ML20217P355
| ML20217P355 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1999 |
| From: | Korte J DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217P344 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-99-S01, NUDOCS 9910290271 | |
| Download: ML20217P355 (6) | |
Text
NRC FC'AM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMtSSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 Estimated burden gr resporse to comply with " tbs"mandatory informat#cn LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 0%"Of nd IAaEll%7,l Fon**r'd"a, L's $$"i&ffn (S:3 reverse for required number of c="a' w""Ja "*F2Tst at 2 kS."A*"i"ca$
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FAeiLITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
Fermi 2 05000341 1 OF 6 TITLE (4)
Introduction of Contraband into Protected Area w'
1 EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVol.VED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YuAR Hg/f Q $N MONTH DAY YEAR F Aclu 1Y NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 09 22 99 99 -S0 1- 00 10 22 99 f ^C'UTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING 1 _ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RE3UIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 9: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 202201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73:a)(2)(viii)
N-8 97 20.2203(a)(1) 20 2203(((3)(i) 50.73(a)t2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20E03(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(c)(2)(iii) X 73.71 j Y 20.2203(a)(2)(li) 20.2203(a)(4[ 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER !
20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(3)(2)(v) f;Mf" **'** *"n unc 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)_ _ _ 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (It'ca de Area Code)
Josrph H. Korte, Director - Nuclear Security g (734) 586-1095 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER HEPORTABLE CAUSE i SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED d4) EXPECTED MOMTH Dfi YEAR YES X NO (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
At approximately 0825 hours0.00955 days <br />0.229 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.139125e-4 months <br /> on September 22,1999, a loaded 9mm handgun was discovered on the truck cargo area of a vehicle inside the protected area. The vehicle was a non-designated vehicle under escort by security personnel. The vehicle was brought into the protected area for the purpose of digging numerous fence postholes to support erection of a nLw security fence. The vehicle was searched prior to entering the protected area, however the weapon was located under a pile of hoses in the back of the vehicle and was not discovered by security personnel during the search. When the contractors set up equipment to perfoun work, one of the contractors removed a hose from the cargo area of the truck and discovered the weapon. The contractor immediately informed the security officer performing escort duties and backed away from the weapon. Both contractors stated that they had not seen the weapon before. This event has been entered into tne corrective action program under Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) 99-17056. The root cause analysis team determined that the root cause of this event was an inadequate vehicle search, specifically that a plan or niethod to search a vehicle involving multiple search personnel had not been developed prior to the event. Corrective actions include providing guidance in procedures and security training to address multiple personnel vehicle searches. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR'13.71(b)(1).
9910290271 991022 PDR ADOCK 05000341 g PDR
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) . DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
NUMBER (2)
YEAR SEQ NT AL REV S N Fermi 2 , 05000341 99 -S 0 1- 00 2 OF 6 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionalcopies of NRC Form 366A) (17}
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Operational Condition: 1 (Power Operation)
Reactor Power: 97 percent Reactor Pressure: 1023 p;ig Reactor Temperature: 540 degrees Fahrenheit DESCRPTION OF THE EVENT:
l At epproximately 0640 hours0.00741 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.4352e-4 months <br /> on September 22,1999, a vendor truck arrived at the Fermi 2 site to perform a job.
' The contractors were hired to dig numerous fence postholes to support erection of a new securig fence. The truck was permitted into the trucklock and security began a vehicle search in accordance with Procedure MGA09,
, " Access Control," and the Physical Security Plan. One Response Force Supervisor (RFS), one trainee, and another officer (assigned as the Vehicle Search Officer (VSO)) were assigned to conduct the vehicle search. The VSO was also going to assume the Vehicle Escort Officer duties after the search was completed because there were no other Vehicle Escort Officers available at that time. The RFS and the trainee began searching the hood area and the truck cab while the other officer began searching the passenger side of the truck cargo area (rear truck bed and cabinets). At that point, a fourth officer entered the trucklock and began to search the driver's side of the truck cargo area. The fourth officer relieved the VSO of his vehicle escort duties. The vehicle search was completed and logged into the Nuclear Security Department Vehicle Gate Log and no contraband was discovered.
The truck was allowed to enter the Protected Area at approximately 0754 hours0.00873 days <br />0.209 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.86897e-4 months <br /> with an assigned security officer (the fourth officer) performing escort duties.
At approximately 0825 hours0.00955 days <br />0.229 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.139125e-4 months <br />, one of the contractors removed a hose from the cargo area of the truck and discovered the weapon. The contractor immediately informed the escorting security officer. The escorting security officer immediately took control of the weapon, and requested the RFS to report to the location. 'When the RFS arrived at the location, he took possession of the weapon. The weapon was a loaded 9mm handgun with 10 rounds of ammunition. The RFS instructed the escorting security officer to remain with the truck, and to maintain control of the contractors.
The RFS returned to the security building and informed the Securhy Shift Supervisor (SSS) of the discovery of the weapon. Security declared a Security Alert at 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br /> because the weapon was discovered inside the Protected Area. A Detroit Edison Property Record was completed and the weapon and ammunition were stored and locked in the Security Armory. The two contractors were then escorted to the security building. The weapon was tumed over to the Monroe County Sheriff's Department shortly after they arrived onsite at approximately 0923 hoves. A check of the weapon's serial number was conducted by the Sheriff's Department and determined NRC FORM 366A (41930)
I NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
+ (6-1998) l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
!JUMBER (2)
YEAR SE " " '"
NU BE NU BER j Ferrni 2 05000341 99 -S 0 1- 00 3 OF 6 S TEXT (11more space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form J66A) (17) l that the weapon was not stolen or registered to anyone in the State of Michigan. The contractors were then '
escorted back to the truck for out processing and left the Protected Area at approximately 1123 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.273015e-4 months <br />.
The Sheriff's Department turned the weapon over to the Michigan State Police for further investigation. The contractors accompanied the Sheriff's deputy to the Sheriff's Department where they were fingerprinted for comparison purposes to any prints that may be found on the weapon and released. j This event constituted a one hour NRC reportable event in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1) per 10CFR73.71, Appendix G Part I,9(d), the actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a protected area, vital area, or transport. The NRC was notified of the event at 0917 hours0.0106 days <br />0.255 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.489185e-4 months <br /> on September 22,1999 via Fermi 2 Event Notification Number 99-0008.
It was discovered during subsequent investigation and root cause analysis that the same vendor truck and contractors were granted access into the Protected Area to perform work the previous day, September 21,1999.
The truck arrived at Fermi 2 at approximately 0641 hours0.00742 days <br />0.178 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.439005e-4 months <br /> on September 21,1999. Two officers and one trainee were assigned to conduct the vehicle search. One of the ofDeers and the trainee began searching the vehicle hood area of the truck while the other officer began searching the truck cab and undercarriage. The vehicle search was completed and logged into the Nuclear Security Department Vehicle Gate Log and no centraband was discovered.
The truck was allowed to enter the Protected Area at approximately 0755 hours0.00874 days <br />0.21 hours <br />0.00125 weeks <br />2.872775e-4 months <br /> with an assigned security officer performing escort duties. The contractors completed work that day and exited the Protected Area at approximately 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT:
This event was entered into the Fermi 2 corrective action program as Condition Assessment Resolution Document (CARD) 99-17056. A root cause analysis was conducted to determine the root cause of this event.
The root cause analysis team determined that the root cause of this event was an inadequate vehicle search, specifically, that a plan or method to search a vehicle involving multiple search personnel had not been developed prior to this event.
The root cause team also determined that several process barriers were inadequate and contributed to the event:
. Inadequate procedure - Fermi 2 Conduct Manual Procedure MGA09, " Access Control," did not include adequate guidance for vehicle searches when multiple security personnel are required to complete the search. ,
NRC FORM 366A (61998)
NRC FORM 366 A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSloN j (6 1998) 1 LICENBEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
NUMBER (2)
YEAR SE " " "
NU BE Nt ER Fermi 2 05000341 99 -S01- 00 4 OF 6 i j
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) j i
Inadequate communication - Pertinent information regarding the status of the vehicle search among the security search personnel was not discussed prior to, during, or after completion of the vehicle search.
. Inadequate training - Multiple personnel searching a vehicle is not adequately addressed in initial, continuing, or requalification security training.
. Management expectations - Communication of what the expectations for responsibilities during vehicle searches involving multiple personnel were not clear, were confusing, and not understood. For example, the VSO has responsibility for signing the Vehicle Gate Log, but it is not clear if this signature is used to indicate vehicle arrival at the gate or if the VSO is responsible for conducting and overseeing that an l adequate vehicle search has been performed. l l
. Inadequate immediate supervision -Immediate supervision was inadequate during the evolution and du l not ensure teamwork in performing the search satisfactory. For example, confusion existed regardir.g l supervisory responsibilities of the RFS while he was performing hands-on training during the search. '
ANAYSIS OF THE EVENT:
This event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. Although, the weapon was introduced undetected into the Protected Area, the vehicle containing the weapon and the contractor personnel were continuously escorted by an armed security officer. There is no indication of malevolent intent. Upon discovery of the weapon, the contractor immediately backed away from the weapon, and informed the esconing security officer, who took immediate control of the discovered weapon. The contractor personnel fully cooperated with the Security Force and offsite authorities.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
A. Immediate Corrective Actions:
Security declared a Security Alert at 0828 hours0.00958 days <br />0.23 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15054e-4 months <br /> on September 22,1999 because the weapon was discovered inside the Protected Area. A Detroit Edison Property Record was completed and the weapon and ammunition were stored and locked in the Security Armory until the weapon was turned over to the Monroe County Sheriff's NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)
NRC FOHM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
NUMBER (2)
NU BE NU B R Fermi 2 05000341 99 -S01- 00 i 5 OF 6 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Department at approximately 0923 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00153 weeks <br />3.512015e-4 months <br /> on Sepember 22,1999. A check of the weapon's serial number was conducted by the Sheriff's Department and determined that the weapon was not stolen or registered to anyone in the State of Michigan. The contractors were then escorted back to the truck for out processing and left the Protected Area at approximately 1123 hours0.013 days <br />0.312 hours <br />0.00186 weeks <br />4.273015e-4 months <br />. The Sheriff's Department turned over the weapon to the Michigan l State Police for further investigation. The contractors accompanied the Sheriff's deputy to the Sheriff's i Department where they were fingerprinted for comparison purposes to any prints that may be found on the l weapon and released.
This incident was discussed during Security Department human performance stand down meetings, which w cre !
held on September 24 and 27,1999. A remedial training program for security personnel was developed for vehicle search techniques. This training was conducted for all security shift personnel. The remaining security support personnel (i.e., management personnel) who are also certified to perform Watchperson duties, but typically do not perform vehicle searches on a regular basis, will be trained prior to performing vehicle search duties, i
B. Long-Term Corrective Actions:
The General Supervisor, Security Operations distributed a memorandum on October 21,1999, outlining the responsibilities and management expectations associated with the performance of vehicle search duties. During ;
any vehicle search, the officer who has been assigned as the VSO has responsibility for ensuring that all areas of the vehicle are searchei When the VSO initials the Vehicle Gate Log, the VSO is indicating that he/she has performed or coordinated the search of the vehicle,in accordance with Conduct Manual Procedure MGA09.
With regard to clarifying management expectation of the level of supervisory oversight during vehicle search activities, the Security Shift Supervisor's Activity Log contains an entry that requires a time to be entered.
Entering a time for this activity indicates that an SSS/RFS is present in the trucklock and is observing a vehicle search from initiation through completion. This memorandum also included an increased frequency of training drills conducted on vehicle searches.
Conduct Manual Procedure MGA09, " Access Control," will be revised to include guidance for vehicle searches when multiple security personnel are required to complete the search. Included in the revision will be guidance to conduct a " pre-job briefing" prior to search activities that will involve more than one person. Also included will be a self-checking or peer checking mechanism, to ensure all steps have been completed. Procedure MGA09 will be revised by December 10,1999.
Security Training Lesson Plans and Critical Task Certification Questions will be developed and/or revised to include " team" searches of vehicles. Training of all personnel in the department who are task certified to the position of Watchperson will be completed by December 31,1999.
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REIULATORY COMMISSION a
(6 1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILMY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGt! (3)
NUMBER (2)
YEAR REV SiON SEggT AL Farrni 2 05000341 99 -S01- 00 6 OF 6 TEXT (11more space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
A. Failed Components None B. Previous Similar Events On September 18,1996 a semi-tractor / trailer rig entered the trucklock for processing into the Protected Area and a VSO discovered an unloaded handgun with ammunition during the search. Search procedures and practices were effective in this event because the weapon was discovered before access was granted into the Protected Area. The cause of the event was determined to be that the driver did not declare possession of any prohibited items. The corrective action included placing a sign in the tmcklock area that informs visitors that a vehicle search will be performed and requires visitors to declare any known prohibited items. However, this corrective action would not have prevented the September 22,1999 incident from occurring because the contractors were unaware of the presence of the weapon on the vehicle.
)
NRC FORM 366A (6-1998)