IR 05000440/1986010

Insp Rept 50-440/86-10 on 860225-0320.No Violations or Deficiencies Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Undocumented Electrical Cable Tray Hanger Splicing & Followup Insp of Allegations Re Liquid Radwaste Pipe Welds

ML20138C412
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	03/28/1986
From:	Neisler J, Phillips M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138C394	List: IR 05000440/1986010 ML20138C390
References
50-440-86-10, NUDOCS 8604020486
Download: ML20138C412 (5)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-440/86010(DRS)

Docket No. 50-440 License No. CPPR-148

~ Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuniinating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101 Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit I r Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, OH Inspection Conducted: February 25 through March 20, 1986 Inspector: /'J. &H. Neisler 7!2fthG Date Approved By: Chief M2 [

Operational Programs Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on February 25 through March 20, 1986 (Report No. 50-440/86010(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Licensee activities relative to previously identified issues;

followup inspection of allega.tions regarding liquid radioactive waste pipe welds and undocumented electrical cable tray hanger splicin Results

No violations, deficiencies, or unresolved issues were identifie m*We844

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Principle Licensee Employees

• C. Shuster, Manager, Quality Assurance

• E. Riley, General Supervisor, Quality Assurance

• E. Parker, Unit Supervisor, Pipe /I&C, Quality Assurance R. Mattys, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer

• K. Cimarelli, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer

• T. Bass, Supervisor, Call for Quality T. Trail, Quality Engineer-

A. Thelon, Engineering

• T. Heatherly, Operations Engineer

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• B. Ferrell, Licensing Engineer

• Kritzer, Unit Supervisor, Civil Quality Assurance

• Denotes those persons 'ttending the exit intervie . Licensee Action on Previously-Identified Items (Closed) Open Item (440/85033-01): Verify that Division 3 ATWS cabling is routed in separate conduits from the Division 3 HPCs cabling (ICSB trip

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report, Section 2.D.). The licensee's analysis has determined that no single failure will cause loss of both Division 1 and Division 3 ESF ~

busses. Coordination tests of the existing breakers and similar fuses have been completed. The licensee has committed to provide further isolation by installing a Class 1E qualified isolation transformer in the power supply to the Division 3 APRMs prior to exceeding five percent

. rated power. .The NRR/ICSB reviewers have accepted this commito.'it. The commitment has been included in Attachment 1 of the Perry operating license as Item B.3. This action'also closed 10 CFR 50.55(e) item (440/85021-EE) (DAR 248).

(Closed) Construction deficiency report (440/85023-EE) (DAR 259):

Moisture in the instrument air system. Moisture in the system resulted from operation of.the system with the air dryers out of service for periodic maintenance and the after. filters bypassed, permitting possible contamination of the system with particulate matter. This item was discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-440/85084, as part of allegation No. RIII-85 -A-0205. All corrective action has been completed to return the system to design conditions and procedural modifications completed to preclude' recurrenc . . Allegation (RIII-85-A-0076) LK Comstock hanger installers were splicing electrical cable tray hangers without proper authorization and

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documentation.

I NRC Review: The inspector reviewed four nonconformance reports for undocumented spliced hangers in the reactor building and three nonconformance reports in the control buildin ;

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Hanger splicing without approval was initially identified by the LK Comstock quality control inspectors in the reactor building. An independent contractor, Mangaflux Corporation, was hired to determine the extent of the unauthorized hanger splicing. All safety-related cable tray hangers were examined using eddy current to detect the splices. Of the 161 hangers examined, four were found to have been spliced without proper authorization. .Nonconformance reports were initiated on the four spliced hangers. The nonconformance reports were reviewed by the architect / engineer and dispositioned "use as is," based on their determination that the splices did not reduce the structural strength.of the hanger below design requirement Eddy current examinations of 118 electrical cable tray hangers in the control complex revealed three splice indications. The areas where the indications appeared were polished and micro-etched to reveal that only one of the hangers had been spliced. The architect / engineer evaluated the spliced hanger and determined that it met structural design requirements. The NRC inspector's examination of the splice weld revealed no unacceptable indications in the wel Conclusion: This allegation is substantiated, in that, there had been undocumented and unauthorized splicing of electrical cable tray hanger However, the spliced hangers have been evaluated and determined to meet design requirement . Allegation (RIII-86-A-0024). A local n!wspaper reporter provided the Perry resident inspection office with a legations concerning welds in the

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liquid radioactive waste system. The a71egations are: Isometric Drawing No. 0G50-220. Spool Pieces 239, 240. and 24 These spool pieces contain two welds at an elbow that are alleged to be deficien Isometric Drawing No. 0G50-74, Spool Pieces 359 and 360. Two welds at an elbow are alleged to be deficient, and three welds at a "T" are all.eged to be deficien Isometric Drawing No. 0G50-75, Spool Piece 362. Two welds at a 90 degree elbow are alleged to be deficien Isometric Drawing No. GG50-44, Spool Pieces 478, 479, 488, and 48 Three welds are alleged to be deficient at a "T", and two additional on those spools are alleged to be deficien Isometric Drawing No. 0G50-78, Spool Pieces 375, 376, 377, and 378

- contain stainless steel piping welds which are alleged to be deficien Isometric Drawing No. 0G50-20, Spool Pieces 105, 106, 107, and 10 Carbon steel piping butt welds at 90 degree elbows on those spool

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pieces are alleged to be deficient.

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,. . Isometric Drawing No. 0G50-36, Spool Piece G-50-G-LRW-461 field weld No.1 and 25 to 30 additional welds on that drawing are alleged to be deficien Welding in the pipe chases at elevations 574 and 602 in the radwaste building are deficient. The alleger felt that the discrepancies or deficiencies in these welds could not be disclosed without

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radiographic examination of the weld NRC Review: The liquid radioactive waste system at Perry was desigr,ed, fabricated, inspected, and tested according to the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide (Reg. Guide) 1.143 and ANSI B31.1-1973 Power Piping Cod The design pressure for the system is 125 psi and temperature of 215 ANSI B31.1, Table 136.4 requires a visual inspection of pipe welds in systems of less than 1025 psi and 350-750 F. Visual inspections by qualified quality control inspectors of welds in the liquid radioactive waste system were performed according to ANSI B31.1 requirements using the acceptance criteria specified. in Paragraph 136.4.2 of the cod ANSI B31.1, Paragraph 137.4.6, requires piping to be hydrostatically tested at 100% of the design pressure. The inspector verified, by review of the hydrostatic test results, that the piping had been tested to 150%

of the design pressure. .The tests were witnessed'by a State of Ohio inspector. Reg Guide 1.143 requires the test pressure be maintained for a minimum of 30 minutes. The inspector verified that the minimum test times were as required by Reg Guide 1.14 The inspector. visually inspected the welds in approximately 500 feet of pipe in the liquid radioactive waste system including the pipe chase and those accessible spool pieces identified by the alleger; no rejectable welds were observed. Additionally, the inspector reviewed liquid penetrant examination reports of welds in the liquid radioactive . waste system, no unacceptable indications were identified in the examination reports. The licensee's construction quality section also inspected the liquid radioactive waste system in February 1986. No unacceptable welds were identified in the spool pieces with the alleged weld deficiencie The inspector reviewed Procedure OM13B: RWI-4-14 and Plant Equipment Rounds - Radwaste Operation Checklist OM18: 0AP-1702. .These plant operations procedures ard checklists require liquid radioactive waste system inspections at e.ght hour intervals during plant operation The inspector reviewed the licensee's calculated material thickness requirements for the piping in the liquid radioactive waste system and performed independent calculations using calculation methods specified in ANSI B31.1-1973. In all cases, the observed weld thicknesses were almost ten times the required thickness for the 125 psi design pressure of the

~ piping syste The alleger suggested radiogrcphic examination of the welds in the liquid radioactive waste system piping. This system is classed as a nonsafety-related system. The applicable code, ANSI B31.1, for the design, fabrication, and testing requires only visual examinations and

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a hydrostatic test of the system. There are no provisions or criteria for radiographic examinations for low pressure and temperature systems. NRC Reg. Guide 1.143 requires visual inspections and a hydrostatic pressure of

.150% of the design pressure, not radiograph . Conclusion. There are no requirements for radiographic examination of pipe welds in this system. The licensee reinspected all'the allegedly deficient welds. The NRC inspector inspected some of the welds and reviewed the results of nondestructive examinations of others. Welds were calculated to exceed material thickness requirements. Based on the welds meeting e. ode and regulatory guide requirements, this allegation is not substantiate . Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment The inspector also discussed the likely infcemational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar .

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