ML20140D827

Insp Repts 50-498/85-19 & 50-499/85-17 on 850930-1122. Violation Noted:Filler Matl Issue Repts (Fmir) for Some Supports Listed Welders Unidentified on Mpdc & Fmir Matl Ref Numbers Not Documented on Mpdc

ML20140D827
Person / Time
Site:	South Texas
Issue date:	01/16/1986
From:	Constable G, Ireland R, Clay Johnson, Renee Taylor, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140D802	List: IR 05000930/2011022 ML20140D796 ML20140D827
References
50-498-85-19, 50-499-85-17, NUDOCS 8602030121
Download: ML20140D827 (14)

See also: IR 05000498/1985019

Text

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4

- APPENDIX B

~

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-498/85-19 Construction Permits: CPPR-128

50-499/85-17 CPPR-129

Dockets: 50-498

50-499

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Licensee: Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)

P. O. Box 1700

>

Houston, Texas 77001

Facility Name: . South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: South Texas Project, Matagorda County, Texas

. Inspection Conducted: September 30 - November 22, 1985

Inspectors: k a, dr_, e c. m, )-16 - 8 6

, C..E. Johnson, Senio0 Resident Inspector Date

! Project Section C, Reactor Projects Branch

(paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, & 7)

/ ->GW-

R. G. Taylor, Project Inspector, Project Date

Secti6n C, Reactor Projects Branch

-(paragraph 3)

N

, } 'lanblJ I-/C hY,

/p D. Tomlin9en, Reactor Inspector, Date

i Engineering Section, Reactor Safety

, Branch

(paragra JL_4) .

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) g

Approved: / f7

G. L.TUnstaMef-Chief, Project Section C

///F

Date '

[.

Reactor Projects Branch

R. E. Ireland, Chipf, Engineering Section Date

Reactor Safety Branch

0602030121 860129

PDR ADOCK 05000490

G PDR

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted September 30 through November 22, 1985 (Report 50-498/

85-19;50-499/85-17)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee action on

previous inspection findings, allegation follow-up, pipe support records

review, and reactor coolant pressure boundary piping. The inspection involved

323 inspection-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the scope of this inspection, one violation was identified and

is discussed in paragraph 5.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

• S. Head, Lead Project Compliance Engineer

• K. O'Gara, Project Compliance Engineer

R. R. Hernandez, Supervisor, Project Compliance

S. Hubbard, QA Welding Engineer

• T. Jordan, Project QA Manager

• I. L. Guthrie, Project Manager, Safeteam

• W. N. Phillips, Project Manager, Safeteam (outgoing)

• G. B. Rodgers, Construction Manager

Other Personnel

Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

• R. W. Miller, Deputy PQAM

• R. D. Bryan, Construction Manager

• R. H. Medina, Lead QAE

• C. W. Humes, Site Project Engineer

Ebasco Services, Inc. (Ebasco)

I J. Johnson, Lead Documentation Specialist (Welding)

D. Sprouse, QC Supervisor (Welding)

F. Miller, Welding Superintendent

• A. M. Cutrona, QA Kanager

• W. J. Taylor, Site Manager

Westinghouse

C. Hahn, Welding Engineer

• Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on

November 26, 1985.

2. Site Tour **

The NRC inspector made several site tours through Unit 1 and 2 facilities

in order to observe safety-related work in process, the condition of

safety-related equipment, and general plant status.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-498/499 83-11-03) Filing of Procedurally

Required Logs:

This item concerns a finding that accountability type logs are required

to be maintained by some procedures. The NRC-inspector had noted that

the procedures were deficient in clear instructions on filing the logs.

The applicable procedure, QCP-17.1, Revision 2, " Quality Assurance

Records," has been changed to include the statement: "5.8 All logs

maintained in accordance with QC procedures shall be transferred to the

Ebasco records group, upon completion of all activities relative to the

scope of these logs, for further processing in accordance with their

procedures." This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Deviation (50-498/77-12; 50-499/77-07) Design Review

Committee:

This finding noted that the licensee's Design Review Committee was not

performing the functions described in the PSAR. The licensee indicated his

intent to clarify the responsibilities of the above committee upon

issuance of the FSAR. The FSAR was submitted in July 1978 and Section

17.1 was revised as indicated by the licensee in his response to the

deviation. The NRC directed deletion of Section 17.1 via question 421.1

on October 9, 1978, and further directed that revisions to the QA program

for design and construction be submitted independent of the FSAR for

review. The licensee responded to this direction by submittal of a

separate docketed Quality Assurance Program Description in 1980. This

document no longer discussed the " Design Review Committee" with the

functions of the committee vested in other organizations. This item is

considered closed.

(Closed) Violation (50-498/79-19-50; 50-499/79-19-50) Failure by

Brown & Root to Perform Supplemental Audits:

This item is considered closed since Brown & Root has had no involvement

in the South Texas Project that would require supplemental audits since

early 1980.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-498/83-01-04) Storage Requirements and

Equipment Identification:

The NRC inspector, by review of pertinent documents and interviews with

involved personnel determined that the equipment involved was two large

nonsafety 15kv switchgear cabinets rather than safety-related motor

control centers. Procurement of nonsafety equipment under a safety-related

specification is acceptable; however, safety-related storage requirements

are not applicable to nonsafety equipment. This item is considered closed.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item (8315-06) Nonconformance Report (NCR) Tags Not

Completed

During a periodic spot-check of NCR tags in the field and in the warehouse

areas, the NRC inspector observed that the NCR number block on the form .

sometimes contained information other than the identifying NCR number. In

some cases the word "Pending" or "N/A" had been entered. In other cases

the~NCR number was entered but no further information describing the

nonconforming condition. It was explained to the NRC inspector that this

practice was permitted by governing procedures. The NRC inspector

questioned this as an acceptable practice and stated that this would be

,

considered an unresolved item pending further review.

- The NRC inspector reviewed the original QCP 15.1, and early revisions,

noting that the application of the NRC tag was not clearly defined. The

NCR tags were allowed to be placed on the material, prior to issuance of

the NCR, to serve as notification that a nonconformance had been noted.

QCP 15.1, Revision 4, dated January 26, 1984, clarified this by stating

that the NCR tag will be attached only after validation of the NCR and the

entering of the number on the tag. This item is closed.

4. Follow-up on Allegations

'

(Closed) Allegation 4-84-A-092 (Inappropriate Weld Rods)

On September 3, 1985, Region IV received a phone call from an individual

with concerns about the site purchase of a * certain type of welding filler

material. His specific concerns were:

a. The type 7018 weld rods are 2 inches shorter than the standard 14"

rods he is use to using,

b. Welders cannot achieve a 2" weld length in the overhead position with

these shorter rods,

c. The flux coating on the rod is chipped and cracked, causing excessive

weld spatter and weld porosity.

d. The filler material was produced in another country and shipped to

Houston for sale. At one time he mentioned Mexico and later the

Philippine Islands as the point of production.

On September 6, 1985, the same individual expressed these concerns to the

South Texas Safeteam and forwarded a copy of his letter to the Region IV

office. On September 10, 1985, Region IV contacted this individual by

telephone and confirmed these concerns.

The NRC inspector ascertained that the filler material was purchased

by Bechtel from Oerlikon Welding Industries located in Houston,

Texas. This-is a new supplier for STP. When questioned by the NRC

inspector, the Bechtel purchasing agent stated that the reasons for

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changing suppliers were economics, time, and risk of handling damage. It

was felt that the lower initial cost of the filler material, the shorter

turn-around time between order and delivery, and the elimination of

potential handling damage because of local delivery were considered

adequate justification for changing suppliers.

Prior to issuance of the purchase order, Bechtel conducted an in-depth

audit of the Oerlikon manufacturing facility. Oerlikon was added to the

approved vendors list based upon the satisfactory results of this audit,

and a purchase order was issued for 60,000 pounds of type 7018 filler

material with a 3/32" diameter. A partial shipment was received on

July 12, 1985, and the first issue from the warehouse to field activities

was on August 4, 1985. Several days later, welding supervisors, QC

inspectors, and the Ebasco welding engineering office began receiving

similar complaints about this filler material. Virtually all of the

complaints were about excessive weld spatter, weld porosity, broken flux

coatings, and uneven consumption rate of the weld rod.

Ebasco welding engineering performed a visual inspection of the flux

coating on rod in the field and found that a significant percentage had

cracked and broken areas and that the flux was not of uniform thickness

along the length of the rods. The flux coating on arc welding electrodes

serves three functions: arc stabilization, prevention of oxidation of the

molten weld puddle, and to provide additives to the weld to produce the

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desired chemical and physical properties. The flux coating anomalies

mentioned above would probably result in weld spatter, weld porosity,

unstable arc characteristics, and erratic rod consumption. Several sealed

containers were opened in the warehouse and the same conditions were noted.

Although the material certifications and all supporting documentation

indicated that the rod was as ordered, the usage and visual inspection

proved that it was not suitable for the high quality welding required at

a nuclear construction site. The partial shipment received from Oerlikon

consisted of two different lot numbers. After opening several more sealed

containers, it was determined that Lot No. 10450 contained flux

discrepancies and that Lot No. 10496 appeared to be acceptable for use.

A representative from Oerliknn visited STP on August 16, 1985, and a

joint inspection of both lots of material was performed by Oerlikon,

Bechtel, and Ebasco. All agreed that the flux coating was unacceptable and

the remainder of Lot No. 10450 that had been issued for use was retrieved

from the field. Oerlikon stated that they would retract the unused portion

of the 20,000 pounds of material identified as Lot No. 10450 and replace it

with another lot of material having a higher quality flux coating. Prior

to issuing any filler material bearing the second lot number (10496),

Ebasco conducted several weldability tests at the Weld Qualification Center

onsite. Three welding supervisors were instructed to weld for several

hours each using Oerlikon Lot No. 10496 material in the flat, vertical, and

overhead positions and make independent evaluations of the rod. Each of

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the three submitted signed statements to the Ebasco welding engineer

stating that they felt the filler material and flux coatings were adequate

to produce quality welds. Two of these welds were selected at random and

subjected to radiographic inspection. Both were found to be acceptable.

Based upon this information, Lot No. 10496 was issued for use by field

activities.

When the remainder of Lot No. 10450 was withdrawn from the field issue

stations, 18,960 pounds were recovered leaving 1,040 pounds unrecovered.

It is not certain how much of this was used on safety-related or

nonsafety-related welding. As a minimum, visual inspection is performed

on all safety-related welds and the excessive weld spatter and weld

porosity would be cause for rejection of any weld exhibiting these

conditions. Because of the inspections performed, any rejectable anoma)ies

resulting from the use of this filler material would be subjected to

rework or removal of the weld. It was noted by the NRC inspector and the

others who examined Lot No. 10450 that not every piece of welding rod had

an inadequate flux coating. Although most of the rods were found to be

acceptable, the deficient ones were found in sufficient quantity to

question the acceptability of the entire lot. Because of inspections

performed on all safety related welding and the sporadic occurrence of

flux coating defects, it has been determined that use of the 1,040 pounds

of material will have virtually no safety significance.

After Region IV was contacted by the concerned individual, an additional

weldability test was conducted at the request of the NRC inspector. Ebasco

selected a certified welder who reported to the Welder Qualification

Center on September 17, 1985. This test was observed by the NRC inspector

and cognizant representatives of HL&P and Ebasco. The welder, operating

in the vertical position, stated that he had no difficulty in making

several welds. The observers noted that the weld rod produced a very

stable arc, smooth weld contour, no undercutting, and only minimal weld

spatter. No surface porosity was noted in the final weld surfaces.

The alleger stated, in concern 1, that the Oerlikon filler material

is 2" shorter than those produced by other manufacturers. The ASME l

Code, AWS standards, and other industry-accepted standards contain no

requirements for the length of welding rods. Although the traditional

length for 3/32" rod is 14", Oerlikon has opted to produce theirs in 12"

lengths. The rationale for this is that 3/32" rod is commonly used for

tack welding and other relatively small applications. The shorter rod

length should result in shorter rod stubs being scrapped and a higher

percentage of each rod being used to produce welds. This was seen as

being a monetary advantage to the project.

Although this concern was substantiated, it violates no site or industry

standard.

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The alleger stated, in concern 2, that he was unable to produce a 2" length

of weld in the overhead position with this shorter length rod. The alleger

is a welder involved in the welding of steel Unistrut shapes for electrical

supports. This is done with " stitch" of " chain" welding which consists of

a series of intermittent welds of a specified length separated by unwelded

areas of a specified length. In this case the required weld length is 2".

None of the three supervisors or the welder mentioned above voiced this

concern. Although the requirement governing his welding states that each

weld shall be 2" long, there is no stipulation that this be accomplished

using a single electrode.

This allegation could not be substantiated. It violates no site or

industry standard.

The alleger stated, in concern 3, that the f ax coating on the Oerlikon

rod is chipped and cracked, causing excessive weld spatter and weld

porosity. As stated above, Lot No. 10450 of Oerlikon 3/32" filler material

was found to have a flux coating of less than acceptable quality. Lot

No. 10496, presently being used in the field, was found to be acceptable by

visual inspectiAn and the weldability tests performed.

Although this allegation was substantiated, it has since been corrected.

This allegation has little or no safety significance as all safety-related

welds are inspected and the conditions, as stated, would be cause for

rejection of the weld.

The alleger stated, in concern 4, that the filler material was produced in

a foreign country and shipped to Houston for sale. As a result of this

concern, the NRC inspector reviewed the purchase order requirements and

receiving inspection documentation for this material. Clause 14 of this

purchase order clearly states that the material shall be of domestic

origin. The flux coating applied to the surface of welding rod is a

combination of elements formulated to produce the desired weld

characteristics. This combination should produce a stable welding arc,

smooth deposition rate, uniform finished surface and, most importantly,

the required chemical and physical properties in the weld metal. The

combination of elements used by various manufacturers is the only real

difference between filler materials of the same type produced by different

manufacturers. The chemical composition of the various fluxes are

considered to be trade secrets and highly proprietary. The flux is mixed

and applied to domestic wire in the Oerlikon Houston facility and the

finished product is, therefore, considered to be of domestic origin and in

compliance with clause 14 of the purchase order.

This allegation could not be substantiated.

As stated above, concerns 2 and 4 could not be substantiated. Concern 1,

although substantiated, violated no site or industry standard and has no

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safety significance. Concern 3, although substantiated, was corrected

prior to the alleger notifying Region IV of his concerns. Because of this

prompt retrieval of deficient material and the inspections performed on

safety-related welds, this item is deemed to have no safety significance.

Based on the above findings, Allegation 4-85-A-092 is closed.

(Closed) Allegation 4-85-A-080 (Alleged Mismanagement of Safeteam)

On July 16, 1985, an individual telephoned Region IV and presented a

general allegation about mismanagement of the South Texas Project Safeteam.

The individual stated that a letter with specific information and selected

documents would be forthcoming. This has not been received. Several

unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the individual by telephone and

on August 1, 1985, an unacknowledged certified letter was sent by Region IV

to the address provided by the individual. The NRC inspector also made

seven unsuccessful attempts at telephone contact between October 1 and 4,

1985.

Because the individual identified himself as a former Safeteam

investigator at STP, the NRC inspector contacted the Safeteam and

learned that the same allegations had been received by them several

months prior to the NRC notification. In an effort to avoid any

appearance of a biased self-investigation, the Safeteam engaged the

services of an experienced consultant organization to conduct an

independent third party evaluation of these allegations. The final

report of this investigation, on file with the Safeteam, was found to

be comprehensive and impartial. The independent investigation found

that the allegations of Safeteam mismanagement could not be substantiated

and that "the cause of the concerns was the disgruntlement of the

terminated Safeteam investigator and his desire to discredit the safeteam

investigator coordinator."

The NRC inspector reviewed the personnel records of the individual

and noted that he had received a formal notification on February 13,

1985, that his job performance was less that satisfactory. This

notification and several non-job related incidents resulted in his

dismissal on April 1, 1985. During his termination interview he was

given an addressed and prestamped " concern form" on which he

originally stated his allegations of mismanagement. The Safeteam, in

an effort to gain more information, unsuccessfully attempted to

contact the individual by mail on April 23, July 25, August 1, and

September 6, 1985. In addition, the Safeteam attempted, via

certified mail, to contact the individual on September 5, 1985. The

NRC inspector, as stated, also attempted to contact the individual by

telephone on several occasicns, all unsuccessful.

In addition to reviewing the personnel records for this individual,

the NRC inspector reviewed the independent third party investigation

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report of these allegations. The report addressed each of the specific

concerns in detail and drew conclusions for each from the information

gathered. The investigation appears to have been conducted in a thorough

and professional manner.

,

Based upon the NRC review of the third-party investigation and the

inability of the NRC and the Safeteam to reestablish contact with this

individual, Allegation 4-85-A-080 is closed.

5. Pipe Supports Records Review

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a. Records Review

The NRC inspector reviewed 15 pipe support traveler packages in the

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FiMS vault. During this review of pipe support records, the NRC

inspector observed several discrepancies.

j (1) Some FMIRs for some of the supports listed welders who appeared

to have performed work on the support but were not identified on

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the MPDC.

) (2) Some FMIR material reference numbers (heat numbers) were not

documented on the MPDC as required by procedure,

j By procedure it is not required to maintain FMIRs in the records,

however, it is required by QCP-9.1 for the QC supervisor to assure,

during final review, that the WPS, welder ID, and material reference

! number, recorded on the FMIRs contained in the weld package, are also

i documented on the MPDC. These discrepancies appear to be in

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violation of procedure QCP-9.1.

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The records reviewed by the NRC inspector indicated a procedural

i problem and not a hardware problem, since all required information

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had been retained but not fully transferred from record to record.

Documents Reviewed

. EW-1129-HL5003 . EW-1114-HL5007

. EW-1329-HL5003 . EW-1229-HL5003

i . EW-1114-HL5001 . EU-1330-HL5003

! . EW-1107-HL5003 . EW-1229-HL5005

) . EW-1114-HL5003 . EW-1107-HL5008

1 . EW-1113-HL5001 . EW-1113-HL5001

j . EW-1114-HF5002 . EW-1129-HL5001

i . EW-1130-HL5002 . EW-1130-HL5003

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--&-r------p-w- m e w -y -g-ym,ww9-i--**r-WmFPWM-1-W-er'tr-M~wwf*1N T*FP -*-* **- "

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. EW-1114-HF5006 . EW-1130-HL5001

. EW-1130-HL5003 . EW-1113-HF5006

. EW-1130-HL5006 . EW-1113-HF5003

b. Welders Qualification and Filler Material Certification

The NRC inspector reviewed approximately 16 welder's qualifications.

All welders listed on the support packages were qualified to make the

welds. The weld filler materials were also found to be certified in

accordance with requirements.

No discrepancies were observed.

6. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping

a. Procedure /Soecification Review (QA Review)

The NRC inspector reviewed various procedures and specifications

related to the RC loop. Westinghouse has Engineering Specifications

(ES). Design Specifications (DS), General Specifications (GS) and

Process Specifications (PS) governing RC loop activities.

Bechtel has specifications and Ebasco has procedures used in

conjunction with the Bechtel specification. Ebasco's procedure /

specification are not separate for just the RC loop, they cover all

Class 1, 2, and 3 piping erection and field fabrication.

The FSAR, Table 3.2.A-1 and related site specifications list

applicable Codes and standards that the RC loop is fabricated and

installed to Westinghouse ES, GS, and PS specifications are incor-

parated into the vendors procedures, and also the site specific

procedures by Bechtel and Ebasco.

Appropriate and adequate procedures have been established for the

specific activities below:

. Procurement

. Receipt Inspection

. Storage Requirements

. flaterial, Welding, and Installation

. Fabrication

. Cleaning and Pressure Testing

. Coating

. Applicable Codes

It appears that technical requirements referenced in the FSAR

associated with the reactor coolant pressure boundary piping have been

adequately addressed or referenced in the construction specification,

drawings and procedures.

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Documents reviewed are listed below:

Bechtel/Ebasco

. Specification 5A010PS002, Revision 7, " Specification for Piping

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Erection and Field Fabrication," dated August 21, 1985

. Specification 4LO20PS01000, Revision 5, " Specification for

Fabrication of ASME Section III Piping 2 1/2-inches and

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Larger," dated September 6,1985.

.

. QCP-9.1, Revision 6, " Weld Inspection ASME," dated October 4,

1985.

Westinghouse

. G-678864, Revision 4, "RC Centrifugally Cast Pipe, ASME

i Section III, Class 1, Safety Class I," dated May 16, 1975

. G-678864, Revision 4, "RC Cast Fittings, ASME Section III,

Class 1, Safety Class 1," dated February 26, 1975

. G-678843, Revision 3, "RC Piping Shop Fabrication, ASME III,

Class 1, Safety Class 1," dated June 24, 1975

No violations or deviations were identified.

b. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Work Observation,

Units 1 and 2

3

The NRC inspector observed completed work and partially completed

work on Unit I RC loop 4 and portions of the pressurizer surge line.

Using the design / installation drawings the NRC inspector verified

general orientation and configuration, components, thermowells and

component parts, serial number and heat code. By direct observation,

the work on loop 4 RC boundary piping, except welding and NDE

i activities, are being accomplished in accordance with licensee

drawings / procedures. During the observation of the RC loop, Unit 1,

the NRC inspector noticed some modification taking place. Discussions

with Westinghouse indicated that the modification is the elimination

of the RTD bypass. FCN #TGXM 10611A gives details of this modifi-

cation. Unit 1 RC loop is approximately 97% complete. The NRC

inspector observed work in Unit 2 RC loop. The reactor coolant

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pump / reactor vessel (cold leg) and the steam generator / reactor vessel

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(hot legs) sections are installed on all four loops. The steam

generator /RC pump crossover legs are not installed on any of the

! loops in Unit 2 at this time. Work appears to be in accordance to

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plans.

No discrepancies were observed during the observation.

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Documents reviewed are listed below:

Westinghouse Drawings

1218E54, sht 1 of 2, Revision 3

1218E54, sht 2 of 2, Revision 3

1080211, Revision 8

Q-6214-TGX, sht 10, Revision 6

Q-6214-TGX, sht 11, Revision 5

Q-6214-TGX, sht 12, Revision 5

Q-6214-TGX, sht 13, Revision 5

Q-6214-TGX, sht 14, Revision 5

No violations or deviations were identified.

c. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping Records Review Receipt Inspection

and Material Certification

The NRC inspector reviewed 11 data packages and 5 receiving inspection

reports pertaining to the reactor coolant loop piping and accessories.

Records reviewed confirms that required material characteristics, non-

destructive tests, and other specification requirements were met.

Installation Records

The NRC inspector selected all inspection records generated for Unit 1,

loop 4 RC piping and 4 weld packages from Unit 2, loops 1 and 3. Only

one weld package for Unit 2 was available for review. The other

packages were in process or final review.

There were approximately 8 field welds related to RC loop Unit 1,

loop 4. The NRC inspector reviewed 6 of the weld packages. The two

welds which were not reviewed, FW 30 and FW 31. FW 30 was still in

process and FW 31 had an NCR #FP00082 against it. The remaining

records reviewed indicated that the selected components were installed

as specified, and that the required inspections were performed.

The NRC inspector also reviewed the implementation of Bechtel phase "A"

program pertaining to the RC loop. This program was initiated by

Bechtel to identify all deficient and open items by Brown & Root,

lhe deficient or outstanding open items were listed on a phase "A"

punch list. The NRC inspector reviewed the remaining field weld

packages for incomplete or outstanding open items left by Brown &

Root to determine if Bechtel's phase "A" punch list identified these

open items and addressed each. It was determined by the NRC inspector

that each outstanding open item was addressed on the Bechtel's

phase "A" punch list.

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The records adequately documented the current status of nonconformance

reports. The records were ledgible but were not entirely easily

retrievable. Overall the records are being properly stored and

identified.

No violations or deviations were identified.

'

Documents Reviewed

Data Packages # Recieving Inspection Records

. 0005 REC #2455

. 0587 RIR #2464

. 0609 RIR #5527

. 0642 RIR #1027

. 1043 RIR #2391

. 0007

. 1320

. 0015

. 0017

. 0018

i . 0016

! RC Loop 4 (Unit 1) RC Loop 1 & 3 (Unit 2)

, . FW 25, 26, 27, 28 . FW 0018

l & 29 . FW 0017 (in process)

! . FW 0003 (in process)

!

. NCR 6018 . FW 0004 (in process)

. NCR 3628

. NCR 3604

. NCR 3695

. NCR 0209

7. Exit Interview

l The NRC inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) on November 26, 1985, and summarized the scope and

findings of the inspection.

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