ML20081B925

Interim Deficiency Rept,Item 116 Re Potential for Freezing of Buried Fire Protection Sys Piping to RHR Bldg.Initially Reported on 840131.Water Will Be Passed Through Line Once Per Shift During Freezing Weather

ML20081B925
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	02/29/1984
From:	Wells D DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
116, QA-84-326, NUDOCS 8403120068
Download: ML20081B925 (1)

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', - j) pt r3 Donald A. Wells Manager-Quality Assurance DekoR- (313) 237-9657 p - 3 c{ \

D$OO $b$Y' February 29, 1984 QA-84-326 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Region III U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject:

Report of 10CFR50.55(e) Item on Potential Design Deficiency by Allowing Freezing of Buried Piping Systems (#116)

Dear Mr. Keppler:

On January 31, 1984, Detroit Edison's Mr. W.R. Wingfield, Quality Engineer - Construction Quality Assurar.ce telephoned Mr. P.M. Byrori of NRC Region III to report a potential design deficiency that all'wed freezing of buried piping systems at the Fermi 2 site.

-During the severe cold weather experienced in January, the service water for the Division I Fire Protection System in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) building was found to be inoperable. The situation was later identified as ice in the pipe between the underground 12" ring

-header which circles the Reactor / Auxiliary / Turbine building and the fire plugs located in the RHR building. Immediately after this was identified to the Nuclear Production Department, the system was made operable by opening the emergency cross tie valve which connects Division I and II. The Division II fire protection piping originates from the same underground 12" ring header, but it is routed separately

-into the RHR building. The exact area of freezing could not be sub-stantiated due to the subsequent warming spell, but the potential areas in which freezing could have occurred were identified.

-In addition.to the fire protection line freezing, the demineralized water line was inoperable and later confirmed to be frozen. Since this line enters the RHR building at approximately the same location as-the RHR Service Water (RHRSW) and the Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW), the service water in these lines were also suspected to be. frozen so they were reported as potentially frozen. These lines were then checked and found to be operable with no evidence of any freezing. -The demineralized water line is not safety related and is therefore not reportable, however, corrective action will be taken to preveht the potential freezing of the line.

-The safety implications of the fire protection lines being inoperable was the potential to disable T,he Emergency Diesel Generators in g 120068 840229

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Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator

[ February 29, 1984 QA-84-326 Page 2 I-Division I in the event of a fire. These Diesel Generators supply electrical power to the Safety Related Equipment in Division I during a postulated loss of off site power.

The corrective action, to prevent any additional freezing of the fire protection line, includes both an interim and long term action. The interim action has been to pass water through this line, from the underground 12" ring header to the RHR bulloing for both the Division

-I and II lines once a shift while the potential for freezing exists.

The long term solution has not yet been established but it will pre-vent freezing from occurring by installing any necessary equipment .

and/or.following any prescribed procedure and/or instruction which will be necessary. The entire length of pipe in question will be reviewed, and any area which has the potential t; result in freezing will be identified and corrective action will be taken to prevent the event from recurring.

An additional report will be sent when further information becomes available. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. G.M. Trahey, Assistant Director - Project Quality Assurance.

Very truly yours, k

i ffI hJdl cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director

~0 ffice of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Paul Byron, Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission 6450_ North Dixie Highway Newport,-Michigan 48166 i

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