ML20086U427

Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Changes Re Accident Monitoring Instrumentation to Be Installed Per NUREG-0737 Requirement

ML20086U427
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	02/29/1984
From:	WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20086U423	List: ML20086U422 ML20086U427
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 TAC-54559, TAC-54560, NUDOCS 8403070257
Download: ML20086U427 (10)

Text

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5. Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORV) and PORV Block Valves

a. Two PORVs and their associated block valves shall be operable.

(1) If a PORV is inoperable due to leakage in excess of that allowed in Specification 15.3.1.D. the PORV shall be restored to an operable condition within one hour or the associated block valve ehall be closed.

(2) If a PORV is inoperable due to a channel functional test failure, the associated PORV control switch shall be placed and maintained in the closed position or the associated block valve shall be closed within one hour.

(3) If a PORV block valve is inoperable, the block valve shall be restored to an operable condition within one hour or the block valve shall be closed with power removed from the block valve; otherwise the unit shall be in hot shutdown within the next six hours.

6. The pressurizer shall be operable with at least 100 KW of pressurizer heaters available and a water level greater than 10% and less than 95%

during steady-state power operation. At least one bank of pressurizer heaters shall be supplied by an emergency bus power supply.

7. Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System These Specifications are not applicable during cold or refueling shutdown conditions:

a'. At least one Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System vent path shall be operable from each of the following locations:

(1) Reactor Vessel head (2) Pressurizer Each vent path from these locations to the containment atmosphere or pressurizer relief tank (PRT) includes two closed valves in series powered from emergency buses.

b. When unable to vent the Reactor Coolant System from one of the above two locations, Reactor startup and/or power operations may continue provided that the isolation valves in the inoperable vent path from that location are maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuator. This does not include the PRT or containment atmosphere isolation valves. Restore a vent path from that location to operable status within thirty 8403070257 840229 15.3.1-3 PDR ADOCK 05000266 p PDR

days, or be in hot shutdown within six hours and in cold shutdown within the following thirty hours,

c. When unable to vent the reactor coolant system from both of the above locations, that is with all vent paths from both locations inoperable, maintain the inoperable vent paths closed with powcr removed from the valve actuators of all the values in the inoperable k , vent paths and restore at least one of the vent paths to one of the locations to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown within six hours and in cold shutdown within the following thirty hours.

Basis When the boron coacentration of the " ctor Coolant System is to be reduced, the process must be uniform to prevent st. reactivity changes in the Reactor.

Mixing of the Reactor Coolant will be at ;ent to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one Reactor Coolai. Pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the primary system volume in approximately one-half hour. The pressurizer is of little concern because of the lower pressurizer volume and because pressurizer boron concentration normally will be higher than that of the rest of Reactor Coolant.

Specification 15.3.1.A.1 requires that a sufficient number of Reactor Coolant Pumps be operable to provide core cooling in the event a loss of power occurs.

The flow provided in each case will keep DNBR well above 1.30 as discussed in FSAR, Section 14.1.9. Therefore, cladding damage and release of fission products to_the reactor coolant will not occur. Heat transfer analyses ( } show that reactor heat equivalent to 10% of rated power can be removed with natural circula-tion only; hence, the specified upper limit of 1% rated power without operating pumps provides a substantial safety factor.

Item 14.3.1.A.1.C(2) permits an orderly reduction in power if a Reactor Coolant Pump is lost during operation between 10% and 50% of rated power.

Above 50%. power, an automatic reactor trip will occur if either pump is lost.

The power-to-flow ratio will be maintained equal to or less than 1.0, which ensures that the minimum DNB ratio increases at lower flow since the maximum enthalpy rise does not increase above its normal full-flow maximum value.( }

15.3.1-3a

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Specification 15.3.1.A.3 provides limiting conditions for operation to ensure  !

that redundancy in decay heat removal ~ methods is provided. A single Reactor Coolant loop with.its associated steam generator and a Reactor Coolant Pump or a single residual heat removal loop provide sufficient heat removal capacity for removing the reactor core decay heat; however, single failure considerations

. require that'at least two' decay heat removal methods be available. Operability ofafsteam.generatorfordecayheatremovalincludestwosourcesofwater, water level indication in the steam generator, a vent path to atmosphere, and the Reactor Coolant-System filled and vented so thermal convection cooling of the core is possible. .If the steam generators are not available for decay heat removal,-this Specification requires both residual heat removal loops to be operable unless the reactor system is in the refueling shutdown condition with the refueling cavity flooded and no operations in progress which could cause an -

increase in reactor' decay heat load or a decrease in boron concentration. In

.this-condition, the reactor vessel is essentially a fuel storage pool and removing a RHR loop from service provides conservative conditions should operability

. problems develop in the other RHR~1oop. Also, one residual heat removal loop may be temporarily outLof service due to surveillance testing, calibration, or inspection requirements. The surveillance procedures. follow administrative controls which allow for timely restoration of the residual heat removal loop to service if required.

Each'of the pressurizer safety valves is designed to relieve 288,000 lbs. per

-hour of. saturated steam'at:setpoint.. If no residual heat is removed by any of the_means available, the~ amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve relief pressure would be less than half the valves' capacity. One valve, therefore,

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.provides adequate defense against overpressurization. Below 350*F and 400 psig in the Reactor Coolant System, the residualiheat removal system can remove decay i

heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure.

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A PORV is defined as OPERABLE if-leakage past the valve is less than that allowed

in Specification-15.3.1.D and the PORV-has met its most recent channel test as

'specified in Table,15.4.1-1~. The PORVs operate to relieve, in a controlled

' manner, Reactor Coolant-System pressure increases below the setting of the pressurizer safety valves. The PORVs have remotely operated block valves to

,  : provide a positive shutoff capability shculd a PORV become inoperable.

15.3.1-3b

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The requirement that 100 KW of pressurizer heaters and their associated controls be capable of being wupplied electrical power from an emergency bus provides assurance that these heaters can be energized during a loss of offsite power condition to maintain pressure control and natural circulation at hot shutdown, The requirement to have a reactor coolant system gas vent operable from the reacyprvesselorthepressurizersteamspaceassuresthatnon-condensiblegases

.can b'e released from the Reactor Coolant System if necessary. The Reactor Coolant I

Gas Vent System (RCGVS) provides an orificed vent path from the pressurizer steam space and an orificed vent path from the reactor vessel. Both vent paths include two parallel solenoid-operated isolation valves which are powered from emergency buses plus a common series valve to either the containment or pressurizer relief tank. The orifice in. these vent lines restricts leakage so that in the event of a pipe break or isolation valve failure makeup water for the leakage can be provided by a single coolant charging pump. The vent lines to the contain-ment atmosphere or the pressurizer relief tank each contain a single solenoid-operated isolation valve powered from the emergency buses. If a RCGVS vent path from either the pressurizer or reactor vessel head is inoperable, Specification 15.3.1.A.7.b requires the remotely operable valves in that inoperable path to be shut with power removed. The solenoid valves in the vent piping to the contain-ment atmosphere or pressurizer relief tank, which is common to both the pressurizer and reactor vessel head, need not have power removed unless the vents to both the pressurizer and reactor vessel are inoperable.

(1) FSAR Section 14.1.6 (2) FSAR Section 7.2.3 15.3.1-3c

15.3.5 INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM operational Safety Instrumentation Applicability:

Applies to plant instrumentation systems.

Obieetives:

To provide for automatic initiation of the Engineered Safety Features in the eve t that principal process variable limits are exceeded, and to delineate the conditions of the plant instrumentation and safety circuits necessary to ensure reactor safety.

Specification:

A. The Engineered Safety Features initiation instrumentation setting limits shall be as stated in Table 15.3.5-1.

B. For on-line testing or in the event of a sub-system instrumentation channel failure, plant operation at rated power shall be permitted to continue in accordance with Tables 15.3.5-2 through 15.3.5-4.-

C. In the event the number of channels of a particular sub-system in service talls below the limits given in the column entitled Minimum Operable Channels, or Minimum Degree of Redundancy cannot be achieved, operation shall be limited according to the requirement shown in Tables 15.3.5-2 through 15.3.5-4, operator Action when minimum operable channels unavailable.

l D. The accident monitoring instrumentation channels in Table 15.3.5-5 shall be operable. In the event the number of channels in a parti-cular sub-system falls below the minimum number of operable channels 7

given in Column 2, operation and subsequent operator action shall be in accordance with Col on 3.- This specification is not applicable f

in the cold or refueling shutdown conditions.

Basis:

Instrumentation has been provided to sense accident conditions and to initiate operation of the Engineered safety Features (1) .

15.3.5-1

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TABLE 15.3.5-5 (ContinuId)~ -

MINIMUM '

iNO. OF OPERABLE OPERATOR ACTION IF CONDITIONS NO. FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHANNELS CHANNELS OF COLUMN-2 CANNOT BE MET 7.- Containment High Range Radiation 3 2 If operability cannot be restored within Monitor seven days after failure, prepare a.special:

report'to be-submitted within thirty days in accordance with 15.6.9.3.G.

'8.

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Containment High Range Pressure 2 1 If operability cannot be restored within Monitor _ 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />,-be in hot' shutdown within twelve 4~

hours.

9. . a. -Containment Water Level neyway- 2. 1 Operation may continue up to. thirty days.

If the operability cannot be restored, be in hot shutdown within the next twelve hours, r b. Containment Water Level Sump.B '2 1 If the operability cannot be restored within-Continuous Indication 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, be in hot shutdown within twelve hours.

10. Containment Hydrogen Monitors 4 1 If operability cannot be retored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, be in hot shutdown within the i .next six hours.

11. Reactor Vessel Fluid Level System 4 1 If operability cannot be restored within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, be in hot shutdown within the next twelve hours.

! 12. In-Core Thermocouples 4/ core 2/ core If operability of at least two thermocouples

. quadrant quadrant per core quadrant cannot be restored within i

48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, he in hot shutdown within the next twelve hours.

13. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors 1/ steam 1/ steam If operability cannot be restored within

. (SA-11) line line seven days, prepare a special report to be submitted within thirty days in accordance j with 15.6.9.3.H.

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TABLE 15.4.1-1.'(2 cf 4)'

Channel

. N 2. Description Check . Calibration Test Remarks

10. Rod Position Bank Counters S (1)** N.A. N.A. 1)' With analog $ od position

11. Steam Generator Level S ** R M** .

12. Steam Generator Flow Mismatch s ** R M**

13. Charging Flow N.A. R N.A. -

14. Residual Heat Removal Pump Flow N.A. R N.A.

15. Boric Acid Tank Level N.A. R N.A.

18. Reactor Containment Pressure D R B/W (1)** 1) Isolation valve signal 4

19. Radiation Monitoring System D R M

20. Boric Acid Control N.A. R N.A.

21. Containment Water Level M R N.A.

22. Turbine Overspeed Trip

• N.A. R M (1)** 1) . Block trip

23. Accumulator Level and Pressure S R N.A.

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• Overspeed Trip Mechanism, and Independent Turbine Speed Detection and Valve Trip System.

• • Not required during periods of refueling shutdown, but must be performed prior to starting up if it has not been performed during the previous surveillance period.

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TABLE 15.4.1-1 (4 of 4)

' Channel N w. Description Check Calibrate Test Remarks J40. Containment High Range Radiation S **- R M** Calibration to" 5 verification of response to a source.

'41. Containment Hydrogen Monitor D R N.A. Sample gas for calibrat: ion at 1%

and 4% hydrogen.

42. Reactor Vessel Fluid Level System M R N.A. -

43. In-Core Thermocouple M R N.A. Calibration to be verification of response to a source.

S - Each Shift M - Monthly D - Daily P - Prior to each startup if not done previous week W - Weekly R - Each refuleing interval (but not to exceed 18 months)

Q - Quarterly N.A. - Not applicable B/W - Biweekly

• • Not required during periods of refueling shutdown, but must be performed prior to starting up if it has not been performed during the previous surveillance period.

• • • Not required during periods of refueling. shutdown if steam generator vessel temperature is greater than 70*F.

, **** When used for the overpressure mitigating system, each PORV shall be demonstrated operable by:

a. Performance of a channel functional test on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operations, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required operable and at least once d

per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required operable.

b. Testing valve operation in accordance with the inservice test requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

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to other minor procedures under the jurisdiction of Maintenance, Instrumentation and Control, Reactor Engineering, or Chemistry and

-Health Physics,'shall be approved by a supervisor of the cognizant group and shall be subsequently reviewed and approved by the group head of the cognizant group.

'f15.6.8.4 The following programs shall be established, implemented, and maintained.

A. -Post-Accident Sampling

• A program ** which will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant, containment atmosphere, and in-plant gaseous effluent

. samples under-accident conditions. The program shall include the following:

(i) Training of personnel; and (ii) Procedures of sampling and analysis.

• Post-Accident Coolant Sampling and Post-Accident Containment Atmospheric Sampling Systems -

• • It is acceptable if the licensee maintains details of the program in plant

. operation manuals.

15.6.8-3 i-L

G. Failure of Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor A minimum of two in-containment radiation-level monitors with a maximum range of 10 rad /hr (10 /hr for photos only) should be operable at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages. This is specified in Table 15.3.5-5, item 7. If the minimum number of operable channels are not restored to operable "k , condition within seven days after failure, a special report shall be submitted to the NRC within thirty days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

H. Failure of Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors If a main steam line radiation monitor (SA-11) fails and cannot be restored to operability in seven days, prepare a special report outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the channel to operable status within thirty days of the event.

15.6.9-11

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