ML20154L444
| ML20154L444 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1988 |
| From: | TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154L424 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8809260191 | |
| Download: ML20154L444 (23) | |
Text
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4 SUPPLEMENT fl0. 3 HUMAN FACTORS CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW OF COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION SEPTEMBER 1988 1
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ABSTRACT Supplement No. 3 to the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Human Factors Control Room Design Review provides an update of Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCROR) program activities performed since the submittal of Supplement No. 2. All elements of the program have been completed except for the environmental surveys and the comparison of the Unit 2 control room with Unit I to assess design differences. Procedures have been developed to formalize the ongoing Human Factors Engineering Program.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
2.0 STATUS OF HEDs 2 3.0 HEDs IDENTIFIED SUBSEQUENT TO 5 DCRDR SURVEY 4.0 TASK ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF FESULTS 6 WITH CONTROL ROOM INVENTORY 5.0 VERIFICATION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS 8 6.0 DETAILS OF ONG0ING HUMAN FACTORS 9 ENGINEERING PROGRAM LIST OF REFERENCES 14 APPENDIX A - STATUS OF CATEGORY 3 HUMAN ENGINEERING A .1 DISCREPANCIES 1
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose This supplement statuses the remaining activitie, of the Detailed Ccntrol. Room Design Review (DCRDR) as defined in Supplement No. 1 of NUREG-0737 [1]. This status is provided to facilitate NRC review and acceptance of the CPSES DCRDR prior to Unit 1 11 ensing.*
1.2 Background
The Comanche Peak DCRDR plan encompassed the following program elements:
- a. Review of the Unit 1 main control boards to assess compliance with NUREG-0700 [la] guidelines,
- b. Review of human factors rnlated Licensee Event Reports (LERs) from other plants for potential CPSES implications,
- c. Evaluation of Unit I human factors discrepancies and implementation of required design changes,
- d. Comparison of Unit 2 main control boards to Unit I to assess design differences, and
- e. Development and implementation of design change packages such that Unit 2 instruments and controls will be identical to the OCROR-improved Unit 1 main control boards.
The review of the main control boards included the cc.itrol room panels with which the operator normally interfaces, and the remote shutdoun panels." The review methods and procedures included data collection, analysis and review, and documentation.
- fhis report contains re > .r e s ) current versions of CPSES procedures which may be changed in bt. e. The report will not be updated to reflect such changes unless er are substantive and programmatic, and then, c ly until the later of (1) h staff acceptance of the CPSES Human Factors l Engineering (HFE) Program or (2) incorporation in the FSAR of the HFE Program '
basic criteria.
The basic criteria for the activities to be performed during plant operat'?ns, i.e., the HFE Program, will be described in the CPSES FSAR. The FSAR description will be maintained in accordance with the applicable regulations and procedures. Once these criteria are incorporated in the 1 FSAR, they will supersede the criteria for the ongoing HFE Program as j described in this Supplement.
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- Hereaf ter, for the purpose of brevity in this report, when the terms main control boards or control room panels are used, they are mear.t to encompass i
the remote shutdown panels.
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Where design data did not agree with the ree.ommended guideline criteria contained in Section 6 of NUREG-0700, a human ergineering discrepancy (HED) was documented. All HEOs were reviewed for validity and safety significanca. Corrective action, if required, was implemented.
The Comanche Peak Unit 1 OCROR deport [2] identified 335 HEDs, of which 240 required corrective action; the remaining 95 did not require any corrective action.
Two supplemental reports to the Comanche Peak DCROR [3,4] revised 54 of the HEOs submitted in the original DCROR and added 19 new HEDs, increasing the total to 354 HEDs of which 265 required corrective action. The two supplements to the Comanche Peak OCROR also reported a schedule for completing the corrective actions for the remaining open HEDs.
Based cn a review of these documents, the NRC conducted an on-site audit of the Comanche Pea'c Unit 1 DCROR during July and Aupust, 1984. The results of this audit are documented in an NRC letter to Texas Utilities dated August 27, 1984 [5] and in Sa/ety Evaluation Report Supplement No. 6 (SSER-6) [6].
In summary, SSER-6 identified the following ac'.ivities that remaine'1 to be completed for the Comanche Peak Unit 1 full DCROR:
o Provide a status of HEDs requiring pre-licensing corrections, environmental surveys, and additional assessment, o Provide a comparison of the task analysis results with the control room inventory, o Provide verification that the design improvements accomplish the necessary corrections and do not introduce any new HEDs, and o Provide a description of the onguing Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Program.
Each of the above activities is addressed in the sections that follow. In addition, a section is included which a'1 dresses the new HEDs identified by the ongoing HFE program.
2.0 STATUS OF HEDs Appendix 22-A of SSER-6 listed 3 categories of HEDs requiri,,g correctiv.
action. The 3 categories are statused in the sections thn follow.
2.1 Category 1 HEDs Requiring Pre-licensing Corrective _ Action The following HEDs in Category 1 have been closed and verified by the NRC Resident inspector, as reported in Inspection Report 445/84-45 dated March 21, 1985 (7):
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L j Control No. Brief Description 3 Visual Annunciator Priority 68 Procedure Storage 4
00 J-Handle Pointers 93 Control Discrimination 2
106 Missing Labels 120 Hissing Sound Powered Phone Jacks 122 Incomplete Hierarchical Labeling on HSP
- 130 Unlabeled Switch Position 1 4
214 Direction of Motion Convention ;
1 225 Unlabeled Locking Position i 226 Set Point Knob Covers Removable 267 Recorder Frosted Glass I j 321 Annunciator Charactor Size :
l 345 P-2's00 Computer Abbreviations inconsistent Inspectio7 Report 445/85-08, dateo September 18,1985[8], reported J
the following Category 1 HEDs closed arid verified by the NRC ,
- Resident Inspector.
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- Control No. Brief Description !
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! 181 Power Scale Missing i
) 164 Counter Value Conversion Factor !
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q The remaining Category 1 HED, i.e., control number 88, Matching ,
Recorder Chart Paper and Scales, has been closed recently and l j verified by the NRC Resident Inspector. ;
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i 2.2 Category C HF.Os Requiring Environmental Surveys ,
i l The environmental surveys are scFeduled to be performed and the l
- results evaluated during the preoperational testing phase of the >
Unit 1 Startup Program. Since the original DCROR survey, major ,
l changes have been made to the control room lighting and ceiling. !
j The environmental surveys will be perfor;ned when all control room
- construction and modifications, including carpet installation in i j the main control board area, are complete. '
i 1 Since the environmental conditions t .i be different, it is .
) expected tha he lighting and ceiling modifications and the ,
i addition'of a:peting will invalidate the open Category 2 HEDs. l
! The survtys v:ill be perfonned and new HEDs will be generated as ,
necessary to reflect as-built conditions. Any new HEDs that are :
generated will be assessed and resolved as part of the ongoing HFE !
j program. ,
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All of the HEDs in Category 2, as enumerated below will be evaluated in conjunction witn the new surveys:
Control No. Brief Description 42 Glare on Meters 59 Noise Masks Communications 154 Glare on Recorder Glass 170 Glare on Controilers and Counters 308 Ambient Noise Masks Audible Alarms 310 Alarm level Above Noise Not Evaluated 311 Alarm Level Not Evaluated 346 Noise Level Disturbs Voice Communications 347 Page Phone Audio Level Masks Alarms '
348 Illumination Level Excessive 349 SRO Desk Illumination Inadequate 352 Emergency Lighting Level Inadequate 353 HVAC Comfort Zone Not Maintained 2.3 Status of Category 3 HEDs Requiring Design Improvements and Assessment The following five Category 3 HEDs have been assessed and the re ,Jired design changes have been made as part of the ongoing human factors engineering program. HED 354 will be evaluated further.
Control No. Brief Description 151 Color Coding of Hand Switch Lights 183 Color Coding of Controller Lights 200 Controller Meter Scales 342 HFE Improvements Not Complete on Support Panels 354 Remote Shutdown Area Temperature High See Appendix A for status dets , for these Category 3 HEDs. There are no other HEDs in Category 3.
2.4 Safety-Significant HEDs :
An independent human factors specialist conducted a control room "walk-talk through" verification to determine if any safety significant HEDs remained or were generated by any of the corrective actions. The results of this verift:ation process revealed that there were no safety significant HEDs. either from the DCRDR or the ongoing HFE Program, white required additional corrective action. This verification was accomplished in conjunction with the Unit 2 survey (see section 6.7.3).
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.- t i i 3.0 HEOs IDENTIFIED SUBSEQUENT TO DCROR SURVEY The following list of HEDs was identified subsequent to the OCRDR survey reported earlier [2]. I 1
Description - Indicator Pointers !
! It was observed that the black vertical indicator pointers -
1- had limited visibility when at the maximum limit of travel 0
at the top or bottom of the scale. Orange pointers were i
]- considered to improve visibility, i Resolution:
The existing )ointers were evaluated as adequate and in agreement witi NUREG-0700. The benefit / cost analysis !
showed only marginal improvement if replaced. If these i meters are replaced for other reasons during the life of !
the plant, orange pointers may be installed.
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1 Description - Feedwater Bypass Valve Control Switch i The handswitches on Cb-09, 1-HS-2162, 2163, 2164, and 2165 ;
! were labeled "FW BYP CTRL VLV". These switches also close :
the main feedwater control valves. '
Resolution:
The tags and hierarchical labels were changed to reflect !
the scope of control of the switches. New nomenclature i l shows "FW BYP & CTRL VLV".
l Description - Veit Designators l I
i l The al hanumerics of the nomenclature for the secondary l i side i clude a number for the Unit designator. This is not j consistent with the remaining control board labels and
, applied conventions. '
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! The Unit designator numbers have been removed from the !
labeling and annunciator panels for the secondary side.
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Description - Ventilation Chilled Water Alarms Common alarms are located on Unit 1 and 2 alarm panels 1-ALB-11A and 2-ALB-12A, respectively. These alarms should be on X-ALB-11C since they are common to both Units.
Resolution:
Design Modification Requests-Construction Phase (DMRCs) 87-1-103 and 87-X-104 were issued for relocation of alarms.
Description - Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve (AFWlV) Control
. Switches One removable handle was provided for the AFWly handswitches. This removable handle did not have the valve code symbol utilized for J-handle type switches.
Resolution:
The ap3ropriate valve code symbol has been provided for the remova)le handle. DMRC 87-1-105 has been issued for installation of fixed handle modules.
Description - Ventilation Panel Layout The cumulative effects of design modifications which deleted numerous controls made it difficult to periorm 1 routine tasks and time sensitive emergency tasks in an efficient manner. ,
Resolution:
Panels X-CV-01 and X-CV-03 have been substantially rearranged into functional groups witt di plays and controls located in a systematic manner. This was l acconiplished by ONRC 87-X-165. r 4.0 TASK ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH CONTROL ROOM INVENTORY [
The function and task analysis assures that operator +. asks for emergency operations have been identified and that instruments and controls required to aerform those tasks are ava;1able to the ccntrol room operator. 111s analysis was performed on the Comanche Peak Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) in accordance with Opo ations Procedure No.
00A-204, Revision 4, ' Preparation of Emergency Response Guidelines."
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r i The Comanche Peak ERGS were derived from the Generic Technical Guidelines ;
developed by the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG). These Guidelines l included a step-by-step sequence of functions to be performed on a i reference plant in response to different events. The sequence included [
' instrument and control requirements for performance of these functions. ,
The WOG Background Documentation explained why each step was necessary and what was required to perform each step. l
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In performing the Comanche Peak ERG update, the plant design was compared ,
i to the reference plant of the Generic Technical Guidelines to identify ;
and justify design differences that would need to be taken ir,to account !
4 when writing the Comanche Peak ERGS based on the Generic Guidelines. L
! These differences and the corresponding justifications were dccumented in l; the Generic Plant Comparison which is available on site.
- An ERG Data Package was developed for each ERG to identify the plant specific data and information incorporated into the ERG. Procedural ,
! differences between the Generic Technical Guidelines and the ERGS were I identified and the reasons for the differences were documented in the ERG l Data Packages. [
Using the Generic Techr.ical Guidelines, WOG Background Documentation, and [
ERG Data Packages, a function and task analysis was performed on each ERG i to ensure that the Generic Technical Guidelines were adequately ;
4 translated into plant specific ERGS. Each step of the ERG was checked ;
{ using a Task Analysis Worksheet.
The Task Analysis Worksheets were divided into two specific areas, i.e., ;
1 instrumentation needs and control needs. These needs were verified by l
- comparison to the available control room inventory. This verification L
- was accomplished by perfonning walk-throughs with each ERG. During the r walk-throughs, the following information was obtained from the exitting !
1 control room inventory (at that point in time, the control boards already l had been mod'fied by the DCRDR HED corrective actions),
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{ for each required instrument, l
t o ID number l
! o Units '
- o Scale range l I
1 o Scale range increments o Tolerance j o Qualifications (e.g., post-accident)
] For each required control.
'I o 10 number o Control positions available to the operator 4
o Control indications availabie to the operator 3
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[ t j Utilizing this information, the instruments and controls located on the main control boards were reviewed to determine if they met the required i
features as specified in the WOG Background Documentation and ERG Data I Packages. The following criterla were used in making this determination: !
] a. Could the indicator display the required parameter indication?
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- b. Could the indication be read without excessive estimation between {
increment markings? y l c. Could the indicator meet all of the specific requirements listed in i the WOG Background Documentation? i
- d. Can the control perfonn the required function (e.g., open, close, throttle)? ;
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If the above criteria were not met, then the reviewing engineer would !
determine if a design modification should be initiated or whether an !
i alternate instrument and/or co.itrol replacement could be used.
Fich indication and control used in the Comanche Peak ERGS has been ;
j subjected to the above function and task analysis process. All revisions l
- to the ERGS undergo the same evaluation process. An example of the above l
! process has been submitted to the NRC for review [9]. Complete j documentation is available on site.
a j Operations Procedure No. ODA-204 also required verification that, after l
- implementation of the DCROR-related design changes, the ERGS could be !
q followed by the operators on the control boards without confusion, delays j
, or errors. Checklists were provided for the verification of the !
j controls, equipment, indications, designations, units and component i j operation, as identified in each ERG. The verification was accomplished i
I by operators and operations engineers utilizing simulator exercises, control room walk-through/ talk-throughs or desk top reviews, as !
j applicable.
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i i 5.0 VERIFICATION OF DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS
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l The NRC audit perfonned during July 30 - August 3,1984[5] identified l 1 These concerns concerns which were also documented in SSER-6 [6]. l 1
related, in part, to the ongoing human factors review and continuation of
) the DCRDR program during plant operation. The verification process, which assures that design improvements provide the necessary corrections
! and do not introduce new HEDs, was stated to be an informal process at j the time of the audit. The NRC found the informal program acceptable but ir.dituted it should be proceduralized to assure that documuttation and
- program requiraments were met. In respense, TV Electric developed and j issued ODA-109, "Human Engineering Review".
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ODA-109 also proceduralizes the process used to review design t modifications for human factors principles as well as to review concerns !
and recommendations Design Modifications (oms)are provided reviewed bytoOperations and other)etween assure consistency de)artments.
existing
. documentation and the control board layout in order to identify areas !
j which may affect the DCRDR design or NUREG-0700 guidelines. Any l deviation from these guidelines requires a HED to be written, evaluated, !
{ and resolved. l T Logbooks are used to document concerns and recommendations from the ;
Operations, Training, Simulator, and Engineering organizations. These :
logbooks assign a particular number 7to each entry. Each entry provides !
details and documentation to establish a basis for each concern and t review. Each entry is tracked on a status list u1til closure. 00A-109 !
also provides the forms to be used in documenting the DN HED Post- (
1 Resolution Surveys and Routine Surveys. These surveys are performed in t
- situations which require additional verification data. The surveys can i address specific areas or more general topics within Operations. !
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1 Examples of the areas of concern for which operators have supplied input
- include:
0 i o Engraved label changes l o Escutcheon changes
) o Mimic changes 3 o Power supply tag changes (
o Annunciator working changes L 1 o 09erator aids i j o 0'erations p terminology changes !
j o Programmatic improvement recommendations !
l The operators are trained, through the operator training programs, in I human factors engineering principles as they apply to Comanche Peak. l l 6.0 DETAILS OF ONG0ING HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING PROGRAM I 1 i i The objective of the program is to define and implement a plan of action !
j that will apply human factors principles to maintain and improve the :
j control room design and enhance operator effectiveness throughout the !
i life of the plant. The elements of the DCRDR'and NUREG-0700 guidelines l l are basic to the program, as outlined below. l 1
6.1 Concern Identification
- At the present time, Operations Engineering evaluates control room l i
concerns reported by the operators and reviens design modifications i
! to the control boards. Nuclear Engineering and Operations l i Procedure NE0 5.13, "Human Factors Engineering Program", is in the i final review process and will provide a more comprehensive program !
! fo.' identifying human factors concerns from the simulator, control t i room, and design process. Operators, simulator it.structors, and j engineers are encouraged to report characteristics of the control i
! room instrumentation, procedures, and ihysical layouts that may I i' improve the control room interface wit, the operators.
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6.2 Assessment Procedure NE0 5.13 directs Comanche Peak Engineering (CPE) to administer a multidiscipline team for the assessment of the reported HFE concerns. The following factors are evaluated in the assessment process for all concerns before selection of the design improvements for those which require corrective action:
o Safety significance o History of associated error '
o Potential for error o Likelihood of recovery from error '
o Conse pence of error o Technic;l Specification impact o Operator performance o Interactions / cumulative effects o Economics 6.3 Function and Task Analysis Procedure NE0 5.13, requires the multidiscipline team to review design changes to determine if a function and task analysis would
'; be beneficial. A function and task analysis will be performed for modifications which affect emergency operating procedures to assure that information and control requirements are satisfied as i described in section 4.0 of this Supplement. l
- 6.4 Implementation and Verification Priorities for the improvements will be prcposed to management by i
the HFE multidiscipline team. Enhancements such as paint, labels, and tape improvements will be implemented expeditiously in the simulator and control room. Feedback from use of the simulator and I from the control room operators will supplement the results of surveys performed by the team to verify that design modifications ;
j provide the necessary corrections and do not introduce new HEDs. ~
6.5 O_esign In accordance with procedure ECE 5.09-01, "Design Verification and -
Interdiscipline Review," design changes that affect the electrical operation, mechanica' layout or environment of the main control ,
boards are reviewed by the Human Factors Engineer. The Human L factors Engineer assures that the conceptual layout, labels, i scales, coding, display and centrol saintion confonn to accepted i
human factors principles. l Qualification requirements for the position of Human Factors i
Engineer will be developed af ter review of Section 2.1.2.1 of Appendix A to Standard Review Plan 18.1 (10), and will be available on site.
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6.6 Documentation 6.6.1 Guidelines Technical procedure EEE 5.01-11, "Human factors Engineering Guidelines," provides conceptual and detailed design criteria for modifications to assure that main control board changes are consistent with the human factors principles established by the DCROR.
6.6.2 Drawings At the present time, Computer Aloed Design (CAD) detail drawings are being developed to show "as-built" hierarchical labeling, demarcation, mimic, layout, coding and instrument types. These detailed drawings will aid in the verification of improvements, design concepts, training, simulation, and configuration management.
6.6.3 Labels The controlled listing, ECE-El-2975, "Unit 1 Main Control Board Engraving List," identifies component labels, nameplates and electrical bus tags for main control board devices. This document aids in assuring the consistent use of acronyms and abbreviations in procedures, controls, displays, and alarms. The unique designation of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 instrumentation is also identified.
6.6.4 Standards Attachment 8.B of Procedure No. 00A-207, "The Dictionary of Abbreviations and Acronyms," will be maintained and
' updated, as ap)11 cable, for use in the preparation of procedures, la)els and annunciators.
6.7 Ongoing HFE Activities 6.7.1 Safety Parameter Display System (SPOS) Survey The SPOS was installed in the control room subsequent to the original DCROR. As part of the ongoing HFE Program, a review of the SPOS was performed.
A checklist developed from review of Section 18.? of NUPEG-0800[11], as well as from NUREG-0835 [12), and NUREG-0700 was used by an independent human factors specialist to survey the human factors suitability of the SPOS for Comanche Peak Unit 1. A total of 30 human erjineering concerns (HECs) were identified and documented.
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These HECs were reviewed and assessed by a HFE ,
- multidiscipline team comprised of a Human Factors Engineer, !
. Operations Engineer, Computer Systems Engineer, and ,
l Training Specialist. HECs that were assessed to have a
- safety, operational or technical impact on plant '
performance were classified as human engineering l
- discrepancies (HEDs) and incorporated into design changes !
i for implementation. Verification will be accomplished as !
part of the ongoing HFE program. !
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. Documented results of this survey are available on site.
6.7.2 Control Room Work Center Review I I
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A human factors review of the Comanche Peak Units 1 and 2 ,
control room work center mock-up was conducted during the 4
week of January 18, 1988 by an independent human factors :
s3ecialist. The objective of the review was to evaluate
- tie work center for the following
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- o General layout !
i o Anthropometric dimensions ;
I o Document organization and accessibility i i o Traffic flow a ,
The rusulting eight recommendations were incorporv ed into j the final design to improve the control room intertste with '
{ the operators. ;
Documented results of this survey are available on site. l
- 6.7.3 Unit 2 Contrcl Room Survey !
i j The original DCRDR identified the methodology for l, conducting the Unit 2 DCRDR as: l i
"Compare Unit 2 with Unit 1 to assess the design differences".
t in conjunction with perfurming this comaarison, a survey of -
Unit 2 wss conducted by an independent iuman factors
} specialist. The purpose of this survey was to identify any I HEDs that developed either as a result of implementing l l improvements or from the experience gained by operator;. on i
watch or while undergoing simulator training, l
i All 265 HEDs which required corrective action in Unit 1
' were surveyed in Unit 2. A total of 153 of these HEDs have been corrected in Unit 2 as of the date of preparation of l this Supplement; the remaining 112 HEDs require additional j corrective action. By combining HEDs of similar nature,
- '5e number of HEDs in Unit 2 which require corrective
, action to resolve design differences has been reduced to j G8.
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In addicion, based on a series of unstructured operator e
interviews, 19 new HEDs were identified. These 19 HEDs will be reviewed and assessed on the basis of safety ,
significance, as well as operational and technical impact '
cn plant performance. Any of these new Unit 2 HEDs that also apply to Unit I will be documented and required [
improvenents will be implemented as part of the ongoing '
Unit 1 HFE program.
- The results of this survey have been documented and are available on site.
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LIST OF REFERENCES
- 1. D.G. Eisenhut (NRC), "Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 Requirements for Emergency Response Capability," Generic Letter 82-33, dated December 17, 1982.
la. US n.'C, "Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews," NUREG-0700, dated September, 1981,
- 2. R.J. Gary, "Transmittal of the Human Factors Control Room Design Review Final Report of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station," letter (T7'-3588) dated December 15, 1982.
- 3. R.J. Gary, "Transmittal of Supplement 1 to the Human Factors Control Room Design Review Final Report," letter (TXX-4129) dated March 8,1984.
- 4. H.C. Schmidt "Transmittal of Supplement 2 to the Human Factors Control Room Design Review Final Report," letter (TXX-4207) dated June 24, 1984,
- 5. B.J. Youngblood (NRC), "Results of NRC Staff Pre-Licensing Audit of Control Room Design for Comanche Peak Steam Station Electric Station (Units 1 and 2)," letter to M.D. Spence, dated August 27, 1984.
- 6. US NRC, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2," NUREG-0737, Supplement No.
6, dated November, 1984.
- 7. D.R. Hunter (NRC), inspection Report 445/84-45, dated March 21, 1985.
- 8. R.P. Denise (NRC), inspection Report 445/85-08, dated September 18, 1985.
- 9. W.G. Cot'nsil, "THI Action Items I.C.1 and I.D.1, Emergency Response Guideline Task Analysis," letter (TXX-4641) dated December 16, 1985.
- 10. US NRC, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0800, dated July, 1981; Appendix A to SRP 18.1, dated Septernber,1984,
- 11. US NRC, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reportc for Nuclear Poner Plants," NUREG-0800, dated July, 1981; SRP 18.2, dated November, 1984,
- 12. US NRC, "Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for Safety Parameter Display System," NUREG-0835, dated October, 1981.
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l APPEtIDIX A STATUS OF CATEGORY 3 hut 1Att EllGillEERING OlSCREPANCIES 1
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HED CONTROL N0. 151 A. HE0 DESCRIPTION Control switch indicating lights, for controls with three indicating lights, are not !abeled.
B. GUIDELINE REFERENCE NUREG-0700: 6.6.1.1.
C. LOCATION
,1 CB-01 D. POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES ;
! 1. Loss of instrument air.
- 2. Unit shutdswn.
E. ASSESSMENT PROCESS q 1. The functional meaning of indicator lights was determined. ,
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- 2. Potential for error.
F. BACKFIT None.
] JUSTIFICATION:
- 1. Control switch indicating lights, for control with three indicating l lights, conform to the following standard convention used throughout j the main control boards: '
! Red pump running, breaker closed pump stopped, breaker open 4
Green !
Amber: mismatch j White: trip
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This standard is well k.1own to the operators, thus making labeling I unnecessary.
- 2. CONSISTENT DESIGN }
Standard color coding guideline are contained in CPE Technical Procedure EEE 5.01-11.
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l HED CONTROL NO. 183 A. HED DESCRIPTION The color coding of pushbuttons on the miniature turbine control panel and on the process controllers is indiscriminant.
B. GUIDELINE REFERENCE NUREG-0700: 6.4.2.2.f.
C. LOCATION ;
CB-01, CB 04, CB-05, CB-06, CB-08 CB-09, CB-10, CV-01, and CV 03.
D.
POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
- 1. Delay in identification of proper control function.
- 2. Incorrect control function.
E. ASSESSMENT PROCESS The applicability of various types of visual enhancements was evaluated.
P F. BACKFIT 1
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Process controller pushbuttons have been color coded: '
Amber: Manual White. Auto Red: Increase Output .
Green: Decrease Output l 2.
Thisnot are serves to reduce the number of distracting red indications that warnings. ;
- 3. ,
The pushbutton color coding on the unique miniature turbine control panel is clear and unambiguous.
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HED CONTPOL NO. 200 A. HED DESCRIPTION Absence of engineering units on process controller meter labels.
B. GUIDELINE REFERENCE NUREG-0700: 6.5.1.1.b.
C. LOCATION CB-09 and CB-10.
D. POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES None.
E. ASSESSMENT PROCESS
- 1. Analyze feasibility of providing engineering units.
- 2. Analyze backfit alternatives.
F. BACKFIT None.
JUSTIFICATION:
Prtcess controllers do not utilize quantitative units on output meter scales. The output meter indications have no direct correlation to their process parameters. The display indicator for each process loop is '
calebrated in suitable engineering units. The output meter scales indicate 0-100's of controller output. All process controllers have corresponding display indicators with engineering units for process 4
feedback. No additional labels are needed. '
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O HED CONTROL NO. 342 A. HED DESCRIPTION Human factors improvements have not been made to the NIS Panel, the Meteorological Panel, the In Core Instrumentation Panel, or Recorder Panel. >
B. GUIDELINE REFERENCE i
NUREG-0700: 6.1.2 5.
C. LOCATION ,
NIS Panel, Meteorological Par 01, In Core Instrumentation Panel, Recorder j Panel. ,
l D. POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES [
l 1. Inability to operate controls.
- 2. Failure to read displays properly. !
l 3. Failure to locate components.
E. ASSESSMENT PROCESS t
)
] Determine operator interface requirements at these panels, l F. BACKFIT i i None, other than enhancements. '
JUSTIFICATION:
Generic enhancements such as labeling, coding and demarcation have been :
1 implemented for the recorder and meteorolog' al panels. Only minor HFE l
) changes we n made on the NIS and in Core Inst mentation Panels due to i the very limited opei m, i::br f,v.u . Major design changes are being ;
made to the meteorological panel and will be reviewed for HFE conceins by ;
i the Human Factors Engineer during the normal design process, in light of both the previous and ongoing activities, no additional major HFE backfit l
is needed. 1 I
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HED CONTROL N0. 354 A. HE0 OESCRIPTION The effective temperature at the Hot Shutdown Panel (HSP) was not maintained within the comfort range.
- 8. GUIDELINE REFERENCE i NUREG-0700: 6.1.5.1.a a
C. 1.0 CAT 10N Hot Shutdown Panel
, D. POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES I l j Operator Stress.
I E.
, ASSESSMENT PROCESS Environmental survey l F. BACKFIT 1 None
) JUSTlFICATION:
- 1. The Hot Shutdowr Panel is an emergency operating station which is not l normally manned. As such, it is not nacessary to maintain the !
J environment of the Hot Shutdown Panel within the comfort zone
, required for the control room. Testing performed thus far indicates ,
t that the ambient temperature should be maintained at a level that !
will allow the operator to adequately perform his remote shutdonn '
I tasks.
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- 2. No new surveys have been made. '
Additional monitorino of the Hot Shutdown Panel environmental area will be performed under operating conditions and evaluated at that time, t
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