ML20198T131

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Opposes Continuance of 5% Power OL & Issuance of Full Power Ol,Based on Listed Deficiencies in Emergency Plan.Nrc Should Publicize ASLB & Aslab Methods for Dismissing 38 Contentions of Suffolk County.Served on 860610
ML20198T131
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 06/01/1986
From: Klaus B
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP), Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#286-487 OL, OL-3, OL-4, NUDOCS 8606110334
Download: ML20198T131 (7)


Text

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~s eaa. m Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Fifth Floor Hearing Rocm 4350 East - West Highway g "

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Bethesda, Maryland i

Att: Adninistrative Judges of NRC, ASLB and ASLAB Re:

Suspension of Shoreham Nuclear Power StationGRestart s ...

Pending He FEMA Post-Drill Assessment Exercises Sirs:

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O JUN p l.9F There is difficulty in constructing this correspondence because there is much to say, little time in which to say it and a deepening conviction that in reality you are not an independent governmental agency, but rather one Wiich is bound by other considerations, not inclusive of the safety of 60,000 school youngsters, disabled. infinned, hospitalized individuals and general citizenry, who to itsalllimits.

happen to live in the 10-mile EPZ on this elongated shape, elasticized most TheLongconsiderations Islanders now. which do appear irresistable to you are familiar to TheTe is among us a sense of wonder regarding your real direct you ability destiny to grasp how you are actually being perceived by those over whom eavesdrop on sam o. It is doubtful you would eat or sleep if you could but f the local include sane aspect of Shoreham. gentry's daily conversations, which invariably Shoreham is the focus of heightened and keen interest, due in part to the curiosity generated from a transparently preformed who relentlessly pursue an irrational proposal, position of appointed judges potentially devastating consequences. These legally learned but notinbued self- with astoun examined men are fully anticipating the future victims of their proposal's enacta nt, ie. licensing at any capacity, will come around to believe that said .

licensing is based on safe and sane judgent.

1%, and then later to 5% was the approval of not only the ge,ographic placan of this plant, population but also the operation of a breeder reactor in the vicinity of densities.

Islanders' unwillingness to accept thisIt lant is well in their very established midst. now that you hav establishen that the Nuclear Re latory Agency accepts theIt nuclear is also well industry's will and that will forms the asis of your deliberations. The will of the nuclear , industry absorbed your rationality fror, the onset of Shoreham.

The question was not whether this plant should go on line, but when.

Sinply because you have denied their existence throughout these proceedings, sound judgent. you have not been able to transform reality and the nature of No one can convincReason and logic have survived even your legal maneuvering.

stage of power-up. e us of the safety or sanity of this nuclear facility at any Shoreham is also spoken of in "high places" as a test case. Shoreham no longer represents an intently mismanaged, deceitful and reckless utility.

Shoreham represents the nuclear industry and its self-assumed right to do anything it wants, anywhere it so pleases, ckog62jjjcn osoooog, 34 e606o2 PDR ~

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of And you, the regulative body , are to regulate with diligence the  !

licensire and operation of these facilities as they proliferate the landscape.

This would rightfully inply that there will be certain and particular junctures in the licensing phase wherein you will have to issue a prudent 'no' to sone facilities which have been poorly managed, negligently, constructed, wrongfully anninistered, subject to the claim of inproper staffing and operated without the benefit of an even rmotely feasible or workable evacuation plan.

Another aspect .of Shoreham which will continue to receive a voluminous amount of attention regards the granting of any license to operate over the strenuous objections of state and local governments. It will be in the courts presided over by judges other than you that you should begin to feel your first real tinge of regret that you ever allowed a utility to pull you around by the ear. It will be in the courts shakily assuning Shoreham does not have a sinple cmtination of minor eve,nts leading us to a Three-Mile Island or Chernobyl accident first, that your credibility as an independent governmental agency will at last be dissolved like so nuch jello in hot water.

I find that lamentable. Since the nuclear industry.doesn't just plan to go away, we, the public, desperately have need for a vigilant body, a true, regulatory group enpowered with the ability to say 'no' and to make it stick, to act on our behalf and most inportantly, on the behalf of our children.

Introductory thoughts aside, I would like to address the possibility and proper issuance of a no-go order to LILC0 within this interim of shut-down and their planned 5% power-up planned for some time this sunmer. There would be no better time than doing so: LILC0 is waiting for the media cool-down on Chernobyl before they heat up again. Who ever said LILCO was not sensitive to the people it abuses.

As to how you ever managed to salve your consciences issuing even the 1%

power-up last year recains a opaque mystery to many of us in view of the fact that a workable evacuation plan was just as paramount at 1% as it would be at 100% capacity. We became at risk the norent Shoreham sunk its rods and powered up to 1 of 1%--the potential for loss of coolant is constant no matter the power-up percentage. Pressures and tenperatures were the same at 1% as they would be at 100%. You knew all this. Yet you issued the license for low power testing.

possible soYou youknew no evacuation of sound or workable measure would ever be circumvented it. Somewhere around that early period of your discovery, you decided to allow the plant to go hot, thereby minimizing the potentiality of the risk of decision reversal. You knew that at some _ater date, LILC0 "should" be capable of finalizing something on paper from all their revisionary 31ans that would borrow the look of a pseudo-evacuation plan. Then would come F 1Ws paper drill. Fran this paper doctment, you would extrapolate nony of your future considerations in tne licensing process. The FEMA PAPER DRILL-[FPD]- predicated upon such an obviously feeble exercise would take on new dinensions, would grow in its stature, and would become elevated to a serious plateau, to be given the honor of serious consideration. But not be_-

fore its main detractor and overseer, Mr. Petrone, was removed from his regional position. Surely you must know how this reflected on the reality of the drill.

You have arbitrarily dismissed the main bulk of the Intervenor's (Suffolk County) contentions. One by one, you hurled out of the arena, valued and truthful information regarding the geographic concerns, the lack of participation of institutions which are responsible for the welfare of thousands of people and you ignored school officials telling you and over again, the kind of evacuation required by a full-scale radiological emergency

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would not be workable in their school districts.

How is it that you conpletely reversed the natural order in the licensing process which would appear to be, first be able to ensure the residente safety; then and only then, issue a low-power license?

For those of us who have knowledge of the FPD, we are uniquely surprised that a goverrmental agency would choose to erbarrass itself so blatantly in public. We are further astonished that LILCO, upon reading the FPD, dido t hastily direct it be shredded outright, and start over again.

It is painful to imagine no sirens sounding in a drill, no school children being moved, not one hospital or nursing facility being evacuated, not one sincere effort on LILC0's behalf to fulfill a desire to block the roads east of the 10 EPZ (easily winning the " Jeer" award for all tine), not one invisable relocation center opening its arms wide to draw into its bosmi even one, solitary resident of the EPZ, and not one clue that a disasterous event was unfolding at the inpolitely situated silo in Shoreham.

Further realized from the FPD: a breakdown in coordination of messages and the pertinency in those messages in the area of E0C traffic innediments; confusion in notifying the FAA the non-notification of the LI1R sinply because there never were any or;iginal procedures to do so in the first place; LER0's need to have a larger dose assessment board to keep their own information clear; downwind distance sanpling of thyroid dose miscalculations -[due to a misplaced decimal point, the miscalculation read 9000 mrem /hr @ 4.3 mi instead of sare mrem /hr 0 .5 mi) -; extrapolated data treated as actual data rather than projected data, requiring 215 hrs. to correct the error; LILC0's decision not to test the sirens during the drill; lack of consultation and timliness of reports between Evacuation coordinator and route coordinator, LILC0's choice to eliminate schools from the drill; bus drivers' lack of training in reading dosineters which would tell then when they should take appropriate actions, such as ingesting or adninstering KI; untimely delays in distribution of information; sinple matters such as having an EPZ map show plume pathway; bus drivers dispatched 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after declaration, others going to wrong transfer points or missing a portion of their route altogether; traffic guides inadequately informed as to the destination of evacuees; non-dispatch of emergency personnel to clear accident area; a 40-minute delay in sending out a bus to pick up one group of school children (simulated); inproper instructions given to bus drivers; traffic guides needing to learn does authorization limits and who may authorize them; traffic guide deployment excessive. The list of verifiable characteristics of the FEMA Paper Drill go on and on. By the tine this drill was to be staged LERO was supposed to have everyone trained. This was not a highschool rehearsal in which errors would naturally arise and be ironed out for the final show. This was the final show. And this is the Grand Drill whose documentation is being elevated by you to lofty heights. You are treating it as if it were legitimate.

It was the most visable farce of the Keystone Cops variety.

I can't tell you how it agonizes me to criticize the best effort LERO was capable of offering. I did not want to find myself at the disconcerting position of realizing that LILC0 would never be capable of

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standing.up to the overwhelming realities involved in evacuating even the miniaturized 10 EPZ.

Yet with this painfully dismal FEMA PAPER DRILL and the truth of no workable evacuation fornulae possible, you rendered license for the power-up to 5%.

We are now experiencing the first wave of our annual aopulation increment with thousands of smmer residents seeking relief " rom their nine nonth sojourn in the city. This would be an awfully fine time to state to LILCO that no further testing will be allowed until you have reworked each of Suffolk County's 38 contentions.

It is inconceivable that within the framework of reportable occurrences at this plant since 1% power-up, theyour knowledge duplicity and of lack of qualification in the radiological department on site, the corrosion of pipes, the undeniable history of generator problems, the known problems within GE designs, and the fact that by your own guidelines, an evacuation plan which reflects reality must be set in place, that you do not fortnwith revoke your granting of the 5% operating status of SNPS.

in its How very difficult tracks. it may seem to you to inmediately brake this insanity But in truth it could be quite easy. You could go about it any any nmber of ways,, among which would include a little media-blitzing yourselves. Sinply take out a two-page spread in Newsday and list the 38 contentions of Suffolk County and then indicate the methods enployed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and Appeals in casting those crucial considerations into a sea of indifference. Simply show how you legally attempted to lay to rest the contentions which represent our ver/ .ifelines. Then you could reprint for all those MOMS P. DADS out there in evacuee land, word-by-Word testinonies offered by school adainistrators and teachers about the sheer inpossibility of sheltering, relocating or directly mass evacuating children under the umbrella of a rLdiological 'energency situation in a tinely and safe manner. And please don't forget to print in lar presme you are proud of your decision-making) geletters and proudly BOLITTT the following from your partial Initial decision:

  • FEttA agrees that LILCO need not have written agreements from schools
  • Since schools have early dismissal plans, LlLCO does not have to come up with any additional plans Parents do NOT require written agreements as to how or where their children will be taken evacuation
  • School bus drivers are expected by LILCO to drive during There will be no real role conflict on behalf of bus drivers during evacuation
  • Schools need NOT pre-plan sheltering even though pre planning might increase dose savings
  • LILCO does not have to concern itself with sheltering or shielding factors for every EPZ schc.ol w i .,h LILCO chose early dismissal over direct evacuation because they to discourage problems incurred when families attempt to reunite during emergency phase; LILCO thinks early dismissal will mitigate parents and children from seeking protection TOGETHER
  • NRC does not demand that each and every element of the plan be capable of working with absolute precision. They will determine how much precision is actually necessary for us.

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o NRC believes LILCO has provided all the information necessary for schools to evacuate properly

  • NRC assumes bus drivers will be able to supervise children in just the same way as ifit were early dismissal
  • There will be some adults around at relocation centers to supervise children. No specification of who the adults will be, their caliber, how long they will be available, or if they will be trained to handle children of all ages
  • NRC agrees that there may be an extensive delay in evacuation due to the fact that no reasonable time estimate can be given without knowing predesignated relocation centers
  • NRC agrees that LILCO does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate and protective measures can and will be taken to evacuate children.

Despite the above considerations and so very many more, too numerous to place in this letter, you have granted the low-power testing of this plant. You know that " low power testing" is really an inadequate description. You know that we should have had the decency of cmpleted hearings before this nuclear oven was ever allowed to be made hot. But you denied us our right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

We are all sitting on the creaking lint of disaster right now, In real time, not future time.

To you, the NRC, and all your attending legal bodies, I say "Let this ship sink now and regain your souls." Deny not only continuance at 5% power but for 100% power, now ana for all ture to come.

Most Sincerely, BJ. KLAUS Rocky Point, NY

PASSED RESOLUTION -- SHOREHAM EVACUATION PLAN BOARD OF EDUCATION, ROCKY POINT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

[ The Rocky Point School Board hereby replaces and supersedes its 1983 Shoreham Resolution with the following May 19, 1986 Resolution ]:

WHEREAS, the Rocky Point School District is located within the 10-mile radiological emergency planning zone of the Shoreham plant; and WHEREAS, the Rocky Point Board of Education is cognizant of its responsibilities relative to the health and safety of students and school personnel; and WHEREAS, the governments of Suffolk County and New York State, after extensive analysis, decided not to adopt or implement any radiological emergency evacuation plan for response to a Shoreham emergency; and WHEREAS, New York State Supreme Court decisions have upheld Suf folk County's decision not to adopt or implement any plan for Shoreham; and since the LILCO emergency plan for Shoreham has been found to be beyond LILCO's authority to implement, it would be inappropriate for the Rocky Point School District to cooperate with LILCO regarding Shoreham planning; and WHEREAS, the Rocky Point Board of Education believes that the governments of Suffolk County and New York have acted responsibly and in furtherance of the interests of Rocky Point School District residents in

/ deciding not to adopt or implement any radiological emergency evacuation plan for Shoreham; and WHEREAS, the Shoreham emergency plan developed by Long Island Lighting Company makes unwarrented assumptions about the willingness and capability of Rocky Point school personnel to undertake emergency actions in the event of a Shoreham radiological emergency; and WHEREAS, the Rocky Point Board of Education af ter having surveyed its employees cannot assure adequate participation and supervision from school personnel and bus drivers, and on the basis of the limited transportation and other resources available to Rocky Point, it is clear ,

that Rocky Poin school personnel could not and would not implement early dismissal, evacuation, sheltering or other protective actions in the event of a Shoreham radiological emergency evacuation; and WHEREAS, the Rocky Point School District is informed that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Licensing Board concluded that Rocky Point school preparedness is adequate for a Shoreham radiological emergency evacuation; and WHEREAS, the Rocky Point School District is informed that the Federal Eme rgency Management Agency appears to have ignored the fact Rocky Point School District has adopted no plan and performed no training l for a Shoreham radiological emergency; and WHEREAS, that the mere acceptance and use of tone alert radios does not in any way indicate Rocky Point School Board's acceptance of, or cooperation with LILCO's proposed evacuation plan.

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  • Pags -2 of 2 prgss May 19,.1985 PASSED RESOLUTION -- SHOREHAM EVACUATION PLAN BOARD OF EDUCATION, ROCKY POINT PUBLIC SCHOOLS NOW THEREFORE BE IT, RESOLVED, that the Rocky Point Board of Education recognizes its responsibilities to students and school personnel in the Rocky Point School District; and be it further RESOLVED, that the Rocky Point Board of Education recognizes that the LILCO plan provides no way of dealing with the potential liability of the Rocky Point School District or of the school employees which could arise out of lawsuits resulting from a Shoreham radiological evacuation, or from protective actions taken during a radiological emergency evacuation; and be it further RESOLVED, that the Rocky Point Board of Education fully supports the Suffolk County Legislature and the State of New York in their position of refusing to participate in Shoreham radiological emergency evacuation planning and in their opposition to the licensing of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant; and be it further RESOLVED, therefore, that the Rocky Point Board of Education cannot and will not adopt or implement any plan for, or perform any training for, or participate in any exercise of school protective actions for

/ response to a Shoreham radiologcial emergency, and that to do so would be irresponsible; and be it further RESOLVED, that the Rocky Point Board of Education concludes that no operating license be granted to LILCO for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.

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