ML20198Q641

Responds to Ieb 97-002, Puncture Testing of Shipping Packages Under 10CFR71. Requested Actions of Item 1 Conducted for Three Certified Type B & Fissile Matl Shipping Packages.Items 2 & 3 Not Applicable

ML20198Q641
Person / Time
Site:	07000754
Issue date:	11/04/1997
From:	Murray B GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
IEB-97-002, IEB-97-2, NUDOCS 9711120293
Download: ML20198Q641 (3)

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.u GENucicar Energy Gene:at Elecint Comray Vettwtos Nxtear centw P O Sn 460. Vaheptos Ro~J heawton CA 94566 November 4,1997 -

N c' 7 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

_ Review of Puncture Tet Assessiaent of Certified Package Designs

References:

1) NRC Bulletin 97-02," Puncture Testing of Shipping Packages Under 10 CFR Part 71"; September 23.1997.

2) Letter from NRC to Multiple Addressee List," Extension of Response Period for NRC Bulletin 97-02 Entiticd, Puncture Testing ofShipping Packages Under 10 CFR Part 71", dated 1 oil 7/97.

Gentlemen:

The referenced bulletin requests the following actions regarding required puncture testing for Type 13 and fissile material shipping packages:

1.

Review our puncture test assessment for each of our certified package designs, determine the method used to assess the effects of the puncture test, and determine whether the puncture test was performed in accordance with 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3).

2.

For any package design whose puncture test assessment was based upon physical tests that were not in accordance with 10 CFR ?!.73(c)(3):

- a)

. Identify any special precautions or operational controls that are needed to assure safe

- use of the package, pending retesting and reassessment of the package design.

b)

Prepare ajustification showing why there are no health and safety concerns that would require immediate removal of packages of that design from service.

3.

Prepare a plan and schedule for demonstrating the adequacy of the design for the hypothetical accident conditions specified in 10 CFR 71.73, and justify the timeliness of the schedule.

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9711120293 971104 PDR ADOCK 07000754 C

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ql USNRC November 4,1997 The requested actions ofitem 1 above were conducted for our three certified Type B and tissile material shipping packages. These shipping packages are:

Csrtificate Numbe-Model Number 5926 100 5939 1500 9228 2000 The review concluded that all three packages met the requir ments of 10 CFR 71.73(c)(3) and, therefore, the requests ofitems 2 and 3 above are not applicable.

A tabular summary of the requested review and its results is attached if there are any questions or concerns with this response, please call me at (510) 862-4455.

Vety truly yours, VMkw -

B. M. Murray Senior Licensing Engineer Attacimient

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Certdicate No.

Model No.

Puncture Assessment Methed:

Cor.clusion:

Reference:

5926 100 Full-Sized Test. The packaging wa> dropped in ne method used and its setup are adequate to Consolidated the horizontal position from 40 inches onto a demanstrate compliance with 71.73(c)(3) application dated 6-inch-diameter, 8-inch-long steel punctuw bar.

requirements.

January 18,1993.

The bar was bolted by 4 bolts to the unyieliing surface of the drop pad. Figure 5 of the referenced document shows the puncture bar bolted to the pad and the packaging after it came to rest The test results show that the protective jacket yielded on impact but no major fracture occurred. No damage occurred to the cask.

5939 1500 Extrapolation of Test Data. The design and it can be concluded that the Model 1500 design Consolidated fabrication of this packaging was based on the adequately addresses the requirements of application dated results obtained in the Model 100 testing program.

71.71(c)(3) because its evaluation was based on November 19,1992.

The Model 1500 protective jacket geometry, the results of the Model 100 test.

material thickness, material selection, and fabrication techniques are based on an extrapolation of these features from the Model 100 packaging. Therefore, it is concluded that the Model 1500, during accident conditions, will sustain damage to the package not greater than the damage sustained by the Model 100.

9228 2000 Engineering Evaluation. The evaluation The evaluation establishes the capacity of the NEDO-31582,'Model determines the minimum wall thickness of the Model 2000 cask shell to withstand the puncture 2000 Radioactive cask outer shell required to resist penetration by condition given in 71.73(c)(3).

Material Transport the bar. This approach is conservative in that it Package Safety does not include the support that the lead will Analysis Report,"

provide to the shell in such an event. In addition, Paragraph 2.7.2; April, 1988.

the approach does not consider that before the bar could interact with the cask outer shell it must penetrate *he two ceacentric Overpack structure shells.

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