ML20116E804
| ML20116E804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Reed College |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1988 |
| From: | Ruby L REED COLLEGE, PORTLAND, OR |
| To: | Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116E723 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-92-35 NUDOCS 9211100027 | |
| Download: ML20116E804 (5) | |
Text
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REED COLLEGE : 972oa 1 TartRE010
/ab.h[v i tractor FACERT 3 M Y3l Pl' - 3 24 May 1988 Robert J. Pate, Chief
- Reactor Safety Brsach U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission +
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 '
Walnut Creek, California 94596 5368 Re: Licensing examination conducted by Mr. Tom Meadmys at this site on 16 20 May 1988. Docket 50 288 License R.il2, .
Dear Mr. Pate:
I have the following requests, referenecd by question number, in regard to the Reactor Operator's Exam:
A.08 Accept answer "c" as equally correct. Delayed -neutrons are born at energies below the 1-2 MeV energy range, while prompt neutrons are born fast." ,
Justification: Answer "c" is correct and is an 'even - more precise description than is the key. answer "b." Our Training Manua!, on page 5-12, lists the delayed neutron energies as 250, 560, 405, and 450 kev, while the more recent reference, Glasstose and Sesonske 3rd ed. (see '
Ist anachment) lists the energies as 0.25, 0.46, 0.41, 0.45, and 0.41 MeV.
Figure 2.26 on page 112.of the same reference, shows; how the delayed neutrons arise from de excitation of the precursor daughter nuclei, _ and so, such neutrons must be monoenergetic. On the other hand, answ,r "b" correctly describes both prompt and delayed neutrons. as " fast" '
which 'is in accord with most chartacterizations of the fast group _ as beginning at 10 kev. In particular, it is _the definition used in the' RRF Training Manual (see attachment 2) and in Glasstone and Sesonske _3rd ed. (see attachment 3). "
D 03 D!sregard part a.
~
. Justification: _ Our trainees rre freshmen or sophomores majoring in '
physics, chemistry, or mathematics. Such.. persons have' no ' >
understanding of the descriptors " synchronous" _ or i "nonsynchronous" in connection with - motors. Rather, the information is of benefit only to 3 management in replacing components to the ~ original- specticiations.
. E.02 Accept as an equally correct answer "d. Pt.rticulate Stack Monitor."
Justification. ' The information for the key answer, i.e. the CAM, was ,
obained from an appendix- to our - Emergency Implementation -
Procedures, tvbich : lists ' . typical setpoints 'only as a guide to action -in 921110cc27 920414 PDR F'JI A GOLD 92 PDR . . . - . - . - - . . . ... Q
l
, emergency situations. In actuality, the setpoints change depending on detector efficiencies and sampling flow rates, both of which are subject -
to change at each calibration and at any . Intervening maintenance. The current setpoint for the CAM is 4000 cpm, and for the PSM is 3000 cpm. The question implies current information, and makes no mention of the EIP document as a source. Thus, since neither the CAM nor the PSM is currently clow to. 2000. cpm, either abould be acceptable. Sincerely, Lawrence Ruby Professor < Reactor Director P V h b e F
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l I l l 1 l 4 I I 3.339) 2.192) NUCl EAR REACTIONS AND RADIATIONS Ill i l I ' TABLE 2.10. CHARACTERISTICS OF DELAYED FISSION NEUTRONS . , IN THERM AL FISSION
. Number of Fiasion Neutrons Delayed per Fission '
1 Approximate ! Half hfe Energy l. 1 (seconds) U-233 U.235 P#239 (Mev) 1 I 55 5.7 x 10** 5.2 x 10** 2.1 x 10** 0.25 23 19.7 34.6 18.2 0.46 6.2 16.6 31.0 12.9 0.41 l 2.3 18.4 62.4 19.9 0.45 O.61 3,4 18.2 5.2 0.41 f;, i 0.23 2.2 6.6 2.7 - y Total delayed 0.0066 0.0158 0.0061 Total fission neutrons 2.49 2 42 2.93 s'rsaion detsyed 0.0026 0.0065 0.0020 lli I trens are not appreciably different. It should be noted that the approximate energies of the delayed neutrons, given in the last column of the table, are lower than for the peat majority of prompt neutrons. 2.191. Most of the neutron rich fusion products undergo beta decay ($1.49);in . a few cases, however, the daughter is produced in an excited . t with sufficient en-ergy to make possible the ernission of a neutron. It is in this manner that the de-layed neutrons arise, the characteristic halflife being determined by that of the tilar equa. parent (or precursor) of the actual neutron emitter. The (approximately) 55-s and
.nd pluto- 23.s poups have been dermitely associated with bromine 47 and lodme 137 as pre-atted as a cursors, respectively, and krypton 47 and xenon 137 as the conesponding emitters.
e energies in each case, the number of neutrons in the nucleus of the etnitting species exceeds [
~ 10 MeV. a magic number ty unity, viz.,51 and 83, respectively. This means that the last neu- l af reactor ' con has a low binding energy and is, consequently, easily emitted.
2.192. The mechanism proposed to account for the 55 s poup of delayed neu-trons is shown in Fig. 2.26. About 70 percent of the beta decays of bromine 47 (halflife 55 s) lead to the formation of an excited state (or states) of krypton 47, with excitation energy somewhat pester than the binding energy (B.E.) of the last cas have neutron,i.e.,5.4 MeV,in that nucleus. This excited state can then immediately emit Tsnite ex. , a neutron, leading to the fermation of stable krypton 46; the energy of the neutron 4th each l is indicated by E, in the figure. Although neutron emission is shown from only one are cJose excited state of krypton-87, there are probably several closely spaced statesinvolved; umber of hence, there is a small range of neutron energies l'he observed rate of delayed neu-neutrons tron emission is determined by the rate of formation of krypton 47 and this depends uranium. on the rate of decay of bromine 47. The neutron emission thus occurs with a half-fast neu. life of 55 s. l h n-,^=Ti lf. I~ 6dnok + -Gada 3 y fg'. 1
l , 3.135) 2.140) NUCLEAR REACTIONS AND RADIATIONS 89 i I - '-
- nature of the reactbn. In many in tance>,one reaction predominates, and thls simph. I
! fles the situation; the aarna is true when one particular isotope has a much larger crou ;
- section than others of the same element. Most measurements have been made with naturaDy occurring matentis, and the data are useful for calculations cf the rates of procenes occurring in nuclent reactors. For some elements, however, crou sections ,
l have also been derived for individual isotopes, such as uranium.235, vraruum 238, I i etc. l 2.137. For many elements, especiaDy those of mass number exceeding 100, en i examination of the viriation of the absorption crou sections with neutron energy re. , veals the existence of three regions.* There is, first, a low. energy region, where the ' i l cross section decreases steadily with increasing neutron energy. De absorption cross l l section o, then varies (approximately) inversely as the square root of the neutron I l energy, and since the energy is kinetic in nature, o, is inversely proportional to the neutron speed. This is called the 1/u region, and the neutions are said to obey the l 1/v law. I 2.138. FoUowing the 1/u region for slow neutrons, the elements under considera. ! tion exhibit a resonance regmn, usually for neutrons of roughly 0.1 to 1000 eV en. ! ergy. This region is cbracterized by the occurrence of peaks where the absorption cross secuon rues fairly starply to high values for certain neutron energies and then I faUs again. Some elements,e.g., cadmium and rhodium,have only one high resonance I peak, while others, such as indium, silver, gold, and uranium 238, have two or more
, ! peaks. The crou sections at the resonance peaks are sometimes very large,e.g..more l j than 2 X 10' b for cadmium.ll3 at a neutron energy of 0.17 eV and 3.4 X 10' b for I l xenon.135 at 0.7 eV energy. ne total cross section of umaium.238 and the total and l
fission cross sections of uranium.235, as functions of the neutron energy, are shown ! in Figs. 2.17 and 2.18, respectively. The marked resonance structure is apparent. ! ion that 2.139, immediately beyond the region of weU-defined resonances, minor resonance
- e condi- peaks may occur, but they are difficult to resolve Apart from these resonances, the rons are nuclear cross sections de:rease steadily with increasing neutron energy. At energies stantial. )
i in excess of about 10 kev, there is what is called the fast.ncurron region. The cross 5 in the . sections are usur.lly low, being leu than 10 b in most cases and becoming even smaDer
.tead of I for energies of the order of 0.1 MeV or more. The absorption cross sections are then -
l factors simDar in magnitude to the geometrical cross section of the nucleus, i.e.,2 to 3 b are ob- (g2.165). Low and wide resonances, referred to as broad (or giant) resonances, are culated often obser ed at high neutron energies in the MeV range. They are, however, of bttle significar ce for nuclear reactor calculations. 2.140. Not all elements show the type of behavior escribed in the preceding para-3Y , graphs. Most elements of low mass number, as well as several of high mass number, do not eahibit resonance absorption in the region from 0.10 to 1000 eV, at least not ! to any appreciable extent. There may be broad resonances at high neutron energies, ieutron i but these are usually not very important. The total neutron cross sections,includtng j SDEY' '
'Stnce scattenns cross secuons en usudy smd, the total cross secuen, l.c., absorption plus ith the ;
seattenng. shows the same trend. Pb ] l s m ,s A w a
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" Fast neutrons" are those with energies between 10 kev and one MeV. -From a radiation protection standpoint, these The velocity of fast are the most hazardous neutrons.
neutrons can be calculated in the same manner as was done for thermal neutrens.
" Relativistic neutrons" are those with energies greater than :',0 MeV. This. energy is generally greater than the binding energy of most nucleons, and they are thus par-ticularly effective at fragmenting nuclei with which they collide. The term relativistic comes from Einsteinian physics, which notes that, as the velocity of an object approaches the velocity of light, it gets heavier and heavier until, at the velocity of 31ght, its mass becomes infinite.
The four energy groups are most useful in character-izing -the types of nuclear interactions that predominate in each energy region. Thermal (also known as slow) neutrons are most commonly involved in nucicar reactions that result in their capture by a nucleus, usually with the emission of a gamma ray or most fission reactions. l The absorption or capture of intermediate. energy neu-trons is marked by a series of peaks or points of high affinity for neutrons'of_a particular energy. These are known as resonance peaks, and hence intermediate neutrons are sometimes known as resonance neutrons and are terget specific. This is of. great utility in.the analysis of M h d 2. , 12-1-20 AR FTwh MM
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' _,/ l UNffED STATES
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l g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ REGON V
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'. 1450 MARIA LANE.SulTE 210
%, ,o/ WALNUT CREEK. CALIFORNIA N ;
**** JUN 2 919BB i
Docket No. 50-288 Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202 Attention: Dr. Paul Bragdon President Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION This letter refers to the routine inspection conducted by Mr. M. Cillis of this office on June 1-3, 1988, of cctivities authorized by HRC License No. R-112 and to the discussions of our findir.cs held by Mr. Cillis-with Vice President Provost M. Cronyn and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection. Areas examined during this inspection art described in the enclosed inspection = report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with
-personnel, and observations by the inspector.
No violations with NRC requirements were identified within the scope of thfs inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in .the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any riuestions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you. Sina rely,
. A. Scarano, Acting Chief' Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch:
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-288/88-02 cc w/ enclosure: Professor Lawrence Ruby Mr. J. Mi.chael Pollock . W4 @ , , ggs, w
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O. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 4-Report No. 50-288/88-02 Docket No. 50-288 License No. R-112 Licensee: Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202 - Facility Name: Reed Reactor Facility (RRF) Inspection at: Portland, Oregon - Reed College , Inspection Conducted: ' June 1-3, 1988 Inspectors: O,9 ilm Acn (Jm/tt M. Ci , Senior Ra(jijition Specialist 04te Signed Approved by: d.ha , 6/n91RV YD1as, Chief Da'te SigneJ G. P.(it4bs Radiological Protection Section Facil Summary: Inspection on June 1-3, 1988 (50-288/88-02)
-Areas-Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by a regionally based inspector of reactor operations', including organization, procedures,. .
requalification. training, surveillance, haalth physics,. design changes, audits and committees, emergency planning, experiments, environmental monitoring : transportation of radioactive material, review of open' items, and a tour of the facility. Inspection procedures'90703, 40750, 82745 were-addressed. Results: In the fourteen areas addressed, no violations or' deviations were identified. An overall-improvement in the licensee's performance was. exhibited.
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DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted 4
*Dr. M. Cronyn, Vice Presider.t Provost "Dr. L. Ruby, Director, Reed Reactor Facility (RRF)
*M. Pollock, Assistant Director, RRF
*D. Griffin, Chairman, Reactor Operations Committee
*P. N. Terdal, Reactor Supervisor
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview on June 3,1988.
- 2. Reactor Operations
- a. Organization The licensee's organizational structure was examined and found to be consistent with Technical Specifications, Section I.1, and the licensee's Administrative Procedure, dated October 1987.
A new Director assumed responsibility for the safe operation of the reactor and its associated equipment in Se . 1987. The previous acting Director was appointed as t /'s Associate Director. -Both the Director and Associate t. rector are part time positions (i.e. three days per week). The Directors' working days are staggered such that one or both individuals are at the Facility throughout the normal work week of Monday through Friday. The new Dir'-: tor previously held the same position at another Research Reactor and held a Senior Reactor Operator's license. The Director had also been a Nuclear Engineering instructor at University of California at Berkeley for twenty-seven years prior to dssuming his new responsibilities at the RRF. The intpector notnd that there was a significant improvement in the RRF staffs' oerformance since the previous inspections conducted from 1985 through 1987. No violations ur deviations were identified.
- b. Procedures An examination of the licenree's Standard Operating Procefutus (SDPs) was conducted for the purpose of_ verifying compliance with Technical Specifications, Section 1.5. ,
Actions were taken by the licensee's staff af ter the previous NRC inspection to review and revise the RRFs Administrative Procedures and the RRF SOPS. Resources to accomp'ish this were made available during the summer of 1987, at which time all of the SOPS were revised as described in paragraph 2(e) of Inspection Report 50-288/87-01.
2 The inspector disclosed that several of the revised procedures have not been implemented even though they had been reviewed and approved by the Reactor Operations Committee. The RRF Director informed the inspector that he wanted to personbily review the revised p-scedures to ensure they were adequate prior to their being implem' ente.. The inspector emphasized the importance for imolementing the revised procedures in a timely manner. The licensee's performance in this area appeared to be improving and seemed capsble of meeting its safetv 'n ' ctives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- c. Loos and Recoro The inspector examined the following facility logs and operational records for the period iof July 1,1987, through June 1,1988:
- Console log
- Environmental monitoring log
- Startup check list Shutdown check lists
- Reactor operator records
- Weekly, Monthly, Bi-monthly, Semi-annual and Annual check lists that are used for verifying that the Technical Specifications are performed at their required frequency,
- Health Physics Survey Records
- Naintenance Log
- Operator Requalification Program Training Records The review did not disclose any missed Technical Specification survefilances or abnormal findings.
The licensee's performance in this area seemed to bt improving and seemed capable of meeting its safety objectives. No violations or - deviations were identified.
- d. Site Tour 3
A tour of the RRF facility was conducted. During the tour the inspector noted that the licensee's posting and labeling practices were consistent with 10 CFR Part 19.11 and 10 CFR 20.203. Independent measurements were performed with a Model R0-2, ion chamber, survey meter, serial number 1694, that is due for calibration on October 10, 1988. The independent measurements confirmed that the licensee's posting practices were consistent with 10 CFR 20.203. The inspector witnessed a Subcritical Multiplication Experiment that was conducted on June 2, 1988. A group of students from a local college participated in the experiment. The inspector noted that reactor operations were conducted in accordance with the RRFIs SOPS.
3 The inspector noted that the facility was exceptionally clean and that portable radiation survey instruments were in current calibration. . The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous lev'el of performance in this area. No violations or deviations were identified.
- e. Requalification Training The inspector reviewed reactor operating logs and training files for each reactor operator to verify that the licensee was maintaining the requalification program for all reactor operators in accordance with the licensee's NRC approved program of 1980. The program was
- designed to meet the requirements prescribed in 10 CFR 50.54(1) and 10 CFR 55, Appendix A.\ Discussions of recent changes made to 10 CFR Part 55 and of Information Notice (IN) 87-22, " Operator Licensing Requalification Examination at Honpower Reactors," were held with the licensee's staff.
The review disclosed that the program was being implemented in accordance with the regulatory requirements and IN 87-22. The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous level of performance in this area and their program appeared adequate to accomplish its safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified,
- f. Surveillances The inspector verified that surveillances prescribed in the Technical Specifications were performed at the required frequencies.
Surveillance records for the period of March 1987 through June 1988 were examined. Data related to the following surveillances were reviewed:
- Pool water analys 's for conductivity
- Pool water tempert+ure monitoring
- Fuel element inspecti,rs
- Control element inspections
- Control element drop tir u
- Operational checks of t eactor instrumentation channels and safety circuits listed in Table I and II of the TS
- Ventilation system functional checks
- Calibration and functional checks of radiation monitoring equipment identified in >Jction G of the TS
- Other surveillances established by the licensee's SOPS .,
Improvements in the documentation of maintenance activities and surveillance records were observed. The inspector was informed tt.at the new method for performing rod drop time measurements, using a computer system, was expected to be ready by the end of the summer school semester. The new method is expected to provide the licensee The with a more precise method for measuring the drop times.
4
.C licensee currently uses a stop watch to perform this surveiltance ,
check.
~
The licensee's performance in this area' appeared to be i.mproving and seemed fully capable of meeting its safety objectives, ho. i violations or deviations were identified.
- g. Experiments i
The inspection disclosed that two new experiments had been approved by the Reactor Operations Committee in accordance with Technical Specification requirements. No violations or deviations were identified.
. i
- h. Review and Audits i The licensee's review and audi* functions assigned to the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) and Reactor Operations Committee (ROC) were examined and were found to be consistent with th? regulatory requirements prescribed in Technical Specifications: Section 1. RSC and ROC meeting minutes and audit reports for 1987 and 1988 were reviewed as part of the inspection. The inspector noted that both committee's had met at a greater frequency than was required by their respective charters and the technical specifications.
Tne inspectors concluded that the licensee's review and audit program met or-exceeded the Technical Specifications requirements. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 1. Changes The licensee's staff stated and a review of records / logs discussed in paragraph 2.c indicated that there had.been no changes made'to the facility that would requirt a safety. evaluation be made pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.59. The_inspecter verified that procedure changes were properly evaluated for their safety considerations pursuant- to 10 CFR Part 50.59.
No-violations or deviations were identified.
- k. Hea'th Physics
- 1) Liquid and Solid Waste No liquid or solid waste was generated or disposed of since,the previous inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified. 2). Personnel Monitoring a o
5 The licensee's program for assuring compliance with 10 CFR Part ' 20.202 was examined and was found to be consistent with 10 CFR Part 20.101 and 10 CFF Part 20.104. No violations or deviations were identified. 3). Radioactive Material Shipments and Recef t A review of radioactive material shipping and receiving records disclosed that activities related to this subject area were in compliance with 10 CFR Part 20.205, 10 CFR Part 71, and Department of Transportation regulations prescribed in 49 CFR Parts 173-178.
- No violations or deviations were identified.
4). General Employee Training The licensee's General Employee (GET) training program, for assuring compliance with 10 CFR Part 19.12, " Instructions to Workers," war examined. GET training lesson plans, attendance records, and hand-out meterial were reviewed. The inspector concluded that the licensee's GET program met or exceeded 10 CFR 19.12 requirements. No violations or deviations were identified. 5). Surveys The inspector verified that direct radiation surveys, contamination surveys, and special surveys are performed on a routine basis. The review disclosed that no abnormal radiation measurements were identified and that contamination surveys continue to show no activity above bacxground. The inspector noted that the licensee does not routinely sample the reactor pool water for radioactivity levels, does not have any survey instruments for performing alpha or neutron-measurements, and does not have a portable air sampler. The above observations were discussed with the licensees staff. Both the Director and Assistant Director stated that arrategements have been made with off-site agencies to provide such monitoring instrumentation during emergencies. The Directors added that the ROC had recommended that a schedule te developed for (ampling the reactor pool water on a routine , basis, such as monthly or quar ^ 2rly. The Assistant Director stated that action would be taken to obtain and post some control neutron badges in the RRF to determine what the neutron dose rate may be from reactor optrations. The Directors also stated that the RRF's stack and reactor bay Constant Air Monitors (CAMS), which operate continuously, would provide an early alarm function in the event of a fuel leak.
6 The above observations were also discussed at the exit interview. The inspector was informed that the observations would be brought to the attention of the RRF health physicist for resolution. , In the areas inspected, the licensee's programs exhibited weaknesses as detailed above; however, the overall program appeared adequate to accomplish its safety objectives. No ! violations or deviations were identified. 6). Environmental Monitoring Ti,e licensee's environmental monitoring program prescribed in 50P-20, " Environments 1 Sampling," was examined. The program
- had not changed from what is described in Inspection Report 50-288/87-01. Results of the licensee's off site monitoring (e.g., water sampling, soil sampling, and direct Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLD) measurements) performed since the previous period were reviewed.
The inspector concurred with the licensee's observations that there had oeen no detectable or meaningful increases of radioactivity in the environs as a result of RRF operations. In the area inspected, the prograr appeared capable of accomp',ishing its safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified. 7.) Effluent Monitoring The principal airborne radionuclide released from the facility was Argon-41. Inspection Report 50-288/87-01 identified that the licensee monitors airborne releases with a constant air sampler (CAM) that monitors Ar-41 and particulate releases from the reactor pool area and a stack CAM monitor that monitors particulate releases. On a high CAM alarm, the P.RF ventilation system is I diverted from an unfiltered exhaust system into a filtered exhaust system containing a HEPA filter. Calibration of the pool and stack monitors is per.sre V annually. The alarm set points are based on the 6...c permissible concentrations for Ar-41 that is prescribed in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B Table II. , Column 1. The calibratior.s are performed with known quantities of Ar-41 that are prepared in the reactor. Records of releases are maintained on stri; charts. A review of the strip charts for 1987 disclosed thst the readin> were barely above background level. The licensee's staff were in the process of calibrating both CAMS during the inspection. The staff informed the inspector tnat they had discovered that the CAM's air flow volume measurements readings were a factor of four ice due to an
l' 7 undersized orifice in the CAM's magnehelic gauge. The licensee made this determination through conversations held with vendors that manufactured the CAM. It appeared that the problem hat existed since the CAM was first put into operation, some 15 . years ago. The stack CAM air flow measurements wene determined to be satisfactory. The licensee performed a preliminary review of the strip charts collected during previous peak reactor operations and determined that all prior releases from the facility were within 10 CFR 20, Appendix B. Table II, Column 1 limits. The staff added that they were still evaluating the previous data. The RRF Director and Assistant Director stated that the CAM's air flow volume calibration was condacted because of a question raised by the inspectcr during a previous inspection period. The staff added that calibration procedcres for the CAM's will be revised to include the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 8.25, " Calibration and Error Limits of Air Sampling Instruments for Tote: Volume of Air Sampled." The inspector noted that the licensee's staff still had not devr?oped a method for quantifying the activity measured by the CAM'; in microcuries per milliliters and total curies from the i chart readings. The above observations were brought to the licensee's attention during the exit meeting. The inspector emphasized the importance of assuring calibration of instrumentation is performed in a manner that is consistent with the Industry Standards such as what may be prescribed in R.G.'s and American National Standard Instructions (ANSI). In the area examined, the licensee's performance appeared to be improving and seemed capable of meeting its safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 3. Information Notices The inspector verified that the licensee was receiving and evaluating Information Notices in a timely manner. ,
Licensee evaluations for Information Nctices received between January 1985 through June 1, 1988, were reviewed. The licensee's evaluations were well documented. In the area inspected, the licensee's performance appeared capable of superior performance in accomplishment of their safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 4. Emergency Plan Implementation
' The licensee's capabilities for responding to emergrmcies as specified in the approved Emergency Plan dated February 1986, ant for demonstrating 1
8
- compliance with 10 CFR part 50.54(q) and 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix E, were exsmined.
~
The examination included a review of applicable training records, emergency plan implementing procedures, emergency response equipment, drill scenarios, drill crii.iques and discussions with the licensee's staff. Also examined were the memoranda of understanding maintained with offsite agencies such as the Fire Department, Police Department Hospital and State of Oregon emergency response organization. The inspector noted that the licensee had conducted two emergency exercises since the previous inspection and were in the process of participating in an exercise involving several off-site agencies. This c exercise is tentatively scheduled for Jane 24, 1988. The exercise will be used to verify the licensee's communications capabilities with of f-site agencies as is re:;dired by the Emergency Plan. The inspector noted that none of the exercises performed to date had involved a medical emergency involving a simulated contaminated individual. The Emergency Plan requirer that a scenario involving a medical emergency be performed periodically. Thic observation was brought to the licensee's attention. The licensee informed the inspector that they would plan to conduct an exercise involving a medical emergency with'n the next fiscal school year. The inspector noted that the required Emergency Plan annual reviews had been conducted by the RSC and ROC pursuant to paragraph 10.4 of the plan. A examination disclosed that the licensee's review had been thorough. The RSC and ROC were evaluating the comments raised in the review. The licensee suspects that it may be necessary to make some changes to the plan in order to clarify responsibilities and ambiguous statements contained in the current plan. The inspector informed the licensee that changes should be processed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) Tequirements, Ir. Ne area inspected, the licensee's program appeared adequate to accomplish its safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5. Followup Items (Closed) Followup Items 85-01-02 and 85-01-05 related to the adequacy of logs and records and Standard Operating Procedures are discussed in paragraph 2. The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions in these areas were satisfactory. This matter is closed.
(Closed) The status Information Notices IN 85-92, IN 86-22 and IN 87-22 are discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3. The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions were satisfactory. This matter is closed. (Closed) Licensee Report 88-03-LO is related to a missed surveillance check of the reactor pool water's conductivity during the period of March 3-22, 1988. A rnview of this item disclosed that the licensee's This corrective actions for preventing a recurrence was satisfactory. matter is closed. 1
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9-1.- Exit Interview
? = 6. _
The inspector. met with the-licensee representatives (denote.d:in paragraph ~ .<
- 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June.3,1988. The . scope andl findings of the inspection were summarized. The inspector irfformed the licensee that no violations or' deviations were identified.
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aEACTOR F ACILITY ~o 0 A9: gl 6 January 1989 Ross A. Scarano, Director Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Re: Docket 50-288, R 112 REPORT ON ERRANT-CONTROleROD INCIDENT OF 12/16/88 INITIAL PROBLEM On the afternoon of December 16, 1988, the reactor was being operated as part of the requalification requirements of an RO and for an intended irradiation. The reactor checklist was completed at about 13:35 with no indication of any problems. The first operation, measuring of the core excess at 5 watts, was completed at 13:54 under the observation of the SRO. An inadvertant period scram occurred during this start-up but was attributed to the relative inexperience of the operator. At that point, the SRO went into the adjacent radiochemistry lab to finish preparing a sample foi irradiation leaving the RO of record and another licensed RO in the control room to practice reactivity tuanipula tions. The RO had raised the reactor power to 150 W and was manipulating rod up and down buttons to stabilize the reacter at that level. At approximately 14:17, the operator experienced an unintended power increase, taking the reactor from 150 watts to about 250 watts. This increase was halted and reversed, without the occurrence of a reactor scram, by the operator inserting rods into the core using all three rod-down buttons. Then, as the operator began to stabilize the reactor power again, the RO nnticed that the Safety Rod was at it's upper extreme despite the fact that the RO believed that all rods had been driven down to correct for the original power increase. At this point, the SRO was notified and the reactor was manually scrammed, pending a review of the operation. When initial evaluation suggested a possible equipment problem, the Director was notified. Foltowing a review involving the Director (SRO), Associate Director (SRO of record), the RO of reconi, and the additional RO who had been present at the original incident, the Director concluded that the unexplained pr.wer rise was probably operator instigated, but to allow for the possibility of equipment malfunction, he requested the operation to be repeated exactly as originally performed under the careful observation of all present. Beginning at 15:16, the RO took the reactor to 5 watts, measured the core excess, and then proceeded to 150 watts as before. The power w .s stabilized at that level at 15:40 with no repeat cf the power rise. It was noted that this resulted in the Safety g /p(. 4 Rod position being approximately 1/2 to 2/3 of it's fully withdrawn position, 4i I o far below the level it had achieved during the earlier operation. p _- , p ,
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2 In order to test the hypothesis that the problem was a sticking switch, it was decided to maintain a reactor power of 150 watts (50% on the 300 watt linear power range) but to raise and icwer rods (especially the Safety) alternately by small incremer.ts, essentially to continue the operation which had been in progress. After about 15 minutes of uneventful operation of this type, the Director left the Control Room, requesting that the Associate Ditector directly observe additional testing and that the reactor be immediately scratamed if any additional problems occurred. At 15:52, following a short activation of the Safety Rod "UP" button, die Safety rod continued to rise even though there was no finger on the button. The reactor was thereupon scrammed by the - operator. The Director was immediately notified and returned to the control room. He ordered that no further criticalities would be undertaken until the problem was resolved. From 15:54 until 16:13, the safety rod only was tested by the Associate Director with the other two rods fully inserted in the core to insure that the reactor remained subcritical. Once during this time, the rod condnued to rise after a short activation of the up switch. This rise was halted by a quick tap on the "UP" button. The mechanical portions of the switch were removed, disessembled, and inspected, as were the mechanical portions of several other rod drive switches. All were noted to be dirty; however, due to the 1steness of the day, it was decided to suspend funher testing. At this poit4t, the Director initiated a discussion on whether an immediately reportable incident had occurred. He concluded in the affirmative, and the NRC, the Provost, the Chairperson of the Reactor Review Committee, and the Oregon Department of Energy were thereupon notified. ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 12/17/88 Prior to additional testing, the Associate Director and the Reactor Supervisor comp!cted a review of all past problems with control rod drives by examination of the Mechanical Maintenance Log. Main Log entries for several of these were also examined. One previous occurrence of a similar nature was identified as having occurred on !!4/74. Mechanical Maintenance Log and Main log entries of that occurrence were located and copied . Phone discussions were held between the Associate Director, who by coincidence had been the operator of record on that date, and the person who had been the Director at the time and who was the individual who recorded the log entry on the final resolution of the prcblem on 1/8/74. In that case, the problem was traced to- mechanical binding in the upper portion of the Shim Rod "UP" switch. It was resolved by exchangir.g this portion of the switch with identical parts from the unused " Transient Rod" "UF" switch. The log describes testing of the switet successfully approximately 30 times following the exchange, and no furthe.r problems with that switch were recorded in the logs reviewed. . A discussion was aho held with the chief TRIGA scientist at General Atomic, who advised that Fimilar problems had occurred at G.A. in which mechanical binding of the plastic portion of the switch was found to have been responsible. The GA official r.dded that such problems have always been easily colved by cleaning the mechanism, sanding off the plastic "UP" label, or exchanging the mechanical portion of the switch. GA reported that no problem had ever been documented with the actual switch itself.
i 3 l h, i NOTE: GA warned us that removal and replacement of the switch itself, should I we decide that such is necessary, must be done with extreme care si 2ce the soldering is very fine, and many. of the required reactor safety systems including SCRAMS and interlocks are wired theth this switch. TESTING 12/22188 On this date, additional testing of the Safety Rod was conducted by the Aest,ciate Director (SRO) and the Reactor Supervisor (SRO). The primary goal was to ascertain, if possible, whether the problem was mechanical, in the upper portien of the switch, or electrical, in the lower portion of the switch. The Safety Rod was tested by repeatedly activatir;', the 'UP" and "DOWN" switches. Tests of the Safety Rod "UP" switch were tallied. The rod was tested throughout the range of it's travel. It was tested by both SRO's. Tests were conducted by holding the botton down for long periods of time, by quickly tapping the button, and everything in between. The botton was tested repeatedly by pushing it in the middle as well as on each of it's edges. After a total of at least 660 activations of the button, the previously demonstrated unintentional rod raising had not been observed. One unusual thing, however, was observed. At approximately Test #170 with the Safety Rod at a Position of approximately 1260 (2/3 of it's maximum withdrawal distance), the rod tailed to rise when the switch was depressed. Both SRO's observed this occurrence and verified that the source interlock was not activated at the time. This aberration also never repeated. CONCLUSION AND RESOLUTION 1/6/89 By this date, a letter was on hand from NRC Region V reiterating our obligation to notify NRC before attempting any further criticalities. On the basis of the tests reported above, and in consideration of the advice from GA, we concluded that the sticking of the switch is a rare phenomenon, whose cause is most probably in the mechanical portion of the switet Hence, we removed the UP and DOWN bcttons from all 3 rods, and the mechanical linkages which they activate. The linkages were cleaned in a pressurized-gas stream, which had the effect of removing some solid material which had deposited on their surfaces. Next, in each linkage, lubricant was sprayed between the actuating rod and the bushing through which it passes. Finally, pieces of dirt and other debris were removed from the housings into which the linkates are inserted. The switches tere then reassembled, and each UP and DOWN button was tested 20 times, with no unusual behavior observed. At this juncture, the Director informed the NRC by phone of our proposal to resume criticalities. As soon as possible, the incident will be reviewe,d with all operators, who will be alerted to watch carefully for any aberrant control-rod behavior, and to scram the reactor promptly and notify the Director if such occurred.~ The Director will also put the cleaning and lubrication of the control-rod linkages on a rehularly_ scheduled basis. Sincerely, W .- Lawrence Rub Professor Reactor Director
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%(Q(c 10 January.1989 Ross A. Scarano, . or Division of Radiatic afety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Reguio: >ry Commission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Re: . Docket- 50-228, R-112 lF SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT OF 1/6/89 ON INCIDENT OF 12/16/88
Dear Mr. Scarano:
Persuant to a request from your staff, I am _. writing to supply some additional information regarding- the incident referenced above. SAFETY IMPLICATIONS In the hypothetical event that the. operator does notl terminate q the power rise when the Safety-Rud -UP switch sticks at 150 W, the ramp reactivity insertion with . a rate . less than 50.16/s', _ would result, . P after 4.3' s, -in .a period scram at 288 W on the 300-W scale. We proved this ~ expetimentally, since the situation is . difficult te- analyse theoretically, i.e. the Point Kinetic Equations are non-linear. _ L
.It is a~ tribute to. the designers of the TRIGA: Mark I_ that in a worst-case situation analysis, where all of the permitted $3.00 of -
l- bxcess reactivity _ were- to be inserted into. the core, and all scrams
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were to fail, the reactor power: would rise -to a steady value,:albeit above the . licensed limit, but nevertheless at which fuel integrity
.would be maintained (see Reed lSafetyf Analysis Report Fig. 7-1).
1 PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE L We intend- to - add! the cleaning and lubrication of the rod-L actuating-linkage (see enclosed. sketch),;and the cleaning of .its- a ~ b.1 L ( g g g G M ir q; -Qw [ gEEL- -- 1[4 LI: .L. - L ,; _ -;
4 4 - o housing above the electrical portion of the rod-actuating switch, to our Annual Maintenance Schedule, which is performed in January of every year. NOTIFlCATION OF OPERATORS At a meeting of operators and -prospective operatives on this date, the details of the incident were reviewed. The necessity for scramming the reactor under all circumstances of aberrant rod behavior war stressed. All personnel will further be required to read and sign off on copies of the incident report and of this letter. Sincerely,
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Lawrence Rub'y Professor Reactor Director
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%*****y JA" 13 1999 MEMORANDUM TO: FILE FROM: H. 5. North, Acting Chief, Facilities Radiological Protection Section.
SUBJECT:
Reed Coilege, Portland,_OR Docket No. 50-288, License No. R-112 ' NRR/ Region V/ Licensee Discussions Re: Reports on Errant - Control - Rod Incident of 12/16/88. Dated 6 January 1989-On January 6,1989, J. Crews, G. Yuhas and H. North, Region V, participated in a telepho1e discussion with L. Ruby, professer Reactor Director, Reed College. Dr. Ruby requested that operation of the reactor be permitted to resume. The conclusion of the discussion was that Dr. Ruby:should promptly submit the subject referenced report to permit review by NRR and Region V following which resumption of operation would be considered. On January 9, 1989, the subject referenced report-was received by NRR_and- , Region V. During a conference call between.L. Rubenstein, C. Miller and T. Michaels, NRR and J. Crews, G. Yuhas, and H. North, Regio _n V the suoject report was discussed. It was concluded that, based on the assumption that a taechanically sticking switch was the problem, reactor-operationi could recume provided licensee agreed to provide a brief dist:ussicn of the safety - significance of the reported event, a discussion of a planned-maintenance / surveillance program for the f aulty_ switch and infennation to support the issuance of an Information Notice on the switch problem.
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A conference call including Professor Ruby, keedl College, T. Michaels, NRR, and the previously identified Region V staff began at 12:00, January 9, . 1989. Dr. Ruby agreed to provide a letter. addressing the topics previously identified by the end of the week (1/13/89) or _ early the following_ week. Dr. Ruby was ir. formed that operation of the TRIGA reactor could be resumed immec:ately. H. S. North, Acting Chief Fecilities Radiological
~ Protection Section
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- ReGnON V 1450 MAR!A LANE, SUITE 29 '6 '#
WALNUT CREEK,CAllFORNI A S 696
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Docket No. 50-288 . Dr. Paul Bragdon, President Reed College Portland, Oregon 17202 - r
Dear Dr. Bragdon:
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Subject:
Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator Licensing aninations . In a-telephone. conversation between Mr. Michael Pollock, Acting _Dir d or, Reed Reactor Facility, and Mr. Thomas Meadows, Chief Examiner, arrangements were made for the edministration of the licensing examinations at the- ,
- Reed R' actor Facility.
The written examinations are scheduled for hey 16, 1989. . The operating examinations ere scheduled-for May 18-19, 1989. a To meet the above schedule,-it will be necessary for you to furnish the- -. reference material listed :in Enclosure 1, " Reference Material Requirements for- j Reactor / Senior Reactor. Operator Licensing Examinations," by March'17, 1989. Any- delay in receiving approved, properly, bound and indexed reference material. or the submittal of inadequate orsincomplete reference material may result in
.the examination-being rescheduled. Mr. Pollock has Deen advise'd of- our -
. reference material requirements, and the address where each set-is to be mailed.
y You are responsible for providing adequate space and accomodations-for ! administration of:the written examinations.-.EnclosureL2i " Requirements 1for-
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- Administration of Written Examinations," describes bur requiren,ents __for- d i conducting these examinations. Mr. Pollock-has also been. informed of theseirequirements.
Enclosure 3-contains the Rules and Guidelines that will be in cffect-during-the administration 'of the written' examination.. The facility management is-respons. ole for ensuring that all applicants are.4 ware'ofcthase rules. l The facility staff review of the written examination will;be conducted. in ' accordance with requirements specified in-Enclosure 4~, " Requirements for; Facility' Review of : Written Examinations." 1Mr. Pollock has been informed - o, of these requirements. A or nF so49JW- Lp, . p e rw -r m -<w-- m , ' w -- - v ,
/VGk 2 January 27, 1989 Dr. Paul Bragdc7 All completed reactor operatar and senior reactor operator license applications should normally be submitted at least 30 days before the first examination dates so that we will be able to review the training and experience of the candidates, process the medical certifications, and prepare final examiner assignments applicant s? f gibility has been determined.tbc examination dates, it is likely that a pos at least 30 days ut T'-a will be necessary.
This request for information was approved by the Office of Management and Budget under Clearance Number 3150-0101, which expires May 31, 1989. Comments on burden and duplication may be directed to the Office of Management and Budget. Reports Management Room 3208, New Executive Office Building Washing +on, D.C. 20503. If you have any questions Thank you for your consideration in this matter. regarding the examination procedures and requirements, please contact Mr. Thomas Meadows at (415) 943-3867, or Mr. John Elin at (415) 943-3728. Sincerely, b b f6- . Dennis F. Kirsch, Chief Reactor Safety Branch
Enclosures:
- 1. Reference Material Requirements for Reactor / Senior Reactor Operator Licensing Examinations
- 2. Requirements for Administration of Written Examinations
- 3. Procedures for the Administration of Written Examinations
- 4. Requirements for Facility Review cf Written Examinations ccw/ enclosures (1),(2),(3)and(4):
R. Cross, RV (2 copies) M. Pollack, Reed Ccilege L. Ruby, Reed College cc w/o enclosures (1), (2), (3) and (4): D. Kirsch, RV J. Elin, RV H. Berkow, HQ PBSS M. Cillis, RV T. Meadows, RV M. Royack, RV
, H. North, RV 4
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r !' 1/-T REGION V
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June 15,1989 Docket No. 50-288 1 F Reed College Portland ~, Oregon 97202 Attention: Dr. Paul Bragdon, President Gentlemen:
Subject:
Examination Report On May 16 - 19. 1989 the NRC administered examinations to members of ~your-college who had applied for a license to operate your Reed Reactor Facility. - At the examination exit meeting on May 19, 1989, the examination process and-associated licensing issues were discussed with those members of ycur staff~ identified in.the enclosed report. In accorQ nce with 10.CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and enclosures (1)
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and (2) will be placed in the NRC's Public-Document Room. The results for the-individual applicant are exempt from disclosure by.10 CFR 2.790. Therekre, : enclosure (3) will not be placed in the NRC's Public DJcument Room. Should you have any questions concerning this examination, please contact Mr. Michael J. Royack at (415) 943-3790. Sincerely, , i. Dennis . Kirsch, Ch!ef-Reactor Safety-Branch
Enclosures:
- 1. Examination Report No.'50-288/0L-09-01:.
(w/ Attachments A cnd B, Facility' Comments)-
- 2. Examinations and. Answer Keys-(SR0/RO)
- 3. Grade , Sumary- Report W
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' June 15, 1989 Dr. Paul Bragdon- 2 cc w/ enclosures (1), (2) and (3): _
Mike Pollock, Associate Director, Reed Reactor Facility cc w/ enclosure (3) only: Janet Lanning, Management Assistant, NRR/LOLB cc w/anclosure (1) only: K. Perkins, Branch Chief, OLB J. Martin, R/- R. Zimerman, RV L. Miller, RV M. Royack, RV T. Meadows, RV M. Cillis, RV H'. North, RV
.T. Michaels, NRR/POSNP R. Cross, RV (2 copies) cc w/ enclosures (1) and (2) only:
RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)
o ENCLOSURE (1) U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V EXAMINATION REPORT Examination Report No.: 50-288/0L-89-01 Facility Licensee: Reed Reactor Facility Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202 Facility Docket No.: 50-288 Facility License No.: R-112 Examinations administered at Reed College, Portland, Oregon
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\ Date Sig'nea Chief Examiner:
Michael J. Roypck 2 /~ A /h - t/1 /d Examiner: Date Signed Thoma R. Meadows Date Signed
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Approved by: / . L Hle'r, Ch ef,f;ptrations Section
SUMMARY
Written examinations were administered to six (6) Reactor Operator (RO) - candidates and two (2) Senior Reactor Operator (SRO ..andidates on May 16, 1989. Two (2) of the Reactor Operator written examinations were The operating examinations were one (1) section retake examinations. The two (2) SRO candidates administered on May 16 through 19, 1989. Three (3) R0 candidates passed all passed all portions of the examination.Three of the R0 candidates failed the portions of their examinations. examination, two (2) of the candidates fa'iled both th portions of the examinations and one of the candidates failed the operating portion of the examination. py ~
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It REPORT DETAILS
- 1. Examiners:
Michael J. Royack, RV, Chief Examiner ' Thomas R. Meadows, RV, Examiner :
- 2. Persons Attending Exit Meeting:
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NRC: Michae'l J. Royack, RV REED: , M. Cronyn, Reed Vice President / Provost L. Ruby, Director Reed Reactor facility-J. Pol'ock,_ Assistant Director Reed Reactor Facility C. Grant, Reed Reactor Facility Staff S. Herbelin, Reed Reactor Facility Staff
- 3. .Written Examination and Facility Review:-
16,.1989. Written examinations were administered at Reed College on May At the conclusion of the examination copies of the SR0 and R0 examinations and associated answe, keys were provided to Mr. J. M. Pollock for coordination of the licensee's examinction review. On May 18, 1989 the Chief Examiner met with the facility reviewers to discuss their comments on the written examination. The facility comments' and NRC resolutions for the SRO, and for the R0 written examinations are included as-Attachments A and B, respectively. The resolutions to the facility comments were incorporated into the SR0 ano R0 written examination answer keys prior to the grading of the j' examination.
- 4. Operating Examination:
Tre SR0 and R0 operating examinations were administered from May 16 inrough May 18, 1989. During the operating portion of the examination, three generic weaknesses in the operator training program were identified. The areas identified were: l- ! a. Training of operators in the aret of radioactive material transfer procedures and processes. ' The operators need to be familiar with procedures for the transfer of r;dioactive material, specifically within the facility. No.. of the candidates were unfamiliar with the processes and the location of procedures for the transfer of radioactive materials when questioned in this area during the operating examinations. l
- b. Training of Reactor Operators in the area of reactor kinetics. 9 Safe reactor operators- are required to be knowledgeable in the areas of reactor kinetics in order to prevent or citigate the effects of potential reactor accidents. ;
Some of the candidates examined did not appear adequately trained in the area of reactor kinctics. Examples of this condition were: One of the candidates was unable to explain what " critical i operation" meant. , A candidate incorrectly identified the reactor as critical when it wa. well below the point of criticality during a i reactor start up.
- c. Training of reactor operators in the areas of radiological controls.
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Operators are required to be aware of and conform to the proper use of radiological controls. Some of the candidates did not adequately understand proper measures to control radioactive contamination. This weakness was identified by the following examples: One of the candidates tried to leave the reactor bay area without frisking their hands or feet as required by the Reed Reactor Facility procedures. A candidate placed a bare hand in the potentially contaminated
" rabbit" terminal box. After the candidate frisked the hand and put on protective gloves the candidate touched his face and nair with his potentially contaminated gloved hands that he had used to demonstrate the operation of the " rabbit" system.
- 4. Exit Meeting:
At the conclusion of the examination on May 19, 1989 an exit meeting was held with the facility. During the exit meeting the generic training problems identified in paragraph 3 of this report were discussed with the facility representatives, who agreed to review these weaknesses.
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3 ATTACHMENT A SRO.EXAMINATJON REED REACTOR FACILITY C0191ENTS n AND-NRC RESOLUTIONS , i RRF Comment: a "A". which U, SR0 Exam H.07: This problem concerns 2 reactors,' designated as reached full power in I hour with some final rod adjustments,'and "B" which ' reached full power in 10 hours, but with no final rod adjustment. The question-is, "Which of the following statements correctly describes ' the reasons for- the differences in power stability at 100% power? ,
- d. Reactor "B" required no adjustment since the delayed neutrons'that are being produced are in a-state of equilibrium. _
We believe that the key answer of "d" is' incorrect. Since both reactors > achieve full power in a time large compared tt the longest delayed-neutron. half life, both reactors have delayed neutrons wh.ich are in' essential-equilibrium with the power at all times.-~ However, the actual situation - for reactivity correction is very complicated. Although-both reactors experience the negative temperature coefficient from' fuel-temperature-L increase, the situation with respect to samarium burnout,-and with-xenon buildupj(or burnout) is'different in the.2 cases. There -is- ' insufficient information given to assess the effect of the latter - poisons. The' reference-given for the problem cmpares "very fast" rises to power, with rises over "several hours",-but in'this context, "very: ~
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fast" would have to be of the order of a few minutes, or less, to observe _ l a reactivity effect _due to the temporary lack of d_elayed-neutrons. TRIGAS capable'of square-wave operation, but not_ours, can-illustrate. this effect. RRF Suggested Resolution: Delete question H.07 from examination key. NRC Evaluation: NRC concurs with facility comment.
'NRC Resolution:
Delete questi_on H.07 from SRO examination key; L I., ,,.-;,- - ,. . _ , - - - . . . - , . . ,
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'I ATTACHMENT B V
R0 EXAMINATION < RFr0 REACTOR FACILITY COMMENTS n , AND NRC RESOLUTIONS e RRF Comment: 7' R.0. Exam D.01: Why-is a neutron source-needed for a startup if the reactor has been shut down for long period of time?
- a. To ensure that there is a sufficient number of neutrons to; start- ,
the nuclear reaction.
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- d. To ensure that nuclear power can.be accurately monitored during a start up from low count rate.-
is correct, we suggest that;"a" - While we agree that the key answer of "d" , is equally correct, and, in fact, may be an even more11mportant' reason.. Our training manual says on pagef4-6, "These neutrons are usedLto start the
-chain reaction.....," and Glasstone and Sesonske'say on:page 322, "During_
startup, it is possible for the reactor to become critical, and forJthe . reactor period to be very shortlwhile the neutron flux 11s still1 low.. =Ifi this occurred,q the power mightLincrease so _ rapidly that- dangerous levels 3, would be reached before steps couldLbe taken to reduce the fission: rate." RRF Suggested Reso.lution: Delete question D.01 from examination key. NRC Evaluation: - NRC concurs with facility' comment,1 reference material lis correct.. NRC Resolution:- Delete question D.01 from' RO examination key. - i
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8 o NUCtEAR RE'lutATORY COMMISSION NEGION V he,' { <l
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~~ m n1 m Docket No. 50-288 R:ed College Portland Oregon 97202 Attention: Dr. James L. Powell President Gentlemen:
Sub'at: HRC Inspection This , :rs to the routine inspection conducted by H. S. North of this office on August 1-4, 1989, of activities authorized by NRC License No. R-112 and to the discussion of our findin0s held by Mr. North with Dr. Bennett and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection. . Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector. No violations of HRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you. Sincerely G9 G. P. as, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-288/89-01 cc w/ enclosure: Dr. Douglas Bennett, Vice President-Provost Dr. Lawrence Ruby, Director, Reed Roactor Facility
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l.- . \, l O. S. NUCLEAR REG'".ATORY COMMISSION REGION V Report No. 50-288/89-01 Docket No. 50-288 License No. R-112 Licensee: Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202 Facility Name: Reed Reactor facility (RRF) Inspection at: Reed College, Portland, Oregon Inspection Conducted: August 1-4, 1989 ef[hk _ Date Signed Inspector- North, Senior Radiation Specialist H. 5 9 F/ bad 9
/I h Date Signed Approved by:
F. A.' Wenslawski, Jhief Facilities Radiologic 1 Protection Section Summary: Inspection _on August 1-4, 1989 (Report No. 50-288/89-01)_ " Areas inspected: Routine u'nannounced inspection by a regionally based inspector of the reactor operations program; including reactor operations, health physics, emergency planning and preparedness, transportationInspection activities, follow-up items and exit interview. 40750, 86740 and 92717 were addressed. Results: In the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations werea
' identified. The licen' their safety objectives.
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' 1 DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted
- Dr. D. Bennett, Vice President-Provost
- Dr. L Ruby, Director RRF, Professor of Nuclear Science
- J. M. Pollock, Associate Director RRF
- Dr. D. Garrity, Chairman, Radiation Safety Committee, Professor of Chemistry
- 5. Herbelin, Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), Acting Reactor Supervisor D. Moriwaki, Reactor Operator (RO)
Dr. M. W. Parrott, Reactor Health Physicist, Health Physics Coasultant (*) Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview.
- 2. Reactor Operations (40750)
- a. General Drs. James L Powell and Douglas Bennett have replaced Drs. Bragdon and Cronyn as the President and Vice President-Provost, Reed College, respectively. The remainder of the RRF administrative and academic staff remain as described in Inspection Report 50-288/88-02. Both the Director and Associate Director RRF are An additional SRO license is held by a professor at licensed SRO's. The principal operating staff, SRO's and RO,s, Pacific University.
are students, who have completed the necessary training as an extra curricular activity. The normally assigned Reactor Supervisor,This a student SPO. was not present on the campus during the summer. position u filled by a student SR0 in an acting capacity for the summer. At the t'ime of the inspection a three week, National Science Foundation workshop, involving irradiation of geologic samples, was being conducted on the Reed campur. The inspection established that reactor operations were consistent with the information provided in the licensee's annual report for the period September 1,1987 - August 31, 1988. The inspector observed reactor operation including startup and shutdown, power increase, sample irradiation and handling and recovery from an unanticipated event. The licensee's program and staff appear to be No violations or adequate to meet their safety objectives. deviations were identified.
- b. Organization Except as noted in the previous report section, the licensee's orgtnization, related-to reactor operations, remains as previously .
described. A total of three committees, the Reactor Review- 1 Committee (RRC), the Reactor Operations Committee (ROC) Theand theis, RRC Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) are active on campus. in fact, an incor, .ation (integration) of the ROC and RSC as The two subcommittees do not meet as a single subcommittees.
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2 committee, each conducting their meetings as indep~ dent entities. The RSC and ROC are specifically identified in the Technical specifications (TS). The licensee plans to propose an amendment to the TS, combining the ROC and RSC into one comittee with two subcommittees. The committees are reconstituted each year, The Formal membership meets the requirements specified in the TS. minutes of comittee meetings are maintained and were on file. Since June 1988 the ROC had met three times aad the RSC twice, at the time of the inspection. h was noted that the ROC reviewed all proposed procedure changes, new, changed or revised experiments, and 10 CFR 50.59 changes. Due to infrequent committee meetings and the committees diligence in reviewing procedure changes, proposed procedure changes are frequently delayed. This has occurred at a time when the licensee has been revising, updating and reformatting a significant number of procedures. It was noted that the licensee's organization and eperatkos met the requirements specified in TS Sections 1. A.dmin,Wrative Requirements 1.- 5. The licensee is supported in the area of health physics by a : consultant, two days per month. The consultant reports to the Vice President-Provost and the RRF Director. The consultant is supported j by a Reactor Assistant, a student employee, who functionr. as a haalth physics technician at the reactor facility and at on campus laboratories conducting activities licensed by the State of Oregon, in this area the licensee's program appeared adequate to meet their > safety objective ;. No violations or deviations were identified.
- c. Review and Audit The ROC and RSC establish audit schedules which are implemented by various members of the committees. The ROC conducted an audit of the bimonthly and annual checklists, 9r the period January 1987 to May 1988, in June 1988 with a follow-sp audit of weekly checklistsThe and the main log and general facility operations 90 days later.
Director RRF responded *,o the audit findings. The ro ults of an audit of the same general topics was set =duled for review at the next meeting of the ROC. The RSC had established an audit schtdule and had conducted an audit of the emergency plan. The audits appeared adequate to meat the liceasee's safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified. - d. Corrective Actione, for Unusual Events and Occurrences Since the last inspection the licensee had reported several events. On October 18, 1988, the licensee reported a small chemical fire in the chemistry building whi:h houses the RRF, on October 17, 1988. The fire was extinguished by students promptly, however, the smoke alarms were activated and the fire department rcsponded. The RRF
'nas shut oown, secure, with no experiments in progress and e.c occupied at the time. The fire department evacuated portions of the chemistry building and used blowers to clear the smoke. .The reactor staff wLs not notified of the event promptly and therefore p ,m
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- 3 did not inform the Region V office of the event until the fo19 wing day. The licensee has taken corrective action to assure that the RRF staff will be promptly notified of such events in the future.
The licensee had initiated action to revise the emergency plan to limit Notification of Urmsual Events, to those fires, to which the fire department responds and which require evacuation of the entire chemistry building. Thewhich ifcensee submitted a report of this event proposed the corrective attions noted dated Jancry 17, 1989, atjove. On December 16, 1988, the reactor experienced an unanticipated The Director increase in power due to withdrawal of the safety rod. and Associate Director promptly investigated the event which had been observed by an RO performir,g operations as a part of the Repeated operation subsequently requalification program. established that the safety to therod NRCcontrol rod driv ap).arent problem. The licensee repsted the e"en In a promptly erd by letter reports dated January 6 and 10,1989. 19, 1988, telephone discussien with the Region V office on December the licensee agreed not to make the reactor critical until the cause of the aberrant behavior of the safety rod was fully understood. The agreement vas confimed in a letter to the licensee from .aton V dated Decem W 21, 1988. Subsequent testing by the licensee and discussions with General Atomics staff members establ problem was mechanical sticking of th9 control rod switch. Following cleaning, lubrication and testing of the The licensee requested discussion with Region V staff. The licensee was authorization to resume reactor operatiorr-requested 12/16/88 to submit theIn Report on Errant-Control a conference call on January 9, operations, would be readdressed.1989, which included th The licensee war informed that reactor operations could be resumed. significance of was also asked to provide information on the safety / surveillance for the event, a discussion of the planned maintenance the faulty switch and information to support the issuance of anThe Information Notice on the switch problem. 10, 1989. During the this information in a iciter dated January inspection it was verified that the cleaning of the rod actuating switches had been added to the annual maintenance sche Procedure 50P-66, Cleanica of Operator Actuated Rod Switches, received committee approval and was implemented in May 1989. During the inspection, while the reactor was being operated by t student SCO and RO, the TRIGA tube recovery device, used to recov capsules from the " lazy susan" irradiation The facility, SRO andfailed RO ar.d ca apart while a capsule recovery was in progress. carried out the recovery of all the parts from Se device using g radiation protection practices, reassembled the reco recovered the capsule. faculty staff advised of the event and plans for recovery.
' 4 The licensee's response to these events indicates an appropriate degree of sensitivity to safety concerns and appeared to demonstrate No violations or a high level of student operator proficiency.
deviations were identified, s.
- e. Experiments Experiment No. 1 Records of approved experiments were examined.
Routine Irradiations Utilizino Rotating Specimen Rack _or Pneumatic Transfer System, had been revised to incorporate all or portions of routine experinents 3, 4,13 and 14. A total of 16 r;litionalAll exp routine expc.riments were examined.The most recently approved experiments as ROC approved and signed. were experiment 21, Electronically Measured control _ Rod Drop Time and experiment 22, Rod Drop Tinn Measured with Electto-Optical _ Isolators. These two experiments had been implemented to replace rod drop timing using stop watches with an electronic timer which sensed light. tne rod magnet off indication and the rod panel indicator lights which precludes any potential for signal feedback to the control panel. and experiments established that all experiments had been examin for unreviewed safety questions, as required by 10 CFR 50.59, Theand reviewed and approved by the committee prior to review, the proposed crocedure or change and supporting documentation. The /4sociate Director of the RRF had developed a conguter program to evaluate the activity of irradiated mineral samries at any future The ROC had reviewed and approved the time, beginning at T=0, program for use a.t the facility. It appeared that the licensee was providing 5 opropriate control experiments to meet their safety goals. were identified.
- f. Site Tour It was During the inspection the RRF wts toured severa rooms.
In other portions of the facility the quality of
- housekeeping was not as noticeable due to the crewded nature o f acility and the age of much of the equipment.that s The tours included the counting room, good housekeeping.
laboratory, cor. trol room, reactor room and eq ronms were performed ming an ion chamber survey instrument NRC-015844, due .'Or ca11bration September 26, 1989. The survey reruits were consistent with the results of lic in survey records.
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' 5 The inspector bad the opportunity to observe the studert R0 and SRO ourbu sta% and completion of the Startup Checklist, including rod crop tieg measurement, interlock verifications including, instrument scram settings, source count rate interlock, single rod motion interlock and core e: cess reactivity check and reactor shutdown. Operation at 5 W, 5 kW and approach to and operation at full power (administrative 1y limited to 94%, 235 kW) was observed.
The licensee had imposed the administrative limit due to a fluctuating response of the power indicating channel and recorder. The licensee had taken a:: tion to minimize the fluctuations by repositioning the circulating water return to minimize ths apparent The licensee reported that the apparent vibration of the detector. fluctuations had been reduced to approximately +1% of full power. The licensee had not approved operation at increased power following the change in the cooling water discharge flow path. The inspector also witnessed the operation of the pneur,,atic irradiation sample transfer system (7abbit) and " lazy susan" facilities and the insertion and removal of samples from these devices. It was noted that the operators used good radiation protection practices in the recovery of samples. It was noted that the operating procedures reflected the as-built It system and that the operators were familiar with the procedurer. was noted that the operators were able to conduct their at.tivities in accordance with the procedures, withow having the procedures in hand. Current copies of the operating and emergency procedures were available in the control room. Shortly before the inspection began the licensee had received a shipment of fuel and spare parts from the University of California, Berkeley T.
- IGA facility. The shipment included four new, unirrediated fuel' elements (20% enriched), used irradiated fission chambers and several fuel storage racks. The licensee noted that this material addition to the facility inventory significantly The licensee added to the potential operating lifetime of the reactor.
stated that prior to the receipt of the new fuel the only fuel on hand, in addition to the core, was one dummy element and one ele'nent which had been dropped while being moved, several years earlier. The lower not usable. core plate locating pin had been damaged and th The University of California, Berkeley had requested authorization for the use of a Model No. TRIGA-1, Type USA 9034/AF shipping container for the fuel transfer to the RRF in a letter dated July 24, 1989. The licensee had performed and documented receipt surveys Confirmatory surveys by the ) of the packages when they arrived. It was inspector were consistent with the licensee's results. verified that the fuel handling cool was secuted in it's place of L l storage by a lock. Vith respect to the administrative limit on full power operation 6iscussed above, the licensee expressed concern related to the ' potential for being cited for exceeding the maximum authorized licensed power level if minor fluctuations in the indicated power
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- ..evel exceeded the 100% power indication. The inspector informed the licensee that the intent was to operate at a steady state power level of 100% and that minor fluctustions which indicated power in excess of 100% were not considered to be indicative of steady state operation. It was noted that should the indicated power remain above the 100% indicated power level for any appreciable tin,e the power should be reduced.
The licensee's program in this area appeared to be consistent with their safety goals. No violations or deviations were identified,
- g. Records Review The following licensee records were reviewed:
Main Log (Console Log); " Log Book #35, February 25, 1989 to ---- ". Records maintained in black ink, scrams in green and fuel movements in red. Table of rod worths in 5 unit increments in the back of the book (totals- safety $4.06, shim $4.12, regulating $1.59). Records for the period February 25 - August 2,1989 were reviewed. " Log Book #34, f4 May 1988 - 25 Feb 1989". Records for the period July 29, 1988 to f eimuary 14, 1989 were reviewed. It was noted that the Director RRF reviewed and signed the logs at approximately monthly intervals.
" Weekly Checklist" for the period June 1 to August 2,1989 were reviewad. These records addressed radiation monitors (area, air particulate and continuous air), pool water level, primary and secondary cooling systems and instrement air supply. Signed by the checker and Reactor Supervisor.
( "Bi-monthly thecklist", eight completed checklists completed during the period May 5,* 1988, - July 20, 1989, were reviewed. These checklists addressed functional test of the reactor roca ventilation isolation system, low water alarm test, CAM oil level, secondary water pressure low alarm test, safety light test and ched of the TRIGA capsule retrieval tool fishing line. Signed by the Reactor Supervisor and RRF Director.
" Semi-annual Checklist", reviewed for the periods July-August 1988, January-March and June-July 1989. These checklists addressed calibration of the continuouc air, area radiation and stack monitors, control rod calibraion, rod drop time verifications, I portable survey instruments, " lazy susan" lubrication, inspection and testing of the " rabbit" syster, emergency supply check, colle. tion and analysis of environmental samples and drying the-
" lazy susan" with desiccant. Signed by the Reactor Supervisor and RRF Director.
" Annual Checklist", the January 13, 1989, checklist was reviewed.
This checklict addressed console checkout (ss per Gulf General Atomic manual), fuel element inspection, control rod inspection (due only on sven years), bulk water temperature alarm, flush and bleed air from heat exchanger, povier calibration and verification of last o
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' 7 service o' tentilation system. Signed by the Reactnr Supervisor and RRF Director.
"PCN" (Frocedure Change Notice Log), Sign-offmaintained shests for in the control room operators contained new and revised procedures.
were contained in the log. contained records of gas stack monitor
" Stack Monitors-Boot Ca 2"librations were performed July 26, 1988 ar.d (GSM) celibrations.
June 29, 1989.
" Health Physics Book 3B-Environmental Samples", identified Samplesthe sample types, dates of collection and analytical results. Samples were analyzed by U.S. Testing Co.
both upstream and down stream from the secondary cooling water The upstream and downstream samples vero outfall 3.97 E0 frompC1/1 the RRF. and 2.16 E0 pCi/1, respectively, for samples colle The reactor was operated at 5 W and 200 kW on on January 10, 1989. One sediment and January 9 and 3 W and 150 kW on January %,1989. The last previous environmental samples were 1988.
" Wipe Test Log Book",50P-02 recorded Health the results Physics Wipeof Tests.
smear san.pleiResults en11ected as required by/100cm sq. No contamination above the rccorded in units of pCi procedure identified li. nit of 0.005 pC1/100cm
" Area Monitor-RAM-Semi Yearly Calibration Reports", Calibrationscontained were records of the calibration of the area monitor.
performed on July 25, 1988 and January 11, 1989.
" Continuous Air Monitor-CAM-Calibration Reports", recorded thear.d results of calibrations performed on July 25, 1988, and June 29,1989.
" Control Rod Calibrations", documented te results of cdibrations The 17-18, 1989, using R00 CAL version 4.063.
performed on Januaryreported values were Shim $4.30, Reg $1 I The licensee's system of records appeared adequate to supp safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- h. Procedures The procedures.
licensee had been redewing, revising and r comment and approval prior toDuring implementation. the inspection com the implementation of revised procedures. l selected procedures were reviewed including:
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Reed Reactor Facilit , Administrative Procedures 50P-02 Health Physics Wipe Tests 50P-30 Calibratior, of the CAM (being revised) SOP-31 Gaseous Stack Monitor Calibration (being revised) SOP-32 Particulate Stack knitor Calibration (being revised)
$0P-33 Control Rod Calibration 50P-50 Filling Out Irradiation Requests (being revised)
SOP-52 Shipping Radioactive Materials (in approval process) 50P-66 Cleaning of the Operator Actuated Rod Switches In addition the " Reed Reactor Facility-Standard Operating Procedures-Copy No. 1", was examined. The licensee's procedures appeared to be adequate to meet their safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 1. Requalification Train *ng The licensee conducts a requalification training program which incorporates the operating requirements for research The and test reactors specified in 10 CFR 55.53 (e) and (f)(2).
requalification program incorporates applicable aspects Theof 10 CFR 55.59 (c)(1) through (6) as required by 10 CFR 55.59 (c)(7). licensee's schedula for requalification training operates on aDuring the tra yearly schedule beginningTwo and ending on July 1. c of the lectures were between July 7 and December 7,1988. optional for R0 and SRO requalification since they satisfied a Sta of Oregon training requirement for radioisotope handlers and a Attendance lists were maintained. Annual reviewing the material presented during any missed lectures. written comprehensive examinations are required for all R0s and SR0s. An individual with a minimum passing grade of 70% on the written or operating pnrtions of the examination or apparent deficiencies in operating skills, in the opinion of an SRO until an accelerated requalification program has been completed. Any RO or SRO who fails to achieve a score of 80% o portion of the written examination must complete an accelerate requalification program. The 1989 lecture series included the following topics: l Februery 15- 10 CFR 20; February 22- L.icense, Technical Sp Procedures; March 8- Biological Effects of Radiation; March 29- P
" lazy susan", Shipping Radioactive Material; Detection System; l April 12- Reactor Console, Heutrcr-April 19- Control R l and Console lights.
During the 1989 Paideia (ski two week vacation) schedule, of lectures and reactor operations twre conducted as well as tou i
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to the Richland low level wast disposal site and Trojan Nuclear Power Plant. The licensee maintains records of R0 and SRO reactor operation. These records include Reactor Observation Record (required reactivity manipulations), Operator Observation Record (record sf operators performance during performance of various tasks). The requalific.tfon files of five student R0s and SR0s were examined. The records were adequate to demonstrate the accomplishment of the requalification training program. The Requalification Training Program was adequate to accomplish the l licensee's safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified. : I
- j. Surveillance The inspector verified that the following surveillan reviewing licensee records:
TS F.5. The type and minimum number of safety circuits operable were as specified in TS Table I; TS F.6. The type and af,imum number of interlocks operable were as specified in TS Table II; TS F.7. The reactor instrumentation and safety circuits listed in TS Table I were verified operable at least once per day when the reactor was operated; TS F.8. Following maintenance or modification o control-rod drive switches); TS F.9.a. Contro1Erod drop times less than one second; , TS F.9.b. Functional test of the ventilation system interlocks; TS F.10. Linear power level channel calibrated annut.11y by therma power calibration; The licensee's attention to surveillance requirements. No violations appearedor adequate to meet their safety requirements. deviations were identified. ;
- 3. Health Physics (407S0)
- a. Posting During tours of the facility, noted above, posti the regulations.
- b. Personnel Monitoring The licensee uses both pocket ionization chambers (PIC) and quarterly TLD badges-and finger ring., supplied byTLD' a NVLAP badges accredited processor, to evaluate personnel exposures.
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10 are use$ to perform environmental radiath . measurements in the reactor room and on the roof of the reactor facility. Exposures for 1988 and the first quarter of 1989 were reviewed. Results of the second quarter 1989 had not been received at the time of the inspection. All personnel exposures were less than 10% of the 1.25 rem / quarter limit specifiea in 10 CFR 20.101. A number of students with access to the f acility, including R0s and SR0s, were under 18 years old during the time period of the records evamined. The eaximum whole body lifetime exposure was 80 arem. The maximum extremity exposure recorded was 70 arem. The PICS, used by the licensee, were calibrated, using an NBS (NIST) traceable sealed source, by a member of the licensee's ROC. PICS found to be faulty were discarded. Since the last inspection the licensee had disposed of no radioac'.ive liquid waste under the reactor license. Due to the relatively low power of the RRF and the difficulty of integrating i under the curve of the stack gas monitor recorder, the licensee elected to evaluate gaseous effluer,ts using a different technique. For the September 1,1987, to August 31, 1988, annual report period, the licensee used the ratio of thermal energies of the RRF and the Oregon State University (OSU) TRIGA and the reported Argon-41 releases from OSU to estimate the release from the RRF. At the time of the inspection the licensee had not completed a similar or alternate calculation for the 1988-89 time period. For the last annual texrt the licensee's reported release using this method was 0.0608 Ci Ar-41. At the stack flow rate this was equivalent to an ( average release rate of 3.07 E-9 pCi/m1, substantially less than the ' l most restrictive value given in 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, 4 E-S pCI/ml.
- c. Surveys In addition to the contamination surveys performed by the reactor technician, recorded in the " Wipe Test Log Book", discussed above in report section 3.g., daily surveys are performed as a part of the "Startup Checklist". The results of these surveys were recorded on that form. The inspector observed an R0 and SRO removing samples from the " lazy susen" and monitoring samples discharged from the
" rabbit" irradiation system. The operators were using good cadiation safety practices and evaluating each irradiated sample with a survey instrument at a distance prior to approaching the sample closely.
The licensec's health physics practices appeared to be adequate to protect the health and safety o' the staff and the public. No violations or deviations were l entified.
- 4. Emergency Planning and Preparedness (40750)
The licensee maintained a complete copy of the Emergency Plan, - Implementing Procedures and the Emergency Call tist in the control room within arms reach of the operator. These documents were reviewed during
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the inspection. Since 'he last inspection the licensee i a conducted three drills. Scenarios: June 24, 1988: Severe earthquake causes facility blackout, loss of Telephone calls coumu.ucation and one personnel contamination event. NRC, Walnut Creek, CA, Oregon DOE. A post drill made to Reed Security evaluation was performe
,d and potential improvements identified.
Senior faculty SRO experiences heart attack at reactor December 3, 1988:R0 in facility responds properly and takes corrective actions. console. Drill resulted in obtaining a qualified first aid instructor on campus due to an identified need. April 15, 1989: Complex scenario involving personnel injury, radioactive material release, ambulance and (simulated) fire department respons contamination event. In all cases post drill critiques and evaluations identified area needing improvement. areas. - All agreement letters with the fire and police departments and service and hospital were current. drills, however the Reed staff were permitted to observe drills at the hospital when the hospital played during a Trojan Nuclear Power P drill. RRF staf f members have been included as observers at Trojan emergency plan diills. Training in W crea ofthe emergency response included a lecture, vide emergency drill of December 3, 1988 and a drill on April 15, 1989, 29, 1988, addressing the emergency requalification meetirig on September plan and procedures. The licensee's emergency preparedness activities appeared adequate meet their safety objectives. No violations or deviations were identified.
- 5. Transportation Activities (86740)_
The licensee was in the process of reviewing and approving a newDurin. 1 l procedure 50P-52 Shippino Radioactive Materials. ( 10 and in 1989 Theaonly total of 15 authorized individuals transfersto of shipradioactive or transfer ma HRF had occurred. radioactive Director. materials off campus are the RRF Di OR) f acilities, ' licensed by the State of Oregon. materials from the RRF pick up the irradiated samples at Reed Coll The licensee maintains records on the Reed Reactor The.Facility only Sh which was patterned on that used by Oregon State University. shipment which was not a local transfer was an air shipment lived irradiation sample to Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory on D 1988. For this single shipment of 6 E-3 mci of Si-31, Mn-54 and Na
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the licensee's committee approved 'he use of the now shipp < l for this single use. International Airport in a Reed College vehicle. An examination Prior of the ! shipping documents and survey records revealed A containers. The licensee's transportation p.ogram appeared adeguate to meet theN requirements of 49 CFR ar.J 10 CFR 71 and 20. were identified.
- 6. Information Notices (92717)
The inspector verified that the licensee had received and revi Information Notice No. 89-09: Since all the RRF Capability In The Calculation Of Shutdown Marcin. control rods have scram capability this Information Notice was applicable (IN-89-09, Closed). amendment to theThe facility license should the licensee wish licensee stated that there were no plans to to irradia byproduct material. It was noted that the irradiate such material (88-08-18, Closed). licensee had in place a formal program for the r
- 7. Exit Interview (30703)
The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with theThe individuals denoted in Report Se~ tion 1. It was the inspectors no violations or deviations had been identified. conclu conservative manner. I O
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ g 3 g, E MGON V 1450 MA9tA LANE. Sulf E 210 T. [ WALNUT C* EEK. CALIFORNIA 94596 Us , . . . ,# JUN - 5 1993 Docket No. 50-288 Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202-8199 Attention: Dr. James L. Powell President Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
HRC INSPECTION This refers to the special inspection conducted 16-17, 1990,by of Messrs. A. John.on, activities M. Blume and ". Qualls of this office on May authorized by NRC License No. R-112 and to the discussion of o by the inspectors with you and Dr. Bennett at the conclusion of the inspection. . Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclo report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews w . personnel, and observations by the inspectors. No violations of'NRC requirements were identified within the scope itispection. , In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the ' will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should you have any questions con'cerning this inspection, we discuss them with you. Sincerely, '
.c W Director R. A. Scarano,diation Safety and Division of.Ra Safeguards
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Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-288/90-02 cc w/ enclosure: Dr. Douglas Bennett, RRF Mr. J. Michael-Pollock, RRF Dr. Lawrence Ruby Mr. Paul Terdal, RRFDr. William Vernetson, Director of Nuclear Facilitie University of_ Florida .. ^ 30awo*W \qr .
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' Ui S. NUCLEAP. REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
REGION V \ Report No: 50-288/90-02 Docket No: 50-288 Licensee Ho: R-112 Reed College Licensee: Portland, Oregon 97?02 Facility Neme: Reed Reactor facility (RRF) l Inspection at: Reed College, Portland, Oregon May '. 7, 9 inspection Conducted-JM p//[9O Inspector: M[ P. Qualls, Relictor- Inspectil Udf et ig ed
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f.$egional - ~Counsel
- Date 51 ned W91Y Date Signed A. Joh ' on, Enf orcement Of ficer
(/ #ip Approved by: b h mk-G. P. Yuh'ps, Cnief .
. Date Signed Emerg cy/ Preparedness and Radiological rotection Branch Sumrnary:
Inspection on K.y 16-17, 1990_(Peport No. 50-288/9_0-02} Areas Inspected: Special announced inspection to review and evaluate ility-alle ations ccacerning the safety-of operation of the Reed Reactor Fa (PRF . Results: In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were ident WBTniife operations were identified. 4
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' 1 DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted
*Dr. J. Powell, President
*Dr. D. Bennett Vice President-Provost P ofessor of Nuclear Science Dr.
Dr. D.L.Garri Ruby,ty,ChairmanChairman, Dr. D. Dalton, Radiation Safety Commit
, Reactor Operator D mmittee Dr. D. Griffith, Professor Mr. J. Pollock, Acting Director, RRF Mr. P. Terdal, Senior Licensed Operator, RRF
*Hr. '{. Moomey, Oregon State Department of Energy
- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview.
- 2. Followup of_ A11egtion RV-90-A-0017 On March 13, 1990 an anonymous allegation war received in Region V asserting that the pror.edure for calibrating the stack On gas Marchmonitor 16 at the Reed Ret.ctor Faci'iity (RRF) had been improperly ch that the college evaluate the matter and inform the N findings. which addressed the technical adequacy and need for the April 16, 1990) procedural change, but not clearly answering the N procedures.
On April 17 Reed notified the NRC that Reed had replaced the RRF Director with the former Associate Director as Acting Director. On Mcy 16 and 17 a special inspection was conducted to verify that the ReedReactorFacl11tyhadbeenat,discontinuingtobeoperatedin compliance with regulatory requirements and in a safe ma'iner. In the days immediately preceding the inspection The concerns identified in the correspondence are Operator of the RRF. listed and addressed in the following paragraphs neither the incpectocs nor any of the While addressing the concerns individualscontactedidentifledcasesofpreviousorcurrentplant operations which would jeopardize Moreover,the hesith the. andidentified inspectors safety of the p the safe operation of the reactor. no violations of regulatory requirements. A. Allegation RV A-0017, concerning The inspectorsan reviewed allegedtheimproper ch procedures, was not substantiated. ' change to 50P31, Gas Stack Monitor, for compliance w regulatory requirements. system improvements which the li
2 monitot suction piping. The it:provements resulted in the stack gas ! monitor high alarm being in continuous riarm at 100% power ., operation. The procedure was changed by the The ex-Director revised to proccdure appropriately reset the high alarm setpoint.did not i change t ; release of Argon-41. Althou Radiation Safety Committee RSC) or Reactor(gh the change Operations Committeeto 50P31 d i (ROC) approval prior to implementation, the procedure was approved Prior approval by the Committees was i by the facility director.neither required by the licensee's administrative the fa:ility technical specifications. While Technical - Specification I.2. requires pr-lor Committee approval for changes in "i dety Standards," the term is not defined, either formally informally. A the administrative procedures for future reference. While the change to the procedure was not improper, one potential issue was identified, h e stack gas monitor is now reportedly ' measuring gases released by RRF more accurately Consequently, tha'ithe it did prior to licensee the above-referenced system improvement. now plans to use the actual gas meesurements as the The basis for the 10 ' CFR 20.106 etfluent release calculation for Argon 41. : inspectors informed the licensee that prior to including dispersion of the gas in the calculation, a license amendment in accordance with 10 CFR 20.106 may be required. This item is cons'dered closed. B. In an April 27, 1990 letter to the Region V Regional Administrator, the ex-Director questioned the competency of the RRF Acting ! Director. However, when questioned by the inspectors, the - ex-Director said that the Acting Director was competent to operate the RRF. The inspectors compared the qualifications of the Acting Director to
-the criteria specified in section 4.2 of ANSI standard 15.4, Standard for Selection and Training of Personnel for Research Reactors, and found that the Acting Director satisfied the qualification guidelines listed in the standard. '
' to the ex-Director :the Provost had C.
In his letter of April-16, 1990notedhisunspecifiedsafetyconcer Whea pestioned by the ex-Director's management of the RRr. inspectors about these concerns, the Provo.t-explained that conflicts between the ex-Director and his Associate Director, between the ex-Director ana student operators and.between the: ex-Directorandtheoversightcommitteesicouldhaveledeventually to unsafe conditions at the facility, but'that the situation had-never' deteriorated to the Noextent evidence that of unsafe it threatened the-safe activities was ' operation of the facility. it identified by the inspectors. With the a Director to A: ting Director, sthe concerns Provost'ppointmen have been. alleviated. t _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ i ..__. . _ __ _ __
t 3 D. In an April 27,1990 letter to the NRC, the ex-Director had expressed concern about the Acting Director's failure to.fol procedures in the past. to the HRC dated May IT, 1990, noting that the procedures had been clarified and guidance given io operating personnel regarding the importance of complying with procedures. Director, all cases identified by the ex-Director in violate regulatory requirements. The inspectors questioned personnel The inspectors at the fa familiarity with the content of their procedures. concluded that licensee staff appeared to be saf procedures. E. Licensee managers, includ4ng the ex-Director, were questioned concerning the extent of the ex-Director's current involvemen the operation and management of RRT.that the ex-Directo F. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's progr The iicensee changed the direction of the pump in IR 50-288/89-01. discharge from the significantly primaryreducingcooling the water syst pool rather than into the corefluctuationsobservedontheilnearpo it was apparent that the licensee staff had G. During the interviews, impression that it was not necessary for received an erroneous research reactors toThe strictly comply with NRC regulations and inspectors emahasized to licensee license requirements. personnel that deviations fromareoermissible NRC reguirements specific only by exem NRC regulatiors.
- 3. Inspection 89-01 Corrections In October 1989, the Acting Director 50-288/89 issued to 51, identifying other licensee possible 1
critique of NRC inspection report errors in the report. Air discussing the critique with the Acting Director, the inspectors conciuded that the report contained the following errors: a. In paragraph 2.a., a professor at Pacific University was sa an SRO, when in fact she was an RO.
- b. In paragraph 2.E, the inspector stated, aa seen reviewed by the RCC.
In fact, the program had not been, and is not required to be, reviewed by the ROC,
n . . . . - - ._ . - - . - 4
- c. In paragraph 2.g, discussing Health-Physics-Book 2, the incpector 10, 1989 lists sample.
several sample results as being from the JanuaryHo such analysis is not required. The numbers obtained were from a arevious sample, whose data tre attached to the facing page in the
)ook.
d. ths inspector stated that all procedures had beenIn ta In paragraph submitted to the 2.h,R00 prior to implementation.Instead, some been submitted to the ROC. Technical Specifications as J RSC prior to implementation. administrative procedures do no procedures be reviewed or approved prior to implementation. e. Section 2.1 should have been labelled " Training" rather than "Requalification Training," and the first sentence of that sectio should state that "The licensee conducts an unlicensed operator training program...."
- f. Parcf aph 3.6 statcs that TLD's were on the " roof of the fa In fat.t, the licensee's data report continues to label these as being on the facility roof, where they were a on the roof but were inside the facility to protect ag vandalism.
course a good practice,
- g. Paragraph 4 implies that RRF this Although personnel observed option is available to a Tro. tan em RRF drill at "the hospitil". personnel, none had actually observe The errors in the report were minor and did not affect the conclu therein.
- 4. Exit Meeting an exit meeting was held with the President and Provost On May 17, 1990, The results of this inspection were discus.,cd at that of the licensee.
The insaectors informed the licensee representatives that no time. 4RC requirements were identified and that the inspectors In violatiens of did not identify any unsafe conditions or activities at the facility. addition, the inspectors stated that none of the facil1ty.
g. i D[w UNITED STATES [Da ht gg['o,, a NUCLEAR MEGULATORY COMMISClON
'- e rem 0N V
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, 1460 e4 ARIA LANE. SUITE 210 WALNUT CREE K, CALIFORNIA M680
% . . . . . gat JUN 0 51990 Docket No. 50-288 Dr. James L. Powell, President Reed College Portland, Oregon 97202
Dear Dr. Penell:
Subject:
Examination Report On May 15 - 17,.1990 the NRC administered examinations tofor. one Seni Operator candidate and seven Reactor All of the Opera d a license. candidates failed the Operating portion of their ex h Your operator training' program continues to demonstrate This is som preparation of operator candidates for NRC.. licensing examina evident in the higher fai?ure rate Reed, than elsewhere. This issue is detailed in the This finding was discussed with your staff. enclosed report. i ificant' l Your management comitted to resolve this further issueimprovements as well as some f
- weaknesses identified during the examinations, by '
examination. his letter an1 Enclosure (1) will be placed in the t us. If, you have any questions or coments concerning this rep Sincerely,, \ l I T) Dennis F. Kirsch, Chief Reactor $6fety Branch k Ql }^' ?
\
2
Enclosures:
50-288/0L-90-01 1. Examination Report No.(w/ Attachment A, Written Examination facili
- 2. Examination and Answer Key (RO) 3.
Non-Power Reactor Examination Results Sunnary Snent ccw/ enclosures (1),(2),and(3): Michael P-11ock, Acting Director, Reed ReLetor Facility cc w/ enclosure (3) only: Janet Lanning, Management Assistant, NRR/LOLB ccw/ enclosure (1)only: K. Perkins, Branch Chief, NRR/LOLB S. Weiss, NRR/PDNP J. Martin, RV B. Fruikenberry, RV R. Zimmerman, RV A. Chaffee, RV D. Kirsch, RV L. Miller, RV T. Meadows, RV G. Yuhas, RV P. Qualls, RV I
i l Enclosure 1 Examination Report flo.: 50-288/0L-90-01 Reed Reactor Facility Facility: l d Examinations administered at the Reed Reactor Facility, Reed C Oregon. Ralph Cooley, Headquarters Examiners: Thomas Meaoows, Region V b-Y-7) Date Signed Approved: Id F. Miller Art, Chief ! Operations Section Sumary: h h NRC initial licensing examinations were administrated from May 15 t r May 17, 1990 (Report No. 50-288/0L-90-01). Initial operator licensing examinations were administered to on Operator (SRO) upgrade ce iidate and seven Reactor 304 andOperat These ES-404, Revision 6. examinations were administered in accordan One i nt, Two of the seven RO candidates were first reta because of an acceptabic performance on the first licensing i attempt Two of the seven Reactor Operators failed the oper examinations. sub".equently issued licenses, s E Q
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u, f r, u Qi! .-... . _ , _ , _ . , _ _
I REPORT DETAILS
- 1. Examiners Thomas Headows, RV, Chief Examiner Ralph Cooley, OLB Headquarters 18, 1990
- 2. Personnel Attending tLe Exit Meeting on May
- Thomas Meadows, RV, Chief Examiner Douglas Bennett, Provost, Reed Collece
- Michael Pollock, Acting Director, Reed Reactor F 17, 1990
- Attended the written examination review on May
- 3. Written Examination and Facility Review 15, 1990 on the Reed The written examinations were administered on MayThis e.
College campus. ccordance with NUREG 1021. ES-404, Revision 6. the examination the Chief Examiner imediately secured All the master examination answer key and all of the candidate's answer sheets. other examination materials were forwarded to the key, licensee's staff, including a copy of the master "as given" examination answer for their formal review. 17, 1990 with All facility The Chief Examiner held a formal examination r coments were resolved during this review. 23, 1990 (Attachment Af documented by the licensee in a letter dated May The Chief sent to Region V, in accordance with NUREG 1021, ES-201. i Examiner considered all ofThese the licensee's changes did notcoments alter the and prop and accepted the coments proposed. grading structure of the original answer key, butBank Question were mad question clarity prior to uploading on the NRC Examination (EQB). All of the operator candidates passed this portion of the exa
- 4. Operating _r.aminations.
15-17, 1990, in The operating examinations were administered on MayThese ' examination accordance with NUREG 1021. ES-404, Revision 6. conducted using opr stional scenarios that tested the candidate integral system kn edge and ability to actually cperate the facility. Aspects emergency plan were also thoroughly tested. i Two of the seven reactor operator candidates fa examination. the written examination as well.
i
- 5. Generic Program Weaknesses _
These findings The examiners identified four generic program weaknesses.Some of these f encompass this examination cycle.during the previous two (administeredinMay,1988andMay,1989). ) l First, the examiners found Reed's operator training program to be ineffective in ensuring that all licensed candidates were pre , pass the examination.the continued high failure rates of th; initial (ma applicants: Twenty five percent of this year's applicants failed their licensing examinations. Approximately fifty percent of the initial applicants failed their licensing examinations in the 1989 fiscal year. Second, the examiners found that some initial candidater Plan.were un their responsibilities, as reactor operators, under Reed's Emergency For example, they did not know when and how to sound the emergency evacuation alarm under emergency conditions. Third, the examiner's found that the majority of the initial applicants showed some weakness in their comprehension of Reed's i administ procedures and practices that govern reactor operation and doc Most initial candidates have indicated that they or involved in material transfer procedures, even though this is an operator responsibility at Reed. Finally, three out of the five operator candida on the fixed hand and foot radiation contamination m the since reactor room. it would evcatually contaminate the monitor, m3xing it ino i The licensee's management acknowledged th to the next examination.
- 6. Exit Meeting the Chief Examiner met with the representatives of the On May 18, 1990,licensu's staff to discuss the examination and the NR The licensee staff acknowledged the findings and indicated that steps were being taken in these areas to correct the deficiencies.
f,ICII"ED 1:RC REG 10M V E:l';;-7 C 9 34 July 31,1990 Mr.neodore Michaels Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Re: License R-112, Docket 50-288
Dear Mr. Michaels:
he purpose of this k cr is to stipply infonnation required by 10CFR50.75 regarding assurances that funas will be available to decommission the Reed TRIGA Mark I Research Reactor. Currently, we have no plans t decommission the reactor. Therefore, for purposes of planning, we are assuming that the reactor operates to the expiration of its current operating license on 3 October 2007. We have determined the cost of decommissioning as of 1990 by consultation with Dr. J. Razvi, of General Atorr.ics, Professor J. G. Williams of the University oflifinois and individuals at Chem-Nuclear Systems. Based on these consultations we estimate a cost in 1990 dollars of 5500,000.00, which assumes retuming the building to a condition suitable for unrestricted use. In addition, Reed will make available a Senior Reactor Operator, to supervise the decommissioning, over a period of I-2 years. We have adjusted the present cost for inflation simply by assuming that the present inflation rate of 4.5* continues indefinitely, and have obtained a corrected cost of
$1,056,700.00, i.e. 2.1134 X $500,000.00, for the year 2007. If the extrapolation turns out to be unrealistic, we will adjust the inflation rate accordingly,in future estimates.
The funding method chosen by it,eed College is the prepayment method, where the College will establish an appropriate acciur.t with the First interstate Bank trust department here in Portland. Sincerety, James L. Poweil President
/
cc: D. Bennett NRC Region V / State of Oregon / M. Pollock
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