ML20138E410
| ML20138E410 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1997 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Sheridan T WATERFORD, CT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138E414 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705020191 | |
| Download: ML20138E410 (41) | |
Text
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l The Honorable Thomas A. Sheridan '
l First Selectman of Waterford 15 Rope Ferry Road
! Waterford Cor.necticut 06385-2886 l
Dear Mr. Sheridan:
l During my meeting with the public, after visiting the Millstone plant on ;
August 6. 1996. I answered a number of questions from the public. In response to your request. I agreed to send you broader written answers that address the questions that were posed to me by the public. In order to be concise and non-repetitive, a single answer was provided where multiple related questions ;
were asked on a similar subject. The questions and answers are enclosed. J l !'
I am sorry the responses to these questions were not provided sooner. The dynamics of ongoing activities regarding Millstone have resulted in frequent revisions in order to provide up-to-date responses to the questions asked.
l Again, I would like to thank you for your assistance in coordinating my meeting with the Jublic and trust that you and your constituents will find this information 1elpful. .
i l Sincerely.
l :
Enclosure:
Questions and Answers -
DISTRIBUTION-
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PNorry JAndersen CNorsworthy i EJordan DMcDonald OPA SCollins/FMiraglia SDembek OCA CPaperiello. NMSS MFairtile I !
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SReynolds. SP0 l l i l DOCUMENT NAME: G:\MCKEE\GT96632.001 *See previous concurrence To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE SPO L:DD* l E SPO-L:LA C:SFPO* lN C:PIPB* lN D:OE* lN D:DRPM* l 0:DSSA lN NAME PMcKee LBerry CHaughney WBorchardt JLieberman BGrimes GHolahan l per telecon Per e-mail I
DATE 01/21/97 02/19/97 09/06/96 09/13/96 09/16/96 09/13/96 09/06/96 0FFICE SPO:D* l OGC* l NRR:D 4 l OCA
- l Etpf) / l OCA l NAME WTravers JMoore SCollins JC W IR- SJackson DATE 02/3/97 01/17/97 02/11/97 02/3/97 03/7#97 03/ /97 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY 02cpa NRC FILE CENTER COPY !
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April 24, 1997 JCallan I j %, ./ EJordan HThompson CHAIRMAN PNorry JBlaha i SCollins, NRR !
PMcKee, NRR JLieberman, OE JMoore, OGC The Honorable Thomas A. Sheridan First Selectman of Waterford CPaperiello, NMSS l j
15 Rope Ferry Road KCry, 0GC l EHalman, ADM Waterford, Connecticut 06385-2886 l PBird, OP- ,
GT96632 l l
Dear Mr. Sheridan:
' ED0 r/f I During my meeting with the public, after visiting the Millstone plant on August 6, 1996, I answered a number of questions from the public. In response '
to your request, I agreed to send you broader written answers that address the c
questions that were posed to me by the public. In order to be concise and non-repetitive, a single answer was provided where multiple related questions were asked on a similar subject. The questions and answers are enclosed. )
1 j
I am sorry the. responses to these questions were not provided m oner. The dynamics of ongoing activities regarding Millstone have resulted in frequent l revisions in order to provide up-to-date responses to the questions asked.
Again, I would like to thank you for your assistance in coordinating my l
meeting with the public and trust that you and your constituents will find l
this information helpful.
l Sincerely, l
Enclosure:
Questions and Answers ,
1 i
Originated by: [PMcKee,NRR]
n y e- r-,- .-. + -- -- - - - - .
NRC ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC l
l DURING A MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN JACKSON ON AUGUST 6, 1996 l
- 1. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NRC AND NORTHEAST UTILITIES (NU, LICENSEE) ACTIONS :
1.A Questions Related to Licensee Accountability Why were all levels and limits exceeded in moving and storage of nuclear material and all procedures violated and nobody was suspended or fired
-because of serious violations?
Should NRC staff and Northeast Utilities (NU) employees be held i
accountable for disregard of regulations and other wrongdoing and pay '
some penalty?
Has NV management lied to the NRC? Can you take action against l c-i management for this? What action, and when will you take it?
f Answer:
I Regarding the movement and storage of nuclear material at Millstone, the NRC identified, in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-245/95-82, dated July 10, 1996, a number of apparent violations associated with licensee activities related to the storage and movement of spent nuclear fuel assemblies at Millstone Unit 1. l The NRC also has conducted extensive investigations of the actions of licensee ,
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personnel related to the apparent violations. The apparent violations are being considered for escalated enforcement action along with other apparent l In violations associated with the activities at each of the Millstone units.
i addition, the NRC has ongoing investigations related to alleged wrongdoing by NV personnel in areas other than the movement and storage of nuclear material.
The investigative results and those of continuing inspection activities will also be reviewed for possible enforcement action, if appropriate.
In addition to the foregoing enforcement considerations, depending on the results of the ongoing evaluations of inspections and investigations, both NU as an organization and NV employees found to have engaged in deliberate misconduct may be held accountable f or violations of applicable requirements.
Consistent with the Commission's Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600), normally some enforcement action is taken against the licensee for violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees. Such action could include a civil penalty or order. In deciding whether to also take action directly against the responsible employees, the NRC considers a number of factors such as the level of the individual in the organization, the employee's training
! and experience, the degree of supervision, the employee's attitude, and the degree of management responsibility or culpability. A decision to take action i directly against an individual is significant and normally will be taken only l
when the NRC is satisfied that the. individual engaged in deliberate
! misconduct. The action taken could include prohibiting the individual from involvement in licensed activities for a period of years.
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3 Additionally, in response to the events at Millstone and other related ,
activities, NRC management instructed the staff to conduct a broad-based review of NRC programs and guidance in the areas of inspection, licensing, enforcement and licensee reporting. This review, referred to as the
" Millstone Lessons Learned," considered, in part, Millstone and Haddam Neck inspection results, the Millstone employee concerns review, the results of the i fuel pool cooling and core offload procedures review, and the results of )
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) inspections conducted at all nuclear power plants. This effort involved individuals who were not part of the day-to-day oversight of Millstone, so that an impartial assessment of the situation could be obtained. This review was completed February 12, 1997.
NRC managers currently responsible for review efforts associated with the l Millstone Lessons Learned will be held accountable to take the actions !
L necessary to ensure that weaknesses in the NRC's oversight activities are '
addressed and that the lessons learned from this experience are used to strengthen the NRC's overall programs. The " Millstone Lessons Learned" results were presented to the Commission on February 19, 1997.
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NRC employeer in positions directly responsible for Millstone oversight have '
been reassigned and the NRC staff has taken steps to correct shortcomings in the manner in which the staff conducted certain inspection and licensing activities. There was additional training provided to the appropriate managers and staff. Also, the NRC has assigned additional managers l j
specifjcally dedicated to the oversight of NRC licensing and inspection activities at Millstone.
i To focus more regulatory attention on Millstone ;
I oversight, the NRC has established a Special Projects Office within the Office j
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee inspection and licensing activities at the Millstone site. Further, several special investigations, inspections i
and evaluation efforts have been conducted which have provided independent l review of licensee activities. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Russell have retired from <
the NRC.
1.C. Questions Related to Enforcement Why hasn't Millstone /NU been given any penalty for not following NRC rules (other than being shut down.)
Answer:
Since January 1, 1990, the NRC has issued 15 Severity Level II and III '
violations in which civil penalties were assessed against Northeast Utilities for failures to follow NRC regulations, including harassment and intimidation violations. A total of $1,223,750 has been imposed for these violations. The l NRC has also issued other vic,lations where no civil penalties were imposed. ;
During eight NRC inspections conducted between October 1995 and August 1996, l i '
l numerous apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified (more than
- 60) at Millstone. These apparent violations were discussed at a public pre-
! decisional enforcement conference held at the Millstone site on December 5, 1996. The conference was held to obtain information, such as a common 4
understanding of the facts, root causes, missed opportunities to identify the apparent violation sooner, corrective actions, significance of the issues, and j i
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2 1.B. Questions Related to NRC Accountability Will NRC personnel be held accountable for allowing Millstone to operate outside its design criteria from 1970 to 19957 Why would the NRC_ allow many of the NRC staff responsible for the current situation at Millstone to oversee startup?
?
Has anyone in the NRC been held accountable for the years of neglect at '
Millstone?
Who is being held accountable at the NRC for knowing and allowing risk for over 20 years every time a refueling was being conducted at Millstone? j When will you replace your~ oversight staff with officials who will ,
enforce the regulations?
Why has the Chairman not removed more NRC management from their l
positions, can we ever expect accountability?
Will 'you require full accountability of your Region I staff prior to the restart of any Millstone unit?
'fI it were shown that Mr. Russell's and Mr. Taylor's actions contributed l to the decline of the NRC's ability to regulate effectively or fairly with respect to public safety would you consider replacing them?
Answer:
The decline in safety performance at the Millstone facility over the past several years has been recognized and documented by the NRC staff. Declining c
performance has been a matter of discussion in NRC Systematic Assessment of I Licensee Performance-(SALP) reports and the subject of discussion at NRC.
senior management meetings. As described in response to-other questions in this letter, there have been numerous and significant enforcement actions taken against NU for noncompliance with NRC requirements. While NRC staff has pursued issues regarding performance problems at Millstone, the extent of the
. performance problems and the ineffectiveness of the licensee's actions to correct problems were not fully recognized by the NRC in a timely manner.
The NRC's Of fice of the Inspector General (0IG) performed a comprehensive evaluation of NRC. staff actions associated with NU and the Millstone facility, and staff actions related to Maine Yankee. The report included insights i I
gained during the course of OIG investigations and provided an evaluation of i
the managerial and regulatory program issues associated with the Millstone and Maine Yankee cases. The OIG reviewed the NRC's handling of issues related to l l Millstone Unit 1 and Maine Yankee, and on June 6,1996, issued a " Management l Implications Report - NRC Staff Handling of Millstone / Maine Yankee Issues."
In an October 28, 1996 response to the Management Implications Report, the :
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staff stated specific actions it will take to address the root causes of i problems.
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Additionally, in response to the events at Millstone and other related activities, NRC management instructed the staff to conduct a broad-based review of NRC programs and guidance in the areas of inspection, licensing, l enforcement and licensee reporting. This review, referred to as the l
" Millstone Lessons Learned," considered, in part, Millstone and Haddam Neck inspection results, the Millstone employee concerns review, the results of the fuel pool cooling and core offload procedures review, and the results of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) inspections conducted at all nuclear power plants. This effort involved individuals who were not part of the day-to-day oversight of Millstone, so that an impartial assessment of the situation could be obtained. This review was completed February 12, 1997.
NRC managers currently-responsible for review efforts associated with the
! Millstone Lessons Learned will be held accountable to take the actions j necessary to ensure that weaknesses in the NRC's oversight activities are l
addressed and that the lessons learned from this experience are used to strengthen the NRC's overall programs. The " Millstone Lessons Learned" l
results were presented to the Commission on February 19, 1997.
l NRC employees in positions directly responsible for Millstone oversight have l
been reassigned and the NRC staff has taken steps to correct shortcomings in the manner in which the staff conducted certain inspection and licensing activities. There was additional training provided to the appropriate -
managers and staff. Also, the NRC has assigned additional managers specifjcally dedicated to the oversight of NRC licensing and inspection activities at Millstone. To focus more regulatory attention on Millstone oversight, the NRC has established a Special Projects Office within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee inspection and licensing activities at the Millstone site. Further, several special investigations, inspections
! and evaluation efforts have been conducted which have provided independent l
review of licensee activities. Mr. Taylor and Mr. Russell have retired from the NRC.
1.C. Questions Related to Enforcement Why hasn't Millstone /NU been given any penalty for not following NRC l
rules (other than being shut down.)
i Answer:
Since January 1, 1990, the NRC has issued 15 Severity Level II and III violations in which civil penalties were assessed against Northeast Utilities for failures to follow NRC regulations, including harassment and intimidation violations. A total of $1,223,750 has been imposed for these violations. The NRC has also issued other violations where no civil penalties were imposed.
, During eight NRC inspections conducted between October 1995 and August 1996, numerous apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified (more than
- 60) at Millstone. These apparent violations were discussed at a public pre-decisional enforcement conference held at the Millstone site on December 5,
! 1996. The conference was held to obtain information, such as a common
- understanding of the facts, root causes, missed opportunities to identify the apparent violation sooner, corrective actions, significance of the issues, and 1
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j the need for lasting and effective corrective actions, to enable the NRC to make an enforcement decision. The NRC is reviewing the information provided l i
at the conference and will make a final enforcement decision in the near future. The premise of the question -- that no enforcement action has been I taken or is being considered -- is incorrect.
i 1.0. Questions Reaardina Oversiaht of the NRC Why doesn't the Congress have a committee to oversee the NRC and make sure they are accountable?
To whom is the NRC responsible?
Answer:
The NRC was created by enactment of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 as an independent agency of the Federal Government and as such, reports directly
-to the President. Several Congressional committees currently have jurisdiction over the NRC. In addition, NRC Commissioners are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Further, independent oversight of NRC staff is provided by the NRC's Office of the Inspector General.
As required by law, the NRC submits to the Congress each year an Annual Report ;
(NUREG-1145) covering its major activities in the preceding year. Members of ;
the Commission and NRC principal staff members participate as witnesses '
throughout the year before various committees of the House and Senate interested in aspects of the NRC's responsibilities. In the Senate, the Committee on Environment and Public Works exercises jurisdiction over domestic nuclear regulatory activities. Within the Committee, the Subcommittee on i Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and Nuclear Safety has been delegated .
l responsibility for legislation and oversight related to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In the House, jurisdiction over domestic nuclear regulatory activities belongs to the Committee on Commerce. Tne primary responsibilities are assigned to i the Subcommittee on Energy and Power.
In addition to our two authorizing subcommittees, there are a number of other Congressional subcommittees having jurisdiction over some aspect of NRC activities. The most important of these are as follows: i
. . Acoropriations--The NRC's annual appropriations are included in the ,
annual appropriations bill for energy and water development activities. .
This bill is prepared.by the Subcommittees on Energy and Water l Development of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Each l year we present our annual appropriations request to these two subcommittees and from time to time we respond to specific inquiries ,
from them. We are also obliged to meet whatever reporting requirements i
L are included in the annual . appropriations bill or in the committee reports which accompany the bill. While we do not routinely provide t
these-two subcommittees with all of the information provided the two ,
' authorizing subcommittees, they expect to be kept fully informed of major Commission actions and initiatives.
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5 International Affairs--Matters concerning the international aspects of atomic energy are under the jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations.
In the Senate the Committee on Governmental Affairs shares responsibilities with the Foreign Relations Committee f General Government Operations--Both the House and Senate have separate committees on Government operations. These committees have limited legislative authority (principally over Government reorganizations and the creation of new Government activities at all They have the dutylevels of with a view o determining its economy and efficiency).
receiving and examining all reports of the General Accounting Office (GA0), and comments thereon, as well.
- 2. NU MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION ISSUES 2.A. Questions Reaardina NU Manaaement How can the area people feel secure with the same management at NU that i got us to this point?
l What oversight is the NRC providing over the NU management " shuffle" as
- a corrective action?
Answer:
Significant management changes at NU have been made in the past year. Nor However, the NRC is not directly evaluating the NU management changes.
I will the NRC simply rely on new managers to effect the necessary improvements.
Instead, the NRC will focus on the results of the changes as demonstrated by Particular NRC I
i performance resulting from hardware and programmatic upgrade l actions to correct identified weaknesses in areas such as design control,
( handling of employee concerns, quality assurance, work control practices, and corrective actions. The NRC will perform its own inspection of the licensee's i
l corrective actions.
2.B. What is meant by Wayne Lanning's remark that NU isn't addressing the root cause of its problems, and what can NU do about it?
l Answer:
During a July 24, 1996, meeting, the licensee stated the fundamental causes of its problems were 1) poor leadership and vision, 2) low standards, and 3) ineffective management skills. Wayne Lanning agreed that those were problems that needed correcting but felt they were not necessarily the root causes of the problems. He said that the licensee should be asking the question, "Why did all of these conditions exist?" in order to develop the true root cause.
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2.C. Questions Recardina NU Financial Basis What does the NRC feel is the survivability of NU during this period of scrutiny of Millstone?
l l Answer:
The NRC's focus is on public health and safety. Whether NU can return the Millstone units to service will depend on the adequacy of its corrective
, action program and effectiveness of its management and its recovery program.
l 2.D. Do you feel the bond rating will improve if Fox and Busch were dismissed and NU were led by Mr. Miller?
l Answer:
l The NRC does not have a view on this issue. The NRC would note, however, that Mr. Busch is no longer with NU and Mr. Fox has announced his intention to retire in the near future.
l 3. SHUTDOWN AND STARTUP ISSUES 3.A. How can we trust that your staff will resolve the safety issues at the Millstone plants if you allow Connecticut Yankee to restart with "similar deficiencies" and "significant weaknesses?"
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! Will the NRC demand full compliance to safety regulations before a i startup plan is considered?
Are safety and compliance with 100% of the regulations the same thing, or can a plant be run safely while working to achieve full compliance -
i make a distinction between safety and compliance?
Is it tr'ue that although 1200 compliance issues have been identified at l
l Millstone 3, you will accept resolution of 600 in a restart plan?
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! How can inspectors listen to a proposal for unit 3 restart without correcting all the compliance issues; didn't the 50.54 letters require that to be done?
l Will the plants be allowed to restart and operate with known deficiencies?
Will Unit 3 be allowed to restart with a FSAR that has not been updated and declared unsound by its own engineers?
Will the Connecticut reactors be kept off line until the FSARs are updated as required by law?
7 Answer:
The NRC's approach to protecting public health and safety is-based on the l Briefly stated, this philosophy (1) requires -
philosophy-of defense-in-depth.the application of conservative codes an safety. margins in the design of nuclear plants; (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of malfunctions, including the use of automatic safety system actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and operators can make mistakes, and, thus, requires redundancy in safety systems and components '
to reduce the chances that malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that. release fission products from the facility; and (4) recognizes that, in :
spite of these precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen, thus requiring containment structures and safety Evenfeatures to prevent in the unlikely theofrelease event an past another layer of defense-in-depth.
offsite fission product release, there. is reasonable assurance that emergency protective actions can be taken to protect the pcpulation around nuclear power -
plants.
It is a given that the agency regards compliance with regulations, license But the agency also conditions, and Technical Specifications as mandatory. '
recognizes the plants will not operate trouble-free, that 100% compliance will not always occur, and that not all noncompliances have the same level of safety. significance. This is clearly articulated in. Criterion XVI, Appendix 8, Part 50, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and fuel Reprocessing Plants," Criterion XVI states that, " Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected." The NRC does not contend that all reactors are in full compliance with their respective licensing basis on a continuous basis.
The appropriate regulatory response to an identified deficiency can and should vary, depending on the importance of the element in which the deficiency is ,
found and the safety and regulatory significance of the deficiency. For i
example, during rapidly developing situations where prompt action is required to assure plants are not in an unsafe condition, automatic safety systems are '
in place to shut down the reactor. In other, less time-critical situations, Technical Specifications, which cover the structures, systems and components (SSC) most vital to the safe operation of a nuclear plant, require specific actions within predetermined time periods when an SSC is determined to be ,
inoperable. Even a pattern of lesser deficiencies such as degraded or l nonconforming conditions emerging over a discrete time period may be enough to ~
warrant a decision to shut down an operating plant. NRC Generic Letter 91-18, '
"Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on. -
Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability,"
provides guidance for licensees when they identify degraded or nonconforming conditions. At the same time, some deficiencies or nonconformances can be of such a nature they are insignificant from a safety standpoint and do not degrade operability. ;
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8 The NRC issued a letter on December 13, 1995, to the licensee for Millstone Unit I requiring it to inform the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), of actions it would be taking at Millstone Unit I to ensure that future operation of that facility would be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the plant's operating license, the Commission's regulations, and UFSAR. Later, on March 7, and April 4,1996, the NRC issued similar letters pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), regarding Millstone Units 2 and 3. The 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters require the licensee to demonstrate its compliance with the existing requirements and were not intended to impose additional requirements.
Therefore, in accordance with NRC regulations, the licensee must either-correct each UFSAR deficiency or evaluate it to ensure that the change to the facility does not involve any unreviewed safety question or change to the facility Technical Specifications.
Regarding restart of Millstone Unit 3, the licensee has documented a large number of deficiencies. The licensee has developed a list of these deficiencies, which vary in scope and safety significance. This list contains deficiencies that must be corrected before restart and others that the.
licensee is planning to correct after restart. The NRC staff will review the list of deficiencies that the licensee proposes to not be corrected before plant restart. In its continuing reviews of the deficiency list, the NRC staff will ascertain whether the licensee has appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for completion before restart and whether those items that ,
the licensee will defer until after restart are appropriate. The results of these efforts will be documented in NRC inspection reports. In addition, the
-licensee has indicated that it plans to update the Millstone Unit 3 UFSAR. i prior to restart.
3.B. If it's true that the ultimate decision to open the plants lies with the NRC, what factors will influence this decision?
How can you consider the restart of any Millstone units without resolving the issues that put them there in the first place?
Are we resolving restart issues with on-going investigations; without the cause being determined?
Will the NRC let Millstone restart when they're ready, or will it extract some undefined price? l Will all three units come back on line and why?
Answer:
On June 28, 1996, the Executive Director for Operations (E00) issued a letter .
to the licensee indicating that, after consultation with the Commission, the i Millstone Nuclear Power Station had been designated a Category 3. facility.
Plants in this category have been identified as having significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining the plant in a shutdown condition and requires that the NRC staff obtain Commission approval prior to restart.
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9 During the NRC Chairman's visit to the Millstone area on August 6, 1996, the announcement was made that the Commissicn would require Northeast Utilities to obtain an independent assessment of the results of its programs aimed On Augustat 14, resolving existing design deficiencies at the Millstone units.
1996, the NRC staff issued a Confirmatory Order confirming the licensee'.s The ICAVP is intended to verify the commitment to establish an ICAVP.
adequacy of Northeast Utilities' efforts to establish adequate design bases and design controls, including translation of the design bases into operating procedures and maintenance and testing practices, verification of system performance, and implementation of modifications since issuance of the initial facility operating licenses. NRC's oversight'of the ICAVP and related activities will be separate.from, and in additionThe to, the activities results of this described program in.the restart assessment plan discussed below.
will be incorporated into the restart plan and considered significant input into the NRC's decision regarding recommended restart.
To address the licensee's chronic problem of dealing effectively with concerned employees, the NRC, on October 24, 1996, issued an order that directs Northeast Utilities to devise and implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by Millstone employees The and for orderensuring an additionally environment free from retaliation and discrimination.
requires Northeast Utilities to enter into a contract withThe an third independent party will be third party to oversee the employee concerns program.
responsible for reporting periodically to the NRC and the licensee the results of its findings and recommendatior.s. The reports from this third party and the licensee's response to these reports will be reviewed for restart issues.
To focus more regulatory attention on these significant weaknesses, the NRC established a Special Projects Office (SP0) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to oversee inspection and licensing activities at In the Millstone site. This new office is managed by Dr. William D. Travers.
addition to licensing and inspection activities, the office is responsible for (1) oversight of the ICAVP, (2) oversight of Northeast Utilities' corrective actions related to safety issues involving employee concerns, and (3) inspections necessary to implement NRC oversight of the plant's restart activities.
The Commission currently perceives the restart assessment process as incorporating several major elements. Taese include the licensee's Configuration Management Program (CMP), the above mentioned ICAVP, the establishment of the above mentioned comprehensive action plan regarding employee concerns, responses to enforcement actions, and the NRC Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI).
The NRC staff has formed a Millstone Restart Assessment Panel that provides direct oversight of Millstone restart activities. The Restart Assessment Panel has developed the Millstone Station Restart Assessment Plan which encompasses the NRC Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval." The current assessment plan is applicable to Millstone Unit 3 and will be maintained and updated as necessary. The restart plans for Units I and 2, when developed, will address unit-specific technical issues as well as issues common to all Millstone units.
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The Director of NRR and the Director of the SP0 will keep the Commission, as l well as the public, informed of the staff's oversight and the licensee's l restart plans. When the restart review process has reached a point where :
relevant issues have been identified, corrected, and reviewed, a restart authorization process is begun. The Millstone Restart Assessment Panel will l provide its recommendation for restart approval to the Director of the SP0.
l The SP0 Director will forward the restart-panel's recommendation for restart
! approval through the Director of NRR to the EDO. The EDO, after discussions l with the SP0 Director, the Regional Administrator, and the Director of NRR, will make a recommendation to the Commission regarding. restart..for each Millstone unit. Upon receipt of a staff recommendation, the Commission will hold a meeting to assess the recommendation and then vote on whether to approve the restart of the unit.
3.C. Why, given the inherent danger of nuclear fuel and spent fuel, is the ;
!~ NRC'considering re-opening Connecticut's nuclear power plants? '
Answer: I When maintained in accordance with regulatory requirements and appropriate 1
- engineering controls, the nuclear fuel in the reactor vessel or the spent fuel I in the spent fuel storage pool at a nuclear power plant poses no undue risk to 1 l- the public health and safety.
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l 4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES l 4.A. Questions Reaardina Radiation Protection and Monitorina When will NU send me a radiation suit and radiation survival gear in i case of a meltdown?
How do I obtain information on nuclear fallout shelters in Connecticut?
Why are there no radiation monitors at-schools?-
l Answer:
l As operator of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, the licensee is required to prepare and maintain a comprehensive emergency plan which addresses a full i spectrum of emergencies -- ranging from those having little or no radiological
- consequences to those very low probability events which may lead to significant damage to the fuel in the reactor core (and which may involve the release of radioactive materials to the environment). The NRC frequently inspects these plans and verifies the utility's ability to implement them by requiring emergency preparedness drills and exercises to be performed. Every 2 years, the State and local governments participate in an emergency i preparedness exercise at the Millstone plant to demonstrate the ability of all parties to effectively implement emergency plans. l
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I1 The protection of public health and safetyThe is the plansintent and require thepurpose of all o 1
the emergency plans-(utility, State, and local).
development and, if necesst.ry, the issuance of protective action In recommendations intended to protect the health and saf i emphasizes a graded approach depending on the potential severity of the eve The emergency classification scheme employs indicators of the condition of plant safety . systems (including backup systems) to permit the utility to develop an overall prognosis of. plant conditions in an The NRC hasemergency emphasized in situation an determine if and when the situation might worsen.
nuclear power plant emergency preparedness activities th in advance as possible of a pending release of radioactive State and materials local governments that then might be associated with an accident. Thus, promptly evaluate and act upon these protective action recommendations.
protective action is first implemented based on plant conditions and notAson 1 the results of radiation monitoring at offsite locations (e.g., schools).
part of the response to an emergency event, the licensee's in the event. .On the basis of the results from these monitoring activities, protective actions would be reevaluated and adjusted as necessary.
To further ensure protection of the public health and safety, emergency plans provide for the processing of evacuees through pre-established reception centers (six such centers are designated in the Millstone plant vicinity), and members of the public would be directed to them by radio announcements over the Emergency Broadcast System (soon to be termed the Emergency Alerting System), pre-distributed public information brochures, and related material.
In case evacuees inadvertently pass through radioactive material released as a result of an emergency event, the evacuees would be monitored for possible radiological contamination at specified reception centers, and any radioactive Fallout shelters, which at one time were material detected would be removed.
considered for national defense, are not relied upon as part of the planning bases for nuclear power reactors. .
4.B. Question Reaardina Fundina of Emeroency Preparedness Activities How can the NRC continue to allow virtually no funds to be paid to protect the 26,000 residents of the City of New London when the risk to them is equal or greater than the Town of Waterford (which has 18,000 residents and gets millions in tax funds). ,
Answer:
Local property tax structures dictate funding of municipalities adjacent to nuclear power reactors. These local tax structures are not under the ,
jurisdiction of the NRC. i Each licensee of a nuclear power reactor is required to maintain emergency i plans to ensure that adequate protective measuresThese can be taken to protect the emergency plans public in the event of a radiological emergency. '
include both onsite plans and plans maintained by State and local
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( ., .. .. ,
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12 1
jurisdictions adjacent to the plant. Generally, the mutual emergency planning l interests of the licensee, State, and local jurisdictions result in l cooperation to ensure that adequate resources are available to maintain a
! state of readiness for any and all emergencies.
- 5. NRC ESTIMATION OF REACTOR SAFETY 5.A. Questions Reaardina Accident Probability and Preventi.o_n
! Once on line, are Millstone units more likely to have.a nuclear accident l than any other plant in the country?
Answer:
No. The Millstone units, when operated in accordance with Commission regulations and the plants' design-basis, will pose no undue risk to the l public. The risk to the public will be low and consistent with the low risk posed by other commercial, U.S. nuclear power plants.
5.B. In case of a nuclear accident, is there any reason to believe that the independent safety trains wouldn't be activated to bring the plant
[ Millstone] to safe shutdown?
i Answer; Although different in design and vintage, the Millstone units, like other NRC l
licensed commercial nuclear power plants, are designed with multiple i independent and redundant trains of safety equipment. Each of these safety trains is sized to be capable of shutting the plant down safely given a design basis accident or plant transient. A safety analysis has been performed to .
demonstrate the adequacy of each of these safety trains in mitigating the design basis events. l 1
l
- The systems are designed with -independent and redundant sources of electrical l
! power, instrumentation and control, and supporting systems (i.e., cooling 1 water, room cooling), to minimize the potential that both trains will be unavailable-if a design basis event occurs. To further reduce the potential for common cause failure or " double failure," the plant Technical
- Specifications limit the time one of the two trains is unavailable due to l maintenance or other problems without requiring a plant shutdown.
Additionally, the Technical Specifications require periodic surveillances to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits and that equipment performs in a manner that assures safe operation of the facility.
Potential causes of common mode failures (i.e., earthquakes, floods) are analyzed and evaluated on a plant-specific basis to provide greater assurance that at the very least, one train of safety equipment is available when the plant experiences some sort of transient. Thus, it is unlikely that the
- independent safety trains will not be available to mitigate a design basis accident.
i e -
. _ _ ~. - . - - . . - . . - _ - - - - -
1 13 In February 1996, the NRC staff informed Northeast Utilities that a special team inspection would be conducted at Millstone to evaluate the methods and ,
processes Northeast Utilities had used to handle degraded and potentially t nonconforming plant conditions, including issues affecting the operability of plant equipment. On September 20, 1996, the NRC issued the results of the special inspection. Weaknesses described in the NRC's report included deficiencies which may have challenged the multiple independent and redundant trains of safety equipment. These weaknesses will be tracked through the previously mentioned Millstone Station Restart Assessment Plan and the licensee's corrective actions will be reviewed prior to plant restart.
The Commission will not allow the units to start up until the staff has verified that the licensee has corrected deficiencies that impact safe operation.
5.C. NRC Oversiaht of Nuclear Power Plants .
Has the NRC gotten more serious in its regulation of the other nuclear power plants in this country?
Aren't the problems at Millstone due to a decade of NRC oversight, and doesn't that implicate the safety of other plants across the country?
Answer:,
The NRC has always taken its responsibility to ensure public health and safety seriously. The NRC performs a comprehensive inspection program to independently verify that a licensee constructs and operates the facility in compliance with regulatory requirements. The objectives of the inspection program are to:
t (1) Identify significant declining trends in performance and perform inspections to verify that the licensee has resolved the issue before 1 performance declines below an acceptable level.
(2)
Ensure that the licensee's systems and techniques for conducting internal inspections and maintaining coni.rol result in safe operations.
l (3)
Find and resolve plant-specific safety concerns that have generic significance.
(4)
Provide bases for conclusions on both individual licensee and industry-wide performance for allocating NRC resources.
f The NRC inspection program includes onsite inspectors to evaluate licenseeEngineers activities on a daily basis using specific inspection procedures.
! and specialists from the NRC regional office staff and headquarters office staff perform periodic and special inspections that supplement the resident ,
inspector's efforts in a wide variety of technical disciplines.
Recognizing the fact that its past attention toward the Millstone units could have been better, the NRC staff has taken steps to correct the shortcomings in the manner in which the staff conducted certain inspections and licensing I
14 l ,
activities. NRC management instructed the staff to conduct a broad-based review of NRC programs and guidance in.the areas of inspection, licensing, j enforcement and licensee reporting. This review, referred to as the
" Millstone Lessons Learned," considered, in part, Millstone and Haddam Neck I inspection results, the Millstone employee concerns review, the results of the fuel pool cooling and core offload procedures review, and the results of
, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) inspections conducted at all ,
I nuclear power plants. This effort involved individuals who were not part of the day-to-day oversight of Millstone, so that an impartial assessment of the situation could be obtained. The results of-this review were presented to the ;
l Commission on February 19, 1997. '
The NRC has also outlined not only the actions that the NRC needs to take '
involving the Millstone plants, but also a number of more specific activities aimed at developing a comprehensive lessons-learned study that targets areas ,
l for NRC improvement as a result' of the recent Millstone and Maine Yankee i issues. The NRC has been and remains totally committed to its mission of >
protecting the health and safety of the public. '
l 5.D. NRC Verification of Plant Information If the NRC relies heavily on information submitted by licensees regarding FSARs, amendments, etc., and licensee management cannot be
' trusted, how can the NRC depend on this source alone for critical l decisions; and what alternatives are there to this process?
\
l l
l Answer:
i The NRC obtains information from several different sources to make critical decisions. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the NRC has the ,
- authority to inspect nuclear power plants in its role of providing for the !
protection of public heath and safety. The NRC performs a comprehensive inspection program to independently verify that a licensee constructs and l
- operates the -facility in compliance with~ regulatory requirements. The NRC !
continues to seek to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its I regulatory programs through activities such as the regulatory review group initiative, the operating reactor inspection program assessment, and other periodic self-assessments. In addition, instructions were issued in January 1996, to the Regional Administrators requiring a review of the FSAR, on a i sampling basis, to determine the accuracy of the FSAR as it relates to plant l practices, procedures, and parameters.
Nearly 20 years ago, in 1977, the NRC initiated a program to station resident inspectors at each nuclear power plant under construction and in operation.
The NRC later expanded the program to provide at least two resident inspectors at each of the 71 nuclear power plant sites (Millstone currently is authorized to have 6 resident inspectors). These onsite inspectors evaluate licensee activities on a daily basis using specific inspection procedures. The resident inspection program has provided:
- o Increased NRC knowledge of the conditions at licensed nuclear power
- plants and a better technical base for regulatory actions. ]
l i I l
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15 o Reduced reliance on the accuracy and completeness of licensee records by improving the inspector's ability to independently assess licensee performance, o Additional assurance that licensee management control systems are effective and licensee performance is acceptable.
By assigning resident inspectors to reactor sites, the NRC significantly 1
increased the agency's onsite monitoring of the plants. This increased monitoring provides a greater opportunity to ensure plant safety by observing licensee activities, verifying licensee compliance In with NRC requirements, addition, engineers andand
- responding.to operational events at the plant.
specialists from the NRC regional office staff and headquarters office staff perform periodic and special inspections that supplement the resident inspector's efforts in a wide variety of technical disciplines.
5.E. If units 1 and 2 remain shut down, who is responsible for safety of these plants, the NRC or NU?
Answer:
Regardless of shether a plant is operating or shut down, it is the As responsibility of the licensee to maintain the plant in a safe condition.
discussed earlier, the NRC maintains oversight of each facility to independently verify that the licensee operates and maintains the facility in compliance with its license and regulatory requirements.
- 6. NRC SUPPORT FOR MILLSTONE STARTUP Can you say anything good about Millstone?
What can we do as a community to be supportive of Millstone's effort to get back on-line?
How will the NRC be supportive of those who want Millstone up and running?
When are you going to put a program in place that allows and properly monitors safe operation of our area's nuclear plants and generates the electricity our state needs?
What is the NRC doing at Millstone to get these plants back in operational condition?
Is Millstone doing what the NRC asked to get the plants back on line?
What is the NRC doing to ensure the people of southeastern Connecticut will receive safe and reliable electricity from Connecticut's nuclear power plants?
16 i Answer:
It is acknowledged that much of the recent information has been negative regarding the operations at the Millstone station. NRC inspection reports and other correspondence from the NRC focuses on issues and problems, not only at Millstone but at any power reactor, and, therefore, the material could be viewed as generally critical. However, there are positive aspects of Northeast Utilities' operations that are not necessarily highlighted by NRC documentation. The last SALP report for Millstone, dated August 26, 1994, identified a number of program and operational. strengths for the Millstone units. Also, periodic inspection reports have identified a number of areas where plant activities were performed well. However, the emphasis for Millstone station is now on program deficiencies, particularly in the area of engineering and design control, and corrective actions needed to correct those deficiencies.
The decision to shut down the Millstone plants was made by NV. As the NRC staff became aware of long-standing safety concerns, the NRC staff acted to establish requirements that must be addressed before the Millstone units are restarted. Because of concerns about the history of programmatic weakness and failures to implement effective corrective actions in the area of design and configuration control, the NRC staff also identified a need for an independent review to verify the adequacy of the licensee's efforts. The licensee agreed to this approach, and on August 13, 1996, submitted its plan and commitment for an independent review. On August 14, 1996, the NRC staff issued a Confirmatory Order Establishing Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (Order) which confirmed the licensee's commitment to conduct this independent review. The Order provided a background summary of the issues that led to the issuance of the Order. The NRC staff is closely monitoring the independent review effort, as well as other restart activities. To ensure that its restart review efforts provide objective measures of restart readiness for each Millstone unit, the NRC staff will follow the process outlined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval." The processes described above-will provide an assessment of readiness for the restart of each of the Millstone units. Northeast Utilities has initiated significant efforts to address the identified deficiencies and respond to NRC concerns.
The NRC acknowleages concern about the potential effect of NRC regulatory actions on the licensee and the public. The mission of the NRC as provided in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from radiological consequences of the use of nuclear materials. The NRC is dedicating resources to assure prompt reviews and response to licensing requests related to restart of any of the Millstone units. Further, there is a large NRC presence providing oversight of licensee actions to identify early in the process issues that may affect return of the units to operation. As part of the process, the NRC staff holds frequent meetings with the licensee and public in the vicinity of the site.
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- 7. ~ STATUS OF 2.206 Where is the NRC on Galatis ptition? How can it take so long?
Why hasn't the'NRC addressed the 2.206 petitions of Ross and Galatis and !
rendered a decision prior to the restart of any units at Millstone? :
Will you require full accountability from Millstone for its actions :
addressed in the petitions prior to restart of any Millstone unit?
Answer:
On August 21, 1995, as supplemented August 28, 1995, Mr. Ernest Hadley, on behalf of Mr. George Galatis and the Citizens Group, We the People, submitted a Petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. The Petition requested, in part, that actions be taken against the licensee of Millstone Unit 1 because of alleged ,
deliberate wrongdoing by the licensee related to fuel offload practices at Millstone Unit 1. The supplement to the Petition alleged similar type issues with the fuel offload practices at Millstone Units 2 and 3 and Seabrook. The NRC staff has conducted evaluations, inspections and investigations of fuel offloading practices at Millstone Unit 1. As discussed earlier, the NRC staff ,
identified a number of apparent violations related to the movement and storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies at Millstone Unit 1. The NRC staff is continuing assessment of enforcement action to be taken based on inspection and investigation findings. In a December 26, 1996 Partial Director's :
Decision, the'NRC staff responded to the technical portions of the petition.
The final Director's Decision on the 10 CFR 2.206 petition will follow completion of NRC's evaluation of the wrongdoing issues raised in the petition.
Mr. Ross filed five petitions in late 1994 and early 1995 with the NRC with regard to Millstone. Director's Decisions have been issued responding to -
four of these petitions (DD-95-23, issued on December 19, 1995; DD-96-16 and DD-96-17, both issued on October 31, 1996; and DD-97-04 issued on February 11,1997). The one additional petition filed by Mr. Ross involves asserted noncompliance in the area of work control, procedural compliance, and ;
equipment protective tagging. This petition is presently being reviewed by l
the NRC staff.
Although the NRC has not reached a final decision with respect to the petition from Mr. Galatis and the remaining petition from Mr. Ross, it has periodically u'pdated ths petitioners on the progress of its review. Letters were sent to l ,
l Mr. Hadley on October 26, 1995, and to Mr. Ross on February 23, 1995, acknowledging the receipt of their petitions and informing them that the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation would make a decision at a future time. Since the acknowledgement letters were issued, the staff has ;
updated Messrs. Galatis and Ross approximately every 60 days.
The issues raised in any petition that remains outstanding at the time of ;
restart will be fully reviewed by the NRC prior to giving approval to restart. !
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- 8. LONG-TERM STORAGE OF HIGH LEVEL WASTE -
8.A. Hiah Level Radioactive Waste Repository How can the NRC allow the nuclear industry to continue producing such ,
deadly material before the high level waste problem is resolved? l i
Answer l
Spent nuclear fuel is currently being safely stored at each reactor site. The NRC has concluded that spent fuel can continue to be safely stored, until a waste repository or centralized storage facility is licensed and operating, if it is maintained in accordance with the plant's license and regulatory requirements. This determination is revisited periodically in the Commission's waste confidence proceedings.
8.B. What happened to the National Radioactive Waste Site?
Answer:
l The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 designated a candidate site for a high level waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. DOE is continuing to work on a viability assessment for the Yucca Mountain site.
This assessment is scheduled for completion in 1998.
l 8.C. Does the NRC endorse the Senate high level waste bill, and will it recommend House passage and presidential signing?
Answer:
The NRC has not taken a formal position on S-104. Note that the Chairman has provided testimony on a similar bill in December 1995.
8.D. Do you' foresee a permanent' nuclear waste facility being opened in the future, and if so how can we be assured the waste will get safely to the facility?
Answer:
In the NRC's waste confidence decision (55 FR 38507), the Commission found reasonable assurance that at least one mined geologic repository will be available during the first quarter of the 21st century. The transportation of l radioactive materials, including spent fuel, is a well-developed process.
l Thousands.of spent fuel shipments have been made internationally and domestically, without fatality or injury attributable to the spent nuclear fuel. NRC and U.S. Department of Transportation regulations on the packaging and transportation of spent fuel casks continue to ensure adequate protection of worker and public health and safety, f
a
19 8.E. Other Radioactive Waste Issues How much waste have you accumulated to date which you are unable to move?
Answer:
The total amount of spent fuel stored at U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors (excluding spent fuel stored at U.S. Department of Energy facilities) as of 1994 was 29,784 metric tons. The amount stored is anticipated to increase to 49,865 metric tons by 2004 [ Source: NUREG-1350, vol. 8].
8.F. Why do you think waste can be maintained safely if first generation information is not passed down properly?
Answer:
Title 10, Part 60, to the Code of Federal Reaulations, is the NRC's regulation It contains a systems approach, for licensing a high level waste repository.
combining an engineered barrier system and the geologic setting to provide defense-in-depth, to ensure isolation of waste and adequate protection of public health and mfety and the environment, for current and future generations. The current regulations contain the assumption that institutional controls are not effective for more than 100 years after closure, and beyond this time frame the defense-in-depth principles involving the engineered and natural barriers will work to protect public health and safety. The provisions of Part 60 will be further modified to reflect any protection required by Congress in any legislation that is enacted on the subject.
8.G. Could we glass encase spent fuel pellets like the French do at the various sites?-Why not?
Answer:
The French use glass vitrification for high level liquid waste resulting from reprocessing commercial spent nuclear fuel to recover fissile nuclides (for further use in a reactor). The U.S. Department of Energy also used this technology to vitrify high-level waste resuiting from reprocessing for defensc activities. For economic, environmental, nonproliferation, and policy reasons, the U.S. abandoned reprocessing for its commercial nuclear industry in the 1970's. Spent nuclear fuel will likely be disposed of in its existing form, without reprocessing of the fuel or the need for vitrification.
If so, 8.H. Is dry cask storage a possibility for disposal of spent fuel?
shouldn't the nuclear utilities be responsible for the cost?
Answer:
The Dry cask storage is viewed as an interim spent fuel management strategy.
long-lived hazard of the spent fuel will require permanent disposal at some point. The Commission, consistent with existing law, considers it in the
f 20 national interest to continue development of a permanent solution to nuclear waste disposal. Section 302 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act establishes the nuclear waste fund, and requires nuclear utilities to pay a fee of 1 mil per kilowatt-hour generated, to cover the costs of spent fuel disposal.
- 9. SPENT FUEL P0OL SAFETY Has the analysis of loss of spent fuel pool inventory mentioned on March 13 by Mr. Lanning been completed, and when will it be presented to the public? Will Part 100 requirements be addressed, and will these documents be available for public review and comment prior to restart of the Connecticut plants?
l Why isn't the spent fuel stored in safe containment buildings that would withstand an earthquake or other natural disasters or just wear and tear over the years? ,
Are the other plants with spent fuel pool problems going to be shutdown until they are fixed too, or is the s.ignificance minor -not affecting the safe running of the plant? Haven't these plants been running safely for years now?
Answer:
On July 26, 1996, the staff completed a report that evaluated existing spent fuel pool design features for all operating reactors, including design features associated with maintaining adequate inventory of coolant in the pool. On the basis of that analysis, the staff concluded that existing structures and systems for pool storage of irradiated fuel at operating reactors provide adequate protection for public health and safety. However, l the staff also noted that certain design features at a limited number of plants offered the potential for further enhancements to safety through design modifications or changes in the way the plant is operated. For the specific plants with these design features ~,' the staff will conduct an analysis to determine whether the NRC's imposition of changes to the plants' design or operation would provide a substantial improvement in plant safety and whether the cost of such changes is justified by the improvement in safety.
In the July report, the staff described the importance of maintaining adequate pool coolant inventory to cool the irradiated fuel and to provide radiological shielding for operators working in the vicinity of the pool. Existing design features provide substantial assurance that an adequate pool coolant inventory will be maintained in the pool to satisfy the cooling and shielding functions following postulated credible internal events and natural disasters, including earthquakes. The fuel pool structure, the structure enclosing the fuel pool, and the coolant inventory have also been evaluated to ensure that the fuel is adequately protected from credible physical threats posed by such events.
Events impacting the spent fuel pool were evaluated in NUREG-1353, " Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools," which is publicly available. When the consequences and frequency of these events were combined to evaluate risk, the risk from the
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21 i k from spent fuel pool events was found to be a small part of the trtal r s t reactor operation, and the risk would not justify any during a modifications to f fuel storage facilities.
I no.t include a specific evaluation of a total loss of coolant water
/ full core offload, the staff believes that the conclusions drawn from the On be evaluation of that event for a partial core offload are rep justify gained from a specific analysis of full core offload practices wouldTherefo the necessary resource expenditure.
perform further evaluation of this issue.
The July 26, 1996 report is publicly available and was presented to the Commission at a public meeting on August 1, 1996,
- 10. SAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER IN CONSIDERATION OF CHERNO VERSUS NEED OF THE POWER SOURCE.
- 10. A. Questions Reaardina Commercial Nuclear Plant Risk Is the NRC planning to close our 110 defective U.S. reactors before or after a catastrophic accident occurs, as discussed by Commissioner Asselstine in 1985?
Answer.:
The NRC has and will continue to exercise its regulatory authority to shut down reactors should their operation cause an undue risk to t safety of the public.
undue risk to public health and safety.
10.B. Is there any remote possibility that we could have a repeat of the Chernobyl disaster?
Answer.
The unique design of the Chernobyl reactor (graphite Specifically, U.S.moderated) preclud d and are repeat of this accident at U.S. commercial reactors. commercial housed for anywithin steellearned lessons or concrete and containments.
in 1987 published NUREG-1251, " Implic Accident at Chernobyl for Safety Regulation of Commercial Nuclear Pow in the United States."
Also, any implication that the Millstone spent fuel pool situation h NRC is borders o ft an impending Three Mile Island- or Chernobyl-type The Chernobyl accident is simply not comparable, in the d
di is not accurate.
Chernobyl accident, a large amount of energy was At U.S. reactors, several days are physically l
debris high into the air. required after the reactor is shut down beforel fuel transferred to the spent hel pool.
22 decays rapidly and, therefore, the fuel lacks the capacity to release a large amount of energy rapidly as in a Chernobyl-type accident. Further, NRC requirements applicable to spent fuel pools make the likelihood remote that any accident would cause a release. For example, the NRC has required licensees to evaluate the seismic capability of their spent fuel pools and to provide protection against human errors and postulated mechanical failure that could drain the pool.
10.C. If nuclear power is inherently dangerous as suggested by the President's Commission on Three Mile Island (TMI), then is nuclear power acceptable when it is not necessary?
The issue of nucle . risk versus the national energy policy does not totally fall under the purview of the NRC. As mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act to 1974, as amended; the Nuclear Nonproliferation- Act of 1978;- and'in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended; and other applicable statues, the NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and materials. Therefore, the NRC requires that nuclear power plants are designed l to operate without any significant effect on public health and safety and the environment, however, no industrial activity is risk free. To prevent the I r(lease of radioactive material to the environment, nuclear power plants are constructed with several barriers between the radioactive material and the environment surrounding the plant. While the reactor fuel is in a ceramic pellet form that retains some fission products, the sealed metal tube or I cladding surrounding the fuel provides the initial barrier. The second-principle barrier is the heavy steel reactor vessel and the primary cooling water system piping. The third principle barrier is the containment structure surrounding the reactor which is designed to contain radioactivity that might be released from the reactor system in the unlikely event of a serious accident.
To maintain the integrity of the reactor fuel and avoid damage, an adequate supply of water is provided for cooling .There-are diverse and multiple backup cooling systems at each plant which can provide an adequate supply of water. Also, plant operators are required to operate the plant within safe operating limits and conditions as part of their license. These limits and conditions cover such things as operability of plant equipment, plant operating procedures, and plant maintenance.
In other words, the level of risk to public health and safety is low, in part, through the " defense-in-depth" regulatory approach to design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants. Multiple barriers to prevent fission product release, diversity and redundancy in the design of safety systems, operator qualification and training programs, the testing and maintenance of plant systems, and the regulatory oversight provided by the NRC are elements of the " defense-in-depth" regulatory approach that helps assure there is no undue risk to the public.
l As a result of the corrective steps taken by the NRC and the nuclear power industry since the Three Mile Island accident, the overall level of safety of l
U.S. nuclear power plants has significantly improved. Recent regulatory I
1 23 initiatives, such as the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) program, '
Individual Plant Examination - External Events (IPEEE) program, have led to further safety improvements through plant-specific searches for [
i vulnerabilities to severe accidents and through a more quantitative In ;
understanding of probabilities of core damage and fission product release. !
addition, the Commission's recent policy statement on the use of probabilistic <
risk anal) sis (PRA), seeks to improve the safety decision-making process by helping the licensee and the NRC staff to better understand the risk associated with licensed activities and efficiently focusing resources on those areas that may pose the greatest risk to public health and- safety.
10.D. Questions Reaardina the Future of the Nuclear Industry ,
Will the NRC promote new nuclear power plants in the US, or oversee the ultimate shutdown of the nuclear power industry in our country? l Why is nuclear energy still considered necessary to our state and country when alternate energy sources exist?
Given uncertainties of nuclear power including high level waste storage, L decommissioning, economic future of the industry, and effects of low level radiation, what is your vision for the role the NRC will play in the near and far future?
Answer. L Although the NRC will have a future role in regulating nuclear power plants, the issue about promotion of new nuclear power plants and the need to develop alternative energy resources comes under the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Department of Energy (D0E).
As mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act to 1974, as amended; the Nuclear -
Nonproliferation Act of 1978; and in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended; and other applicable statues, the NRC is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and ,
materials and for conducting research associate with the licensing and '
regulatory process. Issues in this area can be better addressed if sent to Mr. Larry Chaney, Public Information Specialist, with DOE's Office of Congressional and Public Affairs. I 10.E. Question Reaardina Down's Syndrome How would you tell parents of Down's syndrome children from TMI that '
nuclear power is safe?
Answer:
The following information is pertinent to this matter:
. No evidence to date suggests that Down's Syndrome can.be induced by radiation. [ref.1] :
1
1 24
. The detailed study conducted by a public concerns group could find no !
evidence of any ill effect of radiation in the population who live near ,
J TMI. (ref.2]
. The report on the TMI event found no evidence that a member of the public received a radiation dose from the TMI accident that exceeded the doses normally received from nature. [ref.3]
. The comprehensive study by the National Cancer Institute found no evidence of any ill effect of radiation in the vicinity of any U.S. nuclear power plant. [ref.4]
- 11. NRC EVALUATION OF PROBLEMS AT MILLSTONE Why has it taken the NRC so long to shut the Millstone reactors down?
Was the NRC lax or was appropriate discretion being exercised? What does the NRC mean by a serious problem (i.e. a problem not " serious" enough to shut down Haddam Neck), are there serious problems at the Connecticut reactors, and if so what are they?
How did we (public and the NRC) get to this point?
Answer; As discussed earlier, the decline .in performance at Millstone over the past several years has been recognized and documented by the NRC staff. The NRC has been dealing with the problems at Millstone for several years. The current problems are an extension of the onderlying problems that were identified in the early 1990's. The licensee's shutdown of Unit 2 in the fall of 1994 for nearly 10 months was an attempt to deal with issues such as procedural adherence, the corrective action program, and employee-management interactions. The NRC has had a continuing serias of meetings at the site with NU regarding these matters that were open for public observation.
Declining performance has been a matter of discussion in NRC SALP reports and the subject of discussion at NRC senior management meetings. While the NRC aggressively pursued issues regarding performance problems at Millstone, the extent of the performance problems and the ;neffectiveness of the licensce's corrective actions were not fully recognized by the NRC until recently.
On December 13, 1995, the NRC issued a letter to the licensee for Millstone Unit I requiring it to inform the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), of actions it would be taking at Millstone Unit 1 to ensure that future operation of that facility would be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the plant's operating license, the Commission's regulations, and UFSAR. On February 22, 1996, the licensee issued the Adverse Condition Report (ACR) 7007 Report which describes in detail the underlying causes for numerous inaccuracies contained in the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR. On March 7, 1996, the NRC issued similar letters to the licensee requiring it to inform the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), of actions it would be taking at Haddam Neck and Millstone Units 2 and 3.
25 In January 1996, the NRC informed the licensee that the MillstonePlants site had in been designated as a Category 2 facility on the NRC's " Watch L NRC attention until the licensee demonstrates a period of improved performance.
In February 1996, the NRC staff informed NU that a special team inspection would be conducted at Millstone to evaluate the methods and processes NU had used to handle degraded and potentially nonconforming plant conditions, This effort including issues affecting the operability of plant equipment.
focused on Millstone Units 2 and 3 but was expanded to include the Haddam Neck plant . The team's report addressing concerns with respect to Haddam Neck was issued on July 31, 1996. The report for Millstone was issued on September 20, 1996.
Directors of NU voted December 4,1996, to close down permanently the Haddam Neck nuclear power plant.
In June 1996, the staff informed the lice m ee that the Millstone site had been designated a Category 3 facility on the NRC's " Watch List," therefore the plants will remain shut down until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensureTh substantial improvement.
Commission approval by vote prior to restart.
As the NRC The dbcision to shut down the Millstone plants was made by NU.
staff became aware of more long-standing safety concerns, the NRC staff acted to put in plac'e requirements that must be addressed before the Mi are restarted.
and failures to implement effective corrective actions in the area of design and configuration control, the NRC staff identified a need for an independentThe licensee a review to verify the adequacy of the licensee's efforts. submitted its plan and commitment to this approach, and on August 13, 1996, for an independent review. On August 14, 1996, the NRC staff issued the Confirmatory Order Establishing Independent Corrective Action Verification Program which confirmed the licensee's commitment The NRC to conduct staff is closely monitoring this independent review for each of the Millstone units.
the licensee's corrective actions and will monitor the independent review team.
- 12. WHISTLEBLOWERS 12.A. Has Northeast Utilities management harassed whistleblowers?
Answer:
The NRC has issued The NRC has cited NU for harassment of whistleblowers.
escalated enforcement actions and letters to NU for discrimination a whistleblowers. Civil Penalty for discrimination against Proposed the Imposition of a $100,000This penalty was based on a decision by a U an NU employee.
Labor (00L) Administrative Law Judge who found that discrimination occurred l
-. = . - - - - - - - _ - _ - - . - - - _ _ - . - - _ . - . . - - _
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t i 26 against an individual. Subsequently, a DOL Administrative Review Board issued an order dismissing the DOL complaint based on the company's reaching a settlement with the individual.
In addition, the' agency issued a chilling effect letter to NU last year based on a DOL District Director's finding of discrimination on July 27, 1995. This type of letter notifies a licensee's management that the NRC is concerned
- about a potential environment of whistleblower harassment in the licensee's organization and will be watching this area closely.
Other escalated enforcement actions taken against NU for discriminatory acts against whistleblowers include the issuance of a Notice of Violation (NOV) and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (CP) of $100,000 to NU on May 4, 1993 for discrimination against an NU employee and an NOV and Proposed Imposition of CP of $220,000 on July 13, 1994 to NU for the deliberate delay in performing an l
- operability determination and the-discrimination against an NU employee involved with that determination.
l In its September 1996 report, " Millstone Independent Review Group Regarding
- Millstone Station and NRC Handling of Employee Concerns and Allegations," the ,
NRC staff determined that, in general, an unhealthy work environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not welcome or promote a questioning attitude, has existed at Millstone plants for the past several years. This poor bnvironment has resulted in repeated instances of discrimination and ineffective handling of employee concerns and contributed to the Millstone plants being placed on the NRC's " Watch List" as facilities having significant weaknesses.
l On October 24, 1996, the Director of NRR sent an Order to NU requiring (1) a l j comprehensive plan for resolving the Millstone station employees safety j concerns and (2) an independent third-party oversight of NU implementation of ;
i this plan.
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12.8. Has the NRC supported whistleblowers? ]
Answer:
Yes. Concerned individuals have brought forward safety-significant issues to the NRC's attention. The NRC evaluates each concern and allegation it receives. In those cases where the NRC substantiates the employee's allegation of discrimination, appropriate agency action is taken. In addition, NUREG-1499, published on January 1994, contains recommendations on changes to improve the NRC's program for handling allegers' concerns and the staff has ' completed action on 43 of the 47 recommendations in this report.
On May 14, 1996, the NRC published a new policy statement " Freedom of- -
! Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of l
Retaliation: Policy Statement," 61 FR 24336. This Policy Statement i l
reemphasizes that licensees and other employers subject to NRC authority should establish and maintain safety-conscious environments within which I employees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to their management and to i the NRC, without fear of retaliation. j l
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27 On May 23, 1996, the NRC published another policy statement, " Protecting the Identity of Allegers and Confidential Sources: Policy Statement," 61 FR 25924.
This Policy Statement updated the Commission's policy for protecting The the revision identity of an individual who has been granted confidentiality.
also described measures taken by the NRC to protect the identity of all individuals who bring safety concerns to the agency, regardless of whether the individual is granted confidentiality.
12.C. Why doesn't someone expose the fact that whistleblowers make mountains out of molehills for profit?
Why have you allowed activists to glorify whistleblowers, belittle regulatory authority, question NRC independence and in essence dictate NRC actions?
Answer:
Although a number of the allegations received by the NRC have been found to not have merit, some allegers have brought valid, safety-significant issues to the NRC's attention. It is the obligation of the agency, in the interest of protecting public health and safety, to evaluate and address potential safety concerns. Thus, it is in the public interest to have allegers bring forward issues that they believe are safety significant and to have the NRC evaluate these jssues. It is the NRC's intent to continue to accept and evaluate potential concerns from all sources in the interest of assuring that safety issues are identified.
12.0. Why are you allowing special interest groups to influence your decision on whether to keep the plants closed, and is that small group worth sacrificing the progress and good work done in the area of nuclear energy?
Answer:
The perception that the NRC's actions regarding restart of Millstone are based
' on a reaction to special interests is not accurate. Although the NRC staff is concerned about the continuing pattern of employee allegations at Millstone, l
' the allegations are not the sole reason for the recent actions regarding the operation of Millstone. Rather, factuai evidence of operations and conditions that do not comply with NRC requirements, revealed through licensee evaluations, NRC inspections and investigations, and NRC followup of allegations, formed the basis for the NRC's actions.
12.E. When will the NRC take some meaningful action to prevent this continued removal of persons raising safety concerns to the NRC, the media and NU?
Why have harassed workers not been returned to their positions?
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! i i 28 Answer:
The NRC does not have the authority to provide the type of personal remedy-described in this question. The D0L provides personal remedies, e.g., i reinstatement and back pay. NRC licensees must comply with the DOL directives.
l 1
The NRC staff has taken action, including notices of violations (N0Vs) and i civil penalties against licensees, in cases where discrimination has been substantiated by DOL or by independent.NRC investigat. ions.
12.F. Why has the NRC not made more of an effort to protect whistleblowers?
Answer:
! 'With the'recent revision-to Management-Directive =8.8, Management of ,
l Allegations, if the NRC receives a credible report from an individual l expressing reasonable fears of retaliation for being engaged in a protected l activity, and the individual is willing to be identified to the licensee, the j appropriate NRC regional administrator or office director will initiate ;
l actions to alert the licensee that the NRC has received information from an :
individual that retaliation may occur for that individual engaging in protected activities and that we expect the licensee to.act appropriately.
The prjmary responsibility for maintaining an environment free of retaliation against whistleblowers rests with each NRC licensee, as well as with '
contractors, subcontractors and employees in the nuclear industry. In those instances in which discrimination is substantiated, the NRC will take action to ensure that licensees maintain environments free from retaliation for employees raising safety concerns. .
12.G. Have you considered hiring Blanch, Del Core, Wilson, etc.?
Answer: j l :
l The NRC's employment policy for technical staff is based on the selection of l personnel with requisite technical skills and quality. The NRC gives no ;
i special. consideration for or against individuals who have previously raised safety concerns within the industry.
- 13. WATCH LIST l
13.A. Questions Reaardina the NRC's Watch List !
How many plants have been put on the watch list?
How have they recovered having been put on the list?
Are there examples of previous problem plant list sites running better? ,
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29 Answer:
Since the Watch List was created in April 1986, 25 nuclear power plant sites (with a total of 41 units) have been placed on the NRC's Watch List (Categories 2 and 3). Of these 26 sites, 8 (for a total of 14 units) have been classified as Category 3.
Most of these plants have responded positively to the increased NRC regulatory attention that results from being placed on the Watch List. These plants were removed from the Watch List after having adequately addressed the problems that led to their placement on the list, and demonstrating their ability to sustain satisfactory performance.
As summarized in the following chart, several plants that have been on the Watch List have implemented sustained performance improvements. These plants are now among the best performing nuclear power plants:
Date Date placed on removed from Summary of Most Watch List Watch List Recent SALP Ratinas Plant 3/95: all SALP Category l's
' Davis-Besse 4/86* 10/86 received SMM recognition
- 6/95:
for superior performance 1/90 12/95: SALP ratings --
Peach Bottom .4/86* three Category 1 and 2&3 one Category 2 Pilgrim 4/86* 1/90 5/96: SALP ratings --
one Category 1 and three Category 2 9/96: SALP ratings --
Turkey Point 4/86* 10/86 four Category 1 3&4 6/87 1/90 6/90 11/96: SALP ratings --
Surry 1 & 2 5/89 three Category 1 and one Category 2 6/94 6/95: SALP ratings --
Brunswick 6/92 four Category 1 1&2
- These facilities were among the initial group of plants that were placed on the Watch List when it was established in 4/86.
As evident in this chart, the plants' performance improvements were generally demonstrated after they had been on the Watch List for long periods (in some-cases, several years). Their attainment of the current high levels of performance occurred after several more years of sustained improvement.
i 30 l
l 13.B. Northeast Utilities Plants Will Connecticut reactors be put on the watch list after startup until they have demonstrated their ability to follow NRC regulations and requirements?
What event or events caused Millstone to go from a Category 2 to a Category 3 between January and June 19967 l
l Answer:
The three Millstone units are currently in Category 3. The Commission will not allow the units to start up until the staff has verified that the licensee has corrected deficiencies that impact safe operation. In addition, by
- implementing NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart l Approval," the staff will' verify the-licensee's readiness to resume plant i operations. These actions will provide assurance that the Millstone units can ;
! follow NRC regulations and requirements. If the Commission approves restart, '
each unit will be placed in Watch List Category 2, where it will remain until
. it has demonstrated that satisfactory performance can be sustained.
L Directors of NU voted December 4,1996, to close down permanently the Haddam l
Neck nuclear power plant.
In January 1996, Millstone Unit I was already shut down for refueling. Unit 2 l
was shut down on February 20, 1996, because of deficiencies identified with the potential for clegging of the high pressure safety injection throttle valves. Unit 3 was shut down on March 30, 1996, because of deficiencies l
identified with the auxiliary feedwater system containment isolation valves.
Additionally, NRC special inspections at Millstone during the spring of 1996 identified deficiencies in engineering and in the conformance of the plants to ,
their FSARs. All three units were issued letters under 10 CFR 50.54(f) requiring each unit to affirm its compliance with the rules and regulations :
and its licensing bases before plant-restart.
Because of the significance and programmatic nature of the concerns evolving !
from the various NRC reviews and inspections at the Millstone station, and the i fact that each unit is shut down pending resolution of these issues, the Commission chose to place the plants in Category 3. This action was taken to ,
ensure that the Commission will vote on whether to allow plant restart, and, in so doing, satisfy itself that items needed for safe operation have been addressed and that there is a process in place to resolve outstanding matters.
- 14. COMMUNICATIONS Do you agree there appears to be a failure to communicate between the public and the nuclear-industrial complex, and would you be willing to
- staff a local Office of Ombudsman position?
?
! Do you think it beneficial to set up a public library of all Millstone i documents at the Connecticut College federal repository, or permit public l access to all NRC documents via the internet? ;
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31 Why isn't the public being given all information for restart, and equal time as the NRC and Millstone to review those documents prior to the restart public meeting?
How will the Chairman demonstrate leadership in not allowing people afraid of technology to instill fear in communities?
Why not hold meetings at more proper times, say 7-7:30 so more employed people could attend?
Could the public be informed honestly about the amount and times of low or higher radiation releases within the last 10 years?
Answer:
NRC policy on public meetings calls for " conducting business in an open manner, while balancing the need for the NRC staff to exercise its regulatory and safety responsibilities without undue administrative burden".' By conducting meetings in the vicinity of the site, the NRC intends to inform the local residents about the status of the facilities and other areas of public interest.
The NRC staff has made recent efforts to improve communications with the public, about Millstone activities. In April 1996, the NRC set up an additional local public document room (LPDR) at the Waterford Library to help the citizens of Waterford access key Millstone and NRC documents. The NRC staff held meetings in March, May, July, August, September, and December of 1996 to answer the public's questions on Millstone or on any other topics the public raised. After several public meetings between the licensee and the NRC, such as the recent pre-enforcement conference on December 5, 1996, the NRC staff has been available to answer questions from the public. The NRC will continue to have public meetings on roughly a bimonthly basis to keep the public informed of the current status of the activities of the licensee and At the meeting the NRC, inspection result findings, and enforcement actions.
on August 20, 1996, the NRC staff solicited the public's comments on the licensee's restart plan for Millstone Unit 3 and provided an outline of the NRC's restart approval assessment plan. The staff further outlined its plan for restart of any unit at the meeting on December 17, 1996.
In addition, the public will be invited to observe future meetings between the l
NRC and the licensee. Meetings at which there are interactions between NRC staff and the licensee in the conduct of regulatory activities are normally l
conducted during the normal working hours for the personnel involved. These meetings will include (1) periodic meetings to discuss the status of the NRC's activities regarding restart of each of the Millstone units, (2) periodic meetings to discuss the licensee's configuration management plan at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, and (3) the status and results of the ICAVP for each Millstone unit.
' Management Directive 3.5, Revised October 3.1994.
4 i 32 The staff schedules public meetings with sufficient advance notice for public involvement and attempts to make pertinent information available to the public l in advance of the meetings. If information is recently issued by the licensee and is voluminous, logistics of reproduction and distribution may create a problem for both the staff and the public. In such cases, the nature of the l meeting will have a bearing on whether the meeting should be rescheduled to i allow for broader distribution of documents. For example, the full text of the July 2, 1996 Northeast Utilities' submittal of about 800 pages did not get full distribution before the July 24, 1996, meeting because the NRC staff did not regard the document.as. a.startup proposal,. but rather as a status. report.
While the staff, as well as the public, had not had time to thoroughly complete its review of the document, both the staff and the public benefitted from listening to 'an overview description of licensee activities at that time.
Bulky licensee documents that are provided to the LPDRs in microfiche form i
have a delay associated with them that makes timeliness a problem. When such documents arrive at the-NRC mailroom, the reproduction and distribution necessary before sending a copy to the microfiche contractor takes several :
days; and the microfiche processing by the contractor and subsequent mailing takes 2 to 3 weeks. Recognizing this, the staff handcarried hard copies of pertinent documents to the LPDR mail rooms before the July 24, 1996, meeting.
The NRC attempts to balance the schedular needs of the meeting participants l when holding meetings with the licensee which are open to the public.
Although the NRC has occasionally conducted meetings in the evening, most meetings involve details that are best suited to the normal business day.
- However, the NRC staff will take the request for later convening times under ,
consideration when scheduling future briefings with the public.
l Regarding radiation releases, the activity released and the resulting calculated doses for nuclear power plants have been published regularly in two sets of reports: NUREG/CR-2907 (for releases) and NUREG/CR-2850 (for doses).
i Copies of these reports are available from the NTIS (National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161-0002). Furthermore, such information for the-Millstone plants is .available in the Commission's Public Document Room and the local public document room. For Millstone, the latest l
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program report is dated April 23, 1996, and the latest Radioactive Effluent report is dated April 26, 1996,
- 15. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS How do you propose to improve quality assurance relating to safe operation?
What steps have you taken to ensure that the NRC staff responsible for Millstone will quickly change their ways and put the safety of the public first?
What does the NRC plan to do to address the fact that 40% of its own people are afraid to bring up safety issues?
( What precautions are being taken to ensure this situation doesn't happen i again?
33 What procedures have been implemented to prevent the lack of NRC oversight cited in the IG reports of 12/21/95 case # 95-771, 5/31/96 case # 96-025 and 7/23/96 case # 96-055?
What will the NRC do to demonstrate that the public can have confidence?
How soon will problems be corrected?
How do you propose to restore faith in the NRC given that deregulation is putting more economic pressure on utilities, and the NRC in the past has responded more to the needs of the utilities than public safety?
Answer:
As discussed earlier, the NRC staff has requested that the licensee for Millstone describe the actions planned at each facility to ensure that future operation of each facility would be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the plant's operating license, the Commission's regulations, and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. The NRC has classified the Millstone site as a Category 3 facility, requiring the plant to remain shut down until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensure substantial improvement. This also requires the NRC staff to obtain Commission approval by vote prior to restart.
~
Because of concerns about the history of programmatic weakness and failures to implement effective corrective actions in the area of design and configuration control, the NRC staff identified a need for an independent review to verify the adequacy of the licensee's efforts. The licensee agreed to this approach, and on August 13, 1996, submitted its plan and commitment for an independent review. The NRC staff is closely monitoring the independent review effort, as well as other restart activities. To ensure that its restart review efforts provide objective measures of restart readiness for each Millstone unit, the NRC staff will follow the process outlined in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval."
To correct the issues that reflect on the manner in which the staff conducted certain Millstone inspections and licensing activities in the past, the NRC established a Special Projects Office (SP0) within NRR to oversee inspection and licensing activities at the Millstone site. As previously mentioned, in addition to licensing and inspection activities, the SPO will be responsible for (1) oversight of the ICAVP, (2) oversight of NU's corrective actions related to safety issues involving employee concerns, and (3) inspections necessary to implement NRC oversight of the plant's restart activities.
The NRC has made recent efforts to improve communications with the public about Millstone activities. Further, the NRC continues to strive for more efficient methods of keeping the public informed about NRC actions and activities at each nuclear facility.
The NRC has taken significant actions as a result of the problems at Millstone and other nuclear sites. The NRC continues to look for ways to regulate more efficiently and effectively and remains focused on its primary responsibility
! 34 for ensuring the safe operation of the plant within the terms of the facility license and protecting public health and safety from radiological l consequences.
l
- 16. MISCELLANEOUS 16.A. What is the background of NRC officials involved with safety concerns (engineers, scientists, technologists?)
l Answer:
The NRC staff involved with safety concerns has a diverse mix of scientific, engineering, and technical expertise, and includes experience in designing,
! building, and operating nuclear facilities. The overwhelming majority of these people have university degrees in either scientific or engineering disciplines such as> nuclear engineering; physics; electrical-engineering; civil engineering; hydrogeology; environmental engineering; health physics; mechanical engineering; chemistry; and mathematics. Their work experience is J also diverse, and, in addition to their NRC experience, includes work in areas l of nuclear power plants, research facilities, engineering firms, and the U.S.
l Navy's nuclear power program.
16.B. Will the NRC continue to exercise policy of " discretionary enforcement" with regard to utility oversight?
Answer:
We assume this question refers to Notices of Enforcement Discretion (N0EDs).
N0EDs are part of the NRC's Enforcement Policy and are intended to address j i situations where compliance with license conditions would involve unnecessary ;
plant transients; performance of testing, inspection, or system realignment '
that is inappropriate for the specific plant conditions; or unnecessary delays l in plant startup without a corresponding health and safety benefit. Under l such limited circumstancesc the Policy permits the' staff to refrain from ,
issuing enforcement action when the applicable power reactor Technical 1 Specification or other license condition is not met. N0EDs are expected to be l l exercised infrequently and are appropriate only when the situation is j temporary, nonrecurring, and the NRC is clearly satisfied that the NOED is I consistent with protecting the public health and safety.
l In 1994 and 1995, staff and Office of Inspector General reviews of the staff's
! compliance with and implementation of the N0E0 Policy determined that some
[ aspects of the staff's guidance and procedures needed clarification to ensure proper implementation of the Policy. In November 1995, revised staff guidance was issued in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 and was made available to licensees and the public via NRC Administrative Letter 95-05. The N0ED is a regulatory tool that the NRC will continue to use in limited situations where its use is justified in accordance with the Policy and the protection of public health and safety. ,
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i 35 16.C.asIsDr.it DePlanque a conflict toofbeinterest or collusion for former Commissioners suc a member of a utility Board of Trustees?
Answer:
Federal ethics statutes do not preclude former NRC Commissioners from serving on the Board of Directors of a utility. The government-wide post-employment restrictions limit a former Commissioner's ability to represent private parties before the NRC or other Federal agencies, particularly during the first 2 years following the termination of NRC employment. Former NRC Commissioners serving on corporate boards are able to limit their activities on behalf of a utility so that they do not personally interact with the NRC in contravention of the applicable statutory provisions.
16.D. What is the name and type of all radioactive gases discharged at all U.S. reactors?
Answer:
Releases of radioactive material are governed by 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 and by limits established in the license of each reactor facility. The NRC obtains information about radioactive releases from licensed nuclear reactors to verify.that they are within regulatory requirements.
Airborne radioactive effluents are divided into three types of radioactive material: gas, particulate, and radiciodine. The gas group is further divided into two groups: noble gases and tritium vapor. The name of each radionuclide and its type released into the atmosphere from licensed nuclear reactors is given below.
AIRBORNE GASES Tritium Vapor Noble Gas Argon-41 Hydrogen-3 Krypton-85, -87, -88 Xenon-131, -133, -135, -137, -138 PARTICULATES Sodium-24 Ruthenium-103 Cadmium-109 Chromium-51 Manganese-54 Silver-110 Iron-55 Tin-ll3 Cobalt-58, -60 Tellurium-123 Antimony-124, -125 Zinc-65 Cesium-134, -137, -138 Arsenic-76 Barium-139, -140 Bromine-82 Cerium-141, -143, -144 Strontium-89, -90, -91 Yttrium-91 Lanthanum-140 Niobium-95, -97 Osmium-191 Zirconium-95 Neptunium-239 Molybdenum-99 Americium-241 Technetium-99
. c.
l 36 RADIOI0 DINES l
Iodine-131, -132, -133, -135 The doses from all gases, particulates, and radiciodines released to the air i
from a nuclear power plant results in a maximum possible dose to a person I
living immediately adjacent to the plant of about 1 or 2 mrem /yr. The further you live from the plant, the lower the potential dose. To put this into perspective, a person would receive about 60 mrem from a set of dental x-rays.
l The average dose in the U.S. from natural background radiation is about 300 mrem /yr. And, the average dose in the U.S. from all uranium mining, milling, fuel fabrication, power production, and waste disposal is less than 0.1 mrem /yr.
16.E. When will the nuclear tests begun in Nevada on June 18, 1996, be vented to atmosphere ~and who monitors?"
Answer:
Weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site is outside of the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Questions in this area should be addressed to the U.S Department of Energy.
16.F. hen will the two Commissioner vacancies be filled?
Answer:
The vacancies are now filled. President Clinton nominated Dr. Nils J. Diaz of Florida and Edward McGaffigan, Jr., of Virginia to become Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The new Commissioners were confirmed by the Senate August 2. Commissioner Diaz joined the Commission on August 23, 1996.
Commissioner McGaffigan joined the Commission on August 28, 1996.
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i 37 i 16.E. When will the nuclear tests begun in Nevada on June 18, 1996, be vented to atmosphere and who monitors?
Answer:
Weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site is outside of the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Questions in this area should be addressed to the U.S. Department of Energy.
16.F. When will the two Commissioner vacancies be filled?
Answer:
The vacancies are now filled. President Clinton nominated Dr. Nils J. Diaz of Florida and Edward McGaffigan, Jr., of Virginia to become Commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The new Commissioners were confirmed by the Senate August 2. Commissioner Diaz joined the Commission on August 23, 1996.
Commissioner McGaffigan joined the Commission on August 28, 1996.
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38 REFERENCES i
l
- 1. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, Sources. Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiaton. New York: United Nations, 1988. Page 17.
- 2. Hatch, Maureen C., Jan Breyea, Jari W. Neves and Mervyn Susser, " Cancer Near the Three Mile Island Nucleae Plant: Radiation Emissions," Am. J. j Epidemiology. Vol .132, No.3, pp 3'.17-412 (September 1990).
- 3. Rogovin, Mitchell, et a1., Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public. Nuclear Regulatory Commission report NUREG/CR-1250, January 1980.
- 4. Jablon, Seymour, Zdenek Hrubecc John D. Boice, and B. S. Stone, Cancer in Populations Living Near Nuclear Facilities. National Institutes of Health Publication 90-874, July 1990.
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9' g-AnTION EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM DUE: 09/09/96 EDO CONTROL: GT96632 DOC DT:-08/19/96 FINAL REPLY:
Chairman's Office (Marylee Slosson)
TO:
.(r Blaha FOR SIGNATURE OF : ** PRI **
CRC NO:
Chairman Jackson DESC:
ROUTING:
QUESTIONS FROM 8/6/96 CHAIRMAN'S VISIT TO Taylor MILLSTONE Milhoan Thompson Blaha Paperiello,NMSS Lieberman, OE DATE: 08/20/96 Miller, RI Norry, ADM ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT: Cranford, IRM Bird, OP NRR Russell Cyr,0GC SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:
Prepare letter to Thomas Sheridan for the Chairman's Signature,
- j Coordinate w/other offices as appropriate.
If you would like the q's e-mailed to you, please
[ contact Margo (415-1718) i I NRR RECEIVED: AUGUST 20, 1996 NRR ACTION: DRPE:VARGA NRR ROUTING: RUSSELL MIRAGLIA THADANI ZIMMERMAN MARTIN B0HRER