ML20132B605

Insp Repts 50-269/85-25,50-270/85-25 & 50-287/85-25 on 850422-26 & 0703.Violation Noted:Trains a & B of Unit 1 Reactor Bldg Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Inoperable,Contrary to 830318 Confirmatory Order Re NUREG-0737 post-TMI Items

ML20132B605
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	09/11/1985
From:	Debs B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20132B546	List: ML20132B541 ML20132B605
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-269-85-25, 50-270-85-25, 50-287-85-25, NUDOCS 8509260246
Download: ML20132B605 (3)

See also: IR 05000269/1985025

Text

c..

2 Kic

UNITED STATES

[$

'o

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[

-

p

REGION 18

g

,j

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

\\...../

Report Nos.: 50-269/85-25, 50-270/85-25, and 50-287/85-25

Licensee: Duke Power Conpany

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287

License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and

DPR-55

Facility Name: Oconee 1, 2, and 3

Inspection Conducted: April 22 - 26 1985, and July 3, 1985

Inspector:

M

/

7e

B. T. Debs

!

Date 5 gned

Approved By:

M

7 /'

B. T. Debs, Acting Section Chief

Date Signed

Operational Programs Section

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

This refers to an inspection conducted on April 22 - 26, 1985, and an Enforcement

Conference held in Atlanta, Georgia, with members of Duke Power staff on July 3,

1985, to discuss the operability status of Unit I containment atmosphere hydrogen

monitors as documented in Inspection Report 50-269/85-09, 50-270/85-09, and

50-287/85-09.

The Enforcement Conference provided NRC Region II staff with a

better understanding of the past operability status of the licensee's containment

atmosphere hydrogen monitors.

The Enforcement Conference also provided Duke

Power staff with a better understanding of. the regulatory requirements which

apply to these monitors.

8509260246 850919

PDR

ADOCK 05000269

G

PDR

L

'

m ;

_

_

_

. - _ _ _ .

-

. .

--

-

.

.

.

_ -_ . ___

-

.

.

i

!

DETAILS

,

1.

Attendance at.the Duke - NRC Enforcement Conference on July 3, 1985, at the

ll

NRC's Region II Office included:

l

Duke Power Company

i

H. B. Tucker, Vice President,' Nuclear Production

K. S. Canady, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

,

M. Tuckman, Station Manager, Oconee

1

'

N. Rutherford, System Engineer, Licensing

K. R. Caraway, Supervising Design Engineer

R. Bond, Compliance Engineer

i.

T. Glenn, I&E Support Engineer

'

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator

i

Roger D. Walker, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)

i

A. F. Gibson, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)

G. R. Jenkins, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff

C. A. Julian, Acting Chief, Operational Branch, DRS

B. T. Debs, Acting Chief, Operational Programs Section, DRS

H. C. Dance, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2A, DRP

'

W. T. Orders, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire

1

L. P. Modenos, Enforcement Specialist

K. Sasser, Resident Inspector, Oconee

A. Bill Beach, IE, Enforcement

L. Trocine, Enforcement Specialist

,

2.

Exit Interview

-

l

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3,1985, with

i

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the

NRC.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

'

URI 269, 270, 287/85-09-03, Unit 1 Reactor Building Hydrogen Monitoring

i

a.

SystemOperability,(Closed)

On July 3, 1985, an enforcement conference was held with respresenta-

tives of the Duke Power Company and the NRC in Atlanta, Georgia, to

discuss the aforementioned item.

I

4

. , - _

y_,

, __. - _ . _ _ . . _ , - . . . , - - . , . -

. - _ - _ . _ _ -

.,...-,---.--.--.%

,

y,y

,y-

%,,.-.y--

-

.-,,v.e-,

,.

,

---

aw,

c-.

- , .

-

"

.

.

2

Duke Power Company representatives discussed Oconee's pre-TMI and

'

post-TMI containment hydrogen monitoring capability.

They also

presented a historical description of Oconee's implementation of Item

II.F.1.6 of NUREG-0737 to provide continuous indications of hydrogen

concentration in containment.

Additionally, Duke Power Company

discussed their proposed technical specifications for the post-TMI

containment hydrogen monitors and their current method of detennining

system operability. The presentation also provided a history of Oconee

Unit 1 containment hydrogen monitor perfonnance and operability.

In conclusion, Duke Power Company acknowledged that for a period of

time in early 1985, both Trains A and B of Oconee's Unit I containment

hydrogen monitoring system were technically . inoperable due to failed

calibrations, but that the system was functionally operable since there

was hydrogen concentration indication although outside the existing

calibration acceptance criteria.

Duke Power Company maintained that

the significance of having technically inoperable hydrogen monitoring

during this time is mitigated since Oconee procedures suggest that

containment hydrogen recombiners be operating shortly after an accident

to preclude an explosive hydrogen atmosphere. Since Unit I containment

'

hydrogen monitor trains A and B were technically inoperable from

March 6,1985, to March 26, 1985. This condition represents a violation

of 10 CFR 50.44(b) (269, 270, 287/85-25-01).

As a result of this event, the licensee recognized the need for more

definitive actions to assure operability of TMI related equipment which

are not currently covered by existing Technical Specifications.

1

b.

URI 269, 270, 287/85-09-05, Reactor Building Spray Setpoint, (Closed).

At the conference described in the aforementioned item, it was

concluded that the less than or equal to 30 psig setpoint for reactor

building spray initiation as it appears in the licensee's Technical

Specifications is technically correct for loss of coolant accidents.

Licensee representatives stated that assumptions and values regarding

this setpoint which appear in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis

,

.

Report would be changed to accurately support the technical specifica-

i

tion value.

This item is therefore considered closed with no

violations or deviations noted.

l