addressed overall plant reliability and the corrective actions program when developing the RFO6 work pla M8 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92700)
fClosedi LER 50-440197-010-00; * Loss of ElectncalPowcr to Reactor Protection System Bus Due to Elettncal Protective Assembly Trip Results in Engineered Safety Feature Actuations." On September 11,1997, at approximately 11:03 P.M., electrical power from the Division 1 attemate power source to Reactor Protection System Bus "A" was los The inspectors observed the operators' response to the event; no concems were identified. The cause of the event was determined to be unreliable operation of the
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electrical protective assembly (EPA) logic control board. This problem was similar to that reported in LER 50-440/g7@3-00. The licensee began replacing the EPAs with a more reliable design prior to RFO6 and planned to complete installation of the more reliable .
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EPAs before the end of RF06. Completion of conective actions will be evaluated during the inspectors' review of LER 50 440/g7-003 0 lit, Ennineerina ,
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment !
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E2.1 Ennineerina Plans. Reviews. and Analyses lnscoction Scope (37551. 60705, and 9290M The inspectors reviewed several engineering plans,10 CFR 50.5g reviews, and analyses associated with the refueling outag Qb.gfrvations and Findinos The inspectors observed that engineering work packages were detailed and presented in an easily understood manner. Engineering packages had in-depth analyses and .
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calculations to support the associated activities. The analyses reviewed consistently assumed more restrictive or worse case conditions. Prior to the outage the licensee used the outage schedule as the basis for evaluating shutdown risk. Engineering activities were completed in time to prevent significant schedule deviations for outage activitie Safety evaluations required by 10 CFR Part 50.5g included appropriate information and no unreviewed safety questions were identified, inspectors' observations included ungineering activities for the following:
. Emergency and Temporary Servim Water for Pipe Sleeving
. Attemale Decay Heat Removal via Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup
. Emergency Core Cooling System Strainer for Suppression Pool Conclusionr2 Engineering plans, reviews, and analyses were clearly developed and conservativ Engineering designs and analyses were initiated and performed in advance of applicable outage activities to avoid significant schedule impact __ .._ _ _ _ - _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . ___ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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N. Plant Support 81 Conduct of Securtty and Safeguards Activities 81.1 Security Operatens n. 103pgglion Scope (71750)
The Inspectors made numerous observations of security operations during rounds of the i
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b. Observations and Eindinns I
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Security p9rsonnel responded well to increased activity and temporary personnel associated with the refueling outage. Timely responses were observed for stanns and compensatory measure c. Conclusions ;
Overall security issues were handled effectivel V. Mananoment Meetinos
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 3,1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any meterials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary informatica was identifie <
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l PARTIAL UST OF PERSONS CONTACTED i
Licensec
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J. P. Stetz, Senior Vice President, Nuclear '
L W. Myers, Vice President, Nuclear W. R. Kanda, General M4 nager Nuclear Power Plant Dqartment T. S. Rausch, Diredor Quality and Personnel Development Department N. L. Bonner, Director, Nuclear Maintenance Department R. W. Sdwauder, Diredor, Nuclear Engineering Department ;
H. W. Ber9endahl, Director, Nucleer Sswloes Department J. Messina, Operations Manager J. T. Sears, Radiation Protodion Manager F. A. Kearrey, Superintendent Plant Operations INSPECTlON PROCEDURES USED
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IP 37551:. Ontite Engineering IP 60705: Preparation for Refueling IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observation i IP 71500: BOP IP 71707: Plent Operations IP 71750: Plant Support Activities IP 92700: Onsite Follow up of Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor Facilities IP 92709: Licensee Plans for Coping with Strikes
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IP 92901: Follow-up - Plant Operations IP 92902: Follow-up - Maintenance IP 92903: Follow-up - Engineering
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED l 9 /97012-01(DRP) NCV Lack of Positive Control of Reactivity 50-440/97012-02(DRP) NCV Improper Safety Tagging implementation 50-440/97012 03(DRP) VIO Use of imprnper Data on SVi ;
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50 440/97-00H0 LER i Operator Erm Causes invalid Ep2 neened Safety Feature !
Aduation 50-440/97 010-00 LER Loss of Elodrcal Power to Reactor Protection System Bus
Due to Elodrica! Protodive Assembly Trip Results in Engineered Safety Feature Actuations ;
50-440/97012-01(DRP) NCV Lack of Positive Control of Reactivity 50-440/97012 02(DRP) NCV improper safety Tagging imp!smentation ;
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UST OF ACRONYMS ANO INIT1AUSMS CFR Code of Federal Regulations
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EDG Emergency Diesel Generator l
EPA Elodrical Protective Assemby ESF Engineered Safety Feature ;
IPTE Infrequenth Performed Test or Evolution i IR inspedion Report ;
LER Licensee Event Report !
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MSR Moisture Separator Rehestor NCV Noncted V& tion i Nudear Regulatory Commission
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NRC ,
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NPP Nuclear Power Pferd PAP Pferd Administrative Procedure PDR Public Document Room PlF Potentialissue Form i RF06 Refueling 0:dage 6 RPS Reactor Protection System SDIV Scram Discharge Instrument Volume SJAE Steam Jet Air Ejector SV' Surveillance instruction T8 Technical Speck.ation TXl Temporary Instruction USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report !
VIO Violation
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