IR 05000266/1992027

Insp Repts 50-266/92-27 & 50-301/92-27 on 921123-930103.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security & Engineering & Technical Support

ML20127C978
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	01/08/1993
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127C969	List: IR 05000266/1992027 ML20127C964
References
50-266-92-27, 50-301-92-27, NUDOCS 9301150049
Download: ML20127C978 (10)

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. 'I U.S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION i REGION 111 Report Nos. 50-266/92027(DRP); 50-301/92027(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 License No. DPR-24; DPR-27-Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Rivers, Wisconsin Dates: November 23, 1992, through January 3, 1993 Inspectors: K. R. Jury J. Gadzala Approved By: % I gN- H 2-I. N. Jack's, Chief Date Reactor jects_Section 3A Jaspection Summary Inspection-from November 23, 1992. throuah Jcnuary 3. 199 (Reports No. 50-266/92027(DRP): No. 50-301/92027(DRP)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of ,

corrective actions on previous findings; plant operations; radiological controlst maintenance and surveillance; emergency preparedness; security;_

engineering and techn_ical support; and safety assessment / quality-verificatio Res_ults:

s One inspector' followup' item was identified. - An Executive Summary follow Plant Opfrations

~ Unit 1 operated at 100% power during this period with the exception of a reduction to 55% power' on _ November _27 to repair the B main- feedwater pump suction relief valve (paragraph-3a.).

Unit _2 steam generator tube plugging allowed the unit to achieve only 99%

power (paragraph 3b.).

On December 16, control rod C-7 slipped 11 inches '(28 cm) from 135 to 124 inches while rods were being stepped outward (paragraph 3b.).

9301150049 930108 gDR ADOCK 05000266 PDR

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Ihree inadvertent chemical discharges in excess of state limitations occurred during the inspection (paragraph-3c.).

Stinienance/ Surveillance A temporary waiver of compliance (TWOC) was requested and granted to f acilitate residual heat removal pump seal replacement. The pump was returned to service prior to the expiration of the original Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO), obviating the need for.the TWOC (paragraph 4a.).

Engineerino and Technical Support On December 8, the licensee identified that the safety injection pumps and containment spray pumps could potentially be damaged if the isolation valves in their common minimum flow line were to fail shut during inservice testing -

(paragraph 5.).

Saitty Assennmal&uality Verification An extensive plant reorganization became effective December 3 (paragraph 6a.).

A licensee event report regarding the inadvertent actuation of an equipment lockout was not complete (paragraph 6b.).

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QETAILS 1 Egrsons Contacted (71707)

• J. Maxfield, Plant Manager

• T. J. Koehler, Site Engineering Manager R. D. Seizert, Training Manager l

• J. f. Becka, Regulatory Services Manager J. G. Schweitzer, Maintenance Manager J. C. Reisenbuechler, Manager - Operations

- N. L. Hoefert, Manager - Production Planning J. J. Bevelacqua, Manager - Health Physics f. P. Hennessy, Manager - Chemistry J. A. Palmer, Manager - Maintenance '

G. R. Sherwood, Manager - Instrument & Controls W, 8. Fromm, Sr. Project Engineer - Plant Engineering T. G. Staskal, Sr. Project Engineer - Performance Engineering +

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W.-J. Herrman, Sr. Project Engineer - Construction Engineering

' A, flentje, Administrative Specialist Other company employees were also contacted including members of the -

technical and engineering staffs, and reactor and auxiliary operator * Denotes the personnel attending the management exit interview for summation of preliminary finding . Cprrective Action on Previous Insoection findinas (927011 IClosed) Inspection follow 00 item (266/91907-01: 301/92007-01):

Guidance for Resetting Tripped Circuit Breakers On_ March- 12, 1992, a fault in a lighting transformer and concurrent degradation of its-supply breaker caused the upstream breaker supplying a safeguards motor control center to open. This supply breaker tripped and was closed three times before the faulty transformer was identified.- The transformer and its: supply breaker were both replaced. The plant has procedural guidance regarding replacement of blown fuses that allows a blown fuse to _

be replaced once. If the fuse blows a second time, the equipment is to be removed from service and the fault determined, No such guidance had been provided-for circuit breakers.

l As a result of this incident, circuit breaker guidance was incorporated into procedure 01-35, " Electrical Equipment Operation". Two new steps-in the procedure direct-the required actions for equipment feeder and. bus feeder breaker reclosure.

Equipment breaker reclosure is to occur only after a technical evaluation except in cases where the equipment is needed immediately. Direction is also provided for stripping downstream

! loads on a bus prior to reclosing its supply breaker. .The

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inspector reviewed the procedure changes and did not have further concerns. This item is close . Plant Opstalions (71702) (93702)

1he inspectors evaluated licensee activities to confirm that the facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. These activities were confirmed by direct observation, facility tours, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel and management, verification of safety system status, and review of facility record To verify equipment operability and compliance with technical specifications (TS), the inspectors reviewed shift logs, Operations'

records, data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment -

malfunctions. Through work observations and discussions with Operations staf f members, the inspectors verified the staff was knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded promptly and properly to alarms, adhered to procedures and applicable administrative controls, was cognizant of in progress-surveillance and maintenance activities, and was aware of inoperable equipment status. The inspectors performed channel verifications and reviewed component status and safety related parameters to verify conformance with TS. Shift changes were cbserved, verifyinq + hat system status continuity was maintained and that proper control , ou staffing existed. Access to the control room was restricted and operations personnel carried out their assigned duties in an effective manner. The inspectors noted professionalism in most f acets of control room operatio Plant tours and perimeter walkdowns were conducted to verify equipment operability, assess the general condition of plant equipment, and to verify that radiological controls, fire protection controls, physical protection controls, and equipment tag out procedures were properly implemente ' Unit 1 Operational Status On November 27, power was reduced to 67% for turbine stop valve-testin During this testing, a failure of the B main feedwater pump suction relief valve required a power reduction to 55% to isolate the pump and repair the relief valve, An unrelated failure of a crossover steam dump control circuit restricted power-to 92% until repairs were affected. The condition was corrected and-full power was restored later that same day. The unit operated at full power during the remainder of this period with only requested load following power reduction Unit 2 Operational Status Due to the steam generator tube plugging performed during the recent refueling outage, the unit was only able to achieve 99%

power with all four turbine governor valves fully opened and Tavg

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at the midpoint of the normal operating band. Equivalent tube plugging levels for the Unit 2 steam generators were 12.9% for the A steam generator and 13.0% for the B steam generator. Flow measurements made while the unit was paused at 95% power subsequently determined total reactor coolant system flow rate to have been 181,873 gp This was only 73 gpm above the minimum flow required by technical specifications at rated powe Power was therefore reduced to 95% pending completion of engineering analysis and additional flow measurements. Based on data of flow reductions experienced from previous steam generator tube plugging, the plant expected a flow rate of about 182,600 gp The inspectors monitored two subsequent flow measurements performed by different plant engineers. These measurements yielded flow rates of 182,805 gpm and 182,876 gpm. Power was then raised to 99%; a subsequent flow measurement at this power level yielded a rate of 183,876 gpm. The plant could not attribute the differences in measured flow to other than data scatter due to the manual acquisition of raw flow parameters. Since Unit 2 steam generator tube plugging is expected to continue at the current rate, Wisconsin Electric is planning to submit a technical specification change to reduce the. minimum required RCS flow rat , On December 16, while Bank D rods were being stepped outward, control rod C-7 slipped 11 inches (28 cm) from 135 to 124 inche Temperature, reactor thermal output, and pressurizer pressure all responded as expected to the partially dropped rod. Subsequent troubleshooting could not find a fault in either the rod or its control circuitry. Operators reduced reactor power to 90% and verified control rod operability in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure, A0P-6B. The rod was then declared operable and restored to its previous Bank D positio Reactor power was then restored to 99%-powe c. Chemical Spills The plant experienced three inadvertent chemical-discharges in excess of state limitations, necessitating notification to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. The circumstances surrounding these events _ are briefly discussed below:

Approximately 790 gallons of Sodium Hypochlorite was discharged to Lake Michigan between December 16 and December 18, and an additional 260 gallons was discharged between December 18 and December 20. Any discharge over 70 gallons requires state notification. The two discharges involved different flow paths and both discharges occurred when isolation valves did not properly shut following routine circulating water chlorination evolutions. The spills were discovered when routine log readings of chemical tank-levels shued a decreasing tren l

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On December 27, about 300 gallons of sulfuric acid was inadvertently discharged to Lake Michigan. The state limit is 70 gallons. Two events in series led up to this event. A valve manipulation error on the_ water treatment system caused the sulfuric acid addition tank to overflow into the water treatment system waste well tank. This tank is routinely pumped to the effluent sump, which also receives drainage from the' turbine building sump Normally, the effluent sump is pumped to a retention pond for large volume dilution and long term discharge to Lake Michigan. However, because the effluent sump. pumps were inoperable, a portable pump was used to pump the effluent sump contents (18,000 gallons of waste water containing-300 gallons of acid), into a drainage ditch leading directly into the lak The licensee had recently evaluated the circumstances surrounding previous spills to determine if there was a human performance trend evident. As a result of common causal factors for the previous events, coupled with the three events in December, a review / investigation is to be performed to formulate effective corrective actio . Maintenance / Surveillance Observation (62703) (61726) Maintenance The inspectors observed safety related maintenance activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with TS, approved procedures, and appropriate industry codes and standards, The inspectors determined that these activities did not violate LCOs and that required redundant components were operabl The inspectors verified that required administrative, material, testing, radiological and fire prevention controls were adhered t Specifically, the inspectors observed / reviewed the following-maintenance activities:

• MWR 926229,-G05 gas turbine relay wiring terminations

• MWR 926335, G05 gas turbine starting solenoid replacement

RMP 8 (Revision 9) Repair RHR Pump (MWR 920847)

On December 21, during performance of Inservice Test IT-04,

" Low Head Safety injection Pumps and Valves (Monthly)",

excessive leakage was found emanating from the 2P-10A RHR pump seal. Upon starting the pump, the seal began leaking at about 200 drops per minute. This leakage abated after about one minute, then resumed and slowly increased to about one half. gallon per minute (2 liters per minute) towards the end of the 15 minute pump ru This exceeded the maximum

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- leakage from the RHR system allowed by Technical Specification 15.4.4.IV of 2 gallons per hour (7.6 liters per hour). The pump was consequently declared inoperable andthe24hourlimitingconditionforoperation(LCO)

entered at 12:18 a.m. for testing, remained in'effec Technical Specification 15.3.3. A.3.a allows one RHR pump to be out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. A spare pump assembly is maintained on site and actions were initiated to replace the leaking assembly with the spare. Replacement and post maintenance testing normally requires less.than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to perform, if the evolution is planned. Due to minor delays encountered during the replacement activity, it appeared that the pump might not be restored to operability within the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period. As a result, the licensee requested and was granted, a temporary waiver of compliance from the requirements of Technical Specification 15.3.3. A.3.a for a period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to allow returning the pump to service without placing an unnecessary transient on the plan Pump replacement and testing was_ completed at -12:09 December 22, at which time the pump was declared in servic This was 9 minutes prior to the expiration of the original 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period allowed by the Technical Specification LC Therefore, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> extension granted by the temporary waiver was not invoked. The inspector monitored pump assembly replacement and reviewed the plant's justification for requesting the temporary waiver, b. Surveillance The inspectors observed certain safety related surveillance

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activities on systems and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with license requirement For the surveillance test procedures listed below, the inspectors determined that precautions and LCOs were adhered to, the required administrative approvals and tag-outs were obtained prior to test initiation, testing was accomplished by qualified personnel in accordance with an approved test procedure, test instrumentation was properly calibrated, the tests were completed at the required frequency, and that the tests conformed to TS requirements. Upon test completion, the inspectors verified the recorded test data-l was complete, accurate, and met TS requirements; test discrepancies were properly documented and rectified; and that the systems were properly returned to service.

[ Specifically, the inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected portions

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of the following test activities:

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- * IICP-02.0ll-1 (Revision 0), Analog Rod Position Monthly Surveillance Test

• RESP 6.2 (Revision 5), Precision RCS Flow Heasurement Enaineerina and Technical Support (71707)

The inspectors evaluated engineering and technical support activities to determine their involvement and support of facility operations. This was accomplished during the course of routine evaluation of facility events and concerns, through direct observation of activities, and -

discussions with engineering personnel, Potential Inoperability of Safety System Pumos On December 8, the licensee notified the NRC that the safety injection pumps and containment spray pumps could potentially be damaged if the isolation valves in the minimum flow line were to fail shut during an inservice test. The minimum flow lines for both safety injection. trains and both containment spray trains join at a common header to provide a return path to the refueling water storage tank (RWST). Valves SI-897A and SI-897B provide series isolation of this common header to prevent highly contaminated water from being transferred to the RWST during the containment sump recirculation mode of safety injection under accident condition This issue was initially identified by Point Beach and subsequently addressed in NRC Bulletin 86-03, " Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valve in Minimum Flow-Recirculation line". Corrective action to prevent inadvertent isolation of this common header was to gag open the two isolation valves during reactor operation. During quarterly inservice tests IT-40 and IT-45, however, these valves are ungagged and stroke The licensee postulated that if a small break loss of coolant accident were to occur during testing, and

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one or both of the valves were to fail shut, and reactor coolant system pressure did not drop below the 1500 psi shutoff head of the pump, damage to the pumps would occu Although performance of this inservice test creates the potential for a single failure to render a safety system inoperable under certain conditions, the situation is analogous to that experienced during testing of any safety system when the single failure criteria is temporarily relaxed to permit removing a component from service. However, the plant intends to seek relief from the code requirement to test these valves on a quarterly basis and instead, test them annually when the reactor is shutdown for refueling. This item remains open pending initiation of revisions to the plant's inservice test procedure-to remove testing of these isolation valves during reactor operation (266/92027-01).

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6. Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification (40500) (90712) (92700) Plant Manaaement Reoroanization In the wake of a reorganization of the Nuclear Power Department corporate office on November 20, Wisconsin Electric announced a reorganization of Point Beach plant management. Effective December 3, the position of Production Manager was created. This position oversees Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, )

Chemistry, and Production Planning (new group). A Site ,

Engineering Manager position, reporting to the Plant Manager, was l created to centralize on site engineering activitie I Additionally, Site Services (which will include security),

Training, and Regulatory Services will also report directly to the Plant Manager. The inspectors discussed these changes with senior ,

corporate managemen ' Licensee Event Report (LER) Review The inspectors reviewed LERs submitted to the NRC to verify that the details were clearly reported, including accuracy of the description and corrective action taken. The inspector determined whether further information was required, whether generic implications were indicated, and whether the event warranted onsite follow up. The following LERs were reviewed:

301/92-006-00 (0 pen) Inadvertent ESF Actuation as a Result of As-Built Wire Tracing This report describes the inadvertent actuation of an equipment lockout that is designed to strip non-safeguards loads from 480 VAC safeguards bus 2B04. This inadvertent actuation of the 2804 lockout identified a wiring error in the control circuitry for motor control center MCC-821, which did not strip from bus 2B04 during this event as. designed. Details are contained in Inspection Report 266/92023; 301/92023. The trip of this lockout is believed to have occurred when a B train safety injection relay was inadvertently bumped during as-built wire tracing in the Unit 2 safeguards rack This event report did not provide complete details regarding the incident. The event description discusses that output wiring from the 2B04 lockout was not connected to the supply breaker for MCC-B21, but omits details about this wiring being connected to bus 2B03 lockout. The undervoltage relays tripping the supply breaker-to MCC-B21 on loss of voltage was also not discussed. These two details demonstrate how MCC-821 was shed during loss of power testing, thereby preventing previous identification of this wiring error. Discussions with the plant's engineeri_ng personnel also indicated that the review of diesel generator loading under these-conditions may not have included all allowable electrical distribution configuration i

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Following discussions with the inspectors the company decided to issue a supplemental event report to provide the additiona information. This issue remains open pending supplement review and closur /92-007-00 (Closed) Inadvertent ESF Actuation as a Result of Improper Surveillance Testing .

This report describes the automatic starting of emergency diesel generator G02 following deenergization of 4160 VAC safeguards bus 2A0 This bus was deenergized as a result of a personnel error that occurred during the performance of monthly surveillance testing. A violation for failure to follow procedures was cited for this event in Inspection Report 266/92023; 301/9202 . Outstandina Items (92701)

Inspection follow Vo Items Inspection follow up items are matters which have been discussed with Wisconsin Electric management, will be reviewed further by the inspector, and involve some action on the part of the NRC, company or both. A follow up item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in paragraph . Exit Interview (71707)

A verbal summary of preliminary findings was provided to the Wisconsin Electric representatives denoted in Section 1 on January 4, 1993, at the conclusion of the inspection. Written inspection material was not provided to company personnel during the inspectio The likely informational content of the inspection report with.' regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection was also discussed, Wisconsin Electric management did not identify any documents or processes that were reported on as proprietar