ML20140D827
| ML20140D827 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 01/16/1986 |
| From: | Constable G, Ireland R, Clay Johnson, Renee Taylor, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140D802 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-85-19, 50-499-85-17, NUDOCS 8602030121 | |
| Download: ML20140D827 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1985019
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APPENDIX B
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/85-19
Construction Permits:
50-499/85-17
Dockets:
50-498
50-499
Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
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P. O. Box 1700
>
Houston, Texas 77001
Facility Name: . South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas
Inspection Conducted:
September 30 - November 22, 1985
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Inspectors:
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C..E. Johnson, Senio0 Resident Inspector
Date
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Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch
(paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, & 7)
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R. G. Taylor, Project Inspector, Project
Date
Secti6n C, Reactor Projects Branch
-(paragraph 3)
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I-/C hY,
,/p D. Tomlin9en, Reactor Inspector,
Date
Engineering Section, Reactor Safety
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Branch
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(paragra JL_4)
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Approved:
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G. L.TUnstaMef-Chief, Project Section C
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Reactor Projects Branch
R. E. Ireland, Chipf, Engineering Section
Date
Reactor Safety Branch
0602030121 860129
ADOCK 05000490
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted September 30 through November 22, 1985 (Report 50-498/
85-19;50-499/85-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on
previous inspection findings, allegation follow-up, pipe support records
review, and reactor coolant pressure boundary piping.
The inspection involved
323 inspection-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the scope of this inspection, one violation was identified and
is discussed in paragraph 5.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
- S. Head, Lead Project Compliance Engineer
- K. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer
R. R. Hernandez, Supervisor, Project Compliance
S. Hubbard, QA Welding Engineer
- T. Jordan, Project QA Manager
- I.
L. Guthrie, Project Manager, Safeteam
- W. N. Phillips, Project Manager, Safeteam (outgoing)
- G. B. Rodgers, Construction Manager
Other Personnel
Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
- R. W. Miller, Deputy PQAM
- R. D. Bryan, Construction Manager
- R. H. Medina, Lead QAE
- C. W. Humes, Site Project Engineer
Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)
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J. Johnson, Lead Documentation Specialist (Welding)
D. Sprouse, QC Supervisor (Welding)
F. Miller, Welding Superintendent
- A. M. Cutrona, QA Kanager
- W. J. Taylor, Site Manager
C. Hahn, Welding Engineer
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on
November 26, 1985.
2.
Site Tour
The NRC inspector made several site tours through Unit 1 and 2 facilities
in order to observe safety-related work in process, the condition of
safety-related equipment, and general plant status.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-498/499 83-11-03) Filing of Procedurally
Required Logs:
This item concerns a finding that accountability type logs are required
to be maintained by some procedures.
The NRC-inspector had noted that
the procedures were deficient in clear instructions on filing the logs.
The applicable procedure, QCP-17.1, Revision 2, " Quality Assurance
Records," has been changed to include the statement: "5.8 All logs
maintained in accordance with QC procedures shall be transferred to the
Ebasco records group, upon completion of all activities relative to the
scope of these logs, for further processing in accordance with their
procedures." This item is considered closed.
(Closed) Deviation (50-498/77-12; 50-499/77-07) Design Review
Committee:
This finding noted that the licensee's Design Review Committee was not
performing the functions described in the PSAR. The licensee indicated his
intent to clarify the responsibilities of the above committee upon
issuance of the FSAR.
The FSAR was submitted in July 1978 and Section
17.1 was revised as indicated by the licensee in his response to the
deviation.
The NRC directed deletion of Section 17.1 via question 421.1
on October 9, 1978, and further directed that revisions to the QA program
for design and construction be submitted independent of the FSAR for
review.
The licensee responded to this direction by submittal of a
separate docketed Quality Assurance Program Description in 1980.
This
document no longer discussed the " Design Review Committee" with the
functions of the committee vested in other organizations.
This item is
considered closed.
(Closed) Violation (50-498/79-19-50; 50-499/79-19-50) Failure by
Brown & Root to Perform Supplemental Audits:
This item is considered closed since Brown & Root has had no involvement
in the South Texas Project that would require supplemental audits since
early 1980.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-498/83-01-04) Storage Requirements and
Equipment Identification:
The NRC inspector, by review of pertinent documents and interviews with
involved personnel determined that the equipment involved was two large
nonsafety 15kv switchgear cabinets rather than safety-related motor
control centers.
Procurement of nonsafety equipment under a safety-related
specification is acceptable; however, safety-related storage requirements
are not applicable to nonsafety equipment. This item is considered closed.
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (8315-06) Nonconformance Report (NCR) Tags Not
Completed
During a periodic spot-check of NCR tags in the field and in the warehouse
areas, the NRC inspector observed that the NCR number block on the form .
sometimes contained information other than the identifying NCR number.
In
some cases the word "Pending" or "N/A" had been entered.
In other cases
the~NCR number was entered but no further information describing the
nonconforming condition.
It was explained to the NRC inspector that this
practice was permitted by governing procedures.
The NRC inspector
questioned this as an acceptable practice and stated that this would be
considered an unresolved item pending further review.
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The NRC inspector reviewed the original QCP 15.1, and early revisions,
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noting that the application of the NRC tag was not clearly defined.
The
NCR tags were allowed to be placed on the material, prior to issuance of
the NCR, to serve as notification that a nonconformance had been noted.
QCP 15.1, Revision 4, dated January 26, 1984, clarified this by stating
that the NCR tag will be attached only after validation of the NCR and the
entering of the number on the tag.
This item is closed.
4.
Follow-up on Allegations
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(Closed) Allegation 4-84-A-092 (Inappropriate Weld Rods)
On September 3, 1985, Region IV received a phone call from an individual
with concerns about the site purchase of a certain type of welding filler
material.
His specific concerns were:
a.
The type 7018 weld rods are 2 inches shorter than the standard 14"
rods he is use to using,
b.
Welders cannot achieve a 2" weld length in the overhead position with
these shorter rods,
c.
The flux coating on the rod is chipped and cracked, causing excessive
weld spatter and weld porosity.
d.
The filler material was produced in another country and shipped to
Houston for sale.
At one time he mentioned Mexico and later the
Philippine Islands as the point of production.
On September 6, 1985, the same individual expressed these concerns to the
South Texas Safeteam and forwarded a copy of his letter to the Region IV
office.
On September 10, 1985, Region IV contacted this individual by
telephone and confirmed these concerns.
The NRC inspector ascertained that the filler material was purchased
by Bechtel from Oerlikon Welding Industries located in Houston,
This-is a new supplier for STP.
When questioned by the NRC
inspector, the Bechtel purchasing agent stated that the reasons for
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changing suppliers were economics, time, and risk of handling damage.
It
was felt that the lower initial cost of the filler material, the shorter
turn-around time between order and delivery, and the elimination of
potential handling damage because of local delivery were considered
adequate justification for changing suppliers.
Prior to issuance of the purchase order, Bechtel conducted an in-depth
audit of the Oerlikon manufacturing facility.
Oerlikon was added to the
approved vendors list based upon the satisfactory results of this audit,
and a purchase order was issued for 60,000 pounds of type 7018 filler
material with a 3/32" diameter.
A partial shipment was received on
July 12, 1985, and the first issue from the warehouse to field activities
was on August 4, 1985.
Several days later, welding supervisors, QC
inspectors, and the Ebasco welding engineering office began receiving
similar complaints about this filler material.
Virtually all of the
complaints were about excessive weld spatter, weld porosity, broken flux
coatings, and uneven consumption rate of the weld rod.
Ebasco welding engineering performed a visual inspection of the flux
coating on rod in the field and found that a significant percentage had
cracked and broken areas and that the flux was not of uniform thickness
along the length of the rods.
The flux coating on arc welding electrodes
serves three functions:
arc stabilization, prevention of oxidation of the
molten weld puddle, and to provide additives to the weld to produce the
desired chemical and physical properties.
The flux coating anomalies
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mentioned above would probably result in weld spatter, weld porosity,
unstable arc characteristics, and erratic rod consumption.
Several sealed
containers were opened in the warehouse and the same conditions were noted.
Although the material certifications and all supporting documentation
indicated that the rod was as ordered, the usage and visual inspection
proved that it was not suitable for the high quality welding required at
a nuclear construction site.
The partial shipment received from Oerlikon
consisted of two different lot numbers.
After opening several more sealed
containers, it was determined that Lot No. 10450 contained flux
discrepancies and that Lot No. 10496 appeared to be acceptable for use.
A representative from Oerliknn visited STP on August 16, 1985, and a
joint inspection of both lots of material was performed by Oerlikon,
Bechtel, and Ebasco.
All agreed that the flux coating was unacceptable and
the remainder of Lot No. 10450 that had been issued for use was retrieved
from the field.
Oerlikon stated that they would retract the unused portion
of the 20,000 pounds of material identified as Lot No. 10450 and replace it
with another lot of material having a higher quality flux coating.
Prior
to issuing any filler material bearing the second lot number (10496),
Ebasco conducted several weldability tests at the Weld Qualification Center
onsite.
Three welding supervisors were instructed to weld for several
hours each using Oerlikon Lot No. 10496 material in the flat, vertical, and
overhead positions and make independent evaluations of the rod.
Each of
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the three submitted signed statements to the Ebasco welding engineer
stating that they felt the filler material and flux coatings were adequate
to produce quality welds.
Two of these welds were selected at random and
subjected to radiographic inspection.
Both were found to be acceptable.
Based upon this information, Lot No. 10496 was issued for use by field
activities.
When the remainder of Lot No. 10450 was withdrawn from the field issue
stations, 18,960 pounds were recovered leaving 1,040 pounds unrecovered.
It is not certain how much of this was used on safety-related or
nonsafety-related welding.
As a minimum, visual inspection is performed
on all safety-related welds and the excessive weld spatter and weld
porosity would be cause for rejection of any weld exhibiting these
conditions.
Because of the inspections performed, any rejectable anoma)ies
resulting from the use of this filler material would be subjected to
rework or removal of the weld.
It was noted by the NRC inspector and the
others who examined Lot No. 10450 that not every piece of welding rod had
an inadequate flux coating.
Although most of the rods were found to be
acceptable, the deficient ones were found in sufficient quantity to
question the acceptability of the entire lot.
Because of inspections
performed on all safety related welding and the sporadic occurrence of
flux coating defects, it has been determined that use of the 1,040 pounds
of material will have virtually no safety significance.
After Region IV was contacted by the concerned individual, an additional
weldability test was conducted at the request of the NRC inspector.
Ebasco
selected a certified welder who reported to the Welder Qualification
Center on September 17, 1985.
This test was observed by the NRC inspector
and cognizant representatives of HL&P and Ebasco.
The welder, operating
in the vertical position, stated that he had no difficulty in making
several welds.
The observers noted that the weld rod produced a very
stable arc, smooth weld contour, no undercutting, and only minimal weld
spatter.
No surface porosity was noted in the final weld surfaces.
The alleger stated, in concern 1, that the Oerlikon filler material
is 2" shorter than those produced by other manufacturers.
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Code, AWS standards, and other industry-accepted standards contain no
requirements for the length of welding rods.
Although the traditional
length for 3/32" rod is 14", Oerlikon has opted to produce theirs in 12"
lengths.
The rationale for this is that 3/32" rod is commonly used for
tack welding and other relatively small applications.
The shorter rod
length should result in shorter rod stubs being scrapped and a higher
percentage of each rod being used to produce welds.
This was seen as
being a monetary advantage to the project.
Although this concern was substantiated, it violates no site or industry
standard.
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The alleger stated, in concern 2, that he was unable to produce a 2" length
of weld in the overhead position with this shorter length rod.
The alleger
is a welder involved in the welding of steel Unistrut shapes for electrical
supports.
This is done with " stitch" of " chain" welding which consists of
a series of intermittent welds of a specified length separated by unwelded
areas of a specified length.
In this case the required weld length is 2".
None of the three supervisors or the welder mentioned above voiced this
concern.
Although the requirement governing his welding states that each
weld shall be 2" long, there is no stipulation that this be accomplished
using a single electrode.
This allegation could not be substantiated.
It violates no site or
industry standard.
The alleger stated, in concern 3, that the f ax coating on the Oerlikon
rod is chipped and cracked, causing excessive weld spatter and weld
porosity.
As stated above, Lot No. 10450 of Oerlikon 3/32" filler material
was found to have a flux coating of less than acceptable quality.
Lot
No. 10496, presently being used in the field, was found to be acceptable by
visual inspectiAn and the weldability tests performed.
Although this allegation was substantiated, it has since been corrected.
This allegation has little or no safety significance as all safety-related
welds are inspected and the conditions, as stated, would be cause for
rejection of the weld.
The alleger stated, in concern 4, that the filler material was produced in
a foreign country and shipped to Houston for sale. As a result of this
concern, the NRC inspector reviewed the purchase order requirements and
receiving inspection documentation for this material.
Clause 14 of this
purchase order clearly states that the material shall be of domestic
origin.
The flux coating applied to the surface of welding rod is a
combination of elements formulated to produce the desired weld
characteristics.
This combination should produce a stable welding arc,
smooth deposition rate, uniform finished surface and, most importantly,
the required chemical and physical properties in the weld metal.
The
combination of elements used by various manufacturers is the only real
difference between filler materials of the same type produced by different
manufacturers.
The chemical composition of the various fluxes are
considered to be trade secrets and highly proprietary.
The flux is mixed
and applied to domestic wire in the Oerlikon Houston facility and the
finished product is, therefore, considered to be of domestic origin and in
compliance with clause 14 of the purchase order.
This allegation could not be substantiated.
As stated above, concerns 2 and 4 could not be substantiated.
Concern 1,
although substantiated, violated no site or industry standard and has no
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safety significance.
Concern 3, although substantiated, was corrected
prior to the alleger notifying Region IV of his concerns.
Because of this
prompt retrieval of deficient material and the inspections performed on
safety-related welds, this item is deemed to have no safety significance.
Based on the above findings, Allegation 4-85-A-092 is closed.
(Closed) Allegation 4-85-A-080 (Alleged Mismanagement of Safeteam)
On July 16, 1985, an individual telephoned Region IV and presented a
general allegation about mismanagement of the South Texas Project Safeteam.
The individual stated that a letter with specific information and selected
documents would be forthcoming.
This has not been received.
Several
unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the individual by telephone and
on August 1, 1985, an unacknowledged certified letter was sent by Region IV
to the address provided by the individual.
The NRC inspector also made
seven unsuccessful attempts at telephone contact between October 1 and 4,
1985.
Because the individual identified himself as a former Safeteam
investigator at STP, the NRC inspector contacted the Safeteam and
learned that the same allegations had been received by them several
months prior to the NRC notification.
In an effort to avoid any
appearance of a biased self-investigation, the Safeteam engaged the
services of an experienced consultant organization to conduct an
independent third party evaluation of these allegations.
The final
report of this investigation, on file with the Safeteam, was found to
be comprehensive and impartial.
The independent investigation found
that the allegations of Safeteam mismanagement could not be substantiated
and that "the cause of the concerns was the disgruntlement of the
terminated Safeteam investigator and his desire to discredit the safeteam
investigator coordinator."
The NRC inspector reviewed the personnel records of the individual
and noted that he had received a formal notification on February 13,
1985, that his job performance was less that satisfactory.
This
notification and several non-job related incidents resulted in his
dismissal on April 1, 1985.
During his termination interview he was
given an addressed and prestamped " concern form" on which he
originally stated his allegations of mismanagement.
The Safeteam, in
an effort to gain more information, unsuccessfully attempted to
contact the individual by mail on April 23, July 25, August 1, and
September 6, 1985.
In addition, the Safeteam attempted, via
certified mail, to contact the individual on September 5, 1985.
The
NRC inspector, as stated, also attempted to contact the individual by
telephone on several occasicns, all unsuccessful.
In addition to reviewing the personnel records for this individual,
the NRC inspector reviewed the independent third party investigation
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report of these allegations. The report addressed each of the specific
concerns in detail and drew conclusions for each from the information
gathered. The investigation appears to have been conducted in a thorough
and professional manner.
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Based upon the NRC review of the third-party investigation and the
inability of the NRC and the Safeteam to reestablish contact with this
individual, Allegation 4-85-A-080 is closed.
5.
Pipe Supports Records Review
a.
Records Review
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The NRC inspector reviewed 15 pipe support traveler packages in the
FiMS vault. During this review of pipe support records, the NRC
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inspector observed several discrepancies.
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(1) Some FMIRs for some of the supports listed welders who appeared
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to have performed work on the support but were not identified on
the MPDC.
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(2) Some FMIR material reference numbers (heat numbers) were not
documented on the MPDC as required by procedure,
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By procedure it is not required to maintain FMIRs in the records,
however, it is required by QCP-9.1 for the QC supervisor to assure,
during final review, that the WPS, welder ID, and material reference
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number, recorded on the FMIRs contained in the weld package, are also
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documented on the MPDC. These discrepancies appear to be in
violation of procedure QCP-9.1.
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The records reviewed by the NRC inspector indicated a procedural
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problem and not a hardware problem, since all required information
had been retained but not fully transferred from record to record.
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Documents Reviewed
EW-1129-HL5003
EW-1114-HL5007
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EW-1329-HL5003
EW-1229-HL5003
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EW-1114-HL5001
EU-1330-HL5003
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EW-1107-HL5003
EW-1229-HL5005
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EW-1114-HL5003
EW-1107-HL5008
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EW-1113-HL5001
EW-1113-HL5001
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EW-1114-HF5002
EW-1129-HL5001
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EW-1130-HL5002
EW-1130-HL5003
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EW-1114-HF5006
EW-1130-HL5001
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EW-1130-HL5003
EW-1113-HF5006
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EW-1130-HL5006
EW-1113-HF5003
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b.
Welders Qualification and Filler Material Certification
The NRC inspector reviewed approximately 16 welder's qualifications.
All welders listed on the support packages were qualified to make the
The weld filler materials were also found to be certified in
accordance with requirements.
No discrepancies were observed.
6.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping
a.
Procedure /Soecification Review (QA Review)
The NRC inspector reviewed various procedures and specifications
related to the RC loop. Westinghouse has Engineering Specifications
(ES). Design Specifications (DS), General Specifications (GS) and
Process Specifications (PS) governing RC loop activities.
Bechtel has specifications and Ebasco has procedures used in
conjunction with the Bechtel specification.
Ebasco's procedure /
specification are not separate for just the RC loop, they cover all
Class 1, 2, and 3 piping erection and field fabrication.
The FSAR, Table 3.2.A-1 and related site specifications list
applicable Codes and standards that the RC loop is fabricated and
installed to Westinghouse ES, GS, and PS specifications are incor-
parated into the vendors procedures, and also the site specific
procedures by Bechtel and Ebasco.
Appropriate and adequate procedures have been established for the
specific activities below:
Procurement
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Receipt Inspection
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Storage Requirements
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flaterial, Welding, and Installation
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Fabrication
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Cleaning and Pressure Testing
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Coating
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Applicable Codes
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It appears that technical requirements referenced in the FSAR
associated with the reactor coolant pressure boundary piping have been
adequately addressed or referenced in the construction specification,
drawings and procedures.
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Documents reviewed are listed below:
Bechtel/Ebasco
Specification 5A010PS002, Revision 7, " Specification for Piping
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Erection and Field Fabrication," dated August 21, 1985
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Specification 4LO20PS01000, Revision 5, " Specification for
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Fabrication of ASME Section III Piping 2 1/2-inches and
Larger," dated September 6,1985.
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QCP-9.1, Revision 6, " Weld Inspection ASME," dated October 4,
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1985.
G-678864, Revision 4, "RC Centrifugally Cast Pipe, ASME
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Section III, Class 1, Safety Class
I," dated May 16, 1975
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G-678864, Revision 4, "RC Cast Fittings, ASME Section III,
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Class 1, Safety Class 1," dated February 26, 1975
G-678843, Revision 3, "RC Piping Shop Fabrication, ASME III,
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Class 1, Safety Class 1," dated June 24, 1975
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Work Observation,
Units 1 and 2
The NRC inspector observed completed work and partially completed
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work on Unit I RC loop 4 and portions of the pressurizer surge line.
Using the design / installation drawings the NRC inspector verified
general orientation and configuration, components, thermowells and
component parts, serial number and heat code.
By direct observation,
the work on loop 4 RC boundary piping, except welding and NDE
activities, are being accomplished in accordance with licensee
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drawings / procedures.
During the observation of the RC loop, Unit 1,
the NRC inspector noticed some modification taking place.
Discussions
with Westinghouse indicated that the modification is the elimination
of the RTD bypass.
FCN #TGXM 10611A gives details of this modifi-
cation.
Unit 1 RC loop is approximately 97% complete.
The NRC
inspector observed work in Unit 2 RC loop.
The reactor coolant
pump / reactor vessel (cold leg) and the steam generator / reactor vessel
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(hot legs) sections are installed on all four loops.
The steam
generator /RC pump crossover legs are not installed on any of the
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loops in Unit 2 at this time.
Work appears to be in accordance to
plans.
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No discrepancies were observed during the observation.
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Documents reviewed are listed below:
Westinghouse Drawings
1218E54, sht 1 of 2, Revision 3
1218E54, sht 2 of 2, Revision 3
1080211, Revision 8
Q-6214-TGX, sht 10, Revision 6
Q-6214-TGX, sht 11, Revision 5
Q-6214-TGX, sht 12, Revision 5
Q-6214-TGX, sht 13, Revision 5
Q-6214-TGX, sht 14, Revision 5
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Records Review Receipt Inspection
and Material Certification
The NRC inspector reviewed 11 data packages and 5 receiving inspection
reports pertaining to the reactor coolant loop piping and accessories.
Records reviewed confirms that required material characteristics, non-
destructive tests, and other specification requirements were met.
Installation Records
The NRC inspector selected all inspection records generated for Unit
1,
loop 4 RC piping and 4 weld packages from Unit 2, loops 1 and 3.
Only
one weld package for Unit 2 was available for review.
The other
packages were in process or final review.
There were approximately 8 field welds related to RC loop Unit 1,
loop 4.
The NRC inspector reviewed 6 of the weld packages.
The two
welds which were not reviewed, FW 30 and FW 31.
FW 30 was still in
process and FW 31 had an NCR #FP00082 against it.
The remaining
records reviewed indicated that the selected components were installed
as specified, and that the required inspections were performed.
The NRC inspector also reviewed the implementation of Bechtel phase "A"
program pertaining to the RC loop.
This program was initiated by
Bechtel to identify all deficient and open items by Brown & Root,
lhe deficient or outstanding open items were listed on a phase "A"
punch list.
The NRC inspector reviewed the remaining field weld
packages for incomplete or outstanding open items left by Brown &
Root to determine if Bechtel's phase "A" punch list identified these
open items and addressed each.
It was determined by the NRC inspector
that each outstanding open item was addressed on the Bechtel's
phase "A" punch list.
,
- - - - .
_
___ _-_
_
-_
__
_ . -_
..
- __
+
. . ,
.
.
-14-
'
The records adequately documented the current status of nonconformance
reports.
The records were ledgible but were not entirely easily
retrievable.
Overall the records are being properly stored and
identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
'
Documents Reviewed
Data Packages #
Recieving Inspection Records
0005
REC #2455
.
0587
RIR #2464
.
0609
RIR #5527
.
0642
RIR #1027
.
1043
RIR #2391
.
0007
.
1320
.
0015
.
0017
.
0018
.
i
0016
.
!
RC Loop 4 (Unit 1)
RC Loop 1 & 3 (Unit 2)
FW 25, 26, 27, 28
FW 0018
,
.
.
l
& 29
FW 0017 (in process)
.
!
FW 0003 (in process)
.
!
NCR 6018
FW 0004 (in process)
.
.
NCR 3628
.
NCR 3604
.
NCR 3695
.
NCR 0209
.
7.
Exit Interview
l
The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on November 26, 1985, and summarized the scope and
findings of the inspection.
L
l
.
.
.