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Insp Rept 50-416/92-26 on 921001-1107.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation,Surveillance observation,self-assessment Capability & Action on Previous Insp Findings
	ML20125C693
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	11/24/1992
From:	; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20125C682	List: ML20125C679; ML20125C688; ML20125C693;
References
	50-416-92-26, NUDOCS 9212140039
	Download: ML20125C693 (9)
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UNITED STATES

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Report No.: 50-416/92-26

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Jackson, MS 39205

Docke! No.: 50-416 License l'o.: NPF-29

Facility Name: Gr and Gulf Nuclear Station

Inspection Conducted: October 1 through November 7, 1992

R.H. Bernhard, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

CA. Hugfiey, P.esident Inspector Date Signed

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Approved by:

F.S. CantreTI, Chief Date Signed'~

Reactor Projects Section IB

Division of Reactor Projects

SUK%RY

Scope:

The resident inspectors conducted a routine inspection in the following areas:

operational safety verification, maintenance observation, surveillance

observation, self-assessment capabilit;i, action on previous inspection

findings, reportable occurrences, and the plant lubrication program. The

inspectors conducted backshift inspections on October 5, 19, 21, 27, and

November 2, 1992.

Results:

One violation was identified for failure to follow procedures regarding the

control of a vendor lubrication manual and subsequent manual recommendation

updates (Paragraph 3.a). One non-cited violation was identified for failure

to air roll the Division I Emergency Diesel Generator within the required time

after shutdown (Paragraph 3.b). The licensee met the safety objectives in the

areas of safety verification, maintenance and surveillance activities.

(Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5).

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9212140039 921124

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REPORT DETAILS

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l. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

W. Cottle, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

L. Daughtery, Superintendent, Plant Licensing

, *M. Dietrich, Manager, Training >

J. Dimmette, Manager, Performance and System Engineering

L. Dugger, Manager, Plant Operations

C. Elisaesser, Assistant Operations Manager

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C. Hicks, Operations Superintendent

C. Hutchinson, General Manager, Plant Operations

F. Mangan, Director, Plant Projects and Support

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M. Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs

D. Pace, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

J. Roberts, Manager. Plant Maintenance

R. Ruffin, Plant Licensing Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included superintendents,

supervisors, technicians, operators, security force members, and

, administrative personnel.

Attended exit interview

. 2. Plant Status

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The plant operated in Mode 1, power operations, during the entire

, reporting period. As of the end of the reporting period, the unit had

been on-line for 92 consecutive days.

Other inspections or meetings:

The annual emergency preparedness graded exercise was conducted on

October 2. 1992. (NRC Inspection Report 50-416/92-23).

Dr. John T. Larkins, Director, Project Directorate IV-1, Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, USNRC, was on site October 21, 1992, to meet

with the resident inspectors and observe the annual emergency exercise.

During the week of October 5, Region II, Division of Radiation Safety

and Safeguards, Radiological Protection personnel conducted a review of

Grand Gulf's radiation protection program. Results of the inspection

are contained in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-416/92-25.

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3. Operational Safety (71707 and 93702)

Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of

the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the

control room to review the status of equipment, ilarms, effective LCOs,

temporary alterations, instrument readings, and staf fing. Discussions

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were held as appropriate to understand the significance of conditions

observed.

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Plant tours were routinely conducted and included portions of the

control building, turbine building, auxiliary building, radwaste

building and outside areas. These observations included safety related

tagout verifications, shift turnovers, housekeeping and general plant

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conditions. Additionally, the inspectors observed the status of fire

protection equipment, the control of activities in progress the problem

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4 identification systen s, and the readiness of the onsite emergency

response facilities. No deficiencies were identified.

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The inspectors reviewed safety related tagout 922818 to ensure that the

tagout was properly prepared, and performed.

The inspectors reviewed the activities associated with the listed below

i events:

, a. In response to deficiencies found at another facility in the area

of equipment lubrication, the inspectors performed an examination

, of Grand Gulf's lubrication practices. Lubrication of equipment

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was performed by both maintenance and operations personnel.

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Maintenance performed all grease and oil changes, and additions

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required for greases and oils in more difficult to service

equipment. Operations performed addition of oils to equipment ,

with more accessible reservoirs, for example those with bulb type

oilers.

The inspectors examined vendor manual number 460001518, ' Mobile

Engineering Service Report', commonly known as the ' Lube Manual'.

Four controlled copies of this manuai were examined on

September 30, 1992. One was found to be out of date. The out of

date manual was located in the control room and was missing

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several vendor updates. This controlled copy was used as the

reference to determine the correct oils to be added to equipment

, by the non-licensed operators performing plant rounds. It was

! later determined that the manual had been lost, reported as lost,

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removed from the controlled list, later found and placed back in

service without returning it to Document Control. Administrative

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Procedure 01-S-05 4, Control of-Vendor / Technical Manuals, Rev.12,

l dated September 2,1992, and earlier _ revisions of the procedure

, covering the last several years, had requirements that manuals

that were lost and later found be returned h the document control

j group for disposition. This was identified as Violation 92-26-01,

control of Vendor Manuals. Operations replaced the subject

uncontrolled manual with a current copy after the inspector's

findings. The inspectors reviewed a ' list of equipment that

operations added lubricants to and determined that the majority of

the equipment was not safety related. The ECCS jockey pumps and

standby service water fans are the major safety related loads

lubricated by operations. These components did not have a change

in oil recommendation during the. period the manual was not

updated. A check of oil viscosity results on oil samples for

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safety-related equipment did not show any out-of-range viscosities

that would indicate use of a different type of _ oil.

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The inspectors determined in their review of the program that the

vendor had sent additional recommendations to the site in the form

of a ' Lube Manual' dated October,1990. This manual had not been

processed in accordance with Procedure 01-S-05-4, which required

new vendor manuals, vendor manual revisions or vendor information

be forwarded to Document Control for processing. This was

identified as part of Violation 92-26-01.

Subsequent to the inspector's finding the licensee performed a

thorough review of the plant's lubrication program which resulted

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in revisions being planned for the licensee procedures governing

lubrication and control of oils. Oil lockers were inventoried and

cleared of excess oils, and a program was underway to label the

equipment oiled by operations with the required oil type. The

warehouse labelled all oil requisitioned with the type, name of

requester and date of issue as required by Procedure 01-S-09-5,

Warehouse Material Issue / Turn-In, dated August 12, 1992. System

Engineering performed a review of viscosity records of oil samples

taken from major equipment. Several non-safety related pieces of

equipment were found to have mismatches. Vendors were contacted

by the licensee to ensun that oil used provided adequate

lubrication.

The inspectors will review the final lubrication procedures as

they are issued. Changes made to the program recently should

reduce the chance for improper lubricants to be added to plant

equipment.

b. License Condition 2.C.(25)(b) states that Entergy Operation Inc.

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shall comply with TDI emergency diesel generator requirements

L specified in Attachment 2 to the license condition. Paragraph 3.3

of this Attachment requires, in part, the following:

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The engines shall be rolled over with the air start system and

with the cylinder stopcocks open prior to each planned start,

unless that start occurs within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of a shutdown. The

engines shall also be rolled over with the airstart system and

with the cylinder stopcocks open after four hours, but no mere

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than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months after enaine shutdown and then rolled over once again

approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after each shutdown.

r However, on October 13, 1992, the maximum time for the post-

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shutdown air roll for the Division I EDG was exceeded. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

time period was exceed at 1355 hours0.0157 days 0.376 hours 0.00224 weeks 5.155775e-4 months , however, it was performed at

1539 hours0.0178 days 0.428 hours 0.00254 weeks 5.855895e-4 months , I hour and 44 minutes late.

! Corrective actions initiated by the licensee to prevent recurrence

included completion of the required air roll immediately upon

discovery, I hour 44 minutes late, and revising Administrative

procedure 01-S-02-3, Daily Operating Logs, Revision 41, to track

required diesel generator air roll times the same as Limiting

Conditions of Operations,

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. This licensee identified violation is not being cited because the

criteria specified in Section VII.B of the Enforcement Policy were

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satisfied. This item was identified as a non cited violation

(NCV) 50-416/92-26-02 and was opened and closed during this

inspection period.

! c. License Condition 2.C.(25)(b) also states that the origin of any

water detected in the cylinder must be determined and ar.y cylinder

head which leaks due to a crack shall be replaced. -

On October 14, 1992, during a required air roll prior to returning

. the Division I EDG to service from a planned maintenance outage,

water was noted coming from the stopcock on the number 2 right

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bank cylinder head. The air roll was performed two more times

with the samn results. A work order was generated to replace the

Number 2 right bank cylinder head and retest the Division I EDG.

This work was successfully completed and the EDG was declared

operable October 15, 1992, at 2350 hours0.0272 days 0.653 hours 0.00389 weeks 8.94175e-4 months .

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An additional work order was generated tc perform nondestructive

examinations and hydrostatic testing of the remcved head. Results

of these examinations revealed a 3 inch longitudinal crack in the

top lef t exhaust port less than 1/2 inch above the exhaust seat.

This crack ran approximately 90 degrees around the port

circumference. Additionally, pitting on the machined surface of

the cylinder head fire deck, most likely from water intrusion, was

observed. The removed head was manufactured in January 1975.

Based en industry operating experiences, cy?inder heads

manufactured for Transamerica Delaval, Inc. Enterprise (TDI) for

inline and V-type R-4 series engines prior to October 1978 were

not stress-relieved and were susceptible to fatigue cracking in

thin sections or from fabrication induced defects. These heads

were classified as Grocp I heads. Heads cast between October 1978

and September 1980 (Group II) and those cast after September 1980

(Group III) benefited from improved manufacturing precessas and

quality control. At present there are 5 Group III herds and 11

Group I heads installed on the Division I EDG. A determination of

the head grouping on the Division II EDG had not been completed by

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the end of the inspection period. The Division III EDG was

manufactured by General Motors. The resident inspectors will

continue to follow this issue. -

d. At 0800 on October 8,1992, within two minutes of starting a SSW

pump, operations received indications of low discharge pressures

from the CCW pumps, along with a auto start of the standby CCW

pump. CCW surge tank level alarms came in, Off-normal Emergency

Procedure (ONEP) 05-1-02-V-1, Lass of CCW, was entered by the

operating staff and the plant began a reduction of power at 0816

hours towards 80% power. The reactor water cleanup system (RWCU)

was taken out of service and recirculation pump and motor winding <

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temperatares were monitored for increases. Significant amounts of

air were vented from CCW. The plant was returned to normal status

by 0940 hours0.0109 days 0.261 hours 0.00155 weeks 3.5767e-4 months after purging the air from CCW.

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incident Report Number 92-10-02 was initiated and the licensee

. formed a group to investigate the root cause of the event. The

inspectors attended the initial root cause determination meeting

and monitored the group's findings. The final results of the

group are awaiting concurrence by an NPE Engineer. Preliminary

results indicated that an interfacing valve between SSW and CCW

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did not fully closed, leading to a partial draining of CCW, when

SSW was configured for its weekly chemical addition run. The

interfacing valve, IP42 F2018, was a butterfly valve. The root

cause tentatively identified was the lack of a dependable method

i for verifying full closure of the valve. The valve had been

tested between October 1 and 3,1992. The mispositioned valve led

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, to a loss of CCW inventory and draining of the CCW system nead

tank with subsequent air intrusion through the system high point.

Th2 inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee actions in

response to this event.

One violation was identified for failure to follow the Vendor Manual

Procedure. One non-cited violation was identified for failure to air

roll the Division I EDG within the required time after shutdown as per

license condition. The remaining activities examined demonstrated

acceptable licensee corrective actions and/or results.

4. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the repurt period, the inspectors observed portions of the

maintenance activities listed below. These observations included a

i ruiew of the MW0s and other related documents for adequacy; adherence

to procedure, proper tagouts, technical specifications, quality

controls, and rhdiological controls; observation of work and/or

retesting; and specified retest requirements.

MWO DESCRIPTION

l 54336 ARM calibration (hot machine shop)

. 921111 Implementation of MCP 921111 (Relocation of

L diodes on APRM H-ION chamber power supply.

82439 Inspection of spent fuel bundles XNC-827 and

XNC-582 for fuel rod growth.

84350 "B" diesel driven fire pump maintenance

No violations or deviations were identified. The results of the

inspection in this area indicated that with the exception of the lube

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oil program the maintenance program had been effective.

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5. Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillance

procedures listed below. These observations included a review of the

l procedures for technical adequacy, conformance to technical

specifications and LCOs; verification of test instrument calibration;

observation of all or part of the actual surveillance; removal and

return to service of the system or component; and review of the data for

acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria.

! 06-IC-1821-M 1003 Reactor vessel low /high water level (RPS)

functional test.

! 07-S-53-P42-9 Fuel pool heat exchanger flow (PM/WO #31896).

No violations or deviations were identified. The observed surveillance

, tests were performed in a satisfactory manner and met the requirements

- of the Technical Specifications.

l 6. Reportable Occurrences (90712 and 92700)

The event report listed below was reviewed to determine if the

information provided met the NRC reporting requirements. The

, determination included adequacy of event description, the corrective

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action taken or planned, the existence of potential generic problems and

the relative safety significance of each event. The inspectors used the

NRC enforcement guidance to determine if the event met the criterion for

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licensee identified violations.

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A report was made to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (vi) on

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October 15, 1992, because the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency

was notified of an incident that occurred in North Carolina. A

' container that had been shipped from the site by an express carrier had

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broken -in the carrier's warehouse. One of the broken glass quart

containers contained PCB contaminated transformer oils that were not

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radiologically contaminated. A cleanup was performed and reports were

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made by the express carrier to the Department of Transportation, Federal

. Aviation Administration (FAA) about possible violations of Title 49 of

! the Code of Federal Regulations. The PCB contaminated oil had been

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shipped by air without proper labeling, packaging, or entry en the

, shipping papers. The FAA-was investigating this issue and the licensee

was preparing a response to a FAA inquiry.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702)

. (Closed) NOV 91-07-01, Failure to perform adequate review of ISI test

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results. During February 1991, the incorrect transposition of data

during the quarterly LPCI/RHR subsystem "B" functional test caused the

calculation of the RHR pump B differential pressure to appear acceptable-

for ISI requirements when, in fact, it was not. Af ter discovery, the

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surveillance was rerun on March 19, 1991, with satisfactory results, in

addition, revisions to quarterly surveillance procedures for all ECCS

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pumps were issued to improve and clarify the formats in order to prevent

incorrect data transposition. This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 92-12-03, followup the root cause of

the refueling mast failure. During RF05, the main refueling platform

mast (NF500) hung up while being extended into the core to engage a fuel

assembly. As a result, the licensee and the vendor initiated a root

cause evaluation to determine the cause of the binding and any

corrective actions. The vendor completed this evaluation on May 22,

1992, and determined that foreign pa.ticle contamination was the most

probable root cause. The vendor, additionally, was to undertake actions

to preclude the possibility of a recurrence of similar hardware failure

which included: 1) Evaluate the mast design to prevent foreign particle

contamination and/or increase tolerances, 2) Review manufacturing and

shipping requirements, and 3) Inform other sites with a similar mast

(via service information letter) of the potential problem. This item is

considered closed.

8. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 6,1992,

with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The licensee did not

identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by

the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee had no comment on

the following inspection findings:

Item Number Description and Reference

50-416/92-26-01, Vio. Failure to follow Vendor Manual

Procedure

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50 416/92-26-02. NCV Failure to air roll the EDG within

the required time

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11. Acronyms and Initialisms

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APRM - Average Power Range Monitor

ARM -

Area Radiation Monitor

CCW -

Component Cooling Water

ECCS - Euergency Core Cooling System

EDG -

Emergency Diesel Generator

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ISI -

Inservice Inspection

IFI -

Inspector Followup Item

LCO -

Limiting Condition for Operation

LPCI -

Low Pressure Core injection

LPCS - Low Pressure Core Spray

MCP -

Minor Change Package

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NCV -

Non-Cited Violation

NDE -

Nondestructive Examination

NPE -

Nuclear Plant Engineering

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NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ONEP - Off Normal Emergency Procedure

PCB - Polychlorinated Bithenyls

RF05 - Refueling Outage 5

RHR -

Residual Heat Removal

RPS -

Reactor Protection System

RWCU - Reactor Water Cleanup

SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance

SSW - Standby Service Water

TOI - Transamerica Delaval, Inc.

TS - Technical Specification

USNRC - United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissiun

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ML20125C693

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