ML20107F118

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Final Deficiency Rept,Item 146 Re Failure of Colt Industries Emergency Diesel Generators 11 & 12.Initially Reported on 850118.Procedures Revised to Require 2-minute Prelubrication Prior to Generator Starts
ML20107F118
Person / Time
Site: Fermi 
Issue date: 02/12/1985
From: Jens W
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
146, EF2-70382, NUDOCS 8502250956
Download: ML20107F118 (10)
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M Wayne H. Jens Vice President Nuclear Operatus Fermt-2

'om we.0 North Dixie Hignway February 12, 1985 i

640 poc. uegan 48tes lQVI I ma sse-4tso EF2-70382 4

Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator Region'III

U. S.; Nuclear Regulatory Commission

-799 Roosevelt Road..

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137'

Dear Mr. Keppier:

4

Reference:

(1) Fermi 2-NRC Docket No. 50-341 (2) Letter, W.F. Colbert to L.

L. Kintner, USNRC1 August 31, 1981, EF2-54624' s

Subject:

Final Report of 10CFR50.55(e)> Item 146

" Failure of Emergency-Diesel Generator Nos. 11 and'12" On January.18, 1985,. Detroit Edison's Mr. J.nE..Conen,,

Engineer Licensing',z telephoned Mr..P. Pelke:of NRC~ Region.

-III-to' report.the.' discovery of damage:to: Emergency Diesel' Generatorn(EDG)-No. 11.

The damage was' discovered during'an inspection of.EDG No. ll:following-a~ diesel tripfduring:a

' test-run on. January 10', 1984p -On January 21,fMr.JPelkelwasa;- -

4 l informed that irispections of the ;othe'r EDG's revealed that1 EDG No..-12 had indicationsLof incipientTdamage.

This;

_defici'ency is reportable undere10CFR50'.55(e)Landnisibeing; tracked as-: Item:146..

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The_ standby ~AC power system?for1 Fermi 72-consists ofi4)EDG's?

' (Nos.,11,)-12,113.'and: 14)..;,These. uni _ts weregmanufacturediby -

6the.Fairbanks; Morse (Engine Divi ~sion of Colt Industries...f J

.Esch unitlis a 12; cylinder;-' opposed pistonidieselirated fori

39.67 horsepowe'rJatj900 revolutions per! minute.;

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fDescription of Deficiency

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=s Approximately 14i minutes 'after being: starte'difort a124Lhourg 1

surveillance 3te'st,EDG No.t-llJtrippedfautomatically asiaf f M N.

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. result of lowflubricatingnollJpressure.~e.The?preliminarya &. N

? investigation: revealed metal flakes:c ndJfilingslintthenlube!.

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a oilqfilterland' strainer;sthe.refore,"a(completesinspectiondof; A

- thermachine'was,made'withitheJassistance of:the; vendor.

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Mr. James G. Keppler February 12, 1985 EF2-70382 Page 2 The inspection of EDG No. 11 revealed that the following

. components'in the upper crankline were damaged:

the crank-

--shaft and main bearings 1 through 7; connecting rod bearings 1 through 7; pistons 2, 3, and 4; and, the thrust bearing.

t Although operating properly, EDG Nos. 12, 13 and 14:were'-

also-inspected for damage.

The EDG No. 12 filter contained

easily visible bearing material and a check of the main bearing to bearing cap clearances revealed that some of-the upper crankshaft bearings had abnormally high clearances.

-The. internal inspection-of these bearings on;EDG-No. 12 revealed some damage.

The lube oil: filters'and bearing:

-clearances for.EDG Nos. 13 and 14-showed no indications-of, bearing distress.- The subsequent Internal inspections of-these bearingsLeonfirmed,that they were satisfactory..

'Cause: -The apparent cause ~ of EDG z No. 711 bearing!fa'ilure z-was inadequate lubrication during fastistarts.' Evaluation'.

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.of/the operating' history, operating procedures,.and the lube-oil system,' including-the modifications to the=.systemE

' failed to specifically determine (when or;why these?bearin'gs;

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. experienced inadequate _ lubrication.

Based onTextensive.

non-nuclear: commercial success and.experien'ce at other:1.

nuclear power' plants with Fairbanks~~ Morse diesels-of this-design,-the manufacturer concluded:thatithe.high' number;of'

.fa'stcstarts withouti~prelubrication-was the cause!of;this~

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-fallure.

Theeresults'of thela'nalysis of theidata on.thes..

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'Fermij2-fdiesels; supports.this conclusion. ?In particular,Jit" 34

Lwas determinedi thate the'. period ? of Ltime thatE the-. bearings wereiallowed!to(drain before?the':EDG was restartedJwithout P

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prelubricationEwas
typicallyJlonger?for!EDGLNos'.cllfand;12:

than:for:Nos.,13:and=14'x iIncreasing 'thejtimeia bearing 1s f 3

falloweditoJdrain.before the~EDG is restarted'without i n

4 1 prelubricatiloniwil10 decreases the amount offoiltin thel

~ bearings?during thefaubsequent? start.

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Background:

Detroit 1' Edison,9workingiithitheLaanufacturer,a

?has taken actionito:improvefthe'reliabilityTofsthe Fermi 2s 1

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3 ldies'elfgenerators'which:are aubjectsd?toftheCfastistarts; d

associated.withinuclear: plant' service.;. Prior 3tolthes 1.

  1. modificationsidesbribediin1 Reference 12,Jyoids;~oflabout160L 9 ~

Lgallons;.would7formfin;theJlubesoil?systemiasitheilubejoilii

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> Jdrained back to the7sumpf when an? EDG wasj shutdown.7E20,f 3

-gallon periminuteLprelube pump 1was used?to re-fillSthe.

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fsystem!and establishlbearing.'oilfflow priorftoiplanned k 1 j

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+* 3startsk (This procedurefeliminatedidry;(unlubricated); starts'

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? excepti for J the a relati"vely 1 fewlemergency ! s ta rts Mof ithe? EDG t s. s

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'LThisiprogramiof? operation'was3 consistent [with the#goalslofJ u,'

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1 ie Mr., James G. Keppler

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February 12, 1985

-EF2-70382

._Page 3 I

minimizing dry starts and preventing seepage of lube oil

-from~the upper ~crankline into the cylinders while the engine is shut down.-

The modification described in Reference 2 reduced the

. effects of fast starts without increasing the accumulation-tof-lube oil in the cylinders.

The lube. oil keepwarm system.

was modified to supply' lube oil _to the--lower crankline

. continuously without supplying the upper crankline.' The supply pipe'to the upper oil supply. header was_also_ modified.

to prevent the header from draining to-the sump when the engine'is shut-down.

These changes reduced-the size of:the voids 1 formed when the. engine:is shut down;toEabout,5= gallons.

An. oil booster / accumulator.was also added.whichLuses=

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istarting air to: inject oil to the' upper crankline:during thel starting cycle._ These system changes help prevent dry-starts even without'the-operation;of?t.he prelube pump.

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'A vendor recommendation' deleted the requirement (for.

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prelubrication_after the~ installation-of;the lube.'oilosystem

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modification._ Subsequent to receivin~g1thissrecommendation,.

-Fermi-2'EDG's;were'sometimes started-.without prelubrication.

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Detroit Edison's investigation revealed that-_otherL

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-facilities' with FaiIbanks Morse:Dieselsvhave" continued;to:

l perform?prelubrication priorLto planned. starts of~thej.

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engine'sLeveniaftersthis modification wasiinstalled.

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- 7 Analysis 1of'SafetyLImplications

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9 The _ EmergencyL Diesel ~ : Generators start ~ automatically![on " loss;

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oflvoltageito asvit'al bus, eon 11ow
reactorswater; level 2 or(onL chighidrywellupressure'.: tThe"EDG' stare'intendedftofens'urei

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_that power;is;available for emergencyfcoreecoolingRinathe(

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.'eventsthat:offsitefpowerEisflostE fThelfailureJof-anjEDGl m _

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N1 reducesjthe a'asurance ofJthe ava'ilability;offenergency;.

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? Detroit? Edison;[ColbIndustriesandLexpehticonsultAntshave:

Tconcluded that prelubrication6priorito allIplannedistartsdish Lthe.mostTsignificant actions that tcan-be7 taken Vtoiprevent!;,

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~ bearing failuresi Therefore,iprocedures arelbeingirevised e "p

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(to;requireLa'prelubricatio'niperiod5of approximatelyJ21 ',

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minutesiprior;to~plannedistartstof.;theiEDG's k Toi. insure

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Emax'inum1ubricationi~during: starting,ithe?dieselfwillibec

,A' Lstartediwh11'e the"prelubrication) pump lisirunning.110nlyi..

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e and3 unplanned starts wills occur kithout4prelubrica~ 3(

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T' l tion.'- Changesitojthe' draft technicalfs'pecificationsfarel V

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1beingtreque_stedito:enhanceytheireliability#f[thpBDG!si T

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Mr. James G. Keppler F

February 12, 1985 EF2-70382 Page 4 The experience with EDG No. 12 indicated that the bearing i-deterioration is progressive and can be identified and corrected prior to bearing. failure.

Analysis indicates that f-complete bearing failure will be preceded by the.

. accumulation of bearing material on the filter and an increase in the gap between the bearing and bearing cap.

Therefore, Detroit Edison will perform a visual inspection of the oil filter once per calendar quarter.

If bearing-i-

-material is'found in the filter, the bearing to bearing cap clearance will be checked on'each of the crankshaft bearings.

The: bearing to bearing' cap clearance will also-be checked every-18 months or after 20 starts conducted without-prelubrication if less=than 18 months.. These' quarterly filter. inspections and 18-month bearing clearance checks are

!at conservative intervals for identification and correction.

of bearing deterioration. -

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Repairs:..EDG-Nos.-'ll and 12xhave been completely ~ inspected.

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' by Detroit ' Edison: and : the vendor Jand all damaged. components-

are being replaced. _EDG;Nos. 13 and.14 have.been inspected;

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i andino-damage _was found. ; The' inspection of;these machines:

r placed:special emphasis:on_the remote _bearin'gs*of/the:upperJ 1

l crankline._3 It,was-this area where. damage)wasjfound:on(EDG Non..'llfand::12-'and-ittis,this area.thatris;most susceptible =

to damage causedLbyLinadequate: lube oil flow.during.' fast:

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D starts.

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! Testing:' EDG Nos.311Tand-12 willsbe tes'tedlin-~abcordance~

1" withithe manufacturer's recommendations aftergthetcompletion L

=ofirepairs'. sTo+ ensure; operability after3 completion 1of-thel,

. repairs;;EDG Nos. 11fand 12fwilliaisolundergo?the1 applicable Technical; Specification 1 Mode -5' Surveillance tests ;f S

'Thisiis' Detroit (Edison'sifin_al"reportTon. Item (146.TEIf you' ~

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-have question'alconcerninglthis matter,3please contac.tiMr M %

= Lewis.-Bregn1,.. ( 313 ). 586-5083f.:.

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_ Mr. James G. Keppler February 12, 1985

- EF2-70382 Page 5

- bec: -- F. E. Agosti W. F. Colbert J. E. Durkin O. K. Earle L. E.

Eix W..J.

Fahrner W. J. Glasser J.

R. Green E. P. Griffing W. R.-Holland S. J. Latone J. D. Leman R. S. Lenart P.. A. - Marquardt S. E. Martin W. E. Miller, Jr.

J.-A. Nyquist T. F. O'Keefe G. R. Overbeck-T..D. Phillips J.-H. Plona E. R. Preston,'Jr.

LT. Randazzo R. G.,Rateick'

. W. M. Ripley' L.- E. -Schuerman F. T.! Schwartz L. J. Simpkin G. M. Trahey

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y-s Region.III/Chron File;_

9-eNRC2. File;.- (.

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Secretaryis Office:(2412'WCB)?.

Institute _of, Nuclear /PoweriOperatilonsJ s

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Mr. B. J. Youngblood February 4,19 85 NE-85-0275

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'*All with attachment

- bcc: Approval Control *-

F. E. Agosti L. P. Bregni W. F. Colbert O. K. Earle* '

pqg W. J. Farhner -

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Holland W..R.

Holland

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H. Jens*

R. S. Lenart P..A. Marquardt R. D. Olson*

G. M. Trahey' O. K. Earle (Bethesda Office)'

Secretary's Office ( 2412 WCB)

- NRR - Chron File :

  • With' Attachment-Y 2

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-In addition, the study recommended relocating some detectors as summarized in Table 2:

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TABLE 2 DETECTION NUMBER OF DETECTORS AREA ZONE EXISTING TO BE AUXILIARY' BUILDING NUMBER

- DETECTORS RELOCATED Division.I Switchgear Rooms-9 4

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Division-II Switchgear Rooms 14 4

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Fifth Floor.HVAC~ Areas

.16 4

4 RHR BUILDING ^

N EDG fil Switchgear~ Room 52 6

2*-

i EDG #12 Switchgear Room 53

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EDG #13 Switchgear Room 54

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EDG #144Switchgear Room

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These det'ectors are currently planned.to be installed and/or relocated by May 30, 1985.

With the existing' fire detectors initheir existing locations-

-in. service,.cufficient:detectoricoveragel1s provided during-_

the-interim period of time until:the' detectors are relocated and/or added ~ as listed :in Tables :1 ? arid : 2., Additional.

i justification for this -interim deviation to NFPA-72E-is' i-lprovided as follows:

a)

Auxiliary : Building:- Because;of: previous

, commitments,.;an hourly? first watch patro1LwillLbe" making-rounds in;the: Auxiliary; Building.< His' routes lwill al'so? include:the~ Auxiliary; Building;

, areas riisted except~ forb the -ifif th. floor.y The fifth floor;" Auxiliary 1 Building?contains HVAC,

~ systems needed for6 safe shutdownoand thec

' combustible; loading for this?sonefisjlight.

The a L

presentLdetectorsineed to
be~ relocated to. meet.

L NFPA 172E, :but. the; presentl' layout 'will detect a ?

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~ fire condition.

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Thistadditionailfire watch?coveragelalong with)the:

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^. existing fire l detector,coverageiprovides i.'.

Y sufficient" assurance <to~ warrant. granting 1the

- ",W Linterinideviationifor?the) Auxiliary Building.:

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  • The Lexisting location of 5these/ detectors in[fron'tiofk

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L exhaust ductLinlets.- The: detectors;are;equippedgwith"ai_r?

shields ~and 'should ' f unction (acceptably.O Bowever, to i meeti i; code requirements ^,"the1 detectors-will;be? relocated.4

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Reactor Building:

The Reactor Building areas listed in Table 1 are large (approximately 30 ft. ceilings and 10,000 sq. ft floor areas).

The existing detectors are located throughout the y

floor areas.

Dge to these detectors, the more than 20 ft. seperation of shutdown equipment, and the. light fire loading (see FSAR section'9B), a postulated small delay in fire detection due-to not explicitly meeting NFPA 72E will not jeopardize safe shutdown capability.

c)

RHR Building:

The'RHR Building is arranged so-Division I (EDG's 11 and 12)-is separated from Division II.(EDG's 13 and 14) by a three hour--

rated wall.

Additionally, 1the Switchgear Rooms in each division have been separated by fire rated barriers because of' Edison standards.

The rooms have the proper number of detectors in them presently which will asaure detection of a - fire..

I Additionally,-.any postulated fire will be-contained by the fire barriers.

-The:following sections of.this Attachment provide' permanent' deviation ; requests from NFPA.72E for the.. following areas:-

n Control Room Complex

. PerformedLby 4

Torus Room Professional:

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Reactor Building-Refuel [1g Floor)

Loss Control, Inc.

' Reactor : Building'.Basesent' Corner' Rooms ' Performed.by Detroit l Edison?

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-2.2 Fire: Hazards Combustible. loading for the CCHVAC Room is

-approximately 1 lb/ft2 consisting of electrical-cabling and small. amounts of lubricating oil.

The Control Room Area is "-

air space between the-Control Room drop ceiling

  • and the reinforced concrete ceiling.- The amount of combustibles above the' drop ceiling is negligible.

2.3 Safe Shutdown Equipment The CCHVAC Room contains Division II HVAC equipment and Division-I and II HVAC Appendix "R"'

shutdown: cables.. The Division I cables are enclosed in a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> cable wrap.- The Control Room contains all the control and instrumentation necessary for normal safe shutdown.

2.4 Fire Protection Fire detection is provided in both sones.

The Control Room is' manned?100% of the time. - Manual-hose is~available.along with portable extinguishers-being located:in each area.

2.5 ~ Evaluation / Conclusion-L F0-100ilsLlocated inJa' wall with-a minimum one

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' hour rating.

This size opening 10,4"1x 68"'has:

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been tested-forsa.'l.5: hour' rating.which is an acceptable? fire rating 3 or the fire-loading) f t

locatedJin'each sone.:

F0 99 is located _ in ithe ffl'oor. ' CDamperc.'installa-tion has been sectionedrinto'3 sets;of 8 dampers!

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each (76" x 41")'. lThis size '.is within :the 1.5:

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hour.ratingifor_ horizontal. openings..The'matsrial_

.sub-dividing the opening:isna~6";xl76"!10. gauge'.1 csteel plate.'~ Each damper weighs.approximatelyu o 14 pounds'..'This steel bar will provide the i

necessary fireLresistance:because ofithetvery low M

r combustible-loadin'g in.<each; sone.

In addition", 14 gage;steeldisl typically lLutilised.;-

3 for the' duct sleeves.x The Fire; Dampers 1are' x

then'attachedstolthisc14igage sleeve.Z'/Syd

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anchoring 1to a: 10.gageihar theiinstallationLisi
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better than a normallins.tallation; anchoring-; point.s j

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b 3.0 Division I Control Center HVAC Room"(CCHVAC)

(Sketch 1).

I Dampers; FO 101 and FO 102 separates the Control _ Room from the. Division I CCHVAC Room.

FO 101 is located in a wall between the two zones.

FO 102 is located in the Floor / Ceiling between the two zones.

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3.1 -Description of Damper Location h

The Floor Assembly is rated as a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier between the zones and~ consists of reinforced L

concrete.

The wall is an 8" concrete block wall with a minimum'one hour fire resistance.'

L-3.2 Fire Hazards Combustible loading fgr the CCHVAC Room'is I

approximately 1 lb/ftd consisting'of electrical:

cabling-and small amounts of lubricating _ oil.

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The Control? Room' Area:is the air space between-the l

Control Room drop ceiling

  • and the concrete ceiling._ The amount of combustibles above the

. drop ceiling'is' negligible.

3.3 Safe Shutdown / Equipment

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L The CCHVAC Room ~contains' Division I Appendix "R"'

shutdown cables _and equipment.' The) Control.-Room contains all?the-control:and: instrumentation for-norma 1Lahutdown.-

3.4 ~. Fire ? Pro.tection s s

Fire' detection'is provided[in'both' sones. 'The Control. Room l's manned'1004'of?theftims. - Manual' C

-fireLhose.islavailable'along with! portable 4

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extinguishers in each area.'-

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?3.5' -Evaluation / Conclusion

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F0 10'l'is-located.inna' wall with'afminimum one (hour: rating.

This sise opening 1104" x.68" has been-' tested foria-l'.5' hour" rating'whichtis an.

w Jacceptable" fire rating for_.the fire; loading; located"in?each. sone.

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F0 fl02 ' is i located ?i'ni the -- floor.,-. The opening has,

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-been sectioned into-3l sets 'of 8. dampers'each.

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=(76" x'41") This"sise'is withinithe 1.5 hourJ' The: material.r

-rating for'horisontal' openings.'

sub-dividing' the opening ils 'a!6" xi76* :10 geogt I,7 i.

steeliplate.';Each damper weighs approximately 14

-* Ceiling jtile is13; hour? rated.

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